ISIL Radicalization, Recruitment, and Social Media Operations in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines
BY NATHANIEL L. MOIR
n a 2014 video posted to YouTube, the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) announced the end of Sykes-Picot.1 While Sykes-Picot may be unfamiliar among many in the West, IISIL’s appeal in 2014 centered on promoting its ability and vision, as a caliphate, to invalidate the boundary between Iraq and Syria. That border, a result of World War I neocolo- nial competition, stemmed from the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement that divided the region into mandates governed by and reflecting the interests of France and Britain. Where was the Wahhabbi doctrine in this YouTube message? Nowhere. Rather, the message suggested that administrative control of territory, an opportunity provided by the Syrian Civil War, distin- guished ISIL from other terrorist organizations and that expansion of a caliphate did not rely on the legitimacy of radical Wahhabism ideology alone. While ideology remains central to this process, ISIL radicalization depends on exploitation of networks including familial ties, friendship, religious institutions and especially expansion of these connections. With the potential end of its attempted caliphate in Iraq and Syria, what other regional networks will ISIL target for exploitation? As ISIL diminishes in Iraq and Syria, the organization seeks to survive by exploiting radicalized networks elsewhere, especially in Southeast Asia. To assess this ongoing develop- ment, the task and purpose of this article is to examine ISIL-oriented radicalization and recruitment in Southeast Asia. First, this process is assessed in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines with attention to specific groups as national or, where applicable, transnational entities. Second, the paper addresses how ISIL-related radicalization incorporates social media Mr. Nathaniel L. Moir is a doctoral candidate at the State University of New York at Albany. He previously served as a senior research analyst in the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School.
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operations in Southeast Asia and how the use received sustained public support. Still, ISIL’s of encrypted communication apps support proven use of radicalized individuals and those efforts. small groups demonstrates that networks in Southeast Asian terrorist groups’ self- Southeast Asia remain viable threats to proclaimed ties with ISIL grew in 2015 and partners in the region. This is particularly 2016. This article asserts that these connec- true with the provision of specialized tions may expand as ISIL’s base in Iraq and training to regional networks, groups, and Syria decreases. Indeed, many Southeast individuals. Asia-based organizations sought Abu Bakr Groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group al-Baghdadi’s acknowledgement of their (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) continue to allegiance to the Iraq and Syrian-based operate in the Philippines and Indonesia, but “Islamic Caliphate” at its zenith in 2014 and their prestige among radical Islamic support- 2015. However, during its primary period of ers is diminishing. However, the ebb and expansion in 2015, ISIL did not recognize flow of group viability may depend on what Indonesia, for example, as a territory or as a happens to ISIL in places such as Mosul and sponsored province known as wilayaht.2 Raqqa, Iraq. Although ISIL is in a position of Despite this, Indonesian affiliates still sought weakness this year, as compared to 2014 and ISIL acknowledgment by providing recruits to 2015, it still poses a serious challenge ISIL with the intent of potentially extending because of its ability to franchise its ideology the caliphate to Southeast Asia. and encourage attacks, such as those that ISIL leadership in Syria and Iraq failed to took place in Nice and Paris, France; confirm Southeast Asian terrorist groups’ Istanbul, Turkey; and most recently in allegiance to ISIL in a manner similar to the London and Manchester, England. ISIL enfranchisement provided to Boko ISIL remains a threat because of its Haram and al-Shabaab in Nigeria and ability to metastasize in other countries, such Somalia. Why? ISIL’s apparent focus on as Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the recruitment prioritized replacing its dwin- Philippines, in addition to its ability to dling supply of personnel in the conflict support isolated attacks in Western Europe. contesting the Assad regime in Syria instead While a formal caliphate does not currently of viably extending its caliphate to Southeast exist in Southeast Asia, efforts to extend its Asia. One reason, with the current exception reach through proxy organizations persist. In of Mindanao in the Philippines, includes a sense, ISIL presents a hydraulic-like lack of popular support for ISIL despite capability: as it is compressed by anti-ISIL pockets of radicalized populations in forces in Iraq and Syria, it goes to those areas Southeast Asia. Indeed, it is difficult to argue where opportunity exists. In the West, access that a wide-range of the populace, in any to end-to-end encrypted communications Southeast Asian country, supports radical apps, such as Telegram Messenger and Wahhabist interpretations of Islam let alone WhatsApp, enable these transitions to other ISIL demagoguery. Historically, only the locations and the ability to plan and execute Darul Islam movement and rebellion, which operations.3 In the case of Southeast Asia, took place in West Java from 1949–62, space and material support provided by
