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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA St. John's Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR i I I 77-24,642 HUTCHINS, Gerald Lee, 1948- THE PUBLIC FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT: THE CHARACTER OF LEADER BEHAVIOR AND ITS EFFECT ON THE BEHAVIOR OF OTHER DECISION-MAKERS. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1977 Political Science, international law and relations

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

Copyright by Gerald Lee Hutchins 1977 THE PUBLIC FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT:

THE CHARACTER OF LEADER BEHAVIOR AND

ITS EFFECT ON THE BEHAVIOR OF OTHER DECISION-MAKERS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Gerald Lee Hutchins, A.B., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1977

Reading Committee: Approved By

Charles F. Hermann

Margaret G. Hermann dvlser Donald A . Sylvan Department of Political Science For the women in my plan

Renee Vanessa; Freida Anne

ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The assistance of my dissertation committee is greatfully acknowledged. The many hours spent by Charles Hermann and Margaret

Hermann guiding my research provided much benefit. The efforts of

Donald Sylvan were crucial to making this work intelligible beyond the bounds of the CREON project. He, more than anyone, was able to instill at least some of the skepticism this research deserves.

My intellectual debt to Margaret Hermann, Barbara Salmore, and Stephen Salmore is especially keen. Their theoretical work on the psychological and regime perspectives on foreign policy greatly expanded my understanding.

During this research, I was supported by the CREON project at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University. A special word of thanks is due Charles Hermann whose continuous efforts found means of finan cial support. This research was also supported by grants from the

National Science Foundation (GS-3117), and the Instruction and Re­ search Computing Center at The Ohio State University.

My deepest appreciation is extended to those friends who pro­ vided the emotional support necessary to carry through on this study

The gentle words so cheerfully given by Carole Jacobson gave me courage to overcome the difficult moments. And my wife, Freida, gave me the security of knowing that I always had a loving family to come home to.

Having been assisted by so many friends and in so many ways does not in any way reduce my responsibility for any errors of omission or commission.

Lexington, Kentucky May, 1977 Gerald Lee Hutchins VITA

July 27, 1948 ...... Born - Salzburg, Austria

1969...... A.B., With High Distinction, Eastern Kentucky University, Richmond, Kentucky.

1970-1971 ...... Graduate Teaching Assistant, Depart­ ment of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

1971-1973 ...... Graduate Research Associate, Depart­ ment of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

1974 ...... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

1973-1976 ...... Graduate Research Associate, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

1977 ...... Visiting Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.

PUBLICATIONS

"Affect," in Linda P. Brady (ed.) How Nations Act; Dimensions of Foreign Policy Behavior. Forthcoming.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: International Relations

Comparative Foreign Policy. Professor Charles F. Hermann

International Politics. Professor Warren R. Phillips

Minor Field: American Politics

Public Opinion and Voting Behavior. Professor C. Richard Hofstetter

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page DEDICATION...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... iii

VITA ...... V

LIST OF TABLES ...... viii

LIST OF F I G U R E S ...... xi

Chapter

ONE LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY ...... 1

Introduction Leadership And Leadership Studies Summary And Directions

TWO EPISTEMOLOGY...... 35

Conceptualizations Data Sources Reliability Operationalizations Summary

THREE THE CHARACTER OF LEADER FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR: EMPIRICAL MAPPING ...... 94

The Need For Controls Comparisons Of Foreign Policy Behavior Relationships Among Independent Variables Summary

FOUR INFERRING EFFECTS ...... 146

Introduction Leader Effects and Causality Why Nonleaders Follow Procedures For Testing For Effects Effectiveness Measures Analysis Technique Summary vi TABLE OP CONTENTS (Continued)

Chapter Page

FIVE LEADER EFFECTIVENESS . 178

Introduction A Map Of Leader Effectiveness Understanding Leader Effectiveness Summary

SIX A M I C R O A N A L Y S I S ...... 236

The Need For A Microanalysis Conceptualizations Of Foreign Policy Behavior Data Controls Analysis Procedures Findings Conclusions

SEVEN CONCLUSIONS ...... 256

Introduction Findings Validity Of Effectiveness Measures Avenues For Further Research

BIBLIOGRAPHY 280

vii LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1.1 Factors That Alter The Foreign Policy Effec­ tiveness Of Leaders In Democratic And Authoritarian States ...... 17

2.1 CREON Actors By G e n o t y p e ...... 43

2.2 Persons Accepted As Heads of Government ...... 55

2.3 Adversaries of CREON National Actors ...... 66

2.4 Commitment ...... 74

2.5 Piofepsed Orientation to Change ...... 78

2.6 Independence of Action ...... 81

2.7 A f f e c t ...... 88

3.1 Uncontrolled Differences In Characteristics Of Leader And Nonleader Behavior ...... 100

3.2 Differences In Leader And Nonleader Behavior On Whose Problem As Adjusted For The Inter­ national Organization Category ...... 108

3.3 Leader Public Participation In Foreign Policy * B e h a v i o r ...... 112

3.4 Leader and Nonleader Behavior In Setting C o n t e x t s ...... 116

3.5 Leader Participation in International Organi­ zations ...... 117

3.6 Face To Face Meetings In And Outside Of Inter­ national Organizations ...... 119

3.7 Leader and Nonleader Behavior In Timing C o n t e x t s ...... 120

viii LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

Table Page

3.8 Leader and Nonleader Behavior Toward Recipients . . 123

3.9 Leaders Who Play An Active Role In Adversary Relationships ...... 125

3.10 The Extent Of Leader And Nonleader Missing Data On Situational Variables...... 126

3.11 The Extent Of Leader And Nonleader Missing Data On Situational Variables Controlling For The Presence Of A Behavioral Stimulus .... 130

