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Elite Politics and the Emergence of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

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Elite Politics and the Emergence of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria TRAMES, 2017, 21(71/66), 2, 173–190 ELITE POLITICS AND THE EMERGENCE OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA Peter Mbah, Chikodiri Nwangwu, and Herbert C. Edeh University of Nigeria Abstract. This study examines the role of elite politics in the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It argues that the struggle between political elites of northern and southern extractions over the control of state power has intensified national conflicts and insurgency in the country. Political elites are no longer divided by ideology but by economics of state power. Elite politics of who gets what, when, and how and the struggle for state power led to the formation of the sect and fuels the incessant attacks and insecurity in Nigeria. The study adopts a methodology involving re-description of history based on documentary research. It establishes that elite politics accounts for the emergence and escalation of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Accordingly, the study recommends that good and inclusive governance be employed as a panacea for harmonizing the fractured Nigerian state and overcoming insurgency in Nigeria. Keywords: elite politics, Boko Haram, state power, terrorism, political elite, good governance DOI: https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2017.2.06 1. Introduction Political elite is undoubtedly a crucial determinant of the history and identity of a given society. It is also a vital force in politics and violence. Boko Haram was seen as an Islamic sect pursuing religious issues. Its attacks has not just added a new phenomenon to Africa’s numerous conflicts but created a new dimension to such conflicts. Terrorism is not just an African phenomenon but a global one. It seems that the intensification of the global circuits of capital is linked to the rising tide of terrorism. Terrorism refers to “violence principally, but not exclusively, carried out by organized and unorganized non-state actors, as well as the state, designed to instil fear on victims in order to achieve political, economic, social and even religious ends” (Mbah 2007:110). Essentially, terrorism can be placed con- 174 Peter Mbah et al. textually throughout history by various sects to achieve objectives through the use of violence (Aly 2011). Since 1997, Africa has witnessed a significant increase in the number and level of intensity of terrorist incidents. According to the incidents database of the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, between 1997 and 2007 Africa recorded an estimated 522 acts of terrorism, resulting in 8,477 injuries, and 2,614 fatalities. Records show that 73% of these terrorist incidents were domestic while only about 27% were transnational, qualifying Africa as a continent perpetually at war against itself. Despite the high frequency of domestic terrorism in Africa, the many terrorism cleanup initiatives on the continent primarily concern transnational terrorism, especially since the epochal events of 9/11 (Agbiboa 2013). In modern times, manifestation of international terrorism can be seen or dis- tinguished essentially by political and social circumstances within the international environment. Boko Haram exhibits similar tactics and motivation. There was an initial differentiation between Boko Haram, which was regarded as a kind of domestic terror group excluding it from the international network with Al-Qaeda. In this way, the emergence of terror groups in the countries of Africa was linked with economic deprivation and poverty. Thus, the political discourses in Nigeria were based on poor governance, economic deprivation, and elite corruption. How- ever, religion acts as the ideological force, legitimizes and unifies the group and aims to achieve one of the three primary religious goals: establishment of a religiously pure state, establish religious governments or destruction of earth (Aly 2011). In spite of its marginality in global affairs, Nigeria appears to have been drawn into this spiral of terrorism. Boko Haram is predominant in the north- eastern part of Nigeria, particularly in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. It has in the last half a decade ago become the most dangerous insurgent group in Nigeria. They are known to destructively attack innocent citizens, government institutions, security formations, telecommunications masts, banks, religious organizations, educational institutions, media houses, beer halls, markets and local communities with a kind of guerrilla warfare (Mbah and Nwangwu 2014; Mohammed 2014). Scholars and social commentators have advanced theories or propositions to explain the emergence and activities of Boko Haram in the north-eastern Nigeria. The theories are divided into two broad spectrums. One views the problem essentially as internal. The other blames external forces. The former looks at socio-economic factors as well as deep-seated religious differences and animosity in the Nigerian society as the driving force. It also includes vengeance over the death of the sect’s leader, Ustaz Muhammed Yussuf. For instance, Soludo (2012) posits that, although the average poverty incidence for Nigeria stands at 54% of the total population, the three regions in the north, account for a disproportionate share of that average. Olojo (2013:4) also argues that “individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist activities”. The relevance of this can be understood in terms of societal challenges that are increasingly being Elite politics and Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria 175 conceptualised within the framework of human security. With a poverty pre- valence of 72.2%, the north-east region has the highest level of poverty in Nigeria. Poverty index of there was emphasized to buttress such arguments that poverty is the driver of the emergence of Boko Haram sect. They argue that the sect is a reflection of desperate poverty, and, therefore, represents a kind of disillusionment and discontent in the north-eastern part of Nigeria where Boko Haram is based. The index highlights states that, the north-east consisting of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe has the highest incidence of poverty ranging between 54.9% to 72.2% followed by north-west which consists of Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Sokoto and Zamfara and the north-central con- sisting of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger and Plateau (Ojeme 2011). How- ever, this argument cannot be sustained because Al-Qaeda as a terrorist group was formed and sustained by rich millionaires such as Osama bin Laden and other members who are medical doctors, businessmen et cetera. Again, the initial organization of Boko Haram sect started with graduates from the University of Maiduguri. Secondly, poor people in the north-east as far as that variable of poverty is concerned cannot afford to buy sophisticated arms, which members of the sect use in their attacks. They have recruited the poor ones as their foot soldiers but poverty is not the independent variable. Furthermore, scholars such as Onuoha (2012), Alorzieuwa (2012) and Kukah (1993) strongly portray religion as the main cause of the emergence of Boko Haram as an Islamic sect. This is contrary to scholarly arguments that the terrorist group is part of an international terror group linked to Al-Qaeda, al-Shaabab and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). They make their analysis around the issue of Islamizing the country by rejecting western education and culture. According to Huntington (1996:40–42): of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world’s great religions; and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other. However, it is not wrong to argue from this perspective, what one should con- sider as the trigger of the emergence of Boko Haram is the contradiction between the Islamic and Western civilizations. This lies in the imposition of political and economic will on Islamic civilization by the United States and Europe through the process of globalization which emphasizes neo-liberalism, gender equality and individualism among others. On the other hand, “radical Islam sees globalization as frequently leading to destruction, social and moral crisis with individuals cast adrift in destruction with cultural and political disorientation associated with the imposition of Western values on the Islamic countries” (Mbah 2007:117). Economic and political value systems of the Western industrialized countries are being portrayed as superior to all and any other value systems. Radical Islam views this as a real threat as it tends to destroy Islamic culture. Violence therefore, becomes a legitimate tactic for preventing close relations with the West and 176 Peter Mbah et al. destructive tendencies of the Muslim culture and state. Today, in all Islamic countries, radical Islam offer their people an instrument with which to fend off frightening Western influences in order to preserve accustomed ways of life which are very important to the Muslim people. This is close to what Huntington calls the ‘clash of civilizations’. Northern Nigeria has been a region with “a predominantly Muslim population, and has a well-documented history of militant religiosity dating back to the highly successful Holy War (jihad) fought by Sheik Othman Dan Fodio
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