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organizations such as ASG and others who but the latter problem of political extremism assimilate ISIL ideology through local remains, and religious fanaticism remains conditioning also help ISIL maintain problematic. However, while Muslims existence and pose a potential security threat. constitute 87.8 percent of Indonesia’s Security concerns presented by ISIL- population, the Indonesian public’s percep- influenced radicalized groups include tion of ISIL is overwhelmingly negative. attempts to dismantle, or weaken, govern- According to a December 2015 survey ments in Malaysia and Indonesia, and to conducted by the Kompas Media Group, 0.3 establish an Islamic State along the lines percent of respondents supported establish- sought by historical precedents in the region ment of ISIS in Indonesia and only 0.8 such as Darul Islam. The potential threat of percent indicated even general support for ISIL-influenced radicalization is challenging ISIL.7 in Southeast Asia because of the vast popula- Despite this lack of support, as of March tions’ diversity in the region, a lack of 2016, Indonesian Government authorities regional consensus regarding unified security and media reporting indicated that from countermeasures, and ISIL’s ability to 250–1,000 ISIL members existed in incorporate tried technologies, such as Indonesia, while the U.S. Department of mobile messaging applications, especially State Country Report for Terrorism in Indonesia Telegram Messenger, to facilitate recruitment estimated 800 Indonesian foreign terrorist and radicalization among possible adherents. fighters operating in Iraq and Syria.8 Due to An additional concern for Southeast these relatively low numbers in terms of Asian governments is Iraq- and Syria-based Indonesia’s massive Muslim population, the ISIL veteran returnees to Southeast Asia, Indonesian Government is successful in should they survive operations in Syria and managing its civil society organizations, and Iraq. Historical precedents for this phenom- for non-interference with the large majority enon occurred when former members of the of Muslim organizations which condemn Afghan Mujahideen returned to Southeast ISIL. However, while there were stronger Asia to establish JI in Indonesia and the ASG counterterrorism and antiterrorism laws in the Philippines.4 Clearly, the region pending in the Indonesian legislature as of remains a viable region for terrorist recruit- mid-2016, current counterterrorism laws ment, especially among Indonesian, remain weak. Notably, laws criminalizing Malaysian, and Philippine nationals.5 travel to join terrorist organizations and providing material support to terrorists Indonesia remain uncodified in Indonesian law as of When Indonesia achieved independence in mid-2016.9 1949, it confronted “guerrilla war, commu- Even as early as 2014, Indonesian nist revolt, political extremism combined counterterrorism experts stated that ISIL with religious fanaticism, and separatist recruitment occurred in 16 Indonesian movements in some of the various island provinces, with Aceh as a central region for territories that made up the new republic.”6 recruitment.10 Where radicalization has been Guerrilla war and communist revolt passed, successful, the prison system and propaganda
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distribution through social media, specifi- radicalized religious adherents in cally YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter, were Indonesia.14 Current ISIL leader, Abu Bakr force multipliers for radicalized members. al-Baghdadi, infamously, was incarcerated Radicalization within prisoner networks, not and further radicalized during Operation surprisingly, relies on visitor access to Iraqi Freedom. The phenomenon of prison- convicts and those visitors’ dissemination of based radicalization presents, therefore, a messages on behalf of inmates. Abu Bakir problematic and long-standing legacy. In the Bashir, the spiritual head of JI and leader of case of French operations in Algeria in 1958, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, for instance, was for example, American historian and visited by an estimated nine hundred Professor Emeritus at Princeton University’s individuals during 2015. Despite publicly Institute of Advanced Study, Peter Paret noted pledging his allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Bagh- that internment of Front Liberation National dadi in August 2014, Bashir “was allowed to (FLN) members in Algeria typified this receive visitors and often gave lectures which problem. In describing prison camps, Paret were recorded and presumably passed observed: outside.”11 Many camps lacked funds to institute As of February 2016, however, terrorists sufficient work and study programs, so such as Bashir and Aman Abdurraham were that the men had too much time to moved from Kembang Kuning prison to Pasir themselves. All this was conducive to the Putih prison and were confined to isola- establishment of FLN networks in the tion.12 Abdurraham is particularly important camps, and even if an inmate could evade because his organization, Jamaah Ansharut rebel control there, he would find it Daulah (JAD) disseminated ISIL propaganda difficult to escape the power of the and conducts ISIL recruitment under his parallel hierarchies once he had been direction even though he remains incarcer- released.15 ated. This is notable because JAD messaging was also disseminated to violent extremist Current literature on prison-based groups that splintered from JAD including radicalization cites numerous prisons, such the Eastern Indonesia Mujahid (MIT) and as those on the Indonesian island of Western Indonesia Mujahidin (MIB). As a Nusakambangan on Java, where potential source of information operations on ISIL’s ISIL recruits are detained. This is problematic behalf, radicalization within the prison because, as the U.S. Department of State system indicates that prison reform deserves Country Report on Terrorism in Indonesia serious consideration as an important claims, Indonesia’s most hardened terrorists security challenge in Indonesia.13 and ideologues are also incarcerated on the Prisons, particularly those founded by island.16 Radicalized and potentially radical- administrations during the colonial era, ized inmates are co-located and inmates historically provide primary sites for radical- form a foundation of networked relation- ization and recruitment. This occurred in ships when released. Not surprisingly, past cases ranging from incarceration of Nusakambangan and potentially all prisons communists and nationalists in Vietnam, to offer ripe opportunities for radicalization.
