DOCSLIB.ORG

TRUTH on the BALLOT Fraudulent News, the Midterm Elections, and Prospects for 2020

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
TRUTH on the BALLOT Fraudulent News, the Midterm Elections, and Prospects for 2020 TRUTH ON THE BALLOT Fraudulent News, the Midterm Elections, and Prospects for 2020 pen.org TRUTH ON THE BALLOT Fraudulent News, the Midterm Elections, and Prospects for 2020 March 13, 2019 ©2019 PEN America. All rights reserved. PEN America stands at the intersection of literature and hu- man rights to protect open expression in the United States and worldwide. We champion the freedom to write, recognizing the power of the word to transform the world. Our mission is to unite writers and their allies to celebrate creative expression and defend the liberties that make it possible. Founded in 1922, PEN America is the largest of more than 100 centers of PEN International. Our strength is in our membership—a nationwide community of more than 7,000 novelists, journalists, poets, es- sayists, playwrights, editors, publishers, translators, agents, and other writing professionals. For more information, visit pen.org. Design by Pettypiece + Co. Cover image: Ligorano/Reese's installation of a 2000 pound ice sculpture called "Truth Be Told" in front of the U.S. Capitol to protest "fake news" in the U.S. (September 21, 2018). Photograph by Sue Abramson. This report was generously funded by CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 Efforts to Combat Fraudulent News 4 Fraudulent News in the 2018 Election Cycle 6 Conclusions and Recommendations 7 INTRODUCTION 8 Overview 9 Why Fraudulent News Is a Free Expression Issue 10 FIGHTING FRAUDULENT NEWS 11 Tech Companies 12 Facebook 13 Twitter 20 Google and YouTube 24 Making Political Ads More Transparent 26 Ad Archives 29 Tech Company Collaboration with U.S. Government Agencies 31 Government Response 33 Political Parties 36 Risks on the Horizon 37 FRAUDULENT NEWS IN THE 2018 MIDTERM ELECTIONS 38 Who Was Responsible: Foreign versus “Domesticated” Disinformation 38 Fraudulent News and Disinformation in the 2018 Election Cycle 41 Candidate Attacks 41 Blurred Boundaries: Disinformation, Satire, and Negative Ads 43 Political Moments and Fraudulent News 44 Voting and Election Day Disinformation 45 RECOMMENDATIONS 48 PEN AMERICA MODEL PLEDGE AGAINST FRAUDULENT NEWS 52 METHODOLOGY AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 53 ENDNOTES 54 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In this report, PEN America examines the steps taken pressures of removing fraudulent information while by technology companies, government actors, and po- also protecting free expression and avoiding the role litical parties to curb the influence of fraudulent news of unaccountable global censor. in the 2018 U.S. midterm elections; examines current Platforms have generally responded with actions in- legislative proposals to regulate political advertising cluding: revisions to their algorithms; partnerships with transparency online; parses the role fraudulent news third-party fact-checkers and other civic initiatives; in- played in the midterm election cycle; and concludes creased transparency regarding their advertisements with recommendations to stakeholders on steps to and advertising policies; new waves of account shut- combat fraudulent news while protecting free ex- downs for non-compliance with Terms and Conditions; pression rights ahead of the 2020 elections. and more active collaboration with political campaigns This report builds on PEN America’s October 2017 and the government to proactively combat fraudulent report, Faking News: Fraudulent News and the Fight news. The question of whether these new efforts have for Truth, which examined how fraudulent news is been successful in stemming the tide of fraudulent eroding truth-based civic discourse and constitutes a news remains unanswered. While several studies have threat to free expression. Then, as now, PEN America encouragingly indicated that these new tactics have defines fraudulent news asdemonstrably false infor- had some success, others argue any self-congratula- mation that is being presented as a factual news re- tion is premature. port with the intention to One key question involves when and how Facebook, Today, the danger is deceive the public. This Twitter, or Google chooses to shut down the account that fraudulent news and report focuses on exam- of a user disseminating fraudulent news or exhibiting disinformation will become ples that meet this defi- behavior indicating the account is ‘inauthentic’. Ac- normalized as unsavory nition and other forms of count shutdowns are widely seen as the most effec- but acceptable campaign disinformation that are tive and direct way to stop purveyors of fraudulent tactics—just another part of presented as truth with information, but as a tactic they also represent the the toolbox of hotly contested the intent to deceive. most significant risk to the free speech of a platform’s modern campaigns. For the average Amer- users. Given these dueling concerns, companies must ican, the 2016 election exercise a remarkable amount of care and consistency cycle represented the frightening debut of fraudu- in both the formulation and the application of their lent news as a malicious contribution to our national criteria for shutting down accounts, and must ensure politics. Today, our society is still struggling with the appeal mechanisms are clear and accessible. implications and consequences of Russia’s 2016 disin- Additionally, tech company collaboration with gov- formation campaign, as well as the efforts of disinfor- ernment actors offers a proactive means for address- mation actors motivated by profit or ideology. Today, ing fraudulent news, but also carries risks to user the danger is that fraudulent news and disinformation privacy and free expression. At a minimum, increased will become normalized as unsavory