G. S. RAKOVSKI NATIONAL DEFENCE ACADEMY DEFENCE ADVANCED RESEARCH INSTITUTE

IMPROVING ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF COALITION HEADQUARTERS

Collection of papers, presented during the NATO Science and Technology Organization, Human Factors and Medicine Panel Lecture Series 232 September – October 2013

Yantsislav Yanakiev (Editor)

Sofi a, 2014

1 © Yantsislav Yanakiev, Frederick M. J. Lichacz, Delphine Resteigne, Ann-Renee Blais Janet Sutton, Nancy Houston, Plamen Dimitrov, Nikola Stoyanov, Carol Atkinson Leedjia Svec, Iliya Marinov, Aneliya Mitkova, 2014 © Ivaylo Alexandrov Tasev, Cover, 2014 © St. George Military Publishing House, 2014

ISBN 978-954-9348-47-7

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface / 5

Yantsislav Yanakiev Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Headquarters: The Viewpoint of Subject Matter Experts and Theoretical Approach / 8

Frederick M. J. Lichacz Alignment of Structure and Process with the Operative Goals of a NATO Headquarter / 21

Frederick M. J. Lichacz Process Improvement Strategies within an Operational NATO Headquarter / 33

Delphine Resteigne & Ann-Renee Blais Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Operational Coalition Headquarters: The Impact of Cultural Dimensions / 47

Janet Sutton & Nancy Houston Leader and Team Adaptability in Coalition Teamwork / 66

Ann-Renee Blais & Delphine Resteigne The Role of the People in the Organisation: Leadership, Training, and Rotation Practices / 76

Yantsislav Yanakiev How to Reduce the Challenges of a Multinational Context? (Implications for Practice) / 92

Plamen Dimitrov Logistics Support for the Bulgarian Navy in Multinational Operations by NATO Support Agency – General Services Programme / 104

Nikola Stoyanov Model of Collaboration between Public Sector Institution Bodies in Emergency Situations / 115

3 Carol Atkinson U.S. Strategic Defence Priorities: Implications for Multinational Operations / 129

Leedjia Svec Cultural Minefi elds and Coalition Forces / 140

Iliya Marinov & Aneliya Mitkova Stressful Factors in Modern Military Operations / 153

4 PREFACE

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the factors and issues related to culture, coalitions, and multinational operations. These include: training, leadership, teamwork, command and control, inter alia. Consequently, the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) Panel approved establishment of Lecture Series (LS) 232 titled “Improving the Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Headquarters.” The main goal of this lecture series was to disseminate the research results of NATO STO HFM Task Group (TG) 163 which examined the factors infl uencing the effectiveness of coalition operations among academic and operational communities in NATO and partner nations. The research fi ndings of STO HFM TG-163 addressed a variety of issues related to organisational and cultural factors that are critical to effective cooperation in coalition operations with a particular focus on organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level headquarters (HQs). Three sessions of NATO STO HFM LS were carried out: one at the Rakovski National Defence Academy, Sofi a, Bulgaria; one at the Royal Military Academy, Brussels, Belgium; and one at the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), Patrick Air Force Base, Florida, U.S. The sessions were organised by the International Program Committee with members from Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, and the United States. This publication is an outcome of the three lecture series sessions and contains the papers presented during these sessions. The specifi c objectives of the NATO STO HFM LS-232 were: (1) to present and discuss fi ndings on critical factors (barriers and enablers) that impact effective cooperation in coalition operations; (2) to present and discuss models and tools for measuring different aspects of organisational effectiveness of operational headquarters in a multinational context; (3) to demonstrate multimedia training tools such as GlobeSmart® Commander and the Cross Cultural Competence Trainer in order to improve cultural awareness of military leaders participating in coalition operations; (4) to get feedback regarding the demands of the operational community in NATO and partner countries for additional research in the fi eld of organisational effectiveness for the improvement of coalition operations. The NATO STO HFM LS-232 covered the following basic topics: (1) viewpoints from Subject Matter Experts on how to improve organisational

5 effectiveness in coalition headquarters; (2) strategies for how to improve processes within operational NATO HQs with focus on (a) effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision making, and (c) shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities; (3) the alignment of structure and processes with the operational goals of a NATO HQ; (4) the role of people in organisations to include dimensions such as leadership, training, and rotation practices; (5) the role of organisational and national culture and how to improve cultural orientation, openness to diversity, and trust in coalition settings; (6) the adaptability of leaders and teams to working within multinational coalitions; and (7) how to reduce the challenges of a working within a multinational context with implications for practitioners. In addition, there was a technology demonstration of the GlobeSmart® Commander Multimedia Training Tool and the Cross-Cultural Competence Trainer in the program. Finally, several additional papers were presented during the sessions in Sofi a, Bulgaria and DEOMI Patrick AFB, FL, U.S. in order to broaden the understanding of the challenges of the multinational context. These papers cover such important topics related to operational effectiveness as: (1) logistic support in multinational environment; (2) stress and psychological support in modern military operations; (3) inter- organisational collaboration in crisis management; (3) U.S. strategic defence priorities and the implications for multinational operations; (4) cultural property protection education and training for multinational operations. Our project explicitly concentrates on the internal processes in a coalition headquarter, while the factors external to the organisation and related to the context of the operation were not examined in this study. For that reason, I consider this additional input as important enrichment of the original study results. I believe that the research results that were presented and discussed during the Lecture Series will be benefi cial for military leaders and nations, helping them to identify training gaps. These gaps can then be addressed in the Professional Military Education and future pre-deployment training, and used to improve the ways that we work in multicultural environments. This is a direct contribution to one of the basic NATO Long-Term Capability Requirements, namely Human Performance Improvement in Military Operations. In conclusion, I would like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of the International Program Committee to Commodore (BGR-N) Dimiter ANGELOV, Commandant of the G. S. Rakovski National Defence Academy, Major-General Harry VINDEVOGEL, Commandant of Royal Military Academy and Dr. William T. YATES II, Acting Commandant of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) for supporting

6 this signifi cant NATO STO activity that has enabled us to meet our goals by providing an excellent environment for creative work as well as increasing the level of exchange of new experiences and new ideas among researchers and operational communities.

