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National Intelligence Uniyersity
Spring2017
MS!-685-001 Russia: Geostrategic Issues
A New Face for Russia: Alexei Navalny and the Evolution of Narratives of Opposition
Submitted by
27 April 2017
Djsclairner The views and opinions expressed herein arc those of the author, alone, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Conununity, or the U.S. Government. Follo\ving the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia entered a decade of political, ..... ~~~' economic, and social chaos from which the country struggled to recover. President Vladimir
Putin's ability to create a perception that he was leading a return to ?rder, prosperity, and
greatness for Russia has enhanced his popularity and fostered the idea among Russians that the .,J-~., J,. cowitry's polilical system cannot and should not change. Under the veneer of stability and
economic growth, Putin and his allies have perpetuated a political system that rests not only on 4·~ -r... 7 . . ,·, repression, but on depriving the people of any.political alternatives.1 Putin has systematically
labeled Russians who oppose his regime as foreign agents and traitors, while resorting to legal r ~m~~· prosec~~on, and a_!: ti~:_s outrig~:~~ation to prevent the emergence of a unified opposition.- 2 As a younger generation of Russians comes of age in a time of social media and enhanced interconnectivity, however, it is not clear that Putin will be able to maintain this degree
/ df ~o1iol. The rise of Alexei .Navalny from anti-corruption activist and blogger to de facto
leader of the opposition is a sign of the inherent weakness of Putin's regime, but also of the (.,,,.._ jt),,.,11..;~~ unique path that any move toward full democracy in Russia would talce. q~ ~IA-p.. ,O? 117 • Navalny is a uniquely Russian figure, who is difficult to categorize not only along the c o..-Y~ r.,/--{ traditional Western political spectrum, but even within Russia itself. When asked in a survey in
the fall of 2014 whether they >Vould characterize Navalny as a democrat, nationalist, liberal,
corruption hunter, or a demagogue almost half of Russians responded ' 1none of the above."J
Perhaps reflecting the distrust in political figures bred by years of corruption, when asked in the
same survey >Vhether Navalny was trustworthy, 1nost respondents ans\vered no.4 Despite the
expression of distrus~ it is impossible to deny that Navalny has affected the Russian political
scene. His exposes of corruption are frequently inarked by "a sardonic sense of humor that is
ideal for puncturing the propaganda of the grey and humorless Kremlin. "s In contrast to many
1 other figures of the traditional liberal opposition, Navalny is a "genuine populist" who is not an ,e~ '"1 ·' ..£,,..., 4.? oligarch, hac; not fled the country, and has actual grassroots support.6 This ability to identify with
the people and stir up support at the local level is vital for the opposition, which exists in an '1 e...r ~ asymmetric relationship with a regime that controls all instruments of state power including the
media. 7 It is curious that up to this point the Kremlin has allowed Navalny to continue his C-A-.'1 ,':J,.. /tr;J ) activism when so many other opposition figures have found themselves in prison, exile, or dead.8
Whatever the reason for his survival so far, as long as he is free Navalny will likely continue his
campaign for reform in Russia.
Alexei Navalny was born on June 4, 1976 in the Batyun area of Moscow. He obtained a {..Al<.< : (",,.;n·M!. (p~t... ::> law degree from the Friendship of the Peoples University in 1998 and started his political career ~,t.1t..{ in the liberal--·----·- Yabloko party. He began his anti-corruption activities by becoming a minority shareholder in multiple oil companies, banks, and government ministries which allowed him to
investigate these organizations from within and publish his findings on his blogs and website.9 In 2009 a colleague from Yabloko who had been,, appointed regional governor of Kirov asked Navalny to be his adviser, \Vhich allowed the young activist to oversee the state-owned forestry
company Kirovles.10 Around this time, Navalny worked to organize demonstrations before the
~~1 Duma election~, which resulted in his arrest during one of the protests on December 5, £,.J \ ~ rY"' ,/ tc ~pJ.,"1 I 2011.11 At the time of this arrest, he had just published an expose of Alexander Bastry~n, the head of the Russian [nvestigate Committee who had foreign business ties in the Czech Republic.
