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Portions of this document may be illegible in electronic image products. Images are produced from the best available original document. NTNU Norwegian university of Science and Technology
BRIDGING OPERATION AND DESIGN
The Encounter Between Practical and Discipline-Based Knowledge in Offshore Platform Design
Doctoral thesis
by
Mette Suzanne Husemoen
Trondheim 1997
INSTITUTT FOR INDUSTRIELL 0KONOMI OG TEKNOLOGILEDELSE NORGES TEKNISK-NATURVITENSKAPELIGE UNIVERS1TET
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT NORWEGIAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
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Preface
The last three years I have been part of the INPRO research program (Integrated production systems in the process industry) at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. The program has involved a faculty of five professors and post graduate researchers and nine Ph.D. candidates from three different departments - Engineering Cybernetics, Chemical Engineering, and Industrial Economics and Technology Management. It has been a valuable experience to be part of this multi disciplinary research effort trying to bridge different the fields of knowledge in the area of process plant operations. Lisbeth 0yum, Henning Jakobsen, Ludvig Stendal, Karin Aslaksen, and Professor Morten Levin at the Department of Industrial Economics; Catharina Lindheim, Jahn Olaf Olsen, and Professor Kristian Lien at the Department of Chemical Engineering; Jo Simensen, Kjell Stele-Hansen, and Professor Bjame Foss at the Department of Engineering Cybernetics; Thoralf Qvale at the Work Research Institute (API), and Roger Kiev at IFIM, SINTEF made the core of this group. Jorid 0yen and Tove Krokstad, helped to arrange many of the INPRO activities. It has been an interesting journey into the land of operations, design, and Norwegian process industry.
I am especially grateful to my advisor, Professor Morten Levin, for guiding me through the process. He has been of great support and has always given me excellent feedback in the developing of the thesis. I am also greatly indebted to my co-advisor Thoralf Qvale. His experience from large-scale offshore projects in the North Sea has directly influenced the scope of my work.
I have been lucky to be part of a larger group of graduate students at the Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management. I want to thank Lisbeth 0yum and Henning Jakobsen, in particular, for giving valuable feedback on early draffs and final chapters of the thesis. Gaute Knutstad, Ingrid Anette Wulff, Karina Aase, Berit Moltu, and Jan Terje Karlsen are other Ph.D. candidates I have had the opportunity to
- m -
•V 3#w x- Bridging Operation and Design interact with. It was good to have Gaute there to consult with in the final stage. I am also thankful to Kari Kapstad and Merethe Anthonsen for reading through and commenting on some of the chapters.
In my work I have been associated with the Phillips Petroleum Company Norway. Former Vice President Rolf Wiborg and Strategic Business Performance Manager Helge Vollan took an active part in defining the research problem. Their emphasis on taking operational experience into account in the Ekofisk II project corresponded well with INPRO’s focus on operational effectiveness of process plants. I especially want to thank the operations representatives participating in the design, Leif Gilje, 0yvind Dahle, Dagfinn Hatleskog, and Arild Mtehlum, who willingly shared their time and experience with me. They also read through and gave valuable feedback on the final chapters of the thesis. Thanks also to Stig Kvendseth in Phillips for lending me the Ekofisk photos, and 0yvind Roth for being the INPRO contact in Phillips.
I would like to thank the Leaders For Manufacturing Program (LFM), MIT Sloan School of Management, for being my host as I spent one semester with them as a visiting researcher. Janice Klein read though my preliminary drafts and gave valuable feedback while I was there.
Finally, I want to thank Professor Zhang Zhixiang, chief master and founding president of Chinese Society of Yuanji Science, for the opportunity to study at the Yuanji Medicine Hospital in the world headquarters of Yuanji Science, Ezhou, Hubei, China; and ChengLin Will Zhang, Y.M.D., founding president of American Society of Yuanji Science, Inc., Boston, for introducing me to Yuanji, this gem of traditional Chinese culture.
The INPRO program is co-funded by the Norwegian Science Foundation, the Federation of Process and Manufacturing Industries (PIL), the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF), and the participating companies in the INPRO program.
Trondheim March 1998
- 1V - :;V CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER Contents 3.1EKOFISKI 4.1 33 3.2 23 2.2 2.1 A L P S 1.4 13 1.2 1.1 ummary reface ist bbreviations 4. 4.1.2 4.1.1 3.2.4 3.2.3 3.2.2 3.2.1 2.3.2 2.3.1 2.2.5 2.2.4 2.2.3 2.2.2 2.2.1 2.1.4 2.1.3 2.1.2 2.1.1
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Contents 44 30 viii 11 11 73 78 76 73 73 49 40 59 55 51 66 63 61 59 5§ 53 5 35 68 30 22 11 19 14 4 iii ix 3 6 x 8 1 1 Bridging Operation and Design
4.2 D esign at Hitec 80 4.2. l functioning as an integrated , autonomous team 80 4.2.2 Operations committedly in charge of design 82 4.2.3 Knowing both operations and design 85 4.3 THE 2/4 X TOPSIDE ALLIANCE 87 4.3.1 Formation of the alliance 87 4.3.2 THE ALLIANCE ORGANIZATION 90 4.3.3 Work in the alliance 93 4.3.4 Fabrication reviews 96 4.4 Resulting design and operational experience loo 4.4.1 EKOFISK 2/4 X operational EXPERIENCE 100 4.4.2 The innovating aspects of 2/4 X 102 4.4.3 Operations vs . drilling on 2/4 X 108 4.4.4 Reflections on operations involvement in design 110
CHAPTER 5 EKOFISK 2/4 J 115
5.1 Operations not knowing design 115 5.1.1 Operations involved not knowing design 115 5.1.2 Too few operations resources made available to the project 120 5.2 D istance in design 122 5.2. l Initial tension 122 5.2.2 Phillips and Kv /erner working separately in design 125 5.2.3 D esign controlling design 130 5.2.4 Operations knowledge not fitting into the structure of design 132 5.3 Status of the Ekofisk 2/4 J project 136 5.3.1 Fabrication , commissioning , and start -up of Ekofisk 2/4 J 136 5.3.2 Operations ’ impact on 2/4 J 138
CHAPTER 6 KNOWLEDGE IN OPERATIONS AND DESIGN 145
6.1 The operations community -of -practice 145 6.1.1 Practical knowledge 146 6.1.2 Availability and access to equipment 149 6.1.3 Simultaneous knowledge 153 6.1.4 Tacit knowledge 157 6.2 The design community -of -practice 162 6.2.1 D iscipline -based knowledge 162 6.2.2 Sequential knowledge 165 6.2.3 Explicit knowledge 168 63 Knowledge in operations and design 172
CHAPTER 7 BRIDGING KNOWLEDGE OF OPERATIONS AND DESIGN 175
7.1 Bridging knowledge of operations and design 175 7.1.1 Mutual sympathy , trust , and respect 175 7.1.2 Physical integration of operations and design 181 7.1.3 Knowing both operations and design 186 7.2 Creating better production systems in design 189
- vi - Contents
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 125
8.1 Findings 196 8.1.1 D ifferent kinds of knowledge in operations and design 196 8.1.2 Bridging knowledge of operations and design 198 8.2 ACTION RECOMMENDED 202 8.2.1 Operations 202 8.2.2 D esign 203 8.3 Further research 205
APPENDIX A METHOD 207
APPENDIX B THE INPRO PROGRAM 232
REFERENCES 235 Bridging Operation and Design
List of figures
Figure 2. l Tacit and explicit knowledge as two kinds of knowledge ...... 17 Figure 2.2 the Y uanji diagram ...... 50 Figure 2.3 the Y uanji diagram of operations and design ...... 51 Figure 3. l The Greater Ekofisk Area ...... 56 Figure 3.2 Ekofisk production and water injection wells...... 57 Figure 3.3 The Ekofisk Tank in 1973 and 1989...... 57 Figure 3.4 The Ekofisk Complex in 1994...... 58 Figure 3.5 The Ekofisk II Complex ...... 60 Figures . 6 Ekofisk II project schedule ...... 61 Figure 3.7 Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J...... 62 Figure 3.8 Ekofisk II complex layout ...... 63 Figures . 9 Ekofisk 2/4 X wellhead platform ...... 64 Figure 3.10 Bridging Ekofisk 2/4 C and Ekofisk 2/4 X ...... 65 Figure 3.11 Ekofisk 2/4 J processing and transportation platform ...... 67 Figure 3.12 Installation of Ekofisk 2/4 J module support frame ...... 71 Figure 4. l The 2/4 X topside Alliance organizational chart ...... 90 Figure 4.2 Compact placing of valves ...... 98 Figure 4.3 The Ekofisk 2/4 X derrick located in the corner ...... 103 Figure 4.4 Ekofisk 2/4 X ...... 104 Figure 4.5 Previous drilling operations on Ekofisk ...... 105 Figure 4.6 Ekofisk 2/4 X “star rack ” pipe handling system and iron roughneck ...... 106 Figure 4.7 remotely controlled drilling operations on 2/4 x ...... 107 Figure 4.8 Ekofisk 2/4 X installed offshore ...... 112 Figure 4.9 The Ekofisk complex including 2/4 X ...... 113 Figure 5. l Installation of Ekofisk 2/4 J...... 137 Figure 5.2 Ekofisk 2/4 J installed offshore ...... 143 Figure 6.1 The operations and design communihes -of -practice ...... 173 Figure 7. l Conditions favoring a bridging of operations and design knowledge ...... 191
- viii - Abbreviations
Abbreviations
2/4 J Ekofisk 2/4 J processing and transportation platform 2/4 X Ekofisk 2/4 X wellhead and drilling platform API Work Research Institute AOP Aker Offshore Partner AS BPR Business Process Reengineering E&C Engineering and Construction, PPCoN. E&P Engineering and Production, PPCoN HAZOP Hazard and Operability IFIM Institute for Social Research in Industry, SINTEF LCC Life-Cycle Cost MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology NGL Natural Gas Liquids NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate NTH Norwegian Institute of Technology NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology PLM Planned Lifetime Management PPCoN/Phillips Phillips Petroleum Company Norway PRS Project Representative Section PTF Project Task Force SBP Strategic Business Performance SINTEF The Foundation of Scientific and Industrial Research at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology TQM Total Quality Management UMOE Umoe Haugesund Bridging Operation and Design
Summary
In this thesis I investigate the relationship between operations and design and the design process of the two new platforms of Phillips Petroleum Company Norway on Ekofisk II, the Ekofisk 2/4 X drilling and wellhead platform and the Ekofisk 2/4 J processing and transportation platform. The emphasis has been on how to take into account operational experience in design. I have been affiliated with the INPRO program at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in doing this.
In the first chapter I introduce the main question of the thesis on how to bring operational experience into design and I argue why this is important to focus upon. In order to design low-operating cost facilities, operational knowledge is required in design. I further define two research questions of the thesis, namely:
• What constitutes knowledge in operations versus knowledge in design? • How to take into account operational knowledge in design?
The second chapter is a theory chapter on knowledge and knowledge-creation in operations and design. I review existing literature in the field to further focus on the research questions previously outlined. I take the position of operations and design being two communities-of-practice based upon different kinds of knowledge. Practical, tacit knowledge characterizes the operations community-of-practice, as opposed to the discipline-based, explicit knowledge of the design community-of- practice. Close cooperation and physical integration between operations and design personnel, preparing the ground for dialogue, skillful discussion, and sharing practice are sees as important means to bridge these different kinds of knowledge and communities-of-practice. I close the chapter by redefining the initial research questions on the basis of the literature reviewed. The research questions I bring with me into the Ekofisk 2/4 X and the Ekofisk 2/4 J case studies are the following:
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1. Are operations and design two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge?
• What characterizes the knowledge-creation process of the operations and design communities-of-practice? • To what extent do the operations and design communities-of-practice relate differently to the dimension of time? • What distinguishes the educational background of people in operations and design?
2. What are the conditions for bridging knowledge in operations and design?
• What role do close physical interaction and integration of operations and design personnel play in the process of bridging knowledge of operations and design? • To what extent is previous knowledge of the other community-of-practice decisive for creating new knowledge in design? • To what extent is mutual sympathy and respect important for bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice?
In chapter 3 I give an introduction to Phillips Petroleum Company Norway and the Ekofisk II project. In the two following chapters, I present the case studies of the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J projects with a focus on operations involvement in design. In chapter 4 I describe the integrated Ekofisk 2/4 X project model, with the operating company and the engineering contractors cooperating closely in the design. Mutual trust and respect were key factors in the process. Informal rather than formal influence was important to make operational experience part of the project. The Ekofisk 2/4 X project was able to come up with an innovative drilling rig technology, taking significant operational experience into account in the design.
In chapter 5 I describe the traditional project organization chosen by the Ekofisk 2/4 J project. I focus on the formal, distant relationship between the operating company and the engineering contractor and the ways in which these factors impeded the bridging of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. Bridging Operation and Design
Operations were not integrated into the project. It took time to build trust and confidence between the parties involved and to establish some common ground and informal ways of working together. The Ekofisk 2/4 J platform concept represents a standard design solution of processing and transportation platforms in the North Sea.
I chapter 6 I discuss the different kinds of knowledge characteristic of the operations and design communities-of-practice offshore and onshore, answering the research questions outlined in chapter two. I describe the practical, simultaneous, tacit knowledge of the operations community-of-practice offshore versus the discipline- based, sequential, explicit knowledge of the design community-of-practice onshore. Availability, accessibility, and maintainability of equipment is important to the operations community-of-practice offshore, while schedule, cost, area, and weight are essential factors to the design community-of-practice onshore. The educational background of people in the operations and design communities-of-practice tends to differ. Design people usually have an engineering or university degree, while offshore operations personnel tend to have little formal education. I conclude that operations and design are two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge.
In chapter 7 I compare operations involvement in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J projects. Mutual trust and respect between the operating company and the design contractors, and the integrated approach to the Ekofisk 2/4 X topside design at Aker Offshore Partners (AOP) and the drilling rig design at Hitec, facilitated an informal sharing of knowledge across the operations and design communities-of-practice. The Ekofisk 2/4 X project organizations at AOP, Hitec, and Umoe Haugesund were able to create a joint operations and design community-of-practice. Operations and design personnel were working side-by-side. Knowledge was shared in an informal manner. In relation to the Ekofisk 2/4 J project, the operations personnel involved at Ekofisk 2/4 X were better equipped in terms of having previous knowledge of design. This facilitated an easier interaction of knowledge between the operations and design communities-of-practice. The drilling-rig project at Hitec further profited from also having design personnel with offshore operational experience in the group. Together,
- Xll - Summary the project team came up with state-of-the-art drilling rig technology and innovative operational-effective solutions in design.
The traditional way of organizing the Ekofisk 2/4 J project - with a clear distance, formal communication, and separate work organizations of the operating company and the engineering contractor - made the bridging of the operations and design communities-of-practice difficult. It took long time to build trust and to develop an informal working relationship across the operations and design communities-of- practice. The operations representatives involved in the Ekofisk 2/4 J project were not able to be proactive in the project to the same extent as was the case on 2/4 X. Due to their lack of exposure to project management and engineering design, it took time for them to understand the project. Previous knowledge of the other community-of- practice is essential to contribute to the bridging of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice.
Mutual trust and respect, close cooperation and physical integration of operations and design personnel, and previous knowledge of the other community-of-practice were factors favoring a bridging of operations and design knowledge, while distant relationships, physical separation, formal communication, lack of confidence between the operations and design communities-of-practice, and lack of knowledge of the other community-of-practice impeded a bridging of their knowledge.
In chapter 8 I draw the conclusions, on the basis of the theory reviewed and data presented. I argue that physical closeness and integration of operations and design personnel, experience from the other community-of-practice, and mutual sympathy, trust, and respect, are important factors in bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice and creating innovative solutions in design which transcend the existing knowledge in operations and design.
I have used a qualitative methodological approach to data gathering, analysis, and theory building, i.e. grounded theory. I have relied upon open-ended, unstructured and semi-structured interviews and participatory observation in my fieldwork.
- xm - Bridging Operation and Design Chapter 1 Introduction
Phillips Petroleum Company Norway was the first company to find oil on the Norwegian continental shelf. Norwegian oil production started when Ekofisk came on stream in 1971. The field is still producing well and is likely do so far into next century. In the beginnin g of the 1990s, however, Phillips was obliged to redevelop the field due to safety requirements and high operating costs of existing facilities. The Ekofisk II project was launched, which included design of two new platform to take over production from Ekofisk in 1998.
During my fieldwork I spent a few days offshore on Ekofisk. One evening I talked to some senior operation supervisors about my focus on operations and design. They commented how difficult it was for operations to have an impact on design. “It’s too late,” or “it’s not possible, ” were arguments they were used to hearing when trying to communicate with design people onshore. They were used to not being listened to. Instead, they expected having to rebuild and modify facilities once installed offshore - again, and again. “No influence. No impact,” they said. “It doesn’t help to sit in front of a computer if the experience is missing,” one of them said. They were critical to the ways in which operating companies kept their experience to themselves. “What turbines, compressors, and valves do they have good and bad experience with? ” one asked. “Why invent the wheel again and again?” And they started to talk about one project in particular, the Ekofisk 2/4 K platform. They were amazed by the difficulties of onshore engineers to understand the operational context offshore. One of them said:
“Take for instance the junction boxes on 2/4 K. We had to change all the cables. Everything was rebuilt. Incredible. Hair-raising expensive. Only because operations and design didn’t manage to talk. They don’t listen to operations. On the computer you can move everything around. But I want to see things physically out here. It is not as easy as on the computer. They don’t understand that it’s water out here and that scaffoldings can’t stand on the ground. ”
- 1 - Bridging Operation and Design
“What was the final sum?” they wondered. I was told later that Philips spent NOK 8 million only on the first junction box check. “You need cooperation between users and designer,” they said. I was interested in the Ekofisk 2/4 K project and talked to onshore people about it. As for design this was a good project. One project engineer said: “The project finished on schedule and saved a lot of money, and we were lucky with the dollar exchange rate. The project was a success. But operation people were not involved. ” He continued:
“There were many things on 2/4 K. For instance, there was the exact required number of square meters for offices, but not more. We got some stupid solutions. There was no office for the platform manager. We had to find an office for him and tore down walls to build things up again. And it costs a lot to rebuild things offshore. ”
I asked whether he had any written documentation on the experiences from this project, but no. He said: “Someone suggested I should write down everything we learned on the K, but I didn’t. On Ekofisk II we should write something. We should get things into writing. We should start to think about it soon. But we haven ’t done it so far.”
I think these examples illustrate well some of the difficulties of bridging knowledge of operations and design in the area of offshore platform design. The lack of communication between the operating company, the design contractor, and people in operations and design has resulted in expensive rebuilding and modifications projects offshore, ineffective operations and maintenance, and high operating costs. It is therefore of great importance to focus on a bridging of operations and design knowledge in order to develop a less expensive practice and waste of resources in the process of designing and operating offshore oil platforms.
-2- Introduction
1.1 Main research question
The main focus of this thesis is the relationship between operations and design and how to bring operational experience into design. I have studied the Ekofisk II project of the Phillips Petroleum Company Norway, being part of the research and Ph.D. program INPRO (see appendix B). Low operating costs of the future Ekofisk II installations has been a central issue to the project. Phillips therefore brought some of their most experienced offshore personnel to participate in the design onshore.
I met with Phillips ’ vice president and director of strategic business performance together with my INPRO advisors in March 1995 to discuss the direction of my work. Phillips emphasized the involvement of operation personnel in design as essential to the Ekofisk II project. They wanted to know the effect of bringing offshore personnel into design onshore. Their focus on bringing operational experience into design corresponded well with the main concerns and interests of the INPRO program. The Ekofisk II project provided an excellent opportunity to study the process of bridging knowledge of operations and design. The question “What is operation?” had been on the agenda on one informal lunch meeting of the Ph.D. candidates in the INPRO group the previous week. Concluding argument from an engineering cybernetics quarters was that operations were more than mere operations - operations also importantly implied design. Focusing on the relationship between operations and design was interesting and intriguing also to the other disciplines represented in the INPRO program. This is, accordingly, what I shall look into - the relationship between knowledge in operations and design. The main theme of the thesis is:
• How to bring operational experience into design?
I shall now argue why is it important to focus on the relationship between operations and design and on bringing operational experience into design of new platform installations offshore.
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1.2 Why focus on operations and design?
75 % of labor costs offshore are related to maintenance. With oil prices on the decline and rising operating costs of aging platforms, effective operations have become a primary concern of the offshore oil and gas industry. It has become crucial to design low-operating-costs facilities. Oil companies have become increasingly aware of the high level of maintenance costs and the expensive practice of not bringing operational experience back to design. Design contractors and engineers in design need operating experience and knowledge about offshore conditions. The lack of communication between operations and design in the offshore industry has led to expensive maintenance and ineffective operations of platform installations in the North Sea. There are huge potentials in reducing operating costs by improving communication and sharing knowledge between people in operations offshore and design onshore.
It is of great interest also to the Norwegian state to reduce operating costs of the offshore industry. In 1996, the direct financial interest of the Norwegian state (SDFI) accounted for roughly 40 % of all capital expenditures on the Norwegian continental shelf. According to the SDFI arrangement, the Norwegian state pays a share of all investment and operating costs in projects corresponding to the state’s direct interest. Like other licensees, the state receives a corresponding proportion of production and other revenues (The Royal Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 1997). NORSOK, an initiative to increase the competitive standing of the Norwegian offshore sector, was initiated by the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in 1993, and the Development and Production Forum for the Petroleum Sector was established emphasizing common technical standards in place of company specific specifications and increased cooperation between oil companies, suppliers, research groups, and Norwegian authorities as a main effort to reduce operating and project execution costs.
The question on how to bring user experience into design is not a new question, either to the offshore industry or the research community. In 1977, Einar Thorsrud at the Work Research Institute (AFI) brought the question on the agenda. AFI had
-4- Introduction organized the first conference on oil activities in the North Sea where top management from the major operating companies met with representatives from the Norwegian authorities, suppliers, trade unions, and researchers of Norway and abroad to discuss the future of the Norwegian offshore industry. The companies recognized the need for improved experience transfer from operations offshore to design onshore and between projects, but there was no confidence or consensus between the parties involved on how to do this. How to successfully build operational experience into design of new offshore installations has remained a puzzle to the industry.
As a follow-up of the conference, API launched a research program directed towards the Norwegian oil industry, a program that lasted from 1978 to 1988. The question of how to bring operational experience into design guided the research. This was a question not easily dealt with. At the closing of the research program, API had to acknowledge that the situation had not changed very much during this ten year period of time. The offshore industry still had difficulties in learning from one project to another and finding ways to successfully involve operations in design. Oil companies continued to run series of production platforms without any systematic transfer of experience from one project to another. Previous errors were still repeated rather than taken into account in continuing projects. The awareness of emphasizing reduced maintenance requirements and operating costs in design was low.
The relationship between operations and design has remained yet a largely unexplored area for proper research. Engineering and organizational theory and practice do not focus on the interface between operations and design of process plants. Little research has been done to improve an integrated understanding of operations and design within organizational, management, or engineering perspectives. The need for an integrated approach to operations and design to ensure operational effectiveness of new design solutions has implications on the engineering education. How to educate engineers enabling them to integrate perspectives of operations and design? How to develop new concepts beyond-the current practice of operations and design? Operations need to have a larger say in design, and attention needs to be brought to the long-lasting operating phase, not to the start-up and development phase only.
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1.3 Developing the research question
Through my fieldwork I started to ask if operations and design were based on entirely different kinds of knowledge. To what extent had the different backgrounds, experiences, and work contexts of operations and design people led to different kinds of knowledge created within the operations and design communities-of-practice? Could these differences in terms of knowledge-creation in the operations and design communities-of-practice account for the difficulties in integrating operational experience into design?
A large number people I talked to during my fieldwork emphasized the difference between “theoretical ” and “practical” knowledge and the communication barrier which that caused between onshore and offshore personnel. The main difference that separated people in operations and design was the difference between the “theoretical ” knowledge valued in design onshore and the “practical” way of reasoning in operations offshore. People in operations offshore and design onshore are inhibited from talking to each other because of their differences in terms of theoretical and practical background. This conflict came up again and again during my fieldwork. “They don’t speak the same language, ” one operations person said, “there are differences in education. These are two completely different worlds.” “Theory and practice - it is a big difference,” another explained. And both sides tend to be prejudiced against the other part. One operations person onshore explained:
“People in operations feel as if they speak another language. They find it hard to communicate because engineers in design have no concrete experience of their own to relate to in order to understand what operations talk about. It is as if they don’t understand why. It seems like we’re sitting on two different planets. We think - why do we have to say this? Why can’t they figure it out themselves. And we say that with a contemptuous laughter. But how to improve this? Difficult to say. Probably some prejudice has developed over the years. The engineering companies - what do they know? And vice versa. We should have been more actively involved. But the distance to Oslo is a barrier. ”
-6- Introduction
Until recent years, there were few occasions for operations and design people to meet and talk. The offshore operation and onshore design organizations have been far apart and each lived their separate lives. One operations representative involved in the Ekofisk II project said:
“We did not have complete knowledge about what design was. We imagined a drawing of what the platform should look like based on their experiences. We thought it was rather simple. Something done on the drawing-board. We have over simplified the mater of design. But we have been so far away.”
In Phillips there has always been a clear distinction between E&P (operations) and E&C (design). During the pioneering years of Ekofisk there were two telephone lines available - one for E&P and one for E&C. This was the case until 1977-78, one of Phillips operations directors explained. He found it incredible what had happened to satellite and telecommunications since then. Yet, for people in operations and design it is still difficult to communicate. In this thesis I emphasize the different kinds of knowledge of operations and design in order to better understand how to integrate operational experience into design. It is essential to study what constitutes knowledge in operations and design in order to know how to take operational experience into account in the design. My focus is therefore on the two following research questions:
• What constitutes knowledge in operations versus knowledge in design? • How to take into account operational knowledge in design?
The investigation into existing literature in the field has been guided by these research questions. They will be revised on the basis of the literature reviewed in the following chapter. I shall now give an introduction to the structuring of the thesis.
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1.4 Structure of the thesis
In this section I briefly introduce the different chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 2 I develop more a precise definition of the initial research questions based on the theory reviewed. I emphasize operations and design as two different communities-of- practice and the different kinds of knowledge part of operations and design. I focus on the process of bridging operation and design knowledge, and in particular the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge and creation of new knowledge in operations and design. Based on the literature reviewed, I conclude by redefining the research questions outlined in chapter one. The new set of research questions form the basis for the Ekofisk II case description and analysis in the following chapters.
In chapter 3 I introduce Phillips Petroleum Company Norway and the Ekofisk development project (Ekofisk II). I briefly describe the two main design projects of Ekofisk II: the Ekofisk 2/4 X drilling and wellhead platform, and the Ekofisk 2/4 J processing and transportation platform. These represent two interesting design projects that took clearly different courses in terms of organizing operations into design.
In chapter 4 I describe operations involvement in the Ekofisk 2/4 X project. I focus on how operation and design personnel worked together in the topside design at Aker Offshore Partner (AOP), the drilling rig design at Hitec, and the alliance that was established to complete the project on time. I emphasize the integrated, informal working relationship between the operating company and design contractor, and operation and design personnel, and the ways in which this mode of organizing the project opened up for new solutions in design taking operational experience into account. Finally, I look at the operational experience of the resulting Ekofisk 2/4 X drilling and wellhead platform.
In chapter 5 I describe operations involvement in the Ekofisk 2/4 J project at Kvasmer Engineering in Oslo. I look at the ways in which Phillips and Kvasmer personnel
-8- Introduction worked separately in design and how the formal, distant relationship between the operating company and design contractor impeded the bridging of operations and design knowledge. I emphasize the difficulties of fitting operational experience into the discipline-based, formal structure of design and how this way of organizing the project kept the operations and design communities-of-practice apart.
In chapter 6 I answer the first research question previously outlined in chapter two. I use data from the two Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J projects and current Ekofisk operations to discuss whether operations and design are two different communities-of- practice based on different kinds of knowledge. I focus on the differences between the practical, simultaneous, tacit knowledge of operations versus the discipline-based, sequential, explicit knowledge of design. Finally, I present a model characterizing the different kinds of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice.
In chapter 7 1 answer the second research question outlined in chapter two. I compare the ways in which the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J projects incorporated operational experience into design. I discuss conditions that particularly had a mobilizing effect on the bridging of knowledge of operations and design. I argue that mutual sympathy, trust and respect, physical closeness and integration of operations and design personnel, and people knowing both operations and design are factors that contribute significantly to a bridging of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice.
In chapter 8 I conclude by presenting the findings of my research. I recommend action to be taken by the parties involved in the offshore industry in order to improve the dialogue between the operations and design communities-of-practice. Finally, I indicate interesting directions for further research.
In appendix AI discuss research methodology, fieldwork, types of data, data analysis, and the validity of the research. In appendix BI present the research program INPRO (integrated production systems for the process industry) which I have been part of during my Ph.D. work.
-9- Bridging Operation and Design Chapter 2 Operations and Design
In this chapter I focus the initial research questions outlined in chapter one. I investigate available literature on knowledge in operations and design and how to employ operational experience in design. First, I take the position of operations and design being two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge. Second, I focus on the process of bridging knowledge in operations and design to improve the operational effectiveness of the resulting design. I conclude by reformulating the research questions based on the theory reviewed.
2.1 What constitutes knowledge in operations and design?
I this section I investigate literature on what constitutes knowledge in operations and knowledge in design. This is an important question in order to understand the process of bringing operational experience into design. Experience transfer from the operational context offshore to the design context onshore is not trivial due to the different kinds of knowledge inherent in these two work practices. I take the position of viewing operations and design as two different communities-of-practice. I explore what characterizes the operations and design communities-of-practices and the knowledge part of their work. To what extent are operations and design based on entirely different kinds of knowledge? This is the focus of this section.
2.1.1 The operations and design communities-of-practice
Brown and Duguid (1991) and Lave and Wenger (1990) use the concept of “communities-of-practice ” to denote groups of people that share sets of experiences, goals, and interests through common practice. People are socialized into communities-of-practice through learning the language and the way of reasoning of the group. Tacit knowledge emerging from the practice is shared among the people in
-11- Bridging Operation and Design the practice. Knowledge is embedded in the practice, and learning is a collaborative process not separate from it, Brown and Duguid argue. They see knowledge profoundly connected to the context in which it is learned, and linked to particular practice. Different communities-of-practice share different experiences and kinds of knowledge.
Brown and Duguid argue that in the design community-of-practice there is a tendency to value abstract knowledge at the expense of practice. Designers may overlook what it takes to get a job done in practice. In particular, abstract concepts of operations and maintenance work may not fully describe the complexities of the practical operational setting, they say. Brown and Duguid suggest that the design community-of-practice provides support that corresponds better to the actual needs of operations, and that these needs only can be grasped through understanding the details of sophistication of the actual practice. They say:
“In a society that attaches particular value to “abstract knowledge,” the details of practice have come to be seen as nonessential, unimportant, and easily developed once relevant abstractions have been grasped. Thus education, training, and technology design generally focus on abstract representations to the detrimental, if not exclusion of actual practice. We, by contrast suggest that practice is central to understanding work. Abstractions detached from practice distort or obscure intricacies of that practice. Without a clear understanding of those intricacies and the role they play, the practice itself cannot be well understood, engendered (through training) or enhanced (through innovation). ”
Brown and Duguid use the concept of communities-of-practice to denote groups in general that a share common practice and the location of learning and the tacit knowledge shared within different communities-of-practice. Differently from Brown and Duguid, Schein (1996) focuses on three communities-of-practice in particular: operations, design, and management. He argues that by ignoring the different learning processes of the three organizational cultures of operations, engineering, and management, one has misconceived the initial problem of organizational learning and change. Schein claims these communities-of-practice speak different languages, have
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different values, are oriented toward totally different goals, and thereby out of alignment with each other. He argues there is a need to recognize and accept how deeply embedded and different the shared tacit assumptions of executives, engineers, and operations personnel are, and find ways of communicating across these cultural boundaries. He says:
“I believe that organizations will not leant effectively until we recognize and confront the implications of these three occupational cultures I have emphasized. Until executives, engineers, and operators discover that they use different languages, make different assumptions about what is important, and until they leant to treat the other cultures as valid and normal, we will continue to see failures in organizational learning efforts. We will see powerful innovations at the operator level that are ignored, subverted or actually punished, we will see technologies that are grossly under-utilized, we will see angry employees railing against the impersonal programs of re-engineering and down-sizing, we will see frustrated executives who know what they want to accomplish but feel impotent in pushing their ideas through complex human systems, and we will see frustrated academics wondering why certain ideas like employee involvement, socio-technical systems analyses, high commitment organizations, and concepts of social responsibility continue to be ignored, only to be reinvented under some other label a few decades later.”
Perrow (1983) goes further in focusing on the different ways in which the operations and design communities-of-practice relate to knowledge. He argues that engineers in design follow a design logic instilled in them by engineering schools and the practice of design, a way of think ing that differs from operations’ way of reasoning. For engineers, a good design is clean, compact, utilizes new, advanced components, and is low on capital costs. In operations, he says, a good design implies easy maintenance, access to equipment, availability, proven design solutions with familiar components, and low operating costs. Perrow argues further that the practice of design favors information on subsystem dynamics rather than total systems dynamics, following a structure that does not require integration of subsystems other people have worked on. In contrast, the practice of operations requires information on the total system level and an integration of the different subsystem designs.
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Perrow claims that operations effectiveness and human factors are not important to engineers in design. They may be unaware of, contemptuous of bothered with, or incapable of appreciating these, but their careers depend on totally different factors, he says. Project management or individual engineers rewarded for employing operations- and maintenance-friendly solutions in design, and people are seldom confronted with operational experience of their designs.
To summarize, operations and design are two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge. These different kinds of knowledge shared and created within the operations and design communities-of-practice are essential to focus on in order to understand the difficulties associated with experience transfer and organizational learning. Operations and design constitute two communities-of- practice based on distinctively different kinds of knowledge. The kinds of knowledge part of the communities-of-practice of operations and design resemble the distinction between the knowledge created inside and outside the academic community-of- practice. This is what I focus on next.
2.1.2 Different kinds of knowledge
Schon (1983) speaks in favor of inquiry into the epistemology of practice, studying the kind of knowing in which competent practitioners engage in. He is interested in exploring how professional knowledge differs from the kinds of knowledge presented in academia, and questions the relationship between the kinds of knowledge honored in academia and the kinds of knowledge valued in professional practice. He argues that universities are not devoted to the production and distribution of fundamental knowledge in general, regarding them as institutions committed to a particular epistemology and to a view of knowledge that fosters selective inattention to practical competence and professional artistry.
Our knowing is in our action, he argues. It is tacit, implicit in our patterns of action and in our feel for the stuff we are dealing with. He maintains that as we go about
-14- Operations and design everyday life, we all exhibit knowledge in a special way. Although we often cannot say what it is we know, we do know how to take action. The daily work and routines of professionals depend on tacit knowing-in-action. He argues that competent practitioners usually know more than they can say, exhibiting a kind of knowing-in practice, most of which is tacit. Schon (1983) argues that as a practice becomes more repetitive and routine, and as knowing-in-practice becomes increasingly tacit and spontaneous, the practitioner may miss important opportunities to think about what he is doing. When someone reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the practice context, Schon says. Reflection-in-action is for some practitioners the core of practice. When a practitioner becomes a researcher into his own practice, he engages in a continuing process of self-education.
Schon distinguishes between reflection in action and everyday action. He claims that academic research institutionally has been separated from practice, connected only by a carefully defined relationship of exchange where the researcher's role is distinct from, and usually considered superior to, the role of the practitioner. Agyris and Schon (1996) suggest turning the conventional relationship between researcher and practitioner upside down, questioning what practitioners already do know. They argue for rejecting the traditional view of professional knowledge and for recognizing that practitioners may become reflective, remodeling the relationship between research and practice and letting research become an activity of practitioners, triggered by features of the actual practical situation and immediately linked to action.
Polanyi (1958,1966) focuses in particular on the different kinds of knowledge created within the scientific community-of-practice and outside. He argues that the declared aim of modem science was to establish a strictly detached, objective kind of knowledge, and that shortcomings of this ideal would only be accepted as temporarily imperfections. Polanyi, on the contrary, regards human knowledge to be of two kinds (Polanyi, 1958):
“Human knowledge is of two kinds. What is usually described as knowledge, as a set of written words or maps, mathematical formulae, is only one kind of knowledge; while
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unformulated knowledge, such as we have of something we are in the act of doing, is another form of knowledge.”
He calls the first explicit knowledge and the second tacit knowledge. He argues that the essential logical difference between the two kinds of knowledge lies in the fact that we can critically reflect on something explicitly stated, in a way in which we cannot reflect on own tacit awareness of an experience. This distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is also the cornerstone of the epistemology of Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). They see explicit knowledge as knowledge that can easily be articulated in formal, systematic language and transferred to others, knowledge that can be processed by computers, transmitted electronically, and stored in databases, and shared in the form of words, numbers, mathematical expressions, specifications, and manuals. Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is seen as a highly personal, context-specific knowledge that is hard to formalize, formulate, and communicate to others. Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that since tacit knowledge is a personal kind of knowledge embedded in individual experience, its subjective and intuitive nature makes it difficult to process or transmit it in any systematic or logical manner to others. They further emphasize how knowledge essentially is related to human action, and how the active, subjective nature of knowledge is deeply rooted in individual values, beliefs, and emotions.
In particular, Nonaka and Takeuchi contend that knowledge of experience tends to be tacit, physical, and subjective, while knowledge of rationality tends to be explicit, metaphysical, and objective. Tacit knowledge is created “here and now” in a specific, practical context, while explicit knowledge regards past events or objects ’’there and then ” and is oriented towards a context-free theory.
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They present the following model:
Tacit Knowledge (subjective) Explicit Knowledge (objective)
Knowledge of experience (body) Knowledge of rationality (mind) Simultaneous knowledge (here and now) Sequential knowledge (there and then) Analog knowledge (practice) Digital knowledge (theory)
Figure 2.1 Tacit and explicit knowledge as two kinds of knowledge
Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that this type of tacit knowledge has severely been overlooked as a critical component of collective human behavior, while the focus has been on explicit, formalized knowledge. They see the most powerful learning, however, to come from direct experience, and they criticize Western social science, including economics, management and organizational theory, for merely focusing on acquisition, accumulation, and utilization of existing knowledge, lacking or neglecting the subjective, and tacit aspects of knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that in order to understand the pattern of something as a meaningful whole, it is necessary to integrate one’s body in that particular something, and thereby break the traditional dichotomies between mind and body, reason and emotion, subject and object, and knower and known. Nonaka and Takeuchi therefore do not see scientific knowledge as the sole source of knowledge, arguing that much of our knowledge is the fruit of our own purposeful endeavors in dealing with the world.
Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that while in the West one tends to emphasize explicit knowledge, the Japanese tend to focus on tacit knowledge. They argue that the distinction between explicit and tacit knowledge is the key to understanding the differences between what may be termed Western approach to knowledge and the Japanese approach to knowledge. They regard explicit knowledge to be the dominant mode of knowledge in the Western philosophical traditions and management theories where knowledge is seen as something explicit, formal and systematic. Their aim is
-17- Bridging Operation and Design to provide a theory of organizational knowledge creation that is able to overcome the limitations of the Cartesian dualism dominating current scientific thinking.
While Nonaka and Takeuchi ’s focus on explicit and tacit knowledge, practical and theoretical knowledge is a characteristic distinction of the western based scientific community-of-practice. Molander (1992, 1993) argue that practical knowledge traditions are distinctly different from scientific knowledge traditions. He argues that the science-inspired modernization process involved a shift from practice-based knowledge to applied theory, where theory and not practice came to be regarded as the very basis of knowledge. He suggests that a distinction between theoretical knowledge understood as articulated or verbalized knowledge, and practical knowledge as forms of tacit knowledge, may be a fruitful distinction to make when the division is seen as different aspects of knowledge, and not as a division of distinct kinds of knowledge. He claims it may be argued both that no knowledge is purely tacit and that all knowledge is at the bottom tacit and that all professions, even the most intellectual ones, have a craft side.
Eikeland (1990) argues that practice has been regarded as inferior to the theoretical knowledge defined by the scientific community-of-practice. In relation to the dichotomous relationship between theory and practice in Western scientific thinking, Eikeland argues that “theory” traditionally has been understood in contrast to and partly in opposition to “experience” and “practice.” And theoretical knowledge has pretended to be of deeper insight than experience, he says. Theoretical interest has been related to say something about why or how something is as it is and to explain what is given through examining it as an example of something more common and general, a principle, law, etc. Knowledge of experience, on the other hand, has not been considered to seriously say anything else than that something is as it is. Eikeland argues that theory and practice should rather be understood as two closely related kinds of knowledge difficult to separate from each other. Schwandt (1997) also considers practical reasoning and experience as a particular kind of knowledge embedded in practice and being different from the more respected scientific mode of knowledge.
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To summarize, there are different kinds of knowledge shared within different communities-of-practice. The knowledge valued in the scientific community-of- practice differs from the kind of knowledge part of practical life outside academia. While explicit, “theoretical, sequential knowledge is representative of the scientific community-of-practice, tacit, practical, simultaneous knowledge is characteristic of communities-of-practice involved in practical, dailywork outside the academic world. I shall now go on to focus on the community-of-practice of design and the kinds of knowledge taught in engineering schools and shared by people in design.
