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CYBERCRIME PRECURSORS: TOWARDS A MODEL OF OFFENDER RESOURCES A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of The Australian National University Ki Hong (Steve) Chon June, 2016 Declaration This thesis is a presentation of my original research work. Wherever contributions of others are involved, every effort is made to indicate clearly, with due reference to the literature, and acknowledgement of collaborative research and discussions. I authorise Australian National University to lend this thesis to other institutions for the purpose of examination. Student’s signature: Date: June 28, 2016 The work was done under the guidance of Professor Roderic Broadhurst at the Australian National University. In my capacity as supervisor of the candidate’s thesis, I certify that the above statements are true to the best of my knowledge. Supervisor’s signature: Date: i Abstract This thesis applies Ekblom and Tilley’s concept of offender resources to the study of criminal behaviour on the Internet. Offender predispositions are influenced by situational, that is the environmental incentives to commit crime. This thesis employs non-participation observation of online communities involved in activities linked to malicious forms of software. Actual online conversations are reproduced, providing rich ethnographic detail of activities that have taken place between 2008 and 2012 from eight discussion forums where malicious software and cases of hacking are openly discussed among actors. A purposeful sample of key frontline cybercrime responders (N=12) were interviewed about crimeware and their views of the activity observed in the discussion forums. Based on the empirical data, this thesis tests a number of criminological theories and assesses their relative compatibility with social interactions occurring in various online forum sites frequented by persons interested in the formation and use of malicious code. The thesis illustrates three conceptual frameworks of offender resources, based on different criminological theories. The first model ties ‘offender resources’ to the actual offender, suggesting that certain malicious software and its associated activities derive from the decisions, knowledge and abilities of the individual agent. The second model submits that ‘offender resources’ should be viewed more as a pathway leading to offending behaviour that must be instilled and then indoctrinated over a length of time through social interaction with other offenders. The third model emphasises the complex relationships that constitute or interconnect with ‘offender resources’ such as the nexus of relevant social groups and institutions in society. These include the Internet security industry, the law, and organised crime. Cybercrime is facilitated by crimeware, a specific type of computer software, and a focus on this element can help better understand how cybercrime evolves. ii Table of Contents Declaration ....................................................................................................................................... i Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii List of Tables .................................................................................................................................. v List of Figures ................................................................................................................................ v List of Cases .................................................................................................................................... v List of Articles ................................................................................................................................ v Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... vi Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Overview ................................................................................................................................................................ 1 1.2 Definition of Key Concepts ............................................................................................................................. 6 1.3 The Research Problem ..................................................................................................................................... 11 1.4 Summary of Chapters ...................................................................................................................................... 16 Chapter 2: Cybercrime and Theory ...................................................................................... 18 2.1 Dangers of the Internet .................................................................................................................................... 18 2.2 Perceptions of Cybercrime ............................................................................................................................. 19 2.3 From Hackers to Cybercriminals ................................................................................................................. 21 2.4 Social Dynamics of Cybercrime .................................................................................................................. 24 2.5 A Microcosm of Cybercrime Activity ....................................................................................................... 29 2.6 Facilitation, Precipitation and Enablement of Cybercrime ................................................................. 31 2.7 The Causes of Crime ........................................................................................................................................ 34 2.8 Crime Follows Opportunity ........................................................................................................................... 39 2.9 Crime Through Association ........................................................................................................................... 42 2.10 Crime and Society .......................................................................................................................................... 45 2.11 Using Routine Activity Theory to Explore Offender Resources .................................................... 49 Chapter 3: Methodology ........................................................................................................... 52 3.1 Foundations and Assumptions ...................................................................................................................... 52 3.2 Revisiting the Research Questions .............................................................................................................. 55 3.3 Starting the Research and Background ...................................................................................................... 56 3.4 Non-participant Observation of Web Forum Sites ................................................................................ 58 3.5 Interviews with First Responders ................................................................................................................ 67 3.6 Qualitative Analysis of Electronic Data .................................................................................................... 69 3.7 Examples to Provide Context ........................................................................................................................ 72 3.8 Ethical Considerations ..................................................................................................................................... 72 3.9 Addressing Limitations ................................................................................................................................... 74 3.10 Towards a Feasible Model for Offender Resources ............................................................................ 77 Chapter 4: Crime Through Association ................................................................................ 79 4.1 Nature and Modes of Interactions in Online Communities ................................................................ 80 4.2 The Novice, Noobs and Newbies ................................................................................................................ 84 4.3 Basic Elements of Learning ........................................................................................................................... 88 4.4 Learning Contributors ..................................................................................................................................... 94 4.5 Learning Detractors ....................................................................................................................................... 100 4.6 The Relevance of Social Structures and Organisation ....................................................................... 105 4.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 112 iii Chapter 5: The Intersection of Rational Choice and Crimeware ................................. 114 5.1 Attributes ..........................................................................................................................................................
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