ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 24, No. 1 (ME)

Dec 2019

Montenegro political briefing: Political summary of for 2019 Vojin Golubovic

1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

+36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin

Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01

Political summary of Montenegro for 2019

Several internal and external events marked political scene of Montenegro in 2019. Internal political developments were marked mainly by continued intolerance between the ruling parties and the opposition. This intolerance, as is usual for and Balkan circumstances, resulted in the absence of significant cooperation in any area where it was possible. Instead, obstacles to the work of the respective institutions were typically present, which indicates the irresponsible attitude of the political representatives towards the citizens who voted for them. This is especially true of the work of the Committee for the Reform of Electoral and Other Legislation, which has shown, by its dysfunctionality, the true face of the political situation in Montenegro.

When it comes to foreign policy developments that are significant for Montenegro, it should be emphasized that 2019 was marked by Montenegro's relations with the EU. A number of events have been charted along this path, notably the European Parliament elections, the election of a new Commissioner for Enlargement Policy, the French stop for North Macedonia and Albania (which also indirectly affects Montenegro), the French “non-paper”, as well as the attempt to pull in Montenegro in the so-called "mini-Schengen" union that Montenegro rejected.

Reform of the electoral legislation – same target, same distance

The reform of electoral legislation was initiated in second half of 2018 with the main aim to improve the electoral environment, and further strengthen the confidence of citizens in the electoral process. This was expected to be implemented through functional and efficient institutional mechanism, i.e. through established Committee for the Reform of Electoral and Other Legislation1. Although the beginning of the 2019 was promising regarding the functioning of this body2, the later developments revealed the all weaknesses of the Montenegrin internal political scene – insufficient capacity to cope with the daily political problems through cooperation, short-term political interests outweighing the need for real advancement and development, unbundled opposition and inability to agree in common

1 This Committee was formed in late 2018. 2 The initial problems that questioned the functioning of this body, such as the imprisonment of opposition leaders and the like were overcome.

1 activity, the ability of ruling parties to act on the principle “divide and conquer”, and many other weaknesses that hold Montenegro far from potential progress on internal political scene.

In addition to the continued intolerance of the strongest ruling party, the opposition parties continued their mutual disagreements, which were reflected through the work of the aforementioned committee. Namely, small political interests have made the division of seats for members of this committee a stumbling stone between the strongest opposition parties and alliances. “Democrats” seized an additional seat that did not belong to them (with the consent and support of the strongest ruling party), sparking disagreement with the opposition Democratic Front and shifting focus from co-operation to conflict within the Election and Other Legislation Reform Committee.

Although there were numerous misunderstandings between opposition parties during 2019, it seems that one of the rare agreements was made about demand for technical government. This was not the result of high understanding among opposition parties, but, rather, it seems that common request for technical government is the consequence of their political view that such government could be an additional chance for a better result in the 2020 elections. Despite their request the ruling parties, as expected, remain silent on this request, denying each possibility for its realisation. The constant argument against technical government was the opinion that it would be contrary to the electoral will of the citizens and a ruining of democratic principles. The arguments of opposition were still strong since they claimed during entire year that previous EU and OSCE statements confirms that there were numerous shortcomings in the previous electoral process, on the basis of which they question the real electoral will of the voters.

The total fiasco of the Committee's work came at the end of the year, when this body was permanently left by representatives of the opposition Democratic Front, resigning from membership in the body. The reason again, was accusing the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists of not wanting dialogue and not wanting to change bad election laws through the Committee. Also, the reason was the Committee's decision to coordinate the majority of the sub-groups by members of other parties (e.g. subgroup on work on Voting List Act, Law on Election of Parliament members and committee members, etc.) However, there seems to be no true will on either side. For, if there was political will, one more year would not be spent without genuine dialogue. An additional blow to this body is the decision of some other opposition representatives to leave the sessions of the Committee, without which the agenda of this body cannot be adopted, and the agony of inefficient work and dysfunction of such a body only continues. This is the best example of nonexistence of political dialogue on any issue in

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Montenegro. Next year will be election year, and political dialogue from 2019 does not promise that election results will be accepted by all parties, which was initial intention of the reform process.

Intensive foreign policy developments are blurring the EU's path of Montenegro

Although Montenegro has so far been recognized as the EU candidate country with the most progress in the negotiation process, various developments mainly at EU level somewhat obscure Montenegro's clear perspective on the European path.

The election of the new European Commission was promising for Montenegro, since the new European Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement was from Hungary which with no doubt supports Montenegro in its accession to EU. Since previous administration from Brussels had serious stages of slowing down in the implementation of its most successful policy – enlargement policy, the expectations were that new administration will be faster and more motivating for candidate countries. Although the initial candidate for the position of the commissioner for enlargement was not supported, the elected one is still Hungarian, which is good thing for Montenegro due to Hungary's official stance on Montenegro's further progress towards the EU.

However, despite the Hungarian Government's positive general position on Montenegro's accession to the EU, the later developments put a huge question mark on this issue. Namely, this is primarily referred to the French denial to start negotiation process with North Macedonia and Albania. Such behavior from French side send a message not only to these countries but also to Montenegro that EU accession will be more unclear than it seemed to be. This also showed that other countries, such as Hungary are still not so powerful to put its enlargement policy at the top of the European Commission's agenda.

France came out with the so-called non-paper (as a kind of reward and punishment system), which represents a new initiative and a new approach when it comes to policy towards the Western Balkans. The document is primarily a new methodology in the accession process that would be applied in the further negotiations. This approach abolishes deadlines and there is no longer a date until when Montenegro will become a member of the European Union. Change of the rules in the middle of the game is not fair, but Montenegro is small to complain. The French non-paper at least show that, seven years after Montenegro started negotiations,

3 there are still many problems. It is obvious that these events from 2019 reveal that continuation of the negotiations would be much more difficult. Additional external exam for Montenegro in 2019 was a so-called mini Schengen initiative, which is a regional attempt to answer to the EU behavior, but also supported by the EU representatives and, especially by France. Invitation to Montenegro to join to this initiative is legal. Initiative is aimed at reducing barriers, ensuring free flows of people, capital and ideas among Western Balkan countries, but Montenegro refused to join to such initiative. However, this seems to be rational decision of Montenegrin Government, since it does not mean that Montenegro is against promotion of freedom as some would judge. Because, Montenegro already implements such measures (free movement of citizens at borders with only ID card, etc.) in practice with many regional countries. It seems that refusal of joining to mini-Schengen comes mainly due to the fear that such decision would equalize Montenegro with other regional countries in their EU accession process, and consequently neglect the leading position of Montenegro. The Montenegrin work on EU accession in last several years would be pointless.

Nevertheless, the real conclusion is that Montenegro's European perspective is not endangered in 2019, but it is not anymore clear (especially regarding the year of EU accession). All of this creates additional challenges for the strongest political party in Montenegro (DPS) that had a congress and elected new/old leaders at main positions. It seems that these events at EU level require from the ruling Montenegrin party more efforts and make the party more exposed to the risk of bad election results next year, than entire activity of opposition parties in Montenegro.

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