2.1.3 Knowledge in engineering education and design
Florman (1996), an engineer himself, argues that theoretical studies, rather than hands on practice, have become the heart of engineering education. Modem engineering schools are to a large extent based on mathematics and science at the expense of practical experience, and there is ample evidence that the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of pure theory, he says, arguing for a more appropriate balance in terms of more weight put on practical experience. He points to how the American engineering education curriculum is still firmly rooted in the traditions of the Military Academy at West Point and the French engineering schools of the eighteen century. These were schools where discipline and strict moral standards were part of the education, as he says:
“The stem spirit affected not only the general atmosphere - arduous assignments, competitive grading, and deliberately high attrition - but also the structure of the curriculum. Instead of trying to interest the students in engineering, to nurture enthusiasm for the profession that was to be their life’s calling, the program was designed as an obstacle course. The first two years were dedicated almost exclusively to mathematics and the basic sciences, with no effort made to show how these often brutally difficult studies would help the future engineer do constructive work.” Bridging Operation and Design
Florman argues that with a recrafted curriculum, introducing real engineering at an early stage and showing it to best advantage, engineering education can improve. Instead of a medicinal dose of math and science, he suggests to let freshmen get a taste of engineering design and a sense of how engineering fits into society at large. From his work in a national committee evaluating the engineering education in the States, he reports the following comments from the industry on the focus of the engineering education:
“The most fervent appeals came from representatives of industry who wanted engineering graduates trained in practical ways. They complained that current curricula are too heavily weighted with theory, making engineers who are poorly equipped to enter industry and produce. A particular grievance related to “manufacturing ” which business executives felt was slighted in engineering school with disastrous implications for American industry. They also decried the neglect of “design” and the stress on “theory,” the neglect of “synthesis” and the stress on “analysis” or simple problem solving. ”
Mathematics is essential in modem engineering, Adams (1991) argues. It is the theoretical language of technology, and perhaps the largest barrier to understanding science and technology. “Math is the intellectual toolkit that separates the engineer from the technician, ” he says, “it is essential for the degree of sophistication necessary to design airplanes, high speed printers, and oil refineries.” He argues that mathematics is important in engineering because of the need of quantitative thinking in design and the way it opens up for modeling of physical relationships, analysis, optimization, and prediction.
Science is important in engineering too, Adams argues. Not only do engineers go through the same kind of science courses in the beginning of engineering school and acquire some of the same formal scientific techniques, but a large number of the concepts in engineering have been taken from science. The purpose of the engineering sciences is to state relations among measurable properties like length, weight, temperature, and velocity to permit a technological system to be analyzed mathematically, Ferguson (1992) claims. Engineers are exposed to and may use the Operations and design same kind of intellectual approaches to problem solving, primarily in terms of using theory and experiments in the search for understanding.
Adams emphasizes that engineering at the same time is also more than science. Some engineering requires little explicit science, he argues. There are other factors like the engineers’ ability to produce efficiently, compete successfully in the market, and engineers are motivated to solve problems successfully within a given schedule and budget. Engineers in design are rewarded by promotions, bonuses, and the satisfaction of getting a job well done, Adams argues. Design is more than analytical and scientific processes. He maintains that it requires a high level of creativity and practical knowledge about the physical world, and a great deal of arts enters into design. This makes it difficult to fit design into the structure of engineering schools. Ferguson (1992) focuses on engineering design as a contingent process subject to unforeseen complications and influences as the design develops. The precise outcome of the process cannot be deduced from its initial goal. Design is not as some textbooks would have us believe, he says, a formal, sequential process that can be summarized in a block diagram.
Bucciarelli (1996) focuses on the social processes of negotiating and achieving consensus among participants with different interests as an important part of design. He looks at it as a process which no overriding perspective, method, science, or technique can control or manage. The engineering education does not prepare the students for these kinds of challenges of design, Bucciarelli argues. Wulff (1997) emphasizes the heavy reliance on written, formal documentation and time pressure that characterizes large-scale projects of the design community-of-practice. Implementation of design specification and requirements depends on a process of communicating and negotiating these to the responsible people in design, she argues. Work is based on explicitly stated criteria and knowledge. Engineers acknowledge their lack of operational experience, but have difficulties in knowing how to relate to this kind of knowledge.
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To summarize, knowledge created within the engineering community-of-practice at engineering schools have an impact on the practice of design. The language of mathematical modeling and quantitative analytical problem solving techniques practiced at engineering schools is widely shared among engineers working in design. The engineering education is based on handling explicit knowledge. Engineering students are well exposed to analytical problem solving techniques within separate engineering disciplines, but have less experience from practical operational settings. The discipline based way of structuring knowledge at engineering schools is characteristic also of the engineering design community-of-practice. But design do not solely rely on explicit engineering knowledge. Tacit knowledge is also created within the design community-of-practice, but their work is to a large extent based on access to explicit data. I shall now go on to focus on knowledge within the operations community-of practice. First, I look at operations on Ekofisk in the 1980s. I shall now emphasize what constitutes knowledge in operation of onshore process plants.
2.1.4 Knowledge in operations
Maintenance is an important part of operations. Today, operations involves both production and maintenance. Production, however, has tended to have a stronger position in the offshore industry. In the 1980s, The Work Research Institute (AFI) did a series of studies at the Ekofisk field related to the theme “Safety and Social Integration at the Ekofisk Field” (Qvale, Aslaksen, Sagberg, 1986). In this research the focus was on safety and company philosophy (Keen, Aslaksen, Liaaen, Sagberg, 1986), health and medical service (Sagberg, 1986), contractors at Ekofisk (Heen, Aslaksen, 1986), and maintenance planning and work organization at Ekofisk (Heen, Aslaksen, Liaaen, 1987). The latter study on maintenance work together with two reports from SINTEF (The Foundation for Scientific and Industrial Research at the Norwegian Institute of Technology) by Nylehn and Skorstad (1981) and 0stvik (1982) on the same subject describe some characteristics of operations and maintenance work offshore on Ekofisk in the 1980s. Their experiences were as follows:
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Both on Ekofisk and other fields in the North Sea there has been limited time for maintenance planning offshore. It has not been given priority. The maintenance planning systems in use did not function very well. Operations and maintenance personnel tended to bypass the planning department in order to get work done. Planned maintenance work could be stopped halfway in order to handle more urgent repairs. It was therefore difficult to keep track of what kind of maintenance work was going on and to coordinate the activities. There were further problems related to spare parts not being available when needed and planned maintenance work that had to be postponed until proper parts could be obtained. This resulted in a lot of waiting, maintenance people would blame the planning for not doing a good job, and operations got angry because jobs took too long time.
Only a minor part of an operator’s daily work was planned, and work orders received often inadequately described the job. Most of what happened during a shift depended on the production flow and what urgent repairs or fault detection needed to be done. Production was the primary task of the organization offshore, by many referred to as the “owner” or the “king” of the platform. Maintenance was considered less important, and preventive maintenance was not valued. Equipment was run with little or no preventive maintenance until it broke down. “If it works, don’t touch it,” was the attitude.
There were no routines for gathering operations and maintenance experiences. Data on operation and maintenance of equipment were practically not available. There was no systematic registration of experiences for later use either in operations offshore or in design onshore. Some information was available through log-books and files, but it was not used. They did not contain the right information. Operators found it impractical to use the system. Instead, people kept private files and kept their experiences to themselves.
To summarize, operations and maintenance work offshore has been oriented towards keeping production continuously flowing. The people were responsible for runnin g
-23- Bridging Operation and Design the process on a continuous basis. Long-term planning and systematic transfer of operational experience have not been part of their work. What was characteristic of the offshore organization, however, was the strong feeling of community and close networks among the people. Perby (1995) has studied the work of operators in the process industry onshore and what is important in their profession. “Driving a car,” “seamen,” “steersmen,” and “craftsmen” are analogies and metaphors that convey something fundamental in the process operator’s work, she says. The professional knowledge of process operators is developed on the basis of working together with other process operators, Perby argues. There are several operators cooperating and sharing the knowledge it takes to run the process. A central conclusion of her research is that professional knowledge is characterized by an unbroken wholeness of issues related to each other and connections that are essential to the practice and impossible to separate. She sees this very much in contrast to the division, separation, and definitions of analytic thinking and in parallel to differences between communities-of- practice based on oral or written communication. She says:
“The world of professional knowledge does not only follow the logic that is connected to the analytical way of thinking; it follows another logic.”
Perby argues that when process operators carry out their work, they think in terms of practical situations. They are part of the process, and their knowledge is linked to the practice of being out in the plant. Their operational knowledge is concrete as well as abstract and it continuously moves from the one to the other, she says. Day-to-day operations are not separated from unexpected situations. When talking to operators about knowledge, one has to leave stereotype concepts of knowledge in terms of theory and practice, mind and body, concrete and abstract, Perby argues. The knowledge required for operators to run the process is a holistic and unbroken kind of knowledge. Operators make use of an intellect linked to both mind and body, in contrast to the cliche about separations between mind and body, Perby says. Some of their knowledge is in their hands, fingers; in their body. The sounds of the plant are also part of their knowledge base. Perby says:
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“When you work out in the plant you learn, from the experience you step by step gain, that different valves have different characteristics. You adjust your grip to the valve. Inside, at the screen, it looks pretty much the same, however. Jonas compared this to how to turn on a valve with the hands out in the plant: - Outdoor, you learn that you can
turn strongly on that valve, but this one you have to be careful with. It is opposite of the situation inside - and it is a kind of knowledge that remains if you come back to the control room a couple of years later.”
First of all, the work of process operators is related to production and processing. Perby describes the complexity as well as the concrete situations the operators have to handle. The diversity of different equipment systems and sub-systems makes it difficult to master the process. One process operator Perby talked to argued there were no particular part of the process that was difficult - it was the complexity of the huge number of small systems and different parts that made it difficult to handle, he said. There is a diversity of rhythms, times, and personalities within work linked to the process, she argues. There might be a number of pumps and valves of different sizes and types that are controlled and function differently, and placed in different parts of the plant. A vast set of experiences is needed to master the complexity of the process plant, Perby says. To become familiar with a process may take years of experience. The particularities of the different valves, pumps, and processing equipment. Some valves might be slow and more easy to operate manually than automatically. And different people may emphasize different aspects of the diverse knowledge that is required of an process operator in order to do his work well. Perby reports the following from a discussion on valve operations with an operator working in the processing plant:
“It has to do with issues like the size of a pump, the placing of a valve out in the plant, the routes of pipes and wires. It is knowledge that rests on having been out in the plant.”
Perby argues this knowledge is different from the knowledge of people in fabrication and design, depending on the experiences, memories, and focus of attention that have been developed through one’s practice. Designers look at the plant in a different way than the operators, due to the different set of experiences met in their practice, Perby
-25- Bridging Operation and Design argues. For the operators, however, it is a matter of being close to and part of the process, not observing it from a distance. The day to day operations and the responsibility of running the process form the viewpoint of the operators. To be prepared for the unexpected is an important part of operators’ work, Perby says. They have to be attentive to the process and prepared to take action if something should happen. Rhythms of active and passive periods characterize their work, and their awareness is primarily focused on the process while at work. As one of the operators Perby talked to said, comparing his work to fishermen at sea:
“The fishermen were seamen. They had learnt the seriousness of being at sea. When they sailed out in sun and beautiful weather they knew that a storm might come. As an operator I think the same way: what do I carry with me if the storm breaks out? As operator you can relax with a newspaper, but you are always aware that something can happen. ”
Perby argues that knowledge of operations includes more than an outsider is able to understand. This kind of insight implies a respect for the one who performs his work and the knowledge required to do this job, she argues. Tempte (1995) uses the term “the practical intellect” to draw attention to the complex thinking required in practical trades and warns against an excessive faith in the abstract intellect. He focuses on practical thinking as opposed to what he sees as a deeply rooted contempt for and skepticism about practical work in academia:
“The practical intellectualism is to be found in the workshop, in the studio, on the farm. It can hardly be described with scientific exactitude, but it can be sought in the magnetic field between our emotions, which create energy, and our intellect, which is capable of analysis. When these are in harmony, we become enabled to shape the new.”
A monologue or focus on either theory or practice creates nothing but stagnation, while a dialogue creates energy between the two, Tempte says. He thinks this kind of dialogue is largely missing in the way work is organized today. Goranzon (1992) focuses on the concept of ‘the practical intellect’ and knowledge gained in a practice. One does not learn a technique, he says, one learns to make proper judgments by
-26- Operations and design gaining personal experience. He argues that carrying out a practice means applying practical knowledge, knowledge that is based on experience gained from being active in a practice. In addition, one learns from observing and examining examples given by people working within the same practice. Goranzon agrees that the essence of a practice can not be expressed in a formal description, neither can knowledge embedded in a practice be passed directly on to other people. Interaction between people in the same professional group therefore becomes important. Goranzon argues there is a clear tendency to attach too much importance to theoretical knowledge at the expense of practical knowledge in design. He stresses the importance of respecting practical knowledge to a larger extent than what is the case today. As he says:
“It is an unavoidable fact that far more knowledge of the practical intellect is needed and, what is more, respect is needed too, because there is more to professional knowledge than one can realize as an outsider. ”
Goranzon, Perby, and Tempte bring attention to the tacit knowledge inherent in practice, a kind of knowledge that not easily lends itself to formal, systematic description and analysis. The knowledge part of the operations community-of- pracdce is different from the explicit kind of knowledge favored by the engineering community-of-practice in design and engineering schools. Nonaka and Takeuchi ’s (1995) description of Japanese knowledge traditions resembles more the way of knowing of the operations community-of-practice offshore. The way operations relate to a continuous production process, combined with the close contact with wind, water, and shifting weather conditions, and sense of community among people offshore, open up for looking at Nonaka and Takeuchi ’s perspectives on knowledge. In contrast to Western epistemology emphasizing abstract theories and precise, systematic knowledge, they argue that Japanese epistemology value the embodiment of direct, personal experience. They argue that Japanese companies have a very different understanding of knowledge in that they recognize that explicit knowledge only represents a tip of the iceberg.
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They view knowledge as being primarily tacit, something not easily visible, expressible, or communicated to others, and therefore depending more on the use of highly subjective insights, intuitions, and hunches as an integral part of knowledge. Western managers have to get out of the old mode of thinking that knowledge can be acquired, taught, and trained through manuals, books, or lectures, and instead pay more attention to the less formal and systematic side of knowledge, they argue. Nonaka and Takeuchi introduce the Japanese intellectual tradition focusing on the concept of oneness of humanity and nature, body and mind, and self and others. They argue that these traits all have formed the foundation of the Japanese view on knowledge as well as the Japanese approach to management practices. I shall briefly look into the way they reflect on these issues.
• Oneness of humanity and nature Nonaka and Takeuchi claim that the most important characteristic of the Japanese intellectual tradition is the concept of oneness of humanity and nature, and that Japanese epistemology has nurtured a delicate and sophisticated sensitivity to nature, and prevented an objectification of nature. They argue that the Japanese have not built up a rational thought of clear universality because of their lack of separation and objectification of self and nature. Further, they suggest that the inherent characteristics of the Japanese language seems to reveal a unique view of time and space, seeing time as a continuous flow of a permanently updated “present,” and they compare this to the sequential view of time found in the West. They regard the Japanese view of time as circular and momentalistic where everything appears and disappears occasionally and where ultimate reality is confined to “here and now.” As Nonaka and Takeuchi say:
“The Japanese have a tendency to stay in their own world of experience without appealing to any abstract or metaphysical theory in order to determine the relationship between human thought and nature. ”
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• Oneness of body and mind Another important intellectual tradition of Japan, as Nonaka and Takeuchi argue, is the emphasis on the whole personality. For the Japanese, knowledge means wisdom acquired from the perspective of the entire personality, and Nonaka and Takeuchi regard this as an orientation that has provided a basis for valuing personal and physical experience above indirect, intellectual abstraction. They see this tradition of emphasizing bodily experience to have contributed to the development of the methodology dubbed “oneness of body and mind” by Eisai, one of the founders of Zen Buddhism in medieval Japan.
Nonaka and Takeuchi view this concept to be in stark contrast to the Western philosophical tradition of separating body and mind. Referring to Nishida, Japan’s first theoretical philosopher who developed a philosophy through logical articulation of Zen experience, claiming that ultimate reality and existence are only found in the acquisition of “fact from pure experience,” Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that true knowledge cannot be obtained by theoretical thinking but only through one’s total mind and body.
• Oneness of self and others Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that the two major traditions of the oneness of humanity and nature and the oneness of body and mind have led the Japanese to value the interaction between self and others. They regard the Japanese view of human relationships to be based on a collective and organic understanding, the ideal of life being to exist among others harmoniously as a collective self. As they say:
“The ultimate reality for the Japanese lies in the delicate, transitional process of permanent flux, and in invisible and concrete matter, rather than in an eternal, unchanging, invisible, and abstract entity. They see reality typically in the physical interaction with nature and other human beings. These basic attitudes are clearly different from the prevailing Western view of the thinking self, seeking the eternal ideal as a detached spectator.”
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$ -.Sr 1 s « I Bridging Operation and Design
The continuous perspective of time in contrast to a sequential relationship to time, the emphasis on direct, personal, “on-the-spot ” experience in contrast to precise, systematic knowledge, together with the collective way of thinking offshore opposed to an individual focus in design onshore, make operational knowledge better accounted for by Nonaka and Takeuchi ’s description of Japanese knowledge traditions than by current scientific knowledge traditions. Personal, tacit, and practical knowledge is characteristic of the operations community-of-practice rather than the kind of explicit knowledge valued in design. I shall go on to focus on how to employ operational knowledge in design - the second research question of the thesis. The process of bringing design knowledge into operations is as equally important. However, the focus of this thesis is the bridging of knowledge in design.
2.2 How to take operational knowledge into account in design?
In the previous section I emphasized the different kinds of knowledge part of the communities-of-practice of operations and design. In this section I focus on conditions favoring a bridging of these different kinds of knowledge in design. First of all, there must be a will to bring operational experience into design. Next, one needs to overcome the barrier between the different kinds of knowledge of operations and design. Close physical distance and informal communities-of-practice of operations and design personnel are central conditions for bridging tacit and explicit knowledge of the respective operations and design communities-of-practice. Sharing knowledge through shared practice is an important step in integrating perspectives of operations and design. First, I look into literature on bringing operational experience into design.
2.2.1 Bringing operations into design
Corbett (1992) suggests bringing users into the design process in order to improve the design and better meet the specific needs of the operations and users. He argues that
-30- Operations and design since it is the user who has job-specific knowledge about the production process, that knowledge should influence the design in order to ensure effective operations. Brown and Duguid (1992) see the design process as the bridge between the opposites of use and design. They suggest aiming for a design process that better corresponds to and embodies the circumstances of operations, and emphasize the need for supporting an interaction between the community of users and the community of designers, and ensure a process capable of sharing emerging practices. They regard the objectives of the design process should be directed towards reconciling the seemingly conflicting but integral contributions of use and design.
Adler and Winograd (1992) suggest a dialogue in which designers and their clients together go beyond the traditional approaches to design. They focus on the concept of “usability” in design. They see the key challenge in the design process as being how to bring the skills of the users into design in order to create effective and productive working environments. If users are to successfully explore and use new technologies, usability needs a higher priority in design, they say. New technology is too often introduced into work places without sufficient planning for the implications for the work force, and therefore realizing too little of the potential of this technology. They argue that industry needs to develop more appropriate usability criteria and implement more effective processes to assure usability. Their key design criteria in the design process are related to communication between users and designers. They argue that the formal language of design is foreign and opaque for the general user, and that designers therefore need to develop ways of communicating with the users who are predominantly familiar with the work context and operational issues, not with design.
Norway has strong traditions in terms developing industrial democracy and broad participation processes in Norwegian onshore and offshore industry. In particular, I emphasize research on bringing operational experience into design of new offshore platform installation in the North Sea. It is mainly the Work Research Institute (API) in Norway that has been involved in research on the relationship between operations and design of offshore oil platforms. In 1977, API initiated an oil research program focusing on bringing operational experience into design. Prior to this, the research
-31 - Bridging Operation and Design institute had been involved in socio-technical design projects in shipping and land- based process industry (Rogne, 1974). With the growing Norwegian oil industry, API saw an opportunity of bridging offshore and onshore industrial development and having an impact on the new industry offshore. They wanted to be active participants in the process, and influence the process of developing industrial democracy and participation in work organizations offshore and onshore. The emphasis was on socio-technical design, i.e. a mutual dependence between human, social, technical, and economic factors in design. API wanted to promote this concept of socio- technical focusing on a joint technological and organizational development. To a certain extent, socio-technical design became the ideology of their work.
The oil companies fended off research proposals and were not interested in doing research in this area. They hesitated disturbing design projects with kind of work. Access to the field was difficult. But trust was gradually built, and researchers from API were allowed into offshore projects. They were invited to do studies at fields like Statfjord, Ekofisk, Brent, Murchison, and Frigg. The efficiency of the research was low due to the limited interest among the oil companies. The oil companies were not interested in critique or in the highlighting of previous errors, not wanting to weaken their position towards obtaining new production licenses from the Norwegian government (Qvale, 1985, 1990, API and Scanpower A/S, 1983). Saga Petroleum ’s Snorre project was the first development project where API was invited to actively participate. Their experiences from the Snorre project and Norske Shell and Statoil’s Troll project (Hanssen-Bauer, 1990; Qvale, 1993) make a good summary of the conclusions of the API oil research program.
Qvale and Hanssen-Bauer argue that the greatest challenge in integrating operational experience into platform design is the increasing of knowledge about and giving priority to the developing of a well-defined operations concept and transforming it to criteria useful in design. The question is twofold, Hanssen-Bauer: On the one hand, strengthening the operations environment in itself is more important than increasing the operations’ influence on design. On the other hand, there is a need to strengthen the knowledge of operations in the engineering environments. This is one of the main
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conclusions of API’s research program on North Sea oil activities. Hanssen-Bauer (1990) summarize the difficulties met in bringing operational experience into design the following way:
» Lack of will from oil companies to focus on operations High oil prices and general economic conditions for the oil industry in the 1970s provided little motivation for focusing on the efficiency of operations. Economic considerations have given priority to a short design phase and an early start of production, not to focus on the operations phase. However, due to poor design planning of the operations phase, projects tended to loose control over expenses in the commissioning and hook-up phases offshore and manning needs on the platforms tended to be 60-100 per cent higher than initially assumed in the designed estimates of living quarters capacities.
• Lack of systematic operational experience The oil companies’ focus on production rather than on maintenance has resulted in a lack of gathering and analyses of experience data on equipment and work processes offshore. Learning from operational experience has not been emphasized.
• Lack of experienced operations personnel available in design The oil companies have been reluctant to taking their people out of production and into design, or initiating any kind of rotation between operations and design personnel. It was therefore a lack of people with operational experience available in design. It was easier to influence the project when requirements could be formulated into specific criteria accepted for use in design.
• The structure of a design project The way in which design projects were organized and responsibilities split between different groups of people made it difficult to have an operations input. The size of the projects and number of people involved made it difficult to perform a systematic optimization from an operations perspective at the time of design.
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Further, there was no-one taking on a total design perspective as part of the project. It was difficult for operations people to give the information needed to the right people in time. In addition, operations personnel tended to be involved too late in the project to have any impact on the design. Operations requirements failed to be presented early in the project.
Projects tended to be short of time and therefore inclined to choose solutions that were just “good enough, ” not having time or knowledge to optimize the design from an operations point of view. Their primary concern was to finish the work on time and within the budget. They preferred well known solutions to evaluating new ideas. If a solution had been accepted previously, they were likely to keep to it. Project organizations therefore tended not to be very receptive towards operations input.
• No routines on how to involve operations personnel in design There were no routines on how to involve operations personnel in the project, and how to ensure feedback from the project to the operations people involved. This caused much frustration among operation personnel, who felt they were not being listened to and therefore gradually tended to withdraw.
• Lack of operational knowledge among engineers in design Engineering companies have little insight into operations conditions offshore. They lack feedback from the operating companies on their designs, and their engineers are not trained to think in terms of operations and maintenance. They have no knowledge about operations conditions offshore and do not see the consequences of their choices made in design. Project organization regarded operations input as little coordinated and of minor value and importance.
Central issues in operations like easy access to equipment, good transport ways, sufficient lifting equipment, workshop areas, and room for spare parts were easy to ignore and not taken care of in design, because of the lack in knowledge as to how operations were organized offshore. Instead, the layout on the early platform solutions in the North Sea tended to complicate operations work instead of supporting it.
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• Lack of integration of operations and design personnel It was difficult for operations personnel to have an impact on design if they could not be physically integrated with the design team. It was decisive that they develop good personal relationships to the engineers in design and thereby be able to influence directly through a personal, informal network. The closer operations personnel could work to the engineers, the better influence they could have on the design, especially on layout-related issues. Further, in order to translate operational experience into a language that people in design would be able to understand, it was important to work in close physical contact to each other. Communications then improved.
To summarize, bringing users into design is essential to be able to design for operational effectiveness and low-operating costs. In the context of North Sea platform design, lack of will or need of the oil industry to focus on operations has led to high maintenance costs of existing platform installation offshore. The process of bringing operational experience into design has further been impeded by the lack of systematic operational experience offshore, lack of experienced operational personnel made available to design projects onshore, a project structure not facilitating integration of operational knowledge, lack of routines on involving operations personnel into design projects, lack of operational knowledge among design personnel, and the lack of integration of operations and design personnel. I shall now go on to focus on how close physical interaction and integration of operations and design personnel facilitates a sharing of knowledge across these communities-of- practice.
2.2.2 Sharing practice in operations and design
Participatory design in practice requires a shared form of life, a shared social and cultural background, and a shared language, Ehn (1992) argues. This does not only mean users participating in design, but also designers participating in use, he says. In order for designers to come up with useful designs, they need access to more Bridging Operation and Design
information than explicitly can be stated as theoretical knowledge. Designers therefore have, in some way, to take part in the practice they are supposed to design for. Professional designers will have to share their practice with the user and further be concerned with the practical operational setting and the knowledge of the user, when organizing the design process. Ehn argues that “expert design” strategies too often have turned out as failures in term of usability. Design is a practical activity, he argues, and in design-by-doing the user is able to express both theoretical and practical understanding which gives designers access to the more tacit part of their knowledge. Practical understanding in the sense of practical experiences from doing something and having sensuous experiences from earlier cases defies formal description, he says. If made explicit, it would become something different.
Ehn (1992) proposes to shift the focus of design from correctness of description towards an intervention into practice. He argues that this way of thinkin g would bring the attention to the crucial role of skills and participation in design, and to the opportunity of transcending some of the limits of formalization in practical design. He suggests an approach to design involving practical use and understanding rather than detached reflection. He sees practical understanding as a type of skill that seriously needs to be taken into design, and argues that a focus on practical skills is not a drawback, but a necessary condition, to creative design. He argues that traditional approaches to design have been influenced by the assumption that practical skills can be exhaustively described in a formal way and further oriented towards deskilling the user. Ehn focuses on participatory design, a process in which designers and users may learn from each other, and where participation of skilled users significantly contribute to operational efficient and user-friendly designs.
Ehn focuses on the importance of involving operational personnel in design of new technology and the role of practical knowledge in design. In Norway, the concept of participation has been particularly important in developing work democracy in Norwegian industry. Levin (1990) describes how worker participation played an important role in shaping the new technology and work organization of a Norwegian fertilizer plant. The key factor in the design process, he argues, was the way in which
-36- Operations and design workers took part in different phases of engineering work. What the workers experienced as the most fruitful way to communicate with the project was by talking directly to the engineers involved. They felt this was an effective way of bridging the gap between theoretical and practical thinking on how to design and operate the plant. A few workers further joined the construction people, which turned out to be a very effective way of facilitating learning. These workers indicated that concrete experiences from construction of the new technology, rather than formal lectures on process and regulation technology, was the way of learning that most closely resembled the way of learning in their own practice.
In designing the new plant, the engineers themselves acknowledged their lack of knowledge about operations of the process and what kind of judgments were involved in day-to-day operations. They realized that their engineering knowledge needed to be supplemented by the operating personnel’s knowledge about how to run the process. Levin argues, however, that there is a danger of management and engineers controlling the process through their former practice and training in handling scientific engineering, and economic models. Based on another research project on worker participation in design of new technology at six Norwegian chemical plants, Levin (1983) recognizes the difficulties in bridging operations personnel and engineers because of the differences in language, academic background, and lack of understanding of the work setting and constraints of the other part
Levin (1997) emphasizes the importance of engineers and scientists working together with operating personnel in the process of developing new technology. Just as important as bringing operational knowledge into design of new technology, is transfer of engineering knowledge from design to operations, he argues. The tacit knowledge of engineers in design needs to be communicated to the operations personnel, in order to make proper use of the technology. Levin suggests that engineers must work together with operators through the design process and make it as easy as possible for the operators to utilize the new technology.
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Aase (1997) focuses on experience transfer processes in the offshore industry specifically. In order to ensure proper experience transfer from operations to design, from one design project to another, or from design to operations, she argues that people in operations and design more than anything need opportunities to meet and communicate. The existing approaches to experience transfer within the offshore industry today are based upon exchange of explicit knowledge, while people have negative experiences with these methods. Written documents, hand-books, and formal procedures alone have proven to have limited effect. What people find useful in order to exchange operations and design knowledge is the use of personal networks and dialogue, where knowledge can be shared in an informal, direct way. Wulff (1997) argues that implementation of operations requirements depends on operations personnel being fully present in design, and able to communicate and negotiate their requirements to the project.
Bums and Stalker (1961) also emphasize the importance of close, personal relationships in order to bridge operations and design. They argue that the way in which design is respected and valued, as opposed to operations, contributes to consolidate the social barriers of status distinction between operations and design. In order to bridge the people in design, who often have common educational background and are socialized into a certain way of thinking and acting, and the often unskilled workers in operations who lack this kind of common frame of reference and language, close personal relationship between people in operations and design are important. Bums and Stalker argue that the resulting design is as much determined by the effectiveness of the working relationship between engineers and user, as by individual contribution from people from either side.
Among their studies was the relationship between engineers and users in the wartime organization of radar development in Britain and Germany. In this case Bums and Stalker look at the close relationship that was established in Britain between the personnel of the Telecommunication Research Establishment (T.R.E.) and the serving officers in the Royal Air Force and officials in the Air Ministry. In the design process the differences in rank were obscured or ignored, and when a particular type of
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equipment or an operational item should be developed, both scientists and users were there to discuss it. There was thus an intimate, personal connection between the people who had the operational knowledge and were facing the problems, and those who had an intimate knowledge of the scientific techniques that formed the basis for successful innovative design. The result of this was that the laboratory personnel developed an emotional as well as intellectual appreciation of the pressing operational difficulties, needs and problems, which they could not have acquired by any other means. Equally important, Bums and Stalker argue, was that the operations people began to acquire knowledge about the potentialities of the technology, which they could only gain through meeting the people who originally designed them. Bums and Stalker argue that this intimate joining of operational needs and technical possibilities in an immediate, personal, informal way made possible the rapid application of the techniques to the problems which took place.
In Germany, however, Bums and Stalker report that there was a strict and formal system in which design specifications were sent to research laboratories appointed to the task. The laboratories would develop a design without any knowledge about operational needs and were therefore, in many cases, not able to meet them adequately. Operations people could not envisage the potentialities of the technology, nor could the designers appreciate the problems in operational use. Bums and Stalker’s conclusion was that the strong lead which Britain obtained and held, was due to the appreciation of the supreme importance of bringing technical knowledge into close physical contact with the user ’s requirements.
Research by Allen (1971) on communication networks in R&D laboratories also indicates that informal relations and close physical location are essential factors in the development process of new designs. He focuses on the importance of close, informal relationships in order to facilitate communication between practitioners of different fields of knowledge. What matters, he argues, is to bring people into contact who would otherwise not meet, and create facilities for promoting interaction. As he says: Bridging Operation and Design
“Physical location is also a very strong determinant of interaction patterns. People are more likely to communicate with those who are located nearest to them. Individuals and groups can therefore be positioned I ways that will either promote or inhibit communication. ”
To summarize, physical integration, informal cooperation and close contact between people in operations and design are important factors in bridging operations and design knowledge. For designers to gain access to the practical operational context they design for and the tacit knowledge part of the operations community-of-practice are essential factors to the design community-of-practice in order to create operational effective designs. Operations personnel further need experience from the work context of design. Integrated and informal communities-of-practice of operations and design personnel are significant sites of innovations enabling one to go beyond current practice of operations and design. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) present a model of knowledge creation based on interaction of explicit and tacit knowledge in particular. I investigate their theory on employing tacit operational knowledge in the process of creating new knowledge. First, I mention one concrete examples of innovative thinking within the Japanese car industry, Nissan’s Primera project.
2.2.3 Interaction of tacit and explicit knowledge
In Nissan’s Primera project there was a strong focus on taking the tacit operational knowledge of new models into account in design. Skilled test drivers were employed to evaluate and communicate their experience of the new models to the engineers in design. Further, design engineers were taken along on test drives to gain a direct and bodily experience of their designs themselves, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) report.
Operations personnel often have an abundance of highly practical information which they often find it difficult to transform into useful knowledge. They find it difficult to communicate the importance of that information to others, since what makes sense in their context may change or even lose meaning when communicated to people in a different context. Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that the major task of management is to
-40- Operations and design transform this kind of confusion into a purposeful knowledge creation process, and that management and organizational theories of today lack this kind of perspective and instead largely neglect the subjective, bodily, and tacit aspects of knowledge. In their model of knowledge creation, they see organizational knowledge creation as a continuous and dynamic interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge.
“The key to acquiring tacit knowledge is experience. Without some form of shared experience, it is extremely difficult for one person to project her- or himself into another individual ’s thinking process. The mere transfer of information will often make little sense, if it is abstracted from associated emotions and specific contexts in which shared experiences are embedded. ”
Based on their understanding of tacit and explicit knowledge, Nonaka and Takeuchi propose a model on knowledge creation in a business organization based on four different modes of knowledge conversations between tacit and explicit knowledge. The interaction between explicit and tacit knowledge is the key dynamics of knowledge creation in this model. They argue that knowledge creation takes place at three different levels in an organization, namely at an individual level, a group level, and an organizational level. They distinguish between the form of knowledge interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge, and the level of knowledge creation between the individual and the organization. Tacit and explicit knowledge, however, are not seen as totally separate forms of knowledge, but as mutually complementary entities that interact with and interchange into each other. They view this model to be dynamic and anchored to the critical assumption that human knowledge is created and expanded through social interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge. The four processes of knowledge conversion constituting knowledge creation are the following:
• Conversion from tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge (socialization) • Conversion from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge (extemalization) • Conversion from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge (combination) • Conversion from explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge (internalization)
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Nonaka and Takeuchi stress the importance of conversion from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge. They see organizational knowledge creation as a spiral process, starting at the individual level and moving up through expanding “communities-of- interaction,” crossing intra- and inter-organizational boundaries, and argue that having a highly personal insight or a hunch is of little value to the company unless the individual is able to convert it into explicit knowledge, thus allowing it to be shared with others in the company. I shall now briefly present the four different processes of knowledge conversion in the model.
• Socialization: from tacit to tacit Nonaka and Takeuchi see socialization as a process of sharing experiences and thereby creating shared tacit knowledge. They emphasize that the key to acquire tacit knowledge is through experience. As part of this process, individuals may acquire tacit knowledge directly from others without using language, like apprentices work with theirs masters and learn craftsmanship not through language but through observation, imitation, and practice. Without some form of shared experience it is difficult for one person to understand another individual ’s thinking process, and the transformation will make little sense if abstracted from associated emotions and the specific contexts in which shared experiences are embedded.
• Extemalization: from tacit to explicit Nonaka and Takeuchi view extemalization as the process of articulating tacit knowledge into explicit concepts. They see this as the quintessential knowledge creation process in that tacit knowledge becomes explicit, taking the shapes of metaphors, analogies, concepts, hypotheses, or models, and thereby becoming available to the organization. The extemalization mode of knowledge conversion may typically be seen in the process of concept creation, and it is triggered by dialogue or collective reflection. Among the four modes of knowledge conversion, extemalization holds the key to knowledge creation, because it creates new, explicit concepts from tacit knowledge.
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• Combination: from explicit to explicit Combination is seen as a process of systematizing concepts into a knowledge system and combinin g different bodies of already existing explicit knowledge. Individuals may exchange and combine knowledge, either through documents, meetings, telephone conversations, or through computerized communication networks. Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that configuration of existing information through sorting, adding, combining, and categorizing may lead to new knowledge. They regard knowledge creation carried out in formal education and training at schools to usually takes this form.
• Internalization: from explicit totacit Internalization is seen as a process of embodying explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi hold the view that experiences gained through socialization, extemalization, and combination, becoming part of an individual ’s tacit knowledge, represent an internalization process. For explicit knowledge to become tacit, they maintain it helps if knowledge is verbalized or diagrammed into documents, manuals, or oral stories.
• From personal to organizational knowledge Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that new knowledge always starts with the individual, and that organizations cannot create knowledge on their own without the initiative of the individual and the interaction that takes place at group level. Tacit knowledge of the individual is viewed as the basis of organizational knowledge creation, and the task of an organization is to mobilize this tacit knowledge created and accumulated at an individual level, and to bring it up to the organizational level. Unless shared tacit knowledge becomes explicit, they argue, it cannot easily get an impact on the organization as a whole. Trough dialogue, discussions, sharing experience, and observation, they see knowledge to be amplified or crystallized at the group level. Teams therefore play a central role in their knowledge creation model in providing a shared context in which individuals can interact with each other, and where team members create new point of views through dialogue and discussion.
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Since tacit knowledge cannot easily be communicated or passed on to others, but is acquired primarily through experiences not easily expressible in words, the sharing of tacit knowledge among a diverse group of individuals from various backgrounds, and with different perspectives, emotions, and motivation becomes critical in their model for organizational knowledge creation to take place. To create such a sharing, Nonaka and Takeuchi argue that we need a “field” in which individuals can interact with each other through face-to-face dialogues, a place to share experiences and synchronize one’s bodily and mental rhythms, and where mutual trust can be built. Shared tacit knowledge is verbalized into words and phrases, and finally crystallized into explicit concepts.
To summarize, the interaction of tacit and explicit knowledge is important in creation of new knowledge. Tacit knowledge acquired in an operational context needs to be shared and made explicit for creation of new knowledge to occur. Socialization, extemalization, combination, and internalization of knowledge constitute important steps in the process of creating new knowledge. Tacit knowledge of the individual represent the basis of organizational learning. Unless personal tacit knowledge becomes shared within a wider community-of-practice or made into explicit knowledge, organizational learning is difficult. I shall now look at research done at the Organizational Learning Center at MIT on dialogue as a mode of sharing tacit knowledge of different communities-of-practice.
2.2.4 Dialogue as a mode of transforming tacit knowledge
Isaacs (1993) focuses on the importance of bringing feelings, worries, frustrations, and beliefs shared within a community-of-practice on the table and expressing what is on one’s mind and carefully look at the feelings involved and learn about the assumptions behind ones thinking. His experience with dialogue is that one challenge for the participants is not to hide the differences between people involved, but to find a way of letting them be explored. He stresses that the purpose of a dialogue is not to
-44- Operations and design lapse into a debate in which two parties try to win, but that a dialogue is built on a collective thinking and inquiry.
Isaacs claims that this research into the concept of dialogue is opening up a new area of research that is central to the field of management and organizational learning in terms of understanding collective thinking and communication. To solve problems in complex systems, we must learn how to tap into the collective intelligence of groups of knowledgeable people, he says. Isaacs argues that organizational conversation most frequently tend to lapse into debates where one side wins and another looses, while both parties maintain their concepts and suppress their deeper inquiry. Dialogues on the other hand, he says, is a way of collective thinking and inquiry, a process of transforming the quality of conversation and, in particular, the thinking that lies behind it. He gives the following work definition:
“Dialogue can initially be defined as a sustained collective inquiry into the processes, assumptions, and certainties that compose everyday experience.”
Isaacs focuses on dialogue as a means of bridging different opposing perspectives and parties involved within or between organizations. He looks at dialogue as a mode of transforming tacit collective thought in social settings. He sees the experience of dialogue to be of a special kind, namely the experience of the meaning embodied in a communi ty of people. If people are brought into a setting where they may become conscious of the very process by which they form their tacit assumptions and beliefs and are rewarded for doing so, people can develop a common strength and capability for working and creating things together. This, Isaacs says, is a free flow of inquiry and meaning allowing new possibilities to emerge.
Dialogue, Isaacs argues, seeks to unveil the ways in which collective patterns of thinking and feeling unfold, both as conditioned, mechanistic reflexes, and potentially as fluid, dynamically, creative exchanges. He claims that as opposed to consensus building, dialogue seeks to let people learn how to think together, not just in the sense of analyzing a shared problem, but in the sense of surfacing fundamental assumptions
-45- Bridging Operation and Design and gaining insights into why they arise. Dialogue can thus produce an environment where people consciously are participating in the creation of shared meaning. Through this people begin to discern their relationship to a larger pattern of collective experience. Only then can the shared meaning lead to new and aligned action, he says. Dialogue, Isaacs argues, produces insights into collective challenges that can alter people ’s way of thinking and acting in their system. Dialogue is an attempt to perceive the world with new eyes,not merely solving the problems without examining the way of thinking which originally created these problems.
