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Print Image Quality Is Vital to Marketing FEBRUARY 2014 The official publication of the National Auctioneers Association PICTURE PERFECT Print image quality is vital to marketing. 300 dpi is the standard. - NAA Marketing Competition returns - CAI? Yes, you should - New markets for auction emerging easy, affordable Auction Software WEBCAST Live or online, big or small, is here at last with simple or complex, we have solutions NO PERCENTAGES!!! to help you grow your auction business. Webcast Live Bidding Run locally (no internet required) · Includes prebidding prior to lot going live or access via our Cloud service. · Simplified bidding interface increases participation Webcast → · Audio/video broadcasting included Features included: · $50 setup + $100 max bidding fee per auction* • Fastest, most versatile cataloging • Barcode image recognition • Eye-Fi wireless image capture • Full iinventory system with barcoding Internet-Only Auctions • Drivers license check-in · Live Catalog provides real-time info; no refreshing • Self check-in touchscreen kiosk · Soft-Close extends bidding per lot; prevents sniping • Phone bid schedule generator ← Live catalog · Linked Soft-Close - link multiple lots together • RF modem wireless clerking · No setup + $100 max bidding fee per auction* • Powerful mailing list builders • Bulk email system with mailmerge • Fully integrated with Bidopia Internet Absentee Bidding • and much, much more · Accept internet bids before your live auction · Higher starting bid amounts speed up live auction Catalog → · No setup + $100 max bidding fee per auction* * Price is 25¢ per unique bid not to exceed $100 bidding fee per auction. Fees for the optional credit card authentication registration service are separate. (Screenshots above are customized with your logo, colors, etc.) Providing the tools you need to build your brand. Simple, modern, user-friendly, and affordable. Only Bidopia puts it all together. ® Internet Auctions Visit www.auctionflex.com for more information. Visit www.auctionflex.com/bidopia.htm for more information. easy, affordable Auction Software WEBCAST Live or online, big or small, is here at last with simple or complex, we have solutions NO PERCENTAGES!!! to help you grow your auction business. Webcast Live Bidding Run locally (no internet required) · Includes prebidding prior to lot going live or access via our Cloud service. · Simplified bidding interface increases participation Webcast → · Audio/video broadcasting included Features included: · $50 setup + $100 max bidding fee per auction* • Fastest, most versatile cataloging • Barcode image recognition • Eye-Fi wireless image capture • Full iinventory system with barcoding Internet-Only Auctions • Drivers license check-in · Live Catalog provides real-time info; no refreshing • Self check-in touchscreen kiosk · Soft-Close extends bidding per lot; prevents sniping • Phone bid schedule generator ← Live catalog · Linked Soft-Close - link multiple lots together • RF modem wireless clerking · No setup + $100 max bidding fee per auction* • Powerful mailing list builders • Bulk email system with mailmerge • Fully integrated with Bidopia Internet Absentee Bidding • and much, much more · Accept internet bids before your live auction · Higher starting bid amounts speed up live auction Catalog → · No setup + $100 max bidding fee per auction* * Price is 25¢ per unique bid not to exceed $100 bidding fee per auction. Fees for the optional credit card authentication registration service are separate. (Screenshots above are customized with your logo, colors, etc.) Providing the tools you need to build your brand. Simple, modern, user-friendly, and affordable. Only Bidopia puts it all together. ® Internet Auctions Visit www.auctionflex.com for more information. Visit www.auctionflex.com/bidopia.htm for more information. FROM THE PRESIDENT Let’s get going! he new calendar year has started, and I’m come all who are in the auction industry into Tagain ready to hit the ground running! our membership. The Board listened to the rec- ommendations made by the task forces earlier I’m headed to the Pennsylvania Auctioneers this year, helping us create the priorities that are Association meeting, and it hit me that I only now listed in the Pathways document. have five months left as president of the Na- tional Auctioneers Association. What a ride it And, we are transparent. This document tells has been. People often ask me what I like best you what you can expect NAA to do. It tells you about being president. I have to say that this what our top priorities are: creating a new web- position has given me an opportunity to see all site, discussing data collection, rewriting some facets of the auction industry, and what I have of our top educational programs, and more. Paul C. Behr seen, I like. Moving forward, of course we will keep you informed how we are doing on these projects. CAI, BAS, NAA President I have seen