september 2014 . Vol 7 . Issue 9

Contents Profiles of Foreign Fighters in

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Profiles of Foreign Fighters in Syria Syria and and Iraq By Evan Kohlmann and Laith Alkhouri By Evan Kohlmann and Laith Alkhouri

Reports 5 New Developments in Australian Foreign Fighter Activity By Andrew Zammit 9 The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014 By Jeffrey White 14 Iraq’s New Government and the Question of Sunni Inclusion By Reidar Visser 16 Ebola: Not an Effective Biological Weapon for Terrorists By Stephen Hummel 19 The Life and Death of Al-Shabab Leader Ahmed Godane By Christopher Anzalone

23 Recent Highlights in Political Violence 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

n february 2003, the Central Muslim revolution.3 The events of 9/11 Intelligence Agency published a made it painfully clear that there could “National Strategy for Combating be severe consequences for permitting .”1 Drawing on lessons ungoverned spaces to lapse into the Ilearned from the failures that led to the control of stateless extremists. Had more devastating terrorist attacks in New of this first generation of “muhajirin” York and Washington on 9/11, the CIA possessed European or North American warned that “terrorism cannot have travel documents and citizenship—as in About the CTC Sentinel a place of refuge” and, as such, the the case with the Syria and Iraq conflicts The Combating Terrorism Center is an United States must “ensure effective today—the United States might have independent educational and research governance over ungoverned territory, faced an unprecedented security threat institution based in the Department of Social which could provide sanctuary to in the pursuant years. Sciences at the United States Military Academy, terrorists.”2 This decision was directly West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses based on the example of , It is these stark lessons from the era the Center’s global network of scholars and where the United States had detachedly of 9/11 that make the contemporary practitioners to understand and confront observed—to its later regret—as up to problem of North American, European, contemporary threats posed by terrorism and 20,000 foreign fighters traveled to and Australian foreign fighters now other forms of political violence. the region in search of paramilitary gathering in Syria and Iraq under the training and expertise to launch a Sunni banner of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Jabhat al-Nusra, and The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 1 “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,” Central the Department of the Army, or any other agency 3 The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & of the U.S. Government. Intelligence Agency, February 2003. 2 Ibid. Co., 2004), p. 67.

1 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 potentially the Khorasan group so his U.S. passport, chewing on parts don’t have hotel, I don’t have none troubling. Even rough estimates of of it, and setting it on fire. He offered of this stuff. I’m scared…I don’t their numbers far exceed those seen an explicit message in English for the know what to do. Subhanallah, I in prior jihadist conflicts. These Western public: “You think you are safe see two men, three men speaking numbers include dozens of U.S. where you are, in America and Britain. Arabic, and I said, “Subhanallah, nationals, approximately 500 British You think you are safe, you are not I know what these people are here citizens, and more than 900 residents safe.”7 Turning his attention directly to for.” People speaking Arabic, of France.4 ISIL propagandists have President Barack Obama, he vowed, “We they’re either Syrian or you know, openly singled out for recruitment are coming for you, mark my words.”8 from tons of research, muhajirin “he” who “lives in the West amongst from Tunis or I don’t know where… the kuffar [disbelievers] for years, spends In another video, Abusalha calmly So I didn’t say nothing to them I hours on the internet, reads news and recounted how he began “striving” to just simply sat down and waited posts on forums.”5 More recently, “get to ” while living in Texas. He until they got off the train. When ISIL leaders have called on their credited lectures by Yemeni-American they got off I was going to speak to sympathizers to undertake attacks in cleric Anwar al-`Awlaqi on hijra for them. It was very dangerous what I the West.6 Indeed, perhaps never in the helping inspire him to take action: “he was doing—I could’ve went to jail, history of the global jihadist movement [al-`Awlaqi] says, you make hijra, it’s you know, could’ve been a spy... has one single conflict attracted so many like a cliff. You jump off the cliff, but So when I got off the train, I follow Westerners seeking to join the cause in you don’t know if the water is deep or them I went to ask them, “I want to such a short period of time—and the shallow. You don’t know if there’s going make hijra, I want to go to jihad.”11 stories of these men and women give to be rocks…you just have to jump and real reason for pause and reflection. put your [trust] in Allah.”9 Abusalha After several failed efforts to randomly described the moment he “realized I was approach Arabic-speaking men with This article profiles a number of being watched by the Federal Bureau Salafist-style beards and ask their help Americans and other Western foreign of Investigation. I had to flee back to in getting to Syria, Abusalha eventually fighters who traveled to fight in Syria [Florida] to throw them off and think came across a one-armed Turkish man and Iraq, and assesses the potential that I was somewhere else in the United who agreed to help and cheerfully threat these fighters pose to the West. States.” Shortly thereafter, he set off acknowledged in what little Arabic he It finds that these recruits often come and “walked literally five miles to the spoke, “I am from al-Qa`ida.”12 from humble and unexpected origins. At airport. I went straight. I didn’t look times, they are evading the best efforts back…I walked with a heavy bag on my A Wave of American Recruits by law enforcement and intelligence shoulders, and…I was singing anashid. I Recruits headed to jihadist factions agencies to detect and monitor them. was very happy.”10 This enthusiasm was in Syria have likewise come from the The available evidence suggests they soon tempered with the harsh realities West Coast of the United States. In are also readily embracing the notion of he found at his intended destination: late 2012, a local Muslim convert from combating their enemies far beyond the Turkey. He confessed, Garden Grove, California, Sinh Vinh borders of the Levant. Ngo Nguyen (also known as Hasan Abu When I was making hijra, I didn’t Omar Ghannoum), traveled to Syria America’s First Suicide Bomber in Syria know what to do, all I knew was where he joined Islamist forces and On May 25, 2014, Moner Mohammed you know I just get on the airplane spent four months in combat near the Abusalha, a 22-year-old American and get to Istanbul because from town of Qusayr. In late January 2013, from the sleepy town of Ft. Pierce on research, tons of research, I know he posted an update on his status to Florida’s Atlantic coast, drove a truck that all the mujahidin that come friends on Facebook: “I’m doing well in packed with 17 tons of explosives into from around the world they come Syria…having a blast here, and I mean a fortified, mountaintop base manned to Istanbul and you know Turkey literally.”13 Nguyen later acknowledged by the Syrian army in Idlib Province, and the Syrian border’s close and to the FBI that while in Syria he had making him the first known suicide they switch like this…I still don’t “offered to train some of the al-Qa`ida bomber in Syria to come from the know what to do. I still need to fighters” from Jabhat al-Nusra who he United States. He conducted his attack look for mujahidin, I need to look had “fought alongside” and “greatly on behalf of al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in for people to help me to get to jihad admired.”14 After returning to the Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. In the weeks in Syria…In my heart, I don’t know United States for six months, U.S. following his death, several videos were where to start. I don’t know where law enforcement arrested Nguyen as published on the internet featuring to begin, who to ask, you know, I he attempted to travel to Peshawar, final recorded messages from Abusalha, was scared. I don’t have money, I Pakistan, via Mexico in October 2013. including showing him ripping up He later pleaded guilty to charges of

7 “The Story of an American Muhajir in Al-Sham: A Spe- conspiring to travel to an al-Qa`ida 4 Elaine Ganley, “2 French Girls Investigated as Would- cial Meeting with the Mujahid Shahid Abu Hurayra Al- Be Jihadis,” , August 22, 2014. Amriki,” The Global Islamic Media Front, July 28, 2014. 11 Ibid. 5 Dabiq Magazine 3, al-Hayat Media Center, August 8 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 2014, p. 27. 9 “Interview with Abu Huraira Ameriki. Part 1: The Hi- 13 This post was available on Facebook. 6 “Islamic State’s Taunting Speech Calls for Killing Civil- jrah,” Bilad al-Sham Media, August 29, 2014. 14 U.S.A. v. Sinh Vinh Ngo Nguyen, Central District of ians,” Los Angeles Times, September 22, 2014. 10 Ibid. California, 2013.

2 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 training camp in Pakistan to assist in replied that she had “no interest in the Netherlands, France, and many providing paramilitary training and doing humanitarian work” and “felt other countries have joined the ranks instruction. Nguyen admitted that, after that jihad is the only answer to correct of extremist groups in Syria, creating fighting alongside Jabhat al-Nusra in the wrongs against the Muslim world.”19 a frenzy among law enforcement and Syria, he was infatuated with the desire She admitted that she was in intimate intelligence agencies. to “return to jihad,” believing “that this contact with a 32-year-old Tunisian was what he was born to do.”15 national working for ISIL, as well as Recruitment Beyond U.S. Borders another woman who had married an ISIL As was vividly evidenced by ISIL’s Ironically, neither Nguyen and militant. When asked if she intended to execution videos of American journalists Abusalha were recruited or fighting actually engage in jihad, she responded, James Foley and Steven Sotloff, the on behalf of ISIL—but rather were “If it was absolutely necessary, then faces an increasingly drawn to al-Qa`ida’s official franchise yes…I would do it.” She admitted that complex problem stemming from its in the region, Jabhat al-Nusra, which her knowledge of Islam and ISIL were nationals who have traveled to Syria. is engaged in a bitter and violent drawn solely from “research that For some of these individuals, Syria dispute with ISIL and, until recently, she conducted on the internet.”20 On is merely the latest chapter in their has not been considered as potent an April 8, 2014, after multiple attempts process of radicalization. In February international threat as ISIL. Yet, since by the FBI to intervene and dissuade 2014, British national Abdul Waheed the latest wave of conquest by ISIL over her from pursuing her mission, agents Majid (also known as Abu Sulaiman vast regions of Syria and Iraq, the weight finally arrested Conley at Denver al-Muhajir)—who reportedly once of Western recruitment seems to have International Airport as she attempted served as a personal aide and driver swayed firmly in its direction. On July to board a flight to Turkey via Frankfurt. for extremist cleric Shaykh Omar Bakri 2, 2014, FBI agents stopped 20-year-old In her possession were materials Mohammed—blew himself up in a Los Angeles native Adam Dandach from for providing first aid as well as “a suicide bombing targeting the infamous boarding a flight at John Wayne Airport number of CD/DVDs labeled ‘Anwar al- Aleppo Central Prison in order to in Orange County, California, headed to `Awlaqi.’”21 According to Conley’s own spearhead a pitched ground assault by Istanbul. He allegedly told the agents public defender, her arrest by the FBI Jabhat al-Nusra.24 The operation, which that he intended to travel to Syria to “may very well have saved her life.”22 was the first known case of a British “assist ISIS [ISIL] with anything ISIS suicide bomber in Syria, reportedly led asked him to do, and that he believed ISIL is even now drawing American to the escape of hundreds of prisoners. the killings of U.S. soldiers are justified recruits away from other competing In a subsequent interview with British killings.”16 According to a criminal jihadist factions globally, including media, Omar Bakri praised Majid as “a complaint filed in his case, Dandach various official branches of al-Qa`ida. very dear brother”: “He was someone later told his brother that “he was more This has become clear in Minnesota, who was always at hand to help people… disappointed that he did not get to go to where reports indicate that ethnic He was also very interested in the issue Syria than getting in trouble with law Somali men who might once have been of how we could establish an Islamic enforcement.”17 lured by the cultural appeal of al- state.”25 Qa`ida’s al-Shabab affiliate in East Interestingly, not all of the would-be Africa are now instead heading to the On June 19, 2014, the same English- American recruits in Syria and Iraq unlikely destination of Syria. A federal language ISIL media unit responsible are male. On September 10, 2014, 19- grand jury in the Minneapolis area is for releasing the James Foley beheading year-old Colorado resident Shannon reportedly looking into allegations video, the al-Hayat Media Center, Maureen Conley pleaded guilty to that as many as 30 young Somali- published a video titled There is No Life providing material support to ISIL Americans were encouraged to travel Without Jihad, featuring recorded English- after being recruited online by an by unknown parties to Syria to join language interviews with several British individual who described himself as ISIL and Jabhat al-Nusra over the past jihadists, including two young men “an active member” of ISIL.18 Even two years, including a 19-year-old of Yemeni and Indian descent. Briton prior to her eventual arrest, Conley woman from St. Paul.23 The numbers Abu Muthanna al-Yemeni boasted, had freely told FBI agents during and facts are startling—and yet U.S. “we understand no borders…we have interviews that she “planned to go to nationals are only the tip of a much participated in battles in al-Sham and Iraq” to “find a jihadist training camp.” larger iceberg. In the last year alone, we’ll go to Iraq in a few days and we’ll After the agents encouraged her to fighters from the United Kingdom, fight there…We’ll even go to Jordan and instead participate in peaceful support Canada, Norway, Finland, Sweden, Lebanon, with no problems—wherever for Muslims in Syria and Iraq, Conley our shaykh wants to send us.” Openly 19 U.S.A. v. Shannon Maureen Conley, District of Colo- addressing ISIL leader Abu Bakr al- 15 Ibid. rado, 2014. Baghdadi, Abu Muthanna urged him, 16 U.S.A. v. Adam Dandach, Central District of California, 20 Ibid. “be firm and don’t change at all. Allah 2014. 21 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 22 “Colorado Woman, 19, Pleads Guilty to Trying to Help 24 “The Martyrdom-Seeker Abu Sulayman Al-Muhajir,” 18 “Arvada Woman Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Pro- Islamic State,” NBC News, September 10, 2014. Jabhat al-Nusra, February 6, 2014. vide Material Support to a Designated Foreign Terrorist 23 Paul McEnroe and Allie Shah, “Federal Grand Jury 25 Haroon Siddique, “Suspected British Suicide Bomber Organization,” U.S. Department of Justice, September Targets Local Terrorist Pipeline,” Minneapolis Star Tri- Was My Student, Says Radical Cleric,” Guardian, Febru- 10, 2014. bune, September 6, 2014. ary 13, 2014.

3 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 willing, we are with you…throw us the end of the day…how can you answer Assessing the Potential Threat wherever you want.”26 For his part, to Allah the Almighty when you live on Some analysts and observers have “Abu Bara al-Hindi” directed a message the same street, when using their lights correctly argued that not all Western to “my brothers who are living in the and paying taxes to them, and they use foreign fighters in Syria are there on West”: “I know how you feel in the these taxes for war on Islam?”31 Like behalf of Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIL, or heart; you feel depressed. The prophet his British comrades, Poulin offered a analogous hardline jihadist groups. said the cure for the depression is jihad message to Muslims living in the West They have also suggested that these for the cause of Allah. You feel like you and appealed to them to make hijra to Western recruits will likely meet their have no honor…my brothers, come to Syria to join ISIL. According to Poulin: demise during combat in Iraq and Syria jihad and feel the honor we’re feeling. and pose only a small residual terrorist Feel the happiness we’re feeling.”27 You know, there’s a role for threat to countries such as the United When the lonely girlfriend of another everybody. Every person can States, United Kingdom, , and reported British jihadist fighting in contribute something to the Islamic other Western states. With measures Syria, Aine Davis, begged him during State. It’s obligatory on us. If you in place to cancel passports and travel internet chats to return home to the cannot fight, then you give money, documents for those suspected to United Kingdom, Davis wrote back and if you cannot give money then you be fighting in Syria, perhaps these scoffed, “You think I spent two months can assist in technology, and if individuals will not even be able to on the road to get where I am to come you can’t assist in technology you return home. While these points are back? (rofl).”28 can use some other skills...We can all worth noting, it is simply not clear use you. You’ll be very well taken what activities these individuals might The ISIL video There is No Life Without Jihad care of here. Your families will engage in once they return home. featured other Westerners fighting in live here in safety just like how it Syria, including Australians “Abu Yahya is back home. You know, we have One of the Western hostages once held al-Shami” and “Abu Nour al-Iraqi.” Abu wide expansive territory here in Syria alongside James Foley—French Nour admonished his “brothers in the in Syria and we can easily find journalist Nicolas Henin—has since been West” that “the reasons to come to jihad accommodations for you and your freed and has publicly identified at least are plenty. Shaykh Anwar al-`Awlaqi families. My brothers, there is a one of their former rebel captors: a 29- once said that when it comes to jihad, role for everybody here in Syria... year-old foreign jihadist from Roubaix, there are two types of people: those who come join before the doors close.32 France, named Mehdi Nemmouche. find every single excuse to come to jihad According to Henin, Nemmouche and those who find every single excuse Even a famous German rapper, Denis earned a reputation as a “violent and not to come to jihad. For those who want Mamadou Gerhard Cuspert (also known provocative” thug who took pleasure in to come to jihad, who want the reward, as “Deso Dogg”), traveled to fight in torturing hostages. He recounted how there are many excuses, many reasons Syria and has since joined ISIL’s banner Nemmouche once punched him in the to come to jihad, in the lands of al-Sham under the name Abu Talha al-Almani. face and flashed a new pair of gloves: especially.”29 In fact, one of Jabhat al- In 2009, the onetime street criminal “You saw these motorcycle gloves? I Nusra’s most senior Shari`a officials, Cuspert suddenly “changed my life” and bought them just for you, to punch you Mustafa Mahamed (also known as Abu abandoned his music career to dedicate in the face. Did you like them?” As for Sulayman al-Muhajir), is likewise an himself to becoming a hardline Islamist. his victims, Henin insisted, “It seemed Australian national.30 By August 2013, he had made his way to us that he did not leave for Syria to Syria.33 With his celebrity status, because of some grand ideals but, above The English-language al-Hayat Media Deso Dogg has been featured in ISIL all, to make his mark, to carry out a Center has also released video footage propaganda and has drawn a following murderous path that he had traced.”35 As of a Canadian convert to Islam, Andre of thousands via his online social media an example, Henin quoted Nemmouche Poulin, who was recently killed while posts from the jihadist frontline in as boasting, “It’s such a pleasure to cut fighting alongside ISIL in Syria. In his Syria. Using Twitter, he posts frequent off a baby’s head.”36 recorded testimonial, Poulin recalled, battlefield updates in both English and “I was like any other regular Canadian; German, including images and videos. After spending nearly a year marauding I watched hockey, I went to cottage Cuspert is one of more than 240 German across Syria, Nemmouche finally in the summertime, I loved to fish, I nationals who were known to be fighting returned home to Europe via Germany wanted to go hunting, I liked outdoors, in Syria by the end of last year alone.34 in March 2014.37 Despite being under I liked sports…life in Canada was good. surveillance by French authorities, I had money, I had good family, but at two months later, in late May, he was arrested for allegedly carrying out 26 There is No Life Without Jihad, al-Hayat Media Center, June 19, 2014. 31 Al-Ghuraba: The Chosen Few of Different Lands, al-Hayat 35 Sylvie Corbet and Lori Hinnant, “French Ex-Hostage 27 Ibid. Media Center, July 11, 2014. Says Tortured in Syria By Brussels Shooting Suspect Me- 28 “Woman Free after Syria Cash Trial,” Daily Mail, Au- 32 Ibid. hdi Nemmouche,” Associated Press, September 6, 2014. gust 14, 2014. 33 Paltalk interview with Abu Talha al-Almani. 36 David Chazan, “Brussels Museum Shooting Suspect 29 There is No Life Without Jihad. 34 Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “‘Jihad Tourism’: From Ger- ‘Beheaded Baby,’” Telegraph, September 7, 2014. 30 See the account at www.twitter.com/abusulay- many to the Syrian Battlefield,” National Public Radio, 37 “Brussels Jewish Museum Murders: Nemmouche to man321. December 22, 2013. be Extradited,” BBC, June 26, 2014.

