SOCIETY AS INSULATION the Origins of Control Theory
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CHAPTER FIVE SOCIETY AS INSULATION The Origins of Control Theory he most important step in the solution to a problem, the- T oretical or otherwise, lies in asking the right questions about it. The proper formulation of the problem often may make the answer obvious. At the very least, asking the right question in the right way will contribute greatly to a solu- tion. Asking the wrong question, or asking the right question in the wrong way, will result in no progress at all, although there may be an illusion of getting somewhere. Unfortunately, the first step also usually is the most dif- ficult one. Not only does it require a thorough understand- ing of the nature of the situation with which one is faced, but it also demands the capacity to think about it in new and creative ways. Because one is not likely to ask questions about aspects of the situation that one takes for granted, different Courtesy of American Society Criminology Courtesy of of criminologists have been led to see very different questions Walter C. Reckless as the key to an understanding of crime and delinquency. 1899–1988 Ohio State University What one takes for granted needs no explanation, but what Author of Containment Theory one takes for granted depends on assumptions—in this case, assumptions about human nature and social order. Most criminologists have taken conformity for granted as part of the natural order of things and have concentrated on trying to explain the “crime problem.” As we have seen, they have found their explanations in spirits and demons; in theories tracing the nonconformity to individual factors such as biological abnormalities or personality defects; or in theories tracing the nonconformity to social factors such as social disorganization, subcultural traditions, and inequality of opportunity, all of these being factors presumed to operate so as to distort the natural order of conformity. But is conformity really the natural order of things? To what extent should it be taken for granted? By the time a person is a certain age, he or she speaks a certain language shared by others, drives a car in general obedience to traffic regulations, avoids urination or defecation in public, and in most other ways “goes along.” All this tends to be taken for granted, but the evidence indicates that it is not at all “natural” (Davis, 1948). In fact, great effort is expended by parents, teachers, and the individual involved in a concerted attempt to produce these results. Viewed in this way, all of this conformity is a striking thing much in need of explanation. That is the focus of control theory, which takes the position that because conformity cannot be taken for granted, nonconformity such as crime and delinquency is to be expected when social controls are less than completely effective. In this sense, control theory is not so much a theory of deviance as a theory of conformity. It does not ask the question, “Why do people commit crimes and acts of delinquency?” Rather, it suggests that crime and delinquency are going to occur unless people conform to all of the social 86 demands placed on them and then asks, “Why do people conform?” That is, if crime is gratifying— fun, exciting, physically enjoyable, emotionally satisfying, and/or materially rewarding—why don’t individuals just break the law? From this perspective on human nature and social order, the poten- tial gratifications offered by crime and delinquency will be resisted only when sociocultural controls are operating effectively to prevent such behavior. Control theory has been at the center of American criminology for the better part of a century—so much so that we devote two chapters to this perspective. Much of its appeal is the sim- plicity of its main theoretical premise: When controls are present, crime does not occur; when con- trols are absent, crime is possible and often does occur. Except for the fact that control and crime can be measured independently and the strength of the relationship assessed empirically, there is a tautological quality to this thesis: The very existence of crime seems to be persuasive evidence that controls have been rendered ineffective. Although the organizing premise of control theory is simple—no control permits crime—the perspectives that fall under the umbrella of the control paradigm offer a complex view of how con- trol is linked to criminal conduct. In this chapter, we explore the thinking of early control theorists, selecting those scholars whose work still resonates today. These include Albert Reiss’s insights on personal and social controls, F. Ivan Nye’s work on family controls, Walter Reckless’s influential containment theory, Gresham Sykes and David Matza’s revelations about techniques of neutraliza- tion, and Matza’s extension of that collaboration into his theory of delinquency and drift. In Chapter 6, we chiefly explore the work of Travis Hirschi, arguably the most influential criminologist of the past half century. Hirschi developed two dominant control perspectives: first his social bond theory and then, in conjunction with Michael Gottfredson, self-control theory. We also consider some more recent variants of control theory that present more complex ideas on how control is implicated in crime and delinquency: Hagan’s power-control theory, Tittle’s control bal- ance theory, and Colvin’s differential coercion theory. Finally, at the end of Chapter 6, we review the policy implications of control theory. Before embarking on this excursion across control theory, however, we first examine some forerunners of modern control theory. As in Chapters 3 and 4, here we stress the significance of the work of Durkheim and the Chicago school. Both bodies of work remain rich sources of ideas about both human nature and social order. It is not surprising to find that they also contributed much to the reconsideration of the basic assumptions about the relationship between human nature and social order. This marked the development of control theory. FORERUNNERS OF CONTROL THEORY Durkheim’s Anomie Theory The origins of contemporary control theories of crime and delinquency are to be found in part in the work of French sociologist Émile Durkheim, in the same body of theory that inspired Merton’s analysis of anomie as a source of crime (see Chapter 4). Durkheim’s work was a product of the late 19th century, a period that had seen dramatic social change in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. He described anomie not simply as “normlessness” but as the more or less complete collapse of social solidarity itself, the destruction of the fundamental bonds uniting individuals in a collective social order so that each person is forced to go it alone. Technological change had combined with the rise of capitalism, and the old world of agrarian society, in which farmers and herders lived simply in face- to-face relationships with interests in common, was rapidly giving way to a more complex, urban, technologically sophisticated social system. The sense of community was being eroded; the large extended family consisting of many relatives working together was being torn apart and replaced with the new nuclear family of parents alone with their children, and the pace of life was accelerating with an increasing division of labor separating different individuals into occupational specialties. CHAPTER FIVE • SocIETY as INsuLatION 87 Describing London in 1844, Karl Marx’s friend and collaborator, Friedrich Engels, painted the picture as follows: The restless and noisy activity of the crowded streets is highly distasteful and is surely abhorrent to human nature itself. Hundreds of thousands of men and women drawn from all classes and ranks of society pack the streets of London. Yet they rush past each other as if they had nothing in common. They are tacitly agreed on one thing only—that everyone should keep to the right of the pavement so as not to collide with the stream of people moving in the opposite direction. No one even thinks of sparing a glance for his neighbors in the streets. We know well enough that this isolation of the individual—this narrow-minded egotism—is everywhere the fundamental principle of modern society. (cited in Josephson & Josephson, 1962, p. 32) As we will see in Chapter 8, Marx and Engels saw this situation as a consequence of the underlying economic shifts that had generated capitalism. Writing in France later in the century, Durkheim disagreed. For him, the moral order was more fundamental than the economic order. The idea of social solidarity can be said to represent almost a religion to Durkheim (1893/1933): Everything which is a source of solidarity is moral, everything which forces man to take account of other men is moral, everything which forces him to regulate his conduct through something other than the striving of his ego is moral, and morality is as solid as these ties are numerous and strong. (p. 398) The Importance of Integration and Regulation. In Durkheim’s (1897/1951) view, social solidar- ity was maintained by two distinct sets of social functions: those involving integration and those involving regulation. Integration was described as a state of cohesion amounting to a common “faith” sustained by collective beliefs and practices leading to strong social bonds and the sub- ordination of self to a common cause. For Durkheim, collective activity was what gave purpose and meaning to life. When integrative functions failed, the “collective force of society” was weak- ened, “mutual moral support” was eroded, and there was a “relaxation of social bonds” leading to extreme individualism (pp. 209–214). Whereas Durkheim (1897/1951) saw integration as the sum of various social forces of attraction that drew people together, regulation was considered to be the sum of those forces of constraint that bound individuals to norms.