Capt. (BGR-N) Prof. D. Sc. Yantsislav Yanakiev, NATO STO HFM Lecture Series -232 Director January 6th, 2014 Sofi a, Bulgaria

7 IMPROVING ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF COALITION HEADQUARTERS: THE VIEWPOINT OF SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS AND THEORETICAL APPROACH1

Capt (BGR-N) Prof. D.Sc. Yantsislav Yanakiev 82 Evlogi & Hristo Georgievi, Blvd., 1504, Sofi a, Bulgaria G. S. Rakovski National Defence Academy Defence Advanced Research Institute [email protected]

ABSTRACT This paper summarises results out of two focus group discussions with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). The SMEs responded to a set of pre-defi ned questions about their experiences related to: (1) impediments and enablers of organisational effectiveness in multinational environment; (2) proxy measures of mission success; (3) characteristics of an effective multinational HQ, and (4) suggestions for improving organisational effectiveness. The experts identifi ed four groups of barriers for successful cooperation in multinational operations: (1) Political- military decision making regarding participation in NATO coalition operations; (2) Internal process management in the organisation with emphasis on NATO HQ; (3) People in the defence organisation, and (4) The infl uence of the cultural differences on organisational effectiveness. The primary enablers of organisational effectiveness according to the SMEs are: (1) Introduction of processes improvement strategies in the coalition HQs; (2) Improvement of strategic decision-making processes; (3) The organisational structure improvement, and (4) Organisational culture.

1.0 BACKGROUND The paper utilises results out of two focus group discussions with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, USA, carried out in the framework of NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Task Group “Improving Organisational

1 The paper builds on: Yanakiev, Y., Lichacz, F., & Paris, C. (2012). Chapter 2: Results of Subject Matter Expert Focus Group Discussions. In Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 2-1 – 2-6). RTO-TR- HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.

8 Effectiveness of Coalition Operations”. These events were conducted correspondingly in 2008 and 2009. During the group discussions the SMEs responded to a set of pre-defi ned questions about their experiences related to: (1) impediments and enablers of organisational effectiveness in multinational environment; (2) proxy measures of mission success; (3) characteristics of an effective multinational HQ, and (4) suggestions for improving organisational effectiveness.

2.0 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH The primary leading criteria for the selection of the SMEs to participate in the focus group discussions were: (1) commissioned offi cers from diverse national background; and (2) offi cers with extensive experience in NATO multinational operations. The SMEs group that participated in the discussion at NATO School in Oberammergau comprised commissioned offi cers from the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, and the U.S. who had experience in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. There were SMEs, responsible for ISAF missions from Joint Forces Command Brunssum, the Netherlands that took part in the discussion as well. The group discussion carried out at the NATO ACT comprised commissioned offi cers from the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, the UK and the U.S. (commissioned offi cers at level OF-3 to OF-4) who had been selected because of their operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan missions. During the group discussions the SMEs responded to a set of pre-defi ned questions about their experiences related to: (1) impediments and enablers of organisational effectiveness in multinational environment; (2) proxy measures of mission success; (3) characteristics of an effective multinational HQ, and (4) suggestions for improving organisational effectiveness. Two basic terms will be used in this paper: (1) operational effectiveness, and (2) organisational effectiveness. The operational effectiveness encompasses environmental factors that are outside of an organisation or in general all external preconditions for successful performance. An example is political-military decision making regarding planning and participation in NATO coalition operations. The term organisational effectiveness is defi ned as the degree of fi t, or alignment, among various internal factors of the organisation such as organisational structure, processes, people and culture towards the achievement of the main organisation’s goal (Porter, 1996). The main focus of this research project was put on identifi cation of the factors that infl uence organisational effectiveness of NATO HQ implementing Non-article 5 Crisis Response Operations.

9 Another dimension of the analysis is related to identifi cation of the factors in control of the individual and the organisation. Typical approach when analysing the organisational performance is the Behavioural Engineering Model (BEM) (Gilbert, 1978) (Gilbert, 1996). According to the BEM model data, resources, and motivation are identifi ed as “Environmental Supports”. These factors are perceived to infl uence the working environment and are considered external to the individual, so that they are primarily under the authority, support and control of the organisation. On the other hand, knowledge, capacity, and motives comprise a “Person’s Repertory” of behaviour, which is recognised to be under the authority, support, and control of the individual. Both terms “Environmental Supports” and “Person’s Repertory” represent elements of the above-defi ned term organisational effectiveness. The existing research in the area of business as well the military organisations found out that approximately 80 per cent of performance issues are attributed to environmental factors such as manpower, systems, and processes. This leads to conclusion that the organisational issues are more likely to present a barrier to effective human performance than individual- focused issues, such as knowledge and training (Quiram, 2008). Following the above mentioned, we will test the extent to which this hypothesis was confi rmed by the SMEs data collected in our study.

3.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS Using the BEM, we can sort out the data from the SMEs assessments according to general root causes, both under the control of the organisation or under the control of the individual. Table 1 and Table 2 present the SMEs input related to: (1) barriers to effective performance; (2) enablers of effective performance and related recommendations. 3.1 Barriers to Effective Performance in Coalition Operations Data analysis, in table 1 gives an opportunity to summarise identifi ed barriers for successful cooperation in multinational operations in four groups: (1) Political-military decision making regarding participation in NATO coalition operations; (2) Internal process management in the organisation with emphasis on NATO HQ; (3) People in the defence organisation, and (4) The infl uence of the cultural differences on organisational effectiveness.

10 Table 1: SEMs Evaluations Regarding Barriers to Effective Performance in Coalition Operations

Political-military Internal process Cultural People decision making management differences Differences in Lack of NATO pre- Lack of adequate Language barriers national and deployment training; manning; in translating coalition defi nitions commander’s intent Lack of organisational Personnel selection of operational into action; knowledge because (some individuals effectiveness; lessons learned are not don’t contribute or National differences Unclear NATO systematically passed on; are not qualifi ed); in understanding doctrine; the non-kinetic side Intended organisational Rapid turnover of operations; Different tour lengths; structure is not there in of leadership and practice (commanders personnel; Culture of fear of National rotations are change it to how they making incorrect not synchronized; Lack of willingness want it); decisions; to make decisions Nation-centric politics Lack of resources (time and take Lack of individual, result in restrictive and/or money); responsibility; organisational, caveats; national trust; Lack of communication and Leader committed Team leaders have poor information sharing; to nation, not the National perception responsibility but no mission; of women in “real” authority; Lack of social networking operations being opportunities; Poor leadership National symbols less capable than abilities (e.g., versus one NATO Lack of info sharing men; micromanagement; symbol; systems (e.g., interoperable lack of willingness Different service IT systems); U.S. dominance to make decisions, and national in pushing the Lack of understanding of leader committed cultures. “American” way of team members’ information to nation, not the Different national doing business; needs; mission); work ethics; Lack of shared Lack of standardised Training attendance War-fi ghting ethos goals among processes; is lacking; where mission is different institutions, Different IT systems and Personality confl icts; peacekeeping; participating in the lack of technological mission (e.g., PRTs People don’t want interoperability hampers and NGOs may have to share information information sharing; different goals). or don’t have the Need national social means to do so (e.g., communication networks to common IT systems); accomplish tasks;