3.12 Leader And Nonleader Behavior In Undesirable Situations ...... 131

3.13 Leader And Nonleader Behavior In Types Of Situations ...... 131

3.14 Relationships Among Independent Variables: Gamma Coefficients ...... 134

3.15 Relationships Between The Classical Approach Variable And The Regime Approach Variables . . . 13 5

3.16 Relationship Between Openness And Training .... 136

3.17 Relationship Between Genesis And Training ...... 137

3.18 Relationship Between Participation And Coherence. . 138

3.19 Relationship Between Participation And Genesis. . . 138

3.20 Relationship Between Regime Approach Variables . . . 139

4.1 Number of Leaders For Whom Effects Are Inferred. . . 171

5.1 Percent of Leaders Having An Effect on Various M e a s u r e s ...... 180

5.2 Number of Measures For Which The Percentage Of Leaders Was Larger On One Data Set Than On 186

5.3 Confounded Effectiveness and Values on Independent Measures ...... 191

ix LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

Table Page

5.4 Relationship Between The Mean Number Of Dimensions With An Effect Indicated And The Number Of Interim Periods As Altered By Requiring Different Percentages Of Interim Periods To Constitute An Effect...... 195

5.5 Summary Of Leader Effectiveness ...... 197

5.6 Openness And Leader Effectiveness Controlled For Interaction E f f e c t s ...... 209

5.7 Coherence And Leader Effectiveness ...... 211

5.8 Coherence And Leader Effectiveness Controlled For Interaction Effects ...... 212

5.9 Genesis And Leader Effectiveness Controlled For Interaction Effects ...... 213

5.10 Training And Leader Effectiveness Controlled For Interaction Effects ...... 214

5.11 Participation And Leader Effectiveness ...... 216

5.12 Participation And Leader Effectiveness As Con­ trolled For Interaction Effects ...... 217

6.1 Sets Of Comparisons For Inferring Effects For The Microanalysis ...... 246

6.2 Microanalysis Summary Of Leader Effectiveness . . . 250

x LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

2.1 Operationalizations As Related To The Study's G o a l s ...... 52

2.2 Independence of Action ...... 79

4.1 Relationships Over Time of Nonleader Behavior To The Model of Leader B e h a v i o r ...... 157

4.2 Cumulative Distribution of Nonleader Change Over Time on Respect/Status...... 169

6.1 Leader And Nonleader Comparisons For The Micro­ analysis...... 244

7.1 A Model Of Leader E f f e c t i v e n e s s ...... 277

xi Don't view me with a critic's eye, But pass my imperfections by. Large streams from little fountains flow, Tall oaks from little acorns grow; And though now I am small and young, Of judgement weak and feeble tounge, Yet all great, learned men, like me Once learned to read their ABC.

David Everett

xii CHAPTER ONE

LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

This study is primarily concerned with the role heads of government^ play in foreign policy. Although heads of government are generally assumed to play a leadership role in their nation's foreign affairs, the cross national study of their foreign policy role :is a relatively new area of social science research. This study is an exploration of that role. Two major goals are espoused.

The first is to describe the foreign policy behavior of heads of government. The second is to probe some of the relationships implic­ it in the literature relevant to the study of heads of government.

The lack of empirical cross national studies dealing with heads of government obligates us to begin by describing their be­ havior. How does the behavior of heads of government compare with the behavior of other decision-makers involved in foreign policy?

Do they behave in similar or different arenas? Are the character­ istics of their behavior similar? For example, are heads of govern­ ment more friendly or more hostile than other decision-makers? Are heads of government more attentive to military and security issues than other decision-makers? Describing the behavior of heads of government will provide insight to these and similar questions. It will also lay the groundwork in establishing baseline measures for

future behavioral studies to use in evaluating particular heads of

government.

Heads of government are widely viewed as playing a leadership

role in foreign affairs. The general public as well as many

scholars interpret world politics through an implicit rational actor

model in which heads of government play a central role. Important

aspects of their role in this model include the specification of

goals, the evaluation of alternatives, and the announcement of

decisions. Faithful implementation of these decisions by the

foreign affairs bureaucracy culminates the leadership role of heads

of government implicit in this model. However, the extent to which

heads of government actually play such a leadership role is challenged by Allison (1971), Halperin (1974) , Hilsman (1967), Janis (1972),

Neustadt (1962), and others who suggest that the control heads of government are able to exercise over foreign policy is minimized by

structural factors that impenge on the formulation and the imple­ mentation of decisions. These analysts build arguments supported by historical anecdotes that structural characteristics such as organi­

zational control of information, organizational repetoires, and

budgetary politics create an impenetrable web which denies control

from the top.

These charges have not been put to any rigorous empirical

test, but neither has the common assumption of a leadership role for heads of government. Such an investigation is well beyond the scope of an exploratory study. A more modest goal is pursued. The literature on heads of government suggests myriad relationships concerning their behavior, recruitment, and so forth. The focus will be on investigating relationships concerning their effective­ ness in controlling their nation's foreign policy. All references to effectiveness in this study refer to effectiveness in foreign policy. There are serious philosophical questions regarding causation which make the concept of effectiveness elusive. The entire fourth chapter tackles the problems of inferring effects, measuring effec­ tiveness, and imputing causation. For now a simple definition of effectiveness will be offered to aid the reader in understanding the intervening chapters. The effectiveness of a head of government is his ability to alter the foreign policy behavior of other decision­ makers in his nation in the direction he desires.

The literature relevant to the foreign policy role of heads of government consists of (a) descriptive accounts of how foreign policy is made and implemented and (b) what might be referred to as leader and leadership studies. The literature reviewed in the following sections focuses almost exclusively on leader and leader­ ship studies. Relatively few of these studies deal directly with leadership by heads of government. Those which specifically deal with the role of heads of government in foreign policy on a cross national basis are discussed in their own section.

Three approaches to understanding the effectiveness of heads of government organize the discussion of the cross national literature on leadership. The classical, regime and psychological approaches are used as referends to aid the reader in orienting him­ self to the theoretical bases of discussions throughout this study.

Primarily, this is done with regard to the relationships implicit in the literature and with regard to variables designed to represent those relationships. Studies representative of the classical approach deal with societal sources of foreign policy leadership and juxtapose leadership in democratic and authoritarian nations. Studies involv­ ing the regime approach deal with the political foundations of the

leadership structure. Studies taking the psychological approach deal with the personal characteristics of political leaders.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relationships

implicit in the three approaches to leader effectiveness. The dis­ cussion formulates these relationships as the research questions to be used in analyzing effectiveness.