vibrant state associations offering great educational opportunities for their mem- But, we are also flexible — ready to respond if National Auctioneers bers. I have seen other auction organizations, needed, continuing to look where we need to Association President such as the National Auto Auction Association, go as the landscape in this industry continues Paul C. Behr, CAI, BAS, working hard for the industry. I have worked to change. joined NAA in 1981. with a great group of auction professionals A three-time World through the Education Institute Trustees, the There is a lot of discussion about why people National Auctioneers Association Board of should belong to NAA. If you are reading this Champion Auctioneer, Directors and the National Auctioneers column, you are probably already a member — Behr was the first IAC Foundation. I have learned what great leaders and, for that, I thank you. However, please don’t Champion in 1988 and we have in the National Auctioneers Associa- stop there. We need to continue to reach out has conducted over 8500 tion Auxiliary. and get more people in our organization. Last auctions in his 42-year year, we wanted to reach 3900 members. We career. Behr is President What you get to see when you are president is didn’t quite make that number. This year, we the total of what is happening in the industry, want to reach 4000. It’s not because we want the of both the World Wide and what I see makes me proud. $300 every member pays; it’s because we want College of Auctioneering to represent the industry. and the World I see Auctioneers Helping Auctioneers (AHA). Automobile Auctioneers I see Auctioneers learning new skills to make Theodore Roosevelt once said that “every man Championship. Also, he their business better and grow the industry. owes some of his time to the up-building of the has served on the CAI I see conversations happening on places like profession to which he belongs.” We can argue Facebook that could previously only happen at whether NAA owes us benefits, or whether we Board of Governors. educational events and Conference and Show. owe our time to NAA. But, what we can’t argue Behr makes his home in What a world we live in! about now is that we — every one of us — are Denver, Colo., with his the NAA. wife, Suzanne. And through it all, I am most proud of what NAA has put together in the form of Pathways I hope that you will continue to be a part of this to 2020. This document is the culmination of dynamic organization. We — all of us — need hundreds of our members’ conversations — you. We need your friend who is not a member. from the Council on Future Practices to our We need your friend’s friend. NAA needs us all! most recent task forces on promotion, educa- tion and advocacy. I am proud that the Board Let us know what you think about Pathways listened to feedback each step of the way. The to 2020 by sending us an email to: hcombest@ Council listened to members as they asked auctioneers.org. (See page 10 for the article. For questions, back in Orlando, about what the the entire document go to www.auctioneers. future of the industry is and how NAA and its org/about) members should respond. I can guarantee you that we will be listening! The Vision 2020 Task Force listened when members told us that now is not the time for a name change, but it was time to officially wel- 4 FEBRUARY 2014 Auctioneer www.auctioneers.org FEBRUARY 2014 VOLUME 66 NUMBER 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS 18 22 COVER STORY: Picture Perfect, part 1 What is 300 dpi? Why is it important? Why do media people keep asking me for it? We explain all of this and illustrate the reasons 36 why image quality is vital. FEATURES & NEWS NETWORKING CAI? Yes, you should Auction Adaptation 42 Hall of Fame form 6 The three levels of CAI all offer business-changing 22 New markets emerge for auction-based services 44 Success stories networking and instruction Effective top performers 51 Thanks, Foundation Addison move explained 28 To win sales, you must embrace discomfort donors! 8 CEO Hannes Combest explains why C&S in 2015 New discovery for St. Jude has moved from Frisco, Texas to nearby Addison 52 New members 32 The latest from St. Jude Research finds T cells Board passes Pathway to 2020 production mechanism 54 In memory 10 In its final call for 2013 the NAA Board sets the Online 'Eduaction' 55 State association news Association's extended business plan 40 Part education, part interaction will answer 56 Board requirements NAA marketing contest returns "How do I put my auction online?" 18 Competition has new categories and rules changes 57 Trustee requirements 58 Auction schools MEMBER PROFILES 59 St. Jude update FUNdraiser Giving back, with purpose 60 Filler words 26 From Super Woman to circus performers, Gayle 34 NAA Director Joseph Mast wants to help insure Stallings works to put the 'fun' into fundraising the NAA's longevity DEPARTMENTS Reunion 30 Brad W.
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