4 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 a mass shooting targeting a Jewish Conclusion New Developments in museum in Brussels, Belgium, that These incidents reveal the nature of the killed four people. At the time of his dilemma posed by ISIL to the United Australian Foreign Fighter capture in Marseilles, Nemmouche was States and its Western allies. Law Activity reportedly in possession of an AK- enforcement and intelligence agencies 47 rifle and handgun that were used are confronted with the challenge of By Andrew Zammit in the museum attack, “a white sheet closely monitoring a relatively large and emblazoned with the name of the Islamic decentralized network of radicalized australian citizens continue to join State in Iraq and the Levant,” and a 40- extremists with paramilitary training. jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, and second video featuring the two guns This does not even include the inevitable this trend has been identified as a and the ISIL banner, as well as a claim number of additional Westerners who national security priority. In mid- of responsibility for the attack.38 Thus will slip through unnoticed as they September 2014, the Australian far, authorities in both Belgium and join the conflict and are recruited by federal government raised the France have not answered the bigger ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusra, or al-Qa`ida’s National Terrorism Public Alert from question of whether the plot targeting Khorasan group. These young men “medium” to “high,” citing the foreign the Jewish museum was carried out on (and women) see nothing wrong with fighter threat.1 Within a week, the the direct orders of ISIL leaders, or if the brutal murder of civilians, and country experienced its largest ever the accused culprit was merely inspired they have taken every opportunity to counterterrorism operation, when a by the example set by ISIL. proclaim their commitment not only to series of raids by more than 800 federal the frontline in Syria and Iraq, but to and state police officers uncovered Only weeks before Nemmouche’s fateful the more expansive global jihad against an alleged terrorist plot, reportedly return to Europe, French security forces the West. Thus, even a small number of instigated by a senior Australian arrested another veteran of the jihadist hardened fanatics returning home from member of the Islamic State in Iraq frontline in Syria, French national Syria could pose a significant threat. and the Levant (ISIL).2 Security was Ibrahim Boudina, shortly after his own also enhanced at the Parliament House return home. The latter had initially fled In this regard, it is worth noting that the following “chatter” about a potential to Syria in September 2012 after a close Islamic State of Iraq (ISIL’s predecessor) attack.3 associate tossed a grenade into a Jewish released an audio recording of Abu grocery in the Sarcelles neighborhood of Bakr al-Baghdadi in July 2012, in which This article details developments in Paris. Upon arriving, Boudina allegedly he solemnly vowed that Americans Australian jihadist activity in Syria and first joined the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra would soon witness terrorist attacks Iraq during the past year, updating an and eventually drifted to ISIL.39 A friend “in the heart of your homeland, as our article from the November 2013 issue of reportedly warned French authorities: war with you has just begun, and so the CTC Sentinel.4 It outlines the changing “Ibrahim said if he could not do jihad await them.”42 Even more explicitly, threat within Australia, as well as some on Islamic soil he would do it in France. on September 21, ISIL’s top spokesman of the countermeasures enacted by Ibrahim compared France to the head of Abu Mohammed al-Adnani addressed the Australian government. It finds the serpent, which you had to cut off… the American and European publics, that Australia faces an increasingly Ibrahim spoke to me often about this threatening that ISIL would “come to complex threat. Australian citizens Zionist area in Cannes and that if he your homeland” and “strike you.”43 The continue to be involved in ISIL and could not go do jihad overseas it would recording came only three days after Jabhat al-Nusra, including in senior for him be a target.”40 After fighting for Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott positions, and potential domestic plots 15 months, Boudina attempted to reenter warned of intelligence indicating that have been uncovered. The Australian Europe through Greece in January local militants had planned random federal government has responded 2014—where border police found a “demonstration killings” on the streets to the evolving threat with increased USB stick in his possession with bomb- of Australia in the name of ISIL. In security measures, extra resources for making instructions. A later search light of these stark facts, it is clear why police and intelligence services, and of a storage closet in the apartment Western governments have grown so complex near Cannes where Boudina concerned about the focused recruitment 1 Latika Bourke and Lisa Cox, “Terror Risk High: Tony was hiding turned up a handgun, more of their own nationals by ISIL and other Abbott Announces Increase in National Terrorism Pub- bomb-making instructions, and several jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq. lic Alert System,” Morning Herald, September 12, aluminum cans filled with 950 grams 2014. of TATP high explosive—at least one of Evan Kohlmann is founder and CIO of 2 Karl Hoerr and Lucy Carter, “Senior Australian Islamic which was covered in screws and nails, Flashpoint Global Partners. State Member ‘Arranged for Random Beheadings in Syd- 41 apparently to serve as shrapnel. ney, Brisbane’; Omarjan Azari, Believed to be Involved Laith Alkhouri is Director of Middle East in Alleged Plot, Faces Court,” Australian Broadcasting 38 “France Arrests Syria Jihad Suspects as Nemmouche Research at Flashpoint Global Partners. Corporation, September 18, 2014. Held,” BBC, June 2, 2014. 3 “AFP to Take Over Parliament House Security After 39 Anne Vidalie, “Djihadisme: Ibrahim Boudina, iti- 42 “A Speech by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: ‘And Allah Re- ‘Chatter’ About Possible Terrorist Attack; Investigation néraire d’un fou d’Allah,” L’Express, June 23, 2014. fuses But to Complete His Light,’” al-Furqan Media Cen- into Thwarted ‘Beheading Plot’ Continues,” Australian 40 Paul Cruickshank, “Raid on ISIS Suspect in the ter, July 21, 2012. Broadcasting Corporation, September 21, 2014. French Riviera,” CNN, August 28, 2014. 43 “‘You will not feel secure even in your bedrooms,’” To- 4 Andrew Zammit, “Tracking Australian Foreign Fight- 41 Vidalie. ronto Star, September 22, 2014. ers in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6:11 (2013).

5 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 a problematic push for extensive new after first joining Jabhat al-Nusra.11 He bombed a school stationing Syrian powers. was 22-years-old, from Sydney, and of soldiers near Deir al-Zour in September Turkish background.12 He was also a 2013. New Australian Martyrs veteran, having joined the Australian The Australian Security Intelligence Army in February 2009, and he trained Foreign Fighter Flow Organization (ASIO) recently estimated as a combat engineer before going absent The composition of the Australians that 60 Australians are currently without leave in late 2010.13 involved in Syria and Iraq has changed fighting in Syria and Iraq, that “tens” little since November 2013. Judging from have returned, and that 15 have died In mid-February 2013, a Sydney man those killed, they tend to be male, under fighting.5 At least six of these deaths named Ahmad Moussali was killed 30-years-of-age (often under 25), from occurred in the past year and were in Syria.14 Moussali was Lebanese- a range of backgrounds (predominantly publicly reported, providing some Australian and a close friend of the Lebanese-Australian followed by information on who has been involved aforementioned Yusuf Ali. Little is Turkish-Australian), in some cases and what militant groups they joined.6 known about his involvement, other have wives and children, and in most than that he had studied Arabic in Egypt cases had attracted security attention In mid-January 2014, Yusuf Ali and his in 2012 before entering Syria in 2013.15 before leaving Australia.19 wife Amira Ali were killed in Aleppo. Initial reports said that they were Zakaryah Raad, an Australian man from A key change since November 2013, killed by the Free Syrian Army (FSA).7 Sydney, was killed soon after appearing however, has been that many have More detailed follow-up reporting, in an ISIL video in June 2014 titled There joined ISIL and went to fight in Iraq. however, stated that the couple was is No Life Without Jihad, which called for Previously, Australian fighters tended affiliated with Jabhat al-Nusra, and Muslims across the globe to join ISIL.16 to operate within Syria, fighting either that they were killed by ISIL as part for Jabhat al-Nusra or groups that fell of the power struggle between the two In July 2014, ISIL announced that an loosely under the FSA rubric.20 There jihadist groups.8 Yusuf Ali was born “Abu Bakr al-Australi” had carried out a are still Australians who fought with to a Christian family in Australia and suicide bombing in central . He Jabhat al-Nusra, such as a former spent his teenage years in the United was later identified as Adam Dahman, Gold Coast resident who has called for States, while Amira Ali was of Lebanese an 18-year-old man from attacks within Western countries, but and New Zealand background and was who had left for Turkey when he was overall ISIL appears to have overtaken raised in Australia.9 They had married 17.17 He attacked a market in central Jabhat al-Nusra in popularity.21 in April 2013, lived in Queensland Baghdad near a Shi`a mosque, killing before traveling to Syria, and were both five people.18 Dahman is the second A further change has been increasing 22-years-old when killed.10 known Australian suicide bomber, the evidence of Australian jihadists playing first being Abu Asma al-Australi who leadership roles. One example is former Also in January, Caner Temel was killed Sydney preacher Abu Sulayman, who in Syria. He was reportedly recruited 11 Matt Brown, “Militant Says Australian Jihadist Caner is now a member of Jabhat al-Nusra’s into ISIL by a man known as Abu Hafs, Temel was Shot in Head by Rebel Sniper After Syria Shari`a Council. Sulayman has stated Siege,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, January that he was appointed by al-Qa`ida 22, 2014. to mediate between Jabhat al-Nusra 22 5 Peter Hartcher, “The Real Terrorism Threat Lurks in 12 “Caner Temel Memorial: Service Held for Australian and ISIL. He has appeared in several the Indonesian Shadows,” Sydney Morning Herald, Au- Man Killed while Fighting in Syria’s Civil War,” Austra- Jabhat al-Nusra videos, and has become gust 12, 2014. Of these 15 individuals, 14 “had fought on lian Broadcasting Corporation, January 18, 2014. their most prominent English-speaking the Sunni side.” 13 Amanda Hoh, “Caner Temel Killed in Syria Revealed member to address the fratricidal 23 6 Information on the publicly reported deaths of Austra- as Former Australian Soldier,” Sydney Morning Herald, dispute. lians in the Syrian conflict prior to November 2013 can be March 19, 2014. found in: Zammit “Tracking Australian Foreign Fighters 14 Neil Keene, “Sydney Man and Roadside Preacher Ah- In July 2014, the Lebanese Army in Syria.” mad Moussalli Killed in Syria,” Daily Telegraph, February arrested a Lebanese-Australian dual 7 Clementine Cuneo, “Family and Friends Gather at Syd- 11, 2014. citizen named Hussam Sabbagh, who ney Mosque to Remember Slain Muslim Woman Amira 15 Rachel Olding, “How ‘Lion’ Ahmad Moussalli Died in has been accused of playing a major Karroum and Her husband Yusuf Ali,” Daily Telegraph, Syrian War a Mystery,” Sydney Morning Herald, Febru- role in Jabhat al-Nusra networks in January 14, 2014. ary 20, 2014. Ahmed Moussali’s close friendship with 8 Sean Rubinsztein-Dunlop, “Amira Karroum and Tyler Yusuf Ali suggests that if he was involved with any jiha- Casey: How a Young Australian Couple Came to Die in dist group in the conflict, it may also have been ISIL. 19 Dataset maintained by the author. Syria,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, September 16 Megan Levy, “Australian Man Zakaryah Raad ‘Died 20 Zammit, “Tracking Australian Foreign Fighters in 9, 2014. Fighting with ISIL Militants,’” Sydney Morning Herald, Syria.” 9 Ibid.; Bridie Jabour, “Family of Australian Woman June 23, 2014. 21 Mark Schliebs, “Jihadist Urges Kidnap of Western Believed Killed in Syria Seek Return of Body,” Guardian, 17 James Dowling and Alex White, “Suicide Bomber VIPs,” Australian, June 11, 2014. January 14, 2014. Adam Dahman was Led Astray,” Herald Sun, July 30, 22 Thomas Joscelyn, “Al Qaeda Official in 10 Cuneo; Suzanne Dredge and Matt Wordsworth, 2014. Syria was Extremist Preacher in Australia,” “Yusuf Ali, Australian Man Killed in Syria, Had Links to 18 Simon Cullen, “Australian Suicide Bomber in Iraq The Long War Journal, March 21, 2014. Al Qaeda, Court Documents Allege,” Australian Broad- was an 18-year-old Man from Melbourne,” Australian 23 Andrew Zammit, “Syria: A Fractured Opposition and casting Corporation, January 17, 2014. Broadcasting Corporation, July 21, 2014. Australian Consequences,” The Strategist, April 24, 2014.

6 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9

Lebanon.24 Prior to his alleged Jabhat Then, in September 2014, two members the explosives) and was released from al-Nusra activity, he had been accused of an alleged recruitment network prison in 2009.34 He continued to attract of involvement in Fatah al-Islam’s for Jabhat al-Nusra were arrested in the attention of police and security attempted uprising in the Nahr al-Bared Brisbane, one of whom is believed to be agencies before escaping to Syria using refugee camp, near Tripoli, in 2007.25 the brother of the suicide bomber “Abu his brother’s passport.35 Lebanese media reports suggest he has Asma al-Australi.”30 since come to command a 250-strong Sharrouf’s fighting companion, militia.26 Second, several of the newly apparent Mohamed Elomar, is the nephew of fighters have close connections to past the Sydney Pendennis cell’s leader, The Domestic Threat to Australia extremist violence in Australia. In and one of his uncles (Hussein Elomar) Not all Australian involvement in contrast, many of the known fighters was convicted of terrorism offenses in these conflicts requires travel. ASIO in 2012 and 2013 appeared to have had Lebanon.36 His brother, Ahmed Elomar, currently estimates that around 100 little involvement in Australia’s most was briefly detained in Lebanon in 2007 people in Australia are supporting serious jihadist networks. The two most and would later be convicted of jihadist- jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq prominent examples of this new trend related violence in Sydney.37 in various capacities, such as by are Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed providing funds and equipment.27 Elomar, two ISIL fighters who have Other examples of this changing While this is largely a continuation drawn repeated media attention by dynamic include Adam Dahman, the of previous activity, the domestic making threatening statements toward Australian suicide bomber in Iraq. situation has changed in three key Australia and posting photos online He was the brother-in-law of Ahmed ways during the past year. of themselves posing with murdered Raad, who had been a member of the captives and severed heads.31 When Melbourne Pendennis cell and acted as First, there is growing evidence of active Sharrouf released a photo of his seven- their treasurer.38 Similarly, Zakariyah recruitment networks within Australia. year-old son holding a severed head, U.S. Raad was related to two members of Many of the Australian fighters prior to Secretary of State John Kerry described the Melbourne Pendennis cell and had November 2013 appeared to be entering it as underscoring “the degree to which been involved in violence in Sydney.39 Syria with few pre-existing connections ISIL is so far beyond the pale with Another relative, Mounir Raad, to armed groups, but since then two respect to any standard by which we currently claims to be in Aleppo with alleged recruitment networks have been judge even terrorist groups.”32 Sharrouf ISIL.40 Amari Ali, who was killed in uncovered. In December 2013, two men and Elomar were closely connected to Aleppo, was the cousin of Melbourne were arrested in Sydney and charged earlier jihadist activity in Australia. Pendennis cell member Fadl Sayadi.41 with offenses under the Crimes (Foreign Sharrouf was a convicted terrorist, Some other members and associates of Incursions and Recruitment) Act of having been arrested in November 2005