In his research into this field, Isaacs has drawn on works by and conversations with the physicist David Bohm who suggested that dialogue, as a new form of conversation, should focus on bringing to the surface and altering the “tacit infrastructure ” of thought. Bohm argued that as groups of people learn to watch and articulate the assumptions and pressures inherent in individual and collective thought, they may catch and alter their self-defeating and self-deceptive processes. He suggested that part of what he considered a dialogue is for people to realize what is on each other ’s minds, without coming to any conclusion or judgments. The first thing, he said, is to take in all the opinions. You have to become aware of your own reactions of hostility, or whatever you may feel, and see by the way people are behaving what their reactions are. Bohm saw dialogue as part of collective thought - people thinking together. He argued that the object of a dialogue is not to analyze things, or to win an argument, or to exchange opinions. Rather, it is to suspend ones opinions and listen to everybody’s opinions, suspend them, and see what all it means (Bohm, 1990).
In the beginning, Bohm said, people won’t trust each other, but if they see the importance of the dialogue, they will work with it. And as they start to know each other, they will begin to trust each other. He argued that this sharing of minds, of consciousness, is more important than the content of the opinions. There is no place in the dialogue for the principle of authority and hierarchy, he said. Listening to all the opinions will bring people together. The defense of opinions separates people. Bohm argues that the principle should at least be to let people come to know each
-46- Operations and design other ’s assumptions, listen to their assumptions, and become aware of what they are. He sees the problem is often that people don’t really know what the other person’s assumption is, but react according to what they think it is (Bohm, 1990).
To understand dialogue and its contribution to collective learning, Isaacs argues, one must explore the domain of collective thought, and in particular, the underlying processes that seem to govern it. He suggests this focus opens an inquiry into the nature of “tacit thought, ” as it is held by individuals and collectives. As Bohm conceived it, dialogue would kindle a new mode of paying attention, to perceive, as they arise, the assumptions taken for granted, the flow of polarization of opinions, the rules for acceptable and unacceptable conversation, and the methods for managing differences. Since these are collective, individual reflection would not be enough to bring these matters to the surface, Isaacs argue. And since reflection, by its nature, looks back at what has already taken place, he says, it is innately limited for anticipating assumptions, opinions, rules, and differences that are only now emerging. As Isaacs sees it, dialogue is central as a means for promoting collective thinking and communication, and he focuses on how the mindfulness embodied in dialogues involves an awareness of the living experience of thinking:
“The mindfulness embodied in dialogue involves awareness of the living experience of thinking, not reflection after the fact about it. For us to gain insight into the nature of our tacit thought, we must somehow learn to watch or experience it, in action. This work would require a form of collective attention and learning. Dialogue ’s purpose is to create a setting where conscious collective mindfulness can be maintained.”
Varela et al. (1991) go deeper into the concept of mindfulness in terms of bridging different communities-of-practice and traditions of knowledge. They emphasize that the scientific community-of-practice need to enlarge its horizon to encompass non- Westem traditions of reflecting upon experience, and a dialogue between these different traditions of knowledge in order to bridge mind in science and mind in experience. Particularly, they suggest to focus on mindful observation of everyday experience:
47 Bridging Operation and Design
“Mindfulness means that the mind is present in embodied everyday experience, and mindfulness techniques are designed to lead the mind back from its theories and preoccupations, back from the abstract attitude, to the situation of one’s experience itself.”
The purpose of mindfulness and awareness is to become mindful, to experience what occupies one’s mind, to be present with one’s mind, and come closer to one’s ordinary experience rather than further from it. They see mindfulness and awareness as a means to enable the mind to be fully present in one’s actions, so that one’s behavior becomes progressively more responsive and aware. What Varela et al. suggest is a change in the nature of reflection from an abstract, disembodied way of reflecting to become more mindful and open-ended. When focusing on embodied reflection in which body and mind have been brought together, they wish to convey that reflection is not just on experience, but a form of experience in itself. When reflection is done in this way, it enables one to cut the chain of habitual thought patterns and preconceptions, so that it can lead to an open-ended way of reflecting, they say.
Ross (Senge et al., 1994) regards the concept of “skillful discussion ” to be a modified version of the dialogue concept, emphasizing the intentions of some kind of convergent thinking involved in practical business situations. He sees skillful discussion to be lying on a midpoint between “raw debate ” and “dialogue, ” arguing that all team would profit from mindful reflection on their own performance. He says:
“Team unquestionably benefit from dialogue - from exploring shared meaning - but they also have the everyday need to come to a pressing conclusion, decision, or plan. To accomplish this work productively, skillful discussion incorporates some of the techniques and devices of dialogue and action learning, but always focused on tasks.”
Trust, openness, encouragement and reward of new perspectives in a group are important ingredients in preparing the ground for skillful discussion, Ross says. Paying attention to your own intentions, balancing advocacy with inquiry, building
-48- Operations and design shared meaning, using self-awareness as a resource, and exploring impasses are five techniques he finds particularly useful for team to focus on.
To summarize, dialogue and skillful discussions are important modes of sharing tacit knowledge of different communities-of-practice. Dialogue opens up for collective thinking and inquiry into everyday experiences of the different communities-of- practice involved. Attentiveness and mindful reflection towards tacit knowledge of two communities-of-practice as different as operations and design is important in order to bridge the different kinds of knowing of operations and design. The concept of skillful discussion is a modified version of dialogue. It offer a practical methodology on how to bridge knowledge of different communities-of-practice in a practical business setting. Building trust among the people involved is another key factor to the process of dialogue. I shall now investigate Chinese sources of knowledge on the dynamics of dichotomous relationships like operations and design. Harmony between opposites is seen as a fundamental concept to bridging opposing kinds of knowledge and communities-of-practice.
2.2.5 The dynamics of dichotomous relationships
To have a fresh look at the bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice, I take a step outside the Cartesian framework of current scientific thinking into Japanese and Chinese thinking. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) see a strong propensity in the West to view the world in terms of dichotomies, arguing that the starting point towards creating new knowledge is to recognize the need to transcend beyond dichotomies like East/West, tacit/explicit, theory/practice, or operations/design. They see these dichotomies not as opposing ends of a dichotomy but rather as mutually complementary entities that dynamically interact with and interchange into each others to create something new. They emphasize the potential of innovative thinking in transcending these dichotomies. They say:
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“The dynamic and simultaneous interaction between two opposing ends of “false” dichotomies creates a solution that is new and different. In other words, A and B create C, which synthesizes the best of A and B. C is separate and independent of A and B, not something “in-between ” or “in the middle of’ A and B.”
The Chinese use the terminology of Yin and Yang to address the opposing parts of a dichotomy. Yuanji theory provides a theoretical framework and conceptual model on how to conceive of the dynamic relationship of dichotomies and creation of new knowledge (Zhang, 1992). Yuanji theory state that new knowledge is formed in the harmonious union (Huangji) of the quintessence (Yin-in-Yang and Yang-in-Yin) of the dichotomies (Yin-Yang). Harmony and mutual sympathy between two opposing ends of a dichotomy is a prerequisite for the creation of new knowledge. These processes are fully illustrated by the Yuanji Diagram.
Figure 2.2 The Yuanji Diagram
The S-curve that divides the outer circle represents the distinction of Yin and Yang. These two interrelated but opposing parts mutually generate and transform each other, a process which can lead to creation of Yin-in-Yang and Yang-in-Yin, symbolized by the small circles called the “fish eyes.” They illustrate the self-generated transformation of Yin into Yang and Yang into Yin. According to Yuanji theory, the central circle of the diagram is the harmonious union of Yin-in-Yang and Yang-in- Yin, created by the essence of Yin and Yang.
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Yuanji theory provide a visual model and theoretical framework of the dynamic interaction of opposing ends of dichotomous relationships and the knowledge creation process emphasized by Nonaka and Takeuchi. It represents an interesting conceptual framework to the process of bridging the opposing kinds of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. I shall bring with me this model and the theories previously reviewed into a redefinition of the initial research questions.
2.3 Research questions revised
In this section I shall first focus on the research question on how to take operational experience into account into design. Secondly, I emphasize the question of different kinds of knowledge in operations and design. These are questions I shall come back to answer in later chapters.
2.3.1 Bridging knowledge in operations and design
Based on theory reviewed in this chapter, I redefine the research question of how to take operational experience into account in design to a question of bridging the different kinds of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. Inspired by Yuanji theory, I suggest the following model to conceptualize the process of bridging knowledge of operations and design:
Operations- O in.nMi'an Design
Innovation
Operations
Figure 2.3 The Yuanji Diagram of operations and design
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In order to successfully create new knowledge and operational-effective solutions in design, the operations and design communities-of-practice need knowledge of each other ’s communities-of-practice. The operations community-of-practice offshore need tacit and explicit knowledge of the design community-of-practice onshore (design-in-operations), and the design community-of-practice need explicit and tacit knowledge of the operations community-of-practice offshore (operations-in-design). Three factors become particularly important in this bridging process of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice:
• In-depth knowledge of operations in design (operations-in-design) • In-depth knowledge of design in operations (design-in-operations) • Mutual sympathy between the operations and design communities-of-practice
According to Nonaka and Takeuchi people in operations and design need shared experiences from participating in each other ’s communities-of-practice to build mutual trust and understanding of the different kinds of knowledge and work contexts of operations and design. Sharing practice and working side by side are important elements in bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of- practice. Bums and Stalker argue that close physical interaction of operations and design personnel is essential to sharing tacit knowledge of the two communities-of- practice, reaching a common understanding on ways in which to create operational- effective solutions in design. Mutual understanding, sympathy, and respect between the operations and design communities-of-practice is necessary for creation of new knowledge to take place. One then becomes able to transcend the current practice of operations and design and make use of the innovative potential of the opposing relationship of operations and design. Based on these reflections, I redefine the second research question of the thesis:
1. What are the conditions forbridging knowledge in operations and design? • What role do close physical interaction and integration of operations and design personnel play in the process of bridging knowledge of operations and design?
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• To what extent is previous knowledge of the other community-of-practice decisive for creating new knowledge in design? • To what extent is mutual sympathy and respect important for bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice?
These are questions I shall answer through the case studies of the two design projects of Phillips Petroleum Company Norway, the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J design projects presented in chapter 4 and 5. I further compare operations’ involvement in the design process of the two different Ekofisk II platforms in chapter 7, and in chapter 6 I shall discuss research question number one.
2.3.2 Knowledge in operations and design
Based on the theories investigated in this chapter, I reformulate the question of what constitutes knowledge in operations versus knowledge in design to a question to what extent the communities-of-practice of operations and design are based on different kinds of knowledge. Interesting questions to answer in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J case descriptions are:
2. Are operations and design two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge? • What characterizes the knowledge-creation process of the operations and design communities-of-practice? • To what extent do the operations and design communities-of-practice relate differently to the dimension of time? • What distinguishes the educational background of people in operations and design?
These are questions I shall touch on in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and 2/4 J case descriptions and finally explore in chapter 6.
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-54- Chapter 3 Introduction to Phillips and Ekofisk II
3.1 Ekofisk I
Phillips Petroleum was the first company to express its interest in exploring hydrocarbons on the Norwegian continental shelf. Few believed the North Sea concealed any rich oil or gas deposits, but a gas discovery in the Netherlands caused geologists to revise their thinking. In 1962, the American based company Phillips Petroleum applied for permission to conduct geological surveys in the marine areas off Norway and established a branch office in Stavanger (Phillips, 1994a).
In 1963 Norway’s sovereignty was declared regarding exploration and production of subsea natural resources. It was established that the Norwegian state had the property rights of any natural resources in the continental shelf, and the government was authorized to award licenses for exploration and production. The same year commercial companies were granted permission to carry our preparatory surveys and reconnaissance, which entitled them to perform seismic surveys. In 1965 Norway, England, and Denmark agreed to divide the continental shelf according to the median line principle, and the first Norwegian licensing round was announced. Phillips Petroleum Norway Group received three licenses over a total of 11 blocks, the Production License 018 (PL018) covering the Ekofisk area being one of them (The Royal Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 1997).
In 1968 Phillips found gas and condensate on Cod, but the discovery was not considered commercial at that time. In December 1969, however, oil was found on Ekofisk, a field located in the middle of the North Sea, close to the border between the British and Norwegian sector. It soon became obvious that it was a large discovery. Phillips Petroleum Company Norway marked the start for Norway as an oil producing nation when the Ekofisk field came on stream in 1971. It has since then proved to be one of the world’s largest offshore oil and gas fields (Phillips, 1995a).
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Figure 3.1 The Greater Ekofisk Area
Until the Ekofisk II development, the Ekofisk area has consisted of eight oil and gas fields and 27 platform installations. Ten of the platforms are linked to the Ekofisk Complex which serves as the production and transportation hub. The Ekofisk Tank (2/4 T) is part of the complex, and three other platforms (2/4 A, 2/4 B, 2/4 K) are located nearby. The remaining platforms are placed on outlying fields (Eldfisk Edda, Embla, West Ekofisk, Albuskjell, Tor, Cod). Many of these will cease production when start-up of Ekofisk 2/4 J in 1998 (Phillips, 1995a).
The Ekofisk field average gross production in 1996 was 246 thousand barrels of crude oil per day and 552 million cubic feet of natural gas (Phillips, 1997). The gas is forwarded to Emden in the United Kingdom and the oil to Teeside, Germany. Oil and gas from Valhall, Hod, Gyda, Ula, Statfjord, Heimdal, Tommeliten and Gullfaks are also piped through Ekofisk. To counter the gradual reduction of natural reservoir pressure, Phillips decided in 1983 to inject water into the Ekofisk reservoirs. By 1987 the production had declined to less than 70 thousand barrels per day. Field-wide water flooding was therefore initiated. In 1996 the water injection capacity was 870 thousand barrels per day, with the dual benefit of increasing oil production and reducing the Ekofisk subsidence rate.
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' ' ' ' -j
Figure 3.2 Ekofisk production and water injection wells
Owing to a pressure drop in the Ekofisk field reservoirs, there is a subsidence of the sea bed. The subsidence was discovered in 1984 when registering that the platform decks of the Ekofisk complex were 2.5 meters closer to sea level than they originally were. As the story goes, someone fishing from the Ekofisk complex started to count the vertical row of holes on the Ekofisk tank. He was puzzled by the number he got. He checked with photos from production start-up, and discovered that several holes were missing. The tank was sinking. In 1996 the annual subsidence rate was 38 cm, and total subsidence was 7 meters. The Ekofisk II installations are therefore designed to be prapared for another 14 meters of subsidence.
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A major effort was immediately initiated to counteract the subsidence problem, resulting in a decision to jack up the platforms. During the summer 1987, six of the nine platforms at the Ekofisk Complex were jacked up six meters. The Ekofisk tank, the million-barrel storage and processing facility, could not be jacked up because of its weight and design. To protect personnel and processing equipment from the weather, it was decided to build a concrete protective barrier around the tank. In 1989, the two completed half sections of the barrier were successfully installed around the Ekofisk tank.
Figure 3.4 The Ekofisk Complex in 1994
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3.2 Ekofisk II
3.2.1 Ekofisk II project background
In 1989, the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) ordered Phillips to conduct Concept Safety Evaluations on nearly all Ekofisk platforms, an evaluation which concluded that the Ekofisk tank (2/4 T) did not meet the necessary safety requirements. In October 1992, the NPD informed Phillips that their operating license would be withdrawn by the end of 1995 if nothing was done to improve the situation, and they demanded that Phillips draw up a long-term plan for the Ekofisk complex. In addition to the safety issues, increasingly high operating costs were associated with the existing Ekofisk platforms.
In July 1992, Phillips established an Ekofisk complex evaluation team whose goal was to evaluate long term scenarios for the Ekofisk complex. Phillips had a choice of either investing in new production facilities or continuing to fight against the rising operating and maintenance costs and the expensive modifications in order to conform with current safety regulations, especially on the Ekofisk tank. Other concerns were declining production, low prices, and the threat of continued subsidence. The conceptual and feasibility stages of the Ekofisk development project (Ekofisk II) involved the assessment of six scenarios, ranging from the establishing of a new Ekofisk center outside the main subsidence bowl to a minimum solution consisting of one additional platform to replace the current Ekofisk tank operations. Phillips ’ final recommendation was to develop the field based on new facilities and a minimum use of the existing facilities.
The Plan for Development and Operation (PDO) was submitted to the Norwegian authorities in December 1993, and the target was to have the new facilities installed and in operation by 1998. This plan was not accepted, Phillips had to revise its concept to improve the economic viability of the project, and they submitted an amended PDO in March 1994. The major difference was that the location of the new
-59- Bridging Operation and Design facilities was changed from being outside the subsidence bowl to being within. In June 1994 Phillips reached a tentative agreement with the Norwegian authorities on a plan for Ekofisk II that was meant to meet the challenges and help ensure a long-term safe and efficient operation of the Ekofisk field for the 35 to 40 years to come. The project had a marginal finance. To make it financially feasible, Phillips requested better terms and conditions on the royalties and licensing period, i.e. an extension of the Norpipe license till the end of 2031, exemption on royalties, confirmation that abandonment would not be required before the end of the current license period, reduction in the special tax rate, and an additional uplift or production allowance. The Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Energy answer granted Phillips an extended production license from 2011 until 2028, royalty relief, and deferred decisions on abandonment issues until a later date. The Ekofisk II development could then start (IPA, 1995). The Ekofisk II Complex layout was the following:
Figure 3.5 The Ekofisk II Complex
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3.2.2 The Ekofisk II concept
The Ekofisk II plan called for the construction of two new platforms for the Ekofisk complex: the Ekofisk 2/4 X wellhead platform (to start drilling in October 1996), and the Ekofisk 2/4 J processing and transportation platform (to start production in September 1998). Further, the existing pipelines connected to the Ekofisk complex had to be re-routed and connected to the 2/4 J platform. The total capital cost estimate for the Ekofisk II project was 1995 NOK 19 billion. Both projects had tight schedules, particularly the onshore phases because of the weather window constraints, April to September being the offshore installation period in Norway. Installation of both 2/4 X and 2/4 J were planned for August/ September, leaving little margin for any delay (IPA, 1995). The key project milestones for the Ekofisk II platforms were the following:
Engineering
Design and procurements
Fabrication
Installation offshore
Drilling start 2/4 X
Completion offshore
Start-up 2/4 J
Pipelaying
Figure 3.6 Ekofisk II project schedule Ekofisk 2/4 X Proiect Phase Start Finish Conceptual design November 1993 March 1994 Basic Engineering April 1994 September 1994 Detailed Engineering October 1994 September 1995 Fabrication April 1995 July 1996 Installation August 1996 September 1996 Hook-up & Comm. September 1996 October 1996 Start-up October 1996
Ekofisk 2/4 J Proiect Phase Start Finish Conceptual design November 1993 March 1994 Basic Engineering April 1994 January 1995 Detailed Engineering February 1995 August 1996 Fabrication November 1995 July 1997 Installation August 1997 September 1997 Hook-up & Comm. September 1997 July 1998 Start-up August 1998
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Figure 3. 7 Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J
The project requires the re-location of a number of PL018 operated and third party pipelines. The project includes a number of modifications to existing Ekofisk facilities to integrate with new ones. Most of the existing facilities of the Ekofisk complex will become redundant after start-up of 2/4 J, while some platforms (2/4 C, 2/4 W, 2/4 H) will remain in use for gas lift injection, water injection and housing. 2/4 H will be retained as living quarters for the remainder of the field life. 2/4 C will continue as a wellhead platform for several years until it is no longer economically viable. 2/4 W and 2/4 K will continue water injection as dictated by reservoir management and economic operation. Production from 2/4 A and 2/4 B will be phased out as required by well failures and subsidence, and then be replaced by production from 2/4 X. Modifications will be done to these facilities to meet NPD regulations and PPCoN working practices. In addition, structural modifications will be performed on existing Ekofisk jackets to compensate for subsidence (Phillips, 1996).
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Ekofisk II Complex Layout
Figure 3.8 Ekofisk II complex layout
3.2.3 Ekofisk 2/4X
Ekofisk 2/4 X commenced drilling on 26 October 1996, as planned. The new Ekofisk II 2/4 X wellhead platform is linked to the east side of the 2/4 C platform of the existing Ekofisk complex. Compared to the rig on Ekofisk 2/4 C, it can drill a standard well in half the time. Ekofisk 2/4 X is a relatively compact platform composed of the following four parts: jacket, topside, mud module, and drilling facilities. The topside measures 56 by 52 meters with a topside dry weight of about 8000 tons, including drilling facilities. Aker Verdal has delivered jacket and piles, Aker Offshore Partners (AOP) was responsible for the topside design, and Hitec was responsible for the drilling rig and mud module design. Umoe Haugesund was in charge of the mechanical completion and fabrication of the mud module and deck frame (Phillips, 1995a). A project alliance was formed between PPCoN, AOP, Hitec, and Umoe Haugesund to complete the project on time.
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Ekofisk 2/4 X 3 the production from the Ekofisk field reservoir. The platform have ability for 50 wells.
Figure 3.9 Ekofisk 2/4 X wellhead platform
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The 2/4 X platform has three deck levels: the cellar deck, the mezzanine deck, and the weather deck. It is divided into a utility area and a wellhead/process area, the two being separated by a fire/ blast wall. In the utility area, you find the generator set for backup power and emergency power, the main switch gear room, the battery room and the emergency switch gear room, the HVAC and local equipment room. The utility area also provides support for and access to the two bridges connected to 2/4 C and 2/4 J. The new bridges and platform decks are placed 14 meter higher above the sea level than the existing platforms, in order to prepare for the additional subsidence.
NEW BRIDGES AND PLATFORM DECKS WILL BE 14-15 METER HIGHER ABOVE SEA LEVEL THAN THE OLD INSTALLATIONS.
Figure 3.10 Bridging Ekofisk 2/4 C and Ekofisk 2/4 X
There is room for 50 wells on the 2/4 X platform, arranged in two separate areas in order to let the permanent platform derrick and a temporary jack-up derrick work in parallel. The drilling program is designed to last for a period of five years starting from October 1996. Totally, 45 wells are planned from Ekofisk 2/4 X. These will replace all the existing production wells on the Ekofisk field. The drilling program includes the use of both water-based and oil-based mud. The first well drilled was therefore reserved for reinjection of mud spills and cuttings leftovers in order to permit the use of oil-based mud to improve drilling operations efficiency. Disposal of the oil-based drill cuttings will be accomplished by slurrifying the drill solids with sea water and reinjecting this into a suitable formation in the overburden strata, in order not to severely affect the reservoir or to allow migration to the seabed.
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The topside structure is designed to support the drilling equipment set (DES), consisting of a derrick, a substructure and skid base, and a mud module. In addition, bulk barite and cement tanks have been included in the main topside area. A cuttings transport and slurrification system has been incorporated into the DES and located on the weather deck, while the slurry reinjection and holding tank system is included in the topside areas. The bulk cement and barite and cuttings reinjection system can be controlled from the local control stand or from the drilling control and monitoring system (DCMS). Remote-controlled pipe deck, deck-to-derrick, and derrick pipe handling systems are parts of the new drilling rig design. Until start-up of Ekofisk 2/4 J in 1998, Ekofisk 2/4 X will be controlled from 2/4 C (Phillips, 1996).
3.2.4 Ekofisk 2/4 J
Ekofisk 2/4 J will be the central platform on the new Ekofisk II complex. It will contain the facilities for processing and transportation of Ekofisk oil and gas, and the new central control room facilitating all control functions for the new Ekofisk complex. The 2/4 J processing and transportation platform is linked to the east of Ekofisk 2/4 X and will replace all existing processing and transportation facilities on the existing complex. It is designed to be capable of processing 260,000 barrels of crude oil and 750 million cubic feet gas every day. The platform is further equipped to reinject gas back to the reservoir to meet the gas sales requirements.
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Figure 3.11 Ekofisk 2/4 J processing and transportation platform
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The Ekofisk 2/4 J platform is 78 m long, 35 m wide, and 31 m high. It has four main levels: a cellar deck, a module deck level 1 and 2, and a weather deck including a mezzanine deck. The platform is divided into four different modules: the separation module, the processing module, the utility module, and the module support frame. One is going to separate oil, gas, and water; a second will dispatch the crude oil by pipeline to Teeside in the United Kingdom and send the natural gas under pressure to Emden, Germany; while the third will house the various auxiliary systems. The dry weight of the topside is 23,500 metric tons.
Kvaemer Engineering in Oslo has been responsible for the Ekofisk 2/4J design. Aker Verdal has built the jacket, piles and utility module (including the central control room at 2/4 J). Umoe Haugesund has constructed the separator module, while Amec in Newcastle has built the process module and the module support frame. The jacket, the module support frame, and the deck modules were installed by August 1997, and offshore commissioning could start. Seven lifting operations were necessary to install the platform.
3.3 Ekofisk II management strategy
Declining production rates and oil prices necessitated low-operating cost facilities in the Ekofisk II development project. The Ekofisk II operating philosophy was to design for a minimum of people offshore with a maximum of support from onshore. All equipment that could be dismantled and carried onshore was preferrable, and vendors needed to give a detailed account for maintenance requirements of the equipment. “In a 30-40 yearsperspective, life cycle costs and maintenance issues are decisive. We are going to have the right price in 1998, but also low maintenance costs in 2020,” Phillips ’ vice president argued. In order to design for low operating costs, Phillips involved operations personnel into the project. Their argument was that the requirements of operations and maintenance personnel were vital components of
-68- Introduction to Phillips and Ekofisk II the design process, this alone determining the future operability and maintainability of the platforms.
Operations (i.e. the owner of the installations) were made part of the Ekofisk II project organization through the Project Representative Section (PRS). This was a new concept to Phillips. Normally projects were run without any interference from operations. In the beginning the PRS consisted of 6-7 persons. Later, the group was enlarged to 11-12 people. They were working as an integral part of the project organization at Phillips ’ headquarters in Tananger. They coordinated and controlled operations’ involvement in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and 2/4 J projects.
Planned lifetime management (PLM) and life cycle costs (LCC) were two concepts emphasized by the Ekofisk II project (Phillips, 1994b, 1994c). The purpose of the PLM was to optimize the design with regard to operating and maintenance requirements, to help facilitate minimum life cycle costs. Phillips hired external consultants to do this work. They were supposed to estimate the support needed to ensure optimum efficiency, cost, and safety of the Ekofisk II operations, but did not live up to the expectations. In January 1997, the PLM scope of work was revised to cover only the preventive maintenance program, corrective maintenance, spare parts for critical operations equipment on 2/4 J, and a preventive maintenance program for 2/4 X.
Life cycle equipment costs should be calculated and the calculations be used when choosing between solutions and manufacturers. Maintenance costs of equipment over its full life time should be calculated. Life cycle costing should be used during bid evaluation, and vendor selection should be based on the LCC criteria including a guarantee for future operating and maintenance costs. Operations and maintenance concerns were meant to influence design, and the contractors were urged to supply standard solutions based on functional specifications. Functional, rather than detailed specifications, should be used to simplify and rationalize specifications with real requirements for equipment performance, safety, availability, and quality. Inquiries
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should be issued using functional specifications, and vendors were supposed to bid price and delivery for standard equipment plus operations required or suggested.
However, the functional specifications and life cycle cost concepts were new to Phillips, as well as to engineering contractors and vendors. Previously, operating companies that told design contractors and vendors what to build through detailed specifications. In the Ekofisk II project it was up to the vendor to do the specification, but the vendors did not have the necessary experience to estimate future operating costs and schedule the maintenance required. Phillips ended up with only a few LCC contracts as part of the project.
The PLM process required some explicit operating experience to be forwarded to design. The first task given to the offshore personnel brought onshore to participate in the project, was that they should develop a set of design criteria based on past Ekofisk experience. They came up with 163 design targets capturing the experience of operations offshore and onshore staff. Phillips management did not immediately accept the document, in fear of limiting the project too much to past Ekofisk practice, but finally they accepted it as part of the project description. The targets were arrived at through discussions and brainstorming, and a refinement process was further undertaken to coordinate the targets. The targets were divided into two categories: hard targets and soft ones. Hard targets applied to safety, legal, or environmental requirements or to mandatory commercial expectations, and no tolerance or deviation was allowed. Soft targets applied to production, operating, or maintenance needs, and other support requirements. They were meant to communicate operations and maintenance requirements to the design, and were distributed to the design review teams and design contractors on 2/4 X and 2/4 J. In the following two chapters I shall describe operations’ involvement in the design of Ekofisk 2/4 X and 2/4 J.
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*-'•'^1^.5 juv u- 1 . - 1 ■- # Bridging Operation and Design
-72- Chapter 4 Ekofisk 2/4 X
The Ekofisk 2/4 X wellhead platform consists of three main parts: the topside with the wellhead, the mud module, and the drilling rig. Aker Offshore Partner AS (AOP) in Stavanger was responsible for the topside design, while Hitec AS at Forus was responsible for the drilling rig and the mud module.
Three operations people were included full time in the project: a senior planning and construction superintendent from operations offshore in the design at AOP, and a senior drilling supervisor and a tool- pusher in the design at Hitec. They all continued to work in the 2/4 X Topside Alliance that developed through the project. In this chapter I shall describe how operations were involved in the work at AOP, Hitec, and the alliance, and the final result and operational knowledge so far.
4.1 Design at AOP
4.1.1 Willingness to listen and involve operations in design
Aker Offshore Partner (AOP) was responsible for the basic engineering and the detail engineering of the topside on 2/4 X, in addition to the bridge, tripod, and modification of existing Ekofisk facilities. The project started as a traditional project - AOP versus Phillips, but Phillips ’ site representative wanted operations to be a part of the project, not something on the outside. He wanted Phillips ’ site team integrated into the design contractors organization, so that the project could benefit from Phillips ’ great operating experience. He said:
“We checked with Aker. They were a little skeptical. Afraid of being watched. It didn’t take long time to see the advantages of sitting close to each other. It became a natural process. The instrument people went to Phillips ’ operations representative. And it
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wasn’t any threat if he had questions. We sat very decentralized. This was important in order to use the design contractor and operations representatives the way they should. ”
In the beginning, AOP hesitated to bring Phillips ’ people into the project. But they were willing to look into their traditional way of doing design and soon they invited them into the project. In this way people from AOP and Phillips could work closely together on a daily basis and resolve critical issues on the spot. Phillips ’ site representative said:
“The organization at Aker was special, but it shouldn ’t be. Instead of sitting physically separate from Aker as a controller, we agreed to spread our discipline people among Aker’s discipline people. The discipline leaders from Phillips and Aker sat next to each other. They had direct contact instead of communicating through formal letters. The operations people were sitting in the office landscape. One person was there on a permanent basis. He called additional Phillips personnel when required. ”
Phillips ’ site representative at AOP was content with the way the two organizations functioned together. AOP was receptive and willing to listen to Phillips ’ concerns and experiences. People from the two companies sat down and spent time together to find solutions that would be practical to operations offshore. Phillips ’ site representative explained:
“People in technical design have actively requested input from operations - instead of design saying that this is the way things should be. This has clearly brought a success. They have been willing to turn away from their traditional engineering thoughts. Concrete examples are issues like control of valves and flexibility when it comes to the selection of valves. People here sat down and spent time together. It required a lot of effort, but we found a way to solve the technical problems, so that operations got things the way they wanted. And it took a month, not a year.”
The people from AOP and Phillips worked well together. Mutual trust is a key word in order to understand the process. Phillips ’ operations representative became an integral part of the organization, and a person whom design personnel could easily relate to. Phillips ’ site representative commented:
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“It is a question of trust. Something which people are able to establish between them. It depends very much on the person whether you succeed or not.”
The site representative of Phillips at AOP was an engineer himself, in his late thirties. He had previously worked as a contractor and therefore experienced the traditional approach to design both from engineering and operating companies. He said:
“I have worked as a contractor myself. I have never understood why the customer shuts himself off from the project, not being a part of it. I have a background from fabrication in the Kvasmer system. In Phillips, I have worked as a project engineer and construction leader on smaller projects.”
With this experience in mind he chose an integrated working relationship with the design contractor, instead of the traditional approach of operating companies not being directly involved. One of the problems encountered in earlier design projects was getting proper feedback from operations offshore to drawings made by design onshore. Documents tended to be returned too late or come back without comments. Phillips ’ 2/4 X management wanted to avoid this by having offshore people come onshore to go through the drawings there. As explained by one 2/4 X manager:
“We decided that no documents should be sent outside Aker. All comments should be given locally at the design house. We called people in to give comments at the site. People were then obliged to go through the drawings there. ”
Sending formal papers to and from have had limited effect in terms of bridging the two communities-of-practice in operations offshore and design onshore. People in the 2/4 X management team were rich in offshore operational knowledge and had seen the value of informal contact between onshore and offshore. As one 2/4 X Phillips manager emphasized:
“We have had, and must have, a continuous communication with operations. I have a background from maintenance and modifications. I know we depend on close cooperation. It has had an impact on this project. Informal communication between the
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different engineering disciplines comes in. And I think informal discussions between project and maintenance personnel is equally important. One should avoid to base the project primarily on writing formal letters.”
The Ekofisk 2/4 X project organization functioned as an integrated team with operations and design personnel working side by side. Experienced offshore personnel were available to the project. Informal communication, rather than written, formal documents characterized their work.
4.1.2 Experienced operations personnel available in design
At AOP, one operations representative from Phillips worked full time in the project, and he called additional people when he did not have the necessary expertise himself. Operational experience was thus easily accessible to the project. The engineers in design could come and ask questions, find out how things functioned offshore, what solutions operations would prefer, etc. When operations knowledge was available in- house, questions could be sorted out directly as the project went along. The operations representative worked closely together with the design people, and there was a lot of informal contact between the engineering and operations people involved. As the permanent operations representative explained:
“It was useful for engineering to have someone from the users that they could ask. When they realized that our people knew what they were talking about, they came. But this can be dangerous too. You need to be aware of your responsibility and understand what they ask for, as design may swallow things without thinking. Not all of them are able to exercise any judgment in these matters. Operations people involved therefore need to be conscious of their responsibility and what people ask for.”
The operations representative working full time in the project had a background from maintenance and larger modification projects offshore in Phillips. He profited from having insight into both operations and project management. He came from a management position in Phillips and therefore had a large network to draw on. He knew how projects were run and to whom people needed to talk. This made him able
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to contribute, he said. He could easily connect people that needed to talk together, and he managed to do so. As he commented the on way he worked:
“I have had a leading position in Phillips. It has been an advantage. I have a large network. I have been able to call people who can answer when I cannot And to get things settled either over phone, fax, or e-mail.”
He further emphasized the importance of having authority to address the needs of operations in design and cut through discussions in order to employ relevant operational knowledge. This could be issues like having extra space available in case of changes and modifications at a later stage, matters not that important seen from a design point of view. The operations representative explained:
“The philosophy of Ekofisk II has been to have no spares, no reserve capacity. On certain occasions we have had to compromise on this. We have said we needed to have some spare space for future cables and pipes. And we have had two change orders already. If we had not left any extra space and ensured some flexibility, these changes would have required much larger modifications. It has been important to be able to cut through and take this kind of decisions. From experience we know there will be a need of extra room for additional cables and pipes as the platform gets older and operating conditions require modifications to be implemented.”
The 2/4 X project was short of time. The operations representative experienced that much of the methodology and management tools available were not appropriate in their case. In order to give necessary operations input on time, they could not follow any lengthy analytical procedures and evaluations. Instead, they based their involvement on direct communication with people in design in order influence the project. The operations representative said:
“All these fashionable studies, criticality analyses, etc. - we didn’t have time for. They are not synchronized with the development of the design. We couldn ’t do these studies in a qualified way until it would have been too late. Instead, we had experienced operations personnel involved at an early stage who could go in and say: “This is good, this is not good.” Things need be done as simple as this - experienced people that go in and directly contribute with their experience.”
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Experienced operations personnel were integrated into the project to ensure then- influence on design. They worked closely together with the engineers in design. Informal rather than formal communication was an important in terms of bringing operational knowledge into the project.
4.1.3 Having informal rather than formal influence on design
Operations had informal rather than formal impact on design, the operations representative said. He argued this was more important than formally having the right to participate in the process. Their focus became how in a practical way to influence the design. The permanent operations representative at AOP explained:
“How to have an impact on design became important to us. We had much influence through directly working with the people in design - on how to arrange the loading system and sea transportation system, for example. We had discussions on how it should be arranged practically. Other examples are questions related to location of test tubes for gas detectors, how to arrange equipment in order to ensure easy access and avoid building scaffoldings, etc.”
He emphasized the importance of operations personnel being present there and then, in order to answer questions that came up through the engineering work. He said:
“It is important to be present so that the people in design can come and ask: “Should we do it this or that way? How do you do this offshore? What are the procedures for start up and control of wells?” Real influence, not formal. We have had real influence - more than formal.”
He focused on operations involvement in the early phases of design. He felt that basic engineering, in particular, was a phase where operations personnel could contribute considerably in developing operations-effective solutions in design. He said:
“We have introduced a lot of operations perspectives informally. But operations needs to be there in the beginning. It is in design things happen. Operations can influence the
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most in basic design, not so much in the detail and follow-on engineering phases. Operations can have a large impact in basic design.”
“It is better to include things in design than trying to include them later,” he commented. It becomes much more expensive and complex to change things afterwards. He had the advantage of being involved from day one in the project. He managed to have an impact on the premises set in the conceptual design. He explained:
“It is important to be involved in the early conceptual phase - to be there and set the premises. Layout arrangement, for example, and number of cranes on board. This must be done from the very beginning. To a large extent, we managed to get things implemented in the design. Questions like having enough room to get equipment in and out, enough room to drive a truck, a good layout in the well area in the limited area available, etc. We managed to do this. ”
One piece of knowledge taken into account in the design was related to the problem of scaling offshore, i.e. deposits on the inside of pipelines that may ultimately obstruct the production flow. Operations were able to pro-actively influence design, in order to ensure a stable production on Ekofisk II. The operations representative told:
“Scale. To be able to clean the processing systems for layers of deposits from the reservoir . There we were early involved. We managed to do something there in design. Pipe locks. To be able to wash this out without interfering too much with operations. This was an important issue. Think of the production constraints if we had not thought of that! ”
Operations were part of the project. In contrast to traditional approaches to design, people from the operating company were integrated into the design contractor’s project organization. Operational experience was easily available to the project. Operations and design personnel worked closely together, and informal, rather than formal influence, was a key factor in building operational knowledge into the actual topside design. I shall now focus on the design of the drilling rig at Hitec.
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4.2 Design at Hitec
Hitec was responsible for the design of the drilling rig and the mud module on Ekofisk 2/4 X. The company was founded in 1986, started as an instrumentation and control system company, and cooperated with Dreco in Canada in the delivery of drilling rigs. Ekofisk 2/4 X was the third drilling rig for Hitec to design. One Ekofisk 2/4 X manager said:
“Practical people have helped Dreco and Hitec. It has been a mixture of practical experience and theoretical input. Hitec has had the responsibility for the rig and the mud module. Mechanical and electrical engineering, instruments, control systems, etc. Dreco has built the rig. In Canada. But people sat together here in Norway. The current solution is a modified version of Troll. It is a result of input from people with practical experience.”
The two first drilling rigs designed by Hitec were Draugen and Troll for A/S Norske Shell. The Troll rig is the one that resembles most the Ekofisk 2/4 X. But 2/4 X represents a cutting edge in terms of drilling rig technology and incorporation of operational knowledge in the design.
4.2.1 Functioning as an integrated, autonomous team
Two operations people were involved in design at Hitec: one senior drilling supervisor from Phillips and one tool pusher from the drilling contractor. The Phillips and Hitec people worked closely together during the design. “It was a very creative environment ”, the Phillips drilling supervisor said, “ the interaction between Phillips and Hitec functioned extremely well,” And he went on to say:
“We established a very creative environment. We looked at each other as a community. We behaved as a team. It functioned very well. We sat in the same house. We functioned like an integrated team. We had a common interest in reaching the objectives of the project. It was Phillips that made the decisions, but with the help of Hitec to make the right decisions.”
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Hitec and Phillips coordinated their efforts as the project went along. People sat down in meetings when required. As a project they were able to make rapid decisions and approached questions in an un-bureaucratic manner. “It was 180 degrees difference between us and Shell/Statoil in terms of bureaucracy and decision-making,” the Phillips drilling supervisor said. They found it necessary, however, to have a relatively structured meeting agenda and schedule, because of the speed of the project. Those who needed input and feedback were the ones to call a meeting. The drilling supervisor explained:
“It was as much they as us that asked for meetings. We sorted it out together. Those who needed a meeting took the initiative. The attitude was: “Let’s have a meeting now to settle this and that ” We needed structured meetings because of the speed of the project. We needed a reason to meet We didn’t just meet in order to meet. It was the activities of the project that determined the frequency of our meetings."
The project team at Hitec functioned as an integrated, autonomous group. Phillips ’ headquarters did not intervene into detailed decision-making at Hitec. The project could therefore make the required decisions in time without having to wait for response from the headquarters. The project managed on its own. As Phillips ’ drilling supervisor explained:
“We were lucky. No-one of my superiors knew what we were doing. We thus became an autonomous, integrated team. With time constraints de luxe. Quick decisions were needed. My boss did not involve himself in the detailed decision-making. We therefore didn’t need to wait to make decisions. We made them ourselves. We informed him only about the main issues. On one occasion he intervened too much in details. Then we used more time to argue why we did things than to do them. ”
The drilling supervisor emphasized the creative atmosphere in the group:
“It was a very creative environment We quickly jumped into new things. We went into brainstorming and performed HAZOP studies. We did not dwell on things that were not feasible. The creative environment produced the conditions that made the result. ”
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The 2/4 X drilling rig project team at Hitec functioned as an integrated, autonomous team. They were able to make decisions at great speed, and operations were highly involved in design.
