Threat Perceptions and Scenarios for EU Security and Defense

Outcomes Report of the Mercator European Dialogue Workshop Brussels – 9 July 2018 Text: Marcin Buzanski

Editor Dr. Thanos Dokos | ELIAMEP Caspar Kolster | GMF

July 2018

Copyright German Marshall Fund of the United States Voßstraße 20, 10117 Berlin | www.gmfus.org THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND SCENARIOS FOR EU SECURITY & DEFENCE 1

On 10 July 2018, a group of 17 Members of prospects for EU integration). Parliament from across Europe met at the King Baudouin Foundation’s headquarters in Brussels Recent developments in EU’s Common Security on the sidelines of the NATO summit. The meeting and Defence were presented by Minhea Motoc– was dedicated to exploring the national parliamen- Deputy Head of the European Political Strategy tarians’ perspective on threat perceptions, and to Centre (European Commission’s think tank), and co-developing scenarios for European security and by General Michail Kostarakos, Chairman of the defense politics. A number of high-ranking expert European Union Military Committee (CEUMC). speakers joined the conversation to substantiate it The officials discussed the establishment of the with the newest insights from NATO, the European Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); the intitutions and think tanks. launch of the European Defence Fund (EDF), the potential for joint research and capability projects, as well as for better synchronization of EU defence planning. They made a clear plea for EXPERT VIEWS AND CONVERSATIONS Member States to work together more effectively, and to achieve a viable compromise among their internal political differences. A good example of The workshop was an opportunity for participat- potential for acceleration of collaboration in the ing members of parliament, as well as experts, to area of Common Security and Defence was the discuss key risks and opportunities for the EU’s “military Schengen”, for improved military mobili- Common Security and Defence Policy and the ty on the continent, by taking down physical, legal future of NATO. It was a chance for MPs to talk and regulatory barriers. about perceptions in their own countries of main threats to security and to share views on defence priorities, as well as ideas for communicating The session “Qvo vadis NATO” focused on the with constituencies about these important policy future of NATO in a multipolar world. It included areas. a presentation by guest expert - Stefanie Babst, Head of the Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC) for the NATO Secretary General and the Chairman The meeting provided MPs with the opportunity of the Military Committee, followed by reflections to deepen their understanding of security and from Ian Lesser, Director GMF Brussels Office. defence trends and emerging issues, as well as The discussions focused on directions for NATO to learn about approaches and views from their in the current international environment, the peers in other countries. Importantly, the discus- greatest challenges ahead and recommendations sion also revolved around ways to build closer to overcome them. The subject of strengthening relations among EU member states to address NATO-EU relations was raised, including challeng- common security challenges and to strengthen es and opportunities in that relationship. Among collaboration towards stronger EU capabilities in the greatest challenges where NATO needs to in- the sectors of security and defence. creasingly direct its attention, relations with China and the cyber-sphere were mentioned. It was also Prominent guest speakers at the workshop gave pointed out that NATO is no longer sleep-walking their input on recent crises along the EU’s bor- about the increased threat from Russia. An effort ders, the transatlantic relationship and the current was also made to calm anxieties about US poli- state of NATO, as well as the state of the EU Com- cies, claiming that frictions are more part of the mon Security and Defence Policy. showmanship in the context of populist policies, but that the foundations of the transatlantic alli- The opening of the workshop included a presen- ance remain firm. tation by Maciej Popowski, Director General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotia- “ The nexus between external and internal se- tions at the European Commission. The speaker gave an overview of threats and trends impact- curity is where the EU can bring added value ing on EU security, particularly in Southern and - so the question is how well we are equipping Eastern neighbourhoods. Several themes were discussed, including relations with Turkey, the sit- ourselves to address this challenge. ” uation in Libya and more broadly in North Africa and relations with the Western Balkans (including 2 SCENARIOS FOR EU SECURITY & DEFENSE The scenario-building exercise built on a set of triggers and trends that participants believed to have a particular influence on security and defense policy.