LEADER AND LEADERSHIP STUDIES

Nearly all of the broad range of studies that may be subsumed under the heading "leader and leadership studies" have at least tan­ gential relevance to the cross national study of the role regime

leaders play in foreign policy. Much of the research on leadership focuses on leadership in contexts other than political institutions.

This includes small group and organization studies. Studies focusing on political aspects of leadership include political biographies and studies of leader succession. A brief review of these literatures pointing out the aspects relevant to this study will provide a background for the more detailed discussion of cross national studies

of political leadership.

Small group research can be divided into studies which have

focused on the evolution of leadership following the formation of a

new group and studies which have focused on pre-existing groups with 2 formalized leadership structures. One of the most important con­

tributions of small group research to the cross national study of

leadership in foreign policy is the distinction between the occupants

of positions within the formalized leadership structure of a group

and the persons who actually lead the group. This distinction is

important because it should alert researchers to the possibility that

the role played by heads of government in foreign policy may not be

the dominant leadership role that has so often been assumed.

The original objective of small group research on leadership was to reveal the personality traits of individuals who have or seek

leadership roles. It also dealt with those traits of leaders which 3 are related to attaining group goals. The findings of these studies

indicate that the perceptions of the skills that an individual can

contribute to attaining group goals are important for group members

in accepting someone as the leader. Gibb (1969) describes four major variables as constituting the "interaction theory" of leadership: the personality of the leader; the attitudes, needs, and problems of the

followers; the personal relationships within the group; and, the

situations for the group. The situations for the group include

aspects of the physical setting, interactions with other groups, and the nature of group tasks. The relevance of the leadership research

described by Gibb (1969) and McGrath (1962) to the role of regime

leaders in foreign policy is strained by the differences between the

nature of the group tasks used in those studies and the tasks in­

volved in foreign policy. Most leadership studies have used either

producing or military targeting tasks in which the number of items

produced or the distance from the target has provided readily

quantifiable measures of goal attainment. Although it is difficult

to even describe the goals of foreign policy, much less to measure

goal attainment, they would seem to be of a different character from

the goals involved in producing and targeting tasks, and thus the

applicability of the findings of small group research for this study

is ambiguous.^

One of the more general findings reported by Gibb (1969) is

that group leaders almost always embody the qualities of the followers 5 such that it is often difficult to determine who is leading whom.

Hollander (1958) states that a paradox exists between the view of the

leader as closely conforming to the norms of the group and the ex­ pectation that the leader play an important role in directing and altering group norms. On the one hand the leader is expected to epitomize group norms, and on the other hand the leader is expected to lead in altering those norms. Hollander develops the concept of idiosyncrasy credit as means for reconciling this paradox. By up­ holding group norms and expectations over time, members receive a certain degree of credit that defines the extent to which a member can deviate from those norms before the group will apply sanctions.

Status within the group is regarded as a function of idiosyncrasy

credit. As the leader uses his idiosyncrasy credit to deviate from

a particular group norm, he may invoke expectations regarding his

leadership role, that is, he may indicate that he is attempting to

lead. As the new behavior pattern is accepted by members of the group, a new norm is established. If the new behavior pattern is not

accepted, the leader would eventually use up all of his idiosyncrasy

credit and group sanctions would be applied or the leader would ad­

just his behavior to again conform to the group norm. This scenario

suggests that the length of time a leader can deviate from group norms before sanctions are applied is related to the degree of the deviation and the extent of his idiosyncrasy credit. Sanctions applied to

regime leaders might include failure at re-election, coup d'etat,

impeachment, and exile.

The study of large organizations constitutes an important segment of leader and leadership studies. These studies have focused on formal leadership structures in pre-existing institutional set­ tings. As such their relevance to the leadership role played by re­ gime leaders is more direct than that for small group studies.

Cartwright (1965) states in his review of the literature on organi­ zations that influence within organizations occurs along hierarchical lines. The organizational reward system is differentially distri­ buted along hierarchical lines so that those at higher levels control more of the rewards and thereby have more influence than those at lower levels. Gouldner (1950) suggests that the organization's hierarchical structure is supplemented by informal lines of influence

and communication that may not be revealed until there is a change in management. The new manager may find that he is ineffective until he makes changes in key supervisors and begins to develop new informal

lines of communication. Part of the new manager's ineffectiveness

lies in changes in goals that frequently accompany changes in manage­ ment. Resistance to policy changes are sometimes legitimized by re­ miniscence about the former manager and his way of doing things.

The presence of bureaucratic sabotage has been studied for a long

time,** yet promising suggestions of how to overcome bureaucratic opposition have not been made. This problem seems to be particularly acute for regime leaders because of possible political repercussions of executive action to overcome specific instances of bureaucratic resistance (Gawthrop, 1969). Such action would also disturb personal interaction patterns that, as already mentioned, play an important part in leadership.

This attention to the problems that changes in management create for attaining an organization's goals is augmented in the political realm by studies of leader succession. Bureaucratic succession frequently follows the succession of political leaders as appointees are placed in the bureaucracy. The problems of bureaucratic succession relate to bureaucratic sabotage as mentioned in our discussion of Gouldner (1950, see also Dimock, 1944, and

Levenson, 1961).

Most of the succession literature is couched in terms of "the succession problem" in authoritarian and one party regimes where the means of succession are not legitimized or regularized. Rustow

(1964) divides the succession problem into the problems involved in dealing with a nation whose leadership is engaged in a power struggle and the problems brought on by aged or critically ill leaders who precipitate a more subtle power struggle prior to their death. Other treatments of succession such as Harvey (1965) and Rush (1965) give more detailed analyses of the succession problem including impli­ cations for foreign policy.

Relatively few studies, although more recent ones, have dealt with the foreign policy implications of the succession of regime leaders. Forrester (1966) indicates that since Nehru's regime con­ trol over foreign policy in India has gradually been shifting away from the Prime Minister to the Congress party. His successors,

Shastri and Gandhi, had been unable to reverse this flow at the 7 time of Forrester's analysis. Blake (1968) is the earliest treat­ ment of the foreign policy impacts of leader succession in a cross national context that we have found. Investigating 126 successions, he finds that leader succession made no more difference in voting behavior in the United Nations than does ordinary change over time within one regime. This conclusion is challenged by Rosen (1974) who suggests that succession does not necessarily measure idiosyncratic differences in leaders. Using United Nations voting behavior and data from the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON)

Project he finds that there is more change in foreign policy behavior in instances of regime change than there is in instances of continu­ ing regimes. Salmore and Salmore (1972) present a theoretical 10 perspective for understanding when foreign policy will change with

regime changes and what types of changes will occur.