4.2.2 Operations committedly in charge of design
Phillips ’ drilling supervisor played a major role in the design of the 2/4 X drilling rig. This was not originally intended, but Phillips ’ project management realized the potential of his proposals in design, and the drilling supervisor was stubborn enough not to give in. As he commented himself:
“I have had the opportunity to design a drilling rig based upon the constraints I was given. I have managed to have an impact. It has been a lot of quarreling. Lots of documentation written and hours spent to justify what we have done. This is as important as coming up with an idea for a smart technical solution. When your proposal is rejected, you need to have the next one ready. I am not stubborn. I call it consistent. And people are predictable. You know who will say “No.” ”
The drilling supervisor was highly committed to the responsibilities he had undertaken, and to making an operational effective rig that would function well offshore. In periods he traveled extensively in order to coordinate the design process at Hitec and the fabrication at Dreco in Canada and USA. As he reported from this period:
“We had to travel around. I shuttled between Fonts, Houston, Canada, and Utah. And all the time I had the latest updated drawn version on my PC, so that people could work on it. That was the informal part. You lived at airports, worked 24 hours a day, and traveled in the weekend in order not to disturb work days.”
When you are hecticly involved in a project, it may be difficult to separate job and private life. “Just ask my wife,” he said, “you bring with you these things home. ” He himself had installed a home office where he could sit and work in evenings instead of
-82- Ekofisk 2/4 X working overtime in the office. “If you turn off at 4 p.m. you’re not committed enough, ” he said, arguing that one couldn ’t expect people to stop the thinking process from work once they got home. Things are linked up with each other, he said:
“You cannot do things separately from each other. When you have been in a leading drilling position, theory and practice walk hand in hand. It is difficult to tell what is what. Before Phillips I worked with floating rigs. The rig becomes a part of yourself. But there is one condition: a feeling of ownership. If not, you won’t make it. It is your rig.”
As mentioned earlier, it was not Phillips ’ intention that this drilling rig supervisor should take such a degree of responsibility in designing the drilling rig. He was involved in the project after the conceptual design, to assist the project with his experience from drilling rigs operations. The project was short of time, and Phillips decided to use the drilling rig concept previously developed for Eldfisk 2/7 A, a rig that was never built. Limited time was spent on analyzing what kind of rig was needed for future operations on Ekofisk II, and whether the Eldfisk design satisfied the requirements of 2/4 X. The drilling supervisor commented his first contact with the project in the following way:
“I came in relatively early, in the bid update. Phillips had looked at a concept for the drilling rig at 2/7 A that was never built. They picked it up for studies on 2/4 X and decided to use the same concept. This had all started when I was introduced to the project. I was the first user to be involved. I started to take things in and out. They had forgotten the most basic thing: to ask whether the 2/7 A rig was based on the same needs as 2/4 X. That was the beginning. Very difficult.”
When he came into the project, several commercial constraints were already defined. Expectations as regards contracts and what vendors to choose were already made, and the project was not willing to go back on these decisions. The rig concept was thereby given, while no-one had asked what the rig was going to be used for, as the drilling supervisor said:
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“I came in and asked: “What are we going to use the rig for?” Phillips hadn ’t thought of what they were going to use it for. They had to find out. But the Ekofisk Drilling Functional Specifications came after a long time, in June ‘94. They should have been defined at the very start.”
One of the issues that was not taken into account in the initial design was the need for offices at 2/4 X. At Eldfisk 2/7 A there was no need for offices on the rig. This omission complicated the design process and the overall coordination of the 2/4 X project, when first discovered well into the basic design. Phillips ’ drilling supervisor at Hitec commented:
“Only a necessary evil as an office building. It had been forgotten. On 2/7 A there was no offices at the rig itself. Thus, they forgot the need for offices on 2/4X.”
He had to negotiate with Phillips ’ operations personnel involved at AOP to get acceptance for enough office space:
“Offices needed to be included. It was a battle. They would give me room for only three offices, but I said we needed twelve. Dealing with the office building probably cost more than the building itself.”
In contrast to traditional offshore projects, operations personnel played a major role in the design of the platform. Phillips ’ drilling supervisor was highly involved in developing the 2/4 X drilling rig concept. With long experience from offshore drilling rigs and knowledge about project management onshore, he was able to communicate his ideas to the people in design. The project at Hitec further profited from having design personnel with combined offshore and onshore operational knowledge. I shall now focus on this advantage of having operations and design personnel with practice from the other community-of-practice available to the project.
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4.2.3 Knowing both operations and design
The drilling supervisor from Phillips had 27 years experience from offshore drilling when he came into the project. He had long experience from offshore drilling, in addition to being exposed to engineering and project management thinking onshore. He had studied petroleum engineering and project management at the engineering school in Stavanger, and was enrolled in a contract management course when entering the 2/4 X project. He knew both project management and engineering terminology and concepts, and the intricacies of the bureaucracy and how to operate in order to get what he wanted.
The Ekofisk 2/4 X drilling rig was his first design. He had seen many, however. Before being appointed to the Ekofisk 2/4 X project, he was working with rig upgrading in Phillips. Through this work he came to visit many of the drilling rigs in the North Sea, and he had the opportunity to study the latest development projects in the field. He was amazed to see the extent to which expensive equipment was not properly taken into use, because of unpractical solutions and lack of an integrated systems perspective, and he said:
“You can’t manage without an experienced drilling person. Before Ekofisk II, I was involved in upgrading. I traveled around. I got to see new rigs. Things amazed me. These rigs would not have been made the same way if an experienced drilling person had been there. One had not thought of the consequences of the design. You need to have experienced similar situations in order to address the problem. At one place, some equipment was placed right in front of the driller. He could not see a thing. I see much nice and expensive equipment when I am out, but it is not made into a system.”
Philli ps’ drilling supervisor did not operate alone in giving operations input to the project. One representative from Phillips ’ drilling contractor on Ekofisk was also involved full-time in the project. He also had more than twenty years experience from drilling offshore. Together they made a good team. Phillips ’ drilling supervisor had, in addition, experience from onshore administrative drilling work. He said:
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“We both had much experience. I had 27 years’ experience from drilling - and I had a vision about what a drilling rig should look like. Together we had 50 years of experience. At the same time we complemented each other. He was better on the practical level. I was more on the administrative and theoretical level. We quickly agreed upon how things should be. And we were both stubborn. But there were disagreements too, but to a less extent.”
It was Phillips ’ drilling supervisor who became in charge of the drilling rig design. The tool pusher from the drilling contractor assisted him with feedback and input as the project went along. They worked closely together. As the drilling supervisor said:
“We worked together here. It put me at ease when he was there with me. He could say yesor no to whether things would work. When he said: “Let’s go for this, ” I dared to go for it. When two or three people sit together, you so much easier find advantages and disadvantages in a design.”
They worked highly integrated with the people from Hitec. They were involved in evaluating various design solutions and provide the necessary knowledge to make it function as a whole. The drilling representatives knew in advance what kind of questions would come and made sure to provide the documentation required by the project. In this way they were able to have a pro-active approach to the design. The drilling supervisor explained:
“We knew what questions would come. We therefore worked out concepts because we knew what questions would arise. We were at the leading edge. But it was not given that what we came up with was good. Hitec came in. We had to look at the concept together and get input on the things we were dependent on to make the machinery work.”
The people at Hitec were a group of engineers and technicians with a background of instrumentation, electrical engineering and mechanical engineering. “They are a group of good rig designers,” the drilling supervisor said, “and they have some great capacities.” Some of Hitec’s design people also had experience from maintenance work offshore. There were technicians with a reasonable offshore experience available to the project. Looking back, the drilling supervisor said:
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“It wouldn ’t be as easy with any contractor. The people I am working with now is a totally different group of people. Lots of Englishmen and Scotsmen. It is a slow process to get people think of differently. Some of the engineering staff at Hitec had experience from offshore maintenance. And there were technicians with pretty good offshore experience. The interaction functioned extremely well.”
Phillips ’ operations people, together with the project people in design at Hitec were able to come up with state-of-the-art technology and operational effective solutions in the Ekofisk 2/4 X project. They were able to integrate the knowledge of operations and design personnel into an innovative drilling rig design. I shall now focus on the alliance that developed in order to finish the 2/4 X project on time.
4.3 The 2/4 X Topside Alliance
4.3.1 Formation of the alliance
The Ekofisk 2/4 X project started as a traditional project. The 2/4 X Topside Alliance was not planned. However, there was an extremely tight schedule for completion of the project. And the project experienced increasing difficulties in controlling and coordinating the different activities within the tight time frame given. The decision making went fine within the two AOP and Hitec projects, but the communication between these two separate organizations turned out to be more complicated. The drilling supervisor involved in design at Hitec said:
“We used a lot of time on not taking decisions. There was not one person that could take a decision. There were many tragic examples of this. Only a necessary evil as the office building. It had been forgotten. ... That ’s one typical example. Everyone knew that we needed one, but no-one managed to take a decision on where it was going to be located. The way the project was organized, people were unable to make decisions. This happened again and again. The interface between the two different organizations, Aker and Hitec, was difficult to handle. Because of lack of communication. ”
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Because of the very tight schedule, Phillips needed a smooth transition between the different phases of design and excellent working relationships between the various contractors involved in the project. In order to finish the project on time, Phillips started to look for new ways of running the project. External consultants estimated the chances to finish the project on time to be marginal. One member of the 2/4 X Topside Alliance steering group said:
“We needed a good cooperation between the design contractors, hook-up, operations, and commissioning. We saw that we needed an extremely good cooperation because of the schedule. An external consultant, IPA, gave us a chance of 10% to make it.”
Initially, people in Phillips were hesitant towards working closely together with the contractors. “If it hadn ’t been for the problems regarding the time frame, it would have been difficult to sell the idea to Phillips, ” the alliance manager said. But when the Ekofisk II project manager said yes, people agreed. The Ekofisk II project manager ‘s main concern was to finish the project on time. He said:
“My drive was more schedule than cost. But I hope the contractors can earn money too. I didn’t think they would earn so much money on it, but it seems that they are able to earn both money and time.”
Phillips invited the fabrication contractor Umoe Haugesund, AOP and Hitec into discussions whether they would be interested -in some kind of cooperation. Umoe Haugesund came up with the idea of forming an alliance. They had positive experiences from Statoil’s alliance on Sleipner B. The companies were willing to try out new ways of working together, and the Ekofisk II project management concluded that forming an alliance would be the most cost effective solution and maybe the only way to complete the project in time. The Alliance manager said:
“The fabrication contractor was chosen, Umoe. Aker had during the bid phase tried to offer something close to an alliance. A more complete package. More than an EPC contract. But they lost on price. Umoe was working in an alliance with Statoil. They had very good experiences with this and tried to sell the idea to Phillips. And they succeeded. ”
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The 2/4 X project started recruiting personnel for the new project organization, and the 2/4 X Topside Alliance Agreement document was signed in June 1995. The project was then executed as a project alliance between Phillips Petroleum Company Norway (PPCoN), Aker Offshore Partner (AOP), Hitec, and Umoe Haugesund. It was a time-limited cooperating relationship between the four companies with the purpose of building the 2/4 X topside, a relationship based on a mutual sharing of profit and risk. Later in the process Phillips ’ Ekofisk II project manager commented on how intertwined the four companies were working together and on the aggressive schedule:
“At 2/4 X we have a completely seamless organization. I don’t know who is Phillips, Aker, Umoe, or Hitec. The schedule is extremely aggressive. They are ahead, mostly. Not at the topside right now. They are two weeks late. But the rest are on schedule. It is a very aggressive schedule. We could not have achieved that process without the alliance.”
The four companies negotiated as to the scope of work, what it would most likely cost most likely cost (i.e. under a traditional project regime,) the schedule, and they agreed upon objectives which they all considered realistic. When the alliance was established, the most likely cost was estimated to NOK 1392 m. Together they aimed at a result of NOK 150-190 m below the budget, which they finally achieved with good margins. The bonus arrangement functioned as a strong motivating factor to reach this goal. Phillips suggested to give the contractors 60% of the reward and Phillips to take 60% of the risk. The companies agreed upon the following way to share the result: Phillips: 40 % of the profit and 60 % of the risk, Umoe: 33.75 % of the profit and 22.5% of the risk, AOP: 15 % of the profit and 10 % of the risk, and Hitec: 11.25 % of the profit and 7.5 % of the risk. This was a new way of working together. Phillips ’ 2/4 X project manager said:
“We are trying several things new. Also involving operations people. And the alliance is something new to Phillips. In fact, we are the first foreign operator to join such a corporation in Norway. Now you trust the design contractors. They are responsible. We won’t check all the work. It is a push towards not checking their work.”
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He had long experience from drilling and day-to-day operations offshore. Ekofisk 2/4 X was his first project, which may have opened up for untraditional approaches to the design process. In order to keep up with an extremely aggressive schedule, the project transformed into a project alliance between Phillips and contractors on 2/4 X.
4.3.2 The alliance organization
The 2/4 X Topside Alliance was organized with a steering group at the top. The steering group functioned as a board in an ordinary business enterprise. It was responsible for defining the alliance contract, scope of work, schedule, most likely cost, and for selecting the alliance management team. They involved two external consultants to assist this process - one consultant with alliance experience from Statoil’s Sleipner B project, and one consultant with team building experience from Phillips. They further assisted the alliance organization with team building sessions along the project.
Steering Group: Umoe, AOP, Hitec, PPCoN, PPCoN (chair) I Alliance Manager (PPCoN)
Secretaries* IT Coordinator* (AOP)
Section Lead Section Lead QA/HES Cost/Contract (Total) (AOP) *Did not Section Lead Section Lead participate DES/MM Coord. Plan. & Scheduling in the Alliance (Hitec) Management (PPCoN) Team L Section Lead Section Lead Section Lead Section Lead Engineering Procurement Fabrication Comm ./Hook-Up (AOP) (AOP) (Umoe) (PPCoN)
Figure 4.1 The 2/4 X Topside Alliance organizational chart
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The steering group consisted of five persons: one from each of the contractors and two from Phillips. The chairman of the steering group was from Phillips, and the second Phillips person was the PRS-manager, i.e. operations representatives in the Ekofisk II project. Thus, operations were part of the of the 2/4 X Topside Alliance steering group. These five persons were all experienced management personnel who could assist the alliance process. They came to have a critical role in controlling the interface of the alliance and the companies’ base organizations. The PRS-manager gave the following comment on the work in the alliance:
“The alliance is a very good thing. The secret behind is that hook-up is included. It means a great deal in terms of cost savings since we do a lot work onshore for around 300 NOK an hour that would cost around 1200 NOK offshore. That is the secret behind the alliance.”
The alliance manager was Phillips ’ site representative previously involved in design at AOP. He reported to the steering group, but was totally accountable for the financial result, meeting schedule, quality and safety standards of the alliance. People had a high degree of trust and confidence in him. All four companies delegated full authority to him to run the project. He was regarded as an “alliance man,” focusing on what was good for the project, not solely for Phillips as an operating company. He had positive experiences from integrated projects with AOP and Hitec and involving operational knowledge into design. He said:
“We got good feedback from Aker on everything that was presented. Both in terms of documentation and experience brought into the project And Aker was searching too. That can be used as a competitive advantage later. Also for the drilling rig. There has been a heavy involvement of operations people. The drilling rig is built on direction from experienced drilling people. They have got what they wanted. But the framework was given by Hitec, Aker, or Phillips before that They made a platform frame without letting the costs go sky-high. Space, weight, arrangement, technical solutions. Operations have had an influence here. Those have been integrated projects.”
The alliance management team consisted of section leads of the disciplines of engineering (AOP), procurement (AOP), fabrication (Umoe), commissioning and
-91- Bridging Operation and Design hook-up (PPCoN). In addition, cost and contract (AOP), planning and schedule (PPCoN), and drilling equipment set and mud module coordination (Hitec) were areas included in the management team. They had, together with the alliance manager, the total responsibility for project progress and results. Phillips ’ operations representative, previously involved in design at AOP, became section lead for commissioning and hook-up. They were all located at Umoe Haugesund, which facilitated the communication between the companies and various disciplines.
The base organizations of the four companies imposed few restraints on the alliance. Their success was seen as heavily dependent on the mandate and degree of freedom which the base organizations would give the alliance management team. As the section lead for commissioning and hook-up said:
“We were given high levels of authority. More than in a traditional project. This gives a feeling of responsibility and ownership. And it has shown results in practice. It functions. We are unconventional. Many young people. Everyone moved to one location. One common destiny, actually.”
The management team managed to keep a high speed on the decision-making process and focused on the agreed schedule. To finish the project on time was regarded as a top priority. There was a strong emphasis on personal ownership of established milestones and individual responsibility for to reach these. The management team was highly committed towards managing reaching the ambitious goal of the alliance. As one of the team members said:
“We are quite proud. We manage to work well together. We have a feeling of ownership to the project. And we are very geared towards managing this. It has been a tremendous effort. We are quite proud of that. We have very good experiences with the alliance.”
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4.3.3 Work in the alliance
The 2/4 X Topside Alliance organization functioned as an integrated team. People were located closely together at the fabrication site at Umoe Haugesund. This resulted in an efficient cooperation between the companies and the various disciplines of fabrication and design. Informal communication became important more than formal requests. Things could be settled through informal meetings instead of exchanging letters and producing a large quantum of documentation that seldom was read. The barriers between the different companies were reduced and people made new connections across company and discipline lines.
The interface between the different contractors was considerably easier to handle than in traditional design projects, the alliance manager argued. Transitions between the different phases of the project and the companies involved became less complicated. Instead, they became part of the total planning process, and the emphasis was on how to work together as one company. Critical issues between engineering, procurement, construction, commissioning, and hook-up could be solved on the spot. If there was a need for new or different specifications, one knew where to go to find the necessary expertise and quickly supply the information needed. As opposed to traditional contracts where companies would defend themselves and blame the other party, the alliance gathered experience from all four companies with a joint focus on a common goal.
The main advantages of the alliance were reduction of time and money spent on the project, the alliance manager argued. This was possible due to the reduced need for documentation and double work, and the intense cooperation between the parties involved. The alliance succeeded in reducing the amount of documentation within the alliance. Regarding the vendors and base organizations, however, there was still a large amount of documentation exchanged. One did not, to the same extent, succeed in reducing the amount of documentation there. Another area for improvement was the various planning and IT-systems of the companies that were not fully integrated.
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Different planning systems were in use, and the software employed by the companies proved not to be compatible (ODA and ifo, 1997).
There was a high level of trust between the partners in the alliance. They all had a positive attitude to the working together. The alliance created an attitude of openness and a direct way of communicating between the partners, the alliance manager said. Team building activities on management and discipline level were part of the alliance work and contributed to better communication between the parties involved.
Time spent on decision-making was considerably reduced in the alliance. Rapid decisions could be made through working closely together, based on a high level of trust. One management team member commented on how people went “high ” out of meetings instead of having endless discussions and conflicting attitudes draining people’s energy. The focus was on anticipating and controlling problems that were likely to occur. The quick decision-making process was seen as one of the clearest and most important improvements through the work the alliance.
People had fun. There were lots of jokes and humor in the corridors. There was an emphasis on people also having fun in the hectic life of the project. “There is no-one in the alliance that has ever had as much fun as on 2/4 X,” the drilling supervisor said. “It has been a fun project,” the 2/4 X project manager said, “and I think most of the people would say the same thin g.”
I was fascinated by how closely people were working together and how close to the actual fabrication of the 2/4 X platform they were sitting. As I noted in my field book after my first day at Umoe Haugesund:
“In general I remember narrow corridors where people sat. Partition walls, people sitting closely together, a good atmosphere, a good mood, and jokes and cartoons hanging around. And when I went in the “wrong” direction, I suddenly was in the North Sea Hall where they constructed the topside. Fascinating.”
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It was a delicate balance for Phillips at the same time being customer and a partner in the alliance. As there were four partners in the alliance, changes that would increase cost or interfere with the schedule had to be agreed upon by all four of them. It was therefore more difficult for Phillips to get acceptance for suggestions they wanted implemented. To the alliance, on the other hand, it was important that the customer ceased to make change proposals that would severely affect the design. The alliance management was clear about being loyal to the alliance objectives, not to Phillips. As one of Phillips team members in the alliance management said about the balance between focusing on Phillips or on the alliance:
“We have met with a lot of adversity. It has been tough sometimes. We from the operating company have had to bum many of our boats. It has been difficult for people to understand. We have had to say no. The alliance manager has been clear on that point. To say no. If not, we would not have been able to finish on time. We wouldn ’t have been able to finish if we constantly had to make changes until the platform would be brought offshore. ”
The distinctions between operating company and contractors were made less obvious in the alliance. Phillips ’ personnel were alliance, not solely Phillips persons. “Then it becomes a question of who takes the responsibility for the quality of the design according to what the customer wants and needs,” the drilling supervisor previously involved at Hitec said. In the alliance he worked in the commissioning and hook-up team. He argued that since the main objective of the alliance was to finish on time and within the budget, the quality aspect could tend to be given less priority. He said:
“A project can be divided in time, cost and quality. It’s a triangle. But one often forgets the last part. The alliance changes the customer-client relationship. I am drilling. I am going back to look the boys in the eyes afterwards. It’s a double role. I try to disconnect myself, identify myself as a rig owner. But the alliance manager and other people in the alliance are also rig owners. It is a closely integrated environment One needs to strive for an equilateral triangle with equal focus on quality, time and cost”
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Phillips ’ personnel outside the alliance found it difficult to interact with the alliance organization to coordinate issues important to the Ekofisk II project as a whole. One of the operations representatives involved in design of 2/4 J at Kvasmer said:
“It was difficult with experience transfer because the aim was to finish on time. The alliance was good on schedule, progress, and objectives. But communication and experience transfer between operations and the alliance were more complicated. It seemed as if a wall surrounded the alliance. It was difficult to interact.”
Quicker decisions, reductions in time and money spent on the project, informal communication and trust are some key words which describe work in the alliance. At the same time it is not obvious that a project alliance organization favors operations input into the project. I shall now focus on the effort of bringing offshore operations personnel to the Umoe Haugesund fabrication site, in order for operation to point out problematic sides of the design and fabrication work.
4.3.4 Fabrication reviews
Offshore operations were involved in fabrication reviews. A fabrication review team was selected among Phillips operations and maintenance personnel offshore, and their task was to inspect the platform in order to identify questionable solutions that would cause problems during operations offshore. Phillips ’ aim was to correct such cases onshore rather than offshore. The team met five times to go through the platform at Umoe Haugesund. Each time they spent two daystogether, coming up with a number of requests for changes that needed to be done. The alliance and PRS in Ekofisk II project management finally agreed upon the changes that should be implemented. The alliance manager suggested I accompanied this group in their work, which I did on their last two visits to the yard.
The group consisted of six operations people and two from drilling. They split into two groups that worked on their own. Operations did not intervene too much in the drilling area, but the two groups met for coffee and lunch breaks during the day and
-96- Eko&k 2/4 X coordinated their observations and suggestions. They communicated their change proposals to the section lead for commissioning and hook-up. They knew each other well from working a number of years together offshore.
They were satisfied with many of the solutions they saw, but the most general impression from operations people seeing the platform the first time was that it was very compact. In particular, they found the mud module to be extremely tight. The fabrication review team made jokes about only letting operators of 1.5 meter height work in the mud module area. They were not satisfied with the solution, but there was nothing they could do. I wrote in my field notes:
“In general, everyone feels that the platform is too tight and compact There is too little space. Too little space both horizontally and vertically. Too little room around the equipment and too little room to either put lifting equipment or lift the equipment in and out Things become awkward and difficult for the operations and maintenance people that are going to operate the equipment. ”
The commissioning and hook-up section lead commented how the platform was a compromise between different interests in the design, rather than an ideal platform. We had to give input within the limits of the project. You only realize this when you are part of the design, not when you onlyget to see the final result offshore. He said:
“In a large project like this - a platform is a compromise, a compromise between time, money, and other parameters. Two important parameters were to design for twenty meters subsidence on lower level, and further to take in a jack-up and have a certain amount of rigs to choose between. The weather deck therefore had to be at a certain level. It has resulted in less space than desired between the two decks.”
The fabrication review team emphasized the importance of easy access to the equipment. They commented on the lack of pad eyes (lifting bricks) in order to lift out for repair or replacement, the lack of enough room around equipment in order to take things in and out, of room to screw equipment out, to lift and remove valves, etc. In general, people in fabrication and design tended to forget these issues. Things were placed too close to each other. Operations of valves, for example, was made difficult
-97- Bridging Operation and Design placed too close to each other. Operations of valves, for example, was made difficult because of the lack of space in-between. These were draw-backs too late to do anything about. The fabrication team focused instead on changes that were realistic to consider at this stage of the project. Focusing on what they were not content with, I wrote in my field notes:
“It is a question of being able to remove and replace equipment. To be able to remove valves and pumps that need maintenance or replacement. You need pad eyes right above, and often a little to the side of, the particular equipment in order to lift things out. There must therefore be enough room right above to lift equipment out. And there must be opportunities to install pad eyes. There can not be pipes or electrical cables, etc. right above. This is obviously something people in design or fabrication don’t think of. Instead, things are placed as compact as possible. The most important issue in design is to get the equipment in. They don’t think about getting things out again. In general things are placed too tight. Flexibility and space are missing.”
Figure 4.2 Compact placing of valves
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The fabrication review team made several tours through the platform during their two days visits. They familiarized themselves with the design and took notes of inconvenient design solutions that needed adjustment. The team was fully aware of the limitations of what they could suggest. Changes that would imply delays of schedule could not be considered. They focused on minor changes that would improve day-to-day operations effectiveness. Their task was not always easy. It was difficult for them to see anything in many areas of the platform, because the equipment was still covered with plastic or scaffolding arrangement and not ready yet. In other areas it was too late for them to do anything. Later in the commissioning phase of the project, the leader of the fabrication review team remained on the fabrication site to assist the project. In this manner, operations were much more involved in fabrication and commissioning, compared to earlier projects.
Commissioning and hook-up offshore went fine, and the alliance was satisfied with the way in which the process went along. Many people from operations and drilling were involved in commissioning onshore and offshore. This work was planned and controlled by personnel with offshore operational knowledge. The strategy of the project was to do as much work as possible onshore. One of the management team members in the alliance said:
“The aim was that 80 % of all functional tests should be completed onshore. The rest would be undertaken offshore. Phillips strategy for the Ekofisk II project is to complete as much as possible onshore in order to save cost and complete on schedule. ”
Usually only 55 % of the anticipated work offshore was defined before sailing there, the PRS manager told. The amount of commissioning work undertaken onshore in the 2/4 X project was unique. It was the first time Phillips did this to such an extent. This was also new to Umoe. The project people were determined to finish on schedule, which they finally did. On 26 October 1996, drilling started from Ekofisk 2/4 X, as planned. I shall now focus on operational knowledge of the drilling rig so far.
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4.4 Resulting design and operational experience
4.4.1 Ekofisk 2/4 X operational experience
The availability of the equipment during drilling operations of the two first wells was 97 %. The drilling crew on 2/4 X had less start-up problems compared to similar rigs in the North Sea. “We have had less problems in the initial phase than on Troll and Heidrun, ” the commissioning manager said, “and we have a higher speed and availability.” The drilling supervisor involved in the design was also happy with the way the drilling rig performed:
“This rig is something of the most efficient of its kind. It is state of the art. People are impressed. Recently, I presented the concept on a conference in Bergen for leading drilling personnel. People were impressed. Currently we use about thirty days to complete a well. I expect we’ll soon get below thirty days per well.”
There were few modifications and changes that needed to be done offshore, and people were prepared to start using the equipment. The drilling crew had been through a training simulator at Hitec before start-up. At the end of August 1997, eleven wells had been drilled - five from the jack-up rig connected to 2/4 X and six from the 2/4 X drilling rig. The most rapid well drilled took twenty-six days and two and a half hour to drill and complete. The drilling rig designer commented on this:
“The availability of the rig is now 99.4 %. That is extremely high. And the downtime is caused by mistakes of the operating personnel.”
The 2/4 X drilling crew were highly satisfied with the rig. It functions much better than we expected, an onshore drilling operations manager in Phillips said. The fear had been that there would be serious problems related to the new equipment. He explained:
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"Everything has functioned much better than I expected in advance. I didn’t think it would function that well. It has functioned above all expectations. It slides very easily. Actually, we are very satisfied.”
The cranes onboard, however, were what they had problems with. “People out there would have preferred any other crane available on the Ekofisk field today,” one drilling operations manager said. He further emphasized another problem related to having too little space available on the rig. He said:
“There is too little room for the people that need to be there. But this didn’t come as a great surprise. There is not enough space. We went a bit wrong there. Currently we are considering a container solution in addition. It has also something to do with the way we operate. People are supposed to sit together and participate in the decision-making. Not to sit spread around at the platform. Something is missing there. ”
However, the main conclusion of the people operating the drilling rig was that they were overwhelmingly satisfied with the rig. One drilling operations manager onshore concluded by referring to the drilling supervisor involved in design at Hitec:
"What he usually says about the rig is that this is the second best drilling rig in the world. The best one has not yet been built, he says. And we can agree to that ”
The alliance organization was also happy with the project. The contractors found it reassuring to have the operating company part of the project along the way. Together they reached the goals of the alliance, and the financial result was more than NOK 190 million below most likely cost. The commissioning manager said:
“It became a cheap platform. NOK 1,5 billion, and NOK 190 million in cost savings - versus the NOK 150-190 million planned. Everyone is happy.”
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4.4.2 The innovating aspects of 2/4 X
The 2/4 X project did not plan for innovating technology on Ekofisk 2/4 X. However, the rig turned out to be state of the art of drilling rigs. “Look at technology,” Phillips ’ project manager on 2/4 X said, ”we got good technology, but it more happened than it was planned.” When asked about the innovating aspects of the 2/4 X platform, he was clear in his answer:
“The drilling rig. It is the most advanced system built. It is the most innovating thing. Not conservative. The rest is more straight forward. We had drilling engineers from Phillips working with the designers on a daily basis. A lot of dialogue. Practically- minded people, plus electricians, and others. They were to look at the design. To see it and look at how easy it would be to operate. We feel that we have gained in that way.”
Phillips 2/4 X project manager was amazed to see how operations had contributed to the design process. His background was from offshore drilling and day-to-day operations, and he was impressed by the solutions offered by the project. He supported the initiative along the road, to the surprise of the drilling supervisor from Phillips involved in design at Hitec. The 2/4 X project manager explained the drilling rig design process in the following way:
“There has not been any conservatism from our drilling people. Their push is to make a user-friendly design. They came up with some radical solutions. The drilling supervisor said you got better vision if you put the derrick in the comer. The two from drilling said that visibility would be difficult. Then they were pushing us into a new solution. We’ll see how good it is. It seems good. Hitec used the 3D cad design. But they have it as a visual tool. They worked for a year. Little input all the time. They wanted to clear things away from the drill floor. To have a clean drill floor. This was one of their concerns. It influenced the design.”
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Figure 4.3 The Ekofisk 2/4 X derrick located in the corner
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Traditionally conservatism has been one of the characteristics of drilling. They have wanted solutions similar to the ones which they were already familiar with. One Aker project manager commented the conservatism traditionally found in drilling in the following way:
“Drilling is very conservative. The derrick, the rotary, and all that. Something will happen here. Norwegian companies have been innovative. But you have the sledgehammer mechanics, as we call them. Drilling people that use the sledgehammer on everything. The American cowboy. When there was anything they hadn ’t seen before, they used the sledgehammer to see if it could stand the strain. It was a brutal treatment. They did not respect anything they hadn ’t seen in USA. To come with something European didn’t work. And they hit with the sledgehammer in order to destroy it. That ’s not the way it is supposed to be handled. These cowboys are gone now, but some of the mentality remains. Norwegian companies have been very innovative, but the conservatism in drilling is there. But I think a lot will happen in terms of drilling rig design.”
Figure 4.4 Ekofisk 2/4 X
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The Ekofisk 2/4 X project, however, managed to break out of this conservatism and to integrate new technology with operational knowledge from drilling rigs offshore. The 2/4 X project team at Hitec came up with significant progress in the derrick and drill floor systems concept, compared to the previous Hitec designs. Many years of operational knowledge from drill floors was incorporated into the design. Great emphasis was put on practical, efficient, and safe operating solutions. Phillips ’ drilling supervisor involved in design at Hitec said:
“This rig is very special. You won’t find anything like it. It will be exciting to see if it works. I have put much emphasis on the working area. The rig is fully automated, with the idea behind that if you don’t have people inside the work area, you can’t hurt them either. ”
One of his concerns was to have enough working space and a good vision of the drill floor and work area. Unrequited items were removed. One design criterion was that each person should be able to see his work area only by turning his head. The drilling supervisor said:
“I have said that this should be a dancing floor. Everything that doesn’t need to be there is to be taken away. There should be a good view. Good visibility. We have cleared things away. Moved things away from the working area. Actually, the rig can be run by three people. And we have caught up with the latest development We have called it Cyberbase. We have not connected ourselves to internet, but it can be done.”
Figure 4.5 Previous drilling operations on Ekofisk -105- Bridging Operation and Design
All pipe handling was automated, the only vestige of the past being the mechanical torque-wrench. Winches and draw work had all been removed to the mezzanine level to improve the drilling work space, and the need for personnel working on the drill floor was reduced due to automatic control of equipment. Thus, hazard risks were reduced and safety levels raised accordingly. Hitec’s pipe handling system represents state of the art technology. One of Hitec’s personnel involved in the 2/4 X design explained:
“The key issue is the star formation. It is genial when moving. It is more accurate. Much less movement and more accuracy - those are the advantages. But you get a blind angle. We took out a patent on this, but we have sold it to the States.”
Figure 4. 6 Ekofisk 2/4 X “star rack” pipe handling system and iron roughneck
The “Cyberbase” control system was a concept developed by Hitec. Two drilling persons from Phillips and Deutag (the drilling contractor at Ekofisk) assisted the project in order to make user-friendly design and displays. All pipe handling movements, valve and pump operations, and other devices for the mud module and
-106- Ekofisk 2/4 X drilling systems can be monitored and remote controlled from the driller’s cabin. Communication has greatly improved, since both driller, assistant driller, and pipe handlin g operator can sit together. They can follow the entire operation, both on the drill floor and aloft in the derrick, from inside the driller’s cabin. There are also improvements regarding noise abatement of the equipment. A member of alliance steering group said:
“This rig is modem. It is the most modem rig that has been built, the most automated. You can control it from onshore. The people that are going to operate it are used to something simple. Now they are going to control everything with a joystick. It will be a great challenge. We have bought a simulator to train people. We have learned from Troll. It is like driving a car with a joystick and no steering wheel."
Figure 4.7 Remotely controlled drilling operations on 2/4 X
Operations had also a large impact on the design of the topside. In particular, they were able to incorporate extra space and flexibility into the design in order to facilitate the access to the equipment, to be able to lift things in and out when needed, and other practical arrangement to ease operations offshore. The operations representative involved in the topside design said:
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“In general, we were involved a lot, in ensuring access to equipment, lifting arrangements, and to get things out. Operations were very involved. This had never been built if we were not there. ”
This may sound different from the experiences of the fabrication review team. However, within the limits of height and area of the platforms, operations had a major impact on such issues as access to equipment, lifting arrangements, etc. This is not easy to see for people walking through the platform the first times. The first impression is that it is compact. Looking back, we could have required a larger platform area, but I don’t think we could have done anything with the height, the operations representative involved at AOP said.
4.4.3 Operations vs. drilling on 2/4 X
The project also got complaints from the operators at the neighboring platform 2/4 C who were going to be involved in work on 2/4 X. They were not taken into consideration in the design. Operations representative at AOP admitted this weakness of the process. The project had assumed 2/4 X should be an unmanned platform from operations side. He said:
“We have got some criticism from the operators that are going to man the platform. We did a mistake there. We were too optimistic thinking this would be an unmanned platform. Our point of departure was that it should be an unmanned platform. We should have known better. ”
Although they had been advised that the recreation facilities on 2/4 X were built for everybody onboard, operations and drilling, the operators on 2/4 C were frustrated when they saw the final result. What struck them the most was the difference between theirs and the drilling people’s facilities. They felt that drilling needs were taken into account, while theirs had been ignored. They wrote a letter to the Phillips management to express their anger after a walk through the platform at Umoe Haugesund:
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“...There we came to the area where Phillips ’ process technicians (or autonomous groups) were going to work. These are groups that are responsible for oil production, maintenance, and safety. We experienced here a different world. No room to take a cup of coffee between the battles, no toilet. Not even a sink were we rewarded with, in spite of us often being in touch with crude oil and different chemicals through our work. Neither were we able to find a small room for equipment to be used as a workshop in our area. Computers for process control and inspection had been placed in a comer of a room containing other equipment!!! ”
The director for Phillips medical department, a medical doctor with long experience from operations on Ekofisk, also inspected the platform before start-up. The fully automated drilling system evoked his admiration and interest. However, he commented on a few areas of concern where the needs of operations personnel were not paid enough attention to. In particular, he was critical to the choice of mechanical valves. He wrote to the Ekofisk II project management:
“...This was probably a question of cost, but I am not sure whether the project took into consideration the experience our process technicians on our “old” platforms all the years have had with health and muscles/skeleton problems, both acute and chronic. Costs related to introduction of automatic valves controlled from a data screen would probably have compensated for the extra costs the company now will have with probably a high manning level of process technicians for mechanical operations of the valves. ”
A container with offices and toilets was later set up to facilitate operations. The activity level in the area was higher than expected because of the increased speed of drilling. More people than expected were required to operate the platform. It was not a surprise, one of the operations representatives involved in design of 2/4 J said. The PRS-manager, however, thought this was a problem only for limited period of time in relation to the start-up of the platform.
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4.4.4 Reflections on operations involvement in design
The experiences from involving operations in the 2/4 X project were very good. Phillips ’ 2/4 X project manager argued that they as a company gained a lot through integrating operational knowledge into the project. The operations and drilling people had a major impact during the design phase, he said, and they managed to get then- messages through. Input came through both official and unofficial channels. The 2/4 X project manager explained:
“We have gained a lot from the drilling people. Not through official channels. We have the PRS group. Everything has gone back to E&P through PRS. But the friendship route to E&P works as well. People know people. It is important to keep that in mind. Not to be too formal.”
He argued that Phillips had learned a lot about the importance of involving operational knowledge from the very early stage of design and continuously through the process. He said:
“A main point we have learnt is the importance of having an early involvement, and we have seen the benefits of that. But we have to learn much about how to do this. It is difficult. Is information from 2-3 people representative? Anybody cannot have a representative view. We therefore have to put teams together. ”
And he continued:
“Timing - we could improve. Getting the input on an early stage. We have to leant together. To learn together from the beginning. We have learned. We should have a continuous communication with operations”
The amount of resources made available from operations is another question. In design at AOP there was only one person from operations involved full time. One would probably have profited from involving more people. Looking back, he acknowledged this fact. As he said:
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“I could have had a few technicians here. I had a few under the HAZOP studies. I often called people. But there has not been anyone permanently. It could have been. Anyway, it has been important to have someone with a leading operations position. Someone that has a general overview, who can cut through discussions, and who has a large network. Someone that has the authority to cut through and say things are going to be this or that way. We have influenced well. We have achieved a lot.”
His main conclusion was the importance of early operations involvement. Because of the speed, one needs to be extremely attentive, especially in project start-up, he said. They would have profited from having more people involved. “We should have had more people in early. More people in the beginning. Things move so fast. People with long operational knowledge need to be there. Those who operate the plant must be involved to a larger extent.” Direct involvement on the site is important to ensure real influence. We should have been more people in the beginning, he concluded.
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Figure 4.8 Ekofisk 2/4 X installed offshore
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Figure 4.9 The Ekofisk complex including 2/4 X
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-114- Chapter 5 Ekofisk 2/4 J
In this chapter I describe operations involvement in the design of the Ekofisk 2/4 J processing and transportation platform. Kvasmer Engineering in Oslo was responsible for the design. Two operations representatives from Phillips were involved full time in the project. Aker Verdal, Umoe Haugesund, and Amec were responsible for fabrication of the utility module, the separator module, the process module and the module support frame. I shall focus on basic and detail design, however.
5.1 Operations not knowing design
5.1.1 Operations involved not knowing design
The two operations representatives involved in the 2/4 J design at Kvasmer had both around 20 years offshore operational experience. They had previously been maintenance supervisors, operations and maintenance managers offshore. One of them was also an experienced platform manager and turbine supervisor. They had worked together for a long time offshore. In November 1993 they came onshore to participate in the project. Basic engineering started at Kvaemer in March 1994. Until then they were part of the PRS (operations representatives in the project, the owner of the Ekofisk II installations). They were responsible for defining the future Ekofisk II organization offshore, the design targets, and requirements for offices, warehouse, workshops, and beds offshore.