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Laws guiding prosecution of potential Majmuah al-Arkhabiliy—Katibah Nusantara ISIL adherents are also insufficient and problematic. In one case, which demon- Among the most pivotal indicators of strated a critical loophole after successful ISIL-related radicalization in Indonesia is the arrests by Indonesian authorities, thirty eight development of Majmuah al-Arkhabiliy suspected militants were released within (MA), formerly known as Katibah Nusantara. twenty four hours because authorities cannot This group is ISIL’s Malay Archipelago arrest individuals based only on detection of combat unit based in al-Shadid in the Syrian a radical network. This is problematic, province of Hasaka.19 Established in particularly since those released possessed September 2014, the organization developed weapons, ISIL flags, and training materials to meet the needs of Malay-speakers fighting but had not yet committed a crime or, in in Iraq and Syria. Its name attempts to evoke ISIL’s terms, an operation.17 a pan-Malay concept of nationalism and the The Waiheru Detention Center in organization seeks to complete recruitment, Ambon, Indonesia demonstrates a more training, and propaganda-related tasks on recent case and is similar to the radicaliza- behalf of ISIL, and it attempts to connect tion process Peter Paret described in 1958 in with established local terror groups. Algeria. The Center was known as a planning A key task of Kantibah Nusantara site for an attack on a Christian village, consists of supporting ISIL’s administration named Loki, which occurred in May 2005. of an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and This attack was carried out by KOMPAK, an serving as a potential “forerunner for ISIL’s Indonesian acronym for the Crisis Action extension into Southeast Asia.” In this regard, Committee, a “charity” set up by the however, this phenomenon differs from the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council. An historical case of former Malaysian/ individual incarcerated in the facility named Indonesian Mujahidin returning from Abu Gar led proselytizing discussions with Afghanistan in the 1980s. Those returnees, inmates and communicated with the known known as the “Afghan Alumni,” formed a radical jihadist, Aman Abdurrahman. core node within JI. As suggested earlier, ISIL According to an Institute for Policy Analysis supporters who return to Southeast Asia of Conflict report published in 2016, these would likely return due only to defeat in inmates “also held religious study sessions Syria and Iraq. Survival of ISIL members, (pengajian) once a week after dawn prayers particularly in light of ongoing military via handphones with Aman Abdurrahman, action targeting ISIL members in Syria and himself in prison outside Jakarta. All the Iraq, makes the “returnee” thesis, however, extremist inmates attended.”18 The implica- difficult to sustain and it is more likely that tions for ISIL to graft itself onto established, many go to Syria and Iraq with no intention already radicalized networks, even those to return to their points of origin. incarcerated, is clear for potential ISIL-based Katibah Nusantara’s physical presence in expansion in the region. Malaysia or Indonesia is not verified but the possible establishment of this organization within Southeast Asia is important to
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anticipate. Jasminder Singh, an analyst at the to Establish the Religion), recruiting and S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies collaboration constitutes an important step in Singapore, pointed this group out after in JI’s methodology.22 This process, for they successfully captured five anti-ISIL, example, constitutes a period between Kurdish-held locations in Syria which then offense and defense and focuses on strength- formed the basis for a propaganda effort ening the organization. It is roughly analo- among Indonesian and Malay language gous to the Maoist principle of equilibrium, social media sites.20 Importantly, Katibah or shoring up, required before sustained Nusantara also translates ISIL material from offensive operations. In this component of Arabic into Bahasa Indonesia, the national JI’s doctrine, establishing itself as an Islamic language of Indonesia, and works with the State, or declared affiliate at least, is a Islamic State’s al Hayat Media Centre to primary step. The second stage is the devel- subtitle extremist videos. Thus, the organiza- opment of strength. These steps precede tion serves as a cultural/linguistic intermedi- offensive operations to include warnings of ary to facilitate ISIL’s globalizing efforts in actions and armed jihad. This foundation of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, it potentially group development and reinforcement of serves as a model for organizations with strengths (organizationally and materially) is pledged support to the Islamic State such as required to coordinate and collaborate with Boko Haram and al-Shabaab. other “Islamic States”. Assimilating multiple groups into a Jemaah Islamiyah unified Caliphate presents significant and ISIL recruitment and the consolidation