March–April 2018 Volume 78, Number 2 RCMI The Journal of the Royal Canadian Military Institute

Founded 1890 SITREP The Royal Canadian Air Force

Three helicopters from 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron have been deployed to OP Impact in Iraq since May 2016. —DND/OP IMPACT Inside this Issue Four facets of Proposals for Air Defence Integration by Dr. Richard Goette 3 Canadian airpower Education for 21st Century Aviators by Dr. Randall Wakelam 6

“Making Sausage”: RCAF Doctrine 2005-2016 by Dr. Allan English 10

Drones–A History in the Making by Mark Aruja 14

www.rcmi.org @rcmiHQ From the Editor

he sheer volume and velocity of recent movements in the international security environment continue unabated, to the point where our current newsfeeds are increasingly Treflective of a Tom Clancy or John le Carré novel. Nonetheless, we remain engaged. In February, RCMI Pres- Royal Canadian Military Institute ident Michael Hoare attended the Conference of Defence Associations Congress Founded 1890 on behalf of the Institute, and found the event to be extremely worthwhile. With Patron speakers ranging from the CDS to the NORAD Commander to the Deputy Min- The Governor General of Canada ister for DND, and with the opportunity to interact with participants from across all sectors of the defence and security arena, his presence ensured that the RCMI Vice Patrons The Honourable Elizabeth Dowdeswell, OC, OOnt remains an actively engaged player. I had the opportunity to represent the RCMI Lieutenant Governor of Ontario at yet another February conference entitled Readiness and Resiliance in the Age The Honourable Kathleen Wynne, MPP Premier of Ontario of Disruption, organized by the University of Ottawa. The keynote address was General Jonathan Vance, CMM, MSC, CD offered by Mr. John Brennan, former Director of the CIA, and panel discussions Chief of Defence Staff His Worship John Tory encompassed many of the serious challenges we are facing in the West including Mayor of Toronto cyber attacks, radicalization, artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Officers & Directors Speaking of conferences, by now you will be aware of the RCMI’s annual LCdr/Dr. Michael J. Hoare, CD (Ret’d)—President and conference to be held on 24 April in partnership with Women in International Executive Director Col Jay B. Claggett, CD (Ret’d)—Vice President Security–Canada (WIIS–Canada). Our panel presentations will address a wide Mr. James H. Lutz, MA—Vice President range of critical issues. Our guest of honour will be RAdm Jennifer Bennett who Capt Rodney W. J. Seyffert, CD (Ret’d)—Secretary BGen Paul A. Hayes, OMM, CD (Ret’d)—Director will shortly retire from the CAF following a distinguished career. She will attend Lt(N) Paul Hong, CD—Director Mr. Robert C. Kay, JD—Director our conference in her capacity as leader of the CAF Strategic Response Team on Capt Stewart C. Kellock, MOM, CStJ, CD—Director Sexual Misconduct. Ms. Michele Walkau, MEd—Director

In keeping with our new thematic approach to SITREP, this edition should Past President be of great interest to our flyers, as each article relates to the RCAF and airpow- HCol Gilbert W. Taylor er (do not fret soldiers and sailors—your turn is coming!). We are fortunate to Honoraries have submissions from four very well-known members of the Canadian air force HLGen Richard Rohmer, OC, CMM, DFC, O.Ont, community. We are very pleased to publish an excerpt from Richard Goette’s new KStJ, OL, Legion d’Honneur, QC Honorary Vice President book entitled Sovereignty and Command in Canada-US Continental Air Defence, Dr. J. L. Granatstein, OC, FRSC 1940–57. Given current developments in Canada-US relations, and the ongoing Dr. Desmond Morton, OC, CD, FRSC Honorary Historians debate around ballistic missile defence, his chapter on proposals for air defence Mr. Arthur Manvell integration provide a solid background to this vital aspect of national defence. Honorary Librarian LCol J. Roy Weir, CD, AdeC, QC (Ret’d) We then follow with articles by two of Canada’s most respected air force Honorary Solicitor theorists—Drs. Randall Wakelam and Allan English. These articles focus on issues Honorary Chaplains concerning academic and professional military education for members of the LCdr The Rev J. David Mulholland (Ret’d) RCAF, as well as RCAF doctrine. Combined, they provide a significant reference HLCol The Rev Mark L. Sargent, CD and start-point from which to understand the basis of successful air operations General Manager and air-power more broadly. We leap into the future with a piece by Mark Aruja Mr. Michael T. Jones from Unmanned Systems Canada and a detailed examination of the past, present Controller and, most importantly, future of UAVs or ‘drones’ in Canada, and their growing Ms. Elena Trouba importance in both military and commerical settings. He argues that the RCAF Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme, needs to be better connected to the private sector in order to succeed in the (fast Editor, Sitrep approaching) unmanned vehicle world. Maj/Dr Daniel D. Eustace, CD (Ret’d) I look forward to seeing you at our April 24 conference, or at one of our Deputy Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme many informative Defence and Security After Hours events.  Mr. Eric S. Morse An Official Publication of the Royal Canadian Military Institute Maj Daniel D. Eustace, CD, PhD (Ret’d) 426 University Avenue, Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme Toronto, Ontario, M5G 1S9 Tel: 416-597-0286/1-800-585-1072 Fax: 416-597-6919 Website: www.rcmi.org Editorial E-Mail: [email protected] Copyright © 2018 RCMI ISSN 0316-5620 SITREP may be fully reproduced in whole or in part for academic research or institutional purposes, provided that the author’s and the institute’s copyright is acknowledged. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute or its members.

2 SITREP Proposals for Air Defence Integration by Dr. Richard Goette

fter intense study of the aerial threat, the Air Defence Marshal Slemon [the RCAF Chief of the Air Staff or CAS] Study Group (ADSG) concluded in the autumn of was convinced. Firmly believing in the need for an overall air 1954 that the requirement to make quick decisions in defence commander, he set out to make it a reality. Athe modern air defence battle necessitated a combined Cana- Before Slemon could forward any formal proposals to da–US air defence command under one overall commander. government authorities, however, Canadian political sen- This command would be responsible to both governments sitivities had to be overcome. Although cool to the idea of and ought to be stood up in peacetime to be ready in an air integrating Canadian and American air defences under one defence emergency. The Military Study Group (MSG) con- overall commander, Canadian government officials, notably curred and brought these conclusions to the Canadian and those from the Department of External Affairs (DEA), were American military leadership. not completely opposed to it. Military planners therefore The special April 6 meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Com- needed to find the right command and control authority for mittee was pivotal in convincing Canadian authorities of the a commander that would balance safeguarding Canadian need for integrated continental air defence. It was a rather large sovereignty with ensuring efficient continental air defence. gathering in Ottawa that day. Besides the chiefs themselves, The solution was avoiding the term “command” and using those in attendance also included C.M. Drury, the Deputy the principle of operational control. Minister of National Defence; R.B. Bryce, the Secretary to the Although Joseph Jockel originally noted that the opera- Cabinet; R.A. MacKay, the Associate Under-Secretary of State tional control idea was an American one, recently declassified for External Affairs; Air Vice-Marshal C.R. Dunlap, Chairman records show that it was actually the brainchild of a Canadian, of the Canadian Section MSG; and a few other officers from Air Marshal Slemon. The CAS had previously distinguished Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Air Defence Command the differences between operational control and command in (ADC) Headquarters in St-Hubert and Air Force Headquar- his 1953 US Northeast Command directive to the Air Officer ters in Ottawa. Air Commodore Clare Annis, an Air Defence Commanding (AOC) ADC. Slemon deduced that assigning Command staff officer and a member of the ADSG, conducted similar operational control authority to an overall continental the briefing. Annis was an authority on air power and one of air defence commander would be “politically acceptable to only a few RCAF airmen who had written and spoken publicly both countries.” He explained this reasoning in a December on the subject of North American air defence. He had an 2 brief for Chief of Staff Committee (CSC) chairman General intimate understanding of the air defence integration issue Charles Foulkes: and was the ideal person to give the briefing. Stressing in great detail the urgent need for North American air defence integra- We are giving consideration now on the military tion, Annis explained that Canada currently faced two main level to the working out of a system of operation- problems: a Soviet military threat; and a potential American al control which will avoid the use of the term defence-against-help threat to Canadian sovereignty “resulting ‘command.’ ‘Command’ infers control of logistics, from the US reaction to the Russian military threat.” Canada which is not necessary, and creates a great many thus needed to act quickly by accepting the establishment of political difficulties, particularly in peacetime. and participation in a continental air defence command. Air However[,] we are completely convinced that operational control of the whole system should be Dr. Richard Goette is an air force historian, military educator and author. vested in one commander and we are attempting He teaches at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto. to work out proposals which will allow the opera- This article was kindly excerpted with permission from Dr. Goette’s about tional control of the system without the necessity to be published book Sovereignty and Command in Canada-US Continental Air Defence, 1940-57. University of British Columbia Press, 2018. (Pages of adopting a unified system of command. 177 to 184). The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect Slemon’s brief—and subsequent discussions about the views of the Institute or its members. integrating North American air defences under operational