1978. Police alleged that one of the men, as part of Operation Pendennis, a joint 34 Regina (C’Wealth) v. Sharrouf, New South Wales Su- Hamdi Alqudsi, was closely linked ASIO, federal police and state police preme Court, 2009. to extremist groups in Syria and had investigation that foiled two terrorist 35 Paul Kent, “Terrorist Khaled Sharrouf’s Anger in 33 recruited at least six fighters, including cells in Melbourne and Sydney. He Car Parking Dispute,” Daily Telegraph, December 22, Yusuf Ali and Caner Temel, and pleaded guilty to a small role in the 2011; Nick Ralston, Nick McKenzie and Richard Baker, 28 facilitated their travel. Police alleged plot (attempting to procure timers for “Union Bribes Revealed,” Sydney Morning Herald, Febru- the other man, Mohammed Amin, was ary 10, 2014; Janet Fife-Yeomans, “23 Australians Placed preparing to join the fight. Alqudsi had AFP Issues Arrest Warrant for Islamic State Jihadist on a US Terror Watch List,” Perth Now, August 31, 2011; allegedly cooperated with Mohammad Accused of Sending Australians to Syria, Iraq Conflict,” Yoni Bashan, “A Convicted Terrorist has Exposed Secu- Ali Baryalei, a former Sydney bouncer Australian Broadcasting Corporation, September 9, rity Gaps at Sydney Airport After Boarding a Flight to now believed to be a senior ISIL figure. 2014. Syria on his Brother’s Passport,” Sunday Telegraph, Feb- Authorities believe Baryalei recruited 30 “Two Men Accused of Terrorism-Related Offences ruary 8, 2014. approximately 30 Australians, first for Remanded in Custody,” Australian Broadcasting Corpo- 36 Debra Jopson, “Family Links Strong in Australian 29 Jabhat al-Nusra and then for ISIL. ration, September 12, 2014. Cells,” Sydney Morning Herald, February 6, 2012. 31 David Wroe, “Jihadist Threat to Diggers,” Sydney 37 Greg Bearup and Paul Maley, “How a Regular Subur- 24 “Saqr Preps for Tripoli Militant Prosecution,” Daily Morning Herald, July 5, 2014; Rachel Olding, “Jihadi ban Kid Put his Faith in a Killer Cult,” Australian, August Star, July 25, 2014. Khaled Sharrouf Says he Would Have Launched At- 9, 2014. 25 Shandon Harris-Hogan and Andrew Zammit, “The tack in Australia,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 1, 38 Dowling and White. Unseen Terrorist Connection: Exploring Jihadist Links 2014; Mark Schliebs and Paul Maley, “Aussie Jihadi in 39 Dylan Welch and Sean Rubinsztein-Dunlop, “The Between Lebanon and Australia,” Terrorism and Political Iraqi Executions,” Australian, June 21, 2014; Rachel Old- Australian Who’s a Key Figure in the Fighting in Iraq,” Violence 26:3 (2014). ing, “AFP Issues Warrants for Australian ISIL Fighters Australian Broadcasting Corporation, June 30, 2014; 26 “Saqr Preps for Tripoli Militant Prosecution.” Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed Elomar,” Sydney Morn- Lisa Davies, “Sydney Sharia Whipping Case: Man Jailed 27 David Irvine, “Diligence in the Shadows — ASIO’s ing Herald, July 29, 2014. for Dishing Out 40 Lashes,” Sydney Morning Herald, June Responsibility,” Address to the National Press Club, Au- 32 “Kerry Calls Severed Head Photo Among ‘Most Gro- 14, 2013. gust 27, 2014. tesque’ Ever,” Agence France-Presse, August 12, 2014. 40 Mark Schliebs, “Aussie Trio Align with IS Fighters,” 28 Rachel Olding, “Alleged Recruiter Faces Charges of 33 Bart Schuurman, Shandon Harris-Hogan, Pete Len- Australian, August 30, 2014. Finding Men to Join Syria Terrorists,” Sydney Morning tini and Andrew Zammit, “Operation Pendennis: A Case 41 Rubinsztein-Dunlop, “Amira Karroum and Tyler Herald, December 4, 2013. Study of an Australian Terrorist Plot,” Perspectives on Casey: How a Young Australian Couple Came to Die in 29 Sean Rubinsztein-Dunlop, “Mohammad Ali Baryalei: Terrorism 8:4 (2014). Syria.”

7 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 the Pendennis cells are suspected of Federal police have also issued warrants required to use coercive powers such fighting in the region.42 for the arrests of Khaled Sharrouf, as control orders and preventative Mohamed Elomar and Mohammad Ali detention, and placing greater The third and most serious change in Baryalei.46 Another measure has been restrictions on speech by broadening the domestic situation is new evidence passport confiscations, with ASIO the definition of promoting terrorism. of violent plans by ISIL supporters. On canceling around 45 passports in the Another proposed measure is to alter September 18, 2014, federal and state last financial year, compared to 18 in the traditional burden of proof for police forces raided houses across the previous year and less than 10 in suspected foreign fighters, potentially Brisbane and Sydney, arresting 15 most of the preceding years.47 requiring any Australian returning people of whom one has so far been from designated areas in Syria and charged. While little information The threat has now become a major Iraq to prove they were not involved in is currently available, the plot was political issue, with the prime minister terrorism.51 These proposals go against reportedly instigated by Australian and senior MPs continually addressing the recommendations of multiple ISIL recruiter Mohammad Ali Baryalei the concern in public statements. recent inquiries into counterterrorism and involved a plan to kidnap and The attorney-general has described legislation, and have encountered murder a randomly chosen non- it as “the government’s number-one a strong backlash from Muslim Muslim member of the Australian national security priority.”48 The communities and sections of the wider public, film the killing, and place federal government has granted $630 public.52 the video on social media.43 Then, million in extra funding, over four on September 23, two police officers years, to organizations such as the Conclusion arranged to meet a suspect in a carpark Australian Federal Police, ASIO, and Australia’s jihadist foreign fighters outside a Victoria Police station. the Australian Secret Intelligence pose an ongoing and increasingly The suspect was an 18-year-old man Service (ASIS) to tackle the foreign complex national security threat. named Abdul Numan Haider, whose fighter threat.49 The government has Australians have continued to join passport had been confiscated because also raised the national terrorism alert jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, of potential plans to join ISIL. When and is currently introducing extensive with many joining ISIL. Some of approached by the officers, Haider new national security legislation. the fighters have been involved in attacked them with a knife, although war crimes, some have made explicit one of the officers managed to shoot This includes an amendment designed threats against Australia, some have and kill him. The incident, and whether to make it easier for ASIS to spy on played leadership roles, and some have it was pre-planned by Haider, is still suspected Australian fighters overseas returned to Australia. Evidence has also being investigated.44 on ASIO’s behalf by no longer requiring emerged of active recruitment networks, specific approval from the foreign connections to earlier terrorist plots, State Response minister. Also proposed are measures and of violent plans within Australia. Australia has enacted a series of to make it easier for ASIO to confiscate countermeasures in response to passports and to allow prosecutions in At the same time, the threat has become escalating jihadist activity. In addition Australia to use evidence gathered in a greater political priority, resulting to foiling a suspected terrorist plot foreign countries without the permission in escalating countermeasures, extra and disrupting suspected recruitment of the foreign government.50 resources to security agencies, and networks in Sydney and Brisbane, attempts at legislative changes. Several federal police also arrested Mohamed Several of the proposed changes, of the proposed legislative changes, Elomar’s wife, Fatima, at Sydney however, are more contentious. These however, are highly contentious and Airport. She was accused of attempting include reducing the burden of proof might complicate counterterrorism to bring supplies to her husband and is efforts. The continuing foreign fighter 45 facing trial. 46 Olding, “AFP Issues Warrants for Australian ISIL problem has prompted a high-level Fighters Khaled Sharrouf and Mohamed Elomar”; Ru- response, but elements of the response binsztein-Dunlop, “Mohammad Ali Baryalei: AFP Is- pose their own problems. On the whole, sues Arrest Warrant for Islamic State Jihadist Accused the situation has substantially worsened 42 Alex White and Mark Dunn, “Freed Terrorists From of Sending Australians to Syria, Iraq Conflict.” during the past year. Cell Led by Abdul Nacer Benbrika Could Still be a 47 Dowling and White; Andrew Zammit, “A Table on Threat,” Herald Sun, June 20, 2014. ASIO’s Passport Confiscation Powers,” The Murphy Andrew Zammit is a researcher at Monash 43 Cameron Stewart, “The Order to Kill that Triggered Raid blog, October 31, 2013. University’s Global Terrorism Research Operation Appleby,” Australian, September 19, 2014. 48 “Australians ‘Fighting in Syria and Iraq,’” Sky News, Centre. 44 “Melbourne Shooting: Officials Name Abdul Numan July 2, 2014. Haider as Man Shot Dead by Anti-Terrorist Officers,” 49 Latika Bourke and James Massola, “Tony Abbott ABC News, September 24, 2014; Martin McKenzie- Boosts Funding by $630m to Fight Home-grown Terror- 51 Louise Yaxley, “Tony Abbott to Consider New Ter- Murray, “Inside the Terror of the Suburbs,” The Saturday ism,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 6, 2014. rorism Measures for Australians Returning from Over- Paper, September 27, 2014. 50 Jessie Blackbourn and Nicola McGarrity, “How Reac- seas War Zones,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 45 Peter Lloyd, “Mohamed Elomar, Husband of Fatima tive Law-making Will Limit the Accountability of ASIO,” August 6, 2014. Elomar who was Arrested at Sydney Airport, Believed to Inside Story, July 24, 2014; Sangeetha Pillai, “Foreign 52 Gabrielle Chan, “Tony Abbott Calls Some Muslim be Fighting in Syria,” Australian Broadcasting Corpora- Fighter Passports and Prosecutions in Government’s Groups ‘Petty’ and ‘Foolish’ for Meetings Boycott,” tion, July 8, 2014. Sights,” The Conversation, August 7, 2014. Guardian, August 21, 2014.

8 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9

The Combat Performance a clear improvement in performance of medium range and dozens of long since the Hamas-Israel war in 2009.5 range systems capable of reaching as of Hamas in the Gaza War far as Haifa in northern Israel.9 Hamas’ of 2014 Nevertheless, Hamas also showed rocket forces were well prepared for the weaknesses within its military forces. campaign, with a system of underground By Jeffrey White Its rocket offensive, while disrupting launchers spread across Gaza and the life in Israel, and especially in southern means of moving rockets and rocket in its war with israel in the Israel, caused few casualties and little squads to launch areas under cover.10 summer of 2014, Hamas displayed damage. Its offensive tunnel system, a wide range of combat capabilities, while allowing infiltration inside Israel, Hamas expended considerable effort including new offensive and defensive did not lead to successful penetration into the build-up of its ground tactics.1 Hamas’ evolution on the of the border defense system, except forces. These forces were to be battlefield presented serious challenges perhaps in one case.6 Despite the employed offensively against Israel to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and, defensive tunnel system, Israeli forces and defensively to prevent deep when combined with Israeli operations, caused extensive damage to Hamas’ penetrations into Gaza by Israeli made the conflict the most costly in military infrastructure.7 Hamas’ ground ground forces. Hamas organized the terms of casualties and damage to Gaza forces, notwithstanding their upgrades, defensive battlefield by deploying since Hamas seized power in 2007.2 were unable to prevent IDF ground dense systems of improvised explosive operations. devices (IEDs)11 and converting Hamas once again demonstrated that it civilian areas to defensive localities.12 It is a learning organization. It studies its This article reviews Hamas’ deployed modern anti-tank forces, mortar experience in battle, develops lessons, preparations for battle, its offensive units, and snipers to support ground and incorporates them into its combat and defensive operations, the group’s operations. doctrine, forces, and operations.3 It lessons learned, and the likely plays down the effects of Israeli actions contours of the next conflict. It finds Tunnels were the third major component publicly, does not admit losses or that Hamas conducted significant of Hamas’ war preparations.13 Tunnels mistakes, and presents a face of victory. offensive and defensive operations, offered cover and concealment for Inside the organization, however, Hamas absorbed intense attacks from the IDF, infrastructure, command functions engages in a serious learning process.4 and emerged with reduced but still and commanders, forces, weapons Major improvements by Hamas in its intact military capabilities. Hamas and ammunition. They were integral latest war with Israel included: enhanced will study the lessons learned from this to rocket operations, increasing the range and numbers of rockets, improved conflict to better prepare for its next difficulty for Israel in finding launch protection of its military infrastructure military confrontation with Israel. positions and launchers, and allowing from Israeli attack, a system of offensive launch teams a chance to escape and defensive tunnels, and increased Hamas’ Preparations for Battle Israeli strikes. Communications and effectiveness and cohesion of its Hamas prepared for an asymmetric defensive tunnels enabled movement ground combat forces. Taken together, conflict with Israel. The group’s on the battlefield and for fighting from these improvements allowed Hamas to preparation focused on three principle protected positions. They supported conduct sustained strikes deep inside elements: rocket forces, ground forces, offensive infiltration operations and Israel, even while under siege from and the tunnel system. defensive tactical maneuver. Israeli military operations, to conduct offensive ground actions inside Israel By July 2014, Hamas’ arsenal was In addition, much of Hamas’ military and to present significant opposition estimated at approximately 6,000 infrastructure was embedded in to Israel’s ground incursion. This was rockets,8 consisting primarily of short civilian areas of Gaza.14 This created range weapons, but with hundreds in effect a “human dome,” reducing or

1 This paper focuses on Hamas’ military operations and complicating Israel’s willingness and tactics. There are a number of other Palestinian organi- 5 An unnamed Israeli intelligence officer admitted that zations in the Gaza Strip with substantial military forces while nothing Hamas did in the war was a surprise, the 9 IDF estimates for the Hamas rocket arsenal in July and capabilities, and with whom Hamas cooperated resilience of the organization was surprising. See Isabel 2014 were: 3,900 short range systems, more than 1,600 during the conflict. See Asmaa al-Ghoul, “Gaza’s Armed Kershner, “Israel Says Hamas Is Hurt Significantly,”New medium range systems, and several dozen long range Factions Coordinate Response to Israeli Attacks,” al- York Times, September 2, 2014. systems. See ibid. Monitor, July 7, 2014. 6 This was the attack on the security post at Nahal Oz 10 Christa Case Bryant, “Hamas Unveils Bigger, Better 2 “Scale of Gaza Destruction Unprecedented, Rehabilita- on July 28, 2014, in which five Israeli soldiers were killed Rocket Arsenal Against Israel,” Christian Science Monitor, tion Will Cost $7.8 Billion, PA Says,” Reuters, September and the Hamas squad escaped back into Gaza. See Elad July 9, 2014. 4, 2014. Benari and Gil Ronen, “Five Soldiers Killed During At- 11 “Hamas Booby Traps Palestinian Houses,” IDF Blog, 3 Amos Yadlin, “Dealing With Hamas’ Military Force tempted Infiltration,” Israel National News, July 29, July 27, 2014. Reconstruction,” The Institute for National Security 2014. 12 “New Declassified Report Exposes Hamas Human Studies, September 11, 2014. 7 Yadlin. Shield Policy,” IDF Blog, August 20, 2014. 4 Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, “Hamas in Combat: 8 Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian combat 13 Shlomi Eldar, “Gaza Tunnels Take IDF by Surprise,” The Military Performance of the Palestinian Islamic Re- groups had their own rocket arsenals. See “Special Re- al-Monitor, July 20, 2014. sistance Movement,” The Washington Institute for Near port: The Deadly Rocket Arsenal of Hamas,” Israel De- 14 “New Declassified Report Exposes Hamas Human East Policy, October 2009, p. 22. fense Forces, July 10, 2014. Shield Policy,” IDF Blog, August 20, 2014.

