Canadian Military History Volume 14 Issue 3 Article 5 2005 The Technique of the Assault: The Canadian Army on D-Day: After-Action Reports by Commanders Canadian Army Commanders Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Canadian Army Commanders "The Technique of the Assault: The Canadian Army on D-Day: After-Action Reports by Commanders." Canadian Military History 14, 3 (2005) This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : Technique of the Assault The Technique of the Assault The Canadian Army on D-Day After-action reports by commanders Comments on Operation Overlord (3) Brigade Group exercises with a naval by Major-General R.F.L. Keller, CBE, force, with and without fire support. General Officer Commanding (4) Even larger-scale exercises with 3rd Canadian Infantry Division full fire support against realistically constructed enemy beach sectors, as given to Historical Officer, 21 June 1944 stressing the practice, once ashore, of getting rapidly inland to widen the early one year was devoted to the training beachhead to that of a covering position. Nand preparations of the Canadian assault division and to the formulating of the assault It will be obvious that the third and fourth teams, right down to that of the smallest stages required close liaison – indeed the actual formation. One can cite, for instance, the use of physical co-operation – of both naval and air mock-up craft, taped out, or built of galvanized components. Despite the current operational iron, burlap screens and forms six foot folding, tasks of the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, this representing the starboard, port and keel benches was achieved. of a Landing Craft Assault (LCA), the use of scrambling nets, the practice of getting from the At this time it was apparent that special assault deck of a Landing Craft Infantry (LCI) into a LCA, equipment was necessary and this was indeed the marriage, so to speak, of the recce element of provided, e.g. on the Army side, self-propelled the beach groups (the speedy developments of the artillery, both field and anti-tank, Duplex Drive beaches to take vehicles, wheeled and tracked), (DD) or “swimming” tanks, armoured assault and the assault brigades, the co-ordination of engineers, i.e. Churchills with petards, bridges, Forward Observation Officers (FOO) and Forward fascines, etc., flails mounted on Shermans for Officer Bombardment (FOB) so that artillery the destruction of mines, assault ladders, mine support both from what artillery had been landed detectors, special marking tapes and signs, and what artillery was still seaborne could be shaped charges, waterproof covers for certain quickly brought down wherever the infantry weapons, including the rifle, the waterproofing might be held up. of vehicles to enable them to wade in the surf and still not destroy their electrical circuits. The There were four distinct phases of training, Royal Navy produced the rocket craft, and the patiently and devotedly carried out: seaborne multiple mortar or bombard, known as the “Hedgerow”. By patient trial and experiments, (1) The preliminary phase, done mainly and under varying conditions of sea, tide, light, in South England; wherever the battalions etc., proficiency in shooting the self-propelled or regiments were quartered, with mock- artillery and Royal Navy fire support craft from up craft, practice scaling ladders, small the sea was attained. Wireless sets, sometimes assault courses, etc. carried by hand and sometimes mounted on light go-carts, were also fitted with devices to sustain (2) Basic training, i.e. combined immersion in seawater. Even special sea-sick operations in Scotland on a company, pills for personnel were produced, tried and squadron and battery level. found of value. All assault personnel were taken © Canadian Military History, Volume 14, Number 3, Summer 2005, pp.57-70. 57 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2005 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 5 Photo by Frank L. Dubervill, Library and Archives Canada PA 115544 Archives Canada PA Photo by Frank L. Dubervill, Library and Major-General R.F.L. Keller addresses personnel of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, Normandy, 6 June 1944. to sea and kept at sea in all weathers in order to covered them. The DD tanks, of whom only less make them seaworthy and conversant with naval than half swam in (the rest were carried in and procedure. In fact, by May 1944, 3 Canadian landed on the beaches direct from Landing Craft Division could well have been described as being Tanks (LCT)) were also slightly late in touching “web-footed.” down and slightly less than half of those that swam were drowned or otherwise