The production of SITREP is made possible in part by the generosity of the Langley Bequest, which is made in honour of Major Arthur J Langley CD and Lt (N/S) Edith F Groundwater Langley

MARCH–APRIL18 3 control—is a good example of the military being conscious planners were careful to avoid any mention of the word “com- of political sensitivities to command and working to find a mand” in Canada–US integrated air defence proposals. The solution to remedy it that also ensured military effectiveness second difference was that the JSPC version did not include and efficiency, thereby balancing the functional and societal/ the phrase that operational control “shall always be exercised political imperatives. where possible by making use of normal organisation Units Foulkes agreed with Slemon’s reasoning. In a December assigned, through the responsible Commanders.” The reason 5 top secret meeting of Canadian and American military and for this omission was that the JSPC had yet to address the External Affairs officials, Foulkes explained that the sensitive relationship between the overall air defence commander and nature of continental air defence integration in Canada meant his subordinate component commanders, and especially the that any proposals for an overall North American commander delegation of operational control authority. Nonetheless, by “would be couched in terms of operational control in order to specifically stating that operational control “would not include avoid the politically awkward term of command.” American such matters as administration, discipline, internal organiza- officials were open to this approach. tion, unit training and logistics,” the JSPC definition adhered Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman Admiral Arthur to Canadian and American practice that authority over these Radford in particular agreed that Slemon’s concept of opera- was a service prerogative under national command. The JSPC tional control held much promise. Concluding that Canadian definition of operational control laid out important principles officials would find the establishment of a Canada–US air and precedents that the JCS and Secretary of Defense agreed defence command unacceptable at that time, the JCS decided would form the basis for commencing formal negotiations that the formal proposal to Canada “should be limited to the with the Canadians to integrate continental air defences. peacetime integration of operational control of Canadian and In February 1956 the JCS and the CSC agreed to establish US warning systems and air forces assigned to continental air the Ad Hoc Study Group (AHSG) to study the issue and report defences.” The wording was crucial. The key aspect was differ- to the Canada–US Military Study Group. Because negotiations entiating between “a command” and the exercise of command would likely raise “very delicate political matters,” the AHSG and control authority. In the new proposal, the focus would was to limit its focus only “to the problems of operational shift away from the establishment of a combined command control,” not the actual establishment of a command. The since it – and the very mention of the word “command” – Ad Hoc Study Group consisted of officers from the USAF, was so politically sensitive in Canada. The spotlight would US Army, USN, RCAF, and Canadian Army, and it began instead be on the actual command and control authority to examining operational control integration in the summer be exercised, operational control, which would not include of 1956. The absence of DEA or State Department members the word “command.” Operational control authority could be was not an oversight. East Block was aware of the military exercised by a new bilateral entity established to oversee all discussions but decided “it would be best not to have polit- Canadian and American air defences, or it could be assigned ical officers associated directly with this process.” The Royal to an existing command organization such as the Continental Canadian Navy (RCN) declined to assign a member to the Air Defense Command (CONAD). Regardless of the arrange- AHSG because the Chief of the Naval Staff felt that his service’s ment, operational control would ensure functional military participation was unnecessary. The Canadian Army was also efficiency because it was centralized, provided effective com- reluctant to have a representative, but the Canadian Army’s mand and control, and guaranteed the rational utilization of Chief of the General Staff, Lt.-Gen. H.D. Graham, decided to the continent’s air defence resources. Exactly what kind of appoint a token staff officer since the US Army was sending entity would exercise operational control and what specific one and in case the subject of possible army involvement in authority it would entail remained to be determined. continental defence arose. The reluctance to participate on the The Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), the main part of both the RCN and the Canadian Army was symbolic planning organ of the JCS, made the first attempt at clar- of the pre-eminence of air power and professional air forces ifying the issue. Operational control would include “the in continental defence during the early Cold War. composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, In the meantime, CONAD was undergoing changes that the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction would significantly impact the AHSG operational control necessary to accomplish the mission of providing air defense proposal. General Earle Partridge, the new CONAD Com- for Canada and the continental United States. Operational mander-in-Chief (CinC), was frustrated with the limitations control in this respect would not include such matters as ad- on his operational control authority. During the summer of ministration, discipline, internal organization, unit training 1956 the JCS thus revamped CONAD’s command structure and logistics.” Though generally similar to the British 1944 and terms of reference to provide more effective command and definition of operational control, this JSPC version differed control. They removed Partridge’s additional “hat” by making in two significant ways. First, it omitted the words “those Air Defense Command a separate component command functions of command” that appeared in the 1944 version, under CONAD. Partridge remained CinC CONAD, and Lt.- which was understandable since Canadian and American Gen. Joseph H. Atkinson took over USAF ADC as Partridge’s

4 SITREP component commander. The JCS also broadened CONAD’s proved to be a crucial with regard to the RCAF’s ability to mission by assigning responsibility for the air defence of Alas- protect Canadian sovereignty. ka and the US bases in Newfoundland to CinC CONAD. As The MSG’s final air defence integration proposal, dated a result, effective September 1, 1956, the JCS disestablished December 19, 1956, recommended that an overall continental US Northeast Command and reassigned its responsibilities air defence commander be established and that he exercise op- for air defence in that region to CONAD. erational control over the air defences of both countries based Revised terms of reference provided CinC CONAD with on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and JCS more effective command and control authority and greater practice of unified command. Reference to NATO, however, leeway in coordinating operations. CONAD’s authority was was only in regard to the type of command; there was to be no expanded to include “the responsibility to determine proce- formal connection between NATO and the new air defence dures for conducting the air battle, for exercising operational commander. “Drawing a parallel,” as Jockel noted, “is as far control of all assigned forces, and for directing engagement as the study group went.” The MSG highlighted CONAD as a and disengagement of weapons.” To resolve the Army An- model for the new overall air defence commander. The CinC ti-Aircraft Command decentralized control problem once and CONAD’s relationship with his subordinate commanders for all, operational control of all army anti-aircraft forces was was “based on principles established during World War II for centralized under CinC CONAD; this included authority to joint and combined commands, and is now used in NATO. It assign individual batteries to particular vital points. The terms provides for the forces of each service to be assigned to and of reference also included a new definition of operational commanded by a commander of the same service although control: “those functions of command involving composition they are under the operational control of joint commanders.” of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of ob- CinC CONAD would don another “hat” and become the new jectives, and direction necessary to accomplish the air defence overall air defence commander, called Commander-in-Chief mission.” This was very similar to the JSPC’s definition a few Air Defence Canada–United States (CINCADCANUS). The months earlier. new CinC would be responsible to the Canadian and US chiefs Clarifying CONAD operational control authority over of staff, who were in turn responsible to their respective polit- American national air defences had a significant effect on ical authorities. The proposal also called for the establishment the development in the bilateral Canada–US air defence of a Deputy Commander-in-Chief who would be in charge command and control relationship. The disestablishment of in the absence of the CinC. The MSG recommended that US Northeast Command and the assigning of its air defence these officers “should not normally be from the same nation,” responsibilities to CONAD left open the issue of RCAF oper- which meant there would always be an American CinC and a ational control in Newfoundland. Although for the time being Canadian DCinC. A new headquarters would be established the AOC ADC retained operational control over USAF forces consisting of personnel from both Canada and the United in the area, this was a temporary arrangement that would States, making it a completely bilateral effort. eventually have to be addressed in light of ongoing AHSG CINCADCANUS would delegate operational control discussions. CONAD’s terms of reference set another prece- (defined below) to subordinate component commanders dent for the exercise of operational control over air defence of geographical areas yet to be determined. Each service forces and reinforced the idea that one overall commander providing forces to the component commands would retain should manage the air defence battle. Having one authority national command. This provision was particularly important for American air defence with effective operational control for Canada, as RCAF Air Defence Command would be one authority would therefore make integration with the Canadian of the component commands. By this time, however, ADC air defence system much easier to accomplish. Consequently, was no longer a joint command, for the Canadian Army had the JCS instructed the AHSG to utilize the new CONAD terms disassociated itself from area air defence under ADC in 1955 of reference “as general guidance” for bilateral negotiations. to focus on in-close point defence. This made things easier for In October 1956 the AHSG presented its final study to the CINCADCANUS arrangement, as RCAF ADC would be the MSG, which made minor revisions largely at the request the only Canadian component command to be incorporated of the Canadian chairman, Air Vice-Marshal C.R. “Larry” into the new command structure. The Air Officer -Com Dunlap. As Vice-Chief of the Air Staff, Dunlap was the RCAF manding Air Defence Command would be responsible to member of the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence CINCADCANUS in Colorado Springs for operational control (PJBD), and it was his responsibility to brief the PJBD and the but would still be responsible to the Chief of the Air Staff in CSC on integrated air defence operational control. Dunlap, Ottawa for operational command, thus reinforcing national who later in his career would be CAS and then Deputy CinC command of RCAF forces through the chain of command. NORAD, was considered one of Slemon’s “boys,” meaning that The MSG proposal also reinforced the Canada–US he and the Chief of the Air Staff were on the same page when cross-border reinforcement arrangements in PJBD Recom- it came to air defence matters. Dunlap had the best interests of the RCAF (and its air defence mission) in mind, and this Continued on page 13