At that time, PRS included 6-7 persons in the project. The total Ekofisk II project organization at Phillips headquarters in Tananger counted about 180 people. The Phillips Ekofisk II project manager emphasized the importance of team building in order to familiarize the operations people with the project. He said:
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“We took operations people into the design to ensure their thought in the project. My fear at that time was that those people were not used to the project atmosphere. You have an operations culture and a project culture. You get these people together. That ’s where team building helps. People will be thrown together, but they won’t be going on. They don’t know what to do. Operations people are in a new place, a new situation. They don’t know what to do. They twist their thumbs. But the project people know what to do. They know what has to be done. And they start doing it. And that ’s the way it is done. The operations people don’t know what to do.”
Phillips involved an external organizational consultant to run team building sessions in the Ekofisk II organization in Tananger. He knew Phillips ’ onshore and offshore organization from previous work and the different ways of working in operations and design. He was aware of the difficulties facing operations people when involved in onshore projects for the first time. He said:
“You need to spend time letting people talk to each other, talk about their problems. And they will need help. Things don’t happen by themselves. Early involvement is important You need to get operations people involved early in the process, and you need to let them know how a project works in advance. ”
The Ekofisk II project management was aware of the difficulties facing operations people not familiar with the project setting and engineering practice onshore. The speed of the project was high, and briefing the operations representatives on the procedures of a project was not given priority. The two operations representatives involved in design at Kvasmer had not previously been exposed to projects onshore. They didn’t know how a design project functioned. They were not prepared for what was expected by them. They found themselves as strangers in an environment totally unknown to them, with people speaking a language they were not familiar with. They had to leant as the project went along. This made it difficult for them to provide the necessary input in time and to be proactive in the process. One of them said:
“It doesn’t work to bring operations people in without any project experience. We didn’t know the premises. One thing is to bring operations people into design, another thing is their need to first be introduced to knowledge about the engineering environment. We
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have learned as the project went along. But we couldn ’t foresee what was included in the different phases. If we had, we could have been more proactive. ”
The Ekofisk 2/4 J processing and transportation platform was of far greater complexity than the Ekofisk 2/4 X wellhead and drilling platform. PRS therefore concentrated their resources on 2/4 J. “It was on J there were most uncertainties. Effort and energy was therefore used on J in ‘94,” one PRS representative said. Their focus was on 2/4 J. PRS will therefore appear to a larger extent in the description of operations involvement in the 2/4 J project than in 2/4 X. One of Phillips ’ experienced operations personnel brought onshore to participate in PRS said about Phillips ’ preparations for the project:
“We hadn ’t done this before. We could have prepared better. Things were too haphazard. You need to be conscious about how you involve operational experience into design. You cannot just call in whoever it may be. They cannot just walk around in the office and feel like strangers in a 100 % unknown environment ”
He was involved in defining the design targets and communicating these to Kvasmer. He also came into the project without knowing much about design. Operations offshore are not used to projects, and communication with onshore design has been scarce. He described his picture of design before and after his involvement in the Ekofisk II project:
“Before, design was something done onshore. We got the result offshore. Now, design is the conceptual phase, basic engineering, detail engineering, construction, commissioning, and start-up. Lots of phases. And an ocean of things that need to be done within these in terms of regulations from NPD, unions, partners, approvals, etc. Thousands, or at least hundreds, of things we were not aware of before. ”
In addition to not knowing the context of a design project, the two operations representatives realized they were too few compared to the size and complexity of the project. Too few operations resources were made available to the project. They were not able to follow up on what they saw as required. They repeatedly found
-117- Bridging Operation and Design themselves coming too late, or not having any impact on the decisions made in the project. One of the operations representatives said:
“It has been unnecessary burdensome for us to be in the project. Not only for us, but for most Phillips people. Deadlines - what needed to be done before these? We have not been good enough at predicting what would happen next. We have not been able to set the premises. It has been difficult for us to foresee what would come. And we were too few. We addressed this in the conceptual design but were not strong enough to get it through. We didn’t manage to justify it.”
One of the issues not emphasized well enough in the early process of design was the importance of addressing tag number requirements in the beginning of the design. The operations representatives came to learn that the design and commissioning phase each had different needs for tag identification on equipment, needs that not necessarily were the same. For future projects they stressed the importance of addressing tag identification requirements up-front and giving clear instructions on standardized information, like what tag number system to use. One project representative in the Phillips site team at Kvaemer said:
“For Ekofisk III you would need to have all the standardized information, tag numbers, all where you will insist on something, specified up front. So the vendors actually knew what they had to include in their package."
Gradually, the operations people learned the procedures of a project and how the situation differed from operations offshore. Their decided to hang on to the design schedule. They started to run after the project One of the operations representatives commented:
“Operations and engineering are two different environments. There is too little focus on this. Engineering think delivery on schedule. Operations have no engineering experience. Operations want to change things as late as possible. What we have learned is the importance of giving experience input at the right time. After a while we realized we had to hang on to their schedule. It is the schedule that controls everything. In basic engineering you often heard: “It’s too late.” Even when we had valuable experience
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input. The “too late argument ” has been typical. It is therefore important to focus on having the experience ready in time.”
The operations representatives experienced the disadvantage of not being operative in the early process of design when the premises were set. Far into the design they realized th at operations’ concerns need to be addressed up-front in order to be influencing the design. It was difficult for them to justify changes as the project went along. Their proposals tended to come too late to be taken into account. One of them said:
“It is too late to be involved in an evaluation phase. You must communicate with the one who makes the drawing. Much more time should therefore be used on controlling documentation in the first phase, to include the things we are most concerned about. ”
One PRS representative argued that one needed to emphasize a greater extent of operations involvement in conceptual and basic engineering. “This is where you need operational experience. It is important in all phases, but one has most impact in concept and basic, ” he said, and continued:
“We should have used more time in the conceptual phase. Half a year. To get the most important things settled. We could have benefited a lot from that Stand-by on equipment, for example. Now we have only two compressors that will be running continuously. This came up too late to have any controlling effect on the design. One . should have used more time. Things just happened. We can live with the two compressors, but the operations still hate us for that ”
Phillips was not prepared for a large-scale project like Ekofisk n. The two operations representatives involved in design at Kvaemer were not experienced with projects. They did not know the phases and procedures of design. It took time for them to find their bearings and become operative in the project. They also experienced difficulties because there were too few operations people available compared to the size of the project.
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5.1.2 Too few operations resources made available to the project
Phillips had no recent experience from a large-scale design project like Ekofisk II. Neither were they experienced in bringing operations personnel into design. Their latest project experiences were from smaller projects. They were not updated on the mandatory regulations and routines of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) that needed to be taken into account, and did not have management routines of large scale development projects in-house. One PRS person said:
“To be honest, he problem has been that Phillips has not had any experience from large projects. We have had many small projects. We therefore don’t know the regulations any longer. We don’t know the NPD routines. ”
PRS became well integrated into the Ekofisk II organization at Phillips headquarters in Tananger. It took some time for them to become aware of their role in the project. In the beginning they had a humble approach in order to find their bearings in the project. They were not involved when the first premises were set in the first version of the Ekofisk II management strategy. One PRS representative argued:
“PRS has been a good model. We have been integrated into the project. The only thing in the beginning was that we were not sure about the range of our authority, and the project thought we were there to help them. These things should have been clear to all parts from the very beginning, and an organization model should have been defined. Instead, clarifications came late, and we were too humble to begin with. We were not part of the decision-making process of the first version of the 93 management strategy. The management had decided how things should be done. If we had been involved earlier, we could have clarified as to what we should and should not spend our resources on.”
Gradually, they realized they had to clearly define their role in the project and be explicit about what using their resources on and not. It was not obvious to the project what operations could contribute with. “What is it that an operations person can do? He only sits with his feet placed on the table anyway,” was one attitude among some
-120- Ekofisk 2/4 J project people, one PRS person commented. The project therefore tended just to assign the operations representatives tasks they did not have time to handle themselves. As one of the PRS people said:
“We set up a race. We had people from operation in design. It has shown to be the right way to go. But it became too much for them to do. They became coordinators. To a certain extent they became too occupied with other things. They became occupied with things others didn’t have time for. We should have been more conscious about what people should do. We should have had clearer expectations and work instructions for the jobs. ”
Phillips did not know what was required in terms of involving operations personnel in design. They did not know what kind of resources was needed to have an impact on a design project of this scale. They had limited experience in foreseeing what was required of planning and resources and just jumped into the challenge. The PRS- group soon realized they were too few to cope with the responsibilities they were assigned. They had not foreseen the scope of work and the size and speed of the project. Phillips had done too little planning in advance. As described by one of the PRS representatives:
“We were not prepared for the size of the project, and the speed. We were too few people for the job we were asked to do. It was underestimated. We were just put together. It became evident we were too few. The project is too big. It is too difficult to keep track of things and have an overview. ”
It was difficult for the operations people to argue for involving additional operations people in the project. Two persons were too little to follow up the activities of the design. One of the operations representatives at Kvasmer said:
“In the conceptual phase we said we needed one man on tag identification, but we didn’t get anyone before the middle of detail engineering. Standardization of equipment was addressed in conceptual already. We listed some potential items for standardization, but we didn’t have good enough routines for bringing this further into detail engineering. Time went too fast. We didn’t have time to follow things up. ”
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Another PRS representative concluded:
“We had too few people. They became overloaded. Too much to do. They could have worked twenty-four hours a day.”
Kvaemer was positive to introducing operations personnel to design, but thought Phillips ’ effort to bring only two people into the project was too little. As Kvaemer ’s Ekofisk II systems manager said:
“The most optimal thing is to involve operations in design. Phillips has two. As a matter of fact, that is too little. And we question some of the experience Phillips has. Some may be technologically far behind. It is not very relevant today. We are critical to how useful Phillips ’ experience is.”
The two operations persons involved in design at Kvaemer were too few to handle the size and speed of the project. Another issue that complicated the process of involving operational experience in design was the distance between the operating company and the design contractor in design. Phillips and Kvaemer agreed that Phillips ’ site team should not be integrated into Kvaemer ’s project organization. Their project organizations worked on a separate basis. Compared to the 2/4 X design projects at AOP and Hitec, Phillips and Kvaemer had a strenuous relationship in the start-up of the 2/4 J project.
5.2 Distance in design
5.2.1 Initial tension
Kvaemer and Phillips did not instantly make a good match. The two companies were not used to working together, and it took some time to adjust to each other. The Phillips Ekofisk II project manager explained:
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“Kvasmer came along in ‘94. That was fairly difficult. Kvasmer came in a different way. We were two different organizations. They didn’t know us. Their experiences were from working with Hydro and Statoil. They did things differently. We gave them a lot of things they were not used to. Functional specifications. PLM. We were throwing a lot of different things to them. It was hard to get on a smooth course. Kvasmer ’s last project was Brage. They thought they could continue where they were with Hydro. But it gradually became OK. We had meetings and team building. It was good.”
Kvasmer was used to doing more in design than they did in the Ekofisk II project. Phillips, however, wanted to take responsibility for the procurement themselves. Kvasmer had difficulties in understanding this. One PRS representative said:
“Phillips has been responsible for the procurement on Ekofisk II. But Kvasmer has developed into a total supplier, and they wanted the whole package. There has been some tension. Phillips ’ procurement is in Oslo. It is a large group. Many people.”
The Kvaemer people, on the other hand, were confused by the large number of external consultants in Phillips ’ 2/4 J site team. They thought they could have done better what Phillips had hired consultants to do. Kvasmer ’s Ekofisk II manager said:
“We are used to doing more of the tasks than we do on Ekofisk II. Now Phillips is supposed to do it. But things are hanging in the air. We ask Why? We have been tearing our hair asking that question. They lack culture. They lack systems for performing things in a complete way. It’s a dilemma. They hire external consultants. This appears strange to us. External consultants do for Phillips what we could have done ourselves, but which they have insisted on doing themselves. We have asked ourselves many times: Why? But we don’t find any answer to that ”
In addition, there were uncertainties related to the concepts of functional specifications and life cycle costs as introduced to the project. These concepts were new both to Phillips and Kvaemer. The offshore industry was used to detailed specifications coming from the operating companies. Functional specification came in conflict with the operations’ wish for standardization of equipment. In addition, the design targets brought into the project were another factor that complicated
-123- Bridging Operation and Design communication between the two companies. Kvasmer ’s Ekofisk II engineering manager said:
“Design targets and standardization - we have been through some conflicts. We questioned the need for standardization. It’s a conflict. Standardization versus functional specification to a vendor. When we got the design targets, it became a question how to interpret them. Was it something we should take, or was it something Phillips took responsibility for? Was it something Phillips should follow up on? It was not clear. Then there were some trivialities. And further - what is the industry standard? Industry standard or North Sea standard?”
Kvasmer was critical towards Phillips ’ Ekofisk experience and regarded it as too old to consider in design of Ekofisk II. It was not obvious that operational experiences from Ekofisk I technology were relevant in the design of Ekofisk II. Kvaemer personnel therefore questioned the value of Phillips ’ experience. They had difficulties in interpreting Phillips ’ requirements and experiences. Kvasmer ’s Ekofisk II engineering manager said:
“It has been difficult for us to use them explicitly in design. Some required a follow-up on the construction site or by vendors. Some of the targets were based on Ekofisk I, but they are 20-25 years old. Some of them are almost not relevant any longer. Some of them are standard design now.”
Another issue that complicated the relationship between Kvaemer and Phillips was that Kvaemer was not familiar with total quality management (TQM) and team based work processes. Their engineers were used to work on an individual basis without too much interference from other people, Phillips ’ operations representatives said. Phillips ’ 2/4 J project manager in Tananger commented:
“Kvaemer was not a TQM company. Aker, yes. Kvaemer did not use the notion of customer, internal and external. There has been some tension.”
Kvaemer was reluctant to change their procedures and ways of doing design. They wanted to stick to their own ways of doing things. The PLM consultant involved at
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Kvasmer compared their attitude on the Ekofisk 2/4 J project to AOP’s approach on 2/4 X. He said:
“Look at the 2/4 X Alliance, Aker, and Umoe! Kvasmer - they don’t want to change themselves. They are a bureaucracy of their own. They are having difficulties in accepting changes. Aker seems more willing to adjust. They seem more flexible. They are more willing to listen to new data.”
It took time to build trust between Kvasmer and Phillips in the 2/4 J project. In the beginning, much time was spent on reading the contract. There was a formal relationship between the two companies. One of the operations representatives said:
“In the beginning we spent much time on reading the contract. There was formal cooperation. It took a long time before we managed to work together. People were afraid. During the summer things improved. We could sit outdoor for lunch and talk. In the fall, things became even better. And when we came to Lysaker after Christmas, the ice really melted. Then we had team building. ”
It took almost a year to break the ice between Phillips and Kvasmer. It was difficult to get on to a smooth course. During basic design there was a great distance between the two companies. It was first in detail design that people started to interact more informally. The physical separation of Phillips and Kvasmer personnel contributed to this slow process of people approaching each other. I shall now focus on the traditional project model and contract that was chosen for the project.
5.2.2 Phillips and Kvaerner working separately in design
At Kvasmer, there were around 170 people involved in basic design. In the beginning of detail design, Kvasmer had 360-370 people involved, and 420-450 at the peak. Two thirds of the people worked on the engineering side. The project was divided into the areas of engineering, material administration, project planning, and systems. In addition the project was in charge of health, environment, and safety, and information technology administration. Basic engineering took nearly a year. Detail
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engineering lasted for one year and a half. The schedule was tighter than usual, and Kvasmer had never done a project of this size at this speed before, Kvasmer ’s project manager said.
Phillips ’ site team at Kvasmer, the PTF, were around 80 people, and the two operations representatives were part of the PTF. Phillips and Kvasmer agreed not to function as an integrated team. They decided that Kvasmer ’s project organization and the PTF should sit and work separately. Phillips wanted Kvasmer to take full responsibility for the design. The PTF manager said:
“It’s a question of balancing. In many ways it could have been an advantage to work fully integrated. One could have been sitting in Kvsmer ’s engineering organization with Phillips people in some key positions. Then one could have given a balanced input on operational experience directly to the design, and engineering people in Phillips could have given input to the engineering process at Kvasmer. On the other hand, we want Kvasmer to have the total responsibility, the contractual responsibility for the design. A platform that functions at the end of the day. We chose, however, not to go for a completely integrated model. Actually we are paying an engineering contractor that has experience from doing these things before. ”
Phillips emphasized their own role as facilitator in the process. They did not want to take any direct responsibilities in the design. The PTF manager explained Phillips ’ involvement in the Ekofisk 2/4 J project in the following way:
“We have not put ourselves in a role where we are directly responsible. That is not a goal in a large project, on a large platform like this. We shouldn ’t be involved in a relationship with direct responsibilities. Neither do we have staff enough to manage this. We could have contributed with seven, eight, or ten key people, but that would be far from enough to positively influence the process. It is considerably better that we sit on the side and give the necessary input. ”
The project organization of Kvasmer and Phillips therefore did not function as an integrated team. Kvasmer ran the project in a conventional way. Phillips ’ site team, the PTF, was located at Kvasmer but separate from Kvasmer ’s people. They
-126- Ekofisk 2/4 J communicated through official, formal channels. As explained by one of the operations representatives involved in the project:
“Communication has been through written documentation. Kvaemer has done a standard design. They use what they have. If they don’t get any objections, they take what they already have. ”
Kvaemer had trouble in understanding Phillips. In the PTF there was a large number of external consultants without any Phillips ’ experience. Kvaemer did not get to know the Phillips culture and their way of working, they said. As explained by Kvaemer ’s Ekofisk II systems manager:
“Our problem has been - how does Phillips function? In what ways does Phillips work? In order to design for that. But they are in a down sizing period. We have the impression there is a certain amount of “turf protection” going on that gets the better of optimal operational concerns.”
And he continued:
“We in Kvaemer relate to the PTF. Not to Tananger. PTF has the link to Tananger. We haven ’t The problem is that PTF includes consultants without any Phillips image or Phillips culture. They are people who do not represent the Phillips culture and their way of doing things. It is a problem for us only to relate to external consultants and not to the company itself.”
The two operations representatives were part of the PTF, but they were not fully integrated into the PTF work right away. Both the PTF and Kvaemer project team were afraid that operations input would disturb the schedule. But the attitude changed after a while both PTF and Kvaemer ’s project people gradually started to consult the operations representatives. One of the operations representatives said:
“After a while, experience transfer was regarded in a positive way. We got more and more requests. At Kvaemer there is a typically individual-based work setting with no interference with other people’s fields of knowledge. But the attitude softened when
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they saw the value of taking experience into account. At Kvaemer both the engineering environment and the PTF were critical towards experience in the beginning. PTF was responsible for the schedule and wouldn ’t have anything disturb this. They looked at operations as a restraint. Operations was therefore a threat both to the PTF and to Kvaemer.”
Kvaemer was puzzled by the way Phillips involved operations in the project. Their previous experience from working with Hydro and Statoil was a more integrated approach. Kvaemer ’s Ekofisk II systems manager explained:
“It is a question of the operating company bringing with it operations people into the project. That ’s the way to do it. Hydro has created a totally different structure. Operations is incorporated into design to a much larger extent than here. On Hydro Oseberg and Brage they were working integrated in the PTF. They pulled the operations people along with them during the whole project. In the Sleipner project, Statoil also involved their own people to a larger extent.”
By the end of 1994, the Ekofisk II project moved to Kvaemer ’s offices at Lysaker. Until then the project had been sitting at Hovik. The working relationship between Kvaemer and Phillips went much smoother course from then on. It took a year, however, before people started to informally interact and work together. One of the operations representatives commented:
“It took time to build trust. The first year was hard. But when we moved to Lysaker, things became a little better. But the building itself separated us from Kvsmer. We were sitting apart. Far from each other. And then there was a combination lock separating us. It was a physical barrier. It was complicated to see each other. You didn’t go unless you had to. And the conference rooms were too small and narrow. It didn’t really work out, to tell you the truth. ”
When the project organization arrived at Lysaker there was a joint effort by Phillips and Kvaemer to initiate team building, to improve communication between the two project organizations. There was first a common team-building session for the PTF and Kvaemer people. Then there were separate team building sessions at management level and within the different disciplines. Phillips ’ and Kvaemer ’s people started to
-128- Ekofisk 2/4 J interact in a more informal way. Informal cooperation was what finally gave results, one of the operations representatives said. He thought one should have started team building at an earlier stage. He said:
“We would have profited from starting earlier with team building. It would have given a better start. The ice melted after a while. Then things became different. People contacted us. In an informal way. Informal communication is the most important one. Informal cooperation. That is what gives results. ”
One problem that may illustrate the lack of communication and integrated problem solving between the operating company and the design contractor is the complexity of choice between manual or automated valves, for example. There was no joint effort between Phillips and Kvasmer on these questions. Kvasmer ’s Ekofisk II engineering manager commented:
“It has been a problem that one has not defined how many operators one wants, before looking at the technical design. We have a feeling there has not been any analysis of how many manual operational procedures are part of daily operations. From coupling and uncoupling, opening and closing valves. Throughout the project decisions are made concerning the level of automation. The question is - more or less automation? ”
While one of Phillips ’ operations representatives said:
“To justify changes is too expensive. The premises should have been set during the conceptual design. Automatic versus manual valves, for example. We saw this too late, and we didn’t understand the system. We didn’t see it on the drawing.”
The distant relationship between Phillips and Kvasmer and the physical separation in design retarded the process of developing an informal, effective work climate between the Phillips and Kvasmer personnel. It took long time for people to approach each other. To begin with, the operations people were held at a distance both by the PTF and by Kvasmer ’s project people. The attitudes changed, however. After a year the ice was broken and people were able to informally interact. Kvasmer controlled the process. They were the ones responsible for design. I shall now focus this.
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5.2.3 Design controlling design
Kvasmer was responsible for the design. They decided what experience to take into account and not. The two operations representatives experienced repeatedly that their input was not taken into consideration. And there were no routines for feedback from the project to operations. They were not informed whether their comments had been included in the project or not, and they were surprised at times to see that input they thought was taken care of was not taken into account. It was up to Kvasmer if they would listen to their comments, which they often did not. This was not inspiring for the operations personnel involved. One of them said:
“Kvasmer is responsible for the design, and they are conservative in their design. They are afraid of their responsibility. We have given comments, but they have not always been taken into account. We haven ’t had a chance to follow up on this. We have commented on documents, but never got to see the final version. We thought things were incorporated, but then they were not. It created a lot of work for us. We repeated our comments, and discovered things we commented on earlier were not taken into account. But it is up to Kvasmer to take action.”
This was a problem that took much of the operations people’s time. The way the contract was set up did not favor operations input into the project, they said. Kvasmer was given a final deadline for the project and were afraid of issues that could disturb the schedule. One of the operations representatives said:
“How the contract is set up does not inspire Kvasmer to innovative thinking. They are afraid. If they are able to manipulate in order to follow the deadlines, they do. There are penalties and bonuses. And they are the ones who are responsible. They are always acting like that. It is up to them if they want to listen to our comments or not. They can choose not to take our comments into consideration.”
From an operations point of view it would be useful with more design reviews through the project, to evaluate the concept in terms of operability and
-130- Ekofisk 2/4 J maintainability. But the project did not have time for this. Such stop are difficult for a design project to handle. They disturb the schedule and progress of the project, unless you have planned for them in advance. The PRS manager said:
“You have a resistance against reviews, schedules where activities are defined without them being there. Now, you have hundreds of people working. One cannot let them sit there and twin their thumbs. But they can do something else. It could have been planned before. Foreseen. Included in the initial plan. Then there would be no delays. That ’s the argument for not doing it. Because if you are in a hurry - why would a review of the concept be useful? I think it should be possible to include it in the schedule when you write the contract.”
What tag number system to use turned out to be one of the main controversies between operations and design. Kvasmer had difficulties in accepting that Phillip ’s tag number system needed to be part of the design. It was a struggle for the operations representatives in the project to convince the project about the significance of a tag number system that functioned well offshore. As explained by one operations representatives:
“Tag numbers control all maintenance. Everything starts with the equipment definition. Our problem was that we had an equipment register that differed from Kvaemer ’s. We had a frequency-based register, while Kvasmer had another system. We had to make changes in our structures, and they too. There were many compromises all the way. We have used much time and resources on poor communication between the systems. The tag number issue and setup have been a main problem. That is what has been the problem. If . only Kvasmer ’s system had been used, we wouldn ’t have had any operational experience in.”
The operations people felt that Kvasmer was not interested in learning from Phillips ’ experience offshore. The project organization at Kvasmer stuck to their usual design practice and were not focused on learning from the operations people involved. Operations personnel felt, especially on issues like operations of valves etc., that there was a potential for Kvasmer to learn something from them. One PRS representative said:
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“In basic engineering people think process. In detail engineering you make or do things. You don’t think smart solutions here. It is in basic engineering that you need to get things in - valves and things like that. They are the ones who need guidelines. For example - in basic engineering, Kvaemer could have developed guidelines for maintenance-friendly solutions on the basis of input from operations. Then Kvaemer could have learned something too. Valves - Kvaemer should have learned from us. It is in basic engineering that things are defined, but much is done in conceptual design. Kvaemer though more was done in the conceptual phase. They didn’t have the right people in basic engineering.”
Instead, Kvaemer tended to override questions and concerns expressed by the Phillips personnel. One process engineer in PRS reacted against Kvasmer ’s way of ignoring operations’ comments in design reviews. They did not listen to Phillips ’ concerns and experience, but gave a strong impression of knowing what they were doing. The PRS process engineer said:
“One example: pig receivers. We could say we had problems with wax in certain pipes. But then you get the answer that: “This has functioned well on Gullfaks, Heidrun, etc. - why shouldn ’t it function on Ekofisk? This is how we have this everywhere. Why shouldn ’t it work on Ekofisk too?” But there can be individual differences. They should be a little conscious of that. The attitude is a little “We know this very well.” They didn’t listen to us. But we were going to have the final product. We were the customer. ”
Kvasmer was in charge of the design. They ran a traditional discipline-based design with little communication between the disciplines. This way of structuring work did not facilitate operations input. Operations knowledge did not always fit into the structure of design. I shall now focus on this.
5.2.4 Operations knowledge not fitting into the structure of design
One of the problems facing the operations people was the sequential- and discipline- based structure of design. It was difficult for them to communicate operations’ needs
-132- Ekofisk 2/4 J across the disciplines and coordinate the operations input to the different activities through design. As one PRS representative said:
“The largest drawback has been that Kvasmer is running a discipline-based design with very tight barriers in between. Multi-disciplinary analyses become difficult. Safety functioned. One should have had something similar on operations and maintenance. Several disciplines together in analysis. It works on safety. There it is a requirement from the authorities. But people groan.”
The discipline-oriented structure of design did not fit with the way of thinking in operations offshore. Issues that depended on each other ’s outcome started at the same time. One of the operations representatives said:
“It is a parallel design. You don’t get to see the whole before it is finished. It is easy to loose sight of the whole. Every discipline quickly goes into their details. It is difficult to see the whole picture. Every discipline is in different phases. It is difficult to get insight into operations issues. Difficult to get in between the disciplines.”
And he continued:
“The problem is that you don’t discover areas for improvement before it’s too late. The way in which activities are scheduled does not take into account experience. Many things start at the same time. But many of these things depend on each other, and it becomes difficult when activities start at the same time.”
Phillips operations personnel were not integrated into the daily work of Kvasmer ’s project organization. In general, they met through formal meetings between the design contractor and the operating company. They had the opportunity of meeting on the following occasions: Layout reviews, design reviews, bid evaluations, HAZOP studies, optimization studies, and 3D CAD reviews. The operations people invited to participate in these meetings often found it difficult to communicate with the project people. They felt they were not able to express themselves in such a way that they were listened to. They felt they were saying things in a too simple way, and that attention instead was given to mathematical formulas and fancy concepts. A process
-133- Bridging Operation and Design engineer in the PRS had the following experience from the 2/4 J design reviews at Kvasmer:
“Operations do not talk in terms of meter per second, capacitance, etc. They don’t speak the same language. Instead they become silent. They feel everything is so well documented. They almost become convinced that things are right. And design talk so much and fast and argue that things should be this or that way. People from operations then feel this is nothing to make a fuss about. They get the impression that everything is calculated in depth. But then design only copy what they have done earlier. And it is only the most aggravating things they get feedback on.”
She thought it was difficult for the operations people to have an impact through these meetings because they were too low-voiced. They were silenced by the language of design, and it was easy for the project to ignore what they said. The PRS representative said:
“It is not easy for operations personnel to have influence in design. They are too low voiced. Things are supposed to be as cheap as possible, which easily goes at the expense of access to equipment or a bright, nice working environment This is very easily given lower priority. At 2/4 J they say: “It will be so expensive.” But they are too shortsighted. Twenty years’ scaffolding building is expensive too. I hope they have considered that. But I don’t believe it before I see it.”
It was difficult for the operations people taken into the design reviews to communicate with the project engineers in these formal settings and to gain respect for the practical concerns of day-to-day operations . The importance of having easy access to equipment was difficult to convey. Some of the comments from operations people involved in the process were:
“It is not easy for operations to be concrete about these things. It is more specific things, trivial things like piping, valves, and manual wheels. Like why have to climb or bend over a pipe instead of placing the wheel on the right side in the first place.”
“It is difficult to convince engineers that there are other more practical ways of doing things. They don’t want to listen.”
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“It was difficult in the beginning. Engineers from NTH were skeptical to people without even a high school degree. But most of them have changed. There has been a change in attitude. Also with us. We have gained a better understanding of how they work and the reason for it.”
Operations’ request for standardization of equipment was one issue that was difficult to get accept for in design. Operations wanted to standardize the equipment on the level of grease nipples, which was too detailed requirements for the project to take into account. The design targets didn’t fit into the structure of design. Kvaemer ’s Ekofisk II systems manager commented this design target problem:
“It could have been more useful for Phillips to differentiate these. Those who formulated the design targets did not understand engineering contractors. It is a dilemma. You can’t write a functional specification to a vendor and at the same time have requirements on a detailed level, like requirements for material selection on grease nipples. What we miss is getting things in a more systematic way. To get it filtered. We have HAZOP. But it is personal opinion that gets through. It always is.”
On the other hand, one of operations’ representative said:
“Examples on what we wanted to standardize were grease nipples, instrument fittings, and light fixture. We defined this and issued an inquiry. The intention was that the first equipment delivered should set the standard and control further choices. It didn’t happen. Equipment was not ordered according to this. Things went too fast. The schedule was too tight There were too little resources available. First of all there are two important factors: time and resources. Those are the two important factors that made things go the way they did.”
Philips and Kvaemer agreed that Kvaemer was responsible for the design. Kvaemer defined the progress and structure of the project. The discipline-based way of structuring work in design impeded operations input in the project Operations experience did not necessarily fit into the structure of design. Operations personnel from Philips were invited to participate in design reviews, layout reviews, etc. They had less impact on design through this formal participation than through informal
-135- Bridging Operation and Design interaction with people in design. I shall now shortly focus on the fabrication and commissioning phases following the detail design at Kvaemer and the status of the project.
5.3 Status of the Ekofisk 2/4 J project
5.3.1 Fabrication, commissioning, and start-up of Ekofisk 2/4 J
Fabrication of the three modules and the module support frame on Ekofisk 2/4 J took place on three different sites. Aker Verdal was responsible for building the jacket and the utility module, Umoe Haugesund constructed the separator module, and Amec in Newcastle the process module and the module support frame. Operations personnel were to a large extent involved at all the fabrications sites. This was also a new experience to Phillips. The operations people functioned as consultants to the fabrication contractors and made sure practical operations concerns were taken into account at the fabrication site. One of the operations representatives involved in design at Kvaemer participated in the fabrication work at Amec. The other operations representative involved full time at Kvaemer assisted PRS on developing the Ekofisk II offshore organization and operations procedures.
By the end of July 1997 all the modules were installed offshore. This work included seven lift operations in order to bring the different parts of the Ekofisk 2/4 J platform together and link 2/4 J to the 2/4 X platform. The weather conditions were good, and the project finished on schedule. Offshore commissioning could then start. One of the operations representatives involved in design at Kvaemer is responsible for commissioning offshore. The other one is part of the current Ekofisk II offshore organization preparing the 2/4 J start-up.
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Figure 5.1 Installation of Ekofisk 2/4 J
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Start-up of the processing plant is scheduled to April 1998. Testing of the equipment will be done during June and July. From 1 August 1998, there will be a shutdown period of two weeks when cutting the existing pipelines and connecting the new ones to the Ekofisk II installations. Start-up of the Ekofisk 2/4 J platform is planned for the middle of August 1998.
5.3.2 Operations’ impact on 2/4 J
The Ekofisk 2/4 J platform solution is a standard processing and transportation platform concept. It does not represent any technological innovation. Kvasmer ’s Ekofisk II manager said:
“Technologically speaking, there is not much new. It is more exciting the way we approached the vendors. The control system, for example. The PCSS, the Platform Control Safety Supervisor System.”
What was new, however, was the early involvement of vendors in the design process. Kvasmer ’s Ekofisk II managers continued:
“What we did new was to involve three control room system vendors. Phillips had previously involved several vendors. They got work packages they could give feedback on. The vendors thereby knew what was included when we invited for bids. The only thing that was left was the commercial issue. It was easier for us to evaluate the technological bid. The concept of involving vendors this early is new.”
Phillips was also happy with the way in which early involvement of vendors had an impact on the project. One of the operation representatives involved at Kvasmer said:
“On the control system, ABB came early into the process. We got a better solution through them coming early in. We saved 20-30 % on that. And as for control of valves, we had the same type of involvement from the vendor market there. We saved a lot of money on that. ”
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Phillips ’ PTF manager was satisfied with the operations contribution to the project, especially in layout considerations and practical arrangements. He said:
“On architect-related issues there has been much input from operations in terms of how things should be practically arranged and function. It has very much to do with practical things. Not in any way high-flying academic things that have to do with the technical design of process parameters and dynamic simulations, etc. Not those things. But on the practical level. This is input you get from those who work offshore and know how things function. They know how an operator wants things regarding this and that type of equipment. ”
His experience was that there was a range of practical issues that seemed trivial to people in design, but which were important in day-to-day operations. Practical considerations are not the strongest point of a design contractor, they do not know how things function offshore, he said:
“The practical aspect is not always kept in mind in the design contractor’s organization. But these things are very important to understand and easy to overlook. If you think this is something you can sweep under the carpet, it is not As I said, it is the very, very usual, small everyday issues. How you are going to place this terminal in relation to the next one. Especially when there are things that cannot be removed. ”
During the fabrication period one of the operations representatives previously involved in design at Kvaemer visited the Aker Verdal site to look at the utility module to see how it corresponded to operations input given in design. He was happy to see that most of their comments on layout of the control room, offices, coffee room, and other concerns were incorporated. He said:
“Most of what we commented on has been taken into consideration. On layout It’s fun to see. Things have been taken into account. The module has been built on these recommendations. Office space, coffee room, layout. We see that experience has been taken into account. ”
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The other operations representative involved full time in design at Kvasmer said:
“It has become a good platform. We have got good feedback on the layout. And on access to equipment, placing of pipes and valves, solutions in order to take things out if equipment needs to be carried onshore. The control room is airy and good. It is simple. People are astonished. In the control room on the Ekofisk tank today there are nine different systems. Here there is only one. One keyboard. One screen. Compared to the old one it is much simpler.”
This was his comment after spending three weeks offshore during the 2/4 J installation period. He was happy with what they had achieved. What people were not satisfied with was the lack of office space left for administrative work on the platform. He said:
“What people are not satisfied with are the administrative issues. Things could have been better. But we had a defined starting point. Seen in relation to the terms, things are good. But now they have changed the manning model. That was not part of the terms. But that is not anything known by everybody.”
In addition to the two operations representatives working full time in design at Kvasmer, one union representative with offshore operational experience was included in the project part-time. He assisted the two operations representatives on layout discussions with Kvasmer. He explained:
“I have been working much on design and layout of the workshop, warehouse, stores, offices, control room, and other facilities. I feel I have had an impact here. I have also participated in interface meetings between Kvasmer and Aker, and I have evaluated some packages when I didn’t have anything else to do. I haven ’t had any permanent system or office space at Kvasmer, but I am going to get that changed. Currently, I am working much on work environment and safety.”
He worked well together with the person responsible for work environment at Kvasmer. He was surprised to see the influence he had on the project. He said:
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“Influence? Yes. The workshop was designed to 100 m2. I said that wasn’t enough. It was too little space. Now it will be 250-260 m2. And the size of the manhole - Kvaemer
wanted to put this between the tiers of beams, but finally it was expanded to make easier access. I have cooperated well with the working environment woman from Kvaemer. She has been much in contact with me. Stairs were covered, for example. Kvaemer wanted them open. And now we’re having a discussion on the number of lifeboats. ”
The main conclusion of the operations representatives involved in design full time, however, was that there should have been more people from operations in the project. They stressed the importance of early and broad involvement in the project. One said:
“More people should have been involved. All disciplines - electrical and mechanical engineering, instruments, etc. And operations management and administration, not the least. The control room on J is the heart of Ekofisk II. All operations activities will be controlled from there, and of course you will need PCs at strategic locations, library for reference documentation, etc. All these things must be taken care of. Administrative activities. Offices. Rooms for group meetings. Much more resources must come in. This requires involvement. Administrative issues need to be considered. But mainly the operations concept must be clear in order to have any controlling effect on design, and then one can adjust later."
The operations representatives learned a lot though participating in the project. They felt they were better equipped when going back and to make decisions in operations offshore. One of them said:
“Project experience has given us a lot We have become better equipped to make decisions in terms of modifications offshore. We have a much better understanding of issues related to modification work. We can take into account things we were not aware of in previous decision-making. We have learned a lot. Selection of equipment for example. We shall look at technical solutions in a different way from before. We have now a much better background to understand the whole picture. ”
To summarize, there were too few operations people participating in design compared to the size and complexity of the project. Operations should have had more people involved and been better prepared for the task. The operations representatives Bridging Operation and Design involved in the project did not have previous knowledge of the design community-of- practice. They were therefore not able to be proactive in the project. The traditional project organization of the Ekofisk 2/4 J project, based on a distant relationship and formal communication between the operating company and design contractor impeded the bridging of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. The physical separation of the project organizations of the operating company and the design contractor was a barrier to effective cooperation between the parties involved. It took long time for the project to reach a level of mutual trust and informal cooperation between the two project organizations and the operations and design personnel. Gradually, informal communication between operations and design personnel became a natural part of the process, and proved to have a positive effect on taking into account operational knowledge in the design.
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Figure 5.2 Ekofisk 2/4 J installed offshore Bridging Operation and Design
- 144- Chapter 6 Knowledge in operations and design
In this chapter I look at operations and design as two different communities-of- practice, a concept introduced by Lave and Wenger (1990) and by Brown and Duguid (1991). I focus on the different kinds of knowledge which are parts of and created within these two communities-of-practice. The data are based on fieldwork in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and 2/4 J projects as well as in current Ekofisk operations.
6.1 The operations community-of-practice
First, I look at the knowledge part of the operation community-of-practice offshore. Perby (1995) argues that knowledge in operations follows another logic than the analytical way of thinkin g. Process operators think in terms of practical situations. They are part of the process, and their knowledge is developed on the basis of working together with other process operators, Perby argues. They make use of an intellect linked to the mind and body, she says, what Tempte (1995) and Goranzon (1992) call “the practical intellect.” Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) emphasize the concept of tacit knowledge linked to direct, personal, “on-the -spot” experience. They characterize tacit knowledge as knowledge of experience (body), simultaneous knowledge (here and now), and analog knowledge (practice), a kind of knowledge highly valued in Japanese epistemology. The three distinctions of the Japanese intellectual tradition, i.e. oneness of mind and body, oneness of human and nature, oneness of self and other, focused upon by Nonaka and Takeuchi, seem to catch the kind of knowledge part of the operations community-of-practice better than the Western scientific epistemology, valuing precise, conceptual, systematic knowledge. I start by focusing on the practical knowledge in operations offshore. Bridging Operation and Design
6.1.1 Practical knowledge
A large proportion of people working at Ekofisk used to be seamen before entering the oil industry. Some might have vocational school, but few have any long formal education. Instead, they have vast experience from offshore operations and maintenance work. An operations engineer onshore said:
“It is important to understand the difference between the engineering environment onshore and the good old offshore environment. These are two different businesses. Offshore people are people with practical experience and often long time of service at sea. It is two completely different worlds.”
A platform manager responsible for introducing the TPM philosophy on Ekofisk commented people’s background the following way:
“We in Phillips have been sailing the seven seas. We come from a culture with much TPM. It is just what we had before coming to Phillips. When we were in the middle of the Pacific, we were responsible for repair and maintenance of our own equipment. ”
It is only in recent years that Phillips has employed engineers offshore. Traditionally, Ekofisk operations have been run by people without any engineering or university background. The situation has changed, however. Having engineers as platform managers or in other positions offshore is no longer a taboo. One engineer with offshore experience said:
“In Phillips there has been no tradition of having engineers working offshore. Until recently there were few platform managers with a formal background. People have been self-educated, for good and bad. Engineering background offshore was unacceptable until only a few years ago. The old guys thought it would never work. It was like swearing in the church. ”
The different educational background between people onshore and offshore makes it difficult for them to talk together. It is complicated for operations people offshore to
-146- Knowledge in Operations and Design communicate with engineering onshore and vice versa. One Phillips engineer working in design onshore (E&C) commented the situation the following way:
“I would argue that there is a gap between qualifications of offshore personnel and onshore personnel. They who approve of our projects onshore are engineering. There we have good communication. We have the same qualifications. But it is the communication between the platform and the engineering onshore that is difficult. They don’t communicate very well.”