The fi rst group contains factors, related to political-military decision making regarding participation in NATO coalition operations. Among the most frequently mentioned problems were “unclear and unstable goals, changing tasks and lack of common understanding of goals and mission end

11 state” among coalition partners. Additionally the SMEs’ indicated that a “lack of a comprehensive approach to doctrines and concepts” was a major problem concerning effectiveness of coalition operations. Next, the SMEs noted that “different national and NATO education and training systems, along with differing levels of experience in multinational operations” also hindered their effectiveness. The SMEs agreed that “there is still a lack of NATO pre-deployment training”. Moreover, a traditional barrier to the effectiveness of coalition operations were the capabilities and technological gaps, as well as “lack of adequate resources allocated to implement the mission” among the coalition partners. Among many other important challenges the “lack of technological interoperability” in national systems hampered information sharing and created diffi culties for cooperation among the different troop-contributing nations in the coalition. Last in this group, the SMEs considered “nation-centric politics, related to imposing restrictive caveats to employ the troops during the operation” as a major negative infl uence on coalition operation’s effectiveness. The problem was that “the troops are forced to work around these political barriers, which at times increased the immediate risk to the people on the ground and undermined the trust among coalition partners”. The second group of factors is related to process management in the organisation, with emphasis on NATO HQ. Among the most frequently discussed factors were “different rotation timeframes among national positions in the HQ and the lack of synchronisation of national rotations”. In this regard, the SMEs concurred that “different rotation cycles hurt organisational effectiveness” because it created diffi culties in the adaptation among the national representatives and development of social networks. In addition, some of the SMEs identifi ed “rapid turnover of leadership and personnel” as a hindrance to the learning process. Some of the SMEs considered “the tour length too short (typically 4-6 months)” noting that “learning and the development of social networks take a long time to develop and by the time these things are established the coalition partners are getting ready to come home”. Conversely, some of the SMEs mentioned that “most of nations prefer comparatively short periods of rotation because the high intensity of the operations contributed to high stress levels for the military personnel”. Obviously, this is a problem which deserves particular attention and additional study. Another important barrier to organisational effectiveness according to the SMEs was the “lack of organisational knowledge because lessons learned are not systematically passed on”. This was related to the organisation of the process of the handing-over of positions in the multinational HQ and the willingness of the representatives from different nations to share information with their successors. From a

12 national point of view the SMEs considered this to be problematic that “there is no debriefi ng for many personnel returning from a NATO assignment.” A third and particularly important barrier to effectiveness of coalition HQs according to the SMEs was related to a “lack of communication and poor information sharing process”. The problems here are multidimensional, both from technological and human nature. Some of the typical explanations were “people not wanting to share information”, “lack of social networking opportunities”, “lack of info sharing systems” and “lack of understanding of team members’ information needs”. The third group of identifi ed factors affecting organisational effectiveness was related to people in the defence organisation. One of the most important barriers, according to the SMEs was the “lack of adequate manning”. They shared the opinion that “frequently, individuals are not qualifi ed for their assigned role” and that “some nations never contribute, but merely ride out their time.” This situation generated problems with respect to reasonable distribution of tasks and responsibilities among coalition partners, as well as the development of internal social networks in the multinational HQ. A second factor identifi ed as a hindrance to organisational effectiveness was the “lack of cultural awareness training” of personnel, participating in NATO multinational operations and the development of cross-cultural competences. Directly related to this factor was the problem with “the quality of English language communication”. The problem was certainly multifaceted. On the one hand, “non-native English speakers often do not comprehend the meaning or context of English speech”. On the other hand, “native English speakers also had diffi culties with non-native speakers and therefore, sometime assumed incompetence on the part of non-native English speakers. Moreover there was the basic problem with the use of NATO abbreviations and so-called “NATO slang” which added to linguistic confusion across the various languages in the NATO HQ. Finally, the fourth group comprised factors that were related to the infl uence of the cultural differences on organisational effectiveness and the process of formation of unique organisational cultures within the NATO HQ. The SMEs viewed the organisational culture of a NATO HQ as a mixture of different national, military and service cultures that affected the effectiveness of the multinational operations. A particular example of this was “the different mental models of coping with uncertainty process of overcoming uncertainty” which was related to culturally based biases in the need for information to make a decision. This process might affect the unwillingness to make a decision if the person needed more information or the fear of making an incorrect decision, both of which could undermine organisational effectiveness. Another essential factor was “the effect of

13 different leadership styles” (for example: direct vs. indirect) which could lead to misunderstandings or misperceptions of the intention of the leader. The SMEs were unanimous about the role of the leadership as a factor that shaped the organisational culture in the HQ and thus infl uenced effectiveness of coalition operations. The role of the leader and specifi c leadership capabilities in a multinational environment are critical factors regarding the establishment of shared vision and shared awareness with respect to goals and tasks. In this regard, the SMEs recommended that “leader be committed to the mission, not to the nation.” Another factor which deserves attention, also infl uenced by different national cultures, is “task orientation vs. the need to spend time building and maintaining relationships”. A last factor in this group that the SMEs identifi ed as a potential problem was the “lack of individual, organisational and national trust”. The issue of trust among coalition partners deserves particular attention because it is related to information sharing and the coalition operations’ effectiveness as a whole.