MARCH–APRIL18 5 Education for 21st Century Aviators by Dr. Randall Wakelam

education. Training allows for standardized responses to pre- I have a prejudice: My prejudice is that airmen do dictable circumstances whereas education permits reasoned not like thinking: Airmen are obsessed with bombs, responses to unpredictable circumstances.3 Training can be fuses, cockpits and screens and are actually rather relatively well measured as we can see in the course training uncomfortable exploring the underpinning logic standards and syllabi that form the basis of hundreds of air and doctrine: So producing a thinking air force is a force qualifications. From Robert Smith-Barry’s reforms to strategic requirement. pilot training implemented a century ago today we implicitly —Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge, understand the value of standardized training for aircrew RAF Air Power Review, 2004 and more broadly for all air force hands-on competencies.4 Knowing that your winger knows what she or he is doing; his paper has as its purpose to look at education pro- knowing that the techs have done their ‘snag’ rectification by grammes, both past and present, within the RCAF and the book and that battle managers understand clearly what so it might seem strange to start off with a quote from they can do to assist in the fight allows each of us to perform Ta recent head of the Royal Air Force, but such is not the case. confidently. And all of these skills and knowledges are based Indeed, as you will have read elsewhere in this issue of SITREP on a validated training system which ensures technical and Canada’s air force has had strong philosophical and practice tactical competence. links to the RAF and equally to the USAF and other Western Education, and its value, is on the other hand a bit less air services and so understanding some of their experience quantifiable: does a Bachelor’s in aeronautical engineering with education helps understand our own. equate to an effective aircraft designer or a skilled technical In A/C/M Burridge’s statement one can readily see the authority? Does a Master’s in International Relations make for importance of education for the successful management of air an effective CO when deployed on coalition operations or an forces both in terms of national and international processes astute policy analyst when proposing changes to air force roles like procurement and coalition operations and for the day to and structures? In these examples the answers are probably day conduct of air operations. But the caution that he offers yes, but there is no easily applied ‘training standard’ to tell us about a discomfort for education is equally important, and his so. A 1960s Canadian Forces study on officer education that concern is not new, nor is it limited to the RAF. Indeed one of we will look at in more detail later, said that the undergraduate the central themes of Carl Builder’s study of the USAF – The degree provided a necessary “training of the mind” and that Icarus Syndrome – is that leaders have too often shifted their a graduate degree in areas related to the profession of arms focus from the tough questions of running the institution to a was a useful and necessary enrichment both in knowledge more limited attention to technologies and air vehicles.1 And and intellectual capacity.5 And it is this intellectual capacity we see a similar tendency to eschew non-technical aspects that allows members of the profession to meet the challenges of air power in post war Australia: in a 5,500-hour, four- set out by ACM Burridge. year syllabus at the RAAF College cadets spent fully 1,955 If our allies have had difficulty in meeting Burridge’s hours studying the sciences, while only 230 were dedicated standard then what about ‘chez nous’? You will have seen to history, war studies, and broad security issues. There was elsewhere that only in 1918 was there any political desire in no non-technical course on air power theory. In the view of Canada to create an air service, and that with the Armistice a senior RAAF historian, Allan Stevens, “the Air Force [was] there was deemed to be little need for a large permanent air very plainly identifying itself as a technocracy.”2 arm. Thus in the 1920s with the RCAF numbering just a few Before looking at the Canadian case it is worthwhile hundred and with wartime flyers initially in large supply there to spend a few moments thinking about what we mean by was no need to set up an RCAF cadet college along the lines education and how it differs from training. Both are required of the RAF College at Cranwell. That institution was intended in the air force as in most professions. We learn technical not only to produce pilots but also to inculcate an air force and tactical skills through training for the most part, but the culture to shore up the RAF in the face of strong opposition broader competencies—those alluded to by the commenta- to a third service in the Britain.6 Instead, would-be flyers in tors mentioned above—are more generally the product of Canada completed the programme at RMC, that curriculum, however, strongly oriented to producing army subalterns, with Col (Ret’d) Dr Randall Wakelam, FRHistS teaches military and air power courses in gunnery, musketry and equitation in addition to history at the Royal Military College of Canada. His research and publishing more general subjects. Only in 1931 was a first RCAF staff -po focus on air power and military education. sition created. The first incumbent was S/L Clifford McEwen The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members. who would go on to command No 6 (RCAF) Group of Bomber

6 SITREP Command. His successor, like McEwen as Great War flyer, was will require in staff positions.”12 S/L George Wait who went on to spend much of his career The philosophy of broad education was stated more in education and personnel appointments. Wait was working explicitly a decade later in the RCAF Staff College’s Syllabus: hard to get some air content into the curriculum – at least for RCAF students—but was then posted out and not replaced as The RCAF Staff College makes no attempt to the RCAF turned its attention to the possibility of conflict in graduate experts in a particular field, nor does Europe.7 In the immediate post war years a review of officer it expound any easy universally applicable doc- entry and education needs of the three services was completed trines. Rather by providing its graduates with an and RMC reopened as a tri-service education system, with education of the broadest scope and by developing four years of post-secondary education.8 In 1959 RMC was habits of clear thinking, it attempts to provide them granted university status and except for changes in academic with the breadth of interest, openness of mind, programmes the system has remained much the same over reasoning ability, and a broad view of their Service the past 60 years. Students spend their school year studying and profession, which will enable them to master and their summers undertaking training in their given field. the specific tasks of any appointment and to make Education for officers moving into more senior ranks sound decisions in any situation.13 had also been a priority for the RAF. To meet this need they established a staff college at Andover, southwest of London.9 After the war the programme had been expanded to a The programme drew on the concepts of the long standing 10 month curriculum as the Cold War set in and remained in Army Staff College at Camberley, but focused on air service place until Unification when the RCAF Staff College became problems and processes. In the early years Directing Staff and the Canadian Forces College. Even in its-tri service format students were tasked to develop air force doctrine as none the curriculum allowed for about 16 weeks of pure air power existed. Once suitable material had been published it became education for air force officers. This air force education ended teaching material for later courses.10 The RCAF sent just over in 2007 when the CDS of the day, Gen Rick Hillier, directed 20 officers to Andover during the interwar period, among that the joint curriculum should truly be joint and the air them McEwen and Wait, and thus the serive had a decent force, along with the CA and the RCN, lost the service specific mastery of air power concepts and practices, if not the size and study term. aircraft to implement them in war time. The rapid expansion It was at the same time as the RCAF College changed of all Commonwealth air services during the war led the RAF its name and function that the Canadian Forces conducted as well as the RCAF and the RAAF to implement war staff a study of officer education needs under a different CDS, courses. The RCAF chose Armour Heights as the home for Jean-Victor Allard. Allard recognized the importance of a its campus, with Wait as the commandant of the school, and well-educated officer corps and directed the study leader, the Canadian Forces College, at 215 Yonge Blvd, remains in MGen Roger Rowley, to look at everything. Rowley’s findings, operation there to this day. The Report of the Officer Development Board (ODB)14, posited At the time Wait had an opportunity to offer his thoughts that all officers move away from hands-on tactical and techni- on the content and conduct of the syllabus and by extension cal expertise fairly early in their careers, replacing those tech- the notion of a professional development philosophy that nical and tactical ‘occupational skills’ with broader pan-service combined training and education. He wrote: and then pan-Canadian Forces/whole of government ‘military expertise’ competencies.15 (See chart page 8) This progression …the backbone of the course consists of a series was and is as true of the RCAF as it is of the Royal Canadian of lectures on staff duties given by the Directing Navy or the Canadian Army. More to the point of this paper, Staff, which leads students through service writing, the ODB also stated that officers needed to start their service precis writing, appreciations and orders and in- with a strong intellectual ability and then had to grow that structions. The students then put their knowledge intellect as the challenges they confronted become less pre- to work by doing a series of practical problems on dictable. The ODB made this point in the context of a world the employment of air power.11 which was dominated by tense geopolitical circumstances, burgeoning technological advances and security challenges However, to give this routine staff training some added that ranged from superpower standoff to asymmetric conflict richness the programme of studies also included lectures given to the full range of peace support operations.16 Sounds awfully by well-qualified visiting speakers, both officers and civilian like 2018 doesn’t it? officials, on a variety of topics, including: other services, allied Indeed, military leaders today are called upon to deal and enemy forces, matters of strategic direction of the war, with the often abstract and chaotic problems of the 21st century and war production. “Only by such a means,” Wait had said using what the ODB labelled called ‘executive and military in earlier correspondence with AFHQ, “can the students be executive abilities’. MGen David Fraser, then just returned given the broader and more authoritative outlook that they from commanding RC South in Kandahar, made a similar