lost. Throughout these arduous months the highest team spirit was engendered in the But, by and large, the mechanics of the assault force, not, repeat, not in water-tight assault and the lines along which we had trained, compartments, such as infantry, artillery, naval did work, i.e., the DD tanks touched down and crews, etc., but on the principle that all members remained touched down, hull-down in sea, and of the team help each other, and that all teams engaged by direct fire what beach guns they could assist other teams, with the rough objective, see. Approximately fifteen minutes later (i.e., ten first that every fighting soldier be landed with minutes late) the AVRE teams in LCTs touched his arms, ammunition and equipment on the down (H-hour) and straightaway began to make enemy’s shore, and secondly, that he got across for and prepare selected exits. At the same time the beaches quickly to the designated objective Royal Marine Armoured Support Squadron or objectives. (RMAS) and special obstacle-clearance sappers, together in LCTs, touched down. The RMAS had In the actual assault the weather was far a Centaur tank, mounting a 95 mm gun, designed from ideal and the distance to be travelled in to give the infantry close support until such time the dark with a considerable sea running caused as the self-propelled artillery was able to land. certain elements of craft carrying Armoured This was expected to be 1.5 to 5.5 hours later. Vehicles Royal Engineers (AVRE) and DD tanks The little Royal Navy hedgerows, just prior to to get into the wrong swept channels westward this, were to release their bombs, so as by blast to of the main assault force. By cool and skillful create a lane through the beach obstacles, but in instructors the Commodore commanding Force some cases the sea was too rough for them. The J recovered these lost craft, but this caused them assaulting infantry companies landed from LCAs to be rather late in touching down; consequently, – five such craft being allotted to each company fewer obstacles were cleared away on the beaches – three assault companies to the west of and than was hoped, as by this time the tide rose and including Courseulles-sur-Mer and two assault 58 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol14/iss3/5 2 : Technique of the Assault companies immediately east of Courseulles-sur- devastating effect on those areas of the beach on Mer; on the left brigade sector two companies which their fire fell. All of the assault infantry opposite Bernières-sur-Mer and two companies of 7 and 8 Brigades were carried in LCAs with again on their left. Battalion Headquarters in LCHs. The reserve brigade was carried complete in LCI(L)s and 4th During the run-in the Royal Air Force gave us Special Service Brigade, less No.3 Commando, 100% fighter cover. The effects of the previous in LCI(S)s. night-bombing were visible during the darkness on the morning of D-Day and well after first Even with the inevitable things going wrong light. Naval destroyers and gunfire gave accurate – which was expected – the mechanics of the and sustained fire support. The self-propelled assault did work according to plan and the artillery put on the best shoot that they ever did immediate beachhead objectives, which were the on the four areas pre-selected for them, firing beach lateral roads from excluding la Riviere to from roughly 10-9,000 yards out until they include St. Aubin-sur-Mer, were secured by 1000 were 3,000 yards off-shore. The rockets fired – 1030 hours. from 3,500-3,000 yards off-shore, creating a * * * * * 59 Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2005 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2005 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 14 [2005], Iss. 3, Art. 5 Comments by Brigadier H.F. Foster, infantry, fully two hours were spent preparing Commander, 7th Canadian exits, in the absence of the sappers. In his own sector, Brigadier Foster observed, men of the Infantry Brigade Royal Winnipeg Rifles with their own sappers, assisted later by AVRE personnel, succeeded by as given to Historical Officer, 22 June 1944 dint of great toil in preparing a road through the boggy ground beyond the dunes, even making use 7 Canadian Infantry Brigade of paling flung over a tank which had sunk far in the Assault and the into the muck. By driving heavy vehicles over it Achievement of its Objective a firm foundation was provided and a primitive but usable exit was constructed. 1. The weather was most unkind and very nearly disastrous to the mounting of the assault. There 4. Once the tanks were able to leave the beach were two major results of this inclemency: and move inland they fought fiercely and were of enormous help to the infantry.