of historically-based obstacles. These include allegiance is a dynamic process. In the case of overcoming differences in motivations for JI, procedural steps are described in the joining; wide variances in material resources general guide of Jemaah Islamiyah, The and capabilities; variances in challenges by Struggle Guide Series (II), a source released by law enforcement; divergences in grievances, the Central Leadership Council of JI.21 The and others. In Malaya and Indonesia, for guide articulates doctrinal procedures for the example, Islamic groups consistently failed to establishment of the Jemaah (group) as it coalesce when fighting forces, such as those builds internally and as it seeks to join with of the Portuguese or the Dutch, from the 16th other groups to form a broader Islamic State century through decolonization. In the in Southeast Asia. These steps form the Malacca Strait, for instance, commercial conditions in which the broader “Caliphate” interests rather than Islamic principles to potentially connects to “Islamic States” in the expand the ummah, or other religious Sahel, the Maghreb, the Levant, Afghanistan, imperatives such as jihad, historically shaped Somalia, and Nigeria. conflict concerning maritime control.23 This In the case of JI, recruitment of individu- is a powerful indicator that economic als and other groups occurs within a funda- motivation, versus ideological drivers, mental stage towards the establishment of perpetuates ISIL radicalization in the region. the JI Islamic State. According to al Manhaj al Whether ISIL can achieve sustained unifica- Harakity Li Iqomatid Dien (The Methodology tion among radicalized populations in
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Southeast Asia remains unknown, particu- important component for Malaysians larly as divergent interests potentially conflict supporting ISIL’s operations, potential with ISIL guidance. members appear to include highly educated secular-oriented individuals, but also Malaysia unemployed members of society, drug In Malaysia, the government appears success- addicts, and thrill seekers. ful in thwarting ISIL radicalization and An important consensus in the literature recruitment. While this is partially due to on this subject acknowledges ISIL’s appeal to diverse and disconnected potential recruits individuals for non-ideological and non- who do not possess networks comparable to religious-based reasons. Additionally, the those in the Philippines or Indonesia, perception of ISIL’s past success contributes a administrative capacity is notable. This prominent motivation for many potential assessment is based on Malaysian recruits. Economic factors, such as unem- Government action including counterterror- ployment however, do not explain strong ist legislation. The Prevention of Terrorism Act support for ISIL. As Mohamed Nawab enacted on September 1, 2015 in particular, Mohamed Osman, a professor at the S. provides a useful example of relatively strong Rajaratnam School of International Studies, legislation in the region.24 Alert governmen- explains, “the Salafi jihadist-type is one that tal action and active partnership building we need to understand.”26 Notably, however, with the United States, such as a terrorist analysts differ on the degree and scope of watchlist sharing agreement and cooperation ISIL presence in Malaysia. Peter Chalk, in a with regional partners, also contains ISIL late 2015 Australian Strategic Policy Institute recruitment. Like the Indonesian report, viewed Malaysia as possessing a Government, Malaysia additionally appears greater ISIL presence than that perceived in successful in building cooperative counter Indonesia and the Philippines. In contrast, radicalization and recruitment efforts within other analysts perceived ISIL related efforts in the Muslim community and in developing the Philippines as the greatest counterterror- flexible legislation and judicial efforts to ism threat in the region.27 review and act upon cases of alleged and Religion is still a defining factor for suspected terrorism. For these reasons, many recruits when deciding to support the Malaysia appears successful in its efforts to group. However, for this population, igno- address the challenges of ISIL radicalization. rance and poorly formed understandings of While small in number, a U.S. Islam, especially as it pertains to the purpose Department of State Country Report for of jihad, often lead to the easy manipulation Terrorism in Malaysia from 2016 cites 72 of recruits.28 An example of this effort Malaysians as members of ISIL.25 With includes important social responses to regard to recruitment populations’ motiva- manipulation of Islam by the Malaysian tions, Malaysians who join ISIL, or attempt National Council for Islamic Religious to join the group, represent a highly diverse Affairs. On October 23, 2014, and, again on mix in contrast to potential ISIL adherents in April 20, 2015, the organization issued fatwas Indonesia. While religious ideology is an prohibiting Malaysian Muslim support for