3.2 SMEs’ Evaluations Regarding the Enablers of Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations What were the primary enablers of organisational effectiveness according to the SMEs? Table 2 contains a number of factors focused on: (1) Introduction of processes improvement strategies in the coalition HQs; (2) Improvement of strategic decision-making processes; (3) The organisational structure improvement, and (4) Organisational culture. The analysis of the data presented in table 2 gives an opportunity to structure the factors that enable effective collaboration in multinational coalition operations in four groups. The fi rst group of factors that the SMEs identifi ed is related to the introduction of process improvement strategies in the NATO HQs. The SMEs were unanimous in their view that information sharing was an enabler of organisational effectiveness within a coalition HQ. In order to improve information sharing within the HQ, the SMEs indicated the need for a strategy for changing people’s minds and attitudes of “reluctance to share information” and to provide full-spectrum technical interoperability among coalition partners. Another important enabler of the effectiveness in coalition operations cited by the SMEs was related to the development of the HQ as a learning organisation. They suggest “introducing Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the transition of positions in the HQ in order to avoid gaps of handover” and to transfer lessons learned. In addition, the SMEs considered the introduction of an “effective mentoring program to support hand-over procedure so you don’t start from scratch every

14 Table 2: Enablers of the Eff ectiveness of Coalition Operations

Processes improvement Strategic Organisational strategies in coalition Leadership issues decision-making culture HQs Prioritise confl icting NATO provide Leader should Create social items; standardisation provide both formal networking for education and and informal opportunities When communicating/ training for coalition feedback to (Icebreakers/social sharing information, operations; subordinates; events; Ad hoc make every eff ort to meetings in open spare people’s time; Use common Ability to learn from environment in formats /capabilities/ mistakes and quickly multicultural settings; Prepare the staff (clarify standardisation; adjust to the situation roles, expertise, enable (adaptability to Create opportunities them to get to know No single nation change); for people to talk one another before they predominantly to each other arrive in the operational represented on HQ Ability to take informally; Offi cer’s theatre); staff ; initiative, to go above club - opportunity or and beyond assigned environment for social Develop SOPs for HQ staff with prior tasks; transition (avoid gaps of experience working networking Informal transition and diff erent together as a group; Ability to make networks (i.e., social) rotation cycles); decisions timely and are key to task Eliminate national eff ectively; accomplishment; Facilitate better caveats for mission understanding of where execution. Caveats Good leadership Help people pick up information comes challenge trust among is critical to the “lingo” (NATO from; nations; organisational slang); eff ectiveness: need Provide cultural Create an eff ective Pushing for of strong leader who mentoring program development of awareness education & listen to people, who training. to include hand-over NATO identity in the can make decisions procedures, lessons organisation; quickly, and who Sensitivity to cultural learned, etc. so that the Provide pre- can make the best diversity is of crucial same mistakes are not of a bad situation. importance; repeated; deployment training on how to work in Leader should have an unreserved Need to be more Institute 360 degree NATO/coalition NATO-oriented than feedback system; environment; commitment to make the mission eff ective. nation-oriented; Help individuals Provide orientation for Open minded to other understand how they the key leaders. people’ views. contribute to the goals and mission of the organisation, remembering that most projects are long-term and that they won’t see results right away; Create processes that facilitate data fusion and its action to create some desired eff ect.

15 time” and to “learn from mistakes” of the predecessors as an important way of achieving this goal. Furthermore, the SMEs considered the “process of social networking” and the development of “informal networks” as a key factor for successful task accomplishment. In this regard, the SMEs suggested the organisation of “ad hoc meetings in open environments within multicultural settings”, as well as to “create the opportunity for people to talk to each other informally” through ice-breakers/social events or the use of the offi cer’s club for social networking. The second group of factors put forth by the SMEs related to the improvement of strategic decision-making processes for planning and implementing a NATO coalition operation. Among the most discussed factors was the need to introduce “NATO standardisation for education and training for coalition operations”. The SMEs postulated that the “HQ staff has to have prior experience working together as a group”. Moreover, they considered “pre-deployment training on how to work in NATO/coalition environment as a necessity”. In addition, the SMEs deemed the “elimination of national political caveats for mission execution” is a priority task because “such caveats challenge trust among nations”. Last but not least, the experts focused on to those structural factors that infl uence coalition operational effectiveness such as the format of cooperation (lead nation – framework nation – multinational formation). They gave priority to multinational cooperation which was characterised by the statement “no single nation has to be predominantly represented on the HQ staff.” The third group of factors discussed by the SMEs was related to the leadership issues in multinational coalitions. They rated among the most important enablers of coalition operations’ effectiveness “an unreserved commitment from the senior leadership in the HQ”. In addition, they agreed that “the HQ will be effective only if the leader was not there to serve his/her nation but rather to serve the goals of the HQ”. Having in mind the complex character of current coalition operations, SMEs identifi ed the need to have “leaders who take timely and effectively decisions to be able to prioritise confl icting items” In the end, the SMEs suggested that the leaders had to be adaptable to change, i.e. to learn from the mistakes and quickly adjust to the situation” as well as to take initiative, and to go above and beyond assigned tasks. Finally, the fourth group of factors focuses on organisational culture as a factor for successful coalition cooperation. The SMEs suggestions were aimed at improvement of cross-cultural education and training, and building cross-cultural competencies among the NATO HQ staff. As well, the SMEs considered the development of “NATO HQ culture”, “pushing for development of NATO identity” and to “be more NATO-oriented than nation-oriented” as a priority factor for achieving this aim.

16 4.0 THEORETICAL APPROACH The SMEs defi ned organisational effectiveness as the ability of an organisation, in our case coalition HQs, to achieve its goals. They described an effective HQ as an organisation which: • Facilitates information sharing; • Is able to make fast and timely decisions; • Establishes a common understanding of its tasks and responsibilities; • Is adaptable to change and can adjust quickly to changing situations; • Is able to go beyond task description and taking initiative; • Is able to learn from mistakes; and • Is open to diverse cultures. In summary, the feedback from the SMEs who volunteered to support the HFM-163 interviews contributed signifi cantly to our understanding of NATO HQs organisational effectiveness and toward HFM-163’s recommendations for improving the organisational effectiveness of NATO’s culturally diverse teams. The SMEs stated that the main goal of NATO HQs is to provide effective Command and Control (C2) to its troops on the ground. In order to achieve this goal, NATO HQs should implement the following primary operative goals: • Effective and timely sharing of information; • Quick and timely decision making; and • Improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities. Based upon the input of the SMEs and our review of the literature, the RTG HFM-163 team agreed upon a defi nition of organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs as the degree of fi t, or alignment, among various dimensions of organisational effectiveness such as organisational structure, processes, people and culture towards the achievement of the main goal. In addition, the input of the SMEs led us to the conclusion that the main (offi cial) goal of a NATO HQ is to provide effective Command and Control (C2) to its troops on the ground. Furthermore, we decided to evaluate the organisational effectiveness of NATO HQs by assessing the following operative goals: (a) effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision making, and (c) improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities.