\Vhen brought before the court, Nav~ny \Vas charged with embezz1ing .fimds from Kirovles,
which seemed to be a thinly disguised attempt to damage his reputation as an anti-corruption
activist by linking him to corruption.12 The prosecution was unable to produce any witnesses
that would corroborate the story that Navalny had engaged in embezzlement at K.irovles, so it
2 .:;'·' a,/.~.r( resorted to making accusations tbat he -.vas 1'an American spy', and had been colluding with
foreign interests. 13 The guilty verdict was a foregone conclusion, but Navalny nveeted live
during the three hour reading of his sentence and rallied thousands of supporters to march toward
the Kremlin, demanding his release. 14
Following hls release from prison, Navalny began planning to contest the 2013 Moscow ,.,' >'· ~yoralty election. By this time, the Kremlin was under pressure domestically and .' ...• internationally for the manipulation of the 2011 Dwna election that had resulted in the largest
~: demonstrations in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. The decision to call for a snap /t election for Moscow mayor in 2013 was likely an attempt to demonstrate that regime backed .eA ' candidates could win in reasonably clean ele~tions and to reinforce the message that there were
1 no viable alternatives to the current system in the divided opposition. !i To avoid the perception
of overt manipulation of the vote, the Kremlin atte1npted more subtle methods like sending
incUffibent candidate Sergei Sobyanin.16 This did not mean that the result was ever in doubt,
which was confirmed when a letter congratulating Sobyanin on his victory appeared on the '· ~mlin website a month before any votes were cast, claimin~ that Sobyanin bad garnered 74%
of the vote~%. When the votes \Vere actually cast, Navalny won an unexpected
27% of the vote while Sobyanin won just over 51%, enough to avoid a mandatory runoff.17
Despite opposition protests, Sobyanin was quickly confinned as mayor and Navalny faced
prosecution yet again. 1"his time the authorities arrested not only Navalny, but his brother as well,
\Vhich Alexei denounced as the Kremlin "taking hostages."18
The 201'3 Moscow mayor elec1ion showed that the Putin regime is not invincible, even
\Vith the help of fraudulent electoral tactics and intimidation. Despite this progress, however, the
3 opposition .remained as divided as ever following the vote, with factions breaking off and
forming ever smaller splinter parties and groups that the Kremlin could target. i9 This
factionalism, along with the political and economic tumult of the 1990s, causes the Russian
population to view the democratic opposition \Vith suspicion, and to associate democracy \Vith 7e..r- ,,,.,[ -1> e,.1 1,,,,c fti.r-fU./JU.- the poor living conditions of the YelUiin years.20 Navalny has turned this legacy of failure around
not by trying to wiite the disparate factions of the opposition, but by sho,ving that discontent can
be channeled into political action and votes, even if there have not been enough votes yet to alter
,i,..~ -fl the system. 21 The mayoral campaign was the first test of a new campaign style, centered on '1J. ;7,1;rJ "broad public exposure, wide use of social media techniques, and far-reaching involvement of ,; ""'I ht.'v. ~ volunteers."22 This was the first political campaign conducted in Russia in a modem, Western
style1 which Navalny credits to the time he spent in tl1e United States in 2010 as a fello\v at
Yale.23 __,,- ~ The effect of newer campaign methods would be impossible \Vithout shifts in the Russian
electorate itself. Navalny notes that his rise to political prominence has coincided with the
coming of age of 'vhat be refers to as the "generation of 76-82. "24 This generation were born at
the end of the Brezhnev era, and spent thejr young adulthood in the aftermath of the collapse of
the Soviet Union. Their frrst memories are of glasnost and perestroika; they did not learn to see
the world through a prism of inevitable confrontation bet\veen East and West. They are old
enough to have traveled abroad and become mature, but yowig enough that they are still active
online where Navalny can reach 1hem with liis blogs and videos.25 The impact of new technology
on these voters cannot be overstated. Oates argues t11at technology in and of itself is not
liberating, which is illustrated by state control of 1elevisioJ1 and radio stations. TI1e internet,
however, creates the potential for an ••engaged audience" that responds to what it sees and
4 creates its own content 1'11e shift from passivity to activism has fueled the rise of this grass roots
opposition and begun to pose a threat to the Putin regime. 26 Navalny has alluded to this
phenomenon, \Vhen he argued that what he is promoting is not a debate between good and evil,
but a debate between good and "neutrality."27 The first period of glasnost led to the fall of the
Soviet system, not because the Soviet people valued f1eedom of the press, but because
fragmented elites took advantage of the new media environment to spread competing
messages. 28 The sudden surge in messages that undennined the illusion of stability and
competence the Communist Party had cultivated for 70 years meant that "\vhat glasnost did was / -ey; 1c.:.... l ruin the fayade of an effective state."29 Putin's success at providing a unified regime message in
the media has been crucial to the suppression of alternate voices, but it is unlikely he will be able
to maintain this degree of control as new media technologies continue to proliferate in Russia. ---·--·····------The final piece of Navalny's success is the nationalist appeal he has united to modem
political campaign tactics and nev.• technology. Throughout the 1990s and into the Putin era, a UJ.y .=- perception has persisted that liberal democracy is anti-Russian because it is anti-nationalist.30
Russian nationalism, even in the Soviet period, was not traditionally democratic. The famous
dissident Alexallder Solzhenitsyn was skeptical of democrac:y and surprised American audiences
'vhen he would criticize the system which had taken him in during his exile. When the Soviet
Union fell, Russian nationalism remained statist in its orientation, continuing the long legacy of
identifying the Russian state with fue nation.31 The great dilemma of the Soviet collapse for
Russian nationalists centered on the reality that while the other nationalities in the Soviet Union
achieved the goal of separate nation-states, many Russian nationalists had identified with the
Soviet Union. They now felt like they had lost their home and not gained a nation-state of their
32 o\vn. While some flirted with notions of Eurasianism1 the majority of Russian nationalists have
5 gravitaled toward a more traditional European understanding of nationalism, recalling fuat in the
first wave of democratization in the 19th century it was nationalists who fought for the right to
self-determination.33 It is ironic that Russian nationalists have decided to emulate old European
models of nationalism at the moment when the Europeans are struggling with notions of
nationalism and identity with the crisis over the future of the European Union and migration.
