Pursuing Happiness: the Architecture of Sustainable Change

Pursuing Happiness: The Architecture of Sustainable Change

Sonja Lyubomirsky Kennon M. Sheldon University of California, Riverside University of Missouri—Columbia

David Schkade University of California, San Diego

The pursuit of happiness is an important goal for many people. However, surprisingly little scientiﬁc research has focused on the question of how happiness can be increased and then sustained, probably because of pessimism engendered by the concepts of genetic determinism and hedonic adaptation. Nevertheless, emerging sources of optimism exist regarding the possibility of permanent increases in happiness. Drawing on the past well-being literature, the authors propose that a person’s chronic happiness level is governed by 3 major factors: a genetically determined set point for happiness, happiness-relevant circumstantial factors, and happiness-relevant activities and practices. The authors then consider adaptation and dynamic processes to show why the activity category offers the best opportunities for sustainably increasing happiness. Finally, existing research is discussed in support of the model, including 2 preliminary happiness-increasing interventions.

The pursuit of happiness holds an honored such as “Are you happy?” and “Are you having position in American society, beginning with fun?” ﬁt nearly every occasion (Markus & the Declaration of Independence, where it is Kitayama, 1994). Not surprisingly, the majority promised as a cherished right for all citizens. of U.S. residents rate personal happiness as very Today, the enduring U.S. obsession with how to important (Diener, Suh, Smith, & Shao, 1995; be happy can be observed in the row upon row Triandis, Bontempo, Leung, & Hui, 1990) and of popular psychology and self-help books in report thinking about happiness at least once any major bookstore and in the millions of every day (Freedman, 1978). Furthermore, the copies of these books that are sold. Indeed, pursuit of happiness is no longer just a North many social contexts in the United States have American obsession, but instead it is becoming the production of happiness and positive feel- ever more global as people seek to fulﬁll the ings as their primary purpose, and questions promises of capitalism and political freedom (Diener et al., 1995; Freedman, 1978; Triandis et al., 1990). It seems that nearly all people believe, or would like to believe, that they can Sonja Lyubomirsky, Department of Psychology, Univer- move in an “upward spiral” (Sheldon & Houser- sity of California, Riverside; Kennon M. Sheldon, Depart- Marko, 2001) toward ever greater personal ment of Psychology, University of Missouri—Columbia; well-being. David Schkade, Rady School of Management, University of California, San Diego. Is the pursuit of happiness merely a bourgeois This work was supported in part by grants from the concern, a symptom of Western comfort and Positive Psychology Network. We are grateful to Linda self-centeredness, a factor that has no real im- Houser-Marko, Kathleen Jamir, and Chris Tkach for con- pact on psychological adjustment and adapta- ducting library research and to Shelley Taylor, David Sher- tion? The empirical evidence suggests that this man, and the other members of Psychology 421 for valuable comments on a draft. is not the case. Indeed, a number of researchers Correspondence concerning this article should be ad- and thinkers have argued that the ability to be dressed to Sonja Lyubomirsky, Department of Psychology, happy and contented with life is a central crite- University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, or Kennon rion of adaptation and positive mental health M. Sheldon, Department of Psychological Sciences, 112 McAlester Hall, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO (e.g., Diener, 1984; Jahoda, 1958; Taylor & 65211. E-mail: [email protected] or sheldonk@missouri Brown, 1988). Bolstering this notion, Ly- .edu ubomirsky and her colleagues recently com-

111 112 LYUBOMIRSKY, SHELDON, AND SCHKADE piled evidence showing that happiness has nu- ples work? Do some work better than others? merous positive byproducts that appear to ben- Do the principles work better for some people efit individuals, families, and communities than for others? Are any positive effects of the (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2004; see also principles due, ultimately, to placebo effects? If Fredrickson, 2001). Furthermore, Lyubomirsky the book actually helps people “get happier,” et al.’s analysis revealed that happy people gain does the happiness boost last? Although it is tangible benefits in many different life domains possible that some of the advice given in this from their positive state of mind, including and other similar books could well be appropri- larger social rewards (higher odds of marriage ate and effective, the authors provide almost no and lower odds of divorce, more friends, stron- empirical research in support of their claims. ger social support, and richer social interac- One receives little more guidance from con- tions; e.g., Harker & Keltner, 2001; Marks & temporary academic psychology. Of course, re- Fleming, 1999; Okun, Stock, Haring, & Witter, search psychologists have identified many pre- 1984), superior work outcomes (greater creativ- dictors of people’s happiness or subjective well- ity, increased productivity, higher quality of being. For example, well-being has been shown work, and higher income; e.g., Estrada, Isen, & to be associated with a wide variety of factors, Young, 1994; Staw, Sutton, & Pelled, 1995), including demographic status (e.g., Argyle, and more activity, energy, and flow (e.g., Csik- 1999; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; My- szentmihalyi & Wong, 1991). ers, 2000), personality traits and attitudes (e.g., Further supporting the argument that subjec- Diener & Lucas, 1999), and goal characteristics tive happiness may be integral to mental and (e.g., McGregor & Little, 1998). However, a physical health, happy people are more likely to limitation of previous research is that the vast evidence greater self-control and self-regulatory majority of studies have been cross sectional and coping abilities (e.g., Aspinwall, 1998; and have reported between-subjects effects Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; Keltner & Bon- rather than investigating well-being longitudi- anno, 1997), to have a bolstered immune system nally and examining within-subject effects. In (e.g., Dillon, Minchoff, & Baker, 1985; Stone et addition, very few happiness intervention stud- al., 1994), and even to live a longer life (e.g., ies have been conducted. Thus, researchers still Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001; Ostir, know surprisingly little about how to change Markides, Black, & Goodwin, 2000). Also, well-being, that is, about the possibility of “be- happy people are not just self-centered or self- coming happier.” Doubtless, part of the reason ish; the literature suggests that happy individu- for this neglect is the difficulty of conducting als instead tend to be relatively more coopera- longitudinal and intervention studies. The prob- tive, prosocial, charitable, and “other-centered” lem is further compounded by the tendency of (e.g., Isen, 1970; Kasser & Ryan, 1996; Wil- applied mental health researchers to focus on liams & Shiaw, 1999). pathology rather than on positive mental health In summary, happy individuals appear more (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) and by likely to be flourishing people, both inwardly the thorny issues raised when theorists speculate and outwardly. Thus, we argue that enhancing on how people “should” live their lives to max- people’s happiness levels may indeed be a wor- imize their potential for happiness (Schwartz, thy scientific goal, especially after their basic 2000). However, we believe the principal rea- physical and security needs are met. Unfortu- son for the neglect of this question is the con- nately, however, relatively little scientific sup- siderable scientific pessimism over whether it is port exists for the idea that people’s happiness even possible to effect sustainable increases in levels can change for the better. For example, happiness. the happiness-boosting techniques proposed in the self-help literature generally have limited Historical Sources of Pessimism grounding in scientific theory and even less empirical confirmation of their effectiveness Three considerations serve to illustrate the (Norcross et al., 2000). Consider a representa- depth of this pessimism. First is the idea of a tive best seller, You Can Be Happy No Matter genetically determined set point (or set range) What: Five Principles for Keeping Life in Per- for happiness. Lykken and Tellegen (1996) spective, by Carlson (1997). Do the five princi- have provided evidence, based on