Triggers Several triggers were identified to be on the watch list – tween the two powers at the South China Sea; for having a large impact. Despite low probability, they could happen, having significant consequences for EU • In Eastern Europe, potential incidents with Russia, in- security. cluding aggression against the Baltic States, hybrid activities involving “green men” and local minorities • An unlikely, but major threat is US revision of en- used to steer secessionist tendencies; gagement in NATO, with possible scenarios of either steady withdrawal from Europe, or a more abrupt • Return to open warfare in Western Balkans – a situ- instance of failing to act on article 5 commitments, ation that could be encouraged by Russia should the during an aggression; process of integration with the EU accelerate;

• Relations with Turkey have been ranked as having • A wide-scale cyber-attack in a NATO country (most major impact. Although considered as of rather low likely CEE or Baltics) resulting in significant damage probability, concerns about the collapse of the deal to state infrastructure; with EU regarding migration have been raised, as well as predictions about a rocky future for Turkey-NATO A major disaster – man made or natural- is not a high relations, including a possibility of Turkey leaving • probability event but cannot be ruled out (also taking NATO (or being expelled); climate change into account). Hence, it is important to be prepared to deal with a nuclear incident, a pan- • Escalation of tensions between the US and China has demic or an act of biological terrorism or an ecolog- been another significant risk identified, particularly a ical disaster. situation that could lead to military confrontation be-

Trends Several trends were reviewed and identified as highly like- • Military spending in the EU will not match the speed ly to continue having a strong impact on the future of EU of other powers’ military modernization and growth, security and defence planning and capabilities; China’s in particular.

• Participants identified high risks of turbulence in the • Despite recent efforts, there will be continuing sus- international security environment, given intensify- picion towards and slow collaboration of EU member ing global competition, but also changing US global states on defence, through mechanisms like PESCO; strategy and transatlantic policies; • In some other areas more progress is expected, like • There was consensus that Russia will continue using in military logistics cooperation among some EU hybrid warfare in various forms to achieve political countries, easing infrastructure constraints on the objectives, and increased assertiveness from Mos- region (military Schengen), or strengthening boarder cow can be expected; protection through Frontex;

• In this context, we will witness continuing disinfor- • A global trend, which will strongly affect EU, is ma- mation campaigns; societies in both sides of the chine learning and rapidly increasing automation, Atlantic are distrustful towards institutions and this which can result in creating new threats. EU is not process will continue in the visible future, with addi- sufficiently prepared to respond to these. tional harm to rules and values inside the transatlantic community; • On a positive note, we should observe increased collaboration among EU countries in combating climate • Russia will be increasingly exploiting inter-ethnical change – and slow but continued mitigation of envi- tensions in order to keep governments off balance ronmental risks. and undermine trust within the EU & NATO; OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 3 A central part of the workshop included discussions on how to get substantially closer to a common security and defence policy by 2025, out of which several observations have been ! made and recommendations developed.

