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BSI Grading Samples These documents include examples of graded student work and will be used as evidence to present to Middle State Commission on Higher Education for accreditation purposes only. Disclaimer: All statements of analysis or opinion are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, The Department of Defense or any of its components, or the U.S. Government. National Intelligence Uniyersity Spring2017 MS!-685-001 Russia: Geostrategic Issues A New Face for Russia: Alexei Navalny and the Evolution of Narratives of Opposition Submitted by 27 April 2017 Djsclairner The views and opinions expressed herein arc those of the author, alone, and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the National Intelligence University, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Intelligence Conununity, or the U.S. Government. Follo\ving the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia entered a decade of political, ..... ~~~' economic, and social chaos from which the country struggled to recover. President Vladimir Putin's ability to create a perception that he was leading a return to ?rder, prosperity, and greatness for Russia has enhanced his popularity and fostered the idea among Russians that the .,J-~., J,. cowitry's polilical system cannot and should not change. Under the veneer of stability and economic growth, Putin and his allies have perpetuated a political system that rests not only on 4·~ -r... 7 . ,·, repression, but on depriving the people of any.political alternatives.1 Putin has systematically labeled Russians who oppose his regime as foreign agents and traitors, while resorting to legal r ~m~~· prosec~~on, and a_!: ti~:_s outrig~:~~ation to prevent the emergence of a unified opposition.- 2 As a younger generation of Russians comes of age in a time of social media and enhanced interconnectivity, however, it is not clear that Putin will be able to maintain this degree / df ~o1iol. The rise of Alexei .Navalny from anti-corruption activist and blogger to de facto leader of the opposition is a sign of the inherent weakness of Putin's regime, but also of the (.,,,.._ jt),,.,11..;~~ unique path that any move toward full democracy in Russia would talce. q~ ~IA-p.. ,O? 117 • Navalny is a uniquely Russian figure, who is difficult to categorize not only along the c o..-Y~ r.,/--{ traditional Western political spectrum, but even within Russia itself. When asked in a survey in the fall of 2014 whether they >Vould characterize Navalny as a democrat, nationalist, liberal, corruption hunter, or a demagogue almost half of Russians responded ' 1none of the above."J Perhaps reflecting the distrust in political figures bred by years of corruption, when asked in the same survey >Vhether Navalny was trustworthy, 1nost respondents ans\vered no.4 Despite the expression of distrus~ it is impossible to deny that Navalny has affected the Russian political scene. His exposes of corruption are frequently inarked by "a sardonic sense of humor that is ideal for puncturing the propaganda of the grey and humorless Kremlin. "s In contrast to many 1 other figures of the traditional liberal opposition, Navalny is a "genuine populist" who is not an ,e~ '"1 ·' ..£,,..., 4.? oligarch, hac; not fled the country, and has actual grassroots support.6 This ability to identify with the people and stir up support at the local level is vital for the opposition, which exists in an '1 e...r ~ asymmetric relationship with a regime that controls all instruments of state power including the media. 7 It is curious that up to this point the Kremlin has allowed Navalny to continue his C-A-.'1 ,':J,.. /tr;J ) activism when so many other opposition figures have found themselves in prison, exile, or dead.8 Whatever the reason for his survival so far, as long as he is free Navalny will likely continue his campaign for reform in Russia. Alexei Navalny was born on June 4, 1976 in the Batyun area of Moscow. He obtained a {..Al<.< : (",,.;n·M!. (p~t... ::> law degree from the Friendship of the Peoples University in 1998 and started his political career ~,t.1t..{ in the liberal--·----·- Yabloko party. He began his anti-corruption activities by becoming a minority shareholder in multiple oil companies, banks, and government ministries which allowed him to investigate these organizations from within and publish his findings on his blogs and website.9 In 2009 a colleague from Yabloko who had been,, appointed regional governor of Kirov asked Navalny to be his adviser, \Vhich allowed the young activist to oversee the state-owned forestry company Kirovles.10 Around this time, Navalny worked to organize demonstrations before the ~~1 Duma election~, which resulted in his arrest during one of the protests on December 5, £,.J \ ~ rY"' ,/ tc ~pJ.,"1 I 2011.11 At the time of this arrest, he had just published an expose of Alexander Bastry~n, the head of the Russian [nvestigate Committee who had foreign business ties in the Czech Republic. \Vhen brought before the court, Nav~ny \Vas charged with embezz1ing .fimds from Kirovles, which seemed to be a thinly disguised attempt to damage his reputation as an anti-corruption activist by linking him to corruption.12 The prosecution was unable to produce any witnesses that would corroborate the story that Navalny had engaged in embezzlement at K.irovles, so it 2 .:;'·' a,/.