Nevertheless, Navalny's effort to fuse traditional Russian nationalism with liberalism and J'\..,ol- ~ democracy can be interpreted as trying to give the latter concepts Russian ''Toots."34 It is worth
recalling that Navalny began his political career in Yabloko, the Russian center-left liberal party,
but he \Vas expelled from the party in 2007 for his nationalist tendencies.3s After he was expelled
from Yabloko, Navalny founded a party called the National Russian Liberation Movement
(NAROD) which promoted the interests of ethnic Rrnsians (ruskif) against those of Russian
natia:aTs~~~~iliif;li He has continued to work with and pr~rnote nationalist causes, which has
rai~erns among some liberals in Russia and abroad that his populism is too close to
C.-··1'85cism. When asked to comment on the presence of skinheads and other extreme right groups at
the an nu.al Russian March, Navalny said, "If we disregard those isolated individuals who shout
'Sieg f{iel!' the marches reflect the real agenda of very many people."37· Despite worrying
statements like this, Navalny opposed the annexation of Crimea in 2014 unlike many Russian
1 > nationalists. While recognizing that Khrushchev's cession of Critnea to Ukraine was arbitrary, ,Jll\..l"lv""1 p;IY'V.. Navalny held that borders cannot be changed by force, and that if Russia is going to condemn c ,l1 tJ,fl~ interventions' like the NATO campaign in Kosovo in the 1990s, it is hypocritical for Russia to do
the same in Crimea. }le also remarked that as Russia had promised to respect Ukrainian
territorial integrity in the Budapest Accord of 1994, ",vhen Russia bas given her word, it ought to
mean something.n33
6 .,
When asked to explain these contradictions in interviews, Navalny often gets annoyed
and changes the subject. Laruelle posits that this is because Navalny is a "doer, not a thinker."39
Tue effort to fuse the apparent contradictions between liberalism, democracy, and nationalism is w L. ~' ;:1 ..ff-, t- ; not based in any coherent ideology, but in a unique Russian world.view. In this, Navalny joins
the larger Russian trend in the post-Soviet era of shunning formal ideology which includes Putin,
who also has rejected efforts to formalize an ideology for his regime. This js understandable ,. ., .. given the Russian people's 70-year history of ideological indoctrination under communism, but •" "•• it does not mean that certain ideas are not central. The subordination of the individual to the
- consistently championed majority rule and liberal values like transparency, accountability, and ::. .·:.. fair elections. I:Ie has not, ho,vever, championed the classic individual .liberal rights of free , --·- -- ~ µ,;,Lf speech, tolerance, or equality when they 'vould threaten the position of ethnic Russians.40 While ~s may put him ou1side the Western mainstream, be is finnly within the Russian tradition and in recent years there has been a mutual rapproche1nent between ;Russian liberals who have accepted nationalist arguments and nationalists who have begun to distance themselves from statism.41 In this, Navalny serves as a strOng caution to Western observers and policy makers .,· who imagine ~at Putin is the problem in Russian-Western relations. Many of Putin's policies, such as interventions in the domestic affairs of Russia's neighbors, h~ve been designed to appeal to nationalists. A democratic nationalist government in Russia, whether led by Navalny or not, might not behave as differently as some in the \Vest would hope. The fact that the Kremlin does not seem to !mow what to do about Navalny highlights ho'v much things have changed in Russia. If he is silenced .through imprisonment or 7 assassll1ation, it would only make him a martyr. If he is allo\Ved to remain free, he Vlill continue to spread his message and contribute to the perception that Putin's regime is corrupt and incompetent. 42 The recent viral 'video attacking Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev for his mansions, yachts, vineyards, and shopping habits is an example of the effect Navalny is capable of producing. As of this writing, the video had been viewed over 14 million times, and demonstrates Navalny's tactical sense in choosing to attack the much less popular prime minister over Putin himself.43 At the moment, the lack of action against Navalny implies Putin must see some advantage to not eliminating him. It could be that Putin is trying to coopt Navalny' s anti- corruption message which resonates so strongly \vith the people. Navalny also served as a useful yrat to give the Moscow mayoralty election some legitimacy, and perhaps Putin assumes he will be able to destroy Navalny's reputation at a time of his choosing \vi th more corruption charges or accusations that he is a fascist or anti-Semite. 44 This represents a dangerous calculation on Putin's part, as it assumes the Kremlin \vill maintain its control over the messages received by the population. Putin's popularity has suffered in the cities as the social contract he offered based on economic growth and a return to great power status has broken down under the effect of falling energy prices, sanctions, and international condemnation. Opinion polls showed that while 74% of Russians would have supported an all-out war with Ukraine in 20141 that number ~ fallen to 44% a ~l:t:r.45 It is not likely that those values have improved as conditions continue to worsen for Russians. Even ift11ey do ainong older Russians, younger generations are not as supportive of the adventurism and conseniative values the Kremlin has used in the past to increase its support, and they are the most receppve to Naval11y's online activism. 