Another important portion of the leader and leadership litera­

ture consists of political biographies. Edinger (1964) reviews the political biographic literature and reaches some negative conclusions on the usefulness of most political biographies. He indicates that,

in spite of Murphy's (1950) call for an intensive analysis of the world's political leaders, the role of political biography in political science literature and scholarship has declined. He cites

Garraty (1957) in saying that writers of political biographies have been historians, journalists, and free lance writers who not only

do not conform to the precepts of scientific rigor, but have been moving away from the standards of objectivity, gompleteness, and

replication. Edinger suggests that political scientists should be

able to improve upon the biographies in the popular literature by

bringing to bear some of the findings and methods of the behavioral

approach. He indicates that some measure of scientific rigor will

have to be sacrificed in order to achieve the types of information necessary for classifying political leaders and their behavior in ways that can lead to comparison and generalization. Since Edinger's

review, there have been several political biographies by political Q scientists along the lines he suggested. Among the most interesting

are those studies that have followed the pattern set by George (1969)

in which he develops the "operational code" as an approach for

studying political leaders. The approach postulates a set of philosophical issues and a set of instrumental issues for typologizing 11

leaders. These dimensions form an operational code for interpreting

and predicting a leader's behavior. Although the usefulness of

operational codes in cross national contexts has not been demon­

strated and direct comparisons of operational codes have not been

made, the potential for such use is exciting.

Comparative political biographies do not exist. The phrase is

almost a contradiction of terms. A work extensive enough to be con­

sidered a biography in the usual sense is too intensive to be com­

bined with another such work in a comparative way. Edinger suggests

several problems with the use of existing biographies in scientific

re-analysis. The authors of different biographies may have taken

different perspectives on the individual which make their biographies

non-comparable. For example, German biographers stress the individual

as shaping the times during which he was in power; American bio­

graphers stress the individual as having been shaped by the times.

Such subtle differences in perspectives influence the original bio­

graphical research and the issues discussed in the written document.

It would be extremely difficult to remove differences in perspectives

in pursuit of scientific re-analysis. Some biographers try to reveal

the dynamics of personality through imaginative interpretation be­

coming didactic in their portrayal of the leader's role in history.

Another problem Edinger mentions regarding existing biographies is

that successful leaders are more likely to be biographed than un­

successful leaders. This is because information about them is more

readily available and they are more popular subjects for the reading public. However, unsuccessful leaders are as important from the 12

standpoint of leadership research as are successful leaders.

The leader and leadership studies that we have reviewed up to

this point have dealt with two broad topics. The first involves such

factors as the interaction of the individual's traits, the group's

needs, the group's relationships, and the group's tasks. This topic

might be represented by the simple question, who leads under what

circumstances? The other broad topic dealt with by these studies

involves the activities, characteristics, performance, and effective­

ness of persons in leadership positions. The studies dealing with

this latter topic are more relevant to the role of heads of state in

foreign policy than are the studies involving the question of who

leads.

The Cross National Study of Leaders and Leadership

The effectiveness of regime leaders is likely to be a relative matter as are most questions in social science. Some leaders are probably quite effective and others less effective. The literature

on the cross national study of leadership can provide insights to

leader effectiveness. These insights help to develop understandings

of regularities in effectiveness. Although cross national studies

of leadership that deal with leaders in terms of their characteris­

tics and behavior constitute a near void, the few which do exist

suggest characteristics pertinent to effectiveness. The relationships

implicit in these studies offer different approaches to understanding

effectiveness. The remainder of this section focuses on three cross national leadership studies which represent different approaches to leader 9 effectiveness. Kissinger's (1969) article on "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" is typical of the classical approach to leader effectiveness. Salmore and Salmore's (1972) paper on "Structure and

Change in Regimes — Their Effect on Foreign Policy" is typical of the regime approach to leader effectiveness. M. Hermann's (1976b) arti­ cle "Effect of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on

Foreign Policy" is typical of the psychological approach to leader effectiveness. Russett and Monsen (1975) make observations relevant to more than one of these approaches and will be mentioned where appropriate.

The Classical Approach

Kissinger's general thesis is that differences in domestic political structures result in different paths to political leader­ ship and thereby in different forms of leader behavior."^ He lists three factors as determining leadership groups: leader experiences during their rise to eminence, the structure in which the leader must operate, and the values of their society. These factors are viewed as resulting in three contemporary types of leadership: (a) the bureaucratic-pragmatic type, (b) the ideological type, and (c) the revolutionary-charismatic type. Although the behavior of these leadership groups is described as varying along a wide range of dimen­ sions, the revolutionary-charismatic type and the ideological type are similar in two respects. Both types are ideally characterized by 14 a single authoritarian leader, and both of these forms of leadership are reasoned to be more effective than the bureaucratic-pragmatic leadership of Western democracies. Thus, in regard to his treatment of leader effectiveness, Kissinger's classification of leaders epito­ mizes the classical distinction between democratic and authoritarian political states.

The reasoning used in evaluating the relative foreign policy effectiveness of leaders in authoritarian and democratic states has varied over time and among authors. Kissinger indicates that ideologi­ cal leaders legitimize their policies and prestige with their ideo­ logy. The importance of the ideology transcends bureaucratic differ­ ences, and national policy will more closely reflect the attitudes of the leader. The charismatic-revolutionary leader is able to rely on personal appeal to foster obedience. Charismatic-revolutionary leaders are assumed to use dramatic foreign policy to improve domestic cohesion. Dramatic policy is thought to improve the re­ sponsiveness of the bureaucracy as perceptions of external threat increase. Russett and Monsen (1975) sugyest that deviating from publicized policy, entails greater political risks than deviating from obscure policies. Thus, both heads of government and bureaucracies might adhere more closely to widely publicized policy. This suggests another reason for believing that charasmatic-revolutionary leaders are more effective than bureaucratic-pragmatic leaders. If dramatic foreign policy is supposed to improve domestic cohesion, it must be widely publicized, thus, the bureaucracy would tend to adhere to policies they might have otherwise obstructed. Morse (1970) states that in democracies domestic affairs are stressed over foreign affairs; the peaceful nature of foreign policy is stressed; foreign policy is formulated by representative legis­ latures; and external events are controlled through open rather than closed door diplomacy. These characteristics are reported by Morse as causing democracies to "suffer severe disabilities" in the conduct of foreign affairs. Waltz (1967) lists three worries about the ade­ quacy of foreign policy in a democracy.^ First, democracies will prefer the easy way to solve problems. For example, fighting to the end in order to demand an unconditional surrender is easier than negotiating a lasting peace. Second, public reaction to complicated international events is often unpredictable. This implies that foreign policy of a democracy will be unpredictable as policy is expected to flow from public opinion. Third, the opinions of the masses may override the wisdom of the experienced few.