twin studies SPECIAL ISSUE: ARCHITECTURE OF SUSTAINABLE HAPPINESS 113 and adoption studies, that the heritability of (1978) showed that, after 1 year, lottery winners well-being may be as high as 80% (although a were no happier than controls, and furthermore more widely accepted figure is 50%; Braungart, recent paralysis victims were not as unhappy as Plomin, DeFries, & Fulker, 1992; Tellegen et one would expect. Further evidence of hedonic al., 1988; cf. Diener et al., 1999). Whatever the adaptation comes from findings of remarkably exact coefficient, its large magnitude suggests small correlations between happiness and that for each person there is indeed a chronic or wealth (Diener & Lucas, 1999) and Myers’s characteristic level of happiness. Consistent (2000) observation that while U.S. citizens’ per- with this idea, Headey and Wearing (1989) sonal income has more than doubled in the found, in a four-wave panel study, that partici- past 50 years, their happiness levels have re- pants tended to keep returning to their own mained the same. The notion of an individual baselines over time (see also Suh, Diener, & fighting against the effects of adaptation brings Fujita, 1996). Thus, although there may be sub- to mind an image of a pedestrian walking up a stantial variation around this baseline level in descending escalator. Although the improving the short term, in the long term people perhaps circumstances of her life may propel her upward cannot help but return to their set point, or to the toward ever greater happiness, the process of middle of their set range: “What goes up must adaptation forces her back to her initial state. come down” (a more detailed description of the Together, these concepts and findings suggest happiness set point is provided later). that trying to become happier may be as futile as A second and closely related source of pes- trying to become taller (Lykken & Tellegen, simism comes from the literature on personality 1996). Indeed, some have argued that pursuing traits. Traits are cognitive, affective, and behav- happiness may backfire altogether, if the pursuit ioral complexes that are, by definition, consis- becomes a conscious “extrinsic” goal that dis- tent across situations and across the life span tracts people from enjoying the moment and therefore may account for part of the sta- (Schooler, Ariely, & Loewenstein, in press; see bility of the set point. In support of the latter also Sheldon, 2004). Moreover, striving for assumption, McCrae and Costa (1990) have happiness may inevitably result in deep disap- shown impressive long-term stability for the pointment for many people. From this perspec- “Big Five” traits, including the two traits most tive, rather than seeking an upward spiral, closely related to well-being: neuroticism and maybe people would be better off simply ac- extraversion. Specifically, people tend to main- cepting their current personality and happiness tain the same rank ordering in their levels of levels (McCrae & Costa, 1994). In Zen terms, worry, rumination, and guilt, as well as in their perhaps one should try to transcend the pursuit levels of social engagement, enthusiasm, and of happiness rather than trying to maximize it self-confidence. Because of the close relation (Gaskins, 1999). Indeed, a number of philo- between psychological well-being and these sophical traditions embrace the notion that hap- personality characteristics, McCrae and Costa piness should not be increased beyond an ideal argued that people also tend to maintain the level, one akin to a “Golden Mean” (Aristotle, same relative level of happiness over time (see 1974) between agony and ecstasy. To be sure, also Costa, McCrae, & Zonderman, 1987; Die- most people would undoubtedly reject an unre- ner & Lucas, 1999). strained, ceaseless pursuit of well-being. A third source of pessimism arises from the concept of the hedonic treadmill (Brickman & Present Sources of Optimism Campbell, 1971), which suggests that any gains in happiness are only temporary, because hu- Is the pursuit of happiness futile? We believe mans so quickly adapt to change (see also Kah- not. Despite the seemingly compelling reasons neman, 1999; Tversky & Griffin, 1991). Thus, we have listed for pessimism regarding attempts although new circumstances may temporarily to elevate levels of well-being, there are also cause people to become happier or sadder, they compelling reasons for optimism. In the follow- rapidly adjust, and the effect of these new cir- ing, we briefly describe four sources of opti- cumstances on happiness then diminishes mism, returning to consider some of them in quickly or even disappears entirely. For exam- greater detail later. First, some researchers have ple, Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman had success, albeit limited and short term, in 114 LYUBOMIRSKY, SHELDON, AND SCHKADE using interventions to increase happiness (e.g., just by a few people but perhaps by the majority Fava, 1999; Fordyce, 1977, 1983, Lichter, of people. Indeed, Carstensen’s (1995) socio- Haye, & Kammann, 1980; Sheldon, Kasser, emotional selectivity theory suggests that older Smith, & Share, 2002). The potential of happi- people learn to structure their lives and pursue ness-enhancing interventions is further reflected particular goals that maximize positive emo- in emerging research in the positive psychology tions, consistent with the proposal that people tradition demonstrating that practicing certain can learn to sustainably increase their well- virtues, such as gratitude (Emmons & McCul- being. Further supporting this notion are Shel- lough, 2003), forgiveness (McCullough, Parga- don and Kasser’s (2001) results, which showed ment, & Thoresen, 2000), and thoughtful self- that age-related increases in well-being are in reflection (King, 2001; Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & part mediated by volitional changes, including Dickerhoof, 2004), can bring about enhanced older people’s ability to select more enjoyable well-being. Furthermore, research documenting and self-appropriate goals. the long-term effectiveness of cognitive and Yet another reason why genes are not neces- behavioral strategies to combat negative affect sarily destiny is that they appear to influence and depression has encouraging implications happiness indirectly, that is, by influencing the for the possibility of elevating long-term happi- kinds of experiences and environments one has ness (e.g., Gloaguen, Cottraux, Cucherat, & or seeks to have. Thus, unwanted effects of Blackburn, 1998; Jacobson et al., 1996). genes could be minimized by active efforts to Second, many different motivational and at- steer oneself away from situations that detract titudinal factors have been linked to well-being, from well-being or by avoiding being enticed factors that are presumably amenable to some toward maladaptive behaviors (Lykken, 2000; volitional control. Examples of possible moti- Lyubomirsky, 2001). In addition, it is worth vational factors include the successful pursuit of noting that heritability coefficients describe co- life goals that are intrinsic in content (e.g., variations, not mean levels. Furthermore, even a Kasser & Ryan, 1996); concordant with a per- high heritability coefficient for a particular trait son’s interests, motives, and values (Brunstein, (such as happiness) does not rule out the possi- Schultheiss, & Grassman, 1998; Sheldon & El- bility that the mean level of that trait for a liot, 1999; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995); and inter- specific population can be raised. Under the nally consistent (e.g., Emmons & King, 1988; right conditions, perhaps anyone can become Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Examples of poten- happier, even if her or his rank ordering relative tially controllable attitudinal factors include the to others remains stable. tendency to take an optimistic perspective on To summarize, it appears there is a paradox: one’s life situations (e.g., DeNeve & Cooper, Some theoretical perspectives and empirical 1998; McCrae & Costa, 1986), the inclination data suggest that happiness can be increased, to avoid social comparisons and contingent self- whereas other theories and data imply that it evaluations (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Ross, 1997), cannot. How can these conflicting perspectives and the tendency to feel a sense of optimism or on the possibility of happiness enhancement be efficacy regarding one’s life (Bandura, 1997; resolved? Also, if enhanced happiness is indeed Scheier & Carver, 1993; Seligman, 1991; Tay- possible, what kinds of circumstances, activi- lor & Brown, 1988). ties, or habits of mind are most likely to bring A third reason for optimism is provided by gains, especially gains that can be maintained? recent findings that older people tend to be somewhat happier than younger people Model of