5.0 DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO HQs The model for the organisational effectiveness of Non-Article 5 crisis response operations’ HQs should provide: • An assessment of the internal effectiveness of the organisation;

17 • A distinction between operative and offi cial goals; • A three-step design with a direct link from the input factors through the operative goals to the offi cial goal of the organisation; • The concept of strategic alignment which states that the input factors must be in optimum balance to result in effective goal achievement; • A consideration of hard as well as soft, and environmental as well as individual input factors; • A simple model, easily applicable in practice. Effective organisations ensure their operative and offi cial goals are aligned both in terms of their fi t with the external environment and in terms of their fi t with other factors internal to the organisation. In the paragraph below, we will describe the NATO HQs’ internal factors that we believe need to be aligned with its operative and offi cial goals, as well as with each other. We selected these factors from the reviewed models and from the SMEs’ experience with organisational effectiveness in coalition HQs. As per our research defi nition, the offi cial goal of NATO HQs is to provide effective Command and Control (C2) to its troops on the ground. Operative goals that support achieving the offi cial goal are: (a) increasing effective and timely information sharing, (b) increasing effective and timely decision making, and (c) improving shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities. Previous research on organisational effectiveness has revealed that structure, people, processes, and culture must be aligned towards these operative goals in order for the main goal to be reached effectively (Porter, 1996). Thus, NATO HQs have to make sure that the decisions made with respect to the NATO HQs’ structure, processes, people, and culture support the accomplishment of the operative goals. Figure 1 shows this hypothesised process. These direct effects from the input factors on the operative goals form the main focus of the subsequent discussion.

6.0 EMPIRICAL VALIDATION OF THE MODEL FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF NATO HQs The above introduced model of organisational effectiveness of NATO operational HQ was operationalised and a survey questionnaire, as well as interview protocols for empirical validation of the model were developed by HFM-163 research team. In October 2010 data collection team from NATO HFM RTG-163 carried out the fi eld study in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo. Data were collected from 103 military members and 33 civilian KFOR HQ

18 Figure 1: Model of Organisational Eff ectiveness of Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations’ HQs (Bisig, E., T. Hof, S. Valaker, T. Szvircsev Tresch, S. Seiler, and A. Lise Bjornstad, 2012) personnel, including 5 government civilians and 28 civilian contractors. Our analysis focuses on the sub-sample of 103 military personnel from NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) nationalities represented in KFOR HQ. The respondents were selected based on the following criteria: (1) representation of diverse nationalities; (2) representation of different organisational structures within KFOR HQ; (3) representation of different hierarchical levels and military ranks. As a result, the implemented sample covers respondents from 24 NATO and PfP nationalities. In addition, fi fteen semi-structured interviews were conducted mainly at the Assistant Chief of Staff level. Moreover, the survey questionnaire includes several additional variables related to training and rotation practices in the HQ that were identifi ed as important factors infl uencing organisational effectiveness. The results from the complete study have been recently published in NATO STO HFM 163- RTG Technical report and were made available for the academic and operational communities (Yanakiev, Y. & J. S. Horton (Eds.), 2012). They were presented and discussed in details in the papers, presented during the NATO STO LS 232 sessions in Sofi a, Bulgaria, Brussels, Belgium and DEOMI, Patrick AFB, Florida, U.S.

7.0 REFERENCES [1] Bisig, E., Hof, T., Valaker, S., Szvircsev Tresch, T., Seiler, S., & Bjornstad, A.L. (2012). Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Model. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of

19 Coalition Operations (pp. 3-1 – 3-17). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM- 163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [2] Gilbert, T. F. (1978). Human competence: Engineering worthy performance. New York: McGraw-Hill. [3] Gilbert, T. F. (1996). Human competence: Engineering worthy performance (Tribute Edition). Washington, DC: International Society for Performance Improvement. [4] Porter, M.E. (1996). What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, 74(6), 61-78. [5] Quiram, T. J. (2008). U.S. Coast Guard Human Performance Technology Workshop Proceedings. [6] Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM- 163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO, 2012.

20 ALIGNMENT OF STRUCTURE AND PROCESS WITH THE OPERATIVE GOALS OF A NATO HEADQUARTER

Dr. Frederick M. J. Lichacz Defence Research and Development Canada – Ottawa 3701 Carling Avenue Ottawa, ON M3M 3B9 CANADA [email protected]

ABSTRACT In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the factors and issues that affect the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level Headquarters (HQs). For example, researchers have examined the impact culture, language, multi-national operations, training, leadership, teamwork, and command and control (C2) have on the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level HQs. To this end, HFM RTG-163 was established to continue to build upon this repository of knowledge pertaining to enhancing the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level HQs. Broadly, one of the objectives of HFM-163 was to examine the operative goals of a NATO operational level HQs and how they can be improved. This paper in particular discusses the responses to a NATO survey by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from Kosovo Force (KFOR) HQ, Pristine, Kosovo about how to align NATO HQ structure and process with the operative goals of a NATO HQ in order to enhance the organisational effectiveness of a NATO operational level HQ.

1.0 INTRODUCTION The environmental circumstances in which military forces have to operate are changing and have been changing rapidly for some time now. Operations are more distributed than before, multinational in composition, increasingly reliant on complex technologies, and involve non-traditional foes (Lichacz, 2009). In the face of such changes to military operations, there has been growing research activity examining the factors and issues related to improving the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level HQs to meet the performance demands of modern operations. Previous research on organisational effectiveness has revealed that structure and process must be aligned with the operative goals of the HQ in order for the main goals of the HQ to be achieved effectively (Porter, 1996). In an effort to build upon these past and continuing research efforts, HFM RTG-163 was established to explore further those issues related to

21 enhancing the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level HQs. Broadly, the goal of the group was to develop a defi nition of organisational effectiveness, an understanding of the barriers to organisational effectiveness, an understanding of the enablers of organisational effectiveness, and a theoretical framework and model of organisational effectiveness within NATO operational level HQs. To achieve this goal, HFM RTG-163 organised two focus group discussions with Subject-Matter Experts (SMEs) from the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany (October 2008) and from the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, USA (June 2009). As well, the group developed a questionnaire and survey to be administered to members of KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo to examine this group of individuals’ views on the various input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e., operative goals) factors in the theoretical model of organisational effectiveness postulated by HFM-163 (Yanakiev, & Horton (Eds.), 2012). This paper presents some of the fi ndings from the NATO questionnaire and survey presented to the members (henceforth referred to as SMEs) from KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo regarding their views on aligning HQ structure and process with the operative goals of a NATO operational HQ in order to enhance the organisational effectiveness of the HQ. Other fi ndings from the KFOR HQ questionnaire and survey are presented elsewhere in these proceedings. 1.1 Structure and Process Organisational structure is the formal system of task and authority relationships that control how people coordinate their actions and use resources to achieve organisational goals (Jones, 2004). It shapes the behaviour of people and that of the organisation. Organisational processes refer to the way the organisation implements its objectives in the framework of the given organisational structure (Peters & Waterman, Jr., 1982). As such, processes cut across the organisation’s structure; “if structure is thought of as the anatomy of the organisation, processes are its physiology or functioning” (Galbraith, 2011).