Following an extended discussion of British and American foreign policy since World War II, Waltz concludes that "Authoritarian states suffer many of the political disabilities of democracies; they also have other shortcomings, which though different are as damaging"

(1967:308). The authoritarian is denied corrective criticism be­ cause he dominates those around him. It is also argued that succes­ sors are not better groaned for power in authoritarian states because this would endanger the power of the current leader. Also, power struggles upon succession result in greater discontinuities of policy than those presented by democratic elections. A major contribution of Waltz to the discussion of foreign policy in democratic and 16 authoritarian states is his observation that there is a trade-off between freedom of action cind the strength of a foreign policy posi­ tion. Only when a policy is widely supported by the public can the government fully deploy the nation's resources. Flexibility exists only when there is disinterest in foreign policy.

Katz (1973) suggests that even totalitarian leaders do not enjoy absolute control over foreign policy. The effectiveness of totalitarian leaders is mediated by three problems. The leader must maintain control over all institutions in the society. Contact and communication with the outside world must be heavily restricted,, that is, a closed society is needed. The size of modern societies means that the leader must delegate authority, thus, there is a threat of internal overthrow. Leaders in democratic states draw their strength from powers of persuasion and skills in interpersonal re­ lationships. Those in totalitarian states draw their strength from the use of coercive power.

The relative effectiveness of leaders on foreign policy in democratic and authoritarian states is not as clear as it may have once seemed. Recent research has indicated that not all of the posi­ tive factors are on the side of authoritarian leadership, nor are all the negative factors on the side of democratic leadership. Table 1.1 displays the positive and negative factors relevant to the effective­ ness of leaders in foreign policy. Numerically, the factors favoring 12 the leaders in authoritarian states and disfavoring leaders in demo­ cratic states indicate that the expectations of the classical approach would be upheld. Of course, reliance on such a shopping list of 17

Table 1.1

Factors That Alter The Foreign Policy Effectiveness Of Leaders In Democratic And Authoritarian States

Democratic Au thori tarian

Positive Factors Positive Factors national morale coercive power landslide election closed society free press charisma or ideology constructive criticism widely publicized policies for charismatic leaders stratified society more emphasis on foreign policy more planning

Negative Factors Negative Factors domestic politics no constructive criticism open society power struggles rule by public opinion risks of internal overthrow emphasis on peace take the easy way in diplomacy 18 factors would be wholly inadequate for making predictions of leader effectiveness. The list summarizes the types of societal character­ istics that might be considered in evaluating the relative foreign policy effectiveness of leaders in democratic and authoritarian states.

The Regime Approach

The regime approach to leader effectiveness keys on the accountability aspects of the classical approach. A review of the positive factors listed in Table 1.1 will show that most of the factors involve conditions which lessen the accountability of leaders or improve the more or less objective quality of their foreign policy.

In the column for democratic states, a landslide election represents an affirmation of the leader, but will be used as an affirmation of existing or promised policies. In the column for authoritarian states, coercive power is used to prevent people in the opposition forces from holding the leader accountable; a closed society reduces public information about policies and thereby lessens accountability; charisma is associated with special personal status and may represent the absence of accountability to other elites through a facade of perfect Identity and accountability with the people; ideology is used to embody policy with near religious status making accountability an unreasonable demand; and a stratified society limits accountability to the members of the elite whose needs are gratified through policy favors or a direct reward system. 19

Most of the negative factors listed in Table 1.1 involve con­

ditions which increase the accountability of leaders. In the column

for democratic states, the importance of domestic politics is that

the power base of the leader is more responsive to domestic problems

than foreign problems and will have low tolerance for the disruption

of domestic conditions for the sake of foreign policy. An open

society has free and easy access to information about foreign and dome: tic policy as well as information about problems neglected by policy. This access to information encourages leaders to perceive

themselves as being accountable to the public. However, access to

information and being informed are quite different and rule by public opinion makes the leader accountable to a relatively uninformed and whimsical public. In the column for authoritarian states, the risks of internal overthrow are a form of accountability that leaders try to protect themselves against.

The regime perspective developed by Salmore and Salmore (1972,

1975, 1976) focuses on the foreign policy ramifications of the pre­ mise that "a regime's primary goal is to maximize its political support" (1975:1). Regime is defined as the set of roles wherein resides the power to make authoritative foreign policy decisions.

The regime perspective on foreign policy involves three broad sets of variables. These are the amount of political resources the regime has available for implementing foreign policy, the limits on resource use imposed by political constraints, and the predisposition to use the resources that are available. The more resources available for foreign policy, the fewer political constraints on the use of resourcesi and the greater the predisposition to use the resources available; the more active and change oriented the regime's foreign policy is expected to be. The amount of resources available is believed to be positively related to the autonomy of the regime from other sectors of the society, the general level of societal support, and the willingness of the public to sacrifice. The intensity and direction of the predisposition to use resources may be conditioned by ideology, political socialization, and experiential history. The regime approach postulates that the extent of political constraint is related to the coherence within the regime, the accountability of the regime to wider publics, and the fragmentedness of the society.