MARCH–APRIL18 7 observation in a 2006 lecture at the Canadian Forces College, students—that is a basic understanding of the history of air pointing out that at the tactical level leaders need to have the power over the past century so that they understand how it intellectual agility, and associated confidence to be able to contributes to military operations and to broader aspects of deviate from a plan when circumstances dictate.17 But he went defence. Students, who are drawn from all RCAF occupations, on to argue that while at the tactical level circumstances can develop this common understanding so they can work collab- be complicated, at the operational and strategic levels of war oratively with officers across all flying and technical commu- decision makers often face complexity, overlaid with ambi- nities within the RCAF and can explain and represent the air guity and chaos—what is often called the wicked problem. power concepts and practices to officers in joint headquarters So what about ‘chez nous’ for the future? For me it is clear and other services. The second objective is to develop staff that education is good for the RCAF, both for individuals and officer competencies to allow clear and logical thinking and for the institution. A recent RCAF Journal article “Professional communications. The remaining objectives—planning of op- Airpower Mastery erations in deployed and the RCAF” also and coalition situa- makes the point, tions—build on the stating that Cana- first two and expose da’s air force is very students to the com- good tactically, but plexity of modern that beyond this it air operations, and lacks the ability to this in an service be as effective as where tactical and it might at higher maritime helicop- levels of warfight- ters (and everything ing or in the broad else that flies) are domain of national air force resourc- and international es. Currently the security.18 At those course schedule will levels we, both in- see about 160 grad- dividually and in- uates a year. stitutionally, tend to muddle through problems – sometimes What the more senior follow-on courses might look like successfully, sometimes less so. is still very much undefined, but the wisdom of the 1959 syl- Much of my original paper had been drafted before the labus would suggest that a tactically oriented curriculum will 7 June 2017 release of Canada’s new defence policy ‘Strong, not do. What senior air force leaders need is something more. Secure, Engaged’. Reading through it and ‘blue sky’ imagin- This same idea was much in evidence in a recent Australian ing the work needed to implement the policy one cannot but Defence Force study the central conclusions of which were think that it will require big and imaginative minds to deal that effective tactical leadership could not be counted on to with how we make good on the vision and indeed there are work in broader more complex operational and strategic level repeated references to flexibility of mind and the utility of situations. The key recommendations of the study included: education. Tactical excellence alone, one can surmise, will not guarantee success. • the core JPME [joint professional military educa- Practically, how do we do develop a learning strategy tion] effort (or at least that from mid-career on- that ensures policy ends? The recently restructured and wards) be oriented around the four strategic lead- re-energized RCAF officer professional development system ership roles of Strategic Leader, Strategic Builder, offers a flight plan towards realizing this goal. First, we have Strategic Director and Steward of the Profession. confirmed the need for all officers to achieve, or in certain • such JPME be focused on preparing officers for special cases to be on the path to achieving, an undergrad- future roles in both leadership and support for uate degree before commissioning. As of 2016 we now have senior leaders. a course—the Air Power Operations Course (APOC), that • officers from mid-career onwards periodically be looks remarkably similar to the War Staff Course, albeit only exposed to and engage with contemporary and 60 percent as long. Finally, there is a vision, yet to be defined evolving issues at the strategic level, with exercises and approved, for expanded senior officer education, this to that require them to examine the responsibilities be achieved through focused workshops of several days or a and skills needed for the Director-Leader-Man- few weeks duration depending on the topic. ager-Steward forms within their own current and The APOC has six ‘performance objectives’, the first immediate-future career roles. (For example, as being a learning outcome to develop the air mindedness of part of preparation for ship/unit command, O4

8 SITREP and O5 could examine the application of these It matters little whether the Forces have their pres- four roles to that level of command and the level ent manpower strength and financial budget, or of command immediately above it.) half of them, or double them; without a properly • such engagement use active rather than passive educated, effectively trained professional officer modes of learner behaviour. corps, the Forces would, in the future, be doomed • each Service continue with the current encourag- to, at the best, mediocrity; at the worst, disaster.20  ing trend of introducing career models that enable selected officers to develop in-depth specialisations Notes within relevant fields – not just within “personnel management” and “project management/tech- 1 Carl Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: Air Power Theory and the Evolution of the Air Force. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Press, 1998. nology” but also within economics, politics and 2 Allan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the military sociology.19 Royal Australian Air Force 1921-1991, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra (1992), 109–11. 3 Ronald Haycock, “Historical and Contemporary Aspects of Canadian In these words we can clearly see that technical and tac- Military Education” in Military Education: Past, Present, and Future, Gregory C. tical competencies are no guarantee to success at higher levels Kennedy and Keith Neilson, eds. (Westport, CT.: Praeger, 2002), 171. 4 Smith Barry was a Royal Flying Corps major who introduced a common of command and leadership and that organizations that are syllabus for pilot training in Britain thereby reducing training losses and ensuring similarly successful like likely need to approach institutional that pilots reached the Front with a common set of flying skills. and national/international challenges with ways and means 5 Randall Wakelam and Howard Coombs, eds. The Report of the Officer De- velopment Board: Maj-Gen Roger Rowley and the Education of the Canadian Forces (intellectually and practically) that differ from what works in (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2010), 40. tactical situations. 6 “Permanent Organization of the Royal Air Force, Note by the Secretary of State for Air on a Scheme Outlined by the Chief of the Air Staff,” 11 December Some, if not all of the Australian recommendations for 1919, “Trenchard’s Papers Leading Up to Formation of R.A.F and Air Ministry,” learning could be implemented within the RCAF’s internal AIR 1 718-29-1, The National Archives, Kew (TNA). professional education programme, but there is much to be 7 Richard Preston, Canada’s RMC: A History of the Royal Military College (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 281–82. “Black Mike” McEwen gained from learning environments outside the air force. The was a graduate of Course 8 at Andover. See also file 2391-228-11-155, “Service recent introduction of sponsored assignments to complete a Experiences by Squadron Leader C.M. McEwen, RCAF, Andover, September Masters in War Studies at the Royal Military College (with 1930,” AIR 1, TNA. Wait was a member of Course 9. See file 2392-228-11-175, “Service Experiences Report S/L G.L. Wait, RCAF, Andover, March 1931,” AIR, a focus on air power topics) is one such avenue. Similarly a TNA. Regarding the removal of the RCAF staff officer see: Untitled memorandum, new internship programme, with placements in think tanks, Senior Air Officer to MND, 6 September 1936, file NDHQ Directorate of History and Heritage 76/32, “Royal Canadian Air Force Three Year Expansion Plan.” The industry and government will expose air force officers to dif- memo indicates a 120 percent increase in officer positions and the need to strip ferent ways of thinking, planning and operating. At the time non-operational billets to contribute to the expansion. Regarding the increase of writing the 12 week internship programme which started to air force related curriculum see: “The Organization and Syllabus of Military Instruction at the Royal Military College,” April 1937, file DHH 113.1009 (D5), in the fall of 2017 seems initially to be a big success, but these “Recommendations regarding the Re-Introduction of Special and Optional Cours- are early days. Conversely the master’s programme, and its es in the Final Year at the Royal Military College,” DHH. two year commitment, has struggled to attract any applicants. 8 Preston, Canada’s RMC, 322–24. 9 “RAF Staff College Initial Purpose,” Minute 1, DTO to CAS, 15 July 1921, This is likely due to the pace of operations across the RCAF “Policy regarding R.A.F. Staff College (1921–1924),” AIR 2 251, TNA. See also which leaves both commanders and individuals hard pressed See W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986, 120. for time and skeptical of just how two years in a classroom 10 Allan English, “The RAF Staff College and the Evolution of RAF Strategic can contribute to real time priorities. To be frank, this circum- Bombing Policy, 1922–1929” (Master’s thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, stance does not portend well for institutional commitment to 1987), 31–32. See also R.A. Mason, History of the Royal Air Force Staff College 1922–1972 (Bracknell: RAF Staff College, 1972). the long game, but time will tell. 11 William R. Shields and Dace Sefers, Canadian Forces Command and Staff Where does this leave us as we advance into the new cen- College: A History 1797-1946 (Toronto: Canadian Forces College History Project, tury? As a suggested at the outset a narrow focus on technical Canadian Forces College, 1987), 4-15. 12 Shields and Sefers, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College, 4-16. and tactical proficiency, while necessary, cannot be the nexus 13 R.C.A.F. Staff College Calendar Course 23 (1958-9), “Conclusion.” Empha- of professional education. Many observers and practitioners sis added. 14 Wakelam and Coombs, Officer Development Board, 46. have noted this. A broad blend of intellectual dexterity coupled 15 The same applies to senior warrant officers as they reach formation (wing, with both hands on skills and broad knowledge would seem air group, etc) and national level senior appointments where they must be able to to have been and remains today the essence of professional understand the sorts of challenges their commanders face. 16 Wakelam and Coombs, Officer Development Board, 26-31. effectiveness and thus must be the outcome of an aviator’s 17 MGen David Fraser, Lecture to the Advanced Military Studies Course, education. We have and continue to relearn the need for a Canadian Forces College Toronto, Oct 2006. blend of competencies, and, like other air forces, we perhaps 18 Brad Gladman et al “Professional Airpower Mastery and the RCAF”RCAF Journal Vol 5, No 1, Winter 2016, 8-23. too often allow ourselves to focus on the those hands on profi- 19 Nicholas Jans, Stephen Mugford, James Cullens and Judy Fraser-Jans. The ciencies. We ought not to do so, for as Allard penned in 1968: Chiefs: A Study of Strategic Leadership. Canberra: Australian Defence College, 2013, 113. 20 Wakelam and Coombs, Officer Development Board, 4.