~.r( resorted to making accusations tbat he -.vas 1'an American spy', and had been colluding with foreign interests. 13 The guilty verdict was a foregone conclusion, but Navalny nveeted live during the three hour reading of his sentence and rallied thousands of supporters to march toward the Kremlin, demanding his release. 14 Following hls release from prison, Navalny began planning to contest the 2013 Moscow ,.,' >'· ~yoralty election. By this time, the Kremlin was under pressure domestically and .' ...• internationally for the manipulation of the 2011 Dwna election that had resulted in the largest ~: demonstrations in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union. The decision to call for a snap /t election for Moscow mayor in 2013 was likely an attempt to demonstrate that regime backed .eA ' candidates could win in reasonably clean ele~tions and to reinforce the message that there were 1 no viable alternatives to the current system in the divided opposition. !i To avoid the perception of overt manipulation of the vote, the Kremlin atte1npted more subtle methods like sending incUffibent candidate Sergei Sobyanin.16 This did not mean that the result was ever in doubt, which was confirmed when a letter congratulating Sobyanin on his victory appeared on the '· ~mlin website a month before any votes were cast, claimin~ that Sobyanin bad garnered 74% of the vote~%. When the votes \Vere actually cast, Navalny won an unexpected 27% of the vote while Sobyanin won just over 51%, enough to avoid a mandatory runoff.17 Despite opposition protests, Sobyanin was quickly confinned as mayor and Navalny faced prosecution yet again. 1"his time the authorities arrested not only Navalny, but his brother as well, \Vhich Alexei denounced as the Kremlin "taking hostages."18 The 201'3 Moscow mayor elec1ion showed that the Putin regime is not invincible, even \Vith the help of fraudulent electoral tactics and intimidation. Despite this progress, however, the 3 opposition .remained as divided as ever following the vote, with factions breaking off and forming ever smaller splinter parties and groups that the Kremlin could target. i9 This factionalism, along with the political and economic tumult of the 1990s, causes the Russian population to view the democratic opposition \Vith suspicion, and to associate democracy \Vith 7e..r- ,,,.,[ -1> e,.1 1,,,,c fti.r-fU./JU.- the poor living conditions of the YelUiin years.20 Navalny has turned this legacy of failure around not by trying to wiite the disparate factions of the opposition, but by sho,ving that discontent can be channeled into political action and votes, even if there have not been enough votes yet to alter ,i,..~ -fl the system. 21 The mayoral campaign was the first test of a new campaign style, centered on '1J. ;7,1;rJ "broad public exposure, wide use of social media techniques, and far-reaching involvement of ,; ""'I ht.'v. ~ volunteers."22 This was the first political campaign conducted in Russia in a modem, Western style1 which Navalny credits to the time he spent in tl1e United States in 2010 as a fello\v at Yale.23 __,,- ~ The effect of newer campaign methods would be impossible \Vithout shifts in the Russian electorate itself. Navalny notes that his rise to political prominence has coincided with the coming of age of 'vhat be refers to as the "generation of 76-82. "24 This generation were born at the end of the Brezhnev era, and spent thejr young adulthood in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their frrst memories are of glasnost and perestroika; they did not learn to see the world through a prism of inevitable confrontation bet\veen East and West. They are old enough to have traveled abroad and become mature, but yowig enough that they are still active online where Navalny can reach 1hem with liis blogs and videos.25 The impact of new technology on these voters cannot be overstated. Oates argues t11at technology in and of itself is not liberating, which is illustrated by state control of 1elevisioJ1 and radio stations. TI1e internet, however, creates the potential for an ••engaged audience" that responds to what it sees and 4 creates its own content 1'11e shift from passivity to activism has fueled the rise of this grass roots opposition and begun to pose a threat to the Putin regime.
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