China S Detention of the Uyghur

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China S Detention of the Uyghur Policy Paper (4): China’s Detention of the Uyghur q Introduction: In 2018, a UN human rights panel stated that it had received credible reports of one million ethnic Uyghurs held in a “massive internment camp that is shrouded in secrecy” in the western Xinjiang autonomous region of China. The region of Xinjiang is a geographically strategic point to China’s development plans of investments and infrastructure in Europe, Africa, and Asia, known as the Belt and Road initiative. The Uyghur, or Uighur, is a predominantly Muslim ethnic Turkic group from the region of Central Asia with the largest population residing in Xinjiang, a region that was annexed by China in 1949 at a time in which Uyghurs comprised roughly three- fourths of the population in the region. China’s majority ethnic group the Han Chinese comprised only 6% in the Xinjiang. However, current official statistics now show a population of 42% Uyghur and 40% Han in Xinjiang today due to migration to the region. The current situation of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang include surveillance, arbitrary detention, death in custody, forced labour, and mistreatment. The case of the Uyghur appears to involve violations of the freedom of thought and expression, the freedom of religion, and the right to due process. Other apparent persecuted minorities in Xinjiang include the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kyrgyz and Hui.1 An estimate by a member of the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Gay McDougall cited two million Uyghurs and Muslim minorities being forced into “political camps for indoctrination” in the region. McDougall expressed “deep concern” of the apparent transformation of the Xinjiang autonomous region into an effective “massive internment camp” 1 Hayes, “Uyghur,” 2019. 1 and a “no rights zone.” McDougall’s expressed concern that human rights violations are being committed by China “in the name of combating religious extremism and maintaining social stability” with Uyghurs being treated as “enemies of the state” based on their ethnic and religious identity. Although there had previously been awareness of the situation of the Uyghurs, the documents confirmed mistreatment accusations that China had previously denied. The source of the release of the documents remain unclear.2 q Detention Camps: One out of every 10 Uyghur was estimated to be detained in the camps. The leaked documents gave details of large detention camps for the purpose of “retraining” or “re-education.” The documents furthermore accounted of family separation happening on a large scale.3 There was found to be 28 detention camps spanning across the Xinjiang region. 4The detention centers are built for the purpose with similarities to high-security jails, but they are claimed by China to be “vocational training centers,” offering voluntary education and training. However, documents leaked to the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) reveal a systematic “brainwashing” taking place within the centers with a point system awarding “ideological transformation, study and training, and compliance with discipline." The documents reveal Uyghurs being jailed, indoctrinated and punished. A set of instructions reveal the intention to run the camps as high-security prison camps with no escapes and strict discipline.5 The Chinese government has also increased policing and surveillance in the region. Surveillance measures include voice and facial recognition, iris scanners, DNA sampling and 3D identification. 2 Nebehay, “Secret camps,” 2018. 3 Friedman, “Pressure,” 2019. 4 Doman, “China’s Frontier of Fear,” 2018 5 BBC, “Data leak,” 2019. 2 q International responses: Responding to the the UN panel’s findings in 2018, the U.S. Mission to the UN stated that it was “deeply troubled by reports of an ongoing crackdown on Uighurs and other Muslims in China” and called on China to “end their counterproductive policies and free all of those who have been arbitrarily detained.” In October, 2019, the U.S. announced visa restrictions for Chinese officials who may have been involved in the detention of the Uyghur. In October, 2019, 23 UN member states, the speaking through the UK ambassador to the UN Karen Pierce, came out against China’s treatment of the Uyghur community in Xinjiang. The United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and several EU members states were among those who called on China to "uphold its national and international obligations and commitments to respect human rights," and to allow international monitors access to Xinjiang in order to conduct investigations. This group urged China to follow recommendations by the independent UN experts and to call a halt to the arbitrary detention of Uyghurs. However, in a statement presented on their behalf by Belarus, 54 countries, among them Russia, Egypt, Bolivia and Serbia, expressed their approval of China’s “counter-terrorism” programme and its “de-radicalization measures” in Xinjiang. In their view, the criticism expressed through the UK amounted to a politicization of the human rights issue and consisted of "baseless accusations against China.” The Belarus statement reflected increased support for the Chinese position with regard to the detention of the Uyghurs, having reached 54 compared to the 37 countries that aligned with Beijing in July. The statement said that "safety and security have returned to Xinjiang and fundamental human rights of people of all ethnic groups there are safeguarded” and that the countries behind the statement "commend China's remarkable achievements in the field of human rights."6 In response to the UK’s statement, China’s envoy rejected the UK statement’s allegations as a "gross interference in China's internal affairs and deliberate provocation,” indicating it would not be helpful to trade talks between the countries. On an earlier occasion, China stated that the Xinjiang region was at risk of terrorist attacks from Islamist militants and separatists bent on stirring up tensions between the Uyghur minority and the ethnic Han Chinese majority in the region. Previously, China’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva Yu Jianhua had stated that they were working toward equality and communion among all ethnic groups. Defending its “domestic security programme” in Xinjiang, the government denied singling out Muslims or violating their rights, and insisted the detention centres were” hugely positive" for the region.7 6 Westcott, “Dueling statements,” 2019. 7 DW, “UN members divided,” 2019. 3 q Case Study: The Detention of Mr. Tashpolat Tiyip: On December 26, 2019, a group of independent UN experts highlighted the case of Tashpolat Tiyip, an Uyghur Muslim scholar and former President of Xinjiang University. The experts include the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief; the Special Rapporteur on minority issues; members of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; and members of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. Tiyip’s whereabouts have been unknown since 2017, although Chinese authorities have communicated that he is facing corruption charges, has received a lawyer, and has not been sentenced to death. However, the proceedings are kept away from the scrutiny of the international community and according to the UN “reports indicate that he had already been convicted and sentenced to death.” According to the UN, a death sentence imposed under these conditions without the guarantee of a fair trial would be in violation of international human rights law and be considered arbitrary, and it would contravene the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed by China in 1998. The experts called for Tiyip’s right to a fair trial and due process of law and called the case an “incommunicado detention,” which along with enforced disappearances and secret trials “have no place in a country governed by the rule of law.”8 The experts have communicated with the Chinese government and have urged Chinese authorities to disclose his current detention place and allow for family visits, and the experts expressed that they will continue to seek formal and official clarification of the case of Tiyip and other detainees. The case is an example of detainees, primarily members of the Uyghur community, being held with without charge or with unknown charges in different detention facilities in the Xinjiang region. Particularly, the detention of intellectuals, such as writers, poets, journalists, and university professors, seem to serve an alarming agenda of limiting freedom of thought and expression and creating prisoners of conscience, suppressing 8 Bardwell, “Incommunicado detention,” 2019. 4 independent intellectualism to implement the goals of the “re-education” camps. Another case include the 2014 arrest of the Uyghur professor of economics Ilham Tohti, who had promoted reconciliation in Xinjiang, yet was served a life sentence over accusations of being a separatist. While in prison, Tohti won the 2019 EU’s Sakharov prize for her work. q Recommendations: ● The UN and Member States must place pressure on the Chinese government to disclose the whereabouts and conditions of Tashpolat Tiyip and other Uyghur detainees. ● The UN must help protect Uyghur intellectualism and freedom of expression against China’s oppressive “re-education” agenda. ● The international community should apply pressure via the Belt and Road initiative, threatening to suspend or withdraw from initiative-based agreements unless or until the
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