For the offshore personnel it is difficult to explain the problems to engineers onshore without any operational experience. They feel as if they are talking another language. The context of daily work and life offshore is difficult to convey to people in design onshore. One person from operations offshore involved in the Ekofisk II process said:
“Operations and design are two different languages - and so much different that you need an interpreter at hand. Theory and practice. There is a big difference. It is a bit difficult to explain, maybe. But so easy for us to see. And the surroundings are so different. Wind, salt water, and water - a totally different environment from where they sit and do the design.”
Operations’ focus is on the equipment. They know the equipment and what they are doing. Placed in a project, they are faced with another way of thinking. As one person in PRS commented:
“It is not so easy for offshore people to express themselves in writing. They will see the details right away. But in the beginning of a project you start at a more general level. That ’s a problem. Operations comes with one valve here and one valve there - but they do know how things function. Design, on the other hand, have no tradition on why they do things. It is a clash of cultures. ”
Comparing operations offshore to design onshore, another PRS representative said:
“The practice - that is what we have. The real life. For example: After the concrete wall around the Ekofisk tank was put up, a heavy storm came. And the wall moved. We see this. But do people who designed the wall believe it? Hardly. It is not supposed to
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happen according to the theory. But we know it moved. We feel the enormous forces out there. Design people do not understand this. They have just wave theory.”
He told about one situation where operations personnel offshore had come up with a suggestion on how to increase production, based on their day-to-day observation of the production process. Initially, they were turned down by the reservoir engineers, but they carried out tests on their own. He said:
“Theory versus practice. These are not always in accordance with each other. Let’s just take the example with depletion on Edda. Operations suggested to shut down wells a short period of time every day in order to increase production, but the reservoir engineers didn’t think this would have any effect. Then operations started to test this on their own. They shut down wells to increase the pressure, they measured and made diagrams that were sent to the reservoir department. Then an official test was initiated and it turned out to be a good idea.”
In day-to-day work offshore, practical problems like draining placed on the highest level, always leaving water and oil spill on the floor, or an inconvenient placing of junction boxes and electric sockets, which implies scaffold building, are trivialities that hamper operations. On Ekofisk there has been a constant need for scaffolding teams in order to deal with these kinds of unpractical design solutions. One operations person involved in the Ekofisk II process commented on what operational experience is in the following way:
“Draining is supposed to be on the lowest level. But everyone offshore knows that draining is placed on the highest point. Further - the placing of electric sockets and fuse boxes. There should be requirements in terms of little and easy maintenance.”
About what operational experience to consider in design, one process engineer with offshore experience said:
“Access, inspection, lubrication of pumps, reading a meter - these are typical things one has not been thinking of. But it will be expensive. You have to build scaffoldings, and that will become expensive in the long run too. That is what has been done. When things are impossible to access, you need a permanent scaffolding team, and it becomes
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expensive. This has been an enormous frustration. Things are too narrow and awful. There is no access.”
And she continued:
“Another thing is to think more in systems. To check valves, for example. To think about gathering things physically. If things are natural to regard as a whole, then put them close together. Not one thing here, another one there, that have to be checked at the same time. Often things that are connected are placed far apart. And you can never eliminate the need for people to go out and check what is wrong.”
Operations are part of the process, part of the diverse rhythms of the production system. Their knowledge is linked to the practice of being out in the plant, as Perby (1995) argues. They know the functioning of the different valves and pumps, a knowledge which is in their hands, in their fingers, inherent in their body, she says. Operational knowledge is based on direct, practical knowledge, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue. Operations’ focus is on the equipment. They know the particularities of the different systems and equipment and what it takes to run the process. I shall now focus on what is essential to operations to keep production going. More than anything their work is related to production and processing - to monitor the process and to intervene when required, Perby argues.
6.1.2 Availability and access to equipment
What operations first of all want is safety, availability, and access to equipment. In the Ekofisk II project, availability was defined as the proportion of time that a system or equipment is in a functional state (i.e. in operations or available for operations) as opposed to when it is not functioning (PPCoN, 1994c). Access to equipment is also important in order to perform an effective, regular maintenance. One platform manager at the Ekofisk complex said the following as to what was the most important factors in operations’ work offshore:
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“Things must be practical, available, and safe, of course. And it is important to have enough of everything. Not too much. Not too little.”
Another platform manager added:
“And minimal start-up problems and shut-downs. Plus operations- and maintenance- friendly work.”
Monitoring the process is an important part of process operators’ work offshore. Production is controlled from the control room on the Ekofisk tank. There is a variety of different systems and procedures to take into account. “It takes five years to learn the Ekofisk tank,” one process operator said. When talking about how they spent their time at work another process operator said:
“Much of the time is used to verify and control . Control and inspect equipment, personnel, operations, and the process. It is very unstable working rhythms. Different rhythms.”
Production, processing, and transportation of hydrocarbons are three important tasks of operations. Besides these, operations may include everything offshore except exploration. One operations manager in Phillips onshore explained the work of operations the following way:
“Operations are production, processing, and transportation of oil, gas, and NGL to where it is headed. Operations are when everything works and regularity is close to hundred per cent. Then operations are going well. Before, operations were more the operators in the control room. As long as no lights were blinking, everything was fine. Then everything was OK. If some lights are blinking you must do something to keep yourself going. We are now in the process of involving operations personnel in equipment maintenance. This will be a larger part of operations. We are going away from the attitude “I operate. You fix.” And in some areas we are moving in the right direction. Today it’s part of operations. That is what we are really doing. Taking hydrocarbons from the bottom and processing them. That is really what operations are.”
And he continued:
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“Operations is more than listening to the whistling of the pipes. It is also taking care of the equipment so that the regularity is maintained. And offshore it is more than getting the oil up. Food shall on board, supply boats are coming in. That is also part of operations, but it is a support to operations."
An operations support manager onshore focused on the importance of a safe and stable production:
“Effective operations have two main considerations: Our first objective is safety. To ensure that everything is done in a safe manner, avoiding to harm people or damage equipment or facilities. Second, we want production to go as undisturbed as possible. It has a direct influence on the economy, and again on safety. If production is stable, it is positive in terms of safety.”
Maintenance is an essential part of work offshore. Easy access to equipment is important to ensure effective operations and maintenance work. There has been a number of bad design solutions on Ekofisk, making it difficult for operations to have access to the equipment and to do the required maintenance work. Electrical junction boxes have been placed out of reach for people. Phillips ’ vice president said:
“Operations thinks - how to maintain this? Because everything will break sooner or later. Things need maintenance and therefore to be easy accessible. Design people do not think this way. They can place things that need frequent maintenance and repair out of reach for people. Until now, design have not had any problem with expensive maintenance of equipment It has not been their problem. And this we have learned - it's the long-term operating costs that kill you.”
One process operator offshore said:
“What is important for Ekofisk II is that we get valves that are possible to operate. We should have been involved more systematically in design. A lot is just pure poor design. Proper placing of pipes and valves - there is much poor work done there. ” Bridging Operation and Design
Previously, production was seen as the primary task offshore. Maintenance issues had less priority and value. Production was the “king” of the platform. Taking care of equipment was not focused upon. One maintenance person offshore commented this development:
“Earlier operations were production. Now, operations are different from production. Now operations are both production and maintenance.”
Drilling and reservoir, however, are areas operations are not involved in. Operations do not intervene in drilling or reservoir activities. These areas of interests are clearly separate responsibilities. One former platform manager at the Ekofisk complex commented this:
“Before we had high oil price and production. We didn’t think economy. But today it is alpha and omega. It is part of operations. Well maintenance is also part of operations, but that work is done by drilling. Reservoir also come with requests, but reservoir are reservoir. Operations are operations. Traditionally, what is below the down hole safety valve is drilling’s responsibility. In the other end, operations are responsible until Emden and Teeside.”
Another former platform manager with reservoir engineering background said:
“Most people will say that operations are the process where we take oil out of the wells through the process until it arrives at the transportation site. It includes keeping the process plant going. But more important that anything else is the reservoir. What is important for operations is the reservoir, but operations people do not have any insight into this. That ’s the weak part of the system. One does not understand the reservoir well enough. Maybe this is one of the most important things to bring to the project, but nevertheless not what one would consider as operational experience. It is important to include this when you start talking about nuts and bolts, maintenance of turbines, etc. One must not emphasize the latter part too much. ”
He argued that it is the reservoir that sets the terms for the design. On Ekofisk there are many fields which all behave differently, and Phillips totally missed on the Ekofisk design of today, he said. The pipelines were designed for one million barrels
-152- Knowledge in Operations and Design a day but there has never been that much oil available, and two platforms on the British side were never used. Afterwards, Phillips realized this was a total miss, but they didn’t know the reservoir well enough and how it would behave. Knowledge about the reservoir is the basis for the whole operating activity, he said. On the other hand, Phillips ’ reservoir manager related the activities of operations and reservoir the following way:
“Operations are the short term operation of our business. Production, process, and maybe transportation and delivery. There is a difference between an operations- and exploration-oriented focus. Operations are more focused on how to best operate the platform, wells, and pipelines on a day-to-day basis. To keep things going, and keep the costs down. Operations have a focus on costs and little down time. Optimizing reserves has a more long-term perspective, more an investment perspective. When we do data gathering in reservoir, it is not to help operations or someone else, but to see if we should do things differently.”
To summarize, safety, availability, and access to equipment are three important factors to operations offshore. Their task is related to production, processing, and transportation of oil, gas, and NGL. Their responsibility is day-to-day operations and maintenance. Operations is a continuous process. People think in a long-term, cyclic time perspective, different from the sequential, linear time perspective of projects in design onshore. Operations’ relation to time resembles what Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) describe as the Japanese view of time as a continuous flow of occurrences. I shall now focus on what Nonaka and Takeuchi term as ’’simultaneous knowledge,” i.e. knowledge created “here and now,” in a specific, practical context.
6.1.3 Simultaneous knowledge
I was amazed at the action-oriented attitude and way of working offshore. Operations personnel offshore act very much there and then. The focus is to keep things going. I got a taste of this immediate action-oriented attitude as I happened to ask the person
153 Bridging Operation and Design
receiving me offshore (the DSS) a question he couldn ’t answer. As I noted in my field book:
“I first met the DSS. He walked with me to 2/4 Q where I should stay. A couple of minutes later, in the elevator on our way down, he responded to a question I asked a couple of seconds earlier on how many people were working on the Ekofisk complex today. Suddenly he picked up the phone in the elevator to call someone that could answer my question. And he did. So we got to know the answer to my question before going out of the elevator. I had to be careful what questions I asked when. I would always get very quick feedback. ”
One operations engineers offshore commented on the difference between work in operations offshore and design onshore the following way:
“It is two different languages. Operations say: “We know how to do it. We’ll fix it.” And they just do it themselves. Design may study things too long. They want peace and quiet. But before you get things offshore it might be no problem any more. It is too little operative design. Things take too long time. People out there have given up. Instead they write a work order. When you have a concrete problem, you have to do something there and then. ”
One PRS representative said:
“Operations do not always think too much before they initiate things. They don’t spend much time on evaluation. ”
At the same time as operations act momentarily, they relate to the process on a continuous basis. They are responsible for production twenty-four hours a day. The cycle of work offshore is two weeks offshore, three weeks home, two weeks offshore, and four weeks home. Work is organized in shifts, day and night. There are three sets of shifts, and there are always new people coming and going. The production process is continuous, however. One operations manager onshore explained:
“It is continuous. You don’t go home after work every day. You work longer shifts. You have breaks, but not everyone can take a break at the same time. There is a relief of
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shifts and exchange of information, when you come off and on a shift and when you go home. Some people work onshore a period of time before coming offshore, but for most people there is no onshore work before coming out.”
Loyalty is another keyword on Ekofisk. People are loyal and humble towards the process. They see it as their responsibility to keep the production going. This is one of the ethos offshore, an operations engineer with long offshore maintenance experience argued, in addition to the characteristic rhythm of active and quiet periods of their work. He said:
“Loyalty. The old Ekofisk feeling. They are willing to risk their life in order to keep Ekofisk going. They go on with a contempt of death. You can start crying at less. But in peaceful times one is more relaxed. That is one of the characteristics of the process industry. The overalls is as tom in the back as any other place. There is a lot of sitting.”
Some people work night shifts, some don’t. At Ekofisk, most maintenance personnel work only during the day. Process operators work night shifts too. The rhythm consists of working night shift the first week offshore, and then switch to day shift the second week. The body has to adjust to a variety of work, sleep, and eating rhythms. One process operator explained:
“Every week a new shift arrives. Things are most quiet during night time. Most things happen during day time. And we come home in a day modus. It is easier to switch back to day modus now when we are working only seven days at night ”
There has been little sharing of operational experience between or in the different shifts. There has been no systematic gathering of operations and maintenance experience aimed at improving operations offshore. People have made their own experiences with specific pumps, valves, and compressors, experiences which have not been gathered or shared explicitly in any structured or systematic way. People have made their own records, and written material available has not been used. One of the operations representatives involved in design at Kvaemer said:
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“Written documents and files have not been used. One has not used the tools available. Everyone has written reports and stored them in files, but no-one has checked the archives to see what previously happened to a specific pump, for example. One hasn ’t had the time. Offshore, everyone is focused on their own work. One does not have knowledge about the whole system.”
In each shift people have their way of running the plant, and people have been working on the same shift for years and adjusted to their way of doing things. One operations engineer getting on well with operations offshore said about one joint effort to optimize the process and solve the problem of wet gas in the plant:
“The problem was that each shift had their own way of running the plant. They have the attitude “If we do like this and that, things work. This on 2 and that on 5.” Another shift might do something else. And these things are deeply rooted after many years of practice. The problem is that it is based on their experiences. There were no manuals available. What we tried to do was to tune things in. And the final product was an instruction on how to best operate the plant. Then we held a course - for all the shifts. And it was relatively easy for people to accept this. But we had to argue why it should be done this way. There were some problems, however. People were not comfortable. They wanted things the way they were before. “This on 2 and that on 5.” It’s a bit like that. ”
People in design find it difficult to relate to the variety of operational experience, three different shifts and offshore management. One engineer in design onshore explained:
“Three shifts are a problem. There are too many shifts to relate to. Communication is difficult. There is a language barrier, but it doesn’t have to be. There is more a difference between English and Norwegian. People have different points of reference. And among the shifts one does not agree with the second or the third. ”
Usually one is confronted with a range of contradictory answers when making inquiries of what operational experience to consider. People in design get the impression that operational knowledge is something personal that varies according to whom you talk to. One project manager in design onshore said:
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“You can say that what is problematic about operations is that you can’t say their opinions are very well organized. It is very much dependent upon the person. If you talk to one operations person he may say one thing. Then you come to another operations person that probably has an equal say, and he may say something totally different. My impression is that much of this is very personal. And it has remained there. So it is a little difficult to know what to relate to. Because there is not one voice here. Every operations person has his own experience and principles.”
Operational knowledge is linked to practical, “on-the-spot ” experience. They think and act in the moment. Their focus is on keeping a continuous production flow runnin g. They are part of this continuous production process, not detached spectators. Elaborate planning and evaluation of past experience and current practice are not characteristic of the operations community-of-practice offshore. A continuous alternation of shifts is required to keep production going. Work is characterized by a diverse rhythm of experiences. Each shift have their rhythm and ways of running the plant. A coordination of these experiences in or between the different shifts has not been achieved. Operational knowledge has remained on a personal level or tacitly shared within shifts or among the larger operations community-of-practice. There has been little emphasis on converting tacit operational knowledge into explicit knowledge. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi ’s (1995) model of knowledge creation, socialization of tacit knowledge and internalization of explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge have been characteristic of the operations community-of practice. Less emphasis has been put on extemalization of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge and combination of different sources of explicit knowledge. Operational knowledge has to a large extent remained as tacit, often personal, knowledge. Goranzon (1992) argues for paying more respect to this kind of practical, tacit knowledge which I shall now focus on.
6.1.4 Tacit knowledge
Polanyi (1958, 1966) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) refer to tacit knowledge as a highly personal, context-specific knowledge deeply rooted in individual values, beliefs and emotions. It is embedded in practice and difficult to communicate to
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■s. /r. Bridging Operation and Design others through formal language. An onshore design engineer with offshore experience said about the knowledge part of operations offshore:
“It is always something that remains in here (pointing to the top of her head), and which you cannot get out in a written form. They who come with their experience believe in their experience. But I don’t think that the experience is representative of the platform. A solution for one platform manager is not acceptable to the next platform manager. Experiences are different from shift to shift. The transfer of experience vary from person to person. That is where I think it lies. On a personal level. ”
The operating companies have not succeeded in implementing systematic procedures to share and coordinate this kind of operational knowledge difficult to get hold of in explicit terms. There are data bases on technical design specification, but not on operations of the plant. To see, feel, hear, smell, touch, and being part of the production process is an important part of their knowledge. The more precise and exact kind of knowledge found in design might scare operations people a little. Operational knowledge is more of a fuzzy and less specific character. One operations representative involved in the Ekofisk II project said:
“Operations are based on experiences that are difficult to quantify. They are not based on any cause analysis. You cannot use it statistically. Operations usually become a discussion of who is right. One does not have statistical data to relate to. One cannot quantify things. One cannot offer any statistical analysis. One is therefore not able to convince design. One is not able to argue for operational needs by referring to statistical data. It is difficult to quantify costs. One does not manage to specify.”
Verbal communication is more characteristic of operations offshore than written communication. Many offshore people feel uncomfortable when it comes to writing. People talk instead of sending papers. There are close networks between people, and they care about each other. They work together, but spend limited time on reflection and evaluation in explicit terms. One process engineer with on- and offshore experience said:
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“People out there - it is very much verbal communication. They want to make sure that no-one is left outside. They are not used to taking decisions on their own. They have a very close network. Offshore they talk to each other and reach a consensus together. But it involves having many people together. It can be a disadvantage. Onshore we send papers. We don’t talk to each other. We are not good at that. It is not like offshore. ”
Another operations person emphasized the openness that exist between people offshore:
“There is an openness towards each other. People’s private lives become intertwined. People have insight into each others ’ family problems, problems with the wife, the kids, the marriage, etc. Routines and networks of several years have been established, like who talks to whom. If there are any changes in the pattern of work, people are uncomfortable. You see it when people get together again. They have their own people they tell their things to.”
There are a number of jokes and stories that circulate and connect people offshore. People have been working together for years and experienced a lot together. Stories from various occasions are told again and again, and people laugh. Some of the stories were even collected in a book called “Slit og loye” (Drudgery and fun) a few year ago to capture some of the stories from early pioneering oil production phase in Norway. During the 2/4 X fabrication reviews at Umoe Haugesund I was introduced to some of these stories when accompanying the offshore review team. I spent some days with this group coming from offshore and we had lunch and a lot of coffee breaks together. Here is an excerpt of my field book:
“We went to lunch. The situation developed into a story-telling session of amusing stories from offshore. They and I had a good laugh. There seems to be oceans of good stories to draw from. There were a number of stories related to a certain vertical transportation belt that did not exist any longer. Tool boxes, paint boxes, persons, etc. had fallen off this lift. People had a good laugh at this every time the story was told. Persons that fell asleep in the lift and knocked their head towards the top. And one who took a firm grip with his hands and was lifted up this way instead of resting his feet on the step. They laughed a lot at that too. Further, there was a story about an electrical potato peeler in the kitchen that affected production directly. I didn’t really get the story,
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but they had a lot of fun telling it over and over again. And it was fun to be a part of this. ”
Many of the stories collected in “Slit og loye” are about operations not being listened to and not being in charge. Operations people have had to comply with instruction coming from above, and they have not been consulted or taken seriously in times of design, redesign, and development projects. People seem to share a lot of frustrations at not being listened to and at bad design solutions repeatedly coming offshore. One operations engineer with offshore experience said:
“People have not been listening. What are they trying to say? That kind of work has not been given priority. It has taken inspiration away from many. You have killed the initiative. It’s too bad. People feel: I have said this so many years. Now I don’t bother saying it anymore.”
The operators feel they are the ones who continuously have to adjust to the great number of different systems and equipment. One said: “It is not human to relate to so many systems and so many different and often contradictory signals at one time.” On Ekofisk, much equipment has been put together without any thought of how it would function as a whole. Operations have had to make it work, and they feel that no-one asked operations what they wanted and what their needs were. Here are some comments from process operators offshore:
“Phillips have bought a Volkswagen, specified a Rolls Royce, and tried to make that. They want things as cheap as possible. There have been no means tests. What are the needs of operations? People have not asked that question. ”
“We know there are some turbines and valves that work fine. Why not buy what experience has shown is working? Why buy things one knows are not working? What is important is stable operations. And one must look at the process as a whole. No one knows the equipment better than those who are working with it. It is we who know the equipment ”
“They could at least ask people. It wouldn ’t hurt with a phone call asking whether you have encountered any problems with this kind of equipment. For example, the central
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fire system on the Hotel functioned well. But on Q we bought the system we earlier had encountered many problems with. ”
Another issue causing much frustration among operations personnel was the lack of training in handling new equipment. They felt they never got any instructions on how to use new technology, and they thought it was foolish of the company to buy lots of expensive equipment without giving instructions on how to use it. Instead, they said, operations became an art of guessing and finding out how equipment worked, and expensive equipment often failed and was broken down as a result. Here are two comments from people offshore:
“Equipment is built onshore by someone who has no idea about how to use it. Experience from the user is not taken into account We have to rebuild the equipment. There is very little consideration as to how this should be used and maintained. One should involve people at an earlier stage than what is done. And you need to get instructions from those who install the equipment They have a tendency to go back home once they have done their part of the job. They go home and leave us with the manual. Then we have to go in and write work orders, which cost so and so much money. We could as well have bought a new compressor.”
“In Phillips, it is the operator who is supposed to find out how the equipment works. But we don’t have the background to do that Especially not the control system, and turbine control. There is not sufficient training.”
To summarize, the concept of tacit knowledge emphasized by Nonaka and Takeuchi characterizes well the operations community-of-practice offshore. Operational knowledge has to a large extent remained on a tacit level, part of which is difficult to transform into explicit knowledge. The design community-of-practice is something operations offshore know very little about. I shall now focus on the kind of knowledge part of the design community-of-practice.
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6.2 The design community-of-practice
The design community-of-practice is more focused on explicit knowledge. Adams (1991) and Ferguson (1992) argue that the way of thinking and structuring knowledge at engineering schools and universities influences the practice of design. Engineers are trained to approach questions in an analytical, discipline-oriented, and quantitative manner. Florman (1996) emphasizes the way in which theoretical studies dominate the engineering education. Explicit knowledge is the focus of design.
6.2.1 Discipline-based knowledge
The main focus of the engineers in design is on defining the physical process. Process and piping are the disciplines dominating conceptual and basic design. This was the case both on Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J. Kvaemer’ s Ekofisk II manager explained:
“The basis is the process. To define this. Process simulation. Define the equipment needed to meet the respective requirements. We go into a dialogue with potential vendors. Space, weight, costs, etc. All this information is gathered and then a layout for the platform is developed. And there are constraints given, like the size of the topside. There are many considerations to be taken into account. Lifting capacity for lifting ships for example, and area and height. One of the requirements defined by Phillips was that the deck should be 14 meter above the existing platforms. That was a given parameter. We could have wished for more parameter factors.”
Phillips ’ Ekofisk 2/4 J project manager in Tananger said:
“In design you have discipline engineers. The process engineer is the leading light. They depend on reservoir and E&P. Basic engineering is process engineering. Until you have the process defined you can’t do much. You need a starting point.”
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Basic design requires experienced project personnel. Often process and piping specialists are called from abroad to participate in this work. Kvaemer ’s Ekofisk II project manager emphasized this use of experienced project personnel in design, especially in basic design. He said:
“Basic engineering requires more qualified personnel. People with experience. People that have done this before. People that know process and all of that. It is clearly more heavy personnel involved in a basic engineering phase. It is important that there is an understanding of the process and people that instinctively know what happens and have experience from what previously has proved to be bad solutions. ”
People working in design have an engineering or university background. Quantitative analysis, mathematical modeling, and analytical thinking are important parts of their education. One relates to and requires explicit knowledge for optimizing the design. One project manager in Aker said:
“Engineers want to optimize all the time. We are very concerned about analyzing problems and taking them into account It has gone a little too far. And we have got a tool that enables us to do it in seconds."
He argued that experienced project personnel tended to override young graduates coming from engineering schools. Project people with great experience within their specific field of knowledge dominate the practice of engineering design, he said:
“I don’t know who overrides who. Usually it is the experienced one who overrides the one with theory. “I don’t think that will work,” they say. And that ’s the wayit will be. At the same time young people graduate from NTH or the university, and there is no other moment in your life you know as much as then. Everything you have read is fresh in your memory at that time. We experienced project people only know a fraction, and rather only about a tiny part”
People in the project are focused on their own discipline, and there is no interdisciplinary interaction on a day-to-day basis, one of Phillips ’ operations representatives involved in 2/4 J design at Kvasmer said. He explained:
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“The project and engineering environment has its own way of functioning. Then operations come in. The project resist to begin with, but when they see the results, they give in. Engineering are very helpful, but they have no routines for communication between disciplines. They have design reviews but not on day-to-day work. The run their documents on interdisciplinary checks but sit physically apart from each other. ”
This discipline-based way of structuring work is characteristic of engineering companies. It differs from the equipment and maintenance focus of operations offshore. One onshore design person with offshore experience said:
“Offshore think in system. Design companies think in disciplines - mechanical and electrical engineering, instruments, etc. Offshore you don’t want to talk to a discipline man but to someone who knows the air pressure system, for example. But there is no system man onshore. You should have a system responsible onshore. You have to think in terms of systems.”
One of the areas in which these different ways of structuring work and knowledge became obvious in the Ekofrsk II process was the design targets developed by operations. People in design had difficulties handling these. They would have liked to see them structured according to the discipline-oriented way of thinking they were accustomed to. Kvaemer ’s Ekofrsk II systems manager said:
“The problem with the design targets was that one specific design target could have implications for manysystems. It would have been more useful to break it into pieces so that one target was valid for only one system.”
Phillips 2/4 J project manager in Tananger commented:
“Some of them were too vague. They were not structured. Not totally user-friendly. They could have been organized in discipline order. That would have helped. It was all mixed. Not in any order. A lot is just good engineering practice. To some engineers this is second nature. ”
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The discipline-oriented way of structuring and organizing a project is in conflict with the way in which operations work. Engineering and operating companies have repeatedly experienced the difficulty of projects switching from discipline thinking in design to operations’ way of think ing offshore. One person with experience both from onshore design and offshore operations said:
“You should think systems already in design. The conversion from discipline thinking to systems thinking is expensive for the oil companies. An oil company is interested to know when the systems are ready. In a design project you have discipline-oriented thinking until pre-commissioning. Thereafter the oil companies take over, and things are transferred into a systems-oriented way of thinking. ”
To summari ze, a discipline-oriented way of thinking is characteristic of the design community-of-practice. Engineers in design share a common educational background and an analytic approach which influence the design way of thinking. I shall now focus on parameters that have a major impact on design - time and cost, and the sequential structure of design.
6.2.2 Sequential knowledge
Work in a project is structured into the different phases of conceptual, basic, and detail design, fabrication, commissioning, hook-up, and start-up. Operations offshore are not aware of the complexity of a project and the pieces that have to fall into place before the different milestones of a project. People offshore think design people do things in a too expensive and bureaucratic way, and that they can do it cheaper themselves. They don’t see the picture as the design people do. One engineer in design onshore said:
“To understand what you mean by one week, by 20% done, comments in an early phase, comments on concepts, restrictions, procedures, and delivery time. People offshore often mean you could have done a short cut, while onshore mean you cannot Offshore say they need this and that, but they don’t see the totality of the project as we do.”
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Time and cost are two important parameters controlling design, Wulff (1997) argues. Engineering companies gain contracts on the basis of these, and project engineers are evaluated according to their ability to complete their part of the project on time and within the budget. Elaborate planning systems and milestones targeting are part of the day-to-day practice in design. One operations representative involved in the Ekofisk II project commented on the difference between operations and design:
“Operations and design are two different worlds. Projects are well defined. They have a beginning and an end. They have a plan. You have a project management. Operations are something that happen continuously. You get a collision between two cultures. Operations people see design as heavy, difficult, and bureaucratic. Design see operations as coming in and destroying economics and schedule. ”
Phillips ’ project manager of Ekofisk II also focused on the project-oriented practice of design, in contrast to operations offshore. He said:
“You have an operations culture and a project culture. Operations are not project-driven. Design are not operadons-driven. Operations function on a regularly day-to-day basis. The project is flexible. You have a plan. These are two diverse sets of people coming together. ”
The design cost- and schedule-oriented focus was also emphasized by the PLM consultant involved at Kvsemer. He said:
“E&P has a cash rich culture geared towards production. They used not to care about operating costs. They are more concerned about stop in production. Phillips is 70 ’s style offshore. E&C is schedule- and cost-oriented. They don’t care about the consequences. They are almost an opposite culture. To bridge E&C and E&P, we must try to get E&C responsible for operating costs, and E&P must be responsible for costs and schedules. ”
A short onshore design phase is the focus of the oil industry. This was also the case of the Ekofisk II project, and in particular 2/4 X. One person in PRS said:
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“This project will finish in 1998. We can’t juggle with this. It is a schedule-driven project. It’s not wrong to say that But it hasn ’t been popular to say. The management doesn’t want to hear that. ”
One of the operations representatives involved in design at Kvaemer said:
“Project people relate to schedule. They don’t think from an operations point of view. It is the schedule that controls this. ”
To finish on schedule and budget is decisive for project engineers and management. They are not rewarded for reducing operating costs and maintenance work. The PRS manager commented on the difficulty of considering operational experience in design:
“Project engineers are evaluated according to what they design. Why should they sacrifice their rating for giving an operator a better life the next 30 years? Why should they sacrifice anything in order to help a person they have never met? What you need to do is to document things like this. You must get credit for making the right choice, and you must get help to figure it out. We need to get an awareness of placing things so that they are easily accessible. Location of valves, junction boxes, etc. It must be repeated and repeated that you get credit for reducing operating costs in design. This has not been the culture. People must be awarded for design solutions based on low operating costs.”
To summarize, time and cost are two important parameters controlling design. Project engineers and management are not rewarded for reducing operating costs in design. The project is focused on finishin g on schedule and reaching the different milestones of the project. The activities follow a sequential structure carefully planned in advance. This way of organizing the work in relation to time differs from the operations community-of-practice offshore, which rather has a continuous perspective on time. I shall now focus on the emphasis on explicit knowledge in design.
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6.2.3 Explicit knowledge
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that western scientific thinking tends to emphasize explicit knowledge, i.e. knowledge that can easily be transferred into a formal language, systematized, and communicated to others. They see this kind of knowledge in opposition to tacit knowledge, knowledge based on direct, personal experience and involvement. Aase (1997) argues that approaches to experience transfer in the offshore industry are based on exchange of explicit knowledge, what Nonaka and Takeuchi call combination (conversion from explicit to explicit knowledge). Engineers in design acknowledge their lack of operational experience, Wulff (1997) argues, and it is difficult for them to judge what experience to consider in their part of design. In this section, I focus on the lack of operational experience and the role of explicit knowledge in design. A person involved in design at Kvaemer said:
“I will put it this way. Most design people don’t know what they are designing. They don’t have any operational experience.”
He had been involved in design of Gullfaks A and C, and questioned the practice of the industry not taking experience into account in new projects. He said:
“I was involved in the design of Gullfaks A. Then I continued to work on Gullfaks C. The experience from Gullfaks A was not transferred to C. They just switched A with C. Experience was not taken into account. ”
He argued it is the oil companies themselves that have sabotaged the exchange of operational experience. Operational knowledge has not been valued either in oil or in engineering companies. Operational experience has not been referred back to design. It has not been available to the engineering companies. One person in onshore operations said:
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“The engineering companies have no operational experience. Zero. They never get any feedback. When operating problems occur, we never go to them. We never go to Kvasmer. It is the vendor we go to. In general, the engineering companies have no idea about operations. They don’t understand our comments. They don’t understand what we ask for. They don’t take it into account. We have no active contact with them, but fairly good contact with the vendors. ”
Kvasmer explained how they were not used to getting operations feedback on what they designed. They have access to some operational experience through HAZOP studies in design, but besides this they have little operational experience to base then- practice on. Kvasmer ’s Ekofisk II management said:
“We get very little feedback from operations. We have tried but maybe not enough. The operating companies have not been very interested either. What is out there is theirs. We only get feedback if things go to hell, and then we meet in court If not, it is silent as death. We have people in fabrication, commissioning, and start-up, but they are few. But we are an engineering company, not an operating company.”
It is difficult for design people to imagine work offshore. Few have any offshore or operational experience at all. They have little feeling as to what they are designing for. One onshore operations manager in Phillips said:
“Design have difficulties taking the necessary precautions for things to be simple and easy to maintain. It is difficult for them to get down to the practical, down-to-earth level, the practical world one lives in offshore. What is special offshore is the outdoor environment. It is difficult to fully envisage the conditions under which this will be operated. It is rough, especially outdoor. ”
His experience was that engineers in design were not able to see what was important to operations. They did not have experience in developing a design based on operations’ needs. He said:
“They don’t see things. One person talks about a Volkswagen, another one about a Volvo. They talk about different things, and in this project it is like writing procedures for a car you’ve never driven. ”
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This lack of operational knowledge in design made Ekofisk II life-cycle costs difficult to estimate. Neither did the vendors have the necessary knowledge about operations and maintenance requirement of the equipment. One of Phillips ’ project people at Kvaemer said:
“We say to the vendors, what is you LCC maintenance requirement? To be honest with you, the vendors do not have a clue. No. Because they never had any feedback. They say: we think you should service that valve, grease it, once every sixth months. But they have no real idea. Is it necessary to do it every sixth months? Can you do it every year? Every two years? Do you have to do it every week? Unless the vendors start getting feedback, you know, as to what is good, what is bad, what are the maintenance type requirements? How do they really know what these maintenance requirements are, in order to do LCC?”
Engineers in design need explicit and specific design criteria to relate to. They need quantitative data to work on. The Ekofisk II operations philosophy did not take this into account. One engineer involved in PRS of the Ekofisk II project gave the following comment:
“The operations philosophy should have been more explicit. There must be some kind of measuring system for it. What does this mean in design? What does design have to do in order to incorporate it? Much was too loose. The current maintenance philosophy is too vaguely defined. It is not given as an order. On Ekofisk II, things are supposed to be done onshore. This should have been more incorporated. The engineering environments have a problem in handling such philosophies They need exact requirements, defined requirements. They need concrete lists of what to relate to. They don’t relate to philosophies. Instead you need specific requirements. ”
Design people are not used to handling operational experience that is not transformed into an explicit shape. They don’t trust the operations data available, as one operations representative involved in the Ekofisk II project said:
“Investment costs are known, while operating costs are more vague. There is an estimate because there is no confidence in the data available. At present there is no confidence in
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operating data. Operating and maintenance costs are more “woolen” and difficult to estimate. There is no confidence because the quality of the data is not good enough, and there is much data one doesn’t have. Lacking monitoring the right parameters. Measurements have been based on accounting criteria. Production numbers. There has been no need to monitor how often equipment fail, and where and when, etc. One has not registered this. ”
He continued:
“It will be easier next time. Operational experience must be structured before transferred into design. We need to quantify to gain an acceptance of our operating costs estimate. This must be done in a systematic way.”
The design targets therefore became important to the operations representatives in the Ekofisk II project. This was something concrete they could bring forward to design. One PRS representative explained:
“The design targets were very important They became a comprehensive document for E&C. Design targets were something they could use, a document they early accepted as a serious one. It was important to get the design targets into the project description. Something they could relate to.”
To summarize, design people require explicit knowledge for use in their work. Specific, precise information is needed in their work. Trying to bring operational experience into design leads to the difficulty of transferring another type of experience into the explicit criteria and systematic knowledge in design. Engineers in design have project experience, not operational experience. They have little experience in what they design for. Detached reflection and a sequential structure of project activities and work are characteristics of the community-of-practice of design. I shall now compare the different kinds of knowledge part of the operations offshore and the design onshore communities-of-practice.
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6.3 Knowledge in operations and design
I see operations offshore and design onshore as two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi ’s distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge explains well the different types of knowledge of operations and design. The operations community-of-practice offshore tend to emphasize practical, direct, and personal “on-the-spot ” knowledge, i.e. what Nonaka and Takeuchi describe as tacit knowledge. The design community-of-practice onshore tend to value discipline-based, “theoretical, ” sequential knowledge, or what Nonaka and Takeuchi characterize as explicit knowledge. While operations lack an effort to convert tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge, design lack a tacit knowledge from the context they are designing for. Their strong side is to combine explicit knowledge into new explicit knowledge.
These two communities-of-practice have been out of touch with one another. Few people have experience from both practices. The different kind of knowledge shared within the communities of operations and design makes it difficult for people to communicate with each other. The differences felt between “practical” and “theoretical ” background restrain the contact between the two communities-of- practice. The engineering community-of-practice in design share a common language that operations do not connect with. Communication offshore is based on oral communication and close networks, while design onshore tend to value use of written documentation and individual work processes. In addition, the two organizations are directed towards totally different goals. Continuous production, availability, and access to equipment are important in operations, while finishing a project on time and budget are essential factors in design. Operations are offshore, while the design people are onshore. However, use of new technology reduces the effect of this physical barrier. I end this chapter by presenting characteristics of the two communities-of-practice of operations and design and the kinds of knowledge inherently part of their practice:
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The operations The design community-of-practice community-of-practice
Practical knowledge Discipline-based knowledge Simultaneous knowledge Sequential knowledge Tacit knowledge Explicit knowledge
Operational and maintenance experience Design and project experience Little design experience Little operational experience Oral communication Written communication Focus on: Availability, accessibility, and Schedule, capital cost, space, weight, maintainability process, piping Equipment-systems Discipline-thinking
Figure 6.1 The operations and design communities-of-practice
Project deadlines and cost estimates of design may be ignored offshore, while practical maintenance issues are enigmas to onshore design people. Design have project experience, but no operational experience. Operations have operations and maintenance experience, but no project experience. There are lots of differences that make it difficult to communicate across this barrier between the operations and design communities-of-practice Her are some illustrative comments from people with offshore experience working in design:
“Theory versus practice. It seems to have an influence on the communication and understanding of what has been said. It goes both ways. Practical problems that theoretically-minded people onshore don’t understand. That small things can be of importance. As where you place an inspection hatch or valves. What may be a big problem out there may be ignored onshore. What is a big problem here can be ignored out there. ”
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“One should start to communicate with each other so that people talk about the same things. They don’t speak the same language. They have a different background, and there are differences as to how they view a system and it’s importance. By different background I mean different education - practical and theoretical. For example, an engineer and a machinist - they see things differently.”
“It is easier to work with a platform manager who knows a project from A to Z and is aware of projects apart from a certain amount of money needing approvals, etc. Things become more systematic. At the same time, when we get offshore people into projects we see aspects we were not aware of before but that are important.”
In the following chapter I focus on conditions for bridging the operations and design communities-of-practice and the different kinds of knowledge part of their practice. I use the different approaches of the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J projects to emphasize which conditions that favor a bridging of knowledge in operations and design.
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In this chapter I focus on bridging the two communities-of-practice of operations and design. I compare different ways of organizing operations into design in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and 2/4 J projects and emphasize factors that inhibited or promoted a bridging of the two. The two projects differ in size, complexity, and level of completion, but are both part of the Ekofisk II development of Phillips Petroleum Company Norway. They represent two interesting cases and different approaches to integrating operational experience in design
Most uncertainties were related to the Ekofisk 2/4 J project, which was of far greater complexity and size compared to 2/4 X. What I discuss, however, are the different approaches to involving operations in design, and what effect this had on the resulting platform designs. I focus on three different factors that in particular demonstrated that they have an effect on operations’ influence on design: mutual sympathy and respect, physical closeness between operations and design, and experience from the other community-of-practice.
7.1 Bridging knowledge of operations and design
7.1.1 Mutual sympathy, trust, and respect
It takes time and adjustment for people from different cultures to share tacit knowledge, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue. They also state that it takes time to build mutual trust between people from different cultures, or communities-of-practice. To socialize tacit knowledge from interaction with other people or through direct on site experience, developing what Nonaka and Takeuchi call “sympathized knowledge” takes time. Individual emotions, feelings, mental models, and technical skills need to be shared to build mutual trust, they say. To develop some common ground and be
-175- Bridging Operation and Design able to put one’s feelings, worries, and whole person on the table is essential to build trust among different groups of people, Isaacs (1993) argues. He sees mutual trust as a necessary condition for tapping and sharing knowledge, tacit knowledge in particular, through dialogue. By deliberately not trying to solve familiar problems in a familiar way, dialogue, as Isaacs defines it, opens up new possibilities for shared thinking, he says.
The two projects Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J developed differently. The Ekofisk 2/4 X project opened up for new thinking in terms of innovating drilling technology and restructuring project into an alliance organization between operating company and contractors. Mutual trust was a key word in this process, and the reason that one was able to make relatively swift moves. The Ekofisk 2/4 J project was based on another approach. It took time for the operating company and design contractor to socialize and build mutual trust. The project followed a traditional project organization model emphasizing formal communication and distance between the parties involved. It therefore took longer time for people to meet.