MARCH–APRIL18 9 “Making Sausage”: RCAF Doctrine 2005-2016 by Dr. Allan English

o paraphrase an old saying, “If you like doctrine and Currently the RCAF and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) sausages, you should never watch either one being approach to doctrine fits Holley’s abstraction and general- made.” The adage captures the essence of the idea that ization characterization. They define doctrine simply as the Tmaking doctrine is a messy process that, if seen, could put you “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their off ever reading it again. This essay argues that, like many other actions in support of objectives.”3 This definition reflects what Western doctrine processes, recent Royal Canadian Air Force might be called a faith-based view of military doctrine in (RCAF) doctrine has been made more like sausage than the which it resembles religious doctrine as a statement of beliefs rational doctrine process described in writings on the topic. exhorting the faithful how to act without explaining why such I will focus on the period 2005-2016 here, as this era saw the actions are preferable to others. This view of military doctrine RCAF engage in a doctrine process, not yet well documented, was captured by Henry L. Stimson, the US Secretary of War that effected a major change in both the content and process 1940-45, who said that during the Second World War the of writing its doctrine and that epitomized “making sausage.” US Navy Department “frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune Doctrine in Theory and Practice was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the To begin, I would like to examine what doctrine should only true Church.”4 As I have written elsewhere, this feature be in theory compared to what is produced in practice, and of doctrine has been prominent in much of the late 20th and then called doctrine. Ideally, “military doctrine is comprised of early 21st century American military doctrinal debates about principles, theories and policies, accepted as valid and reliable, how we should conceptualize the use of military forces in which offer military forces good chances for success … [it is conflicts, with Operational Art, Network Centric Warfare an] accumulation of knowledge which is gained primarily and Effects Based Operations being the articles of faith of the from the study and analysis of experience. As such, doctrine three major “churches,” the US Army, Navy and Air Force.5 reflects what works best.”1 I use this definition from the These debates were followed closely in Canadian defence cir- much-maligned capstone air doctrine publication Out of the cles, and the resulting US doctrine was frequently adopted by Sun (1997), because it reflects what we taught at the Canadian the CAF “second-hand” as a result of bureaucratic direction, Forces College (CFC) in the Aerospace Studies Department with little or no modification for Canadian circumstances.6 when I was Co-Chair there from 2001 to 2005 and it explains One characteristic of American doctrine that did have some the essence of good doctrine – a constant interplay of theory resonance in Canada was that it was often written by each and analysis of experience on operations (practice). Even service to support its case in budget wars with the other ser- when these precepts are followed, if it is to be widely read and vices, as described by General Anthony C. Zinni, US Marine applied, it must be “memorable,” as I.B. Holley explained in Corps retired, “We teach our [junior officers] to recognize that his classic essay on US Air Force doctrine: sister service as the enemy…we fight each other for money, programs, and weapon systems. We try to out-doctrine each …the way we articulate doctrine is flawed…our other by putting pedantic little anal apertures…in doctrine doctrinal manuals consist largely of generaliza- centers…to ace out the other services and become the domi- tions. They offer page after page of abstractions. nant service in some way…Interservice rivalry... [is] going to Unfortunately, abstractions don’t stick in the mind kill us if we don’t find a better way to do business.”7 Given the as well as real-life illustrations or historical exam- realities of doctrine writing, perhaps it is fortunate for those ples. I contend that paying more attention to the on the front line that doctrine actually has a weak or indirect format in which doctrine is presented will work effect on the behaviour of armed forces in operations. Instead, toward a wider familiarity with doctrine by Air how armed forces operate is “more a function of their culture Force decision makers at all echelons.2 than of their doctrine.”8 Canadian Air Force Doctrine before 2005 Dr. Allan English served as an air navigator in the Royal Canadian Air The history of Canadian air force doctrine is a chequered Force and Canadian Armed Forces for 25 years in various operational and one, and little has been published about it. Up until the end instructional positions. He currently teaches Canadian military history in the Queen’s University History Department and a course titled “A Canadian Way of the Second World War, the RCAF used Royal Air Force of Air Warfare” for the War Studies graduate program at the Royal Military (RAF) doctrine in the absence of any desire or capability to College of Canada. create its own. From its establishment in 1943, the RCAF Staff The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect College was a key institution in the development of Canadian the views of the Institute or its members. air doctrine, but that ended with its closure in 1966 and the

10 SITREP unification of the Canadian Armed Forces in 1968. Thereafter, integrated Air Force well into the future.”14 air doctrine in Canada degenerated into the views of separate CFAWC’s first Commanding Officer, Colonel Jim -Cot air warfare communities sometimes cobbled together into tingham from 2005 to 2008, took his doctrinal responsibilities one volume with little coherence or consistency. The lack of seriously, and, given the well-known deficiencies in air force coherent air force doctrine above the tactical level after 1968 doctrine, started to work on creating new doctrine. As a also resulted in a series of ad hoc, expedient changes to the graduate of the US Air War College, Cottingham believed in structure of Canada’s air forces resulting in disjointed, often the conventional doctrinal process described above and initi- dysfunctional, command and control arrangements.9 The ated it with alacrity. He contacted a number of people inside Chief of Air Staff (CAS) tried to rectify some of the air force’s and outside of the air force to establish an informal working doctrinal shortcomings with the publication of Out of the Sun group which would provide CFAWC’s staff with input to as- in 1997. However, it has been criticized because its content sist it in writing new doctrine. I was among those who were was “intellectually questionable” and it failed to explain the invited to be part of the working group, which corresponded rationale for the existence of a Canadian air force.10 and then met in Cornwall for two days in January 2006. The The nadir of postwar Canadian air doctrine came in 2005 group included representatives from all the air force warfare when the CAS cancelled Out of the Sun without replacing it, communities and the Aerospace Studies Department at CFC. only promising that new doctrine would be drafted. This led The result was consensus on and an outline of a new capstone CFC to decree that senior officer professional military educa- air force doctrine manual. While the product was similar in tion (PME) there would rely on foreign aerospace doctrine, general content to past Canadian aerospace doctrine, the namely that of the US Air Force as well as US Department of process was thought by those participating to be the manner Defense joint air doctrine. Another outcome of this absence in which future air force doctrine would be written, by allow- of Canadian aerospace doctrine was that CF joint doctrine be- ing CFAWC to tap into various sources of expertise based on came increasingly dominated by land-centric concepts, which its mandate to conduct the necessary research, “education, were not always appropriate for aerospace forces.11 Adding to experimentation, simulation, lessons learned and conceptual air force doctrinal woes in 2005, was the overall state of the development functions.”15 Some of my colleagues and I pro- air force as described by the CAS, Lieutenant-General Ken vided feedback to CFAWC in March 2006 on a draft of the Pennie, as “beyond the point where even constant dedication new manual which was based on the results of the Cornwall is sufficient to sustain the capabilities needed to meet assigned meeting. At that point, everything in the doctrine process Defence tasks…Our Wings and Squadrons are too hollow to seemed to be going according to CFAWC’s stated mission sustain the current tempo of operations.”12 and Cottingham’s plans. Soon after, everything changed. Lucas, the new CAS, Canadian Air Force Doctrine 2005-2016 directed that the part of capstone manual related to air force The establishment of the Canadian Forces Aerospace “functions” would henceforth be based on the Canadian Army Warfare Centre (CFAWC) that year was intended to be part “combat functions” of sense, shape, move, sustain, command. of air force renewal and transformation. Its creation was an- While the intent may have been to “align” the air force with nounced by Pennie in April 2005 and it was stood up by his Hillier’s “Team Canada” transformation of the CAF, in retro- successor, Lieutenant-General Steve Lucas, in October 2005. spect Hillier’s transformation had many flaws and initial air An air force spokesperson said CFAWC was being created in force enthusiasm, along with that of others, waned as the flaws part to address the problems Pennie identified by providing became evident and as the transformation became “jarmy,” i.e., “the air force with a doctrinal focal point for the development land-centric approaches covered with a veneer of jointness.16 of new capabilities and the enhancement of existing ones... Aaron Jackson, whose doctoral dissertation and subse- Consider it like a think tank for where the air force is, where quent book examined aspects of CAF and RCAF doctrine, it’s going, and how it will get there in terms of our doctrine, is among those commentators who view Lucas’ direction fleets, equipment and resources…” This statement also hinted in a positive light. Describing the army’s combat functions at future developments: “[CFAWC] will align the air force with as a product of an “advanced” army concept development the army and navy as the CF moves towards a more integrated process and “a fundamental component of the evolution of force…consistent with the vision of the Chief of Defence Staff Canadian army conceptual thinking since 2001,” he portrays Gen. Rick Hillier… It will allow us to work (more closely) with “the decision to adapt an Army concept for use within Air the army and navy...it’s really important that what we are doing Force doctrine” as allowing “Canadian air power to be located in the aerospace community is consistent with what the Chief within a sound theoretical framework” and that the air force of Defence Staff (has planned).”13 Current RCAF information “appears to have been able to successfully tie the roles of its on CFAWC reflects some of the original intent stating that it various communities into this broader conceptual model, thus will act “as a catalyst for air-power development and as a stew- avoiding the problem of acceptance that was encountered ard for air-power knowledge…to acquire the right capabilities following the release of Out of the Sun.” Jackson describes pre- and develop the appropriate doctrine to ensure an agile and vious air force doctrine, consistent with that of other Western

