Lessons Not Learned from the Fukushima Accident Risks of the European Npps 10 Years Later
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Lessons not Learned from the Fukushima Accident Risks of the European NPPs 10 years later Study commissioned by Greenpeace Oda Becker Patricia Lorenz Hannover, February 2021 1 Content 1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 3 2 Almaraz, Spain ............................................................................................................................... 6 2.1 Spanish National Action Plan (NAcP) ...................................................................................... 6 2.2 Weaknesses identified by the Spanish Stress Tests the NAcP should remedy .......................... 6 2.3 Examples of further safety and security issues of Almaraz ....................................................... 8 2.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................... 9 3 Mochovce, Slovak Republic ......................................................................................................... 10 3.1 Slovak National Action Plan (NAcP) ...................................................................................... 11 3.2 Weaknesses identified by the Slovak Stress Tests the NAcP should remedy ......................... 11 3.3 Examples of further safety and security issues of Mochovce ................................................. 14 3.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 14 4 Temelin, Czech Republic ............................................................................................................. 15 4.1 Czech National Action Plan (NAcP) ....................................................................................... 16 4.2 Weaknesses identified by the Czech Stress Tests the NAcP should remedy .......................... 16 4.3 Examples of further safety and security issues of Temelin ..................................................... 19 4.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 20 5 Krško, Slovenia ............................................................................................................................. 21 5.1 Slovenian National Action Plan (NAcP) ................................................................................. 21 5.2 Weaknesses identified by the Slovenian Stress Tests the NAcP should remedy .................... 22 5.3 Examples of further safety and security issues of Krško ......................................................... 24 5.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 25 6 Ringhals, Sweden .......................................................................................................................... 27 6.1 Swedish National Action Plan (NAcP) ................................................................................... 27 6.2 Weaknesses identified by the Swedish Stress Tests the NAcP should remedy ....................... 27 6.3 Examples of further safety and security issues of Ringhals .................................................... 31 6.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 32 7 Gundremmingen, Germany ........................................................................................................ 33 7.1 German National Action Plan (NAcP) .................................................................................... 33 7.2 Weaknesses identified by the German Stress Tests the NAcP should remedy ....................... 34 7.3 Examples of further safety and security issues of Gundremmingen ....................................... 36 7.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 37 8 Doel and Tihange, Belgium .......................................................................................................... 38 8.1 Belgian National Action Plan (NAcP) .................................................................................... 39 8.2 Weaknesses identified by the Belgian Stress Tests the NAcP should remedy ........................ 39 8.3 Examples of further safety and security issues of Doel and Tihange ...................................... 43 8.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 46 9 Beznau, Switzerland ..................................................................................................................... 47 9.1 Swiss National Action Plan (NAcP) ........................................................................................ 48 9.2 Weaknesses identified by the Swiss Stress Tests the NAcP should remedy ........................... 48 9.3 Examples of further safety and security issues of Beznau ...................................................... 51 9.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................. 53 10 Gravelines and Cattenom, France ............................................................................................ 54 10.1 French National Action Plans (NAcP) .................................................................................. 54 10.2 Weaknesses identified by the French Stress Tests the NAcP should remedy ....................... 54 10.3 Examples of further safety and security issues of Cattenom and Gravelines ........................ 59 10.4 Conclusions ........................................................................................................................... 62 11 References ................................................................................................................................... 64 2 1 INTRODUCTION The March 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant proved that it was not justified to exclude highly unlikely accidents from happening. In a prompt reaction to this catastrophic accident, the European Council concluded in March 2011 that the safety of all EU nuclear plants should be reviewed on the basis of a comprehensive and transparent risk and safety assessment ("stress tests"). The EU Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) took over this task. (WENISCH 2012) However, two month later the scope of the EU stress tests was reduced: The EU stress tests were defined as a targeted reassessment of the safety margins of nuclear power plants developed by ENSREG, with contributions from the European Commission. The EU stress tests comprised three topics: 1. The response of a nuclear power plant when facing different extreme situations (earthquakes, floods and extreme weather events, and the combination of events), 2. Capabilities to cope with consequences of loss of power (Station Black-out – SBO) and loss of heat removal via Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS), 3. Capabilities to prevent major radioactive emissions in case of a severe accident: the Severe Accident Management (SAM). The stress tests revealed a number of shortcomings regarding the plants´ capability to withstand several external hazards and the lack of possibilities to cope with the consequences. By the end of 2012, the national regulators had provided National Action Plans (NAcPs) to remedy the identified shortcomings during the EU stress tests process. By 31 December 2014, each country was obliged to update its original NAcP to reflect developments since its issue and the current status of the measures and their implementation. The updated NAcPs have been published on the ENSREG website. Since 2015, some countries have released several updates and some countries have not released any updates of their NAcPs. By assessing eleven nuclear power plants in nine countries, we want to answer the question of lessons learned from Fukushima. This study1 looked for each plant into the recommendations made by the ENSREG team and how they have been implemented until now, whether they will be realized or delayed or simply ignored. It also sheds light on the issue of safety culture and the determination of the responsible nuclear authorities to enforce it. At the same time “good practices” are not discussed, because the ENSREG reports described them in detail. This study presents the weaknesses and omissions and focuses on the hard facts of the nuclear safety level achieved after completion of the stress tests. These evaluations do nott intend to be exhaustive, but the findings contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the risk of nuclear power plants in Europe. Scope of the Stress tests It is important to understand that the EU stress tests could not take into account all key safety issues such as the capability to prevent accidents – the scope of these tests was not designed to deliver a comprehensive risk assessment. Too many factors were not taken into account – most importantly ageing, obsolescence of the design, safety culture and vulnerability against terror attacks. Thus it is important to underline that the EU stress tests cannot be understood as a comprehensive safety check of the NPP in Europe. (WENISCH 2012) To show a more complete picture of the safety