46 Putin's 8 refusal to even speak Navalny's name publicly is the greatest sign that \Vhatever rhetoric the regime may deploy, this blogger has begun to raise concerns in the Kremlin.47 Alexei Navalny is a unique figure in Russia's contemporary history, rising from online activism to be the voice of the opposition to Putin's regime. While it may be tempting to project Western values onto him and the movement he has helped foster, it would be a mistake to ignore the complexity and contradictory nature of his views. He is no liberal democrat, but it would be a bigger mistake to accept the Kremlin's propaganda that he is some sort of Nazi sympathizer.48 He has proven to be a master of choosing the right message to appeal to the disenchanted masses of Russians who are tired of their country's corruption. In this, he has been shrewder than many liberals of the previous generation, 'vho attacked Putin based on an anti-authoritarian or anti- imperialist critique.49 In a couiltzy where the myth of the "good Tsar" has always held sway, vp;;;haps it is enough to convince the people that P.utin is not a good Tsar to begin the process of democratic reform. Marc Bennet described Navalny as ' 1a liberal kind of guy with an undisguised nationalist tendency. Navalny is confusing, contradictory, and at times, unsavory, but his talent /j,,._, ,,,,.__ ft-<_ ,__,_,,_ ""-JJ'"'-L j ;._!~ ? for tapping into discontent and giving it a voice is unparalleled.1150 Perhaps the best way to understand Navalny is found in his closing statement during his embezzlement trial: "I think that no one of us has the right to neutrality. Every time someone thinks, 'Why don't I step aside and wait?' he only helps this disgusting feudal regime, that; like a spider is sitting in the Kremlin. 1-Ie helps these hundred families, which are sucking from all of Russia. He helps them to put the Russian people on the path of degradation and drinking to death, and to take away all of the national wealth from the country."51 The passion Navalny brings to the fight against corruption in Russia has. stirred the possibility that change might come to Russia through the idea tha~ neutrality is no longer an ~ption. If his biogs and videos continue to gain popularity and motivate ordinary Russians to take a side, it is difficult to see how Putin can maintain power in the long run. 9 Notes 1 Vladimir Kara-Mur:za, "Politics in Russia: The Kremlin's Troubles," World Affairs 176, no. 5 (January/February 2014): 47. 2 Simon Shuster, "Empire of Fear," Ti1nc, March23, 2015, 36-39. l Gcir Flikke1 "Canaries in a Coal Mine: The Uphill Struggle of Russia's Non-Syste1n Liberals," Demokrotizatsiya24, no. 3 (Summer2016): 307. 4 lbid. 'Gary Kasparov, "The Soul-and Teeth-of Russia's Opposition," Tin1e, April 30, 2012, 96. 6 David Klion, "Navalny Sentencing Exposes the Kremlin's Weakness: Corruption," World Politics Review Trend Lines, January 5, 2015, I. 7 Flikkc, 292-293. 5 Frida Ghitis, "The Latest Kremlin !1-Iystery: \Vhy is Alcxey Navalny Still Free in Putin's Russia?" World Politics Review, March 30, 2017, 1-2. 'BBC, "Alexei Navalny: Russia's Vociferous Opposition Leader," February 8, 2017, accessed April 25, 2017, bttp://WW\v.bbc.com/ne\Vs/\Vorld-europe-16057045, 10 Michael Weiss, "Navalny and the Opposition," H'orld Affairs 176, no4 (November/December2013): 73- 74. 11 BBC, "Alexei Navalny." 11 Weiss, 73-74. IJ Ibid., 75. 14 Ibid., 76. 15 Kara-Murza, 48. IG Ibid., 49-50. 17 Weiss, 76, JS Ghitis, 3. 1 ~ Flikke, 303-304. 20 PalKolst0, "Russia's Nationalists Flirt with Democracy," Journal ofDe1nocracy25, no.3 (July2014): 120. :II Kara-Murza, 4748. 22 Flikkc, 295. 23 Kara-Murza, Sl-52. 10 ·' -~ 24 Sin1on Shuster, "Can This Man Save Russia?" Tinie, Ja.nuazy 30, 2012, 34-37. 25 Ibid. :::t. Sarah Oa1es, "Glasnost2.0," Demokratizatsi)•a22, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 279-280. ... 17 Flikke, 298. lS Oates, 281-282. 23 lbid., 283. ; 3°Kolsta, 128. JI Ibid., 122-123. 1 ' lbid., 124. Jl Ibid., 125. :1<1 Flikke, 296-297. 15 KolsW, 120. -~ 36 lbid., 128-129 37 lbid., 129. 31 Ibid., IJI-132, .•. 39 MarlcneLaruellc, "Alexei Navalny and Challenges in Reconciling 'Nationalism' a11d 'Liberalism,"' Post.SavletAJ!airs30, no.4 (January 31, 2014): 279. -II) Ibid., 290. :, .> ' 1 Kolstu, 120-121. 2 "' Oates, 290. ~ 1 Ghitis, 2. 4' Ibid., 4. •s Shuster, ''Empire ofFear," 39. 46 Klion, 1. 7 ' Kara-Murza, 54. 41 Laruclle, 278. :-; ·=~- so Marc Bennet, Kicking the Krer11lin: RtLfsia's Neiv Dissidents and the Battle ta Topple Putin (London: One World Publications, 2014), 84. 11 51 Weiss, 75. Bibliography BBC.Alexei Navalny: Russia's Vociferous Opposition Leader. February 8, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/oewslworld-europe-16057045 (accessed April 25, 2017). Bennet, Marc. Kicking tl1e Kremlin: Russia's New Dissidents and the Battle to Topple Putin. London: One World Publications, 2014. 11 11 Flikke1 Geir. Canaries in a Coal Mine: The Uphill Struggle of Russia's Non-System Liberals. Demokratizatsiya 24, no. 3 (Swruner2016): 291-325. Ghitis, Frida. 