• Improve communication between member states, all which need to be debated convincingly clarified; and internally within defence and security government and private sectors. This would be especially important in the case of the European Defence Fund; • A discussion about common military budgets should start, although currently prospects seem quite re- mote; • Make a clearer distinction between security and defence. It may be much easier to integrate closer policies around security, especially when it comes • Regional initiatives can increase overall EU cooper- to areas such as preventing violent extremism, an- ation and coordination in security and defence. One ti-terrorism, anti-trafficking and crime and especially good example is the Bucharest nine (B9 group), an- in terms of protecting boarders. It is much harder to other could be Belgium and Netherlands or the Baltic integrate closer military establishments, and the de- States; fence industry in particular; • Continue improving relations between EU and NAT0. • A key issue is improved intelligence sharing. Pos- Develop more common mechanisms, more platforms sible improvements include information sharing, for cooperation, work on political climate for improve- closer relations between departments through more ments in that area; regional- and European-level meetings. Another rec- ommendation was to create a joint “situation centre” • It would help to be more transparent among member and a European intelligence agency; states about national security strategies and develop a better understanding of national priorities each • Cooperation towards a common security and defence country has. That kind of frank exchange among policy can also be strengthened through establishing partners in the EU could create common programs more institutional exchanges below the top political with better chances of implementation, and policies level, and create better mechanisms for improving infor common security and defence with greater pros- stitutional memory, so there is adequate continuity in pects of success; these policy areas among EU countries; • Include many more displays of presence of militar- • Increasing defence spending among EU member ies from other EU countries. Make citizens more ac- states is a clear priority. It should be also broadly customed to the idea of joint presence of soldiers, communicated that the importance of NATO and including through walking under the same banners at of European defence cooperation is not just about parades, through open days and media campaigns, money, but about improved cooperation. At the same etc; time, the benefits of increased funding should be ex- plained to electorates across Europe; • Consider moving back to mandatory military service, or propose a form of civic duties, for example in the • Pan – European campaigns to foster a greater com- form of national guard or peace corps or emergency mon-security feeling among the populations should services, which could improve the sense of security be developed. More cross border projects in the fields and commitment to community security; of defence should be undertaken; • A much larger effort on the side of member states • Substantially more resources should be directed to- should be undertaken to promote the EU as key secu- wards education and raising awareness on the im- rity pillar for citizens. This should include using the portance of increased defence spending and cooper- right language by relevant authorities; ation in the areas of security and defence; • More investment, and exposure should be given to • A better communication about creating an EU army EU’s working instruments in areas of security and de- would be useful. The idea raises several concerns fence. Frontex and improving cooperation on borders regarding feasibility, questions about sovereignty as could be an example. EU missions in the Mediterra- well as duplication within and undermining NATO – nean, CSDP missions could be another; 4 COMMUNICATION INSIGHTS Participants did also discuss how to communicate security priorities with electorates. For MPs it is of paramount importance to convey the right messages to voters about the changing international landscape and the need for increased investment in security and defence at the EU level.

• Present NATO as an alliance of both values and in- Currently there are perceived primarily as opposites; terests and a community of trust. Member states should be more forthcoming and honest about their • Foreign and security policy matters should be much expectations and needs among each other – espe- more visible in the public agenda – this could be cially relating to political implications of actions on achieved through more visuals (videos, pictures and their societies; use of social media);

• There should be more direct communication to citi- • Increasing defence-related expenses and closer col- zens on security risks and needs – more awareness laboration could lead to greater innovation and re- building on the importance of NATO for security; search and development, as well as the creation of new jobs. This should be communicated, along with • Governments should undertake “smart” communi- relevant examples; cations – distancing themselves from some of the most sensitive issues, while communicating about • The fact that Donald Trump is currently in the White NATO (and EU) role in security to their citizens; House can be also be used to communicate the need to greater efforts to develop European defence capa- • More investment is needed to improve the quality bilities; of communication – making it simpler, with under- standable language, which people can relate to. Very • Security and defence investment should be portrayed concrete examples should be used to demonstrate as the best “insurance policy”. Investing more trans- how investing in security cooperation is directly ben- lates to greater security of the citizens. A greater eficial for voters; communication effort is needed to demonstrate the current and potential impact of EU policies for the se- • In communicating security priorities, the concepts of curity of European citizens. the EU, Europe and sovereignty should be used together as much as possible, to create an association.

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www.mercatoreuropeandialogue.org IMPRESSIONS 5

“ Lets keep in mind NATO is a dialogue space too, not just a place for joint action. The same should apply to the EU. We need those conversations for forecast and foresight, to at least understand our security landscape better and not be taken by surprise, regard- less of our ability then to act together as the EU ”

“ We really don’t Understand Russia - I mean we don’teven really talk to Russians”

“ The EU is not a military alliance. That is not why We join the EU that is why we join NATO ”

#MEDialogue 6 NOTES JOINING FORCES IN THE MERCATOR EUROPEAN DIALOGUE 7

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