The two regime concepts most relevant to the foreign policy effectiveness of leaders are regime genesis and regime coherence. 13 Regime genesis indicates how a regime came to power. Regime genesis reflects particular patterns of political socialization and experi­ ential history. Modes of succession are treated as either legal or illegal. Legally based regimes come to power through means legiti­ mated by the preceding regime. Lawful elections, cabinet reshuffles, and hereditary succession are some of the paths to power for legally based regimes. Illegally based regimes come to power from outside the law, generally through the use of force. Civil wars, revolutions, and coups d'etat are examples of illegal paths to power.

Illegal regime genesis alters leader effectiveness in foreign 14 policy in ways similar to those mentioned for charismatic leaders.

New states frequently have illegal seizures of power and have a ten­ dency toward authoritarian, rule. The domestic unrest that may have 21 fostered the illegal regime might encourage the leader to use foreign policy as a tool of domestic policy, seeking to mold domestic cohe­ sion through fear and hostility toward outgroups. Legal regimes do not need to use foreign policy to legitimize their power. They are usually more secure in their position than illegal regimes and thus will not have the pressures to use dramatic foreign policy to achieve domestic stability. The limited bureaucracies in new states and in­ creased perceptions of external threat will make leaders with illegal regimes more effective in foreign policy than those with legally based regimes.

Regime coherence indicates "the degree of internal unity of a regime" (Salmore, 1972:7), the general accord among decision-makers in the regime, and the exercise of clear lines of authority (Salmore,

1975). Coherence represents a dimension defined on one end by unity and on the other by fragmentedness.

If the leader shares his power among competing factions, the regime is fragmented. If the leader can act independently of others, the regime is unified. Regime coherence is also defined as "the extent to which a.regime can act in the external environment with the expectation that its actions will be accepted by internal support groups" (Salmore, 1972:8). The similarity of coherence to the notion of accountability links it to the classical approach which might be viewed from the regime perspective as a simple means for making dis­ tinctions in accountability.

Coherence is philosophically and functionally independent of the concepts of democratic and authoritarian states. Not all 22 democratic states are fragmented. Legislative majorities, and one party domination in democratic states are examples of unified regimes.

Authoritarian states may have regimes dependent upon support from internal civilian and military factions. Many Latin American states have had authoritarian rule based on an alliance of the landed aristocracy and business interests. The foreign policy effective­ ness of leaders with unified regimes will be greater than the effec- 15 tiveness of those with fragmented regimes. Salmore and Salmore

(1976:137) state that "major successful initiatives would likely be taken by unified regimes; failures would be higher for initiatives undertaken by fragmented regimes...."

Russett and Monsen (1975) describe an inverse relationship between accountability and risk taking. The more accountable the leader, the less risk taking he will engage in. Their reasoning is that the leader is likely to anticipate negative payoffs for failure.

This suggests that more accountable leaders will be less active and will pursue more stable policies than leaders who are less account­ able. The more accountable leaders are thus less likely to attempt to lead the way in formulating foreign policy and will exhibit less effectiveness than leaders with lower accountability. Russett and

Monsen also suggest that among polyarchies the free press will aid leaders in implementing their goals. The free press is expected to criticize the bureaucracy using information leaked about deviations from stated policy. This suggests that among leaders with fragmented regimes, those with a free press will be more effective in foreign policy than those with a controlled press. 23

The Psychological Approach

The psychological approach to foreign policy focuses on the relationship of personal characteristics of individuals to the nature of foreign policy. The approach developed by M. Hermann (1972, 1976b) is premised on the assumption that the higher an individual is in

the foreign policy hierarchy, the greater and more likely will be the effects of his personal characteristics on his government's foreign policy. In most countries, the head of government has ulti­ mate responsibility for foreign policy; he is at the top of the hierarchy. There are personal characteristics that are postulated to enhance the relationships between the head of government's psycho- 16 logical traits and his government's foreign policy. These charac­ teristics are his interest in foreign affairs, his training in

foreign affairs, and his sensitivity to the environment.

M. Hermann (1976b) posits that the leader's interest in foreign affairs acts as a motivating force. High interest in foreign affairs by the leader is viewed as motivating him to give greater attention to the activities surrounding foreign policy than would leaders who have little interest. Leaders with little interest in foreign affairs are likely to delegate authority to others and to confine their activity in foreign policy to routine and procedural matters.

If the leader has little interest in foreign affairs, the chances of his personal characteristics being related to the government's foreign policy would be limited to any similarities between his characteristics and the personal characteristics of those persons to whom he delegated his authority. It is assumed that leaders who have 24 high interest in foreign affairs "will want to be consulted on deci­

sions and will want to be kept informed about what is happening in

foreign affairs" (M. Hermann, 1976b:42). This higher level of con­

tacts with and direction by the leader is the primary mechanism by which his interest in foreign affairs is theorized to enhance the relationship between his personal characteristics and the government's foreign policy.

Verba (1961) suggests a similar relationship. He argues that the likelihood of personality traits playing a role in determining behavior may increase with greater personal involvement in the situ­ ation. Verba's discussion is not directly related to the impact the

leader's characteristics may have on the behavior of other persons involved in the policy-making process. His discussion is more similar to the interaction sequences one might expect in a heated argument. Greater personal involvement makes the cognitive and evaluative aspects of the situation more ambiguous. The more ambigu­ ous the situation, the greater role the leader's personal character­

istics play in structuring his behavior. This discussion is not a diversion, for it may be asserted that the more important the leader's personal characteristics are in determining his own behavior, the more likely it is that the personal characteristics manifest in his behavior will be related to the behavior of other decision-makers in the hierarchy. The linkages among the leader's interest, involve­ ment, and behavior in foreign affairs are an important aspect of the psychological approach. 25

The second personal characteristic that enhances the relation­ ship between the leader's psychological traits and his government's 17 foreign policy is his training in foreign affairs. The leader with little training will rely on his "natural problem-solving predisposi­ tions" (M. Hermann, 1976b:43) in making decisions about foreign policy. He has little expertise to draw upon; unstated alternatives may be unknown to him; and he may not be aware of norms, nor appre- * ciate their significance, in the conduct of foreign policy. The prospects for the leader with high training seem much brighter. He can be assumed to have some knowledge about what will succeed and what will fail in international politics. His experience will have given him the ability to develop issue and nation specific strategies for pursuing goals. Hermann posits that these capabilities make the relationship between the personal characteristics of highly trained leaders and their government's foreign policy difficult to predict.