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ISIL.29 The government also appears proac- officials, such as the Minister of Education, tively efficient in blocking ISIL recruitment make “anti-Semitic and in some cases, and in effectively responding to cases of anti-Christian, statements.” It is important, alleged ISIL activity. It is not surprising that therefore, to recognize anti-ISIL statements in much literature on the subject of radicaliza- the context of Malaysian state control over tion emphasizes the need for indigenous, the practice of Islam. It is useful to keep this local, community-driven anti-radicalization in mind and not perceive anti-ISIL messaging supported, but not dictated by, the Malaysian as simply a matter of geopolitically minded Government. In a similar case, Indonesia’s benevolence on the part of the Malaysian Nahdlatul Ulama, the country’s largest government to counter-ISIL messaging or as Muslim organization, provides a positive some form of unified, global approach to example of counter radicalization. In counterterrorism. December 2015, for example, it produced a Government efforts, even if the motiva- documentary entitled “Rahmat Islam tions do not always line up with western Nusantara” (The Divine Grace of Islam counterterrorism preferences or principles of Nusantara), which emphasized the validity religious freedom, still matter significantly. of religious pluralism and acknowledgment Counter-ISIL lines of operation include and acceptance of other religious views.30 counterintelligence efforts within the Royal Similarly, in Malaysia, the Malaysian Islamic Malaysian Forces (RMF); development of a Development Authority, which overseas regional information operations center to Malaysian mosques and clerics, initiated an counter radical messages; continued coopera- anti-ISIL media campaign in 2015.31 tion with Muslim religious authorities; and Despite these counter-ISIL efforts, it is government legislation and adjudication.34 critical to remember that, in the case of Regarding legislative efforts, in April 2015 the Malaysia, the government forbade “non- Malaysian Parliament strengthened counter- Sunni practice of Islam, barred Muslims from terrorism laws and supported increased converting to another religion, and imposed funding to review court cases involving fines, detention, and canings on those ISIL-related arrests. As an example, “four classified under the law as Muslim who High Court judges in Kuala Lumpur and one contravened sharia codes.”32 Additionally, judge in Sabah had been assigned to hear according to the U.S. Embassy’s Malaysia ISIL militant and security cases. They were 2015 International Religious Freedom Report, reported to have been trained in particular “National identity cards specify religious areas of the law that involved security.”35 affiliation, and are used by the governments The question remains, however, how to determine which citizens are subject to much does ISIL ideology resonate and lead sharia.”33 The document indicates that the to radicalization in Malaysia? Radicalization Department of Islamic Development of factors unique to Malaysia appear unclear Malaysia (JAKIM) also propagates anti-Chris- and evidence for radicalization depends tian and anti-Shia messages through Friday primarily on qualitative data such as inter- sermons. Additionally, it implements and views with potential recruits and individuals regulates sharia law while government in academia, government, and law
98 | FEATURES PRISM 7, no. 1 ISIL IN INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES enforcement. Current literature on radicaliza- Raqqa as symbolic sites, set conditions for its tion suggests that individuals who seek to failure since it tied its future to enduring in join ISIL are motivated by perceptions that those environments. The most pressing ISIL is successful whereas other groups have question becomes how it will evolve else- failed. Certainly, this is a dynamically where. In Southeast Asia, as this article changing view based on the erosion of ISIL suggests, ISIL’s future is largely dependent on in Syria and Iraq. On one hand, the best the efficacy of local and national govern- method to diffuse ISIL’s appeal is continued ment. successful targeting of ISIL personnel and The Philippines resources, and continued and increased efforts to challenge its narratives, particularly The extent of the ISIL presence in the by Islamic-credentialed authorities. On the Philippines remains disputed among other hand, a less satisfactory answer is that academics, independent researchers, and radicalization remains a difficult process to Philippine Government authorities, particu- map empirically in Malaysia. This is because larly the military. However, evidence of ISIL of the diverse population base of potential infiltration in Mindanao exists and, as of recruits, their understandably secret routes to October 2014, a Philippine Army brigade, an potentially joining ISIL, and the fact that it is estimated 1,500 soldiers, increased support a relatively small number of individuals who for intelligence collection in Mindanao, the seek to join. ISIL, when it posited Mosul and second largest island in the Philippines.36 CIA World Factbook CIA World
Map of Indonesia and neighboring Malaysia, with portions of the Philippines depicted.