Kvaemer Engineering in Oslo was responsible for the design of Ekofisk 2/4 J. It took time for Kvaemer and Phillips to establish a good working relationship. To build mutual trust and respect between the two companies and the people involved in the project was a slow process. There was a distant relationship between the operating company and the design contractor from the very beginning. It took about a year to break the ice. The basic engineering phase of design was characterized by a strenuous working relationship between Phillips and Kvaemer. The contract was based upon Kvaemer taking full responsibility for the design, and there was an agreement about organizing the project according to standard practice of the industry, i.e. the operating company and the design contractor working separately. Against normal procedures, Phillips wanted to take care of procurements themselves, which further disturbed the relationship with Kvaemer as the design contractor. The Kvaemer people were used to include procurement as part of their work, and questioned Phillips ’ professionalism in insisting on doing this themselves and hiring external consultants to do it for them. The introduction of functional specifications and life-cycle costing, which were new
-176- Bridging Knowledge of Operations and Design concepts to Kvasmer as well as to Phillips, created additional complications. The two companies did not get on very well in the beginning.
Kvasmer was skeptical towards the value of the experience brought into the project by Phillips. They considered experience from existing Ekofisk installation too old to take into account. Compared to the new technology of Ekofisk II, Kvasmer had difficulties in taking seriously the operational experience of current Ekofisk facilities. This seemed to be an attitude in the company close to having contempt for the customer. The mood changed after a while, but it took time for the companies and people involved to adjust to each other. It took a whole year before people started to work together. People first started to informally interact and function together in detailed design. As the Ekofisk II project manager in Phillips said: it was difficult to get on to a smooth course.
The Ekofisk 2/4 X design process developed differently. It was a smaller project than 2/4 J, but had a tighter schedule. Ekofisk 2/4 X started drilling in October 1996, while production start from 2/4 J is planned for September 1998. Aker Offshore Partners (AOP), in Stavanger, was responsible for 2/4 X topside design. Hitec, also in Stavanger, was responsible for the design of the drilling rig and mud module. There was a better match between Phillips, AOP and Hitec than with Kvaemer. AOP and Hitec were more receptive towards Phillips ’ needs and willing to listen to operational experience brought into the project. Phillips ’ site manager at AOP suggested to integrate Phillips ’ people into the project organization of the design contractor. AOP was willing to adjust their practice and way of doing design and allowed Phillips ’ people into their project organization. The situation was the same at Hitec. Mutual sympathy and respect were characteristic for the working relationship between the people involved in the project, and for Phillips, AOP and Hitec as the operating company and design contractors working together. People were sympathetic to each other and to the expertise brought into the project. Phillips ’ people became an integral part of the project. Operations and project people worked closely together in an informal setting.
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When 30 % of 2/4 X detail design was finished, an alliance was established between Phillips, AOP, Hitec, and the fabrication contractor Umoe Haugesund in order to finish the project on time. Mutual trust between the four companies forming the alliance was fundamental to working together and keeping the schedule.
The 2/4 X project broke with the traditional way of doing design in offshore industry. The 2/4 X topside alliance was the third alliance established in the North Sea. There has used to be a clear distance and division of work between the operating company and the design contractor. Operational experience has been kept within the operating companies, and there has been little sharing of experience across the borders of operating companies and engineering contractors. The focus of the oil companies has been production, not operations and maintenance. Operational experience has not been taken into account to improve operational effectiveness of either new or existing installations offshore. These problems were addressed already in 1977, at the Lysebu Conference on Oil Activities in the North Sea, where representatives from operating companies, engineering contractors, vendors, the government, and researchers met to discuss the future of the Norwegian oil industry (Thorsrud, 1977, 1978; Engelstad and Rogne, 1977). There was little confidence and tense relationships between the parties involved. One senior project manager at Aker Engineering explained the difficulty of engineering companies gaining access to operational experience. He said:
“Then we have this problem with operating experience. It has been the sacred business of the oil companies. It is not available. Then we are talking about the division of work within the oil industry that has developed through the years. It has been artificial. You can go back to the time we were in shipping. Then we were multi-disciplinary. But then the oil industry came and wanted another division of work. You got a situation where the oil companies controlled the whole process. They had their methods, and that was the way everyone should work. And lots of resources were used on specifying things in detail.”
Operating and engineering companies have therefore not collaborated in bringing operational experience into design. There has been a lack of confidence between the different parts of the industry and a clear division of the work of operating companies
-178- Bridging Knowledge of Operations and Design and the design contractors. Reflecting on what could be learnt from the Ekofisk II project on how to involve operations in design, one of Phillips ’ project people at Kvasmer emphasized the need to break this trend and establish a continuous feedback process from operating companies to vendors instead. He said:
“We’re talking more and more about things like partnership cooperation. That co operation has to take place not just when you are buying equipment. It’s no good saying: OK I’ll cooperate with you fully while I am buying it, you are actually producing it, but once I have got it - Goodbye Mr. Vendor. That partnership, well, that cooperation, has got to continue. Because by continuing and getting the vendor all that experience on the maintenance in use, the vendor can actually improve the quality of the next range of production and all this. ”
And he continued:
“And that constant improvement process is got to come from, if you like, all the operators. And this got to go back to the vendors so they know what the problems are, and can adjust their design accordingly. So then when bidding, another operator, their bid has this benefit of all this experience. And that ’s what I think is missing, if you like. Unless you have got some sort of mechanism like that for feedback, how does the vendor know what is good? How does he know what is bad? How does he improve? I don’t know. There needs to be such a thing. And it not just a company initiative. It has got to be much more a Norsok type of initiative which is in line with that. ”
In order to bridge the communities-of-practice of operations and design, mutual trust has to be built. It is a precondition for bridging the gap between these two different communities-of-practice. One person involved in design at Kvaemer, having long operations and design experience said:
“You has to overcome the distrust Both parts would benefit from that. If you can overcome this and play with open cards, it would be nice. And it is very much a question of human values. These are things I have experienced through twenty-two years practice in this business. I have asked myself why things haven ’t happened before. Before there was a long distance. It was complicated to talk to each other. If you call someone you know offshore, he can direct you further, but you don’t call people you don’t know.”
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His experience was that cooperation between people in operations and design mainly stranded on the operating companies and their will to go into some kind of dialogue with the engineering companies. He said:
“Practically and theoretically the perspectives are different when you haven ’t talked to each other. If you had rotation, you could save a lot of time and money. My hope was that the oil companies had seen this earlier, but they say they don’t have people. Before it was inconceivable. Then people were sitting in they respective trenches. Now things start to change. ”
In the last few years one has become increasingly aware of operations finally being the customer. Operating companies and design contractors have started to reflect on how to bring operations into design. One project manager in design onshore said:
“The project generally has a lot of theory. We therefore need operating competence in. We have a lot to learn from the operations people. We need mixed teams, not only super technicians and theoreticians. We also need good practical people. Operations are the customer. We have acknowledged that ”
One engineering manager said:
“It has to do with interpersonal relationships. It is a matter of trust. It makes it difficult to quarrel about things you know are nonsense. Trust. To give and take, and not be afraid to speak up. It is a question of how you respect each other. ”
One operations representative in PRS commented on the same issue:
“Respect for each other ’s work and competence is important. This is something I really have learned. Confidence and respect between the different fields of knowledge. You gain a better understanding of each other ’s perspectives much quicker. ”
To summarize, mutual sympathy, trust, and respect are essential factors in bridging the communities-of-practice of operations and design. These are important in
- 180- Bridging Knowledge of Operations and Design bridging the different kinds of knowledge of operations and design. Building mutual trust and opening up for new perspectives are key issues in preparing the ground for dialogue and skillful discussion between operations and design personnel. I shall now focus on the role of physical closeness, fact-to-face interaction, and informal communication between people in order to account operational experience take into in design and create a unified operations and design community-of-practice.
7.1.2 Physical integration of operations and design
Brown and Duguid (1992) argue that informal communities-of-practice and the interfaces between different communities-of-practice are significant sites of innovation. Tacit learning is fostered through shared practice, Ehn (1992), Goranzon (1992), and Levin (1983) argue. Bums and Stalker (1991) and Allen (1991) emphasize the importance of physical closeness between users and designers. Close, personal relationships are fundamental to bridge knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice, Bums and Stalker argue. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) focus also on the need for creating a “field” in which individuals can interact with each other through face-to-face dialogue. “It is here that they share experiences and synchronize their bodily and mental rhythms,” they say. Lack of integration of operations and design personnel has been one of the hindrances of bringing operational experience successfully into design, Hanssen-Bauer (1990) and Qvale (1993) argue. A close working relationship between operations and design is important in order to directly communicate operational experience to the engineer working on drawings. Informal communication opens up for further clarification and explanation. One of the operations representative in the Ekofisk II project said:
“People with operational experience must be there. Things around must be explained. It is another language. They don’t understand the logic. We say experience shows this or that, but they don’t have this experience. They don’t understand what is important or what may be problematic in operations. Design engineers don’t think that things need ever to be maintained or replaced. They don’t understand the importance of availability of, and access to, equipment ”
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The Ekofisk II project showed the importance of having experienced operations personnel available to the project. The operations representative involved in the 2/4 X topside design at AOP emphasized the advantage of sitting in the midst of the project. To be able to sit close to the design people made it easier to have an impact on the project. He worked side by side with the people in design, and they could draw on his and other operations personnel’s experience when required. He stressed the important role of having a direct influence by working close to the engineers in design. When he himself could not answer the questions from design, he called other Phillips people with the relevant expertise. Complicated issues could be solved on the spot in an informal setting.
Phillips ’ project and operations people in the design of the 2/4 X drilling rig at Hitec were also closely integrated into the project. They worked side by side with design. The project team had large authorities on behalf of the project and functioned as an integrated, autonomous team. Similar to the design process at AOP, operations and design personnel worked closely together in an informal manner. People had lunch together and functioned as a unified team. Coordination of the two AOP and Hitec sites was difficult, however. Operations issues on the borderline between the two projects were difficult to discover and take into account.
When the 2/4 X Topside Alliance was established, the project organization was gathered at the Umoe Haugesund fabrication site. People were sitting close to each other and had access to operations or engineering knowledge at the site. They were further sitting close to the actual work on the platform. You could go directly from the office landscape into the North Sea Hall where fabrication and design took place at Umoe Haugesund. Questions could be solved and decisions made in an informal setting, and one could go out and have a closer look at the design. There were also a number of team building session within the alliance project organization to ease communication within the project. People got to know each other well and communicated in an informal way. Operations were further represented in the
-182- Bridging Knowledge of Operations and Design alliance management team. The operations representative previously involved in design at AOP was responsible for commissioning and hook-up in the alliance.
In the design of Ekofisk 2/4 J at Kvzemer the situation was different Phillips ’ site team was not integrated into the project organization of the design contractor. Philips and Kvasmer agreed not to go for an integrated project model. Phillips were part of the project, but were sitting on the side as facilitators in the process. They did not want to interfere in Kvaemer ’s responsibilities in the project. Kvasmer was paid for and responsible for the design, and the 2/4 J project management were careful about not getting too involved. They were conscious of supporting the project, not taking the responsibilities out of the hand of Kvasmer.
Communication between the operating company and the design contractor was formal, emphasizing keeping a distance in their relationship. The Phillips and Kvasmer people were sitting physically apart from each other. There were less informal cooperation and interaction than on Ekofisk 2/4 X. Combination locks and relatively long distances between the two project organizations made it inconvenient for people to see each other. People came closer after a year, but were still sitting physically far apart. This was reported to inhibit interaction between the two companies and operations and design.
Until recently, operating companies have not been conscious about taking into account operational experience in design. They have not been willing to spare offshore personnel and let them participate in onshore design. The operations and design communities-of-practice have not been involved in each other ’s work. The Ekofisk 2/4 J design project at Kvasmer continued this trend. One engineer in design onshore with long offshore experience said:
“It is the contract philosophy of the oil companies that impedes the dialogue between operations and design. It is their own contract system that complicates things. The oil companies, Kvasmer, and others should cooperate and exchange people. It may sound expensive, but it is a crucial point Design do not have any idea about how things are related offshore. It therefore becomes important to work in integrated teams on an equal
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level, and this should start at a much earlier stage. A closer cooperation between oil companies and engineering contractors is what is needed.”
The two operations representatives of Phillips involved in the 2/4 J design at Kvasmer were part of Phillips ’ site team, the project task force (PTF). However, it took time for them to become integrated into the project. In the beginning, they were neither integrated into the work of PTF or Kvaemer. They were looked upon as a threat from both project organizations. It was difficult for them to convince both the camps of the advantage of having operational experience available to the project, but the attitude gradually changed. People became less skeptical and more receptive after a while. It took a year, however, to break the ice and reach some kind of informal work context. Until detail design, people from Phillips and Kvaemer interacted through formal channels. This way of working together restrained operations input to the project, while the informal communication that gradually developed opened of for other approaches to experience transfer. “Informal cooperation - that is what gives results, ” one of Phillips ’ operations representatives in the 2/4 J project at Kvasmer said. He was content with the way of working together in the project after the ice was broken.
The Ekofisk II project demonstrated that the operations and design communities need to sit and work closely together in order to facilitate a unified operations and design effort. People need to spend time together on questions and issues that come up during the project. Lack of insight into the other community-of-practice among both operations and design personnel necessitates a close cooperation between the two. One operations representative said:
“Design do not see the importance of things. They have not experienced these things. They have not had overalls on. They don’t see the whole. They are not able to see what is essential and important to operations. They have not experienced the same. But you cannot set a mechanic to design these things either. It is when you get these together that location and layout of the rooms, size, etc. get well adjusted. You need to have this together. ”
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A person involved in design at Kvaemer emphasized the need of letting people work closely together and spend time together in order to adapt. He had experience from both the operations community-of-practice offshore and the design community-of- practice onshore and had worked on joint projects between operations and design, sometimes as an interpreter. He said:
“Cooperation between offshore people and engineers onshore works excellent if they get time to function together a little. If they get to work on something together. But first they need time to understand each other. The oil companies haven ’t seen the value of this. ”
The operations people involved in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and 2/4 J projects realized they had the best impact on design when working directly with engineers close to the drawing-board. It was more complicated ,and the operations representatives were less likely to have an influence when involved only in commenting on drawings in an evaluation phase of the project. One operations representative said:
“An operations person should work on the drawing board together with the engineers. When they get used to each other, they become dependent right away.”
All operations representatives involved in the Ekofisk II project emphasized the importance of direct and informal communication with people in design. Face-to-face interaction and close personal relationships were more effective than formal communication. One person involved in design at Kvaemer with previous offshore and onshore experience said:
“You need to be willing to cooperate. SSP, you should read about that It was a matter of trust and openness between customer and designer. There we communicated horizontally with each other on the same level. Traditionally, things would have gone up through the hierarchy and down again to the right person. Instead, we spoke directly to each other without involving the top. When we finished our job, they could say yes or no. It worked out very well. Things went faster, and it was more comfortable. Direct communication is a wonderful way of doing things. Open cooperation. We sat on each others desks. You may put that down. To sit closely together. Direct and horizontal communication. You save time. Openness and trust are two important keywords.”
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One project manager in Aker commented on their integrated way of working together:
“There is no talk about the work of yours or mine. You don’t control what your neighbor is doing. Instead, you do something too that you contribute with. The other part is management - we sit here and have full insight into each other ’s work. We walk into each other ’s offices. Letters are no big deal any longer. So communication is much easier. Of course you have to tear down some walls and old barriers of stubbornness, own competence, and the attitude of this being mine and I won’t share it with anyone else. You have to open your mind and heart so to speak.”
To summarize, physical closeness between designers and operations personnel has a positive effect on bridging the communities-of-practice of operations and design. Physical integration, informal communication, and direct influence with engineers working on the drawing board are factors facilitating a fruitful bridging of knowledge of operations and design. A relationship based on distance, physical separation, and formal communication impedes a bridging of the two communities-of-practice.
7.1.3 Knowing both operations and design
Operations or design personnel with work experience from the other community-of practice are difficult to get hold of. To a large extent, operations personnel lack design experience, and design personnel lack operational experience. When either of the two has knowledge of the other community-of-practice, communication flows more easily. When not, operational experience is difficult to take into account in design. It is difficult to understand operations’ comments and input without having the same experience, one of the operations representatives involved in design at Kvaemer said. Working closely together in order to sort things out and explain in greater detail, then became important in order to convey the more tacit part of the operations community-of-practice offshore. He said:
“If both parties had been involved in each other ’s work you would gain a better understanding. But when you never hear a thing, there becomes a large gap. In design it
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is not easy to see the whole problem. They don’t know the whole situation. They look at things in too narrow ways. They solve one problem but create new ones. It is important that people get to know each other not only through the phone but also through face-to-face interaction, and not only through writing letters.”
The operations representatives involved in the Ekofisk II project were all experienced offshore personnel. Each had around twenty years offshore experience, but everyone was not equally experienced within the area of project management and engineering design. This proved to be a difference between the operations’ involvement in the 2/4 X and 2/4 J projects. The operations people involved in the design at AOP had experience from design projects and their way of running projects before entering the Ekofisk 2/4 X topside design. One of the operations people involved at Hitec had studied engineering and project management and was therefore familiar with the language of design. It was easier for them to communicate and get along with the design community-of-practice. They knew the structure of a project, what decisions needed to be taken when, and what to do within the different phases of design. They were able to be proactive in the project. They had management experience and knew how to handle decisions in order to get important operations’ considerations through. One PRS representative commented on operations’ involvement at AOP and the alliance the following way:
“The operations representative at 2/4 X was a great plus. A person with long operational experience - from E&P. Inspection and maintenance, plus design experience. It has been very good for the alliance. It was very good to have him exactly where he was. We should bring in more people of that caliber. Inspection. Things became different for the two operations representatives at Kvasmer. At 2/4 X the operations representative had a leading position. The 2/4 J project would have continued without our operations representatives, but the one on 2/4 X had a leading position in the project.”
The two operations representatives involved in design at Kvasmer had no previous engineering or project experience. They did not know how a project worked. It took time for them to understand how to interact with the community-of-practice of design. To a large degree they ended up running after the schedule of project, and being too late to influence the decisions made. They were not able to be proactive. In addition,
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they were too few compared to the size and complexity of the project. They had to select a few areas they thought were the most important ones and try to work on these. There was a large amount of documentation for them to go through and evaluate. In the beginning they were confused in terms of not knowing the project terminology and language of design and what decisions had to be taken when. The situation at Kvaemer with operations representatives without engineering or project experience and design engineers without operational experience made the differences between the operations and design communities-of- practice more obvious. Gradually they learned, however, how the project functioned and how to communicate with people in design. One of them said:
“We learnt there are a lot of considerations to be aware of in design. If we had known the engineering environment and their needs in advance, we would have managed better. It is a machinery. A machinery with need for lubrication. We didn’t know the conditions. It’s fine to bring operations people in, but you need to introduce them to how a project works. They need knowledge about the engineering environment. ”
The design community-of-practice at AOP and Kvaemer had little operational experience, while some of the design people at Hitec had offshore experience. At Hitec you therefore had people within the design community-of-practice with operational experience, together with operations people with engineering and project management knowledge. There was a mixture of operations and design people with experience from the other community-of-practice. They were able to work on an equal footing, profiting from each other ’s expertise. This is where an innovative operational design was created. The design solutions found at AOP and Kvaemer were to a larger extent standard ones. Operations personnel contributed greatly in adjusting design solutions to take into account easy access to and extra room for equipment. They further contributed in the layout of control room, workshops, stores, etc., but the design teams at AOP or Kvaemer did not come out with innovative design solutions comparable to the new drilling rig solution at Hitec.
To summarize, experience from design is a prerequisite for operations personnel in order to actively contribute in design. Without prior knowledge of design, it is
-188- Bridging Knowledge of Operations and Design difficult to communicate with the project and the design commumty-of-practice. Design personnel with operational experience also facilitate the process of bridging knowledge of the two communities-of-practice of operations and design. Having both operations personnel with design experience and design personnel with operational experience opens up for the creation of new knowledge beyond the current practice of operations and design. Operational experience within the design community-of- practice (operations-in-design) and design experience within the operations community-of-practice (design-in-operations) are conditions for bridging knowledge of operations and design. In addition, mutual sympathy and respect between the two are another prerequisite for new knowledge come out in meetings between opposites, according to Yuanji theory (Zhang, 1992). Commun ication with one’s mind and heart is important in bridging the different kinds of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. I shall now conclude by presenting a model emphasizing favoring conditions for bridging knowledge of the two commun ities-of-practice of
operations and design.
7.2 Creating better production systems in design
The design process at Hitec turned out to produce an innovative 2/4 X drilling rig concept, representing state-of-the-art within drilling rigs and the application of operational experience in design. Operational experience was significantly integrated into the project. What was special about the design process at Hitec was:
• The mixture of both operations and design personnel having experience from the other community-of-practice. Operations personnel had onshore engineering and project experience, and design personnel had offshore operational experience. • Operations personnel were physically integrated into design. The project functioned as an integrated, autonomous team, creating a unified operations and design community-of-practice. • There was mutual sympathy and respect between the operations and design communities-of-practice.
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Operations personnel were also fully integrated into the 2/4 X topside design at AOP. Operational experience was easy available in the project when required. The operating company and the design contractor functioned as an integrated team. Informal, rather than formal, communication and transfer of experience were important. The operations person working full time in design had previous project and management experience, but no engineering knowledge of design. He was able to be proactive and contribute directly with his experience in the project, but could not communicate with the engineers on the level of engineering design. Neither had the engineers at AOP any offshore operational experience. Both operations and design were therefore less knowledgeable about the other community-of-practice than were the case in the drilling rig design at Hitec. The project did not come up with a new concept of topside design, but operations were able to have an important impact in terms ensuring easy access to equipment, enough room to take equipment in and out for maintenance, and other layout-related issues.
In the Ekofisk 2/4 J design project, Kvaemer did a “standard design,” as described both by Phillips ’ operations personnel and Kvaemer ’s project management. Operations involvement in the 2/4 J project did not lead to a new processing and transportation platform concept. Kvaemer used solutions they were already familiar with. The operations representatives involved in the project did not have any project or engineering knowledge in advance, and design personnel at Kvaemer did not have any direct operational experience themselves. Neither operations nor design had experience from the other community-of-practice. Further, the Ekofisk 2/4 J project chose the traditional project model of separating the operating company and the design contractor and basing the design on formal, written communication. Kvaemer had full responsibility for the design, and Phillips were sitting apart as facilitators and controllers of the work. Operations were invited to formal meetings by design. It took a year before the Phillips ’ site team and Kvaemer ’s project people started interacting on an informal basis. Through basic design, the work was characterized by a distance between Phillips and Kvaemer and a formal working relationship. To
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• Operations personnel not having project or engineering knowledge in advance. • Design personnel not having operational experience. • A distant relationship and formal communication between the operating company and the engineering contractor. Operations and design personnel were sitting physically apart. • Lack of trust between the operating company and the engineering contractor.
I conclude by presenting a table to summarize the differences in operations involvement in the design projects of Ekofisk II:
Ekofisk2/4 X Ekofisk 2/4 J AOP Hitec Kvsemer Mutual sympathy and respect between the yes yes slowly operations and design communities-of-practice Close cooperation and physical integration yes yes no of operations and design personnel Operational knowledge no yes no among people in design Project experience among the operations yes yes no people participating in design Engineering knowledge among the no yes no operations people participating in design Innovative operational design no yes no
Figure 7.1 Conditions favoring a bridging of operations and design knowledge
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m Bridging Operation and Design
To conclude, there are three factors that are particularly important in bridging the different kinds of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. They are:
• Mutual sympathy, trust, and respect between the operations and design communities-of-practice. • Close cooperation and physical integration of operations and design personnel. • In-depth knowledge of the other community-of-practice.
In the Ekofisk 2/4 X drilling rig design at Hitec all these conditions were fulfilled. An integrated, autonomous project team of operations and design personnel came up with a state-of-the-art drilling rig concept taking into account significant operational knowledge in the design. The operations representatives involved had previous knowledge of engineering and project management, and some design people had knowledge of the operations community-of-practice offshore.
The Ekofisk 2/4 X topside design and the Ekofisk 2/4 J platform concept are more standard design solutions. The operations representatives involved in these projects were able to influence on layout issues and to ensure practical access to equipment etc., and to a larger extent in the Ekofisk 2/4 X topside design than on Ekofisk 2/4 J. But these project did not create an innovative operational concept as was the case in the Ekofisk 2/4 X drilling rig design.
The Ekofisk 2/4 X topside design at AOP was organized as an integrated project where the operating company and the design contractor were working closely together. Operations and design personnel were working side-by-side, and informal cooperation ensured operational knowledge taken into account in design. The operations representative participating in design had previous project experience and was able to be proactive in the project. There was a lack of operational knowledge among people in design, however, and one were not able to fully bridge the knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice in design.
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The Ekofisk 2/4 J project was organized as a traditional project based on a distant relationship between the operating company and the design contractor and formal communication. The project organizations of the operating company and the design contractor were sitting physically apart. The operations representatives were not fully integrated into the project. It took long time to build trust between the companies and the people participating in the project. For a while the operational knowledge brought into the project was not acknowledged by design people. There was a lack of understanding between the design and operations communities-of-practice. The operations representatives participating in the project did further not have previous project or engineering experience, and the engineers in design did not have any operational experience. The Ekofisk 2/4 J project was not able to bridge the different kinds of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice into new knowledge in design.
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- 194- Chapter 8 Conclusion
In this chapter I summarize the answers provided to the research questions of the thesis. In chapter six I discussed the research questions related to the different kinds of knowledge of operations and design. In chapter seven I focused on the conditions favoring a bridging of these. To conclude, I first summarize these answers. Second, I recommend action for operating companies and design contractors to facilitate a better sharing of operations and design knowledge within the industry. Third, I suggest areas for further research. The research questions outlined in chapter two were the following:
1. Are operations and design two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge?
• What characterizes the knowledge-creation process of the operations and design communities-of-practice? • To what extent do the operations and design communities-of-practice relate differently to the dimension of time? • What distinguishes the educational background of people in operations and design?
2. What are the conditions forbridging knowledge of operations and design?
• What role do close physical interaction and integration of operations and design personnel play in the process of bridging knowledge of operations and design? • To what extent is previous knowledge of the other community-of-practice decisive for creating new knowledge in design? • To what extent is mutual sympathy and respect important for bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice?
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These questions were developed through investigation of the literature reviewed. Based on two case studies, the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J design projects of Phillips Petroleum Company Norway, explored in the previous chapters, I shall answer these questions.
8.1 Findings
In this section I answer the two main research questions of the thesis. I first emphasize the different kinds of knowledge of the communities-of-practice of operations and design. Then I focus on the bridging process of the different kinds of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice.
8.1.1 Different kinds of knowledge in operations and design
My data indicate that operations and design are two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge. Operations offshore is based on practical, simultaneous, tacit knowledge, while design is founded on discipline-based, sequential, explicit knowledge. Availability, maintainability, and access to equipment are important to the operations community-of-practice offshore, while discipline- based design, schedule and cost are essential to the design community-of-practice onshore.
Knowledge within the operations community-of-practice is kept at a tacit, often personal level. Direct, personal, “on-the-spot” knowledge, directly linked to practical situations and operations of equipment are the main sources of knowledge in operations offshore. Knowledge has remained tacit at a personal level, or shared among shifts or groups of people. Oral communication and close networks between people are characteristics of the work offshore. They relate to a continuous production process and have little experience with the sequential project thinking of design projects onshore.
-196- Conclusion
The design community-of-practice is based on explicit knowledge. People have an engineering or university background. They share a set of experiences, problem solving techniques, and a common language from the engineering school and engineering practice. They rely to a large extent on written, formal communication. Specific, precise, quantitative data are needed in their approach to modeling and estimation work in design. Onshore design is a project-driven community-of-practice. The rhythm and context of work differ from operations offshore. One has sequential project planning, discipline-based design, and limited access to operational experience. Engineers working in design have not been exposed to knowledge of the operations community-of-practice either through work in design or prior engineering education.
There is a clear status difference between knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. Practical, tacit operational knowledge is not valued in the engineering and design communities-of-practice. Day-to-day operational knowledge has not been seriously brought to the attention in the engineering education or in design. The engineering community-of-practice has little or no operational experience. They have not been trained to think in terms of operations and maintenance. Operational knowledge has been rejected as subjective, unreliable, unim portant knowledge. On the other hand, operations offshore may be skeptical to the engineering knowledge of the design community-of-practice onshore, by which they are use to being overruled.
This unequal relationship between knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice need to change in order to develop more operational- effective solutions in operations and design. There needs to be a more balanced understanding and appreciation of the different kinds of knowledge of the communities of operations and design. The engineering community-of-practice needs to become attentive to the needs of operations and their implications in design, in order to improve the operational effectiveness of their work.
197 Bridging Operation and Design
To summarize, operations and design are two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge. Personal, tacit knowledge is characteristic of the operations community-of-practice offshore, while explicit, discipline-based knowledge characterizes the design community-of-practice onshore. The operations community-of-practice offshore relate to continuous production emphasizing direct, “on-the spot” knowledge. The design community-of-practice, on the other hand, are accustomed to sequential knowledge and project management. The educational background of people in operations and design is also different. Operations personnel offshore tend to have little formal education, while people in design onshore usually have an engineering or university degree. This field study indicates that operations and design are two communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge.
8.1.2 Bridging knowledge of operations and design
The question of how to take into account operational experience in design is a question of bridging communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge. It is a question of bridging the operations community-of-practice offshore based on practical, tacit knowledge and the design community-of-practice onshore based on explicit, discipline-based knowledge. To bring operational experience into design is therefore not a trivial matter since it relies on the encounter between two different communities-of-practice based on different kinds of knowledge. Factors that facilitate a bridging of knowledge between the operations and design communities-of-practice are:
• Close cooperation and physical integration of operations and design personnel. • Early involvement of operations personnel with in-depth knowledge of design. • Design people with in-depth knowledge of operations offshore. • Mutual sympathy and respect between the operations and design communities-of- practice and operations and design personnel.
-198- Conclusion
In the previous chapters I have explored two different ways of organizing a design project and taking into account operational knowledge in the design. I have studied the design process of two new platforms on Ekofisk II, the Ekofisk 2/4 X wellhead and drilling platform and the Ekofisk 2/4 J processing and transportation platform. These were the two main projects initiated by Phillips Petroleum Company Norway as part of the Ekofisk II development, and these two projects took different courses in the design. Interestingly, the Ekofisk 2/4 X project developed into an integrated project alliance where operating company and design contractors worked closely together, while the Ekofisk 2/4 J project chose a traditional project model based on a distant, formal relationship between the operating company and the design contractor.
The Ekofisk 2/4 X project, based on integration of operations and design personnel, succeeded in bridging operations and design knowledge, to a larger extent than did the Ekofisk 2/4 J project, based on a traditional project model emphasizing distance and formal cooperation between the operating company and design. Both projects proved that informal communi cation and interaction of operations and design personnel was what gave results in terms of bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. It took much longer time, however, for the Ekofisk 2/4 J project to build trust and reach the level of informal cooperation between people involved in the project.
Integrated vs. formal project organization The Ekofisk 2/4 X project proved that integrated, informal work settings were important arenas for operations and design people to meet. Close personal relationships, informal communication, and face-to-face interaction facilitated a bridging of knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. Informal, rather than formal communication was what gave results. A formal, traditional project model chosen by the Ekofisk 2/4 J project, with operations and design working separate from each other, impeded the bridging of operations and design knowledge and communities-of-practice.
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The Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J projects were based on two different ways of organizing the design process. The Ekofisk 2/4 X project chose an integrated model where the operating company was integrated into the project organization of the design contractor. Operations and design personnel was working side-by-side. Operational knowledge was easy available to the project. Emerging questions could be answered on the spot in an informal manner. Close cooperation between operations and design personnel and informal, rather than formal influence, was important to make operational knowledge part of the design.
In the Ekofisk 2/4 J project, operations and design personnel worked separately in design. The design process was based on a formal, distant relationship between the operating company and the design contractor. The design contractor was the responsible for the design and controlling the process, while the operating company supported information aside from the design contractor. The projects organizations of the operating company and the design contractor were sitting physically apart. The physical distance was a barrier to bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. It took a long time to build mutual trust between the parties involves in the project. The operations representatives participating in the design were not immediately accepted into the project organizations neither of the operating company or the design contractor. Gradually, however, the attitudes changed, and the project profited from informal cooperation between operations and design personnel.
Knowledge of the other community-of-practice Prior knowledge of design is necessary in order for operations personnel to actively contribute to design and be able to communicate with and understand the design community-of-practice. It is difficult for operations personnel without any project experience or engineering knowledge to have an impact on the decision-making process in design. They will not know when to give the necessary input. The operations representatives involved in the Ekofisk 2/4 J project did not have any project or engineering experience before. It took time for them to understand the practice and language of design. In the Ekofisk 2/4 X project, the participating
-200- Conclusion operations people in design had previous project management experience. One also had an engineering background. They were able to be proactive in the project.
This field study proves that the design community-of-practice lack operational knowledge. This was the case in both the Ekofisk 2/4 J project and in the 2/4 X topside design. This impeded the knowledge creation process in terms of developing operational-effective solutions in design. It was difficult for the engineers in design to take into account the offshore operational context and the operational knowledge brought into the project. The 2/4 X drilling rig design at Hitec, however, proved that design engineers with offshore experience as part of the project made a difference. A combination of operations personnel with knowledge of the design community-of- practice onshore and design personnel with knowledge of the operations community- of-practice offshore facilitated a bridging of operations and design knowledge and opened up for the creation of a new drilling rig concept in design. The project was able to coordinate a joint operations and design community-of-practice able to develop a state-of-the-art drilling rig concept, taking significant operational experience into account.
Mutual sympathy, trust, and respect Mutual trust, sympathy and respect were decisive factors in this bridging of knowledge of operations and design. For the 2/4 J project, based on a formal, distant relationship between the operating company and design, it took nearly a year to build trust and develop an informal working relationship in the project. Through the integrated Ekofisk 2/4 X approach, this project facilitated informal communication and sharing of knowledge between the operations and design communities-of-practice from day one.
To summarize, informal, integrated cooperation between operations and design opens up for bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. Close cooperation and physical integration of operations and design personnel is fundamental to bridging knowledge of the operations and design communities-of- practice. Operational knowledge within the design community-of-practice onshore,
-201 - Bridging Operation and Design knowledge of design within the operations-community-of practice offshore, and mutual sympathy and respect between the two are necessary for innovative operational design to come out.
8.2 Action recommended
Takeuchi and Nonaka (1995) emphasize the need for sharing knowledge of both explicit and tacit character and the essential role of converting tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge to create new knowledge. Their concept of knowledge creation offers a useful perspective in the context of experience transfer in the offshore oil and gas industry and bridging operations and design knowledge and communities-of- practice. In this section I suggest some practical steps to facilitate a sharing of knowledge in operations and design.
8.2.1 Operations
There is a huge potential in tapping tacit knowledge of the operations community-of- practice offshore. Each shift has their way of running the plant. Much of their knowledge has remained tacit within shifts, or often on a personal level. There has been little emphasis on systematic data gathering and knowledge creation in or across shifts, or in the operations community-of-practice offshore as a whole. An effort to share tacit knowledge of the different shifts and operations personnel, externalize tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge, and combine different sources of explicit knowledge would strengthen the operations community-of-practice’s ability to improve the operations offshore and communicate with the design community-of- practice onshore. A larger amount of operational knowledge made explicit would ease the process of transferring operational experience into design. A continuous feedback of explicit operational knowledge from operating companies to engineering contractors and vendors will give designers an opportunity to improve future designs on the basis of operational experience of previous design projects.
-202- Conclusion
Rotation of operations and design personnel will further provide an occasion for the two communities-of-practice to participate in each other ’s work and absorb also tacit operational and design knowledge. This represents an interesting, but challenging, opportunity to the operating companies to bridge the knowledge-creation processes of the operations and design communities-of-practice onshore and offshore through daily operations and design. This will ease communication between the two communities- of-practice and facilitate a bridging of operations and design knowledge in new design and modification projects. Operations personnel need onshore project experience and design personnel need offshore operational experience. Sharing practice, working side-by-side in operations and design, is necessary in order to gain access to tacit knowledge of the other community-of-practice. Operations and design personnel with integrated knowledge of operations and design are likely to contribute significantly to externalizing tacit knowledge of the two communities-of-practice into new operations and design knowledge.
8.2.2 Design
In new design projects, operations personnel need to be involved early in the process. Two operations representatives were involved in the Ekofisk 2/4 J project, one in the 2/4 X topside design, and two in the Ekofisk 2/4 X drilling rig design. They were too few compared to the size and complexity of the projects, especially on 2/4 J. More operations resources must be made available, especially in start-up of a project. Operations must be integrated into the project, and operations’ requirements and standardized information need to be spelled out up-front. A thorough, explicitly stated operations concept must be clearly defined and given as a condition to design. Operations need to be part of the decision-making process from day one.
Operations personnel need knowledge about project management and design practice in order to be proactive in the project. Without prior knowledge about design, it is difficult to understand the processes going on and how to interact with the project.
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People keep running after the project, discovering too late they should have been somewhere else, and are not able to provide the right input at the right time.
Physical integration of operations and design personnel of the operating company and the design contractor is important in order to socialize tacit knowledge and build trust between the different communities-of-practice. Physical closeness and direct, personal contact between operations and design people are important factors to bridge knowledge of the operations and design communities-of-practice. Integrated, autonomous project teams of operations and design personnel are better equipped to provide an operational-effective design than formal, traditional project model, based on distant relationships and physical separation of operations and design expertise.
Preparing arenas for dialogue and skillful discussions between operations and design personnel is important to facilitate a bridging of operational and design knowledge in design. Team-building is essential to bringing the different communities-of-practice of operations and design together. Building trust, making openness part of the working relationship, and encouraging new perspectives into the process are key factors to create a joint operations and design effort and community-of-practice in design.
Engineering companies need operational knowledge in order to design low-operating costs facilities. Their engineers are not exposed to operations and maintenance practice through their education. Engineering schools therefore need to take a closer look at their curriculum and evaluate the role of practical knowledge and operational experience as part of the engineering training. A greater focus should be set on the innovating potential of bridging tacit and explicit knowledge of operations and design.
-204- Conclusion
8.3 Further research
My focus has been on how to increase the operational effectiveness of future platforms offshore through the involvement of operations personnel in design. It would be very interesting to further study the knowledge-creation process within and across the operations and design communities-of-practice as a result of increased participation in each other ’s work practice. What effect does increased interaction between operations and design personnel have on the knowledge-creation capabilities and process of the operations and design communities-of-practice?
It will be important to study the knowledge-creation process of operations community-of-practice offshore in an effort to start sharing, coordinating, and converting tacit operational knowledge into explicit knowledge, and to study what effect this has on improving current operations as well as exchanging knowledge between operations offshore and design onshore. It would be interesting to follow the process of involving design personnel in offshore operations and what effect this had on the knowledge-creation process of the operations community-of-practice offshore and design community-of-practice onshore. What effect will it have on the practice of operations offshore? To what extent will increased access to joint tacit and explicit operational knowledge contribute to knowledge-creation in design? What effect does increased interaction of operations and design personnel have on the practice of design?
Another area in which important research could be done is in the cooperation between competent operations and design personnel with experience from the other community-of-practice. Process optimization, level of automation of process equipment, and operation of valves in particular, are potential areas that will greatly benefit from being studied by a group of experienced operations and design people knowing both the operations and design communities-of-practice offshore and onshore.
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-206- Appendix A Method
In this appendix I give an overview of my fieldwork, types of data, and data analysis. Finally, I discuss the validity of the research results.
1 Fieldwork
1.1 First fieldwork period: September 1994 to March 1995
Date: Place: Activity: Theme: Type of data:
12.10. Phillips, First meeting with Phillips Research topic Field notes/ 1994 Tananger vice president and safety diary manager 13.10. AFI, Oslo Interview with research The AFI oil Field notes, director at AFI research program AFI documents 26.10. Phillips, Meeting with Department The SBP scope of Field notes/ Tananger of Strategic Business work diary Performance (SBP) 28.11- Establishing myself at SBP Controlling Field notes/ 30.11. with office, PC, etc.; documents, process diary Participating in a meeting at control, BPR Shell regarding BPR 01.12- AFI, Oslo Document gathering The oil research Field notes, 02.12 program at AFI AFI documents 02.01- Phillips, Conversations with people Strategic planning, Internal Phillips 12.01. Tananger in the SBP-group and Phillips offshore documents, 1995 human resource department organization, TQM student thesis, field notes/ diary 17.01- Conversations with the SBP Ekofisk II, TPM Field notes/ 20.01 group diary 20.01- Kick off meeting for work Ekofisk II onshore Internal Phillips 22.01 on the future onshore organization documents, field organization notes/ diary 26.01- AFI, Oslo Data collection Research at AFI AFI documents 27.01 24.03 Phillips, Meeting between Phillips, Defining my Field notes/ 1995 Tananger my advisors, and I research topic diary
Table A1 First fieldwork period: September 1994 to March 1995 Bridging Operation and Design
In October 1994 one of my advisors and I met Phillips ’ vice president and director for safety, health, and environment, to discuss the direction of my work. They suggested two possible areas for me to work in: safety management, or the organizational change process in the company. I chose the latter and was introduced to the strategic business performance (SBP) group responsible for organizational development and strategic management in Phillips. The SBP manager became Phillips ’ contact person towards INPRO, the research program I was affiliated to.
