George Marshall, facing imminent war, acted decisively to free airpower from the General Staff’s obstruction and delaying tactics. The First Air Staff By Herman S. Wolk IXTY years ago this month, the United States Army created the Army Air Forces. With that critical June 1941 action came the Sestablishment of the first American Air Staff. That staff reported directly to a new AAF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Henry H. Arnold. All were momentous steps in development of airpower. Creation of the Air Staff stemmed from apprehension about general Principals in establishing the Air Staff, Maj. Gen. H.H. Arnold and Gen. George C. Marshall are shown here at Randolph Field, Tex. 66 AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2001 USAF photo President Roosevelt—here at an airfield in Sicily talking with Arnold— believed the US had to gear up for war. He sought a huge increase in military aircraft and pilots. wars in Europe and Asia—events expansion plan, envisioning produc- made the airman assistant chief of that sparked calls for an expansion tion each year of 12,000 new pilots staff for operations and training, the of airpower and reorganization of and 54 combat-ready groups. first airman ever to serve in this the Army air element. Particularly position. Subsequently, when Mar- disturbing to Arnold and President The Eye-Opener shall became Army Chief of Staff, Roosevelt was the major role the Marshall, subsequently promoted he named Andrews to positions of German air force played in the de- to Army Chief of Staff, shared Roos- theater command in the Caribbean feat of France in 1940. FDR declared, evelt’s concern and, moreover, agreed and the Middle East and as com- “Military aviation is increasing at an with Arnold that the Air Corps re- manding general of US forces in the unprecedented and alarming rate.” quired a stronger ability to plan for European theater. Tragically, in May Consequently, he and Congress expansion. The Air Corps had found 1943, Andrews was killed in an air- sought a huge increase in American an invaluable ally in the struggle for plane crash in Iceland, cutting short aircraft and pilots. a more powerful air force. In 1938, a brilliant career of one of the nation’s Even before the outbreak of war, Maj. Gen. Frank M. Andrews, then most distinguished airmen. Roosevelt was much concerned about commanding General Headquarters The Luftwaffe’s performance in America’s lack of preparedness. In Air Force, had taken Marshall on a Europe in 1940 increased Congres- 1938, he sent his confidante, Harry nine-day tour of air bases, inspect- sional pressure for the creation of a Hopkins, on an inspection of US air- ing units and meeting senior Air separate Air Force, but Arnold was craft plants. Hopkins claimed Roos- Corps commanders as well as visit- convinced that this was not the right evelt “was sure we were going to get ing the Boeing plant in Seattle. time to divide the air arm from the into war, and he believed that air- Marshall and Andrews struck a close rest of the Army. Marshall and Arnold power would win it.” relationship. Later, Marshall said this needed a rapid, efficient expansion Shortly thereafter, an airplane tour had opened his eyes to what air of the Air Corps itself to prepare for crash claimed the life of Maj. Gen. forces could do and what they re- the possibility of war. Arnold em- Oscar Westover, Chief of the Army quired. He quickly determined that phasized in 1940 that “right at this Air Corps. Hopkins, who had the ear airmen best knew how to run the Air minute it looks to me as if it might be of the President, suggested he ap- Corps and make it work. a serious mistake to change the ex- point Arnold to the post, which On this cross-country trip, Andrews isting setup when we are all using Roosevelt did in September 1938. had taken the opportunity to make every facility available in order to Roosevelt believed that America’s Marshall aware of conflicts between take care of the present expansion of military had to immediately gear up the few airmen and the many ground the Air Corps.” Any serious organi- for war. In mid-November 1938, he officers assigned to the General Staff. zational change now might actually convened a meeting at the White In later remarks, Marshall said he impede the buildup. House to consider responses to the realized that “air had almost no rep- Fortunately, Arnold and Marshall events unfolding in Europe and Asia. resentation on the General Staff,” and maintained confidence in each other, Present were Arnold, Hopkins, As- most of the General Staff types “had with Arnold agreeing not to press sistant Secretary of War Louis John- little interest in the air, mostly an- for independence. He would, instead, son, and Brig. Gen. George C. Mar- tipathy, and it was quite