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Additionally and most recently, operations in each.38 This is an issue for three reasons: Marawi City clearly indicate ISIL-related vital- first, the Philippine Government is unable to ity. The debate over ISIL’s presence in the provide security should a hostage crisis occur. Philippines however centers on individuals This issue has precedent from 2004 in the and small groups (20 or less) inspired by Angelo de la Cruz incident.39 As a result of ISIL, and those who publicly swore allegiance this incident, Filipino journalists called for to ISIL in the hope that it may elicit the the Philippine Government to avoid public attention and support of the mother organi- support for U.S. Government operations zation. With ISIL’s defeat in Iraq and Syria, against al-Qaeda in Iraq. Third, radicalization this dynamic is quickly changing to the of Filipinos returning to the Philippines, detriment of ISIL supporters. specifically overseas Filipino workers, is a What role, if any, does past, non-ISIL serious concern. In one case from September related, conflict between the Philippine 2015, a Syrian expatriate, Yasir Muhammad government and Filipino Islamic groups, Shafiq-al-Barazi and a Filipino woman, Joy particularly in Muslim Moro-dominated Ibana Balinang were arrested in Saudi Arabia Mindanao, potentially contribute to willing- for manufacturing explosive belts. Balinang ness to support ISIL ideology or expansion? was reported as an overseas Filipino worker One way of looking at this includes assessing who quit employment earlier in 2014.40 This previous splits among insurgent groups on case presents a quandary: are such incidents Mindanao. In one case, conflict broke out an outlier or a precedent for radicalization between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and recruitment for “lone-wolf” operations (MILF) and splinter groups due to disagree- in the Philippines? ment on the Comprehensive Agreement on ISIL Motivation in Southeast Asia the Bangsamoro (CAB), a peace accord signed in March 2014 between the Philippine A fundamental reason for ISIL-related Government and the MILF. This agreement radicalization and recruitment in Indonesia, served as the basis for the Bangsamoro Basic Malaysia, and the Philippines was the Law, a power sharing agreement between the perception among adherents that ISIL MILF and the Philippine Government in the successfully administered a state. Building proposed “Bangsomoro Autonomous upon the prophesied “al Sham” and historic Region” of western Mindanao that as of caliphate, “ISIL is seen to be the one group summer 2016 was not yet enacted into law.37 that accomplished what other groups only However, the greatest issue at stake for set out to do but failed to achieve: maintain- the Philippines is not in Southeast Asia or ing and governing territory.”41 With ongoing between groups disagreeing over accords events in Syria and Iraq, this dynamic is with the Philippine Government. The subject changing rapidly although it is reasonable to of overseas workers is a concern since more expect that some ISIL adherents will move to than 2.5 million Filipinos reside in the other regions. In its broader, strategic plan, Middle East; 1.2 million in Saudi Arabia; ISIL focuses its efforts primarily on provoca- 930,000 in the United Arab Emirates; and an tion, a trend likely to continue. According to estimated 200,000 in Kuwait and Qatar, this strategy, in the view of Andrew Kydd, a
100 | FEATURES PRISM 7, no. 1 ISIL IN INDONESIA, MALAYSIA, AND THE PHILIPPINES professor of Political Science at the University ISIL Social Media Operations in of Wisconsin, Madison, and Barbara Walter, a Southeast Asia scholar at the University of California, San Social Media Diego, terrorists attempt to draw a violent government response that potentially, and The Taliban were among the first terrorist ideally, harms local citizens and drives the groups to use Twitter to broadcast their 2011 population away from government support attacks in Kabul as part of the spring Badr and services.42 offensive that year.44 Since 2011, social media For ISIL, motivations driving recruitment and encrypted messaging services have and radicalization are two-fold: first, they dynamically complicated and expanded seek replacements for the dwindling num- challenges posed by terrorist recruitment and bers of personnel due to battlefield loses in radicalization. As a tool for recruitment and Syria and Iraq; second, their recruitment radicalization, similar patterns and processes success depends on the perception of an exist among users in the Middle East and in expanding caliphate. Their destruction in Southeast Asia.45 Mosul and Raqqa, and elimination else- A typical path to recruitment includes a where, hinders this expansion. Still, expan- simple process: information in Facebook sion, even if not in significant numbers, directs individuals with interest in ISIL to demonstrates ISIL’s reach beyond the Middle other channels for vetting and private East and other regions where terrorism has channels for further proselytizing or conver- long held sway, such as Somalia and Nigeria, sion. Users may quickly create, delete, or alter and into other countries where lone-wolf social media accounts on Facebook, Twitter, attacks occur. The perceived success, or and other sites, at no cost. Facebook and failure, of ISIL in Syria and Iraq critically Twitter also serve as points of entry towards contributes to this phenomenon and it is radicalization and receipt of pro–ISIL likely that many other groups, such as the messages. As an important countermeasure Bangasmoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, and in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian Minister of more splinter groups may adhere to, or Communications and Information blocked depart from, ISIL’s mission for these reasons. seventy ISIL-connected websites and blogs at For analysts focusing on pro-ISIL radicaliza- the request of the country’s National tion and recruitment, it is useful to keep in Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).46 mind the historical networks and contexts Although this was a positive action, social which preceded ISIL’s split with al-Qaeda as media is transient in nature and ISIL-related much as the network infrastructural changes content consistently reconstitutes on new in ISIL-infected areas.43 sites. Pro–ISIL websites appear anachronistic