I spent the fall of 1994 familiarizing myself with the work of the strategic business performance group and the organizational change processes of the company. The SBP group consisted of seven people, and they were in charge of quality assurance, controlling documentation, total quality management, and strategic management planning. I further met the person in charge of defining the Ekofisk II offshore organization. I got my own office and was well received by the SBP group.
In January 1995 I spent three weeks at Phillips headquarters in Tananger. I met people in the strategic business performance group and in other parts of the company. I focused on the strategic management planning and various organizational change projects going on. I had several conversations with the strategic planning manager and the organizational psychologist in the SBP group, and they updated me on previous organizational development and strategic planning projects within Phillips ’ onshore and offshore organizations.
In March 1994 my advisors in the INPRO program and I met the strategic business performance group and the vice president of Phillips, to discuss the focus of my research. There was mutual interest in studying operations’ involvement in the Ekofisk II development project. Phillips had brought some of their most experienced offshore operations personnel to participate in the onshore design process. They were interested in seeing what effect this kind of involvement had had on the project. We agreed to focus on the relationship between operations and design and the process of bringing operational experience into design. The relationship between operations and
-208- Appendix A design was emphasized one week earlier in a discussion between the Ph.D. candidates of the INPRO program. One of the engineering cybernetics students stressed that operations were not only operations but also implied design. I therefore saw the research question to be interesting and relevant also to the other disciplines involved in the INPRO program.
1.2 Second fieldwork period: April 1995 to September 1995
Date: Place: Activity: Theme: Type of data:
28.04. Phillips, Interface meeting between Project status of the Field notes/ 1995 Kvasmer Phillips and Kvasmer Ekofisk II design diary 09.05- Phillips, Seminar for Norwegian oil Change processes Field notes/ 11.05 Tananger companies in the oil industry diary 20.05 Phillips, Interview (1) with Phillips Operations in the Field notes/ Kvasmer operations representative Ekofisk II project diary 12.06- Phillips, Conversations with the SBP Operations and Phillips 16.06 Tananger group; Participating in maintenance on documents, field M&O meeting. Ekofisk n, TPM notes/ diary 26.06- Interviews (2); Participating Operations and Transcripts of 28.06 in M&O meeting design, Ekofisk II interviews, diary 10.07- Interviews (4) and dialogue Operations and Transcripts of 14-07 with the SBP group design interviews, diary 17.07- Ekofisk, Interviews (8) with Transcript of 19.07 offshore operations and maintenance interviews, personnel (15) diary,field notes 20.07- Phillips, Interviews (4) with onshore Transcripts of 28.07 Tananger design and operations interviews, diary personnel 04.08 Statoil Interview (1) with the Transcript of Heidrun production manager at interview, diary Statoil Heidrun 07.08 Statoil Interview (1) with one of Transcript of Research Statoil’s operations interview, diary Center representatives in design 14.08- Phillips, Interviews (8) with offshore Transcript of 18.08 Tananger operations people onshore interviews, diary 21.08 Kvasmer Interviews (2) with Operations and Transcript of Kvasmer ’s Ekofisk II design Ekofisk II interviews, diary project management (3) 22.08- Phillips, Interviews (3) with Operations vs. Transcript of 25.08 Tananger reservoir management and reservoir; LCC vs. interviews, diary procurement responsible operating costs.
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28.08 Phillips, Interview (1) with Phillips ’ Operations and Transcript of Kvaemer PLM- manager at Kvaemer design interview, diary 12.09 Interview (1) with architect Transcript of hired into the project interview, diary 13.09 Aker, Interview (1) with Hydro’s Transcript of Njord Njord project manager and interview, diary engineering manager 19.09 Phillips, Meeting between Phillips ’ My field Field notes, 1995 Tananger Vice President, SBP observations and diary manager, my advisor, and I research questions
Table A2 Second fieldwork period: April 1995 to September 1995
The second fieldwork period started by a visit to Kvsemer Engineering in Oslo, the Ekofisk 2/4 J design contractor. I met Phillips operations representatives involved in the Ekofisk 2/4 J design and sat in on a joint meeting between Phillips and Kvasmer personnel. Status and milestones of the project were issues on the agenda. I introduced my research topic to the operations representatives from Phillips and scheduled further meetings with them.
During the summer I spent six weeks at Phillips ’ headquarters in Tananger. I studied the total productive maintenance (TPM) concept that Phillips wanted to introduce to the operations and maintenance organization offshore. I talked to the persons responsible for the TPM process in Phillips and participated in meetings in the Ekofisk II Maintenance & Operations group. They were responsible for developing a maintenance and operations strategy to form the basis for the transition plan from Ekofisk I to Ekofisk II and the future organizational model. This work was meant to guide the design review process and enhance operability, maintainability, and ergonomic issues in design. External TPM consultants hired by Phillips also participated in this work. They had considerable influence on the process. The group ceased after a while, and I did not follow up this work.
I further spent three days offshore at the Ekofisk complex during the summer. I mailed a message in advance of what my interests and research questions were. Phillips scheduled meeting for me with different operations and maintenance representatives on the Ekofisk complex and one of the outlying platforms. When I
-210- Appendix A first came offshore, I participated in the daily coordination and planning meeting between operations and maintenance. Later I met the platform manager and the operations engineer working with him , the maintenance director, and maintenance coordinator on the Ekofisk complex. I was informed about how work was organized offshore and day-to-day operational routines. I further spent two evenings talking to the process technicians and senior operations supervisor working on the Ekofisk tank (Operations North), and a senior operations supervisor, operations supervisor, and safety representative on the Ekofisk 2/4 C (Operations South) platform. One day I visited the neighboring Eldfisk platform and met the platform manager, maintenance supervisor, and a group of operators on the platform. We discussed the daily work of operations and maintenance personnel and the relationship between operations and design.
I was particularly interested in the work of the process technicians on the Ekofisk tank, and we continued to meet. We had supper together a couple of nights, and I was invited to join in an internal work meeting once every fortnight ( 00:30-01:30 a.m.). The topic was the generator on Ekofisk 2/4 R. Thereafter a long discussion followed on the difficulties related to bringing operational experience into design projects onshore . We talked to the early hours of the morning. They were frustrated at not being listened to and not being able to bring their arguments forward to onshore management and design. They were happy that someone was interested in what they were doing and focusing a research project on bringing operational experience into design.
In August 1995 I met Kvasmer ’s Ekofisk II project manager, engineering manager, and systems managers. They explained Kvasmer ’s approach to the Ekofisk II project and the challenges of bringing operational experience into design. They were interested in what I was doing, and the systems manager worked with me to explain the interaction between Phillips operations and project personnel and the Kvasmer ’s project organization in the Ekofisk II project. I also spoke to one architect involved in design at Kvasmer to hear about his experiences with the project. And I talked to the Bridging Operation and Design
PLM consultant working for Phillips to listen to his experiences in bringing operational experience into the project.
I further met with Hydro’s project director and engineering manager on the Njord development project and Statoil’s production director on Heidrun. I learned about their experience from bringing operational experience into design and their way of doing so. At Statoil’s research center in Trondheim I spoke to one operations representative responsible for bringing operational perspectives into the experience transfer projects in the company. It was useful to compare work of the Ekofisk II project with experiences of two other large-scale development projects on the Norwegian continental shelf.
In September 1995 I presented my findings and research questions to Phillips. My advisors and I met with Phillips ’ strategic business performance manager and vice president to discuss the results of my fieldwork and what future steps to take. I got positive feedback on my framing of the research questions focusing on how to bridge theoretical and practical knowledge in operations and design.
1.3 Third fieldwork period: January 1996 to March 1997
Date: Place: Activity: Theme: Type of data:
02.01. Trondheim Interview (1) with Phillips ’ Experiences in Transcript of 1996 operations representatives bringing operational interview, diary (2) at Kvaemer experience in design 08.01- Phillips, Interviews (9) with Transcript of 12.01 Tananger Phillips ’ Ekofisk II project interviews, management diary 11.01 Umoe Interviews (3) with Transcript of Haugesund Phillips ’ 2/4 X Alliance interviews, manager and operations diary representatives (2) 15.01- Phillips, Interviews (3) with Transcript of 16.01 Kvaemer Phillips ’ Ekofisk II project interviews, management at Kvaemer diary (2) and one external organizational psychologist
-212- Appendix A
17.01 Aker Njord Interview (2) with Aker Transcript of Njord’s project manager interviews, and Hydro Njord’s diary engineering manager 12.02- Umoe Following the 2/4 X Operations vs. Field notes, 13.02 Haugesund fabrication review team design diary from operations offshore; interview (1) with Phillips operations representative 15.02 Phillips, Interview (1) with Phillips Experiences on Transcript of Kvaemer operations representative at bringing operational interview, diary Kvaemer experience in design 18.03- Umoe Following the 2/4 X Operations vs. Field notes, 19.03 Haugesund fabrication review team design diary from operations offshore 20.03 Watching the lift of the Field notes, derrick at place; interviews diary with Phillips operations representatives (2) at 2/4 X 28.03 Phillips, Interview (1) with Phillips Experiences on Transcript of Kvaemer operations representative bringing operational interview, diary experience in design 09.04- Umoe Data gathering; The 2fX topside 2/4 X Alliance 11.04 Haugesund Participating on an alliance alliance; tag and Phillips meeting on tag numbers numbers documents 12.04 Phillips, Data gathering and Status of the 2/4 X Phillips Tananger interview (1) with the PRS alliance and the documents, and manager Ekofisk II project transcript of interview 29.04 Phillips, Interview (1) with Phillips Experiences on Transcript of Kvaemer operations representative bringing operational interview, diary experience in design 06.05 Interview (1) with Phillips Transcript of operations representative interview, diary 23.05- Umoe Interview (3) with Phillips Transcript of 29.05 Haugesund operations representatives interviews, field and one Hitec manager; notes, diary Fabrication review together with Aker representatives 05.06 Kvaemer Interface meeting between Electronic operations Field notes, Phillips and Kvaemer procedures, TPM diary 18.06 Phillips, INPRO-seminar Operations and Field notes, Tananger design diary 05.08 Kvaemer Interview (1) with one Transcript of design responsible in the interview, diary EOP project 19.08 Phillips, Interview (2) with one Transcript of
-213- Bridging Operation and Design
Tananger operations engineer and interviews, one person from operations diary offshore 02.09 Phillips, Interview (1) with Phillips Experiences in Transcript of Kvaemer operations representative at bringing operational interview, diary Kvaemer experience in design 28.01 Trondheim Interview (1) with Phillips Experiences in Transcript of 1997 operations representative at bringing operational interview, diary Kvaemer experience in design; Status of the Ekofisk II project 06.02 API, Oslo Interview with research History of oil Transcript of director at API research at API interview, API documents 14.02 Hitec, Telephone interview (1) Status of the 2/4 X Transcript of Forus with Phillips ’ operations project interview representative in the alliance management group 14.03 Phillips, Interview (1) with the Status of the 2/4 X Transcript of 1997 Tananger drilling representative project. interview involved in 2/4 X design
Table A3 Third fieldwork period: January 1996 to March 1997
The next round of interviews started in January 1996. The focus of the interviews was on the reflection on people ’s experiences of bringing operations into design and how to improve in future projects. I talked to Phillips Ekofisk II management and operations representatives at the headquarters in Tananger and the design sites of Ekofisk 2/4 J at Kvaemer Engineering and Ekofisk 2/4 X at Umoe Haugesund. I first met the two operations representatives involved in design at Kvaemer. We met for half a day, discovered we had a lot to talk about, and agreed to meet regularly during the spring in order to go more detailed through the process. At Phillips ’ headquarters in Tananger I met the Ekofisk II project manager, the Ekofisk 2/4 X project manager, the Ekofisk 2/4 J project manager, chairman of the 2/4 X topside alliance steering group, the PRS manager, and the PRS planning responsible. At Umoe Haugesund I met the alliance manager and former site representative of Phillips at AOP, the previous operations representative in the topside design at AOP the current section lead for commissioning and hook-up in the alliance management team, and the drilling supervisor and operations representative involved in the design of the drilling
-214- Appendix A rig at Hitec. At Kvsemer I met Phillips ’ 2/4 J site representative, a project coordinator, and the two operations representatives again. In this period I further spoke to the organizational consultant who assisted the team-building process of the 2/4 X topside alliance and listened to his experiences from bringing operations people into design, and I talked to the project manager of Aker Engineering and Hydro’s engineering manager on the Hydro Njord project. They involved operations in a way somewhat different from Phillips and Kvaemer, but many of the obstacles were the same.
When I visited the Ekofrsk 2/4 X fabrication site at Umoe Haugesund, the alliance manager suggested that I accompany the offshore fabrication review team that made regular visits to the platform. They had already been there three times, and I joined them the last two last times. Their procedure was to spend two days at Umoe Haugesund before going to work offshore. I accompanied them on their inspection and walk through platform. The operations and drilling people worked separately. I decided to stay with the operations people. I accompanied them where they went, observed what they were looking for, and they tried to explain to me their concerns and what they were and were not satisfied with. We spent much time together, drank a lot of coffee, and had much fun during these visits. The drillers joined us for lunch and coffee breaks, and a number of jokes and stories circulated around the table. Some of the stories were repeated every now and then and were always followed by laughter. It was fun to be part of them, even if I didn’t understand all the jokes.
Occasionally some of the operations people made sure I took notice of what was going on in situations where their concerns were not taken into account, or if there was anything they didn’t approve of or had difficulties at Some were fascinated with the opportunity of being able to address their concerns through a researcher from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology who was particularly interested in what they were doing. During these visits I continued to meet the operations representatives previously involved in design at AOP and Hitec. They were the two people I had continues contact with at Umoe Haugesund, in addition to the fabrication review team.
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During the spring I had two more stays in Haugesund. I collected documents from the Ekofisk 2/4 X design process and was invited to participate in a coordination meeting on tag numbering at the alliance manager’s office. The second stay lasted for a week, and I talked more in-depth with the operations and drilling representatives involved in the project and the leader of the fabrication review team who was now based in Haugesund until hook-up offshore. During this stay I walked through the platform with Aker’s engineering manager, the tool pusher involved in the drilling rig design at Hitec, and the health, environment and safety responsible from AOP, and I observed what they were looking for and concerned about. I further talked to one Hitec representative, to better understand Hitec’s role in the alliance, and participated in four coordination meetings between various disciplines in the alliance organization and an interface meeting with representatives from Phillips ’ headquarters in Tananger.
Before leaving for MIT in September 1996,1 met a couple of people I had not had the opportunity to talk to before. One of them was the person at Kvasmer who contacted me because he had a lot to say about the topic I was studying. Another was a process engineer at Phillips headquarters of whom the process technicians offshore had spoken so warmly. She was now working in the Ekofisk II project. These two people had work experience both from operations offshore and design onshore and had reflected upon the difficulties in bringing operational experience into design.
I also met one of the operations representative at Kvasmer in September. We spent half a day going through the design process of Ekofisk 2/4 J and the difficulties they as operations representatives had encountered in the project. I met him again in January 1997 and was updated on the status of the Ekofisk II project and the start-up of Ekofisk 2/4 X in October 1996. I had previously been informed through e-mail by the commissioning manager about the success of the 2/4 X platform start-up. I further met the drilling supervisor previously involved in design at Hitec, in order to get his experiences and thoughts concerning the operation of the rig. I kept in touch with these three operations people through 1997, to be updated on the latest operational experience of the Ekofisk 2/4 X drilling rig and the status of the Ekofisk 2/4 J project.
-216- Appendix A
2 Types of data
From July 1995 to September 1995 I interviewed 46 people about operations and design. I relied upon a qualitative data-gathering technique, using interviews of semi- structured or unstructured explorative open-ended character. I talked to 35 operations people and 11 people in design, as indicated in the table below:
Operations Design Total
Number of 28 9 37 interviews Number of 35 11 46 people talked to
Table A4 Number of interviews during first interview round
The majority of the interviews lasted from one to one and a half hour. Only four interviews lasted less than an hour, while seven interviews lasted for two to three hours. The duration of the interviews are summarized in the following table:
Operations Design Duration of 05 1.0 1.5 2.5 3.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 interviews (h) Number of 2 11 11 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 interviews
Table A5 Duration of the first set of interviews
The operations people brought onshore to participate in the Ekofisk II project, had all around 20 years of offshore operational experience. I greatly profited from their offshore experience, which was available onshore during the Ekofisk II design phase. Many of the people I talked to in operations onshore also had considerable offshore operational experience and were well acquainted with offshore working conditions.
Second round of interviews started in January 1996 and lasted well into 1997. Totally, I have 34 interviews from this period. I interviewed the Ekofisk II project manager and the operations representatives at Phillips headquarters in Tananger and Bridging Operation and Design
the two sites of Ekofisk 2/4 X at Umoe Haugesund and Ekofisk 2/4 J at Kvaemer Engineering. The numbers of interviews from my second interviewing period are as follows: Ekofisk Ekofisk PRS Ekofisk II Others Total 2/4 X 2/4 J Management Number of 11 8 6 5 4 34 interviews Number of 12 9 6 5 4 36 people talked to
Table A6 Number of interviews during the second set of interviews.
During the project I continued to meet Phillips ’ operations representative on Ekofisk 2/4 J and Ekofisk 2/4 X. I met the operations representative on 2/4 J six times, and the meetings lasted from two to four hours. We went through the design process at Kvasmer, and he explained his experiences from being involved in the project and the obstacles of bringing operational experience into design.
I had regular contact also with the operations and drilling representatives on Ekofisk 2/4 X. Four times I met the operations representative previously involved in design at AOP, who was then part of the alliance management team. These meetings lasted for one or two hours, and later I called him on the phone to be updated on the Ekofisk 2/4 X development. The same was the case with the drilling supervisor previously involved in the 2/4 X drilling rig design at Hitec. He was part of the commissioning and hook-up team in the alliance organization at Umoe Haugesund. I met him four times, and our meetings lasted from two to four hours. The duration and number of interviews with these three key operations people involved in the Ekofisk II project are as indicated in the table below:
Operations Operations Drilling representative on representative on representative on Ekofisk 2/4 J Ekofisk 2/4 X Ekofisk 2/4 X Number of 6 4 5 interviews Duration of 2.0 2.5 3.5 4.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 2.5 4.0 interviews (h)
-218- Appendix A
2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Table A7 Duration of in-depth interviews with operations personnel
The majority of the interviews during this second round of interviewing lasted for only between one and one and a half hour. Few lasted longer than two hours, as indicated in the table below:
Duration of 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 4.0 interviews (h) Number of 12 2 4 1 1 interviews
Table A8 Duration of interviews during the second set of interviews
Most of the interviews were done without the use of tape recorder. I used a tape recorder for a period of time, but found it more convenient to move around without it. Instead I took detailed and precise notes during the interviews. I tried to write what people literally said, and I managed to get most of it down. Sometimes, if people talked too fast, they had to wait for me to finish writing, and we adapted to each other. This way of doing interviews became more convenient for me than working with the tape recorder. As a rule I consistently wrote down the interviews the same or following day and added my own reflections to the interviews. I carried a portable computer to write down interviews and field notes when doing fieldwork.
In addition to interviews I relied on participatory observation during the Ekofisk 2/4 X fabrication reviews at Umoe Haugesund. I joined the offshore review team in their walk through of the Ekofisk 2/4 X facilities during the fabrication phase, and spent four days together with them. First time was 12-13 February 1996. Second time was 18-19 March 1996. I accompanied the operations people and observed what they were looking for and their reactions to the various design solutions chosen by the project, and we had lunch and several coffee breaks together. I took extensive field notes during these visits. Prior to the fabrication reviews, I spent a few weeks at Phillips headquarters together with the strategic business performance group, and
-219- Bridging Operation and Design
participated on Ekofisk II operations and maintenance work meetings during the summer 1995. These are other participatory observation field data that I have. Other sources of data I relied upon were Ekofisk II project descriptions, site manuals, project schedules, planning documents, contract documents, organizational charts, memos from alliance meetings, Ekofisk II video tapes, and internal Phillips newsletters.
3 Working with the data
I have relied upon a grounded theory perspective to data gathering and analysis. According to Strauss and Corbin (1990) a grounded theory is “inductively derived from the study of the phenomena it represents. That is, it is discovered, developed, and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis of the data pertaining to that phenomenon.” The major difference between this methodology and other approaches to qualitative research is the focus on theory development. Strauss and Corbin (1994) say:
“Grounded theory is a general methodology for developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analyzed. Theory evolves during actual research, and it does this through continuous interplay between analysis and data collection.”
Strauss and Corbin argue that coding of data is the central process by which theories are generated from data. They emphasize the process of labeling phenomena, and discovering, naming, and developing categories as important steps in the analysis. “Once we have identified particular phenomena in data, we can begin to group our concepts around them. This is done to reduce the number of units with which we have to work,” they say (1990). I shall now describe the process of categorizing data material gathered from the Ekofisk II process.
I came to conceptualize operations offshore and design onshore as two different communities-of-practice with different sets of experiences and ways of working and functioning together. The first set of interviews indicated that the barrier between people with a theoretical background onshore and people with a practical background offshore was a central issue in my data. Both onshore and offshore personnel
-220- Appendix A emphasized this to be the main obstacle when trying to communicate across the communities of operations and design. Another factor that stroke me as significantly different was the concepts of time and the rhythm of work offshore and onshore.
In August 1996 I started to go through the interviews in order to code and categorize the data material. I studied each interview in detail and underlined statements I found of particular interest and commented on key issues in the margin. To characterize operations and design was important to better conceptualize these two different communities-of-practice. The way in which people talked about the different “languages ” and “worlds” of operations and design indicated that this was a central category. I was further interested in exploring how to organize the design process in order to take into account operational experience in design, and I found a need for a separate category for this subject. In addition, there was a series of comments related to Phillips as a company that were interesting to follow up on. Through this coding work I ended up with five categories facilitating the further data analysis. They were the following:
• Characteristics of operations offshore • Characteristics of design onshore • Characteristics of languages of operations and design • How to organize the design process? • Characteristics of Phillips
I extracted comments from the interviews together with own comments after the interviews into five separate files. In this way I reduced the data material to a set of five documents when studying these categories in further detail. I continued to work with these documents in order to get a firmer grip of what the data were saying. I went through a regrouping, selection, and subcategorizing process, to get a more compact and convenient format of the data to work with. I used different colors to underline issues that seemed of particular interest or repeatedly mentioned in different ways. I tried to extract the essence of what the data were saying in comments in the margin.
-221 - Bridging Operation and Design
Through this work I realized that ‘organizing the design process’ was a too wide concept that needed to be split into a Ekofisk 2/4 X, Ekofisk 2/4 J, and Ekofisk II part, and a general category of how to organize the design process in order to take into account operational experience in design. It further made sense to transfer the data gathered of the ‘language ’ categoryof operations and design to the two first categories characterizing the communities of operations and design. I regrouped the material into the following six categories:
• Operations experience • Design experience • Ekofisk 2/4 J experience • Ekofisk 2/4 X experience • Ekofisk II and Phillips ’ experience • Organizing operations and design.
Within each of these categories I developed a set of sub-categories and regrouped the data accordingly. This was a very time-consuming work, especially when regrouping individual comments into new sets of documents. I extracted comments characterizing the thinking and practice in the communities of operations offshore and design onshore, and what was essential in work within the two different communities- of-practice. Further, I structured the material into characteristics of the Ekofisk 2/4 J and 2/4 X projects and problems encountered in bringing operational experience into design. I put comments related to the total Ekofisk II process into a separate document. The last category of how to organize design covered comments on imperatives for bridging people in operations and design and new ways of working together for operating companies and contractors. The work from this coding and categorizing formed the basis for further analysis, structuring of the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J case studies, and theory building in the thesis.
-222- Appendix A
4 Trustworthiness
Validity discussions of constructivist, phenomenological research on knowledge creation processes are not easy facilitated by conventional methods on judging the quality of research design and results (see Yin, 1989). Lincoln and Guba (1985), on the other hand, discuss the trustworthiness of qualitative research in relation to the conventional scientific criteria of internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity. They suggest credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability as equivalent terms to these criteria. Credibility and internal validity are seen in relation to truth value; transferability and external validity to applicability; reliability and dependability to consistency; and confirmability and objectivity to neutrality of the research results. Lincoln and Guba suggest five techniques for establishing credibility in qualitative research:
• activities in the field that increase the probability of high credibility (prolonged engagement, persistent observation, and triangulation) • peer debriefing • negative case analysis • referential adequacy • member checks
They see a “thick description” of the research results to ensure transferability, and suggest audits to establish dependability and confirmability. In addition they regard the use of a reflexive journal, a diary research log reported to on day-to-day basis, to be a technique that covers all four criteria mentioned for trustworthiness.
I shall focus on the techniques of prolonged engagement, persistent observation, and triangulation, peer debriefing, member checking, and reflexive journal, in order to discuss the validity of my research results. Lincoln and Guba suggest prolonged engagement as a means to establish credibility through spending sufficient time on the research setting, in order to learn and understand the context, minimize distortions, and build trust, persistent observation in order to sort out inrelevancies and ascertain
-223- Bridging Operation and Design the salient factors of the research context, and triangulation of the data collected by using different sources, methods, and sometimes multiple investigators in the research process. I describe how I used these techniques during my research.
4.1 Prolonged engagement
As previously described I spent several weeks at the headquarters of Phillips Petroleum Company Norway in Tananger. During the fall 1994,1 first met the vice president of Phillips, and later the strategic business performance (SBP) group that I was going to work with. I spent some days together with the SBP group to get familiar with their work. In January 1995 I spent three weeks in the strategic business performance group in order to better understand what this group was working with, become acquainted with the Phillips organization in Tananger and the thinking behind the various organizational change processes in the company. I participated in internal group meetings, had lunch with the people in the SBP group, and a series of conversations with different people in the organization. In June, July, and August I totally spent six weeks at the headquarters in Tananger, and I had a stay of three days offshore on Ekofisk.
During this period I spoke with a number of people from operations (E&P) onshore and offshore and design (E&C) onshore. I kept my base at the strategic business performance group, but the people I talked to during this period worked in other parts of Phillips. I interviewed the operations people participating in the Ekofisk II design project onshore, people in operations and maintenance (operations support) onshore, people in design (E&C) onshore, and operators, operations supervisors, and platform management offshore. Talking to experienced offshore personnel located onshore during the Ekofisk II project was of great advantage to me. I further spent three days offshore on the Ekofisk complex, which was very important in terms of personally experiencing the offshore work setting and facilities. But the time spent offshore was limited due to the offshore safety regulations. It was therefore lucky to have a kind of access to offshore experience through the operations personnel participating in PRS and the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J design projects onshore.
-224- Appendix A
During 1995 and 1996 I did a series of interviews of the offshore personnel located onshore during the project. There were three persons in particular that I had continuous contact with in order to deepen my understanding of the relationship between operations and design and operations’ involvement in the Ekofisk II process. One of them was working full time on the Ekofisk 2/4 J project at Kvaemer Engineering, while two were involved in the Ekofisk 2/4 X design process, one at AOP and the other one at Hitec. We had some long conversations, and they were willing to share their time and experiences with me. Through this communication I was able to become acquainted with the Phillips organization, better understand the difficulties related to integrating operational experience into design, and build trust.
In 19961 continued with fieldwork. I spent two weeks in January interviewing people in the Ekofisk II project at the headquarters in Tananger, the Ekofisk 2/4 X site in Haugesund, and the Ekofisk 2/4 J site in Oslo. The following months I visited the Ekofisk 2/4 X site twice in order to accompany a fabrication review team of offshore personnel, each review lasting two days. I took the role of a participant observer and was well integrated into the group. Through this work I had the opportunity of better grasping some of the characteristics of the offshore community-of-practice and offshore people’s way of relating to each other. I followed up the work at the Umoe Haugesund site and collected Ekofisk II documents and project descriptions and did a few more interviews during the spring. I regarded it important to spent time on the Ekofisk 2/4 X project, since I previously had mainly focused on Ekofisk 2/4 J.
4.2 Persistent observation
In terms of persistent observation and sorting out salient factors in the research setting, the 1995 fieldwork period based on open-ended, unstructured interviews on characteristics of the operations and design communities-of-practice helped me make explicit what I saw as the most problematic factor in the dialogue between operations and design. Through talking to a number of operations and design people onshore and offshore, I felt that the communication barrier between practitioners offshore and
-225-
r- $5*6 Bridging Operation and Design onshore came up again and again. Several times I was struck by these comments, and in my diary I repeatedly mentioned how people expressed frustrations at the gap between practical people in operations offshore and theoretically-minded design people onshore. Among all the obstacles of bringing operational experience into design and the differences between the operations and design communities-of- practice, I extracted the theory/practice dichotomy as the core issue in this context. Through later interviews I talked to some operations and design personnel with both offshore and onshore experience, and they confirmed my interpretation of the situation. One pushed me further in pointing out that maybe more important than the different knowledge background of operations and design personnel, was the will of the operating companies to give priority to operational considerations in design. Still it remains a problem for operations and design to talk to each other, due to the different kinds of knowledge of operations and design, even when the will is there. The engineering and project knowledge of design seemed to be valued to a greater extent than operational knowledge, and communication between these two communities-of-practice often failed because of this lack of respect and understanding of knowledge in operations. I therefore ended up highlighting the importance of increased respect for practical, tacit operational knowledge in order to open up for operational effective solutions in designs.
4.3 Triangulation
I further employee triangulation in order to improve the probability that my findings and interpretations would be found credible. Through my interviews I talked to a number of persons in operations offshore and onshore, and design onshore; engineers and operations personnel. I had the opportunity of verifying and checking out information that came up through the process with other operations and design people. I could check out information given by operators offshore with operations engineers, or information given offshore by sources onshore and vice versa. As I had contact with several people with long offshore experience, I could check out the information with the different respondents as I went along. I also interviewed operations and design personnel in two other operating companies and in one engineering company,
-226- Appendix A
to check out my findings in the Ekofisk II project with the experiences of operating and engineering companies on other large-scale platform design projects. Again, what proved to be particularly helpful was talking to personnel with both onshore and offshore experience. They could verify or question comments both from the operations and design communities-of-practice.
In addition to triangulation in terms of using different sources, I also used the concept of triangulation by different methods of data collection. Through the process I gathered a substantial amount of written documents, memos from internal meetings, internal news journals and handouts, and research reports. I collected this kind of data material from the Ekofisk II project, from the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J project, and other Phillips projects relevant to my study. Through these documents I could get acquainted with the work processes going on and relate and compare this information to the data gathered through the methods of interviewing and participatory observation.
4.4 Peer debriefing
I was lucky to have a number of occasions and opportunities for peer debriefing, to clarify my research focus and to develop a set of research questions, discuss and explore new theory constructions, discuss methodological designs, probe biases, and discuss my findings and my interpretations of them. As part of the INPRO research and Ph.D. program I profited from a series of meetings designed for testing out and developing research questions, theory building, and interpreting the results of every INPRO candidate. We were totally nine Ph.D. candidates from three different departments of the Norwegian University of Science and Technology and five senior researchers and professors gathered in the research group. During the program each candidate presented their research problem and findings to the group. We set aside special days and weekend seminars to give proper feedback, one of the objectives being to develop an “INPRO perspective ” as part of the work, i.e. to integrate perspectives of the other disciplines in the program and take a step outside our own scientific community-of-practice.
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It was interesting to get feedback from and to discuss operations, design, and organizational theory with people from engineering cybernetics and chemical engineering. It was also very useful to compare my data from the Ekofisk II project of Phillips with data of the other Ph.D. candidates from their respective companies and research settings. I could thereby relate my focus on operations and design not only to offshore operations and platform design, but to operations of onshore process industry as well. I gained insight into issues of pulp and paper production, aluminum and nickel production, pharmaceutical industry, and socio-technical change processes in the electro-metallurgic industry in Norway. We were two candidates linked to the offshore industry, and we were comparing data and give each other feedback on more detailed levels.
In addition to formal feedback within the INPRO-group, there was a series of informal lunch meetings where questions could be brought up and ideas presented. My focus on operations versus design partly stems from such a lunch meeting among the INPRO candidates where the question “What is operations?” was on the agenda. After a presentation and long discussion one of the candidates concluded “Operations are operations.” But things were not that easy. Operations also imply design, others argued. We ended the discussion there, but two weeks later my research focus ended up being the relationship between operations and design, in accordance with the interests of Phillips and INPRO.
In addition to the debriefing sessions within the INPRO group we had a separate session within the group of INPRO candidates at the Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management. On a couple of occasions we came together to present our findings and theoretical perspectives. It was very useful to have this kind of dialogue within your own field of knowledge as a supplement to the interdisciplinary perspective of the INPRO group. Besides the formal debriefing session coordinated by our advisor, we regularly met to discuss our work in informal settings. We were physically located close to each other. It was therefore easy to communicate and discuss with the other INPRO candidates in Trondheim.
-228- Appendix A
There were also three other Ph.D. candidates at our department working on issues closely related to my research topic. One was looking at the implementation of ergonomic criteria in large-scale engineering design, another one was studying approaches to experience transfer in the offshore oil industry, and the third one was doing research in knowledge creation across companies. It was useful for us to meet and discuss our results and check out each other ’s experiences and interpretation of results.
4.5 Members check
Lincoln and Cuba argue that member checks the most important technique in establishin g credibility. They say: “The member check, whereby data, analytic categories, interpretations, and conclusions are tested with members of those stakeholding groups from whom the data were originally collected, is the most crucial technique for establishing credibility.”
On two occasions my advisors and I met Phillips in formal feedback sessions to discuss findings and focus on further research. The vice president of Phillips and the strategic business performance manager participated in both these meetings. At the first meeting Phillips expressed their interest in the relationship between operations and design, which corresponded well with the interests of INPRO. At the second meeting the following fall, I presented data from my interviews and my focus on bridging practical knowledge in operations and theoretical knowledge in design and on how to structure and systematize operational experience. Phillips agreed with this approach and indicated especially their interest in the question of how to structure operational experience. Later I interviewed and discussed the development of my research work with them.
As I had continuous dialogue with a few operations people involved in the Ekofisk II project, I repeatedly tested out my theories, interpretations, and research question with them. As I focused my research questions, I tested out my thinking on them. As
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previously mentioned, there were three people in particular that I worked with in this way. They were interested in what I was doing and willingly commented on it. We established a good link, and I felt free to check out my interpretations on them. They agreed to go through the final draft on case description of the Ekofisk II process and give feedback on it. In September 1997 1 sent drafts of the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J case description for a member check to the operations representatives involved in design at Kvaemer, AOP, and Hitec, and to the project managers at the 2/4 X and 2/4 J sites at Kvaemer and AOP. They approved of my interpretations and description and added valuable comments which I included in the final version of the thesis.
4.6 Use of reflexive journal
Cuba and Lincoln (1985) outline “thick description” as a technique to establish transferability of results. They argue that qualitative researchers can only “provide the thick description necessary to enable someone interested in making a transfer to reach a conclusion about whether transfer can be contemplated as a possibility.” A qualitative researcher ’s task is to provide the data base that makes transferability judgments possible for potential appliers, they say. I have applied this technique in presenting my data and provided a thick description including a number of quotations from my data material. It is thereby up to the reader to judge to what extent my findings are applicable in another context.
Another technique in establishing trustworthiness outlined by Lincoln and Guba is the reflexive journal. Through my work I took daily notes of observations, experiences, and reflections in a research diary of mine. It consists of observations, reflections, and thinking in terms of theory development, methodological design, integration of theory and empirical findings, and other issues. When doing fieldwork, I brought with me a portable computer and continued the practice of writing daily in the diary. I communicated with my diary and reflected on experiences during the day. Later it was convenient to go back and see where I was, what happened, how I felt, and what I was thinking at a particular time. I gave to my advisor extracts of the diary, together with reflections made after each interview during a fieldwork period, in order for him
-230- Appendix A to give proper feedback on my work. The practice of writing down reflections after each interview was a technique I felt comfortable with. It helped me figure out what I learned from each interview in particular and to be explicit as to my experience of the interview and the interpretation of what was being said.
4.7 Concluding remarks on the quality of the data
I have discussed the concepts of Cuba and Lincoln (1985) of prolonged engagement, persistent observation, triangulation, peer-debriefing, member check, and use of reflexive journal when evaluating the quality of my research. Strauss and Corbins ’s work on “grounded theory” (1990) has guided the process of gathering data, analysis, and theory building.
In terms of prolonged engagement, I spent considerable time at the headquarters of Phillips Petroleum Company Norway in Tananger. I further spent much time at the Ekofisk 2/4 J engineering site at Kvasmer and the Ekofisk 2/4 X fabrication site at Umoe Haugesund to better understand the process of bringing operational experience into account in design. In addition, I spent a few days offshore on the Ekofisk Complex to get acquainted with the offshore operational setting. To some extent, my data are biased towards operations. I have been less involved in the design community-of-practice.
Onshore, I had the opportunity to talk to the operations personnel involved in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and the Ekofisk 2/4 J projects. We met several times during the two year period of time. I was able sort of what I meant were the salient factors in the context of bringing operational experience into design. I investigated in depth the questions that emerged in this contexts of bridging knowledge of operations and design. I used the method of triangulation to check data with different respondents in operations or design, offshore and onshore. I profited greatly from having access to the offshore experience of the Ekofisk II personnel brought onshore. These techniques of prolonged engagement, persistent observation, and triangulation, account for the credibility of my findings and my interpretations of them.
-231 - Bridging Operation and Design
Being part of the INPRO program, I had the opportunity to discuss my findings and my interpretations of them and probe biases with Ph.D. candidates and faculty from three different departments, i.e. Engineering Cybernetics, Chemical Engineering, and Industrial Economics and Technology Management. Formal feedback sessions were arranged in the. In addition, I exposed my work to the Ph.D. candidates of the Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management in both formal and informal sessions. These peer debriefing activities provided opportunities to develop my research questions and interpretations.
Continuous member checking played an important role in my research. Lincoln and Cuba see the technique of member checking as the most important one in establishing credibility. I had the chance to regularly meet the key operations and project personnel involved in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and the Ekofisk 2/4 J projects. I discussed my findings and my interpretations of the data with them. They read through the final drafts, commented on them, and were happy with what I wrote. We agreed that it was a good presentation of the Ekofisk 2/4 X and the Ekofisk 2/4 J projects. This kind of member checking with the operations and design people involved in the Ekofisk 2/4 X and Ekofisk 2/4 J projects is important in terms of credibility of the data.
I have provided a thick description of my findings to ensure transferability of the data. There is a rich gathering of statements from the interviews performed during my fieldwork. This enables the reader to make this or her own transferability judgments. I have not performed any formal dependability or confirmability audit to ensure dependability and confirmability of my research. However, I have made use of a reflexive journal on a daily basis, providing information about research activities, my own reflections and methodological decisions. This technique has application to all four areas of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability to ensure trustworthiness of my findings.
-232- Appendix B The INPRO program
My Ph.D. work is part of the INPRO program (Integrated Production Systems for the Process Industries), a research and Ph.D. program at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), focusing on plant operations in the process industries. The program was launched in 1994, will run until 1998 and is sponsored by the Norwegian Science Foundation, the Federation of Process and Manufacturing Industries (PIL), the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF), and the participating companies.
The objectives of the INPRO program is to develop knowledge of operations of process plants and to be a resource center for the Norwegian process industry. The main goals have been to:
• educate Ph.D. candidates (Dr.ing.) with a comprehensive understanding of complex production systems, • develop multidisciplinary expertise in order to be a resource center for the Norwegian process industries, and • develop expertise in the Norwegian process industries, in dialogue with educational and research institutions, enabling continual and multidisciplinary approaches to operations of process plants.
The INPRO program is an interdisciplinary research initiative between three different departments at NTNU, the Department of Chemical Engineering, the Department of Engineering Cybernetics, and the Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management. Totally, there are nine Ph.D. candidates and five professors and post-graduate researchers from these three disciplines forming the program. Each Ph.D. candidate has been linked to one particular company through the research.
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The following companies are the industrial partners of the INPRO program, and are all major companies within the Norwegian process industry onshore and offshore:
• Hydro Aluminium Sunndal (aluminium production) • Borregaard ChemCell (chemical pulp production) • Statoil UoP, Gullfaks (offshore oil production) • Statoil Tjeldbergodden (methanol production) • Elkem Fiskaa (silicon/ferroalloy production) • Falconbridge Nikkelverk (nickel production) • Nycomed Imaging (pharmaceutical production) • Phillips Petroleum Co. Norway (offshore oil production) • Norske Skog Tofte Industries (chemical pulp production)
Each Ph.D. candidate develops his/her thesis in cooperation with the affiliated company. Five candidates have their home base at the Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management, while two candidates are situated at the Department of Chemical Engineering and two at the Department of Engineering Cybernetics. All will defend their thesis at their own departments, satisfying the requirements in their respective disciplines. However, much work has been done across the various disciplines during the project. Courses on operations of process plants have been designed and held especially for the group, and joint seminars on a regular basis have been part of the program. In addition, seminars have been held at the university and in the participating companies on themes like “Strategies for centralizing plant operations,” “Technology transfer from research to plant operation,” and “Operation and design of process plants” (Foss, Kiev, Levin, Lien, 1995).
A follow-up of the program is already planned. From 1998, specialization within the area of operations of process plants will be offered as part of the engineering education at NTNU. There will also be offered a graduate operations management program for experienced operations managers in the process industries, and a set of new Ph.D. candidates will be coming in.
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