Happiness (Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; Diener & Suh, 1998; Roberts & Chapman, 2000; Sheldon Accordingly, the primary question addressed & Kasser, 2001). Specifically, both cross-sec- in this article is the following: Through what tional and longitudinal work has shown that mechanisms, if any, can a chronic happiness older persons report higher life satisfaction and level higher than the set point be achieved and lower negative affect. Although these main ef- sustained? To this end, we describe the archi- fects do not always emerge, they are observed tecture of sustainable happiness. The integra- frequently enough to suggest that greater hap- tive model of happiness we present accommo- piness can indeed be achieved over time, not dates the role of both personality/genetic and SPECIAL ISSUE: ARCHITECTURE OF SUSTAINABLE HAPPINESS 115 circumstantial/demographic factors in happi- It is important to note as well that we use a ness. However, it also goes beyond these cross- subjectivist definition of happiness, one that sectional or concurrent factors to incorporate commonly relies on people’s self-reports. We dynamic, time-sensitive factors. This extension believe this is appropriate and even necessary allows the question of within-subject change in given our view that happiness must be defined well-being, and maintained change, to be ad- from the perspective of the person. In other dressed. Most important, the model incorpo- words, happiness is primarily a subjective phe- rates the role of motivational and attitudinal nomenon for which the final judge should be factors, consistent with the assumption that hap- “whoever lives inside a person’s skin” (Myers piness can be actively pursued. We attempt to & Diener, 1995, p. 11; see also Diener, 1994). show that certain types of intentional activities However, the fact that the judgment of happi- indeed offer ways to achieve sustainable ness is necessarily subjective does not mean that changes in well-being, despite the counteracting influences on that judgment cannot be studied effects of adaptation. empirically; for example, researchers might in- In the sections to follow, we first provide a vestigate the effects of factors such as a per- working definition of chronic happiness. Then son’s recent experiences of positive emotion we define the three factors that affect it (genetic (Frijda, 1999), the frame in which the question set point, circumstances, and activities) and ar- is presented (Larsen & Fredrickson, 1999), the gue that intentional activities offer the best po- meaning that the person ascribes to the question tential route to higher and sustainable levels of (Schwarz & Strack, 1999), and the person’s happiness. Subsequently, we consider some sense of making satisfactory progress toward more complex issues pertaining to the achieve- life goals at the time of the judgment (Carver & ment of sustainable well-being via intentional Scheier, 1990). We consider some of these fac- activity, such as the role of person–activity fit, tors in greater detail in a later section. Finally, optimal timing and variety of activity, and the the fact that self-reported happiness is subjec- supportive role of sustained effort and positive does not mean that it is unrelated to relative habits. Then, in the final section of the tively more “objective” variables. For example, article, we describe several preliminary efforts research has shown significant convergence of to increase happiness, based on our model, self-reported well-being with peer and spouse and discuss the nature of effective happiness reports of well-being (e.g., Lyubomirsky & interventions. Lepper, 1999; Sandvik, Diener, & Seidlitz, 1993), with recall of particular types of events (e.g., Seidlitz, Wyer, & Diener, 1997), with Defining Happiness smiling behavior (e.g., Harker & Keltner, 2001), and with physiological responses (e.g., Here we define happiness as it is most often Lerner, Taylor, Gonzalez, & Stayn, 2002). defined in the literature, that is, in terms of frequent positive affect, high life satisfaction, Chronic Happiness Level and infrequent negative affect. These three constructs are the three primary components of Our primary focus in this article is on a subjective well-being, according to Diener and person’s characteristic level of happiness during colleagues (for reviews, see Diener, 1984, 1994; a particular period in his or her life, which we Diener et al., 1999). Supporting the legitimacy term the chronic happiness level. We define of considering them as indicators of the same happiness this way because we wish to identify underlying construct, we find that the measures a quantity that is more enduring than momen- are highly correlated and typically yield a single tary or daily happiness but that is also somewhat factor after negative affect has been recoded malleable over time and, thus, amenable to (Sheldon & Kasser, 1998, 2001; Sheldon & meaningful pursuit. According to this defini- Lyubomirsky, 2004). To refer to this group of tion, although it is possible to alter one’s measures, we use the term happiness or subjec- chronic happiness level, it is much more diffi- tive well-being, although we also discuss mood cult to do so than to alter one’s happiness level and life satisfaction at times according to the at a particular moment or on a particular day. specific ideas and data being presented. Operationally, one might define a person’s 116 LYUBOMIRSKY, SHELDON, AND SCHKADE chronic happiness level in terms of his or her proximate percentage of the variance that each retrospective summary judgments regarding his of the three factors accounts for in cross-sec- or her mood and satisfaction during some recent tional well-being, as suggested by past research. period (such as the past 2, 6, or 12 months) or as As can be seen in the pie chart, existing evi- the average of momentary judgments of mood dence suggests that genetics account for approx- and satisfaction made at several times during imately 50% of the population variation (Braun- the selected period. It is worth adding, however, gart et al., 1992; Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; that people may vary in their “hedonic profiles,” Tellegen et al., 1988), and circumstances ac- such that two individuals with similar chronic count for approximately 10% (Argyle, 1999; happiness levels might differ in their relative Diener et al., 1999). This leaves as much as levels of contentment with life versus their rel- 40% of the variance for intentional activity, ative frequency of experiencing positive and supporting our proposal that volitional efforts negative mood states. offer a promising possible route to longitudinal increases in happiness. In other words, changing Determinants of the Chronic Happiness one’s intentional activities may provide a hap- Level piness-boosting potential that is at least as large as, and probably much larger than, changing We focus on three primary types of factors one’s circumstances. In the following, we pro- that we believe causally affect the chronic hap- vide a definition of each factor, briefly consider piness level, namely, the set point, life circum- whether and how changing that factor can lead stances, and intentional activity. We focus on to changes in people’s chronic well-being, and these three factors because they have histori- discuss whether such changes may be sustain- cally received the majority of attention in the able over the long term, that is, whether the well-being literature, providing a substantial re- forces of hedonic adaptation can be counter- search base. We also focus on this three-factor acted by that factor. distinction because it allows us to address several important issues and paradoxes, such as the Happiness Set Point question of whether it is even possible to “become happier” given strong genetic influences We assume that an individual’s chronic hap- on happiness, the question of why past well- piness level is in part determined by her or his being research has revealed such weak associ- set point, which is defined as the central or ations between demographic/circumstantial expected value within the person’s set range. variables and happiness, and the question of The happiness set point is genetically deter- how a person might appropriately take action to mined and is assumed to be fixed, stable over “pursue” happiness. time, and immune to influence or control. Con- Figure 1 provides an illustration of the ap- sistent with this assumption, twin studies (Lykken & Tellegen, 1996; Tellegen et al., 1988), long-term panel studies (Headey & Wearing, 1989), and studies of the effects of life events on well-being (Brickman et al., 1978) all indicate substantial long-term stability in happiness. For example, Lykken and Tellegen (1996) assessed well-being in twins at 20 years of age and then again at 30 years of age. The test–retest correlation was