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The Monetary and Fiscal History of Brazil, 1960-2016 NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE MONETARY AND FISCAL HISTORY OF BRAZIL, 1960-2016 Joao Ayres Marcio Garcia Diogo A. Guillén Patrick J. Kehoe Working Paper 25421 http://www.nber.org/papers/w25421 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 January 2019 This is a chapter in forthcoming book The Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America. We would like to thank Marcelo Abreu, Pérsio Arida, Edmar Bacha, Marco Bassetto, Tiago Berriel, Afonso Bevilaqua, Amaury Bier, Claudio Considera, Gustavo Franco, Fabio Giambiagi, Claudio Jaloretto, Joaquim Levy, Eduardo Loyo, Timothy Kehoe, Ana Maria Jul, Randy Kroszner, Pedro Malan, Rodolfo Manuelli, Andy Neumeyer, Juan Pablo Nicolini, Affonso Pastore, Murilo Portugal, Thomas Sargent, Teresa Ter-Minassian, José Scheinkman, Rogério Werneck, and participants at the “Monetary and Fiscal History of Latin America” workshops held in the University of Chicago, LACEA-LAMES in Buenos Aires, PUC-Rio, Central Bank of Chile, and Inter-American Development Bank. This project was coordinated by Marcio Garcia. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, the Federal Reserve System, Inter-American Development Bank, or the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w25421.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2019 by Joao Ayres, Marcio Garcia, Diogo A. Guillén, and Patrick J. Kehoe. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. The Monetary and Fiscal History of Brazil, 1960-2016 Joao Ayres, Marcio Garcia, Diogo A. Guillén, and Patrick J. Kehoe NBER Working Paper No. 25421 January 2019 JEL No. E0,E02,E3,E4,E42,E5,E58,E6 ABSTRACT Brazil has had a long period of high inflation. It peaked around 100 percent per year in 1964, decreased until the first oil shock (1973), but accelerated again afterward, reaching levels above 100 percent on average between 1980 and 1994. This last period coincided with severe balance of payments problems and economic stagnation that followed the external debt crisis in the early 1980s. We show that the high-inflation period (1960–1994) was characterized by a combination of fiscal deficits, passive monetary policy, and constraints on debt financing. The transition to the low-inflation period (1995–2016) was characterized by improvements in all of these features, but it did not lead to significant improvements in economic growth. In addition, we document a strong positive correlation between inflation rates and seigniorage revenues, although inflation rates are relatively high for modest levels of seigniorage revenues. Finally, we discuss the role of the weak institutional framework surrounding the fiscal and monetary authorities and the role of monetary passiveness and inflation indexation in accounting for the unique features of inflation dynamics in Brazil. Joao Ayres Diogo A. Guillén Inter-American Development Bank Itau-Unibanco Asset Management [email protected] [email protected] Marcio Garcia Patrick J. Kehoe Pontifical Catholic University of Rio De Janiero Department of Economics [email protected] Stanford University 579 Serra Mall Stanford, CA 94305 and NBER [email protected] 1 Introduction This chapter presents the monetary and fiscal history of Brazil between 1960 and 2016, with emphasis on the hyperinflation episodes. It describes the evolution of the Brazilian monetary and fiscal policy institutions and how they relate to episodes of macroeconomic instability and growth experience, focusing on the high-inflation period (pre-1994) and two stabilization plans: the Government Economic Action Plan (PAEG, an abbreviation for Plano de A¸c~aoEcon^omicado Governo) and the Real Plan. The PAEG, in 1964, stabilized inflation around 100 percent per year, whereas the Real Plan, in 1994, stabilized inflation around 90 percent per month after six failed attempts in over a decade. The analysis follows the conceptual framework in chapter 2 by focusing on the government budget constraint. A summary of the period is illustrated in figure 1, which shows the evolution of real GDP per capita, inflation, and government deficits for the 1960{2016 period.1 Three subperiods are identified: (1) 1960{1980: fast economic growth with high inflation and moderate deficits; (2) 1981{1994: slow growth with hyperinflation and high deficits; and (3) 1995{2016: moderate growth with low inflation and low deficits.2 The 1981{1994 subperiod stands out not only by its poor growth performance and hyperinflation but also by severe balance of payments problems, a common feature among highly indebted Latin American countries affected by the increase in international interest rates and the slowdown in international economic growth. When relating the episodes of macroeconomic instability to the government fiscal and monetary policies, we observe the following: (1) both stabilization plans, PAEG in 