but acceptable transparency around these initiatives is imperative, campaign tactics—just another part of the toolbox of and social media platforms must be as open as they hotly contested modern campaigns. Given this risk, can with users about what type of information they the threat that fraudulent news poses—not only to our might share with government bodies and how they political processes, but to our shared foundation of decide what to share and when. objective truth—has only grown since 2016, and must PEN America’s report examines the issue of ad be taken seriously as the 2020 election cycle begins. transparency in depth. Google, Twitter, and Facebook all sell political ads, and in 2016 foreign agents used Efforts to Combat Fraudulent News these platforms’ ad services to spread disinforma- Since the fallout from the 2016 elections, technology tion, sow dissension, and suppress voter turnout. In companies have taken a series of steps designed to response, all three companies have created their own blunt the impact of fraudulent news. PEN America’s searchable ad databases, a major effort at increasing report examines the actions of three major platforms: the transparency of advertising on their platforms. Facebook (which additionally owns Instagram), Twit- Even so, critics argue that this is no substitute for leg- ter, and Google (of which YouTube is a subsidiary). islative solutions like the Honest Ads Act or the For All the platforms face the seemingly contradictory the People Act. While PEN America views legislative 4 PEN AMERICA Key Conclusions • Russian disinformation continues to be a • While both human and automated content salient threat to our elections, and Russian review are subject to bias, some combina- agents of disinformation are playing a ‘long tion of the two is likely the most reasonable game’: their focus is not merely on influenc- approach. It is imperative that the platforms ing American electoral processes, but on that host such a vast portion of our political stoking political polarization and sowing discourse supplement their current tools distrust in democracy. with greater numbers of qualified, trained, and sufficiently supported personnel to • In the past two years, experts and observers evaluate content, exercise judgment, and have noted a worrying increase in instances adapt to fast-changing threats. of domestic disinformation, with American political actors utilizing fraudulent news and • Fraudulent news and disinformation in disinformation against political opponents. the 2018 midterm election cycle tended to have one of a few objectives: attacking • Today, perhaps the greatest threat that fraud- individual candidates, dampening turnout ulent news poses is the risk that it will become or stoking distrust in the voting process, a normalized part of U.S. political discourse. or amplifying a desired narrative about There is a real danger that fraudulent news a particular political event. Key exam- may become the new normal: a distasteful, ples of the latter included disinformation but not disqualifying political tactic. regarding the confirmation hearing of Su- preme Court Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh • Technology companies have made signifi- and the contingent of Central American cant efforts to reduce the spread of fraud- migrants that moved towards the U.S. in ulent news, the results of which are mixed: the fall of 2018. while important advances have been made, many efforts remain insufficient, while -oth • During elections, individual candidates, ers have caused new problems. Voluntary political parties, and party committees efforts by technology companies to ensure have a critical and fundamental role in transparency regarding advertisements on protecting the integrity of our civic dis- their platforms have so far proven insuffi- course and the public’s ability to make cient to prevent their manipulation. informed decisions about who will rep-
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Unseal by Raymond Bonner
    Case 1:08-cv-01360-UNA Document 436 Filed 11/07/16 Page 1 of 32 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ZAYN AL ABIDIN MUHAMMAD ) HUSAYN (ISN # 10016), ) ) Petitioner. ) ) v. ) No. 08-CV-1360 ) ASHTON CARTER, ) ) Respondent. ) ) REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO UNSEAL BY RAYMOND BONNER David A. Schulz Hannah Bloch-Wehba Steven Lance (law student intern) Andrew Udelsman (law student intern) Media Freedom & Information Access Clinic Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression Yale Law School P.O. Box 208215 New Haven, CT 06520 Phone: 212-850-6103 Fax: 212-850-6299 Chad Bowman Levine Sullivan Koch & Schulz, LLP 1899 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036 Phone: 202-508-1100 Fax: 202-861-8988 Counsel for Movant Raymond Bonner Case 1:08-cv-01360-UNA Document 436 Filed 11/07/16 Page 2 of 32 TABLE OF CONTENTS PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .................................................................................................... 1 ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 2 I. JUDICIAL RECORDS ARE SUBJECT TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS, EVEN WHEN THEY CONTAIN CLASSIFIED INFORMATION .......... 2 A. Classified Information Is Not Exempt From the Constitutional Access Right ....... 2 1. The government misapplies the “history and logic” test to the content of a record rather than the type of proceeding involved. ............... 2 2. The unilateral Executive authority to seal court records claimed by the government would violate the constitutional separation of powers. ..... 5 B. The Constitutional Standard Must Be Satisfied To Seal A Court Record That Contains Classified Information ..................................................................... 6 1. The Executive’s classification standards do not automatically satisfy the controlling First Amendment standard.