a considerable .50. Even more important, the cross-twin, cross-time correlation for the happiness of monozygotic twins was .40 (or 80% of the test–retest correlation), suggesting that the heritability of the “stable” component of happiness is approximately .80. In contrast, the cross-twin, cross- Figure 1. Three primary factors influencing the chronic time correlation for dizygotic twins was close to happiness level. zero (.07). Other studies, although differing in SPECIAL ISSUE: ARCHITECTURE OF SUSTAINABLE HAPPINESS 117 their estimates of heritability, have consistently relatively stable facts of an individual’s life. shown that monozygotic twins exhibit consid- Happiness-relevant circumstances may include erably more similar patterns of happiness the national, geographical, and cultural region change than do dizygotic twins, providing con- in which a person resides, as well as demo- verging support that the variance in adult hap- graphic factors such as age, gender, and ethnic- piness is in large part determined genetically. ity (see Diener et al., 1999, for a review). Cir- The set point probably reflects relatively im- cumstantial factors also include the individual’s mutable intrapersonal, temperamental, and af- personal history, that is, life events that can fective personality traits, such as extraversion, affect his or her happiness, such as having ex- arousability, and negative affectivity, that are perienced a childhood trauma, being involved in rooted in neurobiology (e.g., Ashby, Isen, & an automobile accident, or winning a presti- Turken, 1999; Davidson, 1999; Depue & Col- gious award. Finally, circumstantial factors in- lins, 1999; Gray, 1990; Kagan, 2003; Robinson, clude life status variables such as marital status, Emde, & Corley, 2001), are highly heritable occupational status, job security, income, (Tellegen et al., 1988), and change little over health, and religious affiliation. the life span (McCrae & Costa, 1990). For ex- Again, previous cross-sectional research has ample, Kagan has followed children from 4 linked all of the circumstantial factors just de- months to 11 years of age and shown that so- scribed to subjective well-being (Diener et al., ciability in 11-year olds can be traced to a 1999). For example, empirical evidence shows particular type of infant temperament (called that people who are paid more are relatively “low reactive”) that appears to involve a distinct happier (e.g., Diener, Sandvik, Seidlitz, & Die- neurochemical profile. Other writers, including ner, 1993) and that middle-class individuals are Gray and Depue, have also compiled persuasive somewhat happier than working-class individu- evidence for the neurobiological underpinnings als (e.g., Warr & Payne, 1982). Married people of personality. This rapidly growing body of are happier than those who are single, divorced, research supports the set point theory of person- or widowed (e.g., Mastekaasa, 1994), even in ality and affect. cultures as diverse as those of Belarus and Spain (Diener, Gohm, Suh, & Oishi, 2000). Findings Implications of the Set Point for also reveal that religiously committed people Sustainable Increases in Chronic are relatively more likely to rate themselves as Happiness “very happy” (Gallup, 1984) and that, not surprisingly, healthy people, especially older ones, The preceding analysis implies that one’s declare themselves to be slightly happier than chronic happiness during a particular life period sick people (e.g., Okun et al., 1984). can be increased, but not by changing one’s set However, as suggested earlier, all circum- point, because by definition it is constant. In stances combined account for only 8% to 15% other words, although it is possible that future of the variance in happiness levels (Argyle, scientists will learn how to alter people’s basic 1999; Diener et al., 1999). These relatively temperaments and dispositions, at present it ap- weak associations have been deemed surprising pears that focusing on the set point is not a and paradoxical, given well-being researchers’ fruitful avenue for happiness increase. Again, initial expectations that circumstantial factors however, one can posit that nongenetic factors such as income and physical health would be also influence a person’s chronic happiness strongly related to happiness (Diener et al., level, helping to determine whether the person 1999). We believe that these counterintuitively falls in the lower or upper portion of his or her small effects can be largely accounted for by potential range at a particular time. The remain- hedonic adaptation and the fact that people ing variables in the model are designed to rep- adapt rapidly to new circumstances and life resent these other factors. events. This appears to be the case because adaptation—whether it is sensory (e.g., to a foul Circumstances odor or a heavy weight; Brown, 1953), physiological (e.g., to very hot or cold temperatures; This category consists of happiness-relevant Dar, Ariely, & Frank, 1995), or hedonic (e.g., to circumstantial factors, that is, the incidental but a salary raise; Brickman et al., 1978; Parducci, 118 LYUBOMIRSKY, SHELDON, AND SCHKADE

1995)—occurs in response to stimuli that are ducing sustainable changes in chronic happi- constant or repeated. By definition, constancy is ness. Although this strategy may work in the a feature of most circumstantial changes. short term, it probably will not work in the long term. Of course, if people have not achieved Implications of Circumstances for basic subsistence and security, then it is logical Sustainable Increases in Chronic for them to attend to these circumstances and Happiness basic needs first, before focusing on maximiz- ing their happiness. However, we assume that, Of the different types of circumstances, life at best, satisfying basic needs can move people status variables in particular seem to offer some only up to their set point, not beyond. potential for increasing chronic happiness, in that individuals often have considerable control Intentional Activity over them. For example, a college football player may sign a lucrative NFL contract, a Now we turn to the third and arguably most middle-aged divorcee may remarry, or a retired promising means of altering one’s happiness couple may move to Florida to a condominium level: intentional activity. This is a very broad with a view, all becoming happier as a result. category that includes the wide variety of things Will such new happiness last, however? Per- that people do and think in their daily lives. haps not, because, as mentioned earlier, hedonic Obviously, humans are very active creatures, adaptation tends to shuttle people back to their with innumerable behaviors, projects, and con- starting point following any positive circum- cerns to which they devote energy. By “inten- stantial change. For example, Headey and tional,” we mean discrete actions or practices in Wearing (1989) found in their four-wave panel which people can choose to engage (although study that positive and negative events (e.g., the choice to initiate the activity may have be- “made lots of new friends,” “got married,” “ex- come habitual, as discussed in a later section). perienced serious problems with children,” or We also assume that intentional activities re- “became unemployed”) influenced life satisfac- quire some degree of effort to enact. That is, the tion, positive affect, and negative affect as person has to try to do the activity; it does not would be expected but that people kept return- happen by itself. Indeed, this point touches on ing to their original baselines. And Schkade and one of the critical distinctions between the cat- Kahneman (1998) revealed that although “liv- egory of activity and the category of life cir- ing in California” is a seductive notion for cumstances; that is, circumstances happen to many, it does not actually make people any people, and activities are ways that people act happier in the long run. Furthermore, Lucas, on their circumstances. Clark, Georgellis, and Diener (2003) showed There is good reason to believe that inten- that, for most people, the life satisfaction ben- tional activity can influence well-being. For ex- efits derived from getting married tended to fade ample, some types of behavioral activity, such over the years. Thus, although one may gain a as exercising regularly or trying to be kind to temporary “boost” by moving to a new region, others, are associated with well-being (e.g., increasing one’s income level, or changing Keltner & Bonanno, 1997; Magen & Aharoni, one’s appearance, such boosts will probably not 1991), as are some types of cognitive activity, last, because people tend to adapt to constant such as reframing situations in a more positive circumstances. Other reasons why circumstan- light or pausing to count one’s blessings (Em- tial changes may prove ineffectual for perma- mons & McCullough, 2003; King, 2001; Selig- nently increasing happiness include the fact that man, 1991), and some kinds of volitional activ- circumstantial changes can be costly (e.g., in ity, such as striving for important personal goals terms of money, resources, and time) and, in (Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001) or devoting many cases, impractical or even impossible. effort to meaningful causes (M. Snyder & Also, once a realistic “ceiling” of positive cir- Omoto, 2001). Notably, it is impossible to fully cumstances is reached, it may be difficult to separate behavioral, cognitive, and volitional improve matters further. activity; still, we believe the distinction is use- In short, the data suggest that changes in ful, and we continue to use it throughout the circumstances have limited potential for pro- article. SPECIAL ISSUE: ARCHITECTURE OF SUSTAINABLE HAPPINESS 119

