Philosophical Issues, 28, Philosophy of Logic and Inferential Reasoning, 2018 doi: 10.1111/phis.12129
ON THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF TRUTH IN LOGIC
Gila Sher University of California, San Diego
1. Introduction: Truth- or Proof- Theoretic Explanation of Logic?
Philosophers are divided on whether the proof-theoretic or truth- theoretic approach to logic is more fruitful. The proof-theoretic approach has its roots in Gentzen (1934–35) and Prawitz (1965). The truth-theoretic or semantic approach has its roots in Tarski (1936). More recently, the proof-theoretic approach has begun to encroach on semantics itself, with Dummett (1991), Brandom (2000), and others advocating proof-theoretic or inferentialist semantics, which they contrast with truth-theoretic, and in par- ticular truth-conditional, semantics. Thematically, proof-theoretic semantics is associated with verificationism, the meaning-as-use approach to language, assertibilism, anti-realism, anti-representationalism, pragmatist approach to truth, and/or epistemic approach to logic. Truth-theoretic semantics is often associated with a truth-conditional theory of meaning, representational approach to mind and language, realism, correspondence truth, and/or metaphysics. Although the debate on the preferable approach to semantics goes beyond logic, it is often focused on logic—logical constants, logical inference, etc. My aim in this paper is to demonstrate the considerable explanatory power of a truth-based approach to logic. I will show that, and how, by employing a robust notion of truth (of a kind I will specify) we are able to provide:
r Explanatory characterization of logical inference, distinguishing it from other kinds of inference. r General, explanatory, and systematic criterion for logical constants and operators.