    [Show full text]
  • The Civilian Impact of Drone Strikes
    THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS Acknowledgements This report is the product of a collaboration between the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Civilians in Conflict. At the Columbia Human Rights Clinic, research and authorship includes: Naureen Shah, Acting Director of the Human Rights Clinic and Associate Director of the Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School, Rashmi Chopra, J.D. ‘13, Janine Morna, J.D. ‘12, Chantal Grut, L.L.M. ‘12, Emily Howie, L.L.M. ‘12, Daniel Mule, J.D. ‘13, Zoe Hutchinson, L.L.M. ‘12, Max Abbott, J.D. ‘12. Sarah Holewinski, Executive Director of Center for Civilians in Conflict, led staff from the Center in conceptualization of the report, and additional research and writing, including with Golzar Kheiltash, Erin Osterhaus and Lara Berlin. The report was designed by Marla Keenan of Center for Civilians in Conflict. Liz Lucas of Center for Civilians in Conflict led media outreach with Greta Moseson, pro- gram coordinator at the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law School. The Columbia Human Rights Clinic and the Columbia Human Rights Institute are grateful to the Open Society Foundations and Bullitt Foundation for their financial support of the Institute’s Counterterrorism and Human Rights Project, and to Columbia Law School for its ongoing support. Copyright © 2012 Center for Civilians in Conflict (formerly CIVIC) and Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America. Copies of this report are available for download at: www.civiliansinconflict.org Cover: Shakeel Khan lost his home and members of his family to a drone missile in 2010.
    [Show full text]
  • FAKE NEWS!”: President Trump’S Campaign Against the Media on @Realdonaldtrump and Reactions to It on Twitter
    “FAKE NEWS!”: President Trump’s Campaign Against the Media on @realdonaldtrump and Reactions To It on Twitter A PEORIA Project White Paper Michael Cornfield GWU Graduate School of Political Management [email protected] April 10, 2019 This report was made possible by a generous grant from William Madway. SUMMARY: This white paper examines President Trump’s campaign to fan distrust of the news media (Fox News excepted) through his tweeting of the phrase “Fake News (Media).” The report identifies and illustrates eight delegitimation techniques found in the twenty-five most retweeted Trump tweets containing that phrase between January 1, 2017 and August 31, 2018. The report also looks at direct responses and public reactions to those tweets, as found respectively on the comment thread at @realdonaldtrump and in random samples (N = 2500) of US computer-based tweets containing the term on the days in that time period of his most retweeted “Fake News” tweets. Along with the high percentage of retweets built into this search, the sample exhibits techniques and patterns of response which are identified and illustrated. The main findings: ● The term “fake news” emerged in public usage in October 2016 to describe hoaxes, rumors, and false alarms, primarily in connection with the Trump-Clinton presidential contest and its electoral result. ● President-elect Trump adopted the term, intensified it into “Fake News,” and directed it at “Fake News Media” starting in December 2016-January 2017. 1 ● Subsequently, the term has been used on Twitter largely in relation to Trump tweets that deploy it. In other words, “Fake News” rarely appears on Twitter referring to something other than what Trump is tweeting about.