Implications of Intentional Activity for highlighted one potential mediator from suc- Sustainable Increases in Chronic cessful volitional activity to enhanced well-be- Happiness ing, namely, accumulations of positive daily experiences along the way. The question of Again, it appears that increasing one’s set what other proximal factors may mediate point and changing one’s life circumstances are changes in chronic happiness is addressed in not fruitful avenues for sustainable increases in more detail in a later section. chronic happiness. What, if anything, can pro- Notably, these studies do not extend beyond a vide such an avenue? In the following, we argue single span of time. Thus, they do not directly that intentional behavioral, cognitive, or voli- address the crucial question raised by the cur- tional activity offers the best potential route. rent article: whether gains in well-being last. Some work has already investigated the impact Although Headey and Wearing’s important of adopting new behaviors on longitudinal well- (1989) work suggests that gains in happiness do being, showing, for example, that faithfully en- not last, notably, their study focused only on life gaging in a new exercise program positively events (“circumstances,” in our model) and did boosts people’s mood and vitality and can even not take intentional activity into direct account. maintain the boosts for as long as 6 months Recently, Sheldon and Houser-Marko (2001) (e.g., Ransford & Palisi, 1996; Stewart et al., addressed the question of sustainability by ex- 1997). Although little work has directly inves- amining the effects of goal attainment on emo- tigated the longitudinal effects of changing tional well-being over two consecutive semes- one’s cognitive attitudes and practices on en- ters. Consistent with earlier studies, they found hanced well-being, the general success of cog- that students who attained their personal goals during the first semester of their freshman year nitive–behavioral therapy in reducing suffering experienced enhanced adjustment and emo- (Gloaguen et al., 1998) and recent work indi- tional well-being at the end of that semester. cating positive effects of prompting people to More important, they found that students could practice positive psychological “virtues” such maintain their enhanced level of well-being, but as gratitude (Emmons & McCullough, 2003), only if they continued to do well at their goals hope (C. R. Snyder, Ilardi, Michael, & Cheav- during the second semester. In contrast, stu- ens, 2000), and forgiveness (McCullough et al., dents who did well in the first semester but not 2000) suggest that cognitive activity offers in the second semester tended to regress back to many excellent possibilities for happiness inter- their original well-being levels. This study of- ventions (Fordyce, 1983). fers direct support for our assumption that hap- Turning to the third type of intentional activ- piness can be enhanced and then maintained at ity, recent longitudinal studies have focused the new level, especially when volitional activ- specifically on volitional activity as a producer ity is effectively pursued over long periods of of enhanced well-being (see Sheldon, 2002, for time. Further supporting this conclusion, Shel- a review). In such studies, students are typically don and Lyubomirsky (2004) recently resur- asked to pursue self-generated personal goals veyed these participants 3 years after the origi- over the course of a semester. High levels of nal study and found that initially high-perform- goal progress or attainment consistently predict ing students had maintained their earlier gains increased well-being (i.e., higher positive affect in emotional well-being throughout their col- and life satisfaction and lower negative mood) lege career. from the beginning to the end of the semester, But what about adaptation? Is it not the case whereas low levels of progress predict reduced that even the most successful striver adapts to well-being (Brunstein, 1993; Sheldon, 2002). his or her happy situation eventually? More Specifically, Sheldon’s longitudinal research in generally, is it not the case that people ulti- this area (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998, 1999; Shel- mately adapt to the positive effects of any ac- don & Kasser, 1995, 1998) has shown that tivity in which they engage, whether it be be- well-being increases are most likely when a havioral, cognitive, or volitional, so that the person chooses and attains self-concordant activity loses its potency over time? goals, that is, goals that “fit” the person (as Although hedonic adaptation undoubtedly described subsequently). This work has also constrains the happiness-inducing effects of in- 120 LYUBOMIRSKY, SHELDON, AND SCHKADE tentional activities, just as it does for circum- between circumstantial changes and activity stances, this adaptation effect appears to be changes. Although the boundaries between weaker in the case of activity, as shown by these categories can be fuzzy, apparently they recent data. For example, Sheldon and Ly- are clear enough to produce the predicted ubomirsky (2004) recently conducted several effects. short-term longitudinal studies in which participants’ well-being (positive affect, negative af- Specific Advantages of Intentional Activity fect, and life satisfaction) was measured at Time 1, and positive circumstantial and activ- What are the sources of the sustainable hap- ity-based life changes were measured at Time 2. piness gains afforded by intentional activity? Well-being was then measured twice more, at We posit that activity-based change, unlike cir- Times 3 and 4. These investigators found con- cumstance-based change, has several desirable sistent support for a path model, displayed in features that may help to combat adaptation. Figure 2, in which both positive circumstantial Intentional activity is episodic. One feature change and positive activity change predicted of activities is that they are, by definition, epi- enhanced life satisfaction and positive affect at sodic and transient; after all, people cannot Time 3, but only positive activity change pre- spend all of their time doing one thing. This in dicted maintained happiness gains at Time 4, itself suggests that individuals may adapt less with positive circumstantial change dropping readily to new activities than to new circum- out of the model. In other words, consistent with stances. The episodic nature of activity also the present model, only activity-based well-be- suggests that an additional way to maximize the ing change lasted; circumstance-based happi- impact of an activity is to attend to the timing of ness change did not. that activity. For example, a person might In a separate study, Sheldon and Lyubomir- choose to “count her blessings” only after brav- sky (2004) randomly assigned participants to ing a difficult period, or only when she is espe- report on either activity-based positive changes cially needful of a boost. Suppose instead that or circumstantially based positive changes in she counts the same blessings every day, in a their lives. Relative to those in the circumstan- nonvarying routine. This person may become tial-change group, those in the activity-change bored with the routine and cease to extract group reported a weaker sense of “having gotten meaning from it. The length of time before one used to the change, such that it does not give the reengages in a happiness-boosting activity is an same boost as before,” and more strongly en- important part of its potency in the next appli- dorsed the statement “the change is something cation. By being mindful of the “refractory pe- that varies over time, that is, something that riod” (Kalat, 2001) after which a recently per- adds variety to my life.” These findings further formed activity regains its full happiness-induc- support the claim that activity changes are char- ing potential, individuals may maximize the acterized by less hedonic adaptation than cir- benefits of the activity over time and avoid cumstantial changes. Parenthetically, Sheldon reducing or eliminating the activity’s effective- and Lyubomirsky’s (2004) findings, taken as a ness through overuse. Thus, people should whole, support the validity of our distinction strive to discover the optimal timing for each activity, that is, a frequency of engagement that allows that activity to remain fresh, meaningful, and positive for a particular person. Intentional activity can be varied. Another important parameter of behavioral, cognitive, and volitional activities is that people can continually vary them, both in their foci and in the ways they engage in them. This may help to reduce adaptation to the activity, allowing it to retain its potency (McAlister, 1982). Indeed, by Figure 2. Longitudinal path model predicting maintained definition, adaptation does not occur to stimuli changes in well-being from positive circumstantial changes that are variable or changeable but only to those and positive activity changes. Asterisks indicate p Ͻ .01. that are constant or repeated (cf. Frederick & SPECIAL ISSUE: ARCHITECTURE OF SUSTAINABLE HAPPINESS 121