11 The Latest Kremlin Mystery: Why is Alexey Navalny Still Free in Putin's Russia" IYorld Politics Revie1v, March 30, 2017: 1-4. Kara-Murza., Vladimir. "Politics in Russia: The Kremlin's Troubles. 11 World Affairs 176, no. 5 (January/February 2014): 47-54. Kasparov, Gary. "The Soul-and Teeth--ofRussia1s Opposition. 11 Time, April 30, 2012: 96. Klion, David. nNavalny Sentencing Exposes the Kremlin1s Weakness: Corruption. 11 World Politics Revie1v Trend Lines, January l, 2015: 1. Kolst0, Pal. 11 Russia1s Nationalists Flirt witl1 Democracy." Joun1al ofDe1nocracy 25, no. 3 (July 2014): 120-134. Laruelle, Marlene. 11 .filexei Navalny and Challenges in Reconciling 1Nationalism1 and 'Liberalism'." Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 4 (January 2014): 276-297. Oates, Sarah. 11 Glasnost 2.0." De1nokratizatsiya 22, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 277-293. Shuster, Simon. 11 Can This Man Save Russia?" Time, January 30, 2012: 34-37. 11 11 -. Empire ofFear. Ti1ne, March23, 2015: 36-39. Weiss, Michael. 11Navlany and the Opposition. 11 World Affairs 176, no. 4 (November/December 2013): 72-80. 12 Na1ional ln1clliscncc University frhe Russian Federation'sAddendum Nalion['l=S='='=""=·1=y~S=tra=\e:gy:::.: ------~::!~~!l'.~!!;:'~!::J~~~~~~ Commonllld {JAS1): WcUd011•;.)'lludid1111 c.:ccUcntjob summ.mziiis an adVCJ$1l)''$ nation.al. sccuriiy sttatcgy. You were able la present the argument from the appropriall: pc:rspcctivc without conunitting the projcctiOll biu. These ""'tho skills n=s:iry in a good iiltclligr;m:c officer. Paper grade: 25/lS Picscntationgradc: IOIJO Track 23 l3Sl 409 - Intelligence and National Security Strategy November I I, 2016 In order to 1neet the challenges presented by the current geopolitical environment, the Russian Federation (RFN) must rely on existing 1neans \\•ith improved methods of execution. The complexity and volume of current challenges demands innovative responses. NATO continues its aggressive nnd provocative behaviors by the proliferation ofa 'missile defense shield' that is currently being positioned on the perin1eter of the Russinn-larnkn!l551andmnss, threatening the strategic balance ofpo11'Cr that has largely kept the 1vorld al peace for over 70 years. Corruption, drug use, and illicit activities in the infonnation space threaten the very fabric of our society. Finally and perhaps most importantly. sanctions in1poscd by several countries seek to cripple the Russian t!conomy in order to foment domestic discontcnl and anger. The uncertainty of the current prcdicmncnt can be successfully addressed through intelligent approaches to conflict resolution. The cnrichn1cnt of Russian intcmational prestige requires the utiliwtion of the strongest elements ofnationnl power. 111c efficacy and innucnce of Russion aeti\'ities in the infonnation sphere is unparalleled; this is to he expected \1·hcn truth is 1hc mcssnge. Our \\·calth of natural resources including pc:!lroleum and natural gas cement Russia's standing as an indispensnble \vorld po\\·er. The Russian Federation Anned Forces bra\'ely exemplify Russian strength and values, helping to 1naint11in peace, stnbility, and security at hon1c and abroad, \Vi th a en lib rated and S)TICrgistic approach. Russia '"ill counter the current and future thrcals to the ~lothcrlund. The proliferation of the ballistic missile defense (DMD) by the U.S. and NATO directly challenges the balance of stability in the \\-C>rld. Agreements to station portions of the BMD system by fonner allies Poland and Romania ure incongruent with historical international relation.{ The RussiM Ministry of Foreign AITairs should seek direct bilaterul engugcmcnts \Vi th .--{ Commontod {JAS2J: How so? these countries. Engagemenls should center on the objective of effectively co1nmunicating thal cooperation \\•ilh Russia \viii be more beneficial than confrontation. Russian gas currently accounts for 50% of Polish consumption. 1 Leveraging our long term agree men IS and shared in\·estmcnts should be explored as a stnrting point of acquiring Polish coopemlion concerning the 13MD equities currently being established in Redziko\vo. Nego1iation efforts \vith the Polish government should cmphnsi7.e 1he current Nord Stream II gas pipeline project \vith Germany that completely bypasses Poland. Eastern Europe and especially Poland have reacted very sensitively to this projcct.l Recently Poland has signaled that it \vill not rcm:1\· energy contracts that expire in 2022.1 Poland is optimistic that its nc1\• liquclied nalural gas port 11•i1\ be oper.itional by the time the contracls expire.~ Whether or not this facility 1vill be operational nnd ready to meet the demand in lhc absence of Russian gas imports is an open question. However, Poland's current belligerent mindset should not be factor into our negotiations. Our coun1rics have a long-standing history of economic coopcra1ion. 11011-evcr, our re: la lions \Vi th Ro111nnin arc far less mutually sntisl):ing. Relations 1vith Romania rcn1ain a challenge. ·111is is \1'hcre opportunities must be created in order to achieve our national strategic objectives. Generating a 1ailorcd information campaign that illustrates the bcncfi!S of cxis1ing peacefully 1vith Russia should be explored. The lack or cohesion amongst NATO members amid the absolute f.iilurcs or Afghanistan and Iraq is a perfect example of American rhetoric failing lo make accon1plish stated goals. Instilling a sense of doubt amongst the Romanian populace 1hat questions the \Visdon1 of1heir leaders should not 1 G;iiprom. -E>lpon.