9 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 ability to strike them and providing a • 185 - M75 (mid-range) Offensive tunnels constituted the measure of protection.15 • 64 - M55/Fajr 5 (mid-range) second major offensive capability of • 3344 - Grad/Qassam/Katyusha/ Hamas. The IDF discovered 32 offensive Offensive Operations mortar (short-range) tunnels in the course of operations.29 Hamas had two main offensive forces Fourteen reportedly reached into Israel in the conflict: rocket units and These numbers demonstrate that the and two more had exits within 500 ground combat forces. Hamas also had bulk of rocket strikes fell on southern meters of the Israeli border.30 These a naval unit for sea-borne infiltration Israel, although 271 rockets were tunnels were designed to allow Hamas operations.16 Israeli reports indicated directed at central Israel. Hamas was assault squads to penetrate Israeli that Hamas had even prepared a able to modulate firing as it deemed border defenses without detection and unit equipped with paragliders for necessary and launched salvo attacks to attack targets inside Israel with the operations inside Israel.17 Hamas on numerous occasions.22 According to advantage of surprise. According to employed nearly all types of its one Israeli account: “Analysis of the Israeli information, each tunnel was offensive forces in the conflict.18 fighting indicates that rocket fire is under the control of a Hamas battalion, proceeding according to preset plans, responsible for its digging and probably For the first 10 days of the war, the with every local commander knowing operations during wartime.31 focus was on rocket operations. Despite how many to launch, where to direct intensive efforts by the Israeli Air them and at what time each day. This Hamas assault squads were relatively Force (IAF), rocket strikes continued decentralized method allows Hamas small32 but heavily armed, carrying throughout the war, including salvo to continue firing even under intense rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), light firing and targeting deep into Israel. pressure by the IDF.”23 machine guns, assault rifles, and hand Even as the final cease-fire approached, grenades. Hamas personnel in some Hamas was able to fire large quantities Nevertheless, Israeli active (Iron Dome) cases wore IDF uniforms to increase of rockets.19 For the Palestinians, the and passive (civil defense) measures confusion and hesitation on the part ability to keep Israel under threat and limited the overall impact of the rocket of IDF soldiers.33 Offensive tunnels disrupt day-to-day life were major offensive. Iron Dome intercepted sometimes also contained equipment accomplishments, with the single most 735 of the rockets fired at Israel that for hostage taking34 (plastic handcuffs, dramatic success being the temporary were identified as threats.24 Israel’s anesthetics), and in one case three interruption of air traffic to Ben Gurion civil defense system was important motorcycles were found, probably airport on July 22, 201420—although the in limiting casualties. It provided intended to facilitate movement inside evacuation of Israeli border settlements guidelines for how to respond when Israel.35 was perhaps the most important under attack, warning of attack, and achievement. shelter from attack.25 The inherent Hamas executed six tunnel-based inaccuracy of the rockets, successful infiltration operations during the war According to reports from Hamas’ interceptions, and civil defense with limited success.36 Assault squads military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam measures meant that there were few penetrated the border and in four cases Brigades, it was able to fire some 3,600 Israeli casualties: seven killed and rockets at Israel including the following 842 wounded, including “shock” 29 Jeremy Binnie, “IDF Detail the Damage Inflicted on 21 types and numbers: casualties by the rocket and mortar Gaza Militants,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, August 8, 26 attacks. Structures and property 2014. • 11 - R160 (long-range) suffered physical damage, but it was 30 Ibid. 27 • 22 - J80 (mid-range) quite limited. Disruption of life and 31 Yaakov Lappin, “Analysis: The Hidden Picture in economic activity were substantial, Gaza,” Jerusalem Post, July 31, 2014. 28 15 “How is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in especially in southern Israel. 32 The largest groups were 13-man squads involved in Gaza?” IDF Blog, July 16, 2014. the July 18 and July 19, 2014, infiltrations. See Joshua Mit- 16 Mohammed Najib, “IDF Repels New Hamas Naval nick, Nicholas Casey and Tamer El-Ghobashy, “Hamas Commandos,“ IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 9, 2014. 22 See, for example, Yaakov Lappin, “IDF Completes Fighters Infiltrate Israel Through Tunnel and Kill Two 17 “Israeli Strike on Hamas Leader Raed Attar Foiled Ga- Withdrawal from Gaza, Keeps Forces Massed on Bor- Soldiers,” Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2014. za-Area Paraglider Attack – ‘Attar’s Assassination Has der,” Jerusalem Post, August 5, 2014. 33 Mitch Ginsburg, “Hamas Will Start Tunnelling as Disrupted Everything,’” Algemeiner, September 1, 2014. 23 Amos Harel, “Hamas is Trying to Get Itself Out of a Soon as we Leave,” Times of Israel, July 27, 2014. 18 The paraglider unit was not used in the conflict prob- Tight Spot,” Haaretz, August 24, 2014. 34 Mitnick et al. ably because the IDF disrupted it with its attack on the 24 Ben Hartman, “50 Days of Israel’s Gaza Operation, 35 “Israeli Forces Unearth ‘Terror Motorcycles’ From Al- unit’s leader. See ibid. Protective Edge – By the Numbers,” Jerusalem Post, Au- leged Hamas Tunnel in New Video,” Telegraph, August 19 “News of Terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian Con- gust 28, 2014. 4, 2014. flict (August 26-September 2, 2014),” The Meir Amit In- 25 See Israel Home Front Command website at www. 36 David Horovitz, “Israel Might Have Won; Hamas telligence and Terrorism Information Center, September oref.org.il/894-en/Pakar.aspx. Certainly Lost,” Times of Israel, August 6, 2014. Hamas 2, 2014. 26 Ben Hartman, “71st Israeli Fatality of Gazawar: Man also attempted a seaborne infiltration attempt along 20 “Flights Cancelled Into Israel’s Ben Gurion Interna- Succumbs to Wounds From Rocket Attack,” Jerusalem Israel’s coast near Zikim. This was detected by Israeli tional Airport As Rocket Falls Nearby,” Forbes, July 22, Post, August 29, 2014. naval observers and the infiltration unit was destroyed. 2014. 27 Zvi Zrahiya, “As Fighting Eases, Gaza Conflict Cost See Yaakov Lappin, “Watch: IDF Kills 5 Hamas Terror- 21 This was posted on @qassam_arabic1, August 27, Seen Totalling $8 Nillion,” Haaretz, August 6, 2014. ists Attempting to Infiltrate from the Sea,”Jerusalem Post, 2014. 28 Ibid. July 8, 2014.

10 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 they engaged Israeli forces. Hamas Hamas deployed six “brigades” of a “special unit” for close combat and attempted to ambush Israeli forces between 2,500 and 3,500 men for infiltration operations.51 and patrols using anti-tank weapons defense of the Gaza Strip.45 Each brigade against vehicles. In these clashes, 11 was responsible for a sector of the front Anti-Tank Actions Israeli soldiers were killed.37 The most with Israel.46 Brigades were apparently A second key category of Hamas ground successful action occurred on July 29, grouped together under a regional action consisted of attacks on Israeli 2014, when infiltrators surprised an commander.47 Each brigade probably armored vehicles, including tanks, Israeli security post at Nahal Oz in an had a mix of forces including rocket and armored personnel carriers (APCs), and apparent hostage-taking attempt.38 Five mortar units, anti-tank units, snipers, armored engineering vehicles. Hamas IDF soldiers were killed with possibly and infantry.48 had specialized anti-tank units equipped only one Hamas combatant killed or with a variety of anti-tank guided wounded.39 Hamas forces engaged in a number of missiles (ATGM) and RPGs. ATGMs types of defensive action. reportedly included the Malyutka, Israel’s system of security fences, Konkurs, Fagot, and Kornet types.52 surveillance and patrols was generally Close Combat RPGs included the RPG-7 and the effective in countering the infiltration Close combat involved direct fire modern and capable RPG-29.53 Hamas actions, but the attempts inflicted engagements between Hamas and Israeli attempted to engage IDF armor with casualties on Israeli forces and ground forces, with Hamas using RPGs, ATGMs at long range, and with anti- contributed to the sense of insecurity machine guns, and small arms. Hamas tank teams in close combat.54 Hamas among the border settlements.40 employed mortars, short range rockets also used IEDs and mines against IDF and antitank guided missiles to support armor, and attempted to draw the IDF Throughout the conflict, Hamas used these engagements. Hamas fighters into prepared “ambushes” where all mortars and short range rockets, appeared more effective and aggressive anti-tank means could be brought to especially the 107mm type, in an than in past conflicts, surprising bear.55 artillery role. These weapons were used Israeli forces and coordinating fire. to bombard border settlements,41 IDF Tunnels were a particular venue for Hamas was less effective with these force concentrations on both sides of the close combat. Israeli forces did not just tactics. Not a single IDF tank was border,42 Israeli military posts,43 and to discover tunnels; they had to fight for confirmed destroyed, nor were any support tunnel infiltration attempts.44 them.49 Hamas used tunnels to surprise Namer heavy APCs lost in combat. Israeli forces with close engagements. Other armored vehicles appeared more Defensive Operations While Israel seems to have won most vulnerable, including the aging M113 Defensive operations included of the close combat actions, Hamas APC, in which seven Israeli troops were resistance to Israeli ground fighters inflicted casualties on even killed in an RPG blast.56 Armored corps force penetration into Gaza and the best Israeli infantry and armored personnel were killed and wounded by counterattacks on Israeli forces inside formations.50 Hamas reportedly has sniping and mortar fire, but by and large Gaza. Defensive operations also served Hamas anti-tank weapons and tactics 57 as the shield behind which Hamas 45 Isabel Kershner, “Israel Says Hamas Is Hurt Sig- were not of great effect. This was could launch rockets and mortars nificantly,” New York Times, September 2, 2014. Hamas due to the Trophy anti-ATGM system 58 against Israel. sources estimate Qassam Brigades manpower at 30,000, employed on Merkava Mk 4 tanks, the but this is likely an exaggeration. See “The ‘Izz Al-Din protection provided by Merkava tanks 59 Al-Qassam Brigades’ Weapons And Units,” Middle East and Namer APCs, and probably Israeli Media Research Institute, September 2, 2014. 37 Horovitz. 46 Kershner. 7th, 188th, and 401st Armored Brigades, and the Maglan 38 Elad Benari and Gil Ronen, “Five Soldiers Killed Dur- 47 Israel’s targeted killing of three senior Hamas mili- special forces unit and the Yahalom combat engineer bri- ing Attempted Terrorist Infiltration,” Israel National tary commanders on August 21, 2014, revealed that one gade. News, July, 29, 2014. of them, Mohammed Abu Shamlah, was the director of 51 “The ‘Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades’ Weapons And 39 Ibid. Hamas forces in southern Gaza. See “IDF Targets Senior Units.” 40 Mitnick et al. Hamas Terrorists in Gaza,” Israel Defense Forces, Au- 52 Ibid. 41 See @Qassam_English for numerous tweets on this gust 21, 2014. 53 Ibid. activity during the war. For example: @Qassam_English, 48 For the structure of Qassam Brigades combat units 54 Qassam Brigades reporting provides numerous “Fired 4 107 rockets, 5 rockets & 2 mortars at Sderot and in 2009, see Yoram Cohen and Jeffrey White, “Hamas in claims of such actions. See, for example, “Al-Qassam Bri- 5 107 rockets & 5 mortars at Yad Mordechai kibbutz in Combat: The Military Performance of the Palestinian Is- gades Fired Rocket-Propelled Grenades at Israeli Tank response to Israeli Crimes,” July 21, 2014. lamic Resistance Movement,” The Washington Institute in the al-Tuffah & Israeli Troop Carrier in Beit Hanoun,” 42 @Qassam_English, “18:25 Al-Qassam Brigades for Near East Policy, October 2009, p. 15. @Qassam_English 4:35 AM, July 21, 2014. bombed a gathering of armored machines and soldiers 49 Avi Issacharoff, “Amid the Tunnels and the Traps 55 “Al Qassam Kills 14 Israeli Soldiers in an Ambush Rayyan area east of Rafah with 3 107 missiles,” August of Hamas’s Militarized Gaza,” Times of Israel, August 1, East of Gaza city,” al-Qassam website, July 20, 2014. 3, 2014. 2014. 56 Yaakov Lappin, “IDF Wants More Namer APCs and 43 @Qassam_English, “16:50 Al-Qassam fired 2 mortars 50 While the Golani infantry brigade seems to have tak- Trophy Protection Systems,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly, on Hashudat military base, West of Ashkelon, North of en the most killed in action, all the other regular infantry August 21, 2014. Beit Lahia in response to Israeli Crimes,” July 19, 2014. and armored brigades, as well as some specialized units, 57 Ibid. 44 This is based on correlation of mortar and rocket fire in Gaza took casualties. These included the Parachute 58 Ibid. with tunnel infiltration attempts. Brigade, the Nahal, and Givati infantry brigades, the 59 Ibid.

11 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 tactics that employed heavy firepower Air Defense Israeli sources report that as the against ATGM threats. Hamas claims to have an air defense conflict dragged on, there were cases unit equipped with heavy antiaircraft of Palestinian units breaking under Engineering Warfare machine guns and several types of the stress of combat,75 but this does not Engineering warfare was a principal man portable air defense systems appear to have been a general pattern. aspect of the ground fighting. (MANPADS), including the SA-7, SA- Defensively, Hamas used two primary 18, and SA-24.69 During the course of Lessons Learned types of engineering activity to improve the conflict, Hamas claimed to have Hamas is a learning organization and its ability to resist incursions by IDF “hit” several Israeli aircraft including will study this conflict to develop its ground forces: defensive tunneling60 an F-16 and an F-15.70 own set of “lessons learned.” One Israeli and IEDs.61 The objective of this activity analyst has described Hamas’ “learning” was to reduce the IDF’s ability to Overall, Hamas’ forces performed in these terms: maneuver, increase Israeli casualties, relatively well in the ground fighting.71 and allow Hamas’ combat forces to Resistance to Israeli ground forces Hamas has proven strikingly adept operate tactically against IDF units was skillful, adaptive, and conducted at steering its fighting doctrine even in the face of Israel’s firepower coherently. Personnel were willing to away from Israel’s strengths. advantage. Tunnel entrances were engage in close combat with Israeli If Israel has precise munitions, routinely booby-trapped to cause IDF forces and conducted infiltration and then Hamas has positioned its casualties.62 Tunnels were also difficult ambush missions with determination. weaponry and command centers to destroy, requiring significant The most successful day for Hamas’ in hospitals and in extreme engineering efforts to trace and then defensive operations was July 20, 2014, proximity to civilian centers. If destroy or disrupt them. 63 when 13 soldiers of the Golani Infantry Israel has highly advanced signals Brigade were killed while attempting intelligence capacities, then Fire Support to advance into the Shejaiya area east Hamas has turned toward runners Hamas used mortars extensively, of Gaza city.72 This action involved a and other primitive forms of especially 120mm types, and short range minefield, antitank weapons, infantry communication. If Israel controls rockets to support defensive operations.64 and supporting fire from mortars.73 the skies and sees all from above, Israeli forces inside Gaza and on the then Hamas has carved out a Israeli side of the border were subject to Hamas’ forces were able to inflict subterranean network from which continual harassment fire.65 significantly greater casualties than in it launches ambushes and rocket the 2009 conflict: 66 Israeli soldiers strikes. And if, among other Sniping died in 2014, compared to 10 in 2009.74 things, Israel’s engineers have Hamas snipers harassed and inflicted manufactured a means of striking casualties on exposed Israeli troops and in Rafah Attack that Also Killed 2 Soldiers,” Times of Is- Hamas’ rockets out of the sky, 66 armored vehicle personnel. rael, August 1, 2014. then Hamas has moved toward 69 “The ‘Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades’ Weapons And mortars, which have a limited Suicide Attack Units,” Middle East Media Research Institute, Septem- range but are largely immune to 76 Several suicide attacks were carried out ber 2, 2014. Iron Dome’s capabilities. 67 on Israeli forces inside Gaza. The most 70 See, for example, @Qassam_English, “#AllPraises- successful attack was against Givati ToAllah Today, Al-Qassam Brigades hit an Israeli F-16 There are a number of lessons that Infantry Brigade troops on August 1, warplane over the besieged Gaza Strip…The Israeli jet Hamas likely learned from the conflict. 2014, which killed three Israeli soldiers was targeted early Wednesday with a surface-to-air mis- At the highest level, the war at least and may have been part of a complex sile over the city of Deir al-Balah in central Gaza,” July partially validated Hamas’ way of war: 68 abduction operation. 23, 2014; @Qassam_English, “13:56: Managed one of the sustain strikes into Israel, prevent Qassam units of air defense weapon for targeting F15 deep IDF penetration of Gaza, cause 60 Ibid. warplane; was a direct hit which led to a fire,” July 25, Israel to kill civilians, inflict civilian 61 Ibid. 2014. and military casualties on Israel, and 62 Issacharoff. 71 Amos Harel, “As Casualties Mount, the Gaza Opera- achieve an image of victory. The first 63 Ibid. tion Threatens to Become a War,” Haaretz, July 21, 2014. three of these were largely achieved, the 64 According to the IDF, 356 rockets were fired against 72 Yaakov Lappin, “13 IDF Soldiers Killed in Gaza as last two much less so. Hamas will likely its forces in the Gaza Strip. See Jeremy Binnie, “IDF De- Operation Protective Edge Death Toll Climbs to 18,” Je- see no reason for drastic change. tail the Damage Inflicted on Gaza Militants,” IHS Jane’s rusalem Post, July 20, 2014. Defense Weekly, August 8, 2014. 73 “Al Qassam Kills 14 Israeli Soldiers in an Ambush Hamas learned, or re-learned, that it 65 Ibid. See also numerous Qassam Brigades’ tweets on East of Gaza City,” Al Qassam website, July 20, 2014. can continue military operations of all bombardment of Israeli positions and force concentra- 74 For IDF KIA in Operation Protective Edge, see Ze’ev types even while under intense attack. tions with mortars and 107mm rockets during the course Ben-Yechiel, “Last IDF Soldier Killed in Protective Edge Its investment in tunnels and building of war @Qassam_English. Laid to Rest,” Breaking Israel News, September 2, 2014. 66 The Qassam Brigades published numerous tweets on For IDF KIA in Operation Cast Lead, see Yoram Cohen 75 See, for example, Lilach Shoval, “This is War and We sniping actions at @Qassam_English during the conflict. and Jeffrey White, “Hamas in Combat: The Military Per- are Winning,” Israel Hayom, July 27, 2014. 67 “IDF Troops Foil Female Suicide Bombing Attack,” formance of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Move- 76 Mitch Ginsburg, “Ground Op is Still an Option, but IDF Blog, July 25, 2014. ment,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Time is Not on Israel’s Side,” Times of Israel, August 25, 68 Mitch Ginsburg, “IDF Searches for Officer Kidnapped October 2009, p. 22. 2014.

