Threat Perceptions and Scenarios for EU Security and Defense
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Threat Perceptions and Scenarios for EU Security and Defense Outcomes Report of the Mercator European Dialogue Workshop Brussels – 9 July 2018 Text: Marcin Buzanski Editor Dr. Thanos Dokos | ELIAMEP Caspar Kolster | GMF July 2018 Copyright German Marshall Fund of the United States Voßstraße 20, 10117 Berlin | www.gmfus.org THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND SCENARIOS FOR EU SECURITY & DEFENCE 1 On 10 July 2018, a group of 17 Members of prospects for EU integration). Parliament from across Europe met at the King Baudouin Foundation’s headquarters in Brussels Recent developments in EU’s Common Security on the sidelines of the NATO summit. The meeting and Defence were presented by Minhea Motoc– was dedicated to exploring the national parliamen- Deputy Head of the European Political Strategy tarians’ perspective on threat perceptions, and to Centre (European Commission’s think tank), and co-developing scenarios for European security and by General Michail Kostarakos, Chairman of the defense politics. A number of high-ranking expert European Union Military Committee (CEUMC). speakers joined the conversation to substantiate it The officials discussed the establishment of the with the newest insights from NATO, the European Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); the intitutions and think tanks. launch of the European Defence Fund (EDF), the potential for joint research and capability proj- ects, as well as for better synchronization of EU defence planning. They made a clear plea for EXPERT VIEWS AND CONVERSATIONS Member States to work together more effectively, and to achieve a viable compromise among their internal political differences. A good example of The workshop was an opportunity for participat- potential for acceleration of collaboration in the ing members of parliament, as well as experts, to area of Common Security and Defence was the discuss key risks and opportunities for the EU’s “military Schengen”, for improved military mobili- Common Security and Defence Policy and the ty on the continent, by taking down physical, legal future of NATO. It was a chance for MPs to talk and regulatory barriers. about perceptions in their own countries of main threats to security and to share views on defence priorities, as well as ideas for communicating The session “Qvo vadis NATO” focused on the with constituencies about these important policy future of NATO in a multipolar world. It included areas. a presentation by guest expert - Stefanie Babst, Head of the Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC) for the NATO Secretary General and the Chairman The meeting provided MPs with the opportunity of the Military Committee, followed by reflections to deepen their understanding of security and from Ian Lesser, Director GMF Brussels Office. defence trends and emerging issues, as well as The discussions focused on directions for NATO to learn about approaches and views from their in the current international environment, the peers in other countries. Importantly, the discus- greatest challenges ahead and recommendations sion also revolved around ways to build closer to overcome them. The subject of strengthening relations among EU member states to address NATO-EU relations was raised, including challeng- common security challenges and to strengthen es and opportunities in that relationship. Among collaboration towards stronger EU capabilities in the greatest challenges where NATO needs to in- the sectors of security and defence. creasingly direct its attention, relations with China and the cyber-sphere were mentioned. It was also Prominent guest speakers at the workshop gave pointed out that NATO is no longer sleep-walking their input on recent crises along the EU’s bor- about the increased threat from Russia. An effort ders, the transatlantic relationship and the current was also made to calm anxieties about US poli- state of NATO, as well as the state of the EU Com- cies, claiming that frictions are more part of the mon Security and Defence Policy. showmanship in the context of populist policies, but that the foundations of the transatlantic alli- The opening of the workshop included a presen- ance remain firm. tation by Maciej Popowski, Director General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotia- “ The nexus between external and internal se- tions at the European Commission. The speaker gave an overview of threats and trends impact- curity is where the EU can bring added value ing on EU security, particularly in Southern and - so the question is how well we are equipping Eastern neighbourhoods. Several themes were discussed, including relations with Turkey, the sit- ourselves to address this challenge. ” uation in Libya and more broadly in North Africa and relations with the Western Balkans (including 2 SCENARIOS FOR EU SECURITY & DEFENSE The scenario-building exercise built on a set of triggers and trends that participants believed to have a particular influence on security and defense policy. Triggers Several triggers were identified to be on the watch list – tween the two powers at the South China Sea; for having a large impact. Despite low probability, they could happen, having significant consequences for EU • In Eastern Europe, potential incidents with Russia, in- security. cluding aggression against the Baltic States, hybrid activities involving “green men” and local minorities • An unlikely, but major threat is US revision of en- used to steer secessionist tendencies; gagement in NATO, with possible scenarios of either steady withdrawal from Europe, or a more abrupt • Return to open warfare in Western Balkans – a situ- instance of failing to act on article 5 commitments, ation that could be encouraged by Russia should the during an aggression; process of integration with the EU accelerate; • Relations with Turkey have been ranked as having • A wide-scale cyber-attack in a NATO country (most major impact. Although considered as of rather low likely CEE or Baltics) resulting in significant damage probability, concerns about the collapse of the deal to state infrastructure; with EU regarding migration have been raised, as well as predictions about a rocky future for Turkey-NATO A major disaster – man made or natural- is not a high relations, including a possibility of Turkey leaving • probability event but cannot be ruled out (also taking NATO (or being expelled); climate change into account). Hence, it is important to be prepared to deal with a nuclear incident, a pan- • Escalation of tensions between the US and China has demic or an act of biological terrorism or an ecolog- been another significant risk identified, particularly a ical disaster. situation that could lead to military confrontation be- Trends Several trends were reviewed and identified as highly like- • Military spending in the EU will not match the speed ly to continue having a strong impact on the future of EU of other powers’ military modernization and growth, security and defence planning and capabilities; China’s in particular. • Participants identified high risks of turbulence in the • Despite recent efforts, there will be continuing sus- international security environment, given intensify- picion towards and slow collaboration of EU member ing global competition, but also changing US global states on defence, through mechanisms like PESCO; strategy and transatlantic policies; • In some other areas more progress is expected, like • There was consensus that Russia will continue using in military logistics cooperation among some EU hybrid warfare in various forms to achieve political countries, easing infrastructure constraints on the objectives, and increased assertiveness from Mos- region (military Schengen), or strengthening boarder cow can be expected; protection through Frontex; • In this context, we will witness continuing disinfor- • A global trend, which will strongly affect EU, is ma- mation campaigns; societies in both sides of the chine learning and rapidly increasing automation, Atlantic are distrustful towards institutions and this which can result in creating new threats. EU is not process will continue in the visible future, with addi- sufficiently prepared to respond to these. tional harm to rules and values inside the transatlan- tic community; • On a positive note, we should observe increased col- laboration among EU countries in combating climate • Russia will be increasingly exploiting inter-ethnical change – and slow but continued mitigation of envi- tensions in order to keep governments off balance ronmental risks. and undermine trust within the EU & NATO; OBSERVATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 3 A central part of the workshop included discussions on how to get substantially closer to a common security and defence policy by 2025, out of which several observations have been ! made and recommendations developed. • Improve communication between member states, all which need to be debated convincingly clarified; and internally within defence and security govern- ment and private sectors. This would be especially important in the case of the European Defence Fund; • A discussion about common military budgets should start, although currently prospects seem quite re- mote; • Make a clearer distinction between security and defence. It may be much easier to integrate closer policies around security, especially when it comes • Regional initiatives can increase overall EU cooper- to areas such as preventing violent extremism, an- ation and coordination in security and defence. One ti-terrorism, anti-trafficking and crime and especially good example is the Bucharest