1.2 Alignment between Structure and Processes When implementing changes to achieve a more effi cient organisation, ensuring an intra-organisational alignment between structures and processes may be essential. Organisational changes are at the very heart of NATO’s current goal of implementing NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) (Bartolomasi et al, 2005). The concept of a network organisation represents a change from the traditional bureaucratic type of organisation towards

22 fl atter, more decentralised and fl exible organisations (Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Arnold, Cooper, & Robertson, 1998; Atkinson & Moffat, 2005; Morgan, 1997; Snow, Miles, & Coleman, 1992). This makes it essential to understand how alignment, or misalignment, between structures and processes affects the operative goals of an organisation. There is a tendency in the organisational literature to view hierarchical structures and centralised processes, and conversely, fl at structures and decentralised processes, as if they were one and the same thing (Morgan, 1997; Carley & Lin, 1997). Misalignment of structures and processes is often a problem in organisations and making such generalisations is problematic. For instance, if the structure changes from hierarchic to fl at, while the decision-making authority is not distributed from the top end of the hierarchy, but is centralised at the top, the decision-making load on the top management is likely to become too heavy and render the organisation ineffi cient and unable to reach the necessary decisions especially within the time available in time-sensitive and critical situations (Vego, 2003).

1.3 Alignment of Structure and Processes with the Operative Goals The environmental circumstances in which military forces has to operate are changing. Therefore, it is necessary to implement organisational changes, such as NATO NNEC. The military needs to transform to an organisation that supports agility, fl exibility, jointness and interoperability. An organisational design that fi ts the transformed military organisation is the network organisation design. A network organisation is an organic organisational structure. Jones (Jones, 2004) summarises important aspects of organic structures: Organisations with an organic organisational structure are decentralised. They have an organisational set up whereby the authority to make important decisions reside at all levels in the hierarchy. An organic structure stimulates fl exibility, so that employees can innovate and quickly adapt to changing circumstances, and take responsibility as they make decisions when necessary. Roles are loosely defi ned; organisational members with different functions work together to solve problems and are involved in each other’s activities. A high level of integration is needed to enable organisational members to share information quickly and easily. Rules and norms emerge from the on-going interaction between organisational members. Interaction between organisational members is horizontal as well as vertical. Moreover, fl exibility is a central part of the process factor to research when exploring the organisational antecedents of operational effectiveness.

23 Indeed, both in the military and non-military organisational literature, authors have often suggested fl exibility as the key capability of today’s organisations in order to successfully meet the new challenges of high velocity and fast changing environments (Alberts & Hayes, 2003; Atkinson & Moffat, 2005; Englehardt & Simmons, 2002; Volberda, 1998). This is not a new idea, for at least three decades researchers have suggested fl exibility as a critical factor for organisational excellence (Snow, Miles & Coleman, 1992; Volberda, 1998; Bahrami, 1992; Krijnen, 1979). Accordingly, for NATO HQs to be able to attain its operative goals, they need to properly align the organisational structure and processes and must tend toward a more organic context. Thus greater the degree to which the NATO HQ’s organisational structure and processes resemble those of an organic organisation, the more likely these factors will support attaining the operative goals.

2.0 METHOD This section briefl y describes the materials, participants, and procedures used by the NATO HFM-163 TG to collect data via a mixed-methods (i.e., quantitative and qualitative) approach (see Blais et al, 2012 for more detail).

2.1 Questionnaire 2.1.1 Materials The 89-item questionnaire included several background questions pertaining to the participant’s age, sex, nationality, fi rst language, rank (if military), etc., and items designed to adequately represent/cover all of the input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e., operative goals) factors in the theoretical model previously described (for more information on the full content of the questionnaire, see Blais et al, 2012). With respect to the output factors, the participants evaluated the effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “We seek information as needed.”) and decision making (e.g., “Organisational decisions are made in a timely manner.”) within the HQ as well as the shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (e.g., “The mission is clear.”) (Blais et al, 2012). 2.1.2 Participants and Procedure One hundred and three military members (as well as 33 civilian KFOR HQ personnel, but these results will not be discussed further here), citizens of 24 NATO and PfP countries, originating from various HQ branches (see Blais et al, 2012), for more detail regarding the demographic composition of the sample), completed the questionnaire.

24 Data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo (refer to Blais et al, 2012) for more information on the procedure). The participants completed the questionnaire in a conference facility in groups of approximately 25 participants. The chair of NATO HFM RTG- 163 introduced the multinational research team as well as the goals of the research. He also informed the participants the survey was completely anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary. Each testing session lasted approximately 30 and 45 minutes.

2.2 Interviews 2.2.1 Materials In line with the questionnaire, the semi-structured interview protocol tapped into the theoretical model previously described (see Figure 1). It included background questions as well as items pertaining to the input and output factors (for more information on the full content of the protocol, see Blais et al, 2012). The interviewers asked the participant to share their perceptions in regards to the effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “How does information sharing work in this HQ?”) and decision making (e.g., “How does decision making work in this HQ?”) within the HQ and the level of shared awareness (e.g., “To what extent is there a shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities in this HQ?”) within the HQ. The interviewers probed for additional information by asking (a) what worked (i.e., in terms of the output factor) well/did not and why; (b) about the most critical aspect(s) (i.e., in terms of the input factors) infl uencing (positively or negatively) the output factor; and (c) how the output factor could be improved.

2.2.2 Participants and Procedure As with the questionnaire data, the qualitative data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo (refer to Blais et al, 2012) for more information on the procedure). Members of the NATO RTO HFM-163 TG conducted a total of 15 interviews, with the participants being mainly at the Assistant Chief of Staff level, covering J1-J5, J8, Headquarters Support Group, different structures of the MCA, and JIC. Thirteen of the participants were military offi cers (i.e., Colonel or Lt Colonel), and the participants were citizen of 10 NATO and PfP nations. The interviewers worked in pairs: One of them asked the questions, while the other member recorded the interview and asked additional questions as needed. Before starting the interview, the interviewers informed the participant the interview was completely anonymous and their participation

25 was entirely voluntary, and they asked for the participant’s permission to be audio-recorded. Each interview lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes.