- 2016, 3CCC5$W No\·cmb<;T 2. 2016, hnp·fl•vww g~1pmmeNt>0ll ntfcnlrpnner,.;oobndJ. : Mcmduh K:ir:i\;ullu~~u. -rou Encrg)• l'oUey Sustained by Fmgi!c Solidarny. Jnd1sp.:nsablc for Eurasian s~urny.- l'RfSAl6. nu. 2 (July 18,20161 107. 'Ai,'tl1cszka Ba!lCC7.ko and Anna Kop.:r ...Poland Aims tu Em! Lung-Term Gas Supplies from Russia Aller 2022.- ~l/,•111.. n. May 31. 2016, accessed November 3. 2016. h11r1/11fi N!lle"" cnmianiclc!u<.,;curpnc·•ummiJ. idllKKCNOY/\.!20J 'Ibid. 2 be a difficult prospect: if the U.S. and NA l'O f.1itcd to e\in1inatc insurgencies, ho\v could NA'I'O possibly defend against a sophisticated military like Russia's'! This outrcnch campnign should also highlight the economic benefits ofmen1bcrship in the Cornn1on\vca1th of Independent Stntcs. Russian gas accounts for approxhnately 20-205o/o ofR01nanian market share, but the expansion ofcurrcnt energy deals \vould be of enhanced benefit to both nations.s Socioccono1nic dcvclopn1en1 is a critical undertaking for the securily oft he RFN. 'lllcre arc several challenges facing our nation today. Corruption \\'ithin our borders is thriving. ·rhe shado\v economy continues to gro\v. This prevalence of depravity encourages illegal mineral extraction, and drug trafficking, Much of this activity is enabled through the exploitation of the information space. 6 Security in the information space is an inscpar.1ble clement of national security. Control and protection of the Russian don1ain arc critical objectives. Developing capabilities to monitor for potential crin1inal activity \Viii protect the RFN in sc,·cral \VU)'S. Illegal mineral extraction is not conducted in a vacuun1. There \Viii be uniquely identifying online activities that can be obscn•ed by entities engaged in this undertaking. Development of algorithms that can systcmatic:illy detect these paltcms of behavior can eventually eliminate the permissibility of illegal n1incr.t1 TCliourcc extruc1ion anti sales. By returning these sales to the proper financial dimute, lhc RFN \\'ill regain billions of rubles in !IL'( revenues. This \\·ill hnvc a direct impact on 1hc prosperity and socioeconomic development for citizens of the RFN. ·n1ough, there arc additional challenges that must be ovcrco1nc. • G:izprnm, MExpon." 2016. accessed NO\'Cmbe1 2, 2016, h!tfflI"~'~'"!!all"nmu_~wr1 ru!cnlp~nn2Klrnmoni:11. • Russi:m Federation. Mni~ //11.1J/(lt1 l'~licro11011's N'1tto11al SecurllJ• StruleJ.."V. M /l.loscow. The Kremlin. December 3t, lOIS. 3 1'he organized flood of illicit drugs to the RFN is verification ofa coordinalcd campaign that seeks to undermine Russian society. Again, the U.S. and NA TO have created a pennissible environn1ent for narcotics from Afghanistan to be trafficked into Russia. TI1is unscrupulott~ tac1ic \Veakcns the civil society and funds terrorists currently thrcalening our military forces deployed in the Near Enst. \Vhile the prospect of curtailing trafficking across the Motherland entirely is an incredibly co111plcx task, identifying enablers of this C0\\11rdly activity can serve ns a starting point in eliminating the threat to our society. Infiltration into trafficking ne\\\'orks by true patriots \viii be required to accomplish this task. Successful infiltration into dntg trafficking nct\vorks can benefit the RFN incredibly. EfTective infiltrnlion can create a seemingly on1nipotent security service that discourages direct soles to Russian citizens. ·n1is \\'ill create a more challenging environment in \Vhich drug supplies destined for Russin arc rerouted to other nearby markets. By steering traffickers to dun1p their poisons upon the markets in Europe. and clse,vhcrc, \Ve fncilitate not only un increase of consumption. but ]o\vcr prices for the co11su1ncrs in Europe due 10 the lock of domestic consumption in the RFN. This \viii reduce profits of traffickers due to the increase oftr.msportotion nnd security cos ls. cvcnlually eliminating incentive to use Russia as a transport hub for illicit activities. By countering the threats of corruption and drug trafficking Russia \\ill send o clear message to the \\'Odd that it stands for ID\\\ order. the protection of its citizens and industries. 111cse campaigns should be carried out in conjunction \vi th a targe1cd information campaign highlighting the changing climate in Russia. Sho\vcosing the protection oflegilimuti: business interests and intolerance for corruption \\'ill 011ract foreign invcs11nen1. Earning the tn1s1 of foreign in\'cstors in this tumultuous period \\ill nlleviu!e the challenges presented by the foolish 4 sanctions in1poscd by certain countries. Na1ions that are unconvinced of the underlying causes of these sanctions can serve as catalysts for others to disregard then1 entirely realizing the vast untapped potential in the RFN. By encouraging business to come to Russia. \\"C can advance our initiatives in education. science, and technological dc\'efopmcnt. Russiri. is trailing behind in technological development. 