MARCH–APRIL18 11 air forces, particularly US Air Force and RAF doctrine, as “too demonstrated that effective air forces perform six functions, inflexible” for the CAF. Of equal, or perhaps greater, concern namely “Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain, and Gener- for those supporting Lucas’ intervention was their belief that ate.”24 No sources or analysis are provided in either version the lack of appropriate air doctrine had allowed the army and to support the validity of these different assertions. The latest navy “to make a politically better case for their service than version, published in 2016, affirms the same six functions as the Air Force has” in Ottawa’s budget wars.17 the 2010 version, but no longer uses 100 years of history to What Jackson and other commentators do not mention justify its choice of functions. Rather they are presented as is that, at the time of their adoption by the air force, the terms articles of faith to be accepted by believers.25 Another one of sense, shape, move, sustain, command were, according to the its faith-based characteristics is that, unlike previous versions Director General Land Combat Development, “not discrete which provided few references to support the adoption of in theory or in practice, but rather recognize broad areas of the functions, the latest version cites “scripture” (in the sense capability with significant overlap…[they] are artificial intel- of authoritative texts considered to be central to a religion’s lectual constructs that help in the definition and analysis of practice or beliefs26) in support of its choices, i.e., joint doctrine military capabilities.”18 Furthermore, by 2011 these “artificial and the Defence Terminology Bank (DTB). However, as with intellectual constructs” had become something quite different. the other versions and joint doctrine, no principles, theories For example, in one joint doctrine publication a variation on or detailed analysis of operational experience are given to them, “Command, Sense, Act, Shield, and Sustain,” is called explain to readers the rationale behind the variety of specific the “five main joint operational functions,” and described functions.27 One wonders if those responsible for RCAF doc- as “the functional capabilities required by a JTF [Joint Task trine realized that much of the joint doctrine they cite, and its Force] in order to effectively employ forces.”19 However, in products in the DTB, was “significantly deficient.”28 another joint publication they had become “six capability do- Conclusion mains (Command, Sense, Act, Shield, Sustain, and Generate),” but no evidence or explanation is given in either publication The RCAF doctrine development process 2005-16 is to substantiate the differences in terminology.20 another example of “making sausage.” As we have seen, its Part of the reason for this lack of consistency in CAF product is not too different from that made by other “sausage joint doctrine can be found in a 2007 Chief of Review Ser- factories,” some of whose products the RCAF uses to make its vices (CRS) report evaluating the state of CAF joint doctrine doctrine. Unfortunately, this limits its utility because, while development. It concluded that joint doctrine had “serious this doctrine can be memorized and regurgitated by the un- deficiencies,” including the lack of a rigorous joint doctrine lucky few required to do so, it, like many of its predecessors, process, a lack of “adequate training and professional educa- lacks the principles, theories and analysis of operational expe- tion in joint doctrine and doctrine development,” and that rience that would allow it to be studied, debated and revised the existing “joint operational doctrine process will not meet based on evidence.29 As they are, these doctrinal products the needs of CF operational units.”21 This 2012 assessment of are not seen as particularly relevant by most, are read by few some US Army doctrine mirrors Holley’s 1995 critique of US and used by fewer still. Like much academic work in similarly Air Force doctrine and sums up the state of much of CF joint esoteric subjects, they are “published for an audience smaller doctrine then and now: “[it] does not provide the necessary than a successful cocktail party, and the rest falls still-born details. In content, it defaults to reasonable but timid general- from the press, ignored by citizen and colleague alike.”30 ities of little use to commanders and staff officers…[it] avoids The early promise of CFAWC becoming the “doctrinal nuanced discussion in favor of a numbing series of definitions, focal point” of the air force and acting as its “think tank” and a taxonomy of operational functions and methods…which “steward for air-power knowledge” was quickly dimmed when, is the worst possible method of conveying the complexity of less than a year after its creation, the CAS derailed the air force land operations.”22 doctrine development process initiated by CFAWC by impos- It appears that little has been done to address the CRS ing Canadian Army “combat functions” on air force doctrine. criticisms of Canadian doctrine, as one can see from the parts The result has been ten years of CFAWC “reverse engineering” of RCAF doctrine describing the army functions concept in parts of air doctrine to conform to the Lucas’ edict, while an air force context. The original introduction of these func- relying on joint doctrine with “serious deficiencies.” It might tions by Lucas in 2006 was justified in the RCAF’s capstone be disturbing to some that few in the RCAF doctrine world doctrine manual, Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, with seemed to be aware that they were working with artificial the statement: “A century of air warfare has demonstrated intellectual constructs, not discrete combat functions, even that all effective air forces, whether they are large or small, as joint doctrine inexplicably transformed them into different are capable of performing a number of specific functions. guises, such as “five main joint operational functions” and “six In Canada, these functions are: Sense, Shape, Move, Sustain, capability domains.” Perhaps more disturbing, at least to me, C om m an d .” 23 Three years later, in the 2010 version of the is that when I drew these facts to the attention of a group of capstone manual, “a century of air warfare” had apparently senior air force officers during a 2012 seminar on command