3.0 Results Utilising the outcomes from the focus groups (Yanakiev, Lichacz & Paris, 2012) and a review of the literature (Bisig et al, 2012), HFM-163 defi ned organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs as “...the degree of fi t, or alignment, among various dimensions of organisational effectiveness such as organisational structure, processes, people, and culture towards the achievement of a main goal” (Bisig et al, 2012). However, because offi cial goals are not always readily assessable, HFM-163 defi ned the primary operative goals (i.e., goals that management can use to evaluate organisational effectiveness) of the NATO operational HQs as: (a) the effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision making, and (c) an improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (see Bisig et al, 2012 for more detail). Furthermore, HFM-163 identifi ed four primary characteristics associated with organisational structure and process that need to be aligned with the operative goals to enhance the HQ’s organisational effectiveness: (a) hierarchy, (b) centralisation, (c) fl exibility, and (d) specialization.

3.1 Structure With regard to the question of how the HQ was organised, specifi cally whether or not a J-Structure is used, there were mixed opinions. Some of the SMEs viewed the HQ as a traditional J-structure, while others saw it as either a J-structure undergoing change or something other than J-structure (e.g., ad hoc teams for short term assignments). Some of the interview results indicated that the deviations from the traditional J-structure were mainly related to logistics. J1, J4, and J- engineering had recently been merged into a “resource package”. The transfer of location of support from Skopje to Pristine was also thought to have resulted in some structural changes. Another deviation from J-structure mentioned was the MCA division that was now a separate section, while it was formerly a section within the J4 branch. The MCA division was regarded by SMEs as separate from the J-branches. Formation of ad hoc teams from different J-structure sections was also mentioned as an example of deviation from traditional structure. These ad hoc teams were set up for certain focus areas, and targeting was mentioned as such an area.

26 The general opinion from the SMEs was that the HQs had become fl atter in its organisational structure than before, although it was still hierarchical. A minority thought that it was hierarchical to a large extent. One of the SMEs emphasised that structure was infl uenced by functional areas rather than the fl at hierarchical axis. Those who viewed the structure to be fl atter than before mainly related this to decreased manning due to the recent personnel reduction of the HQs and to changes in the type of skills needed to perform the various tasks. Some of those who had this view also emphasised that a fl atter structure was better for a smaller organisation, in that a shorter chain of command resulted in faster response times and increased fl exibility. One respondent viewed the structure as fl at on a day- to-day basis while remaining generally hierarchical overall. The SMEs indicated that there was a certain amount of hierarchy associated with the different operative goals of the HQ. However, the SMEs agreed that too much hierarchy is detrimental to work. According to these SMEs, greater levels of hierarchy increase the chain of command which makes it diffi cult to coordinate efforts between branches and slows down communications. The goal, according to the SMEs should be to shorten the chain of command in order to facilitate faster response times and increased fl exibility. The results from the interview also showed that a fl atter structure may positively impact information sharing by enhancing the cross-fl ow of communication between branches in the HQ. A shorter chain of command is believed to facilitate faster decision-making. Moreover, the more direct lines of communication associated with a fl atter HQ structure should result in great shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities within the HQ.

3.2 Processes Some respondents viewed the command processes as too centralised, while others argued that processes were too decentralised. Centralisation was thought to be characteristic of how higher echelons of the HQ made decisions, while in day-to-day business, command processes were viewed as more decentralised. Those who viewed the HQ as too centralised indicated that this was causing bottlenecks in information sharing and decision making. As an example, one SME mentioned that the need to get authorisation for everything was a problem which is linked to centralisation and ultimately decreased information sharing and less timely decision-making. Those who held onto the opposite opinion, that the HQ is too decentralised, said that the decentralisation could cause problems if the J-heads were not qualifi ed. That is, less qualifi ed J-heads require more centralised processes

27 to help guide their routine. Moreover, it was noted by the SMEs that more centralisation was emphasised as important and necessary due to political sensitivities to ensure that decisions should be made in accordance with NATO strategy. Some SMEs noted that centralisation differed between day-to-day business and long-term decisions. For example, one respondent emphasised that the HQ was centralised in reporting but decentralised in daily work. The results from the interviews revealed that the centralisation of processes can positively impact decision making, because it guarantees that decisions are made in accordance with NATO strategy. However, it was postulated by the SMEs the centralisation can negatively impact decision making, because subordinates need to get authorisation for everything, and it makes decisions slower. Increased centralisation can impede information sharing due to increases in information since bottle necks. Flexibility suffers because the time to react on sudden events is longer. Since decentralisation is believed to facilitate horizontal coordination within the HQ, increases in centralisation would likely impede the shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities within the HQ.

3.3 Flexibility The work environment was thought of as fl exible to some degree by most of the respondents. Some viewed their own unit as more fl exible than the HQ as a whole and that there was more room for fl exibility the lower one goes in the hierarchy. There were a few respondents who viewed the environment as quite rigid and gave different examples of what could enhance or hamper fl exibility. When asked what could hamper fl exibility, respondents mentioned personality, bureaucracy and administration, lack of access to information systems and factors relating to multi-national issues, such as the lack of language skills and culture awareness. Factors facilitating fl exibility related to personal attributes, common goals, experience, and information sharing. Most of the SMEs believe that fl exibility is a crucial aspect of an effi cient HQ. One respondent expressed that for short term issues, a lack of fl exibility was not detrimental to organisational effectiveness. However, in long-term situations where more complex solutions are demanded, fl exibility is crucial to organisational effectiveness. Still, units should not do things completely on their own. In some units, due to small staff, fl exibility was viewed as necessary for the unit. Conversely, fl exibility was not seen as positive in all contexts. For example, a more rigid process was viewed as important in order to avoid confusion and maintain focus in some contexts. Some

28 pointed out that the work environment was rigid in appearance but fl exible in practice. Finally, the SMEs suggested that fl exibility within an HQ positively impacts improvement orientation because a fl exible organisation allows improvements and also facilitates information sharing.