1l1is is forcing Russian reliance on foreign products. \Vilhout the necessary influ....: of sustained in\•cst1nent into the Russian economy there are fc\v options when considering hO\V to advance our science and technology fields. Given the current fiscally restrictive environ1nent, it is infeasible to begin scientific endeavors from scratch. [Ho\vever, Russian expertise in accessing and acquiring data in the infonnalion space is a core competency and can provide the stimulus for technological brcakthroug . B collcclin • infonnation needs of our scientists. our o rativcs can methodical! · Commorrtod [JAS3J: Thi$ is a po!itc way ofsayini; lhnt gain access to desired information retained on targeted domains. 'Ibis can spare years of research and development, reducing the costs of proliferating nc\\' technologies. Great care should be exercised \\·hen conducting these operations. restricting llCCCSS to those only \Vilh ll strict need-to- kno\\'. \Ve nrc \VC11 a\\'llrC ofthe intelligence activities directed by foreign stales-whicltstntcs. \Vhich present sevcml other security issues.7 Facilitated by foreign entities, either knO\\ingly or unkno\vingly, radical and extremist organizations threaten the Russian people and territory. Non·go\'cmmcntal organizations (NG Os) whose members arc li1tle more than operators of foreign nations. disse1nin11tc violent propaganda that erodes traditional Russian valucs.8 Much of this activity is conducted under the guise of'online activism". By SO\\'ing the anarchic seeds ofmo\·cments like 'color rc\•o\u1ions' ' Russi~n Fcdcm1ion. ~n,~ Ru$$/lm /?~1lcru11011:. !1!ot11JJr11l Sri:11ril)' .'i1ratcJ.:)" •• Moscow. The Kremlin. December 31. 2015. • Russi~n Fi:dcmtlon. -r/u! J/u"I'"' Fi!J~rutm,,:. h'a/1111,.1! Sri:ur/I}' .'>lrut~JI.)·. ··Moscow. The Kremlin. December 31. 201S. 5 lhroughou1 the \\'orid. our adversaries ha\'C invested in a policy of slobal tumull in \vhich they present themselves as 1hc arbiter stability, rushing in to clean up a mess they created. TI1c irresponsible use of communications tcehno!ogics to promote disunity and fear has pro\•cn astonishingly clTectivc. 111c events of the Arab Spring and Ukraine have had a direct and negative impact on Russian national interests and security. By undenvriting separatism in Ukraine, the U.S. has created an area of instability centered bct\vccn Europe and Russia. Preventing this conflict fron1 spreading further demands 1hc implc1ncn1ation ofsc\•cral courses of action. Foreign state actors seek to cause disruption amongst the population of Russia. Through categorical falsification oft he domestic political process. our dcn1ocracy is under attack from multifarious sources. Despite our successes. and perhnps because of our successes in preventing these actors to cause \Vidcsprcad psychological manipulation, the RFN must rcn1ain vigilant and maintain the current course of shaping proper attitudes of the ascendant generation. E.xpanding control over the IlO\\' ofinforrnation is a continuous process that requires increasing authority for Rosko1nnad1.or. Foreign agents involved in the spread of dangerous propaganda must face appropriate fogal action. Shielding the Russian population fron1 the toxic injections of\Vcstem sub\'crsion \\"ill protect the unity of the people, and their trtist in government. 'Jbcsc attacks ngainst the Russian people and our culture should be countered \\ith tnl\h at home and abroad. 'll1e lrulh is that the Russian president enjoys an 83o/a approval rating, 9 opposed to Pfl!sident Obama's 54%. 10 Pcrhaps even n1orc telling is the A1nerican n1edia's propensity to ~Michael Birnbaum, "How to Undcrsland Pulin's Jaw-Droppmgl)' lhl!h Approval Ratmgs." ISU•lll1r~1w1 Past, Man:h 6, 2016, acc.:sscd November J, 2016, hnrr'""")V \\;i 6 openly broadcast such discontent. Their pursuit of objectivity creates opportunities for further truth insertion in to the American medic. The fundamental discontent of the An1crican people is n lesson for Russin to study: \\'Cnk government fosters cynicism in society. This great divide bet1veen the people and their government should be cJ.:plored as a logical cl\amination of U.S. policies to1vards Russia. Planting the seed oftruth in the minds of the young generation can reap a harvest of positive chungc. 11 In supporting the younger generations· quest for truth, Russin should seek to support grassroots 1ncdin initiatives by providing legitimate content for publication. This content should accurately portray American and European political. military, and economic activities across the globe, even ifnol dircc1\y related lo Russian strotcgic objectives. Enhancing the public n1111rcncss of1hcir go1•cmmcnts' actions and repercussions thereof can be contrasted 1vith Russian efforts to restore peace and stability globally. Tite lack of appropriate nnd effccti\'c media regulmions provides ample opportunity to broadcast \Vcstem aggressive activities to their respective audiences. l11is 1vill reinforce and legitimize dontcstic dissatisfaction \Vhilc promoting Russia's reputation abroad. n Conclusion Titerc arc multiple challenges facing the RFN. Russian policy makers must pursue our national strategic objectives through carefully crafted and executed courses of action. Countering lhe eJ.:pansion ofNA'l'O and the evident offensive 11·eaponry of the 'rnissite defense shield' is our top priority. Encouraging regional governments to cooperate 1vith the RFN on ma11crs of energy 11 Paul Gobk, MK11:mlm Prop.:1£:ind3 Exp!oitmi: fi\·¢ Amcric:in Vulnemb11itks. K11illova Says;· -"'"I' Fu~<1bloi:), July t4. 2016, ncCCS$cd November 3. 2016. hnrrllwww ~1nnfnk¢ nrclcnlkrcmlio·nrcp;1g:1nd:1-e~n!m1ing· fi•·c.amqjqn.