12 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 the rocket and mortar arsenal paid the people of Gaza. It can be expected the inaccuracy of their weapons.81 dividends. Israeli air and ground power, that Hamas will attempt to acquire more Improving the rocket warheads will while inflicting casualties and damage on and better MANPADs. mean that those that get through the Hamas’ forces, did not break or render Iron Dome will cause greater casualties them combat ineffective. Air power was There are also important lessons at and damage. These improvements not enough against a physically and the tactical level. Mortar systems will challenge the Iron Dome system. mentally hardened enemy, and Hamas’ are effective in inflicting casualties Hamas will likely pursue alternatives ground forces resisted IDF ground and damage on Israeli forces and to rockets for offensive operations, forces at least up to a point. civilian targets. Close combat can including drones, more powerful produce Israeli casualties in spite of mortars, and more offensive tunnels. Fighting from within the population is IDF firepower advantages. Defensive In a future war, Hamas will attempt effective. Israel is heavily constrained tunnels allow Hamas’ forces to engage to achieve the same level of disruption by the presence of civilians, and will Israeli units in close combat with, in central Israel that it achieved in not use all its available firepower. at least on occasion, the element of southern Israel. It will take measures to reduce surprise, giving Hamas’ forces a degree civilian casualties that will reduce of survivability in these engagements. In preparing for a future war, Hamas its effectiveness in striking targets IDF defensive measures reduced the will continue to place emphasis on and contribute to the survival of effectiveness of anti-tank weapons. In tunnels, including both offensive and Hamas’ assets and forces. According particular, the Trophy vehicle protection defensive tunnels. Hamas will likely to Palestinian and United Nations system worked against Hamas’ ATGM. strengthen and deepen its defensive sources, some 2,100 Gazans were killed Sniping inflicted a number of casualties layout and means. It will likely increase in the war.77 The proportion of civilians on IDF personnel, especially vehicle the number of anti-tank units and to combatants killed is in dispute, with commanders. weapons it can deploy in response to Palestinian and UN sources claiming the Israeli Trophy active protection that about 70% of the casualties were Finally, Hamas learned that it has no system and Israel’s likely acquisition of civilian and Israeli sources claiming answer to the Israeli Navy. The IDF’s additional heavily armored tanks and that a little over 50% were civilians.78 naval forces were able to operate close APCs. Hamas will devote some effort Whatever the number, significant inshore to conduct naval gunfire and to improving its air defenses, although Palestinian civilian casualties will sea commando operations with virtual Israel’s air superiority means that occur regardless of the measures taken impunity. Although Hamas reportedly Hamas will probably not do more than by Israel.79 had an interest in coastal defense try to acquire a capability to perhaps missiles at one time,80 none were used shoot down an Israeli aircraft and claim The Iron Dome does not solve Israel’s in this conflict. an image of victory. rocket problem. While it is successful in reducing casualties and damage, The Contours of the Next Conflict Whatever its path forward, Hamas will rocket firing disrupts life across much Until and unless there is either a be ready for the next round of war with of Israel. Every time Israelis take to the political or military solution to the Gaza Israel. It will seek to fight longer, do shelters, Hamas scores a success. When problem, there will be future rounds of more damage, and defend itself more flights to and from Ben Gurion airport conflict. It is possible to see the shape of vigorously. Whether or not Hamas can are disrupted, it is an important success. Hamas’ military operations in the next accomplish this in the face of Israel’s When Israelis are forced to abandon round. close monitoring of the situation and settlements close to the border, it is a Egyptian hostility to the group remains major success. Hamas will likely continue to emphasize to be seen. Yet Hamas cannot give up rockets as the mainstay of its offensive armed “resistance” without changing This war showed again that Hamas operations against Israel. Hamas will its fundamental nature. needs air defense capabilities. Without try to improve its rocket capability. effective air defense, or at least the There are several ways it can achieve Jeffrey White is a former senior U.S. ability to impose some limits or this, depending on access to technology defense intelligence officer and is currently complications on Israeli air operations, and critical materials. It can increase a defense fellow at The Washington Hamas will continue to lack effective the number of rockets in its arsenal to Institute for Near East Policy. He has means to defend its military assets and enable it to mount larger strikes and written extensively on the Gaza conflict sustain them longer. It can increase the and is the co-author (with Yoram Cohen) 77 William Booth, “The U.N. Says 7 in 10 Palestinians number of mid and long range rockets of the 2009 study Hamas in Combat: The Killed in Gaza Were Civilians. Israel Disagrees,” Wash- to bring heavier fire on central and Military Performance of the Palestinian ington Post, August 29, 2014. northern Israel to increase the damage Islamic Resistance Movement, published 78 See Judi Rudoren, “Civilian or Not? New Fight in Tal- and disruption in that region. It can by The Washington Institute for Near East lying the Dead From the Gaza Conflict,” New York Times, also attempt to improve the accuracy Policy. August 5, 2014. and destructiveness of its rockets. Its 79 These numbers can be manipulated to attract media leader, Khaled Meshaal, has noted attention as well. Even if later corrections to casualty counts occur, powerful and lasting impressions of civil- 80 “Hamas Seeks Chinese C-802 Antiship Missiles from 81 Michael Isikoff, “Hamas Leader: Don’t Compare Us to ian deaths will remain. Iran,” Free Republic, January 29, 2014. ISIL,” Yahoo News, August 22, 2014.

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Iraq’s New Government option of selected Sunni representatives in 2007, however, ministers from IIP/ into the drafting committee. These Tawafuq withdrew from al-Maliki’s and the Question of Sunni representatives were primarily government in protest of its failure to Inclusion affiliated with a Sunni Islamist party stop sectarian killings.4 known as the Islamic Iraqi Party (IIP). By Reidar Visser The extent to which this amounted to Tawafuq returned to government again meaningful inclusion can be debated. in May 2008.5 Still, some indication policy debates related to Iraq, Syria During the course of the process, the of the fragmented nature of “Sunni and the problem of the Islamic State IIP was reluctantly converted to a pro- inclusion” in the first al-Maliki in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have constitutional party. It did achieve government was evident from the referenced the need for “Sunni some last-minute concessions regarding local election results in 2009, where inclusion” in the new Iraqi government. options for future constitutional the parties that were the established Ever since Saddam Hussein’s Sunni- reform, but by and large its efforts were “Sunni” forces—in the sense that they dominated Ba`ath regime was rejected by the community it claimed to were part of the al-Maliki government— overthrown in 2003—thereby paving represent: the overwhelming message by no means managed to secure the the way for democratic processes of those who participated in the majority of the Sunni vote. Instead, local that have consistently produced constitutional referendum in October parties affiliated with the tribal Sahwa Shi`a-dominated governments—a 2005 in Sunni areas was a “No” to the (Awakening) movement in Anbar and key transitional question has focused new constitution, and a two-thirds former Ba`athists in Mosul emerged to on how Sunnis would fare under the majority rejection materialized in the capture large slices of the Sunni vote.6 new political order. The significance heavily Sunni Arab provinces of Anbar For their part, instead of mending fences of the “Sunni question” in Iraq has and Salah al-Din.2 With Kurds and with al-Maliki, the IIP seemed more become accentuated, in particular Shi`a minorities participating in large attracted to a role in the burgeoning following the advances of ISIL in numbers in the mixed (but Sunni Arab- opposition to the prime minister that Sunni-dominated parts of Iraq since dominated) Mosul, the criteria for a emerged among various Iraqi parties 2013. Less attention has been paid to three-province, two-thirds rejection of even as they continued to be part of his what the concept of “Sunni inclusion”1 the constitution as a basis for its non- government. Particularly interesting actually means, and how the question approval did not emerge, and the draft in this regard was the emergence of a of “Sunni inclusion” has played out in constitution was adopted against the Sunni speaker of parliament from the previous Iraqi governments in the post- desire of Sunni public opinion.3 IIP in March 2009, Ayad al-Samarraie. 2003 era. He was clearly backed by al-Maliki’s In the first Nuri al-Maliki government opponents, including the ISCI and the This article offers a historical from 2006-2010, there was initial Kurds.7 overview of Sunni inclusion in past Sunni inclusion in terms of ministerial Iraqi governments with the goal representation by IIP (as part of Sunnis in the Second Maliki Government of providing more clarity on how the Tawafuq coalition), as well as This situation prompted political Iraqi Sunnis are likely to fare in by other political parties elected by reconfiguration ahead of the second the most recent government formed Sunni and secular voters. Yet few of parliamentary vote in March 2010. by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al- these ministries were particularly The Sunni governor of Mosul, Athil al- Abadi in September 2014. It argues prominent. With one exception, they Nujayfi, emerged as a prominent force that “Sunni inclusion” cannot be did not belong to the category of together with his brother, Usama. Tareq properly understood through simply positions Iraqi politicians refer to as al-Hashemi, formerly an important calculating the sectarian composition particularly sought-after “sovereign figure in IIP, broke away to form of the Iraqi government as a measure of ministries,” which include: security, the more secular Tajdid movement. representation. Rather, it is necessary oil and finance. Nevertheless, a Sunni They were joined in an alliance with to analyze policies on specific issues general of the Iraqi army without other parties that were more secular that are of particular concern to a any political connections eventually in orientation and discourse, but that majority of Iraqi Sunnis, including most became defense minister, and Sunni in practice were backed by a majority prominently de-Ba`athification and the parties also controlled the deputy of nominally Sunni voters: the Iraqi structure of the Iraqi security forces. premier position. Additionally, National Accord of Ayyad Allawi and Tawafuq/IIP controlled one of the the Hiwar front of Saleh al-Mutlak. Sunnis in the First Maliki Government three presidency-council positions, Altogether, they formed the massive Sunni inclusion has had different which was significant as a (temporary) Iraqiyya alliance, which was a Sunni- meanings at different stages in Iraq’s veto-wielding institution in the first secular alliance. Many portrayed post-2003 politics. Following the parliamentary cycle from 2005-2010. Sunni boycott of the elections in During the peak of sectarian violence 4 “The Iraqi Accord Front’s Return to Government,” In- January 2005, Sunni inclusion in the stitute for the Study of War, 2008. constitution-writing process was to 2 Al-Dustur, October 27, 2005. 5 Ibid. some extent achieved through the co- 3 On the question of Sunni representation in the Iraqi 6 Radio Sawa, February 15, 2009. constitutional drafting process, see Jonathan Morrow, 7 Reidar Visser, A Responsible End? The United States and 1 Sunni inclusion refers to the level of participation by “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” the Iraqi Transition, 2005–2010 (Charlottesville, VA: Just Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi government. United States Institute of Peace, 2005. World Books, 2010), pp. 104-108.

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Iraqiyya as a “Sunni” coalition (its defense to a Sunni who he, rather than Sunnis in the Abadi Government opponents were more clearly Shi`a the Iraqi parliament, had selected: As Iraq went to parliamentary elections Islamist), but this was not an accurate Sadun al-Dulaymi. Al-Dulaymi’s role in May 2014, the political climate representation of the alliance.8 Of as defense minister under al-Maliki had hardened in a sectarian direction course, some of the constituent parts soon came to highlight the concept nationally and regionally because of were all-Sunni parties and to some of the “unrepresentative Sunni”: the conflict in Syria and the growing extent spoke a sectarian language. Yet portrayed as marionettes with little manifestation of military activities by Iraqiyya’s leading figure, Ayyad Allawi, or no popular backing, figures like ISIL in Iraqi territory. This turn had is a staunchly secular Shi`a who cannot al-Dulaymi were criticized for being be reduced to a “stooge” for Sunnis, in tools of al-Maliki that provided him “The key to understanding whose name he has never spoken. with easy goodwill in certain Western circles who did not go far beyond the viability of the new Due to the combination of Sunni counting the number of ministers of each Abadi government is and secular interests in Iraqiyya, it sect, quite regardless of the question of is difficult to dissect the question their representativeness. not so much to study its of Sunni inclusion in the second al- personnel in isolation, but Maliki government, which came into During the years of the second al-Maliki existence with Iraqiyya’s reluctant government, it became increasingly to look for direction of backing in December 2010. As part clear that al-Maliki attempted to policy.” of the government formation deal, eliminate several Sunni leaders he Iraqiyya had demanded control of an perceived as threatening. By using extra-constitutional national policy the judiciary in what seemed to be council that was supposed to be created politically motivated prosecutions, he prompted protests against the al-Maliki as a check on prime ministerial power first targeted Vice President Tareq al- government in many Sunni areas, such (it was never implemented). This Hashemi in December 2011 (days after as in Falluja and Ramadi, beginning particular demand may have been the last U.S. forces had left Iraq) and in December 2012. But the protests more of a personal goal of Allawi than then Finance Minister Rafe al-Isawi in did not translate into new parties that a meaningful “Sunni demand.” On the December 2012, forcing both men out of participated within the established other hand, there was strong Sunni their positions, and, eventually, out of framework of parliamentary politics representation in the new government the country.9 in Iraq. Instead, the Sunni parties in terms of heavyweight positions that contested the elections in 2014 held by individuals with solid Sunni At the same time, however, other Sunnis were largely the old elites who had support. Saleh al-Mutlak of the Hiwar continued to work with al-Maliki in dominated Sunni Iraqi politics during bloc was deputy premier and Rafe al- government, including some who held the entire post-2003 period. Even Isawi, a prominent Anbar politician, substantial popular mandates based on many of the ministers of the second was minister of finance. Tareq al- their personal votes in the March 2010 al-Maliki government were reaffirmed Hashemi was vice president, now elections. A problem in evaluating their as MPs despite having done nothing with only ceremonial powers but still support for al-Maliki, however, was the more than hold on to their prestigious seen as symbolically important. Other tendency of some Sunni ministers to offices without achieving any policy Sunni Iraqiyya figures held portfolios hold on to their positions even in cases influence under al-Maliki’s rule. This of industry, agriculture, education where they clearly (and outspokenly) suggests that the Sunni grievances that and technology. On paper, at least, differed with the general direction of were articulated in protest movements there was an adequate level of Sunni cabinet policy. It is not clear whether in the year before the elections did not representation in terms of key Sunni they supported the government, as produce representative MPs who would politicians receiving key ministerial they continued to serve as al-Maliki’s participate within the framework of the portfolios. ministers even though they criticized elected Iraqi parliament. him publicly. A case in point is Saleh One exception to the general al-Mutlak who attained the curious Soon after the elections in May 2014, a participation of Sunnis in the second distinction of declaring his premier a new coalition of mostly Sunni parties al-Maliki government, however, dictator only to continue to work with that had won seats in parliament concerned security. It is worth noting him.10 coalesced, this time without the that al-Maliki kept these positions secular Allawi, and therefore with a away not only from Sunnis, but more clear-cut Sunni sectarian profile. from everyone with an independent Shortly after the new parliament had power base (e.g., other Shi`a parties). convened, these parties won a major Instead, he kept control of the security 9 For a good overview of Sunni grievances against al- victory by having Sallim al-Jibburi, a ministries for himself as acting Maliki during his second term, see Zaid al-Ali, The Strug- former IIP politician who in 2014 was minister, and eventually delegated gle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sec- elected to parliament on a local list of tarianism Have Undermined Democracy (New Haven, CT: Sunni politicians in Diyala, elected as 11 8 For an example of Western commentators labeling Yale University Press, 2014). parliament speaker. In the government Iraqiyya as “Sunni,” see “Biden Makes Surprise Iraq 10 “Interview with Saleh al-Mutlak,” al-Jazira, Decem- Visit,” Associated Press, September 2, 2010. ber 28, 2011. 11 Simeon Kerr, “Iraq’s Parliament Elects Speaker as