marked.” count on Marshall to provide an ap- shall, chief of the Army’s War Plans Indeed, Marshall added, “I found ev- propriate degree of autonomy dur- Division. Roosevelt directed increased eryone on the Staff hostile to Air.” ing this period of national emergency. aircraft production and by August Marshall was greatly impressed For his part, Marshall was deter- 1940 the Air Corps had completed an with Andrews. In August 1939, he mined to see that the air arm got AIR FORCE Magazine / June 2001 67 kins, for his part, continued to press for an airpower buildup. “I don’t USAF photo know why,” he exclaimed “we are producing 600,000 automobiles for pleasure-seeking people, when we need airplanes and engines!” Bureaucratic Behemoth The Air Corps continued to have difficulty prompting meaningful ac- tion on air matters from the War Department General Staff. Marshall knew that officers on the General Staff failed properly to support the airmen. As a result, air actions tended to be postponed and bottlenecks ap- peared. The General Staff, Marshall said, had “lost track of its purpose,” becoming, in his view, “a huge, bu- reaucratic, red tape–ridden operat- Maj. Gen. Frank Andrews had the foresight to take Marshall, then chief of the ing agency.” He added, “It had slowed Army’s War Plans Division, on a tour of air bases in 1938. Later, Marshall said down everything.” the tour opened his eyes to the capabilities of air and its needs. In summer 1940, Marshall asked Arnold to provide his views on reor- what it required in organizational would be mounted in the Far East. ganization. Marshall was concerned flexibility, as well as equipment. This Arnold noted that, in early 1941, not only about air matters; he believed meant that he would have to present “We were planning for war, even that the War Department had evolved a rationale to the War Department though we were not in it.” In re- into “the poorest command post in the Staff and make organizational changes sponse to the British request for Army.” Arnold responded by propos- that would have credibility with air- American–produced aircraft, he em- ing the appointment of three Army men. phasized to Marshall and Roosevelt deputy chiefs of staff—for ground, that “we must first meet our own air, and service forces. However, the The ABC Meetings requirements” and then should give War Department Staff opposed this The airmen’s drive to gain more allies “only such items as they could step and remained committed to the freedom from the War Department use effectively.” idea that the mission of the air arm was had been boosted early in 1941 when These talks subsequently led to to support the ground forces. representatives of Britain’s armed formal creation in August 1941 of Still navigating between the War services came to the US for strategy the Combined Chiefs of Staff repre- Department Staff and the airmen, discussions, which became known senting the British and US military Marshall in October 1940 named as American–British Conversations forces—including Arnold, represent- Arnold his acting deputy chief of (ABC-1). These ABC-1 meetings ing American airpower. Arnold, of staff for air—responsible for coor- between a US staff committee and course, was subordinate to Marshall, dinating all air matters—and Maj. the British delegation were held in Army Chief of Staff. However, it Gen. George H. Brett as acting chief the period January–March 1941, and was necessary for Arnold to be pres- of the Air Corps. However, the GHQ they ranged over topics as varied as ent when the Combined Chiefs for- Air Force was removed from the ju- strategy, joint operations, geographi- mulated grand strategy. Thus, the air risdiction of the Office of the Chief cal responsibilities, and command forces’ movement toward autonomy of Air Corps, assigned to General arrangements. was aided by the fact that the RAF Headquarters, and placed under the Air Vice Marshal John C. Slessor had long ago gained independence direct control of the commander of represented the Royal Air Force, and and its opposite American number Army field forces. Col. Joseph T. McNarney sat in for needed to be at the table. This setback was ameliorated in the Air Corps. The purpose of the “I often wondered,” Arnold later December 1940 when the Secretary conversations was to determine the noted, “how I came to be included at of War, Henry L. Stimson, named best means with which the US and Argentia [in Newfoundland, site of Robert A. Lovett to be special assis- British might defeat Germany and the meeting that founded the CCS]. tant to the Secretary of War (redes- her allies “should the United States Prior to that time, Air items on a higher ignated in April 1941 “assistant sec- be compelled to resort to war.” level had been handled by the Chief of retary of war for air”).