\ylncmhiliHo;s.k1rillnva.u1V. 11 Edward Luc:i5 and Peter Pomcmnzcv... \\'mmnc the rnrormation \Var." c·enrcrfur H11rtJpc<1n ""''~')· .r/1111(1"1~ (August 2016): 43. 7 and security nre of existential concern and should rccciviJ top priority of our leaders. But \\'C must not ignore the other, less ob\'ious threats to our don1estic security and prosperity. 111\varting lhe corruption that is looting Russia of its natural resources is essential to cultivating a belier business environment. Eradicating corruption sends a clear nicssugc that Russia is a safe place to do business. Attrac1ing invcstn1cnt in Russia \Viii promote socioeconomic development for all Russians. nut \Ve have a responsibility to inhibit the squandering of this increased prosperity of the consumption of narcotic poisons currently inundating our youth. Until this 1ncnnce cnn be eliminated completely. let this be a concern for other nations. Russia must continue to pursue the Jl(acefu\ resolution of connict \Vhcncvcr possible. As stated in our National Security Strategy our goals arc to prevent armed connict and avoiding a nc\Y am1s racc.u By countering and eliminating the threats described in this paper, Russia \Vil[ secure its national strategic interests. 11 Russi~n Pcdcm1ion. ~Tile Rus.<1u11 Fe 8 BIBl.JOGRAPJ-IY Birnbaum. Michael, "Ho1v to Undcrsmnd Putin's Ja11·-Droppingly J-ligh Approval Ratings," ll'ashing1011 Pos1, March 6, 2016, accessed November 3. 2016, hUps://1\'\\'\V. \\'11Shingtonpost.cnm/11'0rld/curnpe/hn1v-tn-unden>tand-putins-ja11•·droppingly• high-approvnl-rntings/2016/03/0Stl 7f5d8f2-d5ba-1 l e5-a65h-587c721 fh231 storv.html. Gazpron1. "Export." 2016. 1\cccsscd Novcn1bcr 2. 2016. hctp:l/11'\l'IY .gazpromexport. ntfcnlpnrtncrs/nolnndl. Gazprom. •·E.xport." 2016. Accessed Novcnibcr 2. 2016. hup://11'\Y\I' .gw.promcxport.rufenlpartncrs/mmnni'Jl. Goble, Paul. "Kremlin Propaganda E.-..:ploiting Five American Vulncr.ibi\i1ics, Kirillova Says." Stop Fake (blog), July 14, 2016. Accessed November 3, 2016. http://11'\1'\v.s1opf.ikc.org/cnlkrcmlin·propngand11-cxplniting-five·american·vulncrnbilities· kirillova-savs/. Knrnkullukiru. lvtcmduh. "Eu Energy Policy Sustained by Fragile Solidnrity, lndispcnsab!c for Eurasian Security." PRIS,\/ 6. no. 2 (July 18. 2016): 107. Lucas, Ed1vard, and Peter Pomeraw:e1'. "\Vinning the lnforntation \Var." Cenler for Europaan Policy 1/11alysis (August 2016). Russian Federation. "l11c Russian Fcderalion's National Security Strategy;· lvtosco11-. ·111c Kremlin. December JI, 2015. 9 Below are the BSI 409 final paper instructions from the syllabus: Final Paper Each student will complete a strategy paper on a topic proposed by the student and agreed to by the instructor. Students will write an executive summary to, or an abbreviated version of, The National Security Strategy of the United States for the year2030. Using the NIC publication, "Global Trends 2030: Alternatives Worlds," students will assume the role of an Administration staffer, drafting the text of the new NSS. Students may choose from any of the scenarios in "2030" and will select two or three forms of national power, explaining how to craft power appropriately in order to meet the scenario's challenges. More guidance will be given in class. This paper not only examines the student's mastery of the course concepts, but also engages their creativity; a sampling of things to come in the BSI Capstone! Papers will be between 2000 and 2500 words and will include a title page, footnotes, and a bibliography. The maximum limit does NOT include the title page and bibliography. Format will adhere to guidance provided in A Manual for Writers, by Kate Turabian. Papers will be evaluated in part on content, organization, adherence to format, style, and citations (footnotes, not end notes, typed and double spaced). Papers are due to the instructor prior to the Week 6 class session. Special circumstances should be brought to the instructor's attention as soon as possible. Students will also be required to present their papers to the class. Briefs are timed and must be between 10-15 minutes long (no more/no less). Briefs are graded in part on educational value, presentation style, presence, and adherence to the standards listed in the syllabus. Briefs should demonstrate the student's ability to analyze a subject, synthesize course concepts, and convey a clear and persuasive message to the audience. Your briefing must: A. Identify and explain your strategy theorist/practitioner's most important concepts, vision, or framework to the strategy and/or intelligence community; B. Identify and explain key contextual factors influencing his vision or framework; C. Discuss how his concepts, strategic vision or framework applies or does not apply today (provide examples). Late papers may be penalized up to 10% for each day late. For my class, I also afforded students the opportunity to write an Executive Summary of the intelligence component of Russia's National Security Strategy. Students were provided the option of selecting either topic for their final paper. The goal was to test students' understanding of the role of intelligence in strategy, but through the lens of an adversary (to help prepare them for their capstone project). IS2 Anderson selected the second option and I thought did quite well. Please advise if there is any additional information I can provide to be of assistance.