15 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 formation itself in September 2014, the Accordingly, the key to understanding Ebola: Not an Effective Sunnis had less leverage since al-Abadi the viability of the new al-Abadi probably enjoyed sufficient support to government is not so much to study its Biological Weapon for get confirmed without their votes. Still, personnel in isolation, but to look for Terrorists they opted to take part in his government direction of policy. That is admittedly and achieved a very respectable number a challenge, due to the fact that the By Stephen Hummel of ministries—around seven—although attempt by Iraqi politicians to stay on this time service ministries only. The time with the government formation images of humans infected with absolute number of Sunni ministers this year (after much urging by the Ebola Virus Disease, a strain of viral was slightly lower than in the second higher Shi`a clergy in particular) has hemorrhagic fever (VHF), instill public al-Maliki government, but the overall meant that it is precisely discussion fear and panic. Ebola is a naturally size of the cabinet was also somewhat about ministerial positions, rather than occurring virus with no known natural smaller. No security ministers from policy as a whole, which has accounted reservoir.1 In addition to the innate fear any party were approved in the main for most of the political negotiations that the deadly virus inspires, a further parliamentary vote on the new cabinet between the participating blocs. Sunni fear stems from questions about Ebola’s on September 8, 2014. inclusion will require addressing the potential use as a bioweapon. Ebola Iraqi security forces (including army is not a new disease. The virus first In sum, it is hard to initially see a and police deployments in Sunni- emerged in 1976 with two simultaneous meaningful difference from al-Maliki majority areas), de-Ba`athification (a outbreaks in Sudan and Zaire (now the to al-Abadi as far as inclusion of revised law that attempts to satisfy Democratic Republic of the Congo).2 The Sunnis is concerned. For the question common Sunni demands is underway disease is named after the Ebola River in of representativeness, though, more but needs to get passed), the option of Congo on which the Yambuku village, important than numbers are political federalism (initiatives for transforming one of the original outbreak villages, affiliations. The Sunni ministers in al- some Sunni provinces to regions were is located.3 After 38 years of scientific Abadi’s new government are mostly unceremoniously and illegally shelved study and effective management, Ebola individuals who have been in the by the al-Maliki government), and remains a public concern today. There is political process since 2003. Of course, developments on the federal supreme some apprehension about the potential they have been mostly closer to Sunni court bill (and in particular the authority for its conversion into a bioweapon by a sectarian leaders like Nujayfi than that will be granted to Shi`a clerics). terrorist group.4 to the Shi`a Islamist al-Maliki (the exception being Qutayba al-Jibburi), There is, however, one appointment The U.S. Centers for Disease Control but they were never irreconcilable with issue that remains relevant to Sunnis: and Prevention (CDC) categorizes al-Maliki. Conversely, Sunnis who the security ministries. These portfolios VHFs as a Category A bioterrorism are in open revolt and are considering were left unfilled after the first vote disease.5 This designation is based on aligning themselves with ISIL are not on the al-Abadi government. There the ease of their dissemination,6 their represented. Additionally, the tribal and is an expectation that a Shi`a official high mortality rates, their potential local Sunni politicians with whom al- will be appointed to lead the Interior to cause public panic, and the special Maliki sought to improve ties in Anbar Ministry and a Sunni official to lead the preparedness they demand for public and Salah al-Din are poorly represented Defense Ministry. The most realistic health protection. As of September in the al-Abadi government and it remains hope for Iraqi Sunnis will be to have to be seen how they will respond to the a Sunni professional military officer 1 A natural reservoir refers to the long term host of the emergence of a new prime minister. without any political ties (but capable pathogen. The hosts often do not get the disease or are of keeping al-Abadi at arm’s length) asymptomatic for the infection. The World Health Orga- Conclusion appointed as defense minister, and an nization considers fruit bats in Africa a possible natural A key conclusion from the experience interior minister without close ties to reservoir for EVD and is considering the distribution of past Iraqi governments in the post- Shi`a militias. In choosing how to deal of Ebola virus with the overlap of the fruit bats range. 2003 era is that Sunni representation with these vacancies, al-Abadi will be See “Ebola Virus Disease,” World Health Organization, through the inclusion of names with a sending perhaps his most important April 2014. bit of Sunni constituency is in itself no signal about whether he intends to be 2 “Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever in Zaire, 1976,” Bulletin of guarantee for a meaningful inclusion more serious about “Sunni inclusion” World Health Organization 56 (1978), pp. 271-293. of Sunnis—in the sense of policies than al-Maliki ever was. 3 When the initial Ebola outbreak ended in 1976, 430 that take into consideration demands people were dead. Another outbreak occurred in the that are common among Iraqi Sunni Reidar Visser is a historian of Iraq. He has same region in 1995. See Ken Alibek, Biohazard (New voters. There are imbalances with written three books on Iraqi politics: Basra, York: Dell Publishing, 2000), p. 126. regard to which Sunni MPs become the Failed Gulf State (2005), An Iraq of 4 Elizabeth Palermo, “Could Ebola be Turned into a Bio- cabinet members, and there are further Its Regions (2007) and A Responsible Weapon? Possible, but Not so Easy,” CBS News, August imbalances with regard to which Sunnis End? (2010). 11, 2014. take part in elections and elect their 5 “Bioterrorism Agents and Diseases,” Centers for Dis- representatives at all. ease Control and Prevention, undated. 6 Ease of dissemination refers to the person-to-person Army Claims Success in Tikrit,” Financial Times, July 15, transmission of the disease. In the case of Ebola, trans- 2014. mission occurs through the passing of bodily fluids.

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19, 2014, the CDC has confirmed 3,341 Despite previous work conducted by personnel capable of extracting Ebola cases of Ebola in the most recent the Soviet Union and current assertions a highly coveted commodity for a outbreak and 2,811 deaths across five by some in the media, Ebola is not an terrorist organization seeking to use West African states.7 The World Health ideal bioweapon.12 This article examines the virus. Such personnel must operate Organization estimates the mortality the extreme difficulty a terrorist in the necessary protective equipment rate at about 70%.8 Transmission of the organization would face in weaponizing to shield them from inadvertent virus to humans occurs through direct Ebola as well as challenges several non- transmission. Failure to work in what contact of bodily fluids such as blood, conventional employment options of is deemed a biosafety level 4 lab, of secretions, and other contaminated Ebola. This article finds that, despite which there are only about two dozen fluids. The transmission of the fluid the outbreak’s location in West Africa, worldwide, would likely not result occurs through broken skin, mucous terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in successful extraction but almost membranes, or eating infected tissues lack the knowledge and specialized assuredly death of the handlers.15 such as bush meat. Upon infection equipment necessary to employ Ebola of its victims, the acute viral illness as a bioweapon. A study conducted by the U.S. Army is characterized by “sudden onset of Medical Research Institute of Infectious fever, intense weakness, muscle pain, Ebola as a Bioweapon? Diseases (USAMRIID) demonstrated headache, sore throat; followed by Biological weapons, unlike conventional that Ebola could be transmitted in an vomiting, diarrhea, rash, impaired liver munitions, have extensive reach aerosolized form, but their research is and kidney function and in some cases capabilities. “Biological agents can not based on realistic scenarios.16 The both internal and external bleeding.”9 produce lethal or incapacitating rhesus monkeys used in their 1995 study effects over an extensive area and were forced to inhale large quantities The prevalence and pathogenicity of can reproduce,” according to the of droplets via a breathing apparatus17 Ebola as well as the proximity of the Department of Defense.13 Bioweapons containing the Ebola virus.18 Instead of outbreak to terrorist organizations are not limited by the blast radius of the typical fluid-to-fluid transmission such as Boko Haram in Nigeria pose a shell; rather, they can replicate in of Ebola, the monkeys contracted the the question: could Ebola be used as a an infected host and spread from one virus via highly concentrated exposure bioweapon? Dr. Vladimir Nikiforov, person to another. For Ebola to be used to their respiratory mucous membranes. head of the Department of Infectious as a bioweapon in its naturally occurring Moreover, these experiments were done Diseases at Russia’s Federal Medical- state requires several highly technical in an extremely controlled biosafety Biological Agency, has claimed steps. Ideal bioweapons, for example, level 4 environment, and the monkeys publicly that Ebola could be turned are aerosolizable in order to infect mass themselves were anesthetized during into a biological weapon.10 Ken Alibek, numbers of people quickly. the infection process. The labs at the former deputy head of the Soviet USAMRIID have tremendous resources Union’s biological weapons program, In an interview with CBS News, and technical expertise to conduct explained in his book Biohazard that the Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, the chief aerogenic infection experiments of Soviet Union weaponized Ebola during operating officer of SecureBio, stated Ebola, which terrorists groups like the Cold War.11 that for a terrorist group to use Ebola Boko Haram currently lack. as a bioweapon, the group must first “obtain a live host infected with the Ebola is also not a robust virus; it virus,”14 then transport the host to does not survive well outside of the a laboratory to extract the virus. host. Samples, consequently, cannot 7 “2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa,” Centers for Dis- Extracting the virus is not a simple be extracted from an infected host and ease Control and Prevention, September 26, 2014. The process. The flu virus, for example, frozen for later use. As de Bretton- five West African states that are reporting Ebola cases is approximately 100 nanometers in Gordon explained, “the reason anthrax and deaths to the World Health Organization and the size, so the laboratory must have the has been the biological weapon CDC are Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra necessary extraction equipment and Leone. personnel trained to complete the 15 The Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) is required for work 8 Christopher Dye et al., “The International Ebola Emer- skilled techniques, all within the with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high risk of gency,” The New England Journal of Medicine 371 (2014). required biosafety level so that the life threatening disease. The BSL-4 labs are specially de- This number is estimated due to underreporting in the technicians would not become infected signed and engineered to prevent microorganisms from number of Ebola cases. The death rate among laboratory themselves. Furthermore, the skills being disseminated into the environment. All work in the confirmed cases is close to 84%, but the total number of required to extract Ebola from blood lab is conducted in a positive pressure personnel suit to cases (not laboratory confirmed) is reported to be 5,864, are only gained through practice. protect staff. See “Biosafety Level 4 Labs and BSL Infor- putting the death rate at close to 50%. The discrepancy in The training and time required to mation,” Federation of American Scientists, available at the mortality rate is due to reporting from rural villages extract a virus from blood correctly www.fas.org/programs/bio/biosafetylevels.html. and laboratory confirmation. is significant, making the trained 16 E. Johnson, N. Jaax, J. White, and P. Jahrling, “Lethal 9 “Ebola Virus Disease,” World Health Organization, Experimental Infections of Rhesus Monkeys by Aero- April 2014. 12 Palermo. solized Ebola,” International Journal of Experimental Pa- 10 TJ Larson, “Top Medical Expert Calls Ebola Outbreak 13 “Chapter 1: Introduction, Potential Military Chemical/ thology 76 (1995): pp. 227-236. ‘Suspicious’; Others Cite Use as Bio-Weapon,” All Voic- Biological Agents and Compounds,” U.S. Department of 17 The virus containing droplets were 0.8 to 1.2 µm in es, August 9, 2014. Defense, p. I-1. size. 11 Alibek. 14 Palermo. 18 Johnson et al.

17 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 of choice is not for its mortality with a syringe highlights a potential symptoms is not the same as a typical rate—when properly weaponized it means for terrorist organizations to weapon of mass destruction. It would is similar to Ebola—but for the fact spread the virus.23 With this method, not pose a mass casualty threat. The that it is exceptionally hardy. Anthrax however, the victim would know that biomedical surveillance capabilities can and will survive for centuries in they had been potentially exposed to a of hospitals and health organizations the ground, enduring frosts, extreme pathogen. Attack with a syringe or any in conjunction with the response of temperatures, wind, drought, and rain other obvious delivery system would municipalities and governments around before reemerging.”19 prompt the victim to seek immediate the world would enable a counter- medical attention. The victim would response. Some individuals would In the 1970s, the World Health be tested for a wide array of chemicals invariably get sick, but they would be Organization studied the effects of and agents as well as likely undergo quarantined and receive medical care. aerosolized Rift Valley Fever, another precautionary quarantine—which is City limits and borders could be closed VHF strain. The WHO projected that the what occurred to the federal air marshal to prevent the spread of the disease. effects of 50 kilograms of aerosolized in Nigeria—to ensure they were not RVF on a municipality of 500,000 exposed to Ebola. The syringe in this The risk of Ebola as an effective would have an estimated downwind case was also sent to the biodefense unconventional biological weapon distance of one kilometer and cause laboratory at Fort Detrick, Maryland, is low. The aspects of the virus that 35,000 casualties with a mortality rate for further inspection.24 support its classification as a potential of 0.5%.20 Ebola has a higher morbidity bioweapon by the CDC are also the and mortality rate than Rift Valley Another plausible means for a terrorist same factors that limit its capabilities Fever. Fifty kilograms of Ebola is an group to spread Ebola would be to infect as a functional bioweapon. Terrorist astronomical amount for a terrorist themselves and then attempt to spread groups lack the technology, the safety group to culture and purify.21 In his book the virus to others by spending time in equipment, and the expertise to make Biohazard, Ken Alibek, the former deputy confined public spaces, such as in an the virus into hearty, contagious head of the Soviet Union’s biological airplane or bus. bioweapons like Anthrax or Small Pox. weapons program, detailed how the Soviet Union spent billions of dollars In such a scenario, the time period Conclusion and decades working to weaponize between when the terrorist has a high Ebola is a deadly disease. Like any Ebola, to little avail.22 Technology, enough titter count of virus in his biological agent, if given sufficient expertise, and vast amounts of money blood to infect others and when the amount of time, money, and expertise are the three necessary components terrorist himself is debilitated by the under specific conditions, it could to weaponizing Ebola that a terrorist disease is extremely short. The virus be turned into a biological weapon. organization simply does not possess. that the terrorist would hope to spread The resources of groups such as Boko to others would be concurrently killing Haram and the Islamic State in Iraq and A Limited Bioweapon? its host. Consequently, it would be a the Levant (ISIL) are not the same as The Ebola virus is clearly not an ideal race between contagion of others and the former Soviet Union, which spent conventional bioweapon. The virus is the death of the terrorist. As the virus billions of dollars and decades in secret extremely debilitating and requires replicates, the body becomes more and laboratories working to weaponize specialized equipment and expertise more incapacitated. The white blood Ebola. Despite reporting that ISIL has for handling. Additionally, large cell count drops and bodily functions an estimated $2 billion in amassed quantities of the virus must be cultured diminish. The terrorist would appear wealth,25 setting up a mobile laboratory to create the virus-containing droplets sick, alerting those in his vicinity to capable of extracting Ebola from infected to aerogenically spread the virus. avoid him. The virus is not airborne, so patients and transforming the cultured Otherwise, transmission is limited to the terrorist’s ability to move around as virus into a bioweapon is not likely a direct contact. a kind of human viral bomb is negligible priority given the intensified fighting since he must come into direct physical in Iraq and the proposed airstrikes in Ebola as an unconventional bioweapon, contact with others to spread fluids Syria. In the hands of terrorists, Ebola however, is a concern. Nevertheless, either through broken skin or mucous is perhaps more deadly for its own the risks and concerns are considerably membrane. members who have minimal training different. The recent stabbing of a federal with and knowledge of the virus. air marshal at Lagos airport in Nigeria Assuming a terrorist group succeeds in finding an ideal transmission window As a non-conventional bioweapon, 19 Palermo. in which they could spread the virus Ebola is also far from ideal. Ebola is 20 “Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weap- unnoticed to others, the infection would not an aerosolized virus. Consequently, ons,” World Health Organization Group of Consultants, be no different than a typical pandemic. a terrorist organization would have to 1970, pp. 98-109. The rate of infection and presentation of use very direct delivery methods for 21 To culture 50 kilograms of Ebola would consequently infection. Being accosted with a needle require tremendous resources to create an environment 23 “Air Marshal Attacked With Syringe in Nigeria, Flies is noticeable to a victim, prompting to keep cells alive in order for the cells to host a virus that to Texas,” NBC News, September 8, 2014. them to seek medical attention and is simultaneously killing the host cell it is using to rep- 24 Andrew Pollack, “Stabbing with Syringe in Nigeria licate in. Raises Concerns of Ebola as Weapon,” New York Times, 25 Howard Shatz, “To Defeat the Islamic State, Follow 22 Alibek. September 10, 2014. the Money,” Politico, September 10, 2014.