Loewenstein, 1999). For example, a scientist ities (an attitudinal activity), and he can try to may regularly ask new questions and become remember to bring her flowers (a behavioral involved in new projects. In the process, she activity). A person who performs these activi- often feels the joy of making fascinating new ties would probably best counteract adaptation discoveries and thus may remain particularly to this particular circumstance and derive the happy (i.e., at the upper end of her potential most benefit from it. In contrast, consider a range) over a long period of time. If the person husband who is not intentionally engaged in his counting her blessings varies the domains of life marriage; for him, this demographic circum- in which she counts them (i.e., in relationships, stance would essentially become a background in work, in her health, or in her most recently factor, to which adaptation is very likely. successful domain), then the strategy may re- For all of these reasons, intentional activity main “fresh” and meaningful and work indefi- appears to offer the best prospects for increasing nitely. Supporting this notion, past research and sustaining happiness. Of course, following suggests that people tend to seek variety in their through on new intentions, such as the ubiqui- behavior (McAlister, 1982; Ratner, Kahn, & tous “New Year’s resolutions,” is not necessar- Kahneman, 1999), perhaps because change—in ily easy (Sheldon & Elliot, 1998). Indeed, we both thoughts and actions—is innately pleasur- assume that happiness-increasing strategies can able and stimulating (Berlyne, 1970; Rolls et be initiated and effectively pursued only with al., 1981). concerted, consistent commitment and effort. Intentional activity can directly counteract Still, activity-based factors are, by definition, adaptation. Yet another advantage of inten- under greater potential control by the individual tional activity is that it can directly tackle the than are genetic, demographic, and most life problem presented by adaptation. For example, status factors. In other words, if anything can do the cognitive practice of pausing to savor the it, intentional activity can. good things in one’s life can directly counteract the effects of hedonic adaptation to one’s constant circumstances by drawing attention to the Implementing Happiness-Increasing features that produced the initial happiness Strategies boost and helping to keep them from being In this section, we briefly consider several taken for granted. As another example, prac- important issues pertaining to how intentional ticed meditators frequently report renewed ap- activity might be used for increasing happi- preciation of the ordinary as a result of their ness. In other words, having established that intentional reencounters with the world. activity can potentially sustainably elevate The fact that intentional activity can directly happiness, how might one put this potential to counteract adaptation and the hedonic treadmill work? We discuss these strategic issues in helps shed further light on the distinction be- roughly chronological order, proceeding from tween life circumstances and intentional activi- the question of how to choose a particular ties. Obviously, many personal characteristics happiness-boosting activity to the question of are both. For example, “being married” and how such activity may be initiated and the “being a student” both denote demographic sta- question of how the activity can be main- tus, yet they also reflect particular sorts of ac- tained over time to produce a sustained in- tivities. From our perspective, the crucial dis- crease in the chronic level of happiness. In the tinction with respect to well-being is whether process, we discuss the issue of person–strat- one exerts intentional effort with respect to the egy fit, the meaning and nature of effort, the circumstantial category, that is, whether one definition and role of habits, and the impact of acts upon the circumstance (e.g., using inten- short-term versus long-term considerations. tional practices to keep the circumstance “fresh”). For example, an individual can engage in a number of intentional activities with respect Choosing an Activity: The Role of to the circumstantial category “marriage”: A Person–Activity Fit husband can have the goal of making his marriage work (a volitional activity), he can make Any one particular activity will not help ev- the effort to appreciate his wife’s positive qual- ery person become happier. People have endur- 122 LYUBOMIRSKY, SHELDON, AND SCHKADE ing strengths, interests, values, and inclinations activity. This distinction is necessary because it that undoubtedly predispose them to benefit is clear that many activities have definite posi- more from some strategies than others. For ex- tive effects if the person can only get started ample, extraverts may benefit most from activ- doing them. For example, exercising in the ities that bring them into regular contact with morning, making time to work on at least one other people, and people high in nurturance important project during the day, or pausing to motivation may benefit most from activities that count one’s blessings at the end of the day can afford them opportunities to take care of others. have significant benefits, but only if the person This general “matching” hypothesis (Harack- can “get over the hurdle” of remembering to do iewicz & Sansone, 1991) is supported by much them and overcoming any obstacles to initiating recent work showing that the positive effects of them. Obviously, those who do not implement goal attainment on well-being are moderated by their activity intentions stand a worse chance of goal–person fit (Brunstein et al., 1998; Diener & benefiting from them than those who do! We Fujita, 1995; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon assume that this kind of self-regulatory effort & Kasser, 1998). It is also supported by past requires considerable self-discipline and will- well-being intervention research. For example, power. Furthermore, such effort may constitute in several studies that instructed participants to a limited resource, one that must be marshaled apply 14 different techniques to increase their carefully; in Muraven and Baumeister’s (2000) personal happiness, the particular techniques terms, self-regulatory will is like a “muscle” considered most effective for raising happiness that has limited capacity in a given unit of time varied greatly from one individual to another and must be used strategically to avoid fatigue. and appeared to be determined by each partici- If this analogy is accurate, then it seems pant’s needs and areas of specific weakness logical that some people develop the muscle to (Fordyce, 1977, 1983). a greater extent than others, thus attaining a The fit of an activity with a person might be greater ability to “get started” on their intentions conceptualized in a variety of ways, for exam- and gaining greater happiness potential. Of ple, with respect to individuals’ motive dispo- course, some activities will appear intrinsically sitions, basic needs, core values, signature more appealing and will be easier to jumpstart; strengths, personal resources, hedonic profiles, this is undoubtedly one advantage of selecting or other individual-difference characteristics. an activity that fits one’s personality. For exam- There are also a variety of ways that fit might be ple, rather than running on a track, a fitness- operationalized, such as in terms of self-re- seeking wilderness lover might instead choose ported fit, in terms of consistency between im- to run on a trail through the woods, thereby plicit and explicit measures of activity-relevant feeling much less initial resistance to