    [Show full text]
  • Victims' Inclusion and Transitional Justice
    PA-X REPORT: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE SERIES Victims’ Inclusion and Transitional Justice Attending to the Exclusivity of Inclusion Politics Astrid Jamar This research draws on the PA-X Peace Agreement Database (www.peaceagreements.org), a database of all peace agreements at any stage of the peace process from 1990 to 2016. The database is fully searchable and supports both qualitative and quantitative examination of peace agreements. Author: Astrid Jamar Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP) Global Justice Academy School of Law Old College The University of Edinburgh South Bridge Edinburgh EH8 9YL Tel. +44 (0)131 651 4566 Fax. +44 (0)131 650 2005 E-mail: [email protected] www.politicalsettlements.org @PolSettlements Acknowledgements: This research is an output from the Political Settlements Research Programme (PSRP), funded by UK Aid from the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for the benefit of developing countries. The information and views set out in this publication are those of the author. Nothing herein constitutes the views of the Department. Any use of this work should acknowledge the author and the Political Settlements Research Programme. For online use, we ask readers to link to the original resource on the PSRP website. Thanks are due to Harriet Cornell and Jee-Young Song for editorial and production work. ©2018 Contents Executive Summary 01 Key Findings 02 Recommendations 04 Introduction 06 Part I: Existing Research 07 Part II: Global Approaches to Including Victims: The Agenda on Paper 09 Part III: Inclusion in Practice: Burundi Case Study 25 Conclusion 41 01 // Victims’ Inclusion and Transitional Justice Executive Summary This report reviews efforts to include victims in transitional justice programmes, and the difficulties of managing the politics of inclusion in the transitional justice setting.
    [Show full text]
  • Acronym Absurdity Constrains Psychological Science Moin Syed
    Acronym Absurdity 1 Acronym Absurdity Constrains Psychological Science Moin Syed University of Minnesota Version Date: 07/03/20 This essay has not been peer-reviewed and probably never will be Author Note Alternate titles include, “Old Man Yells at Acronyms,” “There is Nothing so Practical as a Good Acronym” and “ABSURD: Acronyms have Become So Unbelievably Ridiculous, Don’t you Think?” If you are an Editor and want to publish this. please direct communications to [email protected]. I am waiting. ************************************* Abbrevobabble is an unacceptable outcome because it belays our primary purpose— clear exposition of facts and ideas. (Kushlan, 1995, p. 3) …it is puzzling why scientists would want to erect barriers to the understanding of their studies by publishing articles with abbreviations that make reading difficult for anyone not intimately familiar with that specific field of inquiry. (Brumback, 2009, p. 1477) Consider this following sentence, which is typical of something that we (social psychologists) might say to a colleague: “Did you read the new PSPB article comparing the accuracy of IATs with the AMP procedure? It is a nice follow up to the JPSP article that came out before SPSP. (Hales et al., 2017) Ok, look, I am obviously not the first person to rail against abbreviations. The three quotes above all come from articles that highlight how abbreviations can obscure meaning and alienate readers. It is classic scholarly “old man yells at clouds” fodder. But in this essay I will focus on a somewhat different issue, what I will call acronym absurdity, which is how a specific type of abbreviations—acronyms—can have the power to constrain discovery and advancement, thereby shaping science in undesirable ways.
    [Show full text]
  • Download Legal Document
    Case 1:04-cv-04151-AKH Document 449 Filed 02/15/11 Page 1 of 44 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, VETERANS FOR COMMON SENSE, DOCKET NO.: 04-CV-4151 (AKH) AND VETERANS FOR PEACE, Plaintiffs, v. Document Electronically Filed DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, AND ITS COMPONENTS DEPARTMENT OF ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF NAVY, DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND ITS COMPONENTS CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND REVIEW, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Defendants. SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CONTEMPT AND SANCTIONS Case 1:04-cv-04151-AKH Document 449 Filed 02/15/11 Page 2 of 44 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF EXHIBITS ...............................................................................................................ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................v INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................1 BACKGROUND...........................................................................................................................3 I. THE INTERROGATION VIDEOTAPES.........................................................................4
    [Show full text]
  • Materials Insupport of H. Res. 24, Impeaching Donald John
    MATERIALS IN SUPPORT OF H. RES. 24, IMPEACHING DONALD JOHN TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS REPORT BY THE MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY Prepared for Chairman Jerrold Nadler U.S. UNITED STATES JANUARY 2021 Majority Staff Amy Rutkin, Chief of Staff Perry Apelbaum , Staff Director and Chief Counsel John Doty, Senior Advisor AaronHiller, Deputy ChiefCounsel David Greengrass , Senior Counsel John Williams, Parliamentarian and Senior Counsel ShadawnReddick-Smith, CommunicationsDirector Moh Sharma, Directorof MemberServices and Outreach & Policy Advisor Arya Hariharan, Deputy ChiefOversightCounsel James Park, ChiefCounselofConstitutionSubcommittee Sarah Istel, Counsel Matthew Morgan, Counsel Madeline Strasser, Chief Clerk William S. Emmons, Legislative Aide Priyanka Mara, Legislative Aide Anthony Valdez, Legislative Aide Jessica Presley , Director of Digital Strategy Kayla Hamedi, Deputy Press Secretary MATERIALS IN SUPPORT OF H. RES. 24 , IMPEACHING DONALD JOHN TRUMP , PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS HOUSEJUDICIARYCOMMITTEE MAJORITYSTAFFREPORT JANUARY 12, 2021 INTRODUCTION 2 FactualBackground 4 A. Conduct Leading Up to January 6, 2021 4 B. The January 6, 2021 “Save America Rally ” 8 C. The Attack on the Capitol 11 D. President Trump’s Response to the Insurrection... 15 E. The Events of January 6th Were a Result of and Incitedby the President's Course of Conduct..... 18 II. The Need for the House to Impeach President Trump 21 A. Standards for Impeachment . 21 B. Application of Impeachment Standards to President Trump's Conduct ...... 22 1. The Article ofImpeachmentCharges an ImpeachableOffense 22 2. President Trump Committed the Charged Impeachable Offense.. 26 3. President Trump's Conduct Harmed Core National Interests ..