18 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 commencing containment procedures, The Life and Death of potential rivals last summer, has led to if necessary. renewed predictions that al-Shabab will Al-Shabab Leader Ahmed split into different factions bickering If a terrorist organization sought to Godane over power and control of the group’s infect its own members, becoming in remaining manpower, territories, and effect Ebola-infected suicide bombers, By Christopher Anzalone resources.5 Al-Shabab announced the short timeframe between when the Godane’s immediate successor, Ahmad virus count in the host would be high on the night of Monday, September Umar, within a week of his death and enough to infect others and when the 1, 2014, a U.S. airstrike targeted two a day after the Pentagon confirmed host himself is debilitated by symptoms vehicles near a wooded area of Sablale that al-Shabab’s leader had been killed. would prove highly limiting. The reach district in the Lower Shabelle region Known as Abu Ubayda, Umar reportedly of such novel suicide bombers could be of Somalia, an area used by the Somali played an instrumental leadership role drastically reduced through biomedical militant group al-Shabab to train its in the purge of dissidents from the surveillance networks in cities and military forces.1 The strike killed group in 2013.6 hospitals around the world, aided by Ahmed Godane, the elusive amir of al- health screens at airports. Shabab, upon whom the United States This article examines Godane’s tenure had placed a $7 million bounty in June as al-Shabab’s amir, paying particular Ebola evokes images of a painful death, 2012.2 The U.S. government officially attention to both the group’s period of but to date its effect on humans has been confirmed Godane’s death on September expansion, followed by stalemate and relatively limited. Last year, malaria 5, 2014.3 beginnings of its decline, the strategic killed more than 627,000 people26 outmaneuvering of his critics and worldwide, and influenza kills between Godane’s death, significant in itself, rivals, and the internal purge he and 3,000 and 49,000 people annually comes at a particularly sensitive time his loyalists enacted in 2013. It finds in the United States.27 Yet these two for al-Shabab. The group is facing a that Godane was a charismatic and diseases are not considered potential renewed offensive, Operation Indian multifaceted leader who demonstrated bioweapons because, despite their high Ocean, by the African Union Mission in both organizational capabilities and rates of infection, their mortality rates Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali federal media savvy, enabling him to oversee are low and do not cause general panic. government that aims to capture al-Shabab’s territorial and governing Baraawe, the last major port town expansion between 2008 and 2010. Fear of Ebola should not stem from its that the insurgents still control.4 His desire for sole power within al- potential use as a biological weapon. The internal dynamics within al- Shabab, however, ultimately shattered Ebola is currently limited to a few West Shabab itself remain the subject the group’s internal cohesion and led African states, and the real probability of intense debate and speculation, a number of founding leaders and of Ebola spreading naturally to although there is little hard, verifiable prominent members to break ranks neighboring countries should itself be information about the current state and leave. The future of the group after a cause for great public health concern. within the group’s multiple leadership his death will depend on the internal Claims that Ebola could be easily tiers, from the top level to the regional cohesiveness of the post-June 2013 transformed into a biological weapon by and district-level administrators and version of al-Shabab. a terrorist organization are unfounded field commanders. The death of Godane, and sensationalized. who only succeeded in consolidating Early Life and the Islamic Courts Union his control of the group by killing Many of the details of Godane’s early Captain Stephen Hummel is a FA52 officer or driving out his major critics and life remain shrouded in unverifiable and currently serving as an instructor in rumor and hagiography, particularly in the Chemistry and Life Science Department 1 Feisal Omar and Abdi Sheikh, “Somalia’s al Shabaab al-Shabab circles. He was born in July at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. Name New Leader after U.S. Strike, Warn of Revenge,” 1977 in Hargeisa, now the capital of CPT Hummel previously served in both Iraq Reuters, September 6, 2014; “Al-Shabab Leader Ahmed the self-declared independent republic and Afghanistan and as the USAREUR Abdi Godane was Target of U.S. Airstrike,” Associated of Somaliland in northern Somalia, 7 CBRN plans officer. Press, September 1, 2014; Helene Cooper, Eric Schmitt, into the large Arab/Isaaq clan. His and Jeffrey Gettleman, “Strikes Killed Militant Chief in The views presented are those of the author Somalia, U.S. Reports,” New York Times, September 5, 5 Edmund Blair and Drazen Jorgic, “Attack on Somali Is- and do not necessarily represent the views of 2014. lamist Leader Seen Triggering Power Struggle,” Reuters, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, 2 Andrew Quinn, “U.S. Offers Millions in Bounty for September 4, 2014. or any of its subordinate commands. Top Somali Militants,” Reuters, June 6, 2012; “Somalia’s 6 Abdi Sheikh, “Somali Islamist Rebels Pledge Alle- al-Shabab: Ahmed Abdi Godane Targeted by US,” BBC, giance to New Leader,” Reuters, September 8, 2014; Fei- September 2, 2014. sal Omar and Abdi Sheikh, “Somalia’s al Shabaab Name 3 “Statement by the Press Secretary on the Death of New Leader after U.S. Strike, Warn of Revenge,” Reu- 26 “Fact Sheet on the World Malaria Report 2013,” World Ahmed Godane,” White House, September 5, 2014; Da- ters, September 6, 2014. Health Organization, December 2013. vid Smith, “Al-Shabaab Leader Ahmed Abdi Godane 7 “Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea 27 “Estimating Seasonal Influenza-Associated Deaths Killed by US Air Strike in Somalia,” Guardian, Septem- Issues Lists of Individuals Identified Pursuant to Para- in the United States: CDC Confirms Variability of Flu,” ber 5, 2014. graph 8 of Resolution 1844 (2008),” United Nations, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, September 4 “Somali and AU Forces in al-Shabab Offensive,” al- April 12, 2010; Markus Virgil Hoehne, “Counter-ter- 12, 2013. Jazira, August 30, 2014. rorism in Somalia: How External Interference Helped

19 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 initial education was at the Umar bin In mid-2006, Godane was named the provincial (wilayat) level, with local al-Khattab Islamic school in Hargeisa the secretary-general of the Islamic administrators exercising authority at where he reportedly excelled.8 Well Courts Union’s (ICU) executive lower levels.19 Each wilayat has, at least versed in poetry, which he regularly council.14 A close associate of Ayro, in theory, a local Shabab-controlled inserted into his audio statements and he had previously been connected to Shari`a court, offices of financial and other messaging while al-Shabab’s amir, al-Ittihad al-Islami, the first major social affairs, including departments Godane was drawn in particular to the organized Somali Islamist movement for the collection and distribution of poetry of Muhammad Abdullah Hassan, that emerged after the fall of Siad religiously-mandated charity (zakat), a Somali Sufi leader who led a rebellion Barre in January 1991.15 After the and units from al-Shabab’s two armed against the British and Italians, who Ethiopian invasion toppled the ICU forces, the frontline fighting Jaysh al- dubbed him the “Mad Mullah,” in the from power in 2006, Godane was one ‘Usra fighting force and the “police early 20th century.9 of the al-Shabab leaders instrumental force,” known as Jaysh al-Hisba.20 in reorganizing the group and laying Godane received scholarships to study the groundwork for the launch of its By 2009, al-Shabab succeeded in in Sudan and Pakistan, the latter insurgency against the subsequent bringing about a period of relative reportedly funded by private Saudi Ethiopian occupation.16 He was also at stability in much of the territory it donors, and it was during his travels the forefront of delegitimizing Shaykh controlled through the implementation abroad that he is believed to have Sharif Shaykh Ahmad after the latter of a strict interpretation of Shari`a been attracted to militant Islamism.10 was elected as the new president that essentially reduced Islamic From Pakistan, Godane is believed to of the Somali Transitional Federal jurisprudence to the carrying out of have traveled in 1998 to Afghanistan, Government (TFG).17 punishments for a set list of offenses where he received military training including murder, theft, robbery, and battlefield experience alongside The exact date of Godane’s rise to al- adultery and fornication, and spying. the Afghan Taliban before returning to Shabab’s amir is debated, although it The harsh implementation of this Somalia in 2001.11 seems he ascended to this position in strict legal code was important from an December 2007.18 economic perspective as well because it In the 1990s, Godane worked for the led to a relative revival of commerce money transfer company al-Barakaat, At the Helm During al-Shabab’s “Golden Age” and trade in areas under the group’s which was shut down by the U.S. (2008-2010) control, including major population government after the 9/11 attacks, in Godane, during his time as amir, and economic centers, such as the an office in the town of Burao in the oversaw the rapid expansion of both al- cities of Baidoa and Kismayo, as well Togdheer region of Somaliland.12 He Shabab’s territorial control in southern as major towns and transit points.21 is suspected of participating in the and central Somalia as well as the Local insurgent administrations also murders of several foreign nationals construction of insurgent governing undertook small to medium scale in Somaliland between 2003 and 2004 structures to exercise a degree of control public works projects, including the alongside Adan Hashi Farah Ayro, an over these newly-acquired areas. construction or repair of bridges influential founding ideologue of the Regional governors were appointed and roads, the building of irrigation group and Godane’s one-time deputy.13 to oversee the implementation of the canals, and the distribution of relief group’s policies, programs, and edicts at aid during the famine in East Africa in 2011.22 Al-Shabab also developed to Produce Militant Islamism,” Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, December 17, 2009, p. 15. Millat Ibrahim 1, September 2008, p. 17. 8 Stig Jarle Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History 14 Ibid.; Abdulkadir Khalif, “Slain Al-Shabaab Chief a 19 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia,” United and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012 (New ‘Master Manipulator and Orator,’” Africa Review, Sep- Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia, March 10, 2010, York: Columbia University Press, 2013), p. 37. tember 7, 2014. pp. 14-16; Stig Jarle Hansen, “Shabab Central: Africa’s 9 Godane spoke about his admiration for Hassan in an 15 Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, p. 37. ‘Taliban’ Grows More Unified,”Jane’s Intelligence Review, interview with al-Shabab’s Radio al-Andalus. See Ahmed 16 Ibid., p. 53. July 16, 2010. Godane, “The First Interview of Radio al-Andalus with 17 “Somalia’s Divided Islamists,” International Crisis 20 “Jaysh al-‘Usra” (Army of Difficulty/Hardship) is the the Amir of Harakat al-Shabab al-, the Group, May 2010. name that the Prophet Muhammad reportedly gave to Shaykh Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr,” 2011. 18 The United Nations and Hansen date his rise to amir the army he gathered, after great difficulty, for a military 10 Tristan McConnell, “Who is Al Shabaab Leader as occurring before Ayro’s killing. See Hoehne, p. 21; expedition in 630 CE against Tabuk. The term “hisba” Ahmed Godane?” GlobalPost, October 1, 2013. Smith, “Ahmed Abdi Godane: What We Know About refers to the practice of verifying moral and ethical be- 11 Ibid.; Hoehne, p. 15; “US Confirms al-Shabab Leader U.S. Airstrike Terror Target”; Hansen, Al-Shabaab in havior, originally in the marketplace. Ahmed Godane Killed,” BBC, September 5, 2014; Smith, Somalia, p. 59; David Smith, Abdalle Ahmed, and Tom 21 “The Announcement of the Implementation of the Law “Al-Shabaab Leader Ahmed Abdi Godane Killed by US McCarthy, “Al-Shabaab Leader Ahmed Abdi Godane of Islam in the city of Marka in Front of a Large Rally of Air Strike in Somalia”; Chothia; Smith, “Ahmed Abdi Killed by US Air Strike in Somalia,” Guardian, Septem- Muslims,” al-Shabab, November 13, 2008; “The General Godane: What We Know About U.S. Airstrike Terror ber 5, 2014; “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Command [of Al-Shabab] Mobilizes Jaysh al-Hisba for Target.” Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1853 (2008),” the Implementation of the Call to God in the Freed Cities 12 Hoehne, p. 15; Paul Beckett, “Shutdown of Al Bara- United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia, p. 14; and Villages,” al-Shabab, August 5, 2008. kaat Severs Lifeline for Many Somalia Residents,” Wall “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to 22 Hamza Mohamed, “Somali Farmers Benefit from al- Street Journal, December 4, 2001. Security Council resolution 1811 (2008),” United Nations Shabab Reforms: In Somalia’s Breadbasket, Many Wel- 13 Hoehne, p. 15; Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, p. 37; Monitoring Group on Somalia, p. 19. come al-Shabab’s Move to Expel Foreign Aid Groups

20 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 a sophisticated and capable media Offensive” in Mogadishu in August internationally recognizable foreign operations network that produced 2010. Planned and pushed for by the fighter, posted a video to his YouTube materials in a variety of languages.23 amir, the offensive was essentially account revealing that he had left the composed primarily of ill-considered group due to differences concerning Under Godane, al-Shabab’s leadership mass infantry attacks on AMISOM “Shari`a and strategy” and feared for pursued a pragmatic approach toward and TFG positions in the capital his life.35 He and other disgruntled clan politics and drew its leadership city, which led to high insurgent foreign fighters, including another and rank-and-file from a relatively casualties likely numbering in the former field commander in al-Shabab, diverse array of clans and sub-clans, hundreds.29 Subsequent “Ramadan Khattab al-Masri, continued to spar unlike many of Somalia’s other armed offensives” in 2011-2013 also failed with al-Shabab and its supporters factions, which were thoroughly to yield many substantial positive both on the ground and online.36 The clan-based.24 There were allegations, results in the longer term for al- transnational jihadist e-universe however, that Godane privileged fellow Shabab.30 Internal discord continued grew polarized between supporters Isaaq clan members with advancement and ultimately centered on control of Hammami and dissident al-Shabab in al-Shabab over members of other clan of the group’s consultative council, leaders on the one hand and Godane groups.25 which Godane focused on stacking and his loyalists on the other, creating with loyalists while removing or a public relations nightmare for the Decline, Internal Discord, and the Purge otherwise marginalizing independent group. Hammami in particular goaded Differences between Godane and other voices and critics, including Robow Godane, other al-Shabab members, al-Shabab senior leaders, chief among and Ibrahim al-Afghani (also known and their supporters online via his them Mukhtar “Abu Mansur” Robow, as Ibrahim Hajji Jama Mee’aad), who Twitter account. The Godane faction, have existed since at least 2008, when were both founding members of al- which was busy consolidating its the two disagreed over strategy.26 Shabab.31 Ultimately, Godane suspended hold of the group, tried first to ignore These earlier disputes, however, were the meetings of the council.32 Internal Hammami’s criticisms while it sought settled peacefully and did not result in discord increased following the entry of to track him and other dissidents a split within insurgent ranks.27 Some, Kenyan and Ethiopian military forces in down to quietly kill them. They were however, saw Robow’s ouster as the southern and western Somalia in October group’s official spokesperson as part of and November 2011 respectively, and it 35 Omar Hammami video message, “urgentmessage,” a campaign by Godane and his loyalists was exacerbated further by Godane’s available at www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAr2srI- to marginalize the popular Rahanweyn decision to formally join al-Shabab with Nqks&context=C4c3babcADvjVQa1PpcFOfNTzHx2G 28 33 commander. al-Qa`ida. Mounting criticism from fZzvpWfoWlVAt97jxVvFusbw=. For background on Somali Salafist religious scholars and Hammami, see Christopher Anzalone, “The Evolution of Godane faced mounting internal jurists who had previously supported an American Jihadi: The Case of Omar Hammami,” CTC 34 criticism from other insurgent leaders the group also damaged al-Shabab. Sentinel 5:6 (2012). Hammami had met Godane during for the failure of the “Ramadan his training to join the militias of the ICU. Godane even In mid-March 2012, what went on “welcomed” him and other foreign fighters in the port and Build Canals,” al-Jazira, March 11, 2014; Christopher to become the most public internal town of Baraawe after the latter joined al-Shabab. See Anzalone, “Al-Shabab’s Setbacks in Somalia,” CTC Sen- crisis began when the American Omar Abu Mansuur al-Amriiki [Omar Hammami], “The Story tinel 4:10 (2011); Christopher Anzalone, “Insurgency, Hammami, arguably al-Shabab’s most of an American Jihaadi: Part One,” May 2012, pp. 61, 99. Governance, & Legitimacy in Somalia: A Reassessment For more in-depth discussion of the schisms, see Chris- of Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, its Rhetoric & Divi- 29 Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, pp. 102-106; “Attack topher Anzalone, “The Rise and Decline of al-Shabab in sions,” al-Wasat blog, December 6, 2010. Kills U.N. Peacekeepers in Somalia,” United Press Inter- Somalia,” Turkish Review 4:4 (2014). 23 Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabaab and Social Media: A national, August 31, 2010; “Somali Fighters Attack Capi- 36 Many jihadist internet forums quickly deleted posts Double-Edged Sword,” Brown Journal of World Affairs tal: Al-Shabab Sends 11 Truckloads of Armed Fighters to critical of Godane and his loyalists within al-Shabab. A 20:2 (2014); Christopher Anzalone, “The Rapid Evolu- Mogadishu after Declaring Final War,” al-Jazira, August prominent exception was the Global Jihad forum, which tion of Al-Shabab’s Media and Insurgent ‘Journalism,’” 27, 2010; “115 Killed, 200 Wounded in 4-Day Mogadishu became one of the main websites to not only allow the OpenDemocracy, November 16, 2011. Clashes,” Garowe Online, August 26, 2010. posting of materials critical of Godane and al-Shabab 24 Christopher Anzalone, “Harakat al-Shabab Con- 30 “Islamic Militants Launch in from Hammami and dissident former al-Shabab lead- tinues to Court Somalia’s Clans as Hasan Dahir Aweys Famine-stricken Somalia,” CNN, August 1, 2011; “Soma- ers and members, but also prominently advertised them. Assumes a More Public Role,” al-Wasat blog, March 21, lia’s al-Shabab Rebels Leave Mogadishu,” BBC, August More recently, the forum’s administrators have taken a 2011; “Harakat al-Shabab Claims Support from ‘Ayr Clan 6, 2011; “Al-Shabaab Changes Tactics, Withdraws from position against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Leaders,” al-Wasat blog, November 4, 2011; “Harakat Somali Capital,” CNN, August 6, 2011. siding with Jabhat al-Nusra, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdi- al-Shabab & Somalia’s Clans,” al-Wasat blog, March 8, 31 Matt Bryden, “The Reinvention of Al-Shabaab: A si, and other jihadist critics of the former. See J.M. Berger, 2011. Strategy of Choice or Necessity?” Center for Strategic & “Omar and Me: My Strange, Frustrating Relationship 25 Michael A. Weinstein, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab’s Split International Studies, February 2014. with an American Terrorist,” Foreign Policy, September and its Absorption of Hizbul Islam,” Garowe Online, 32 Ibid. 16, 2013; Karl Morand, “Jihadis on Twitter,” podcast January 8, 2011; “Internal Disputes Plague Al-Shabaab 33 Abdi Sheikh, “Residents Fear Clashes as Somali Rebel discussion with J.M. Berger, Middle East Week Podcast, Leadership after Mogadishu Withdrawal,” Terrorism Row Worsens,” Reuters, April 1, 2012. April 11, 2014. Khattab al-Masri’s criticisms of Godane Monitor 9:33 (2011). 34 Hassan M. Abukar, “Somalia’s Salafi Groups and were published in a Somali translation in early July 2014 26 Hansen, Al-Shabaab in Somalia, p. 78. Fatwa Wars,” Somali Observer, November 21, 2012; by the Global Jihad forum as “Tarjamad Soomali ah Kali- 27 Ibid. Tres Thomas, “War Igniting between al-Shabaab and al- mad walaalaheyga Ansartow walaalka qaa’idka khadaab 28 “Somalia’s Divided Islamists,” pp. 6-7. I’tisam,” Somalianewsroom.com, March 12, 2013. al-misri—Allah dhowro.”