in contrast to social media and mobile messaging. Specific sites are relatively easy for governments to block and investigate, although groups such as the Taliban, as well as even more recently established groups
PRISM 7, no. 1 FEATURES | 101 MOIR such as MA/Kantibah Nusantara in Indonesia future jihadist movements, we are overlook- and Malaysia, still host and promote web- ing a major part of what is going on.”47 sites. In both cases, these platforms may serve In addition to providing a sense of as a type of clearing house that translates community, the Baqiya family also readily pro–ISIL propaganda into local languages adapts to changes in communications and generates promotion of generalized technology. In a way, it provides an internal propaganda including profiles and opera- form of crowdsourcing for coding and as a tional narratives. vehicle for updating others on technological It is useful to remember that social developments in software sharing and media sites are not merely communication encryption. An example of this includes the channels. Most users of Facebook and dynamic development and use of mobile Twitter, among other sites, use the media to messaging platforms, especially Telegram remain in or enter a community and do not Messenger and WhatsApp. actively communicate or participate with Mobile Messaging other non-community users. Although virtual, relationships and a sense of belong- Commercially available applications that ing are central to social media participation. allow anyone to send encrypted text and It is easy to regard social media and mobile voice messages have become important tools messaging as only nefarious forms of signal for communication among insurgent and communication, but it is also critical to terrorist groups. In the case of the attacks in understand the sense of community these Brussels in 2016, terrorists used communica- forms of media provide users and how tion encryption applications to keep analysts grievances brought to such forums serve as from tracking their efforts.48 Telegram basis for potential radicalization. Messenger, an application of great impor- In cases where users are isolated from tance to ISIL, was a central communication others in their day-to-day reality, the poten- platform for the January 2016 Jakarta tial of lone wolf radicalization is apparent, terrorist attack.49 ISIL is a primary proponent particularly in light of recent terrorist attacks in this development and ISIL-inspired such as those in Jakarta, Orlando, Nice, propaganda expanded significantly in late London, and Manchester. The online 2015 in Southeast Asia, particularly in community, regarded as the “Baqiya family,” Indonesia. is an important example of this develop- Encryption training for ISIL operatives in ment. Best considered as a loose network of Raqqa was formerly overseen by Abu ISIL supporters, members form support Mohammad al-Adnani, an individual groups, develop friendships, and share and formerly referred to as a principal ISIS develop mutual ideologies, although steeped spokesperson.50 Al-Adnani was detained in in pro-ISIL radicalized Sunni Islam. As Iraq by coalition forces in 2005 but then Amarnath Amarasingam, a researcher at the released in 2010. After 2011, he became a University of Waterloo, Ontario, explains, “If “principal architect in ISIL’s external rela- we continue to focus simply on the content tions” and “coordinated the movement of put out by the Islamic State, and I’m sure ISIL fighters, directly encouraged lone-wolf
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attacks on civilians and members of the program messaging for automatic self- military and actively recruited” before he was destruction by programmed devices, so that killed in Aleppo, Syria in late August 2016.51 only intended recipients can read messages. As a core-member of ISIL, al-Adnani trained Also important are extended sharing apps, others to conduct attacks without direct such as broadcast lists. Broadcast lists enable tactical guidance and he utilized encryption users to create digital dissemination of software to coordinate efforts without his content for up to five thousand members presence. According to Michael Smith of that, in turn, distribute links for further Kronos Advisory, this capacity “really plays message dissemination. Additionally, into the larger theater of terrorism. It ampli- Telegram includes channel messaging which fies the fear factor when we realize that this may reach unlimited numbers of users. group can communicate with people around However, in November 2015, the messaging the world in ways that intelligence services service blocked 78 ISIL-related channels in cannot quickly identify and ascertain what is twelve languages.55 contained in the correspondence.”52 In November 2016 through its Telegram- Potential ISIL supporters in Southeast based Khilafah News Channel—one of the Asia increasingly turn to mobile messaging very channels blocked by Telegram—ISIL applications for detailed guidance, typically addressed communication security issues after demonstrating interest through media among its members in response to warnings such as Facebook. Notably, Facebook issued by the hacker group Anonymous after acquired WhatsApp in February 2014 and, as the Paris attacks that month.56 This incident the most popular messaging application highlights the importance