beginning motives, or in terms of informant-rated person– the activity. As another example, rather than activity fit. Another approach is to assume that learning classical pieces, a jazz-loving piano certain kinds of experiences are likely to be student might instead choose to work on jazz beneficial to anyone, because these experiences standards, enhancing the intrinsic appeal of sit- reflect universal psychological needs. From this ting down to practice. point of view, any activity that provides certain Maintaining an activity. This brings us to experiences, such as those involving belonging- the second type of effort. Obviously, if a par- ness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), self-efficacy ticular activity is to yield sustained happiness (Bandura, 1997), or autonomy (Deci & Ryan, change, the person must keep performing the 2000), might be assumed to “fit” the person, a activity over the long term. For many effective priori. happiness-enhancing activities, this will not be difficult, because the task will probably be in- Role of Effort herently interesting or rewarding and thus will be “autotelic” in nature (Deci & Ryan, 2000), Initiating an activity. We assume that en- that is, self-reinforcing and self-sustaining. This gaging in an activity requires at least two dif- is especially true to the extent that the person ferent kinds of effort: first, the effort required to continually varies what he or she does. If, for initiate the activity and, second, the effort re- example, a person shifts attention among sev- quired to actually carry out and maintain the eral projects at work, explores new trails in the SPECIAL ISSUE: ARCHITECTURE OF SUSTAINABLE HAPPINESS 123 state park, or seeks out interesting new piano turned a formerly conscious activity into an pieces, his or her activities should remain intrin- unconscious routine, practiced automatically sically enjoyable and conducive to many reward- and without variation? If so, is it not the case ing “flow” experiences (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). that one is especially likely to experience hedo- What if the activity is not enjoyable and thus nic adaptation to that activity, such that it loses difficult to maintain? In this case, stopping the its happiness-boosting potential? activity may not be problematic, because it We think not. However, to illustrate, we must probably is not working anyway. By emphasiz- first distinguish between the habit of regularly ing the importance of enjoying one’s intentional initiating a potentially beneficial activity and activity, however, we do not mean to imply that the habit of implementing it the same way every people should seek out only “fun” activities. time (the two types of effort mentioned earlier). Sometimes choosing to endure boring or even We assume that hedonic adaptation occurs only aversive experiences in the short term can have with respect to particular experiences, and not considerable positive effects on chronic happi- with respect to the decisions that give rise to ness in the long term; for example, studying for those experiences. Thus, making a habit out of an important exam in a tedious but required deciding to initiate an activity is not problem- class may well represent an excellent invest- atic but may instead help people to keep getting ment in one’s future chronic happiness, even “over the hump.” For example, a woman might though it may detract from one’s momentary make running an automatic part of her daily happiness. As another example, a naval officer routine, such that she does not even have to candidate is paying a short-term cost (boot make the decision of whether or not to run each camp) to receive a longer term benefit (a career day, thus deriving considerable benefit. What is as an officer). potentially problematic is when people make a Of note, self-determination theory (Deci & habit out of how they implement the activity. Ryan, 2000; Sheldon, Joiner, & Williams, When this happens, the flow of experiences 2003) posits that the crucial factor in such cases produced by such a habit is likely to remain is whether the person has internalized the non- relatively constant, and thus, adaptation is likely enjoyable activity, that is, whether he or she is to have the most pernicious effects. To over- able to find meaning and value expression in it, come this, as suggested earlier, people should even if it is not pleasant to perform. From this mindfully attend to optimal timing and variety perspective, the naval officer candidate would in the ways they practice an activity. For exam- pay a smaller short-term cost if he could un- ple, the woman might want to vary the route, dergo boot camp thinking that “this is important time of day, and speed of her running. This will and valuable” rather than thinking that “this is help forestall the effects of adaptation. unnecessary and stupid.” The question of when and how to sacrifice short-term happiness in Extensions and Further Questions exchange for longer term happiness is an important one, as is the question of how to pro- Now that we have presented our basic con- mote internalization of important happiness-rel- ceptual model of sustainable changes in happi- evant activities that are not intrinsically enjoy- ness, we briefly consider a variety of additional able. These questions represent promising issues that extend beyond this basic model. directions for future research. What are the key ingredients of particular activities that lead a person to a higher level of Role of Habitual Activity well-being? Although this question is somewhat peripheral to our model, it merits brief discus- If activities such as “looking on the bright sion. We assume that happiness increases come side,” “making time for the things that matter,” from at least two sources that are described, and “working on an important life goal” make a respectively, by bottom-up and top-down theo- difference for happiness, then it seems it would ries of well-being (Diener, 1994). Bottom-up be a good idea to make a habit of doing them. theories postulate that people make global well- However, on the surface, habits appear to being judgments in part with reference to emo- present a conundrum for our model. Is it not the tions associated with their recent experiences case that acquiring a habit means that one has (Kahneman, 1999). If they can recall a large 124 LYUBOMIRSKY, SHELDON, AND SCHKADE number of recent affectively positive experi- of their coursework. All of the strategies fit into ences, then they report being very happy (see one or more of the three categories of activity Sheldon & Elliot, 1999, for supporting data). outlined earlier: behavioral (e.g., “spend more Studies have produced support for this bot- time socializing”), cognitive (e.g., “become tom-up perspective by showing that accumula- present oriented”), and volitional (e.g., “get bet- tions of need-satisfying daily experiences over ter organized and plan things out”). Consistent time (such as competence, relatedness, and au- with our conceptual model, Fordyce found that tonomy; Deci & Ryan, 2000) lead to enhanced the strategies worked; that is, a significant main global well-being at the end of that time (Reis, effect of participation was found for the exper- Sheldon, Ryan, Gable, & Roscoe, 2000; Shel- imental conditions. Again, intentional activity don, Ryan, & Reis, 1996). Furthermore, Shel- can successfully increase happiness. Also con- don and Lyubomirsky (2004) found, in their sistent with our model, he found that some comparison of the sustained effects of circum- strategies worked better than others and, in ad- stantial changes and activity changes on dition, that person–strategy fit had a moderating changes in well-being among students, that the effect on strategy effectiveness. more enduring activity-based effects on happi- More recently, Sheldon and colleagues ness were mediated by the greater feelings of (2002) conducted an intervention study based competence and relatedness associated with ac- on participants’ personal goals. Early in the tivity changes during the semester. semester, they taught experimental participants But what about when people say they are a set of four strategies for enhancing their ex- happy despite having had recent negative emo- perience and attainment of their personal goals: tional experiences? Although bottom-up theo- “own the goal,” “make it fun,” “keep a bal- ries cannot account for this, top-down theories ance,” and “remember the big picture.” Consis- can. According to such models, well-being tent with the studies cited earlier, goal attain- judgments are in part determined by global at- ment predicted increases in well-being at the titudinal or meaning-based factors. Thus, a per- end of the semester. Interestingly, there was no son who “suffers for a cause” might still feel main effect of experimental condition on in- very happy because