21 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 eventually forced, however, to publicly under al-Shabab’s rule.40 In late June personalities like Hammami, was short. respond to Hammami’s allegations 2013, al-Afghani was arrested by the He outlived the latter by barely a year that Godane and his supporters had Amniyat network along with another before being killed in a U.S. airstrike. purged a number of foreign fighters senior dissident and founding member During his tenure, al-Shabab reached the from al-Shabab’s ranks, including of the group, the charismatic preacher height of its territorial, administrative, Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, a longtime Mu`allim Burhan (Abd al-Hamid Hashi economic, and military power. It was East Africa al-Qa`ida operative, and Olhayi). Both were then killed under also under his leadership, however, Bilal al-Berjawi, a British-Lebanese disputed circumstances.41 that al-Shabab fell into decline, losing foreign fighter.37 great swaths of territory and most major Godane had finally succeeded in urban centers and economic hubs, and The feud culminated in September 2013 eliminating his most vocal and earning the displeasure of Usama bin when the Godane-controlled Amniyat, potentially dangerous critics, and he Ladin, whom Godane had long tried al-Shabab’s intelligence branch, and his loyalists now exercised complete to convince to accept al-Shabab as an finally managed to track down and kill control over al-Shabab. Godane stood at official al-Qa`ida affiliate.43 Hammami and another dissident foreign the pinnacle of his power, thanks to his fighter, Usama al-Britani.38 Shortly gradual but continuing consolidation At the time of his death, Godane and before his death, Hammami accused of control within the group, strategic other al-Shabab leaders faced two Godane of targeting Muslims and other outmaneuvering of rivals, and key difficult decisions: first, how to handle mujahidin, stating that Godane had thus support from within key segments of al- the renewed military push by AMISOM become an apostate. He also compared Shabab, chief among them the Amniyat and Somali federal government forces; Godane and his faction to the Algerian network. He reaped a strategic media second, how to resolve the serious Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which victory a few months later when al- ideological and strategic conundrum turned its guns on its own in the 1990s Shabab gunmen seized control of the of what to do regarding Syria and during a brutal war with Algeria’s upscale Westgate Mall in Nairobi and the competition between Ayman al- military government and has since been confounded Kenyan security forces Zawahiri’s al-Qa`ida and the Islamic used by Sunni jihadists as a cautionary for days.42 Al-Shabab also continued State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).44 tale of takfir (excommunication) and to carry out major attacks inside The rapid territorial expansion of the extreme ideological puritanism.39 Mogadishu, suggesting that the Godane- latter has outshined the seemingly led al-Shabab would continue to be a moribund and isolated al-Qa`ida central Godane, as he was facing mounting major player in the country despite leadership in Pakistan and Afghanistan. criticism from Hammami and dissident its loss of territory and other setbacks Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi, Abu Hamza foreign fighters, was threatened by suffered since the spring of 2011. a serious internal challenge from 43 Ken Menkhaus, “Al-Shabab’s Capabilities Post- a number of prominent al-Shabab Conclusion Westgate,” CTC Sentinel 7:2 (2014); Stig Jarle Hansen, dissident leaders, including founding Despite his seeming brilliance in “An In-Depth Look at Al-Shabab’s Internal Divisions,” members Robow and al-Afghani. They outplaying his opponents, in the end CTC Sentinel 7:2 (2014); Nelly Lahoud et al., Letters from criticized his leadership and treatment Godane’s tenure as undisputed amir Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined? (West Point, NY: Com- of foreign fighters as well as his use of of al-Shabab, free of internal threats bating Terrorism Center, 2012), pp. 38-42; Christopher violence in suppressing dissent both from senior founding figures such as Anzalone, “The Formalizing of an Affiliation: Somalia’s internally and among the communities al-Afghani, Burhan, and Robow, and Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen & Al-Qa’ida Central,” publicly known former insurgent media al-Wasat blog, February 10, 2012. 44 In a May 2014 message, Godane opted for a non-com- 37 Jason Straziuso, “Twitter-loving U.S. Jihadist Faces 40 Mukhtar Robow, Hasan Dahir Aweys, Abu Bakr al- mittal “middle path.” Deploying Qur’anic verses, tradi- Death Threat from Somali Militants after Fallout,” As- Zayla‘i, Zubayr Muhajir, and Mu‘allim Burhan Sheikh tions of the Prophet Muhammad’s reported sayings and sociated Press, January 18, 2013; Nelly Lahoud, “The Hashi, “Fatwa Concerning the Attempted Assassina- actions (hadith), citations from the writings of respected Merger of Al-Shabab and Qa`idat al-Jihad,” CTC Sentinel tion of Abu Mansur al-Amriki,” April 2013; Abu Bakr historical Sunni jurists and religious scholars, and Usa- 5:2 (2012); Raffaello Pantucci and A.R. Sayyid, “Foreign al-Zayla‘i (Ibrahim al-Afghani), “Open Letter to Our ma bin Ladin, he urged all the mujahidin in Syria to avoid Fighters in Somalia and al-Shabaab’s Internal Purge,” Shaykh and Our Amir, Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri, may discord, referring both to intra-jihadist fighting as well Terrorism Monitor 11:22 (2013); Clint Watts, “Hammami’s God protect him,” April 2013. as the careless passing around of idle gossip about those Latest Call Reveals Deceit, Dissension and Death in Sha- 41 Al-Shabab, now firmly under Godane’s control, “striving in the path of God.” He also urged all of them baab & al Qaeda,” Selected Wisdom blog, January 8, claimed through its official military spokesman, Abd to respect the leaders and religious scholars of the jihad. 2013. Al-Shabab released a lengthy written statement, al-Aziz Abu Mus’ab, that the two had died during a gun Although he did not mention them by name, Godane “A Candid Clarification Concerning Abu Mansur al- battle after resisting arrest by the Amniyat. Al-Afghani’s was presumably referring primarily to the Islamic State Amriki,” in English and Arabic on December 17, 2012, in and Burhan’s families, however, along with an al-Shabab in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Jabhat al-Nusra, the which Hammami and other dissidents were painted as defector alleged that they were tried by a kangaroo al- official al-Qa`ida affiliate in Syria. See Ahmed Godane, collaborators with al-Shabab’s enemies. Shabab court and then summarily executed on Godane’s Muslims of Bangui and Mombasa: A Tale of Tragedy, May 38 “Al-Amriki and al-Britani: Militants ‘Killed’ in Soma- orders. See “Al Shabaab Extremists Kill Two of Their 14, 2014. Godane spent most of his time discussing sec- lia,” BBC, September 12, 2013; “US-born ‘Jihadist Rapper’ Chiefs,” France 24, June 30, 2013; “Godane Loyalists tarian violence in the Central African Republic and the Omar Hammami Reportedly Killed in Somalia,” Associ- Reportedly Execute al-Shabaab Leader Ibrahim al-Af- plight of Muslims in Kenya, not on Syria, suggesting his ated Press, September 12, 2013. ghani,” Sabahi Online, June 28, 2013. discomfort with addressing the increasingly bitter feud 39 Harun Maruf, “Interview with Omar Hammami,” 42 Christopher Anzalone, “The Nairobi Attack and Al- between ISIL and al-Qa`ida’s central leadership and its Voice of America, September 12, 2013. Shabab’s Media Strategy,” CTC Sentinel 6:10 (2013). supporters in any specificity.

22 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9 al-Muhajir, and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, External factors will also play a major Recent Highlights in past leaders of ISIL’s predecessor role in deciding the ultimate fate of organizations, have long been popular al-Shabab. The strategies, decision- Political Violence with al-Shabab members, and each has making, and implementation of reforms appeared in the group’s media releases. by the Somali federal government, August 5, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): An Godane, however, was ultimately AMISOM forces, local strongmen like Afghan soldier opened fire on senior unwilling to abandon al-Zawahiri, with Ahmad Madobe and Barre Hirale, and U.S. officers at a military training whom he had reached an agreement to international actors including the facility on the outskirts of Kabul, killing formally affiliate al-Shabab with al- United States and European Union a U.S. Army general. – New York Times, Qa`ida, something the Somali insurgent will be key in determining whether the August 5 leader had long wanted.45 insurgents continue to have a pool of support to draw upon by tapping into August 6, 2014 (UNITED STATES): The Godane’s death has led to predictions local grievances.48 The strengthening FBI arrested a 62-year-old man from of al-Shabab’s imminent collapse into of governing structures, significant northeast Philadelphia, Hayatullah competing factions vying for control reduction of blatant corruption at high Dawari, and accused him of having of the group’s remaining military and levels of government, allure of the ties to Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, an al- economic resources. The future of al- federal government’s “amnesty” offer Qa`ida-linked militant group. – WPVI- Shabab as a cohesive organization to al-Shabab fighters, and reining in TV Philadelphia, August 6 depends on a number of internal and independent militias will significantly external factors. Internally, a great deal damage al-Shabab’s narrative as well August 6, 2014 (PHILIPPINES): The rests on whether or not Godane, in the as bolster the confidence of local Philippine military said that Zulkifli process of consolidating his control communities. bin Abdul Hir (also known as Marwan), of the group, put in place a process, a top Malaysian jihadist bombmaker, agreed upon by al-Shabab’s senior Christopher Anzalone is a Ph.D. is still alive and in the southern leadership and military commanders, to candidate in the Institute of Islamic Philippines. The government originally choose a successor in case of his death Studies at McGill University. His said that Marwan was killed in a U.S.- or capture. The level of support from research focuses on political Islam, backed airstrike in February 2012. these same segments of al-Shabab for contemporary jihadist movements, Shi`a – AFP, August 6 Godane’s successor, Ahmad Umar, also Islam and contemporary Shi`a militant remains an open question. The support groups, the social and ideological August 7, 2014 (UNITED STATES): of the group’s regional governors, construction of jihadist narratives of President Barack Obama said that he senior administrators, and top military martyrdom, and Muslim visual cultures. has approved limited airstrikes in Iraq commanders, as well as influential He is also a former adjunct research to prevent the Islamic State in Iraq and local notables and clan leaders, will fellow at the Ali Vural Ak Center for the Levant (ISIL) from committing an be key to his longevity and success as Global Islamic Studies at George Mason “act of genocide” against some 40,000 amir.46 If there are dissidents within al- University and a former teaching fellow religious minorities trapped on a remote Shabab that oppose Umar, their access at McGill University. mountaintop in northern Iraq. – Canadian to military and economic resources, Broadcasting Corporation, August 7 and the extent of their support base, will have an impact on their ability to August 10, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A challenge him. The Kenyan foreign suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle attacked a NATO convoy in fighter contingent within the group, support the group and assured Kenyan Muslims that the Kabul, killing four civilians. – Voice of which has been steadily growing during insurgents have not “forgotten” them and will come to America, August 10 the past few years, will also play an their aid. See “What a Profitable Gain, O’ Abu al-Zubayr! influential role in the trajectory of al- A Statement from the General Leadership: Congratula- 47 August 10, 2014 (NIGERIA): Suspected Shabab and its new amir. tions and Condolences to the Islamic Nation for the Mar- Boko Haram fighters kidnapped dozens tyrdom of the Amir of Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen, of boys and men during a raid on a 45 Glad Tidings from the Two Shaykhs, Abu al-Zubayr and the Shaykh Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr, may God have mer- remote town in northeastern Nigeria. the Amir, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa`ida and al-Shabab, cy on him,” al-Shabab, September 6, 2014. The fighters were wearing police and February 9, 2012. 48 Hirale recently said he would lay down his arms military uniforms. – Reuters, August 15 46 Abdi Sheikh, “Somali Islamist Rebels Pledge Al- and enter into political negotiations with Madobe, the legiance to New Leader,” Reuters, September 8, 2014; president of the Jubaland region, and the Somali federal August 13, 2014 (FRANCE): The French Feisal Omar and Abdi Sheikh, “Somalia’s al Shabaab government in a move seen as potentially boosting peace- government announced that it will send Name New Leader after U.S. Strike, Warn of Revenge,” making efforts. Hirale has reportedly retained a military weapons to Kurdish forces in Iraq to Reuters, September 6, 2014. option by withdrawing some of his militiamen to rural help fight the Islamic State in Iraq and 47 Christopher Anzalone, “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Cen- areas and maintaining weapons stockpiles, in case nego- the Levant. – Los Angeles Times, August 13 ter and Al-Shabab’s East African Recruitment,” CTC Sen- tiations flounder. He and Madobe most recently fought tinel 5:10 (2012); Fredrick Nzes, “Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab’s a bitter battle over control of the southern port city of August 14, 2014 (GLOBAL): A leader Affiliate in Kenya,” CTC Sentinel 7:5 (2014). Notably, the Kismayo in June 2013. See “Hundreds Flee Kismayo as in al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula eulogy statement from the “general leadership” of al- Clashes Reignite,” BBC, June 8, 2014; Abdi Sheikh, “So- (AQAP) praised the Islamic State in Iraq Shabab announcing Godane’s death, which was released mali Warlord Agrees to Talks, Boosts Government Peace and the Levant (ISIL) for its “victories on September 6, specifically called upon Somali clans to Efforts,” Reuters, August 31, 2014.

23 september 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 9

in Iraq,” but did not pledge allegiance August 23, 2014 (YEMEN): A car bomb CTC Sentinel Staff to ISIL’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. exploded under the vehicle of a Yemeni The AQAP figure, Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, army general in Aden, killing the man. Editor-in-Chief also urged an end to infighting between – AFP, August 23 Erich Marquardt the Sunni mujahidin. – AFP, August 14 Senior Editor, CTC August 24, 2014 (SYRIA): Jabhat al- August 14, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani Nusra, al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in Syria, Editorial Board Taliban militants attacked two airbases released hostage Peter Theo Curtis, an COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. in Quetta, Baluchistan Province. American freelance writer who was Department Head Security forces repelled both attacks. kidnapped nearly two years ago. Curtis’ Department of Social Sciences (West Point) – The News International, August 15 freedom came after extensive mediation by Qatar. – New York Times, August 24 COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. August 16, 2014 (YEMEN): A drone Deputy Department Head killed three suspected al-Qa`ida in August 24, 2014 (NIGERIA): Boko Department of Social Sciences (West Point) the Arabian Peninsula militants in Haram claimed to have established a Hadramawt Province. – Reuters, August 16 caliphate in northeastern Nigeria. – al- MAJ(P) Bryan Price, Ph.D. Jazira, August 25 Director, CTC August 16, 2014 (MALI): A suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle August 25, 2014 (PHILIPPINES): The attacked a patrol base in Ber, 40 miles Philippine military said that it was east of Timbuktu. The attack killed two examining reports that about 100 UN peacekeepers. – Reuters, August 16 Filipinos were training to be jihadists in Syria. – Bangkok Post, August 25 August 17, 2014 (UNITED KINGDOM): British Prime Minister David Cameron August 26, 2014 (UNITED STATES): Contact warned that the Islamic State in Iraq U.S. officials said that American jihadist Combating Terrorism Center and the Levant (ISIL) is a direct threat Douglas McCain died in the past few U.S. Military Academy to the United Kingdom. According to days while fighting for the Islamic State 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Cameron, “If we do not act to stem in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). McCain, West Point, NY 10996 the onslaught of this exceptionally a one-time aspiring rapper from Phone: (845) 938-8495 dangerous terrorist movement, it will California, converted from Christianity Email: [email protected] only grow stronger until it can target to Islam about a decade ago. He died Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ us on the streets of Britain.” – France 24, while fighting against ISIL’s rival August 18 group, Jabhat al-Nusra. – AFP, August 26 * For Press Inquiries: (845) 938-8495 August 19, 2014 (SYRIA/IRAQ): The August 30, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant A suicide bomber in an explosives- released a video showing the beheading laden vehicle attacked the Afghan of American journalist David Foley. intelligence agency in Jalalabad. After – Reuters, August 20 the explosion, armed militants stormed support the building. The dead included at least The Combating Terrorism Center would August 19, 2014 (SAUDI ARABIA): three militants, two security guards, like to express its gratitude to its financial Saudi Arabia’s top cleric, Grand Mufti and three civilians. – NBC News, August 30 supporters, for without their support and Shaykh Abdul Aziz al-Shaykh, called shared vision of the Center products like the the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant August 31, 2014 (SOMALIA): Al-Shabab CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you (ISIL) and al-Qa`ida Islam’s “enemy launched a coordinated attack against are interested in learning more about how number one.” He also said that “Muslims the Somali intelligence headquarters in to support the Combating Terrorism Center, are the main victims of this extremism.” Mogadishu, killing at least five people. please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call – AFP, August 18 Seven militants were also killed. – AFP, Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association September 1 of Graduates at 845-446-1561. August 22, 2014 (IRAQ): Shi`a militiamen reportedly opened fire on a Sunni mosque in Diyala Province, killing at least 68 people. – NBC News, August 23

August 23, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide The views expressed in this report are those of bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, rammed into Baghdad’s intelligence the Department of the Army, or any other agency headquarters, killing at least eight of the U.S. Government. people. – NBC News, August 23

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