of adaptation and worldwide, had more than one billion users adjustment among both terrorists and law by early 2016.53 WhatsApp, however, enforcement and intelligence agencies provides inadequate levels of privacy protec- seeking to contain them. It is likely, there- tion; that may be a key reason motivating fore, that similar processes will continue as violent extremist organizations to use other messaging services and platforms Telegram Messenger which provides a evolve for communication. high-degree of privacy through encryption.54 Conclusion End-to-end encryption relies on technol- ogy utilizing mathematical operations run on In Southeast Asia, Foreign-Trained Fighters digital data to ensure privacy. In most cases, (FTF) returning from Iraq and Syria pose a this technology does not allow the app threat to countries such as the Philippines, developers to open or decrypt messages; this Malaysia, and Indonesia. Regionally, how- seriously challenges law enforcement and ever, ISIL’s failure to publicly affirm pledged intelligence services. For users, it obviously allegiances of Southeast Asian groups such as provides an end-to-end secure communica- MA, ASG, and JI is notable. Instead, ISIL tion chain since all that matters, to them, is offers only indirect operational guidance and the privacy such encryption provides. well-developed propaganda, although it does Telegram also offers a feature entitled Secret demonstrate highly experienced information Chats technology. This feature allows users to operations guidance.
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This article argued that ISIL’s reach to, for reconstruction. A similar, much smaller- and reception in, Southeast Asian countries scale related case may exist for Marawi City such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and the in Mindanao. The example of “rebuilding” Philippines is a credible but not an existen- contrasts significantly with the nihilism tial threat for these countries. While ISIL advocated by ISIL, wherever it exists. The could potentially establish a small province United States and its regional partners, in all in Southeast Asia, it appears unlikely, cases, share Southeast Asia’s regional security especially with the demise of ISIL in Iraq and concerns and in building individual nations’ Syria. Nevertheless, there are at least two capacity to ensure domestic security. The best significant challenges ISIL still poses to the solutions for these countries, in their efforts region. First, it is critical to address the to counter-ISIL recruitment and radicaliza- dynamic increase of social media based tion therefore, is continued support for communication and messaging applications viable, local initiatives. Another step is that, at this point, no longer need direct ISIL continued provision of technical and involvement for recruitment and radicaliza- culturally aware institution building assis- tion for pro–ISIL or similar ideologies. The tance when feasible. This will be much more second challenge, where solutions are successful than tarnished neocolonial-like potentially achievable, concerns the content notions that guidance should stem from of ISIL messaging. Continued cooperative altruistic imperatives driven by liberal efforts, such as those between governments internationalism. PRISM and Islamic communities in particular, are perhaps the most important measures towards challenging the ideological potency of ISIL. On this point, Southeast Asian countries, and especially those with moder- ate religious constituencies, appear to be on the right track. Based on the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines’ demonstrated interest in strengthening rule of law and increasing counterterrorism capabilities, the best way forward is increased capacity building and cooperative efforts with the United States and others. Admittedly, this is often difficult because of political pressures and challenges to continued collaboration yet opportunities exist. In the case of Mosul’s destruction, assisting in the rebuilding of the city provides a small-scale “Marshall Plan” type of opportunity for the United States to help facilitate Iraqi administrative capacity
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Notes 8 Office of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, “Country Reports on Terrorism 1 “ISIS—The End of The Sykes-Picot Agreeent,” 2015,” June 2, 2016, 68, available at
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18 “ISIS in Ambon: The Fallout from Communal 34 Thomas Koruth Samuel. Conflict,” 13 May 2016, Institute for Policy Analysis 35 Ibid. 81. of Conflict (IPAC), Report Number 28, page 6. 36 Ricardo Saludo, How Grave is the ISIS Threat 19 Thomas Koruth Samuel, “Radicalisation in to the Philippines? The Manila Times, October 10, Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in 2014. https://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/how-grave- Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, The isis-threat-philippines, accessed 1 June 2016. Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism 37 Office of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department (SEARCCT), Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2016, 50. of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering 20 Jasminder Singh, Katibah Nusantara: Islamic Violent Extremism, “Country Reports on Terrorism State’s Malay Archipelago Combat Uni, RSIS 2015,” June 2, 2016, 79, available at
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2016, available at
Photo
Page 90. “Bombing on Marawi City” available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Marawi#/me- dia/File:Bombing_on_Marawi_City.jpg, licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0. < https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-sa/4.0/>. Produced unaltered.
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