Apparently, high training in foreign affairs results in a degree of professional objectivity which obstructs the personal characteristic- foreign policy relationship.

The third personal characteristic that is believed to affect the relationship between the leader's psychological traits and his government's foreign policy is his sensitivity to the environment.

M. Hermann states that this sensitivity "indicates the extent to which an individual is responsive to incoming stimuli from objects in the milieu in which he operates." (1976b:43). Hermann suggests that the personal characteristics of leaders with little sensitivity to the environment will have a consistent impact on foreign policy. They will give the same response to different stimuli. Leaders who are

sensitive to their environment would be more likely to differentiate stimuli and to adjust policy to suit changes in the environment.

This suggests that for leaders who are sensitive to their environment, the relationship between personal characteristics and foreign policy, at least in part, depends on the environment or the decision-making situation. Interest, training, and sensitivity to the environment are viewed as mediating the relationship between a government's foreign policy and the leader's other personal characteristics.

Hermann is still in the process of developing the theoretical link­ ages between foreign policy and these other characteristics.

High interest in foreign affairs by leaders is associated with high levels of effectiveness in foreign policy for several reasons.

First, it is assumed that leaders with high interest in foreign affairs will pay a great deal of attention to foreign policy matters.

This means that leaders with high interest would participate more frequently and on a greater variety of issues in the foreign policy making process than would those with little interest in foreign affairs. Leaders easily affect the decisions in which they partici­ pate. More frequent participation by the leader places a larger proportion of foreign policy decisions within the realm where he can easily have an effect on them. More frequent participation results in a greater direct effect on foreign policy by leaders. Interest in foreign affairs is also associated with higher levels of indirect effects on foreign policy. Leaders who have high interest in foreign affairs and who thereby pay more attention to foreign policy are 27 likely to be perceived by decision-makers in the foreign policy hier­ archy as checking up on the implementation of decisions more frequent­ ly and as being more likely to apply executive sanctions for failure to implement decisions than leaders with little interest. These perceptions are assumed to result in higher rates of faithful policy implementation which can be interpreted as higher levels of indirect effectiveness.

High training in foreign affairs by leaders is theorized to be associated with high levels of effectiveness in foreign policy.

Training refers to the skills, knowledge, and expertise developed through experience in dealing with the foreign affairs of the nation.

High training would naturally involve an extensive network of informal relationships with members of the nation's general foreign affairs community and with members of its foreign policy hierarchy with whom the leader would have dealt during his foreign affairs experience.

Persons within this network of informal relationships are likely to accord the leader more prestige and respect than they would if they had never dealt will: him personally. Other persons in the foreign affairs community will have knowledge of his experience and will accord him more prestige and respect than they would if he had little experience in foreign affairs, but less than they would have accorded him if they had dealt with him personally.

Persons within the network of informal relationships developed by the highly trained leader and to a more limited extent persons outside such a network can be expected to he more responsive to re­ quests for information. They may also look out for the interests of 28 the leader. This does not imply that they disregard their own inter­ ests, but that they may be more likely to report failures in imple­ mentation by others. If persons within the network behave as reason­ ed, the foreign policy effectiveness of highly trained leaders would exceed the effectiveness of those with little training.

A leader with high training is assumed to internalize some of the norms and outlooks of his nation's foreign affairs community during his foreign affairs experience. The similarity of norms and outlooks between the leader with high training and his foreign affairs community is believed to result in similarities in the perception and definition of foreign affairs problems and in shared perceptions of the policies or actions that are likely to resolve the problem or be successful. These shared perceptions may foster more widely spread acceptance of the policies within the relevant publics than would be the case if these perceptions were not shared. The more widespread acceptance of a policy within the publics responsible for implementing it, the more faithfully it ought to be implemented. The internali­ zation of norms thus augments the relationship between training and effectiveness.

The expected relationship between training and effectiveness is supported by many small group studies that have found a positive relationship between group members1 perceptions of the leader's task relevant skills and the productivity of the group (Gibb, 1969).

The interest, training, and sensitivity to the environment concepts of the psychological approach are related to concepts in the classical and regime approaches. Their relationship is not 29

obvious because the concepts in the psychological approach have a

different theoretical development. A distinction could be made in

the concept of sensitivity to the environment between the nation's

internal and external environments. Sensitivity to internal environ­ ments is similar to the notion of accountability. Clearly the publics which may hold a leader accountable are part of the milieu in which the leader operates. If a leader is responsive to the demands of those publics, he is being sensitive, to the stimuli they have created for him. An insensitive leader with an accountable regime or in a democratic state may not be able to retain power. Training and to some extent interest are part of and exist through the leader's political socialization and experiential history which were assumed by the regime approach to condition the predisposition to use re­ sources. The point is that the concepts involved in all three of the approaches we have discussed are different interpretations for some of the same general phenomena and although the concepts cannot effec­ tively be interchanged, their conceptual relationships suggest that empirical measures developed for them may be related.

SUMMARY AND DIRECTIONS

This study's goals are to describe the foreign policy behavior of regime leaders and to investigate alternative understandings of leader effectiveness that are suggested by cross national studies of regime leadership. Most of this chapter has been concerned with the scholarship that has developed these alternative means for under­ standing regime leader effectiveness. This emphasis does not reflect 30 the relative importance of these goals. Much progress should be made by describing regime leader behavior. However, the difficulty of the other task requires that more attention be given to investigating leader effectiveness.

Each of the three approaches to understanding leader effective­ ness suggests relationships between its major concepts and the degree of leader effectiveness. The classical approach suggests that the type of political system a .nation has can boost or retard the leader's effectiveness. Leaders in authoritarian states are ex­ pected to be more effective than those in democracies. The regime approach, keying on the accountability aspects of the classical approach, suggests that regime coherence and regime genesis are important. Leaders of regimes with illegal geneses are expected to use dramatic foreign policy which will make them more effective than leaders of regimes that come to power through legal means. Leaders of regimes with high internal unity are expected to be more effective than those with fragmented regimes. The psychological approach suggests that leader interest and training in foreign affairs are important personal characteristics relevant to leader effectiveness.