    [Show full text]
  • 1.Russian Information Weapons; 2.Baltic Department of Defense, Or the US Defenses (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) Against Government
    Sponsor: USEUCOM Contract No.: W56KGU-17-C-0010 Project No.: 0719S120 The views expressed in this document are those of the author Three Discussions of Russian Concepts: and do not reflect the official policy or position of MITRE, the 1.Russian Information Weapons; 2.Baltic Department of Defense, or the US Defenses (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) against government. Russian Propaganda; and 3.Russia’s Development of Non-Lethal Weapons Author: Timothy Thomas March 2020 Approved for Public Release: Distribution Unlimited. Case Numbers 20-0235; 20-0050; 20-0051; 19-3194; and 20-0145. ©2020 The MITRE Corporation. All rights reserved. McClean, VA 1 FOREWORD Russia has long been captivated by the power of information as a weapon, most notably in a historical sense using propaganda to influence and persuade audiences. With the onset of the information age, the concept’s development and application increased dramatically. The power of information-technologies when applied to weaponry increased the latter’s capabilities due to increased reconnaissance and precision applications. The power of social media was used to influence populations both at home and abroad. Both developments fit perfectly into Russia’s information warfare concept, whose two aspects are information-technical and information-psychological capabilities. Information’s universality, covertness, variety of software and hardware forms and implementation, efficiency of use when choosing a time and place of employment, and, finally, cost effectiveness make it a formidable commodity when assessed as weaponry. Russian efforts to define and use IWes are well documented. In the 1990s there were efforts to define information weapons (IWes) at the United Nations, efforts that failed.
    [Show full text]
  • The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command: Making the Case for Oversight of Military Operations by Christopher J
    STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES 33 The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command: Making the Case for Oversight of Military Operations by Christopher J. Lamb Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is National Defense University’s (NDU’s) dedicated research arm. INSS includes the Center for Strategic Research, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, and Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by conducting research and analysis, publishing, and participating in conferences, policy support, and outreach. The mission of INSS is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified combatant commands in support of the academic programs at NDU and to perform outreach to other U.S. Government agencies and the broader national security community. Cover: General William Westmoreland luncheon meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson, The White House, April 6, 1968 (Yoichi Okamoto/ Courtesy LBJ Presidential Library/C9391-17A) The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command The Micromanagement Myth and Mission Command: Making the Case for Oversight of Military Operations By Christopher J. Lamb Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 33 Series Editor: Thomas F. Lynch III National Defense University Press Washington, D.C. August 2020 Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the State Department, Defense Department, or any other agency of the Federal Government.
    [Show full text]
  • The Afd: What Kind of Alternative for Germany?