12 SITREP and control, the senior officer present declared: “you may be nal Culture within the Canadian Air Force,” Canadian Air Force Journal 2, no. 4 (Fall 2009), 38. right, but we have gone too far down that road to turn back 11 English and Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command, 90-1, 150. 12 Stephen Thorne, “Military money too little, too late: Money in federal budget likely now.” Whether that statement is accurate or not depends very not enough for overstretched military,” Halifax Herald (25 April 2005) archived copy. much on the actions of the air force leadership. If they are pre- 13 Ernst Kuglin, “New warfare centre landing at 8 Wing,” Trenton Trentonian (25 April 2005) archived copy. pared to use CFAWC as it was originally intended as a “think 14 RCAF, “Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre – History” at http://www.rcaf-arc. tank” producing doctrine based on principles, theories and forces.gc.ca/en/cf-aerospace-warfare-centre/index.page. Accessed 14 March 2018. 15 Jackson, “The Emergence of a ‘Doctrinal Culture’ within the Canadian Air Force… professional practice supported by rigorous study and analysis, Part 2,” 40. then RCAF doctrine might free itself from its self-imposed 16 Allan English, “Outside Canadian Forces Transformation Looking In,” Canadian Military Journal 11, no. 2 (2011), 12-20. restraints. Otherwise, you might want to avert your eyes from 17 Jackson, “The Emergence of a ‘Doctrinal Culture’ within the Canadian Air Force…  Part 2,” 41. the RCAF’s doctrine making process. 18 Herb Petras, “Update from Director General Land Combat Development (DGLCD),” Canadian Army Journal 7, no. 2 (Summer 2004), 7. 19 DND, CFJP 3.0 Operation (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Warfare Centre, 2010), p. 1-6. Notes 20 DND, CFJP 01 Canadian Military Doctrine (Ottawa: Canadian Forces Experimenta- tion Centre, 2009), p. 2-7. 1 Canada, Canadian Forces Air Command, Out of the Sun: Aerospace Doctrine for the 21 Chief of Review Services, “Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doc- Canadian Forces (Winnipeg: Kelman and Associates, 1997), 1. trine” 1258-153 (CRS) (March 2007), 27-8. 2 I.B. Holley, “A Modest Proposal: Making Doctrine More Memorable,” Airpower Jour- 22 J.P. Clark, “The Missed Opportunity: A Critique of ADP 3-0 Unified Land Opera- nal 9, no. 4 (Winter 1995), 1-2. tions,” Military Review (July-August 2012), 48. st 3 RCAF, B-GA-400-000/FP-001 Royal Canadian Air Force Doctrine, 3rd edition (Tren- 23 Canadian Air Force, B-GA-400-000/FP-000 Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, 1 ton, ON: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2016), 2. edition (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2006), 37. Jackson and others 4 Cited in Philip A. Crowl, “Alfred Thayer Mahan,” in Peter Paret, ed.,Makers of Modern refer to the 2007 edition of this publication and I use that date in the text. Strategy (Princeton Univ. Press, 1986), 444. 24 Canadian Air Force, B-GA-400-000/FP-000 Canadian Forces Aerospace Doctrine, nd 5 Allan English, “The Operational Art,” in Allan English, et al., eds.,The Operational Art 2 edition (Trenton: Canadian Forces Aerospace Warfare Centre, 2010), 35. This article - Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy by CFAWC staff merely summarizes the doctrine and provides no evidence to support the Press, 2005), 1-33, 61-6. “functions”: Concepts and Doctrine Development Staff, CFAWC, “Air Force Functions,”RCAF 6 Howard G. Coombs, “In the Wake of a Paradigm Shift: The Canadian Forces College Journal 3, no. 1, (Winter 2010), 59-62. and the Operational Level of War,” Canadian Military Journal 10, no. 2 (2010), 19-27. 25 RCAF, Royal Canadian Air Force Doctrine (2016), 19. 7 A.C. Zinni, “Verbatim,” The Washington Post Online, 16 July 2000, p. B02. 26 Modified from Wikipedia, “Religious text” at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_ 8 Paul Johnston, “Doctrine Is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of text. Armies,” Parameters 30, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), 30. 27 RCAF, Royal Canadian Air Force Doctrine, (2016), notes to pp. 21-9. 9 Allan English and John Westrop, Canadian Air Force Leadership and Command: 28 Chief of Review Services, “Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doc- The Human Dimension of Expeditionary Air Force Operations (Trenton, ON: CAF Aerospace trine,” iii. Warfare Centre, 2007), 49, 88. 29 Chief of Review Services, “Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doc- 10 Aaron P. Jackson, “The Emergence of a ‘Doctrinal Culture’ within the Canadian Air trine,” 5-7. Force: Where it came From, Where it’s at and Where to From Here? Part 2: Towards a Doctri- 30 Michael Bliss, “Why Tenure Has No Future,” Academic Matters (Oct-Nov 2009), 14.

Integration—continued from page 5 mendation 51/6. During peacetime any permanent changes integration in his December 2, 1955, brief for General Foulkes. of station would have to be outlined in CINCADCANUS Operational control in the MSG proposal was defined as “the deployment plans, which would have to be submitted to higher power of directing, coordinating and controlling the opera- authority for approval. In an air defence emergency, however, tional activities of deployed units which may, or may not, be component commanders, through operational control that under the command of the authority exercising operational CINCADCANUS delegated to them, would be permitted control.” A separate clause stated that “command of forces “temporary reinforcements from one area to another, includ- of one nationality, which includes such matters of logistic ing crossing the international boundary to meet operational support, administration, discipline, internal organization and requirements.” unit training, should be exercised by national [i.e., component] Although planners had originally proposed the defini- commanders responsible to their national authorities for tion of operational control from CONAD’s terms of reference these aspects of their commands.” This was consistent with for CINCADCANUS, they decided instead to utilize the the principle of national command as a service prerogative. operational control definition from the 1952 US Northeast The MSG proposal did not specifically recommend that Command arrangement. The reason for this decision is un- a unified command be established – only that it was the “best clear, though there are a few possible explanations. One has method” of dealing with the Canada–US continental air de- to do with a Janowitzian awareness of political issues. The fence mission. Emphasis was on the authority of operational CinC CONAD terms of reference’s inclusion of the phrase control and on the person who would exercise it, not on the “those functions of command” when describing operational establishment of a unified command, which was still too control authority may have been too politically sensitive for politically sensitive. The new overall air defence commander Canadian authorities wishing to avoid the word “command.” would have the benefits that the CinC of a unified command Another explanation is that the Canadian members of the possessed to ensure military efficiency but would not be the AHSG were also familiar with the 1952 US Northeast Com- head of a binational Canada–US command. This was, to say mand arrangement’s definition of operational control, which the least, an awkward arrangement. It would not last.  was the one Air Marshal Slemon had suggested for air defence

MARCH–APRIL18 13 Drones–A History in the Making by Mark Aruja nmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Remotely Piloted failed to substantively support this world-leading technology, Air Vehicles, or simply drones, are evolving at a the corporate pedigree evolved to Schreiner, then Meggitt, breathtaking rate. This article very briefly reviews and today Qinetiq. Still branded as “Qinetiq Target Systems” Uthe history of UAVs in Canada, develops the case for the need there is, once again, a world-leading capability in Canada, not for the defence community to reconnect with developments only with airborne targets but a very sophisticated maritime in the commercial sector, and then ends with why ‘we ain’t capability, with the Canadian Navy as a key customer. seen nothing yet!’ The Canadian Armed Forces and UAVs A Brief Review of UAV Developments in Canada The Global Hawk overflight of Canada didn’t happen as After the collapse of the Avro Arrow program, Canadair planned (in early 2002) due to a technical problem with the began development of the CL89 autonomous surveillance aircraft. The focus of effort quickly shifted to resolving this system. Rocket-boosted launch followed by turbojet cruise, thorny problem. the CL89 flew a pre-programmed flight path with sensors to Three UAVs were leased from industry: the aforemen- collect imagery, returning to land with parachute assistance. tioned CL327 from Bombardier, an Aervironment hand- This system was very successful launched small UAV called the with 500 systems sold primarily to Pointer, and the IGnat, developed by the German and French Forces. Up- General Atomics - the predecessor to graded in 2003, it was only retired the well-known Predator. The Cana- in 2010. Subsequently, Canadair’s dian Forces Experimentation Centre prodigious engineering talent devel- (CFEC) worked with a Mechanized oped the vertical take-off and land- Battle Group at Suffield, in Exercise ing Peanut (CL227) and Guardian Robust Ram, networking their re- (CL327) UAVs. The counter-rotating connaissance vehicles and putting propeller configuration provided in place high-bandwidth microwave exceptional payload stability, and the links to move the UAV-generated powerful turbine engine enabled sig- data. This experiment led directly to —AERYON LABS nificant performance. Unfortunately, the first operational use of UAVs by it was a technology ahead of its time. Inspecting damage on St. Maarten after Hurricane Irma the CAF, with the IGNat subsequent- Even after extensive testing by the United States Navy, the ly providing security for the G8 Summit held in Kananaskis. markets did not materialize. Regrettably, the last of these met The greatest challenge of the day was not the UAV, it was the its fate in Suffield in 2002 while it was under contract for the intelligence community’s ability to plan and prioritize their military UAV experimentation campaign. information gathering requirements. These trials subsequently In the late 1970s multinational developments at the became much more complex with both Atlantic and Pacific Suffield Defence establishment were undertaken to develop an experiments flown as far north as the Arctic using satellite aerial target system based on the Bristol Aerospace developed communications. Notably, the Pacific experiment (PLIX) CRV7 rocket. This program proved to be highly successful utilized a leased Israeli UAV, the Heron, while the Atlantic with multiple iterations of development leading to a highly experiment utilized the Altair from General Atomics, a very effective subsonic low-altitude product, developed and sold large UAV. by Boeing Canada. Although Canadian defence-procurement The first UAV procurement by Canada was also for experimentation. Nine Silver Fox hand or catapult launched UAVs were procured by Defence Research @2003. Produced Mark Aruja is Chairman of the Board of Unmanned Systems Canada which by Advanced Ceramics of the US, they were originally de- has as its mission to “represent the interests of the unmanned vehicle systems signed for whale spotting for the USN. These UAVs were community, which includes industry, academia, government, military, and other interested persons.” Mark has diverse experience in defence, government, rudimentary at best, but they were immensely cost-effective industry and the not-for-profit sector spanning over 40 years. His boyhood in resolving issues with flight planning, and convincing pilots dreams of flying were fulfilled with a 32 year aviation career in the Canadian that if they didn’t want them to crash, that they should be Armed Forces ending with a number of senior appointments including Wing landed with their automated system! However, more impor- Commander. For further information see: https://www.unmannedsystems.ca/. tantly, they promoted the dialogue between the services on The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute or its members. their respective responsibilities, and notably for the air force, its obligations under the Aeronautics Act.