1964 and the Real Plan in 1994, included measures to improve fiscal balances and were followed by increased access to debt financing; (2) the government policy to increase public investment in the wake of the first oil shock in 1973 explains the rapid increase in external debt that preceded the external debt crisis of 1983 seen in figure 2; and (3) the high-inflation periods (pre-1994) were characterized by the combination of fiscal deficits, passive monetary policy, and constraints on debt financing, while the transition to the low-inflation period (1995{2016) was associated with improvements in government fiscal balances, higher de facto independence of the monetary authority (as of this writing, Brazil still lacks a formally independent central bank), as well as much greater access to debt financing. In comparison to other Latin American countries, the following two characteristics make the Brazilian experience rather unique: (1) a long period of high inflation, with annual inflation rates above 100 percent between 1980 and 1994; and (2) modest levels 1AppendixC discusses the data and methodology. Our definition of “deficit” is the primary deficit plus real interest payments on debt discounting for real GDP growth (see chapter 2), and throughout the chapter, we use the General Price Index from Getulio Vargas Foundation, IGP-DI, as our benchmark. 2One must bear in mind that the quality of fiscal statistics decreases as we move back in time. 2 of deficits for very high underlying inflation rates. We discuss two features that may explain these unique characteristics of the Brazilian hyperinflation. The first is a poor institutional framework in which other public entities besides the monetary authority had indirect control over money issuance. We discuss that framework in section 4.1. The second is the combination of a high degree of indexation in the economy to past inflation with a passive monetary policy.3 Together, these features created what was called at the time inflation inertia, which could explain why the Brazilian hyperinflation was a much more protracted process than elsewhere and gave many the illusion that it could be cured without major improvements in the fiscal stance. We discuss that factor in section 4.2. This chapter is organized as follows: in section 2, we present a summary of the government budget constraint, and in section 3, we provide a historical description of each of the subperiods 1960{1980, 1981{1994, and 1995{2016. In section 4 we discuss the evolution of the institutional framework involving both fiscal and monetary authorities and the genesis of inflation inertia, and in section 5, we present our final remarks and conclusion. 2 The government budget constraint We are interested in analyzing the evolution of the government budget constraint for Brazil in 1960{2016. We attempt to match the variation in stocks (debt figures) with flows (fiscal deficits), duly accounting for valuation effects.4 Table 1 presents a summary of the results. In order to finance interest payments and primary deficits, the government can either issue domestic and external debt or issue money and receive seigniorage revenues. Transfers account for the residual.5 We divide the 1960{1980 subperiod into three parts: 1960{1964, 1965{1972, and 1973{ 1980. In 1960{1964, markets for government debt securities were still underdeveloped, and the government faced restrictions on both domestic and external debt financing. Interest payments were low but primary deficits were on the rise, and had to be financed with seigniorage revenues. In 1964{1967, the stabilization plan PAEG implemented both fiscal and financial reforms, which reduced primary deficits and allowed the government to issue domestic debt securities. Those reforms account for the increase in domestic debt financing and the reduction in seigniorage revenues that we observe in the 1965{ 1972 period. In 1973{1980, on the other hand, we observe a rise in both debt financing in external markets and seigniorage revenues, which were associated with higher interest 3Most prices, wages, taxes, and the exchange rate were indexed to past inflation. 4Mainly the effect of devaluations on foreign-currency-denominated or indexed debt. 5The sums of primary deficits and transfers is close to the measure of the primary deficit reported by the Central Bank of Brazil starting in 1985, which is based on the public-sector borrowing requirements and is usually referred to as the primary deficit below the line. See appendix C. 3 payments on external debt and a significant rise in transfers, the residual.6 Fortunately, in this case, we can explain what most of these transfers are. In the wake of the first oil crisis of 1973, the government implemented policies that aimed at boosting investment through external borrowing, and that was done mainly through state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
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