    Charles Lees. Dept. of Politics, Languages, and International Studies, University of Bath, UK. Email: [email protected] The AfD: what kind of alternative for Germany? Paper prepared for presentation at PSA 65th Annual International Conference at Sheffield City Hall and Town Hall, 30th March - 1st April 2015. 1 Abstract In the past Germany was considered an outlier in Europe because of the absence of a significant Eurosceptic party. A combination of historical, cultural, and structural factors combined to make Euroscepticism the ‘dark matter’ (Lees, 2002) of the German party system, despite significant levels of unease about aspects of the European integration process amongst the German electorate. In a little over two years the rise of the ‘Alternative for Germany’ (Alternative für Deutschland, or AfD) party has changed this perception. This paper charts the rise of the AfD since its inception in late 2012/early 2013 by drawing on electoral data from the 2013 Federal election and subsequent Land elections and judgmental analysis of the party’s policy positions. It breaks new ground by doing this in a comparative perspective. The paper considers (1) whether the AfD really has the potential to alter the underlying dynamics of German party politics? (2) how can it be classified in relation to other Eurosceptic and/or right-wing populist parties?, and (3) what is the extent to which the AfD’s policy ambitions stretch beyond simple opposition to aspects of the European integration process and to encompass a more profound critique of the elite settlement at the heart of Germany’s consensual political system? Keywords: Germany, AfD, Party Systems, Euroscepticism, Populism.
    [Show full text]
  • Ideology and Atheism in the Soviet Union Religion and Society 28
    Ideology and Atheism in the Soviet Union Religion and Society 28 GENERAL EDITORS Leo Laeyendecker, University of Leiden Jacques Waardenburg, University of Lausanne MOUTON DE GRUYTER • BERLIN • NEW YORK 1989 Ideology and Atheism in the Soviet Union by William van den Bercken MOUTON DE GRUYTER • BERLIN • NEW YORK 1989 Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague) in a Division of Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin. The vignet on the cover this book represents the symbol of the Agathos Daimon, the snake of the Good Spirit, known from Greek astrological and magical texts. As its Town God, the Agathos Daimon was believed to protect Alexandria, which was famous world-wide for its library with precious manuscripts and books. Translated from the Dutch by H.Th.Wake Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Bercken, William Peter van den, 1946- Ideology and atheism in the Soviet Union. (Religion and society ; 28) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Atheism- Soviet Union. 2. Ideology. I. Title. II. Series: Religion and society (Hague, Netherlands); 28. BL2747.3.B47 1988 211'.8'0947 88-28526 ISBN 0-89925-384-9 (alk. paper) Deutsche Bibliothek Cataloging in Publication Data Bercken, William van den: Ideology and atheism in the Soviet Union / William van den Bercken. [Transi, by H.Th.Wake]. - Berlin ; New York : Amsterdam : Mouton de Gruyter, 1988 (Religion and society ; 28) ISBN 3-11-011406-2 NE: GT © Printed on acid free paper. © Copyright 1988 by Walter de Gruyter, Berlin. All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages.No part of this book maybe reproduced in any form - by photoprint, microfilm or any other means - nor transmitted nor translated into a machine language without written permission from the publisher.
    [Show full text]
  • Is This Any Way to Vote?
    IS THIS ANY WAY TO VOTE? Vulnerable Voting Machines and the Mysterious Industry Behind Them CELESTE KATZ MARSTON AND GABRIELLA NOVELLO WhoWhatWhy New York City Copyright © 2020 by WhoWhatWhy All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission from the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. Cover design by Cari Schmoock. Cover art and photo editing by Michael Samuels. Data visualizations by Lizzy Alves. Published in the United States by WhoWhatWhy. eBook ISBN 978-1-7329219-1-7 WhoWhatWhy® is a registered trademark of Real News Project, Inc. CONTENTS Initialisms and Acronyms Used in This Book vi Introduction 1 1. The Voting-Machine Manufacturers 5 2. The Voting Machines 25 3. Voting Machine Accessibility 42 4. Voting Machine Vulnerabilities 55 5. Solutions and Global Perspectives 77 6. Conclusion 102 7. Addendum: Is Mail-in Voting the Answer? 108 About the Authors 116 About WhoWhatWhy 118 Glossary 119 INITIALISMS AND ACRONYMS USED IN THIS BOOK ADA Americans with Disabilities Act BMD ballot-marking device COIB Conflicts of Interest Board DRE direct-recording electronic machine EAC Election Assistance Commission EMS election management system ES&S Election Systems & Software FVAP Federal Voting Assistance Program FWAB Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot HAVA Help America Vote Act MPSA Military Postal System Agency NPRM notice of proposed rulemaking OSET Open Source Election Technology Institute RFP request for proposal RLA risk-limiting audit SQL Structure Query Language TGDC Technical Guidelines Development Committee UOCAVA Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act VSAP Voting Solutions for All People VVPAT Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail VVSG Voluntary Voting System Guidelines Photo credit: Florida Memory / Flickr 2 | INTRODUCTION When we talk about elections, we often focus on the campaign horserace, who is up or down in the polls, the back and forth between candidates, and maybe a little about which issues matter most to voters.
    [Show full text]