14 SITREP Canada standards, delivered by some 40 schools which offer UAVs at War—Afghanistan a UAV curriculum. Some 30 universities and community The Canadian Army’s SPERWER procurement is well colleges are engaged in UAS-related research ranging from described elsewhere, and it may be considered a very expen- fundamental aerodynamic research through to highly applied sive way to learn lessons. One of these might be, ‘if it looks research related to applications such as forestry or mining. like a brick, expect similar flight characteristics’. These were The Democratization of Aviation complemented by hand-launched Skylark UAVs used mainly by the Special Forces. The most significant operational UAV The dramatic, if not explosive growth of the commer- capability was acquired after the Manley report, with the award cial UAS industry can be credited to the development of the to Macdonald Dettwiler of a contracted UAV service using smart-phone, and high power density electric motors. The the Israeli Aircraft Industries Heron. This large system ulti- smart-phone brought a compact, rugged, platform which mately proved to be invaluable for its information gathering combined cameras with a multi-band communications capa- capability, establishing routine long-range missions integrated bility, locating sensors (e.g. GPS), and high-power processing into military airspace, and operating from Kandahar, then the all at consumer prices. The electric motors allow smartphones busiest single runway in the world. to fly! Underlying these two developments are tremendous A second contracted service was provided by ING Ro- advances in mass-production techniques. Two key additional botic Aviation who provided services to the Canadian Navy requirements, the development of sophisticated flight control off the Horn of Africa operating the Boeing/Insitu Scan Eagle. avionics and imagery processing were rapidly brought to mar- The unfortunate outcome of these two highly-successful ket, largely due to the evolution of ‘open source’ collaboration contracted programs was that neither had a successor. In other and the advent of low-cost programmable computers, notably words, both were projects, not programs. The Royal Australian a product called RaspberryPi. Nearly overnight, affordability Air Force piggy-backed on the MDA/Heron contract in Af- and ease of use meant that a global community of enthusiasts ghanistan, then repatriated the knowledge to Australia where was developing new capabilities at an unprecedented rate, ex- they are now advancing the integration of UAV operations ploring possible applications, and, driving costs down further. into their airspace to the great benefit of both their defence The one myth that needed to be dispelled was that these small capabilities and commercial industry. Fortunately, the RCN devices are ‘toys’. They are highly sophisticated. has now embarked on a procurement program with options It is estimated that by 2020 there will be nearly for levels of contracted support. 100,000,000 ‘drones’ in operation globally, of which the vast Most of the experience gained over these years of opera- majority will be in the hands of recreational users. This has tions has now moved to the private and commercial sector, and brought some specific challenges for airspace regulators, in that, I would argue, is where the real innovation is taking place. our case Transport Canada. Rise of the Commercial UAV Industry Safety Case Enabling the Business Case Our “Signal Hill” moment occurred in 1998, when a In 1996, the Canadian Aeronautics Act was amended small US company called Insitu launched four small UAVs with the prescience to define an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: from Newfoundland headed for Ireland. One of these com- simply put “a model aircraft flown for other than recreation- pleted that historic flight, in 26 hours and 45 minutes on 1.5 al purposes”. Operations of UAVs would be granted upon gallons of fuel. approval of a “Special Flight Operations Certificate”. In the In 1999, Zenon Dragan, founder of Draganfly in Saska- subsequent 10 years, Transport Canada approved 100 SFOCs, toon, developed what is arguably the world’s first commer- almost all to defence companies wishing to demonstrate their cially successful quadrotor UAV. One notable example of his technology to DND. In the next 10 years, over 10,000 SFOCs products is in the Smithsonian today thanks to the world’s were issued; almost exclusively to commercial operators. first successful Search and Rescue operation by a UAV; that, in This dramatic change came about due to the leadership Saskatoon by the RCMP in May 2013. Other industry founders of Unmanned Systems Canada which initiated a formal in- include Micropilot, a world-leading provider of high-grade dustry/government relationship to develop UAV regulations UAV autopilots, MMIST with its cargo carrying UAVs, used in 2006. In parallel, an exploration began with various work- by militaries around the world and ING Robotic Aviation. shops and a number of corporate initiatives to explore busi- Today, there are about 1000 UAV companies in Canada, ness cases for commercial applications of UAS technologies. the majority of these providing services addressing many ver- Indeed, a precondition for Transport Canada to assign public tical markets, a significant roster of OEMs designing systems resources to the task of developing UAV regulations required for specific applications, supply chain providers of subsystems the development of a business case which forecast commercial from GPS to avionics to sensors, and an ancillary industry outcomes. Adopting a ‘crawl, walk, run” approach became the such as insurance, auditors and financiers. In 2016, 2300 mantra of both industry and the regulator as both had a vested commercial UAV pilots were trained in Canada to Transport interested in ensuring that the adoption of this new technol-

MARCH–APRIL18 15 ogy was done safely. Industry had its investment and future via drone this week in Florida, moving closer business at stake. With the availability of commercial UAV toward a more automated delivery process. The systems, the rate of SFOC approvals accelerated exponentially drone took off from the roof of a modified delivery as of 2012, with industry demand rapidly outstripping both truck, equipped with a high-tech docking bay, then Transport Canada’s capacity and expertise. Indeed, an inter- dropped off package before returning national challenge of regulators is that the expertise necessary • August 16, 2017: AT&T, which has partnered with to formulate policies and regulations in this highly innovative major tech companies including Intel and Qual- new ecosystem resides almost exclusively in industry. Very comm to test UAVs on LTE networks, is now recently, Transport Canada has recognized that challenge and bringing together “drones, machine learning and received an infusion of resources in the 2017 federal budget, video analytics,” according to Mazin Gilbert, vice and, has acknowledged the role of their policy and rule-mak- president of advanced technology at AT&T Labs. ing in enabling innovation and economic growth. • Quebec City, QC, Canada, September 7, 2017: LeddarTech. Inc. today announced the completion UAVs Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) of a combined investment of US$101 million (close Today, with few exceptions, commercial UAV operations to CA$130 million). are undertaken within Visual Line of Sight. Two test ranges in • Lisbon (Reuters), November 8, 2017: Uber is Foremost AB, and Alma QC are already approved for BVLOS, taking part in a joint industry and government and offer extensive airspace for the testing of new equipment push with NASA to develop software which the and technologies. However, it is critical that trials and demon- company aims to use to manage “flying taxi” routes strations move as rapidly as possible off these ranges to areas that could work like ride-hailing services it has which reflect the operating conditions of end-customers; e.g. popularized on the ground. pipelines and large tracts of forests, for example. However, we are now in the ‘walk’ phase, and Beyond Visual Line of These press releases point to where investment flows Sight (BVLOS) operations will be undertaken this year in are coming from, highlighting that the future value of auton- Canada under controlled conditions off-range. The industry omous systems is in the data, and ultimately the decisions expectation is that these trials will lead to limited commercial derived for customers. With systems connected over new operations by next year - on the road to reaching the holy grail. communications technologies, such as 5G, the management of these entities will be automated. Investment is already un- You Ain’t Seen Nothing Yet! derway in Unmanned Traffic Management systems, for the If it hasn’t been clear to the reader yet, UAV technology is computer-based management of UAVs in low level airspace, all about delivering actionable data to the customer in a timely a precursor to what may be a complete overhaul of how air- fashion. In fact, it’s exactly the same use that the military has space is managed heretofore. Connecting airborne and ground for UAVs delivering intelligence data. So, moving to BVLOS vehicles is already happening in the agriculture domain. The is much more than simply figuring out how to fly safely over press release referring to the $130M investment in Leddartech long distances: it’s about how to acquire and process massive underscores how a LIDAR company, that provides sensors for volumes of data in a timely fashion. Overlaid on this perspec- the UAV market, is seeing a major capital infusion, but from tive are two massive transformations which lie at the heart the autonomous vehicles sector. of what is coming. Human Sensing is rapidly progressing to In summary, the world of drones is no longer charac- Machine Sensing, and, Human Decisions is becoming the terized by the aerospace, transportation-oriented industry domain of Deep Learning algorithms. from which it emerged. Rather it is about acquiring data, and The pace of this change is challenging even to those in delivering actionable information to customers. However, the the forefront. Moreover, for those who are familiar with the aerospace industry is taking note. If you’re looking for that aviation industry, the names of those in the forefront are not autonomous air taxi of the future, work is already underway. recognizable. The following headlines from various press re- Close to home, and without much fanfare, Bell Helicopter leases in 2017 highlight where the investment is coming from. in Mirabel QC unveiled their closely held Hydra technology demonstration project earlier this year, seen as a testbed for • New York, February 16, 2017: Building on its airborne autonomous taxis. Canadian industry is near the strategy to drive innovation and adoption for forefront of artificial intelligence and telecommunications IoT services in high-growth markets, Verizon technologies. Combined with expertise in unmanned systems, today announced that it has purchased Skyward, the pace of innovation is likely to see dramatic changes across a private company based in Portland, Oregon. numerous sectors of our economy, and change how society Skyward brings drone operations management to interacts with technology in ways that truly will be called the Verizon IoT portfolio. disruptive.  • February 25, 2017: UPS tested out home delivery

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