Those with high interest are expected to be more effective than those with low interest. Those with much training are expected to be more effective than those with little training. The analysis of leader effectiveness focuses on these relationships and uses the three approaches to provide an orientation to the scholarly bases of the relationships. This study focuses on four research questions. What is the

nature of regime leaders' foreign policy behavior? This first ques­

tion serves the goal of describing behavior and is addressed in the

third chapter. The second research question also involves descrip­

tion, but its impetus lies in the recent challenges to the foreign policy leadership role regime leaders are assumed to play. What is

the extent of regime leader effectiveness in foreign policy? The

fifth and sixth chapters are concerned with this question. The third and fourth questions deal with the relationships embodied by the approaches to effectiveness. How can the effectiveness of regime

leaders be understood? That is, how are the regime, classical, and psychological approaches to foreign policy behavior empirically related to leader effectiveness? And finally, what are the relation­ ships among these understandings of leader effectiveness? The fourth research question is pursued for two reasons. As mentioned in the discussions of the classical, regime, and psychological approaches,

.theoretical linkages exist among their major concepts. In some cases the concepts are different interpretations of the same general phenomena. These linkages suggest that the empirical measures may be related. The third and fourth questions are dealt with in the fifth chapter. NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

*The term "heads of government" is cumbersome and quickly tiring. Terms such as "national leaders" or "regime leaders" read more easily, however two problems arise. The term "national leaders" readily appears to include all persons in the top leadership of a nation. "Heads of government" clearly suggests only one person per nation as is intended. Some analysts have challenged the reality of the leader­ ship role played by heads of government (cumbersome). Thus, there are problems with any phrase which includes the term "leader" because it might be taken to imply that the persons referred to lead other persons. The terms "head of government", "regime leader", and simply "leader" are used interchangably here though consistency is main­ tained within individual sections. Ease in reading has been the major criteria in selecting the term to be used in any particular section and thus the term "leader" is the most prevalent. 2 For a more extensive review of small group research see McGrath (1962) who summarizes the findings of 2155 small group re­ search studies, and in political behavior see Verba (1961) who sum­ marizes some small group research directly relevant to political leadership. 3 Gibb (1969) provides an extensive review of the social psycho­ logical literature on leadership. Most of the findings described here are drawn from his work. 4 We do not wish to imply that the attainment of foreign policy goals is impossible to measure. Russett and Monsen (1975) have made an admirable attempt to measure national goal attainment by assuming that all nations pursue peace, economic growth, and an egalitarian income distribution. Neither do we wish to imply that leadership research on all subnational groups is irrelevant to leadership in foreign policy. 5 The findings reported by Gibb have an interesting parallel m studies of Miller and Stokes (1963), and Cnudde and McCrone (1966). These studies relate the attitudes of congressmen to the attitudes of their constituencies in an attempt to explain congressional voting behavior. If the congressman and his constituency are viewed as a highly abstracted leader-group relationship, then the agreement between their attitudes may be considered as support for the findings reported by Gibb at the level of mass political leadership. 32 33

^See Brecht (1937) for an early study of both inadvertent and willful bureaucratic sabotage. 7 During the 1970's Gandhi has done rather well with stopping and then reversing the flow of power to the party. g Among the more noteworthy of these political biographies are Edinger (1965), Wedge (1968), George (1969), Donley and Winter (1970), Holsti (1970b), McClellan (1971), Robinson (1972), Cummins (1973), and Johnson (1973). q The works of Duncan (1976), Gomez (1967), and Wriggins (1969) are not discussed extensively even though they are cross national examinations of heads of government and do discuss control or effec­ tiveness in foreign policy. Each places heavy emphasis on similari­ ties of the leadership in countries which, though they are different nations, are treated as categorically the same. There are few com­ parisons with heads of government in different situations, thus limiting the usefulness of these studies for our purposes. Duncan and Gomez emphasize the similarities of heads of government in Latin America. They stress the dominant role of the President based on a wide range of powers: commander in chief of the armed forces, broad appointment and removal powers, decree powers, legislative powers, and the state of seige which suspends individual freedoms and con­ stitutional guarantees. Wriggins limits his analysis to heads of government in new Asian and African states. He describes power as being based on an extensive reward system available to these heads of government including the number of new bureaus to be filled by appointment, predominant one party rule, the extreme inequality of wealth in society, corruption, and societal expectations of a life of flash and flare in leadership.

■^The linkages between domestic political structures, patterns of leadership selection, and types of leaders are also made by Cummins (1973). The linkages posited by Cummins are from culture to values to leader behavior and so his work is quite similar to Kissinger's. However, he proceeds to an empirical analysis based on two heads of government and two military leaders. He concludes that the differ­ ences within cultures exceed the differences between them. Baser's (1966) cross national summary of personal traits and Modelski (1970) also suggest that differences between national political leaders may not be as great as Kissinger suggests.

"^The first chapter by Waltz (1967) provides a good historical review of the philosophy that democracies are at a disadvantage in the conduct of foreign policy. 12 Gibb (1969) cautions strongly against assuming an identity between authoritarian leadership style and authoritarian political systems. Findings in small group research support the notion that 34

authoritarian leadership styles are more effective in that they have generally been associated with greater qroup productivity. However, groups are more satisfied and more productive if the current leader uses the same leadership style as past leaders. This suggests that changing from one leadership style to the other would be counter pro­ ductive at least in the short run. 13 See Gibb (1969) for another discussion of succession as a means for explaining the findings of leadership studies. 14 Edinger (1964) discusses the breakdown of institutionalized patterns as might be characterized by domestic instability and illegal regime genesis. He suggests that an innovating leader may be able to substitute a charismatic .role for the institutional role. 15 Hiker's (1962) theory of minimum winning coalitions suggests a different rationale. He suggests that large legislative majorities encourage defections from the party position to positions that are personally favored. These defections are based on the perception that the party's loss of one vote will be insignificant because of the large majority. The defeat of party policy can then be rational­ ized by the lack of popular support indicated by the vote. If there is a minimal majority, it may facilitate the party's ability to hold the voting ranks. 16 Elsewhere Etzioni, 1969; Greenstein, 1969; M. Hermann, 1976a; Holsti, 1970a; and Verba, 1961, describe circumstances or situat