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University of Groningen The Netherlands Otjes, Simon; Louwerse, T.; Timmermans, A. Published in: Opposition parties in European legislature IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below. Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Publication date: 2018 Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database Citation for published version (APA): Otjes, S., Louwerse, T., & Timmermans, A. (2018). The Netherlands: The reinvention of consensus democracy. In E. De Giorgi, & G. Ilonszki (Eds.), Opposition parties in European legislature: Conflict or consensus? (pp. 53-71). (Routledge Studies on Political Parties and Party Systems). Routledge. 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Download date: 29-09-2021 4 The Netherlands The reinvention of consensus democracy Simon Otjes, Tom Louwerse and Arco Timmermans Introduction The Netherlands used to be a proto-typical consensus democracy (Lijphart 1968 ). All major political parties were integrated into an ‘elite cartel’ ( Andeweg et al. 2008 ). On important issues, even if political parties were offi cially part of the opposition, they were consulted. Legislation passed through parlia- ment with large majorities; in parliament and in consultative bodies, where all societal subgroups are represented, spokespersons from groups that were not represented in cabinet were also heard. The role of the ‘real opposition’ was relegated to small, permanent opposition parties ( Daalder 1966 ). In 2002 the Netherlands was suddenly woken from this consensual dream by the entry of the radical right-wing populist Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) into parliament. This party argued that there was widespread societal dissatisfaction with the consensual political system and it introduced a more polarised style of poli- tics ( Otjes 2011 ). Since 2002, one former Member of Parliament argued, the Tweede Kamer (lower house of the bicameral parliament) “has never been calm again.” 1 In 2008, as in many Western countries, the fi nancial and eco- nomic crisis hit the Netherlands. Not long thereafter, in 2010, the fi rst minor- ity coalition government in almost a century took offi ce. It needed a way of working together with opposition parties to ensure majorities for reform and austerity packages. This situation has continued until the end of our period of analysis in 2015, when the government in offi ce lacked a majority in the Senate and therefore has also had to strike some kind of deal with opposition parties. The Netherlands has almost every characteristic of a consensus democracy: from its extreme proportional electoral system via institutionalised, corporatist relations with interest groups, coalition government and bicameralism with a legislative veto for the Senate to its multiparty system. With on average more than fi ve effective political parties, Dutch politics can truly be characterised as pluralistic. Table 4.1 presents all thirteen parties in the Tweede Kamer between 1998 and 2015 and Table 4.2 lists the governments formed during this period. In recent years, elections have become very volatile: on average, more than 20 per cent of seats changes hands at every election. The electoral fortunes of Table 4.1 Political parties in the Dutch parliament (1998–2017) Name Dutch English Party Family First Party Experience in Government abbreviation entry into Stability Parliament (electoral support range) PvdA Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party Social-Democrat 1946 23–45 In and out of government CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl Christian-Democratic Christian-Democrat 1977 13–44 In and out of government Appeal VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Liberal Party Liberal 1948 22–41 In and out of government Democratie SP Socialistische Partij Socialist Party Left Socialist 1994 5–25 Never D66 Democraten 66 Democrats 66 Liberal 1967 3–14 In and out of government GL GroenLinks GreenLeft Green 1989 4–11 Never PVV Partij voor de Vrijheid Freedom Party Extreme right 2006 9–24 Never LPF Lijst Pim Fortuyn List Pim Fortuyn Extreme right 2002 0–26 In and out of government CU ChristenUnie ChristianUnion Christian-Democratic 20021 3–6 In and out of government SGP Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij Reformed Political Party Christian-Democratic 1922 2–3 Never PvdD Partij voor de Dieren Party for the Animals Green 2006 2 Never 50Plus Special Interest 2012 2 Never LN Leefbaar Nederland Liveable Netherlands Populist 2002 0–2 Never 1 The CU was formed in 2001 as a merger of two small protestant parties, the Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond (Reformed Political League GPV) and the Reformatorische Politieke Federatie (Reformed Political Federation, RPF), which had never been in government. These two parties have cooperated intensively since the beginning of the 1998 parliamentary term and therefore are treated as one party in this analysis. The Netherlands 55 Table 4.2 Government and opposition composition (1998–2014) Prime Minister Type of Government Opposition (PM’s Party) Government Parties Parties 1998–2002 Kok (PvdA) Oversized PvdA, VVD, D66 CDA, GL, SP, Majority CU, SGP 2002–2003 Balkenende Minimum- CDA, LPF, VVD PvdA, SP, GL, (CDA) winning D66, CU, SGP, Coalition LN 2003–2006 Balkenende Minimum- CDA, VVD, D66 PvdA, SP, LPF, (CDA) winning GL, CU, SGP Coalition 2006–2007 Balkenende Minority CDA, VVD PvdA, SP, LPF, (CDA) Coalition GL, D66, CU, SGP 2007–2010 Balkenende Minimum- CDA, PvdA, CU VVD, SP, PVV, (CDA) winning GL, D66, SGP, Coalition PvdD 2010 Balkenende Minority CDA, CU PvdA, VVD, SP, (CDA) Coalition PVV, GL, D66, SGP, PvdD 2010–2012 Rutte (VVD) Minority VVD, CDA PvdA, SP, D66, Coalition with (PVV) GL, CU, SGP, Support Party PvdD 2012–2017 Rutte (VVD) Minimum- VVD, PvdA CDA, PVV, SP, winning D66, CU, GL, Coalition1 SGP, PvdD, 50Plus 1 The coalition did not have a majority in the Senate and therefore effectively functioned as a Minority Coalition. almost all parties are tempestuous. Some stability is afforded by the patterns of coalition formation: the centre-left Labour Party (Partij van de Arbeid , PvdA), the centre-right Christian-Democrats (Christen-Democratisch Appèl , CDA) and the right-wing Liberal Party (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie , VVD) have formed the core of every government since 1977. Governments form by partial alternation: at least one of these three parties stays in govern- ment, often one of these parties rotates out of government and a third rotates into government. Except for the inclusion of two of these three parties, cabinet formation is quite open: other parties often join the coalition from the social- liberal Democrats 66 (Democraten 66 , D66) via the centrist Christian-democratic ChristianUnion (ChristenUnie , CU) to the short-lived right-wing LPF. Until 2010 informal norms about cabinet formation prevented the formation of minority governments ( Andeweg 2011 ): in 2010, a centre-right minority gov- ernment was formed with support of the radical right-wing populist Freedom Party ( Partij voor de Vrijheid , PVV). Still, some parties are relegated to being permanent opposition parties: the right-wing conservative Christian Political 56 Simon Otjes et al. Reformed Party (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij , SGP), the eldest party in the Netherlands, is one example, but so are the left-wing Socialist Party ( Socialistische Partij , SP) and GreenLeft (GroenLinks , GL). The open elec- toral system has allowed for the entry of new political parties, such as the ‘deep green’ Party for the Animals (Partij voor de Dieren, PvdD), the pensioners’ party 50Plus and the populist reform party Liveable Netherlands (Leef baar Nederland , LN). For the purposes of analysing parliamentary voting, the Dutch political space can be considered to be one-dimensional, ranging from the left (where we fi nd the Socialist Party) to the right (where we fi nd the Freedom Party). Until 2002 a second religious dimension separated the CDA, CU and SGP from the other parties. Since 2002, with the entry of the LPF into parliament, new cultural issues, such as immigration, Islam and civic integration, have become more important ( Otjes 2011 ). Voting on these issues mostly follows the left-right dimension, strengthening the left-right division in parliament. This study analyses opposition party behaviour between 1998 and 2015. Our analysis focuses on the effect of the global fi nancial crisis in 2008, which became a prolonged European sovereign debt crisis between 2009 and today. We will look at two periods: before the crisis (operationalised as before 28 September 2008, when the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourgish govern- ments nationalised the bank Fortis) and after the onset of the crisis. As is standard in all the chapters in this volume, the tables will show the data per cabinet. The analysis will focus on the difference in the voting behaviour and the use of parliamentary tools before and after the crisis, and by taking larger periods together, we are able to look at the effect of the crisis more directly.2 We use three sources of data. First, for parliamentary voting we use a database on parliamentary voting obtained from the website of the Eerste Kamer , the Upper House.