her suffering demonstrates creased well-being or goal attainment. Instead, a her commitment to, and also perhaps moves her significant interaction was observed, such that closer to obtaining, an important life goal. As only participants whose goals “fit” their inter- another example, a man who has a bad day at ests and values benefited from the intervention. work might still report being very happy that In other words, those with self-concordant goals night, because of a short but meaningful visit who received the intervention evidenced the from his grandchildren that evening that helped greatest goal attainment and, thus, the greatest him to reframe the day. Again, we believe that increase in well-being. In addition to demon- intentional activity can lead to new well-being strating that happiness-boosting interventions by both top-down and bottom-up routes, that is, can work for at least some people, this finding both via accumulations of small positive expe- provides further support for our proposition that riences and via a sense of global meaning and the fit of the activity to the person makes a purpose. difference. Obviously, much future work remains to be Preliminary Data: Happiness Interventions done regarding happiness-increasing interventions, particularly research that explicitly ma- The model of sustainable happiness that we nipulates the various factors in our model. As a have proposed has clear implications for how to preliminary test, Lyubomirsky, Tkach, and design interventions for increasing happiness. Sheldon (2004) recently conducted two 6-week Before describing these, we first discuss some happiness-enhancing interventions based in be- of the few happiness intervention studies that havioral and cognitive–attitudinal change. have been conducted, to show their general con- Drawing on promising interventions grounded sistency with our approach. As noted earlier, in the positive psychology tradition—that is, Fordyce (1977, 1983) conducted several happi- focused on building positive affect and personal ness intervention studies in which he taught 14 strengths rather than on reducing or coping with happiness-relevant strategies to students as part negative affect, pathology, or weakness—they SPECIAL ISSUE: ARCHITECTURE OF SUSTAINABLE HAPPINESS 125 used two diverse strategies (one cognitive and one social behavioral) to serve as initial exis- tence proofs of our conceptual model. To this end, experimental participants were prompted to perform kind acts or to pause and “count their blessings.” The strategy of committing acts of kindness was expected, on the basis of previous theory and research, to boost temporary moods and long-lasting well-being. For example, individuals who report a greater interest in helping others, an inclination to act in a prosocial manner, or intentions to perform altruistic or courteous behaviors are more likely to rate themselves as dispositionally happy (see Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2004, for a review). We assume that acts of kindness and generosity can boost happiness in a variety of ways. Such acts may foster a charitable perception of others and one’s com- munity, an increased sense of cooperation and interdependence, and an awareness of one’s good fortune. In addition, people who commit acts of kindness may begin to view themselves Figure 3. Changes in well-being over the course of two as altruistic people, as well as to feel more 6-week interventions: performing acts of kindness (top) and confident, efficacious, in control, and optimistic counting one’s blessings (bottom). about their ability to help. Furthermore, acts of generosity can inspire greater liking by others, along with appreciation, gratitude, and proso- ticipants experienced a reduction in happiness cial reciprocity (Trivers, 1971), all of which are over the course of the 6-week period, partici- valuable in times of stress and need. Finally, pants who committed acts of kindness experi- kind behaviors may help satisfy a basic human enced a significant increase in well-being, but need for relatedness (Baumeister & Leary, this increase was evident only among those who 1995), thereby contributing to increased showed their weekly generosity all in a single happiness. day. Because many of the kind acts that students Thus, in their first intervention, Lyubomir- performed were small ones, spreading them sky, Tkach, and Sheldon (2004) asked students over the course of a week might have dimin- to perform five acts of kindness per week over ished their salience and power or made them the course of 6 weeks, either all five acts in 1 less distinguishable from participants’ habitual day or five acts spread over the week. Such acts kind behavior. were described as behaviors that benefit other The second intervention tested a cognitive people or make others happy, usually at some happiness-increasing activity. Recently, Em- cost to oneself (e.g., donating blood, helping a mons and McCullough (2003) found that prac- friend with a paper, visiting an elderly relative, ticing grateful thinking on a regular basis can or writing a thank-you note to a former profes- enhance concurrent well-being. Gratitude pro- sor). A no-treatment control group simply com- motes the savoring of positive life experiences pleted measures of well-being immediately be- and situations so that maximum satisfaction and fore the intervention and immediately after. The enjoyment are distilled from one’s circum- results, displayed in the top panel of Figure 3, stances. As noted earlier, this practice may di- provided preliminary evidence that a short-term rectly counteract the effects of hedonic adapta- happiness-enhancing activity can increase well- tion by helping people extract as much appre- being. Furthermore, supporting our model’s ciation from the good things in their lives as predictions, Lyubomirsky et al. found that op- possible. In addition, the ability to appreciate timal timing was critical. Whereas control par- their life circumstances may also be an adaptive 126 LYUBOMIRSKY, SHELDON, AND SCHKADE coping strategy by which people positively re- to such stable factors. Again, however, one can interpret stressful or negative life experiences, deter, or at least delay, such adaptation to pos- bolster coping resources, and strengthen social itive circumstantial changes by engaging in in- relationships. Finally, the practice of gratitude tentional effort and activity with respect to appears to be incompatible with negative emo- them. That is, if one can remember to appreciate tions and thus may reduce feelings of envy, or actively engage with the object or circum- anger, or greed. stance (i.e., pause to savor the new Mercedes or Thus, in the second 6-week intervention, stu- take advantage of the California weather), then dents were instructed to contemplate “the things stable objects and circumstances may not be for which they are grateful” either once a week stable after all, from a phenomenological per- or three times a week. Examples of “blessings” spective. Thus, it remains the case that only life listed by students included “a healthy body,” changes involving intentional activity can be “my mom,” and “AOL instant messenger.” expected to lead to sustainable changes in Control participants completed only the happi- well-being. ness assessments. The results again suggested that short-term increases in happiness are pos- Conclusion sible and, furthermore, that optimal timing is important. In summary, students who regularly If it is meaningful and important to pursue expressed gratitude showed increases in well- happiness, then it is crucial to find out how this being over the course of the study relative to can be accomplished. To what extent, and how, controls, but these increases were observed only can people succeed in making themselves hap- among students who performed the activity just pier? In this article, we have attempted to inte- once a week (see Figure 3, bottom panel). Per- grate what is known about happiness change, haps counting their blessings several times a especially longitudinal variations in well-being, week led people to become bored with the prac- into a single summary model. The model en- tice, finding it less fresh and meaningful over compasses a wide variety of findings and sug- time. gests a number of new directions for research. Although the results of these two interven- More than two centuries have passed since the tions are encouraging, they notably did not test “pursuit of happiness” was proclaimed as a di- the sustainability of the well-being increases for vinely ordained human right. We believe it is the experimental groups (i.e., “kindness” and finally time for the issue of sustainable well- “blessings”) and did not examine the impact of being to be given the scientific attention that it key moderators of activity effects. 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