3.4 Specialisation All SMEs viewed the roles in the HQ as specialised rather than overlapping which was generally described in positive terms. For example, one SME pointed out that “specialisation demands a person to be focused, which is good”. A few SMEs expressed a need for more overlap within the HQ. One of the SMEs expressed the need for more overlap because people new to the HQ are too specialised and do not recognise what is going on in other branches within the HQ. Another SME expressed the need for overlap by saying that “people do not consider others’ work because they are too focused on their own work. A few of the SMEs also expressed a preference to have more overlaps since the HQ needs to be more fl exible. One of the offi cers noted that there are situations where specialists are missing (for vacancy or on leave) and that this puts more demand on those already in the HQ. In one of the branches that contained both civil and military personnel, the civilians, due to longer terms at the HQ, had more specialised roles than the military personnel due to their shorter terms at the HQ which resulted in more overlapping roles. This was considered as a good mix by the SMEs. Views on how the downsizing of the HQ had affected the specialisation diverged. One SME said that as a result of downsizing, roles had become more specialised, which reduced the fl exibility within the HQ. Another interviewee noted that roles had become more overlapping due to fewer people being available to conduct the tasks. It might be that different branches were affected in different ways by the downsizing of the HQ. The general impression of the SMEs on specialisation can be summarised in the quote, “there is specialisation in the structure, but you have to be pragmatic case-by-case”. Overlapping roles positively impacts fl exible structures and processes of an HQ, because the system is more redundant when roles overlap. Information sharing is facilitated because overlapping roles will reduce stove-piping tendencies. Because overlapping roles also lead to a broader understanding of others’ tasks and responsibilities, shared awareness improves. Finally, decision-making improves with overlapping roles. Since some decisions impact several areas, it is good to have people with interests/ knowledge within/about overlapping areas contributing to these decisions.

29 4.0 SUMMARY Not surprisingly, the SMEs from KFOR had mixed views with respect to the degree to which the HQ structure and processes were hierarchical, centralised, fl exible, and specialised. They also differed somewhat on the degree of how hierarchical, centralised, fl exible, and specialised the HQ should be to ensure optimal organisational effectiveness. One reason for this diversity may be that the NATO HQ had recently undergone a structural change which involved personnel reduction and a move from a less active role in peacekeeping. However, overall, the SMEs did agree that there needs to be a better balance of hierarchy, centralisation, fl exibility, and specialisation than is the status quo in order to better enhance the operational effectiveness of the NATO operational HQ. What is considered to be the most effi cient organisational structure, process, fl exibility, and specialization may vary with the degree of task complexity. Less complex tasks might be in need of a less organic or networked structure, whereas, more complex tasks might need a more networked structure (Scott & Davis, 2007). Kosovo might entail less complex tasks than Afghanistan, for instance, and necessitate lower degrees of organic structures. To be sure, determining the best level of hierarchy, centralisation, fl exibility, and specialisation, to enhance the organisational effectiveness is a non-trivial task to implement. Nonetheless, military and civilian organisations should heed the views expressed by the SMEs of KFOR and try to implement the best solutions to achieve optimal organisational effectiveness for NATO operational HQs.

5.0 REFERENCES [1] Lichacz, F. M. J. (2009). Calibrating Situation Awareness and Confi dence within a Multinational Coalition Operation. Military Psycho- logy, 21, 412-426. [2] Porter, M.E. (1996). What is strategy? Harvard Business Review, 74(6), 61-78. [3] Yanakiev Y. & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM- 163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO, 2012. [4] Jones, G.R. (2004). Organisational theory, design, and change: Text and cases. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education.

30 [5] Peters, T. and Waterman, Jr. (1982). In search of excellence. New York, London: Harper & Row. [6] Galbraith, J. R. (2011). The star model. Retrieved from http://www. jaygalbraith.com/pdfs/Star Model.pdf. [7] Bartolomasi, P., Buckman, T., Campbell, A., Grainger, J., Mahaffey, J., Marchand, R., Kruidhof, O. Shawcross, C. and Veum, K. (2005). NATO network enabled capability (NNEC) feasibility study Volume I: NATO network-centric operational needs and implications for the development of net centric solutions. NC3A, Netherlands: NATO UNCLASSIFIED. [8] Alberts, D.S. and Hayes, R. E. (2003). Power to the edge: Command and control in the information age. Washington, D.C.: DoD CCRP. [9] Arnold, J., Cooper, C. L. and Robertson, I. T. (1998). Work psychology: Understanding human behaviour in the workplace. London: Financial Times Professional Limited. [10] Atkinson, S.R. and Moffat, J. (2005). The agile organisation: From informal networks to complex effects and agility. Washington, D.C.: DoD CCRP. [11] Morgan, G. (1997). Images of organisation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. [12] Snow, C.C., Miles, R. E. and Coleman, H.J. (1992). Managing 21st century network organisations. Organisational Dynamics, 20(3), 5-20. [13] Carley, K. M. and Lin, Z. (1997) A theoretical study of organisational performance under information distortion. Management Science, 43(7), 976-997. [14] Vego, M. (2003). Net-centric is not decisive. Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, 120(1), p. 1,199. [15] Englehardt, C. S. and Simmons, P.R. (2002). Organisational fl exibility for a changing world. Leadership and Organisation Development Journal, 23(3), 113-121. [16] Volberda, H. W. (1998). Building the fl exible fi rm: How to remain competitive. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. [17] Bahrami, H. (1992). The emerging fl exible organisation: Perspectives from Silicon Valley. California Management Review, 34, 33- 52. [18] Krijnen, H. G. (1979). The fl exile fi rm. Long Range Planning, 12, 63-75.

31 [19] Blais, A. R., Granеnsen, M., Bisig, E., Bjшrnstad, A.L., Hof, T., Lichacz, F. M. J., Lyons, J. J., Moser-Whittle, E. A., Valaker, S., and Yanakiev, Y. Chapter 4 – Method. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TR- HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO, 2012.. [20] Yanakiev, Y., Lichacz, F. M. J., and Paris, C. Chapter 2 – Results of Subject-Matter Expert Focus Group Discussions. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur- Seine, France: NATO STO, 2012. [21] Bisig, E., Hof, T., Valaker, S., Szvircsev Tresch, T., Seiler, S., and Bjшrnstad, A. L. Chapter 3 –Theoretical Framework and Model. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO, 2012. [22] Scott, R.W. and Davis, G. F. (2007).Organisations and organizing: Rational, natural, and open systems perspectives. Prentice Hall.

32 PROCESS IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES WITHIN AN OPERATIONAL NATO HEADQUARTER

Dr. Frederick M. J. Lichacz Defence Research and Development Canada – Ottawa 3701 Carling Avenue, Ottawa, ON M3M 3B9 CANADA [email protected]

ABSTRACT In recent years, there has been growing interest in the factors and issues that affect the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level Headquarters (HQs). For example, researchers have examined the impact culture, language, multi-national operations, training, leadership, teamwork, and command and control (C2) have on the organisational effectiveness of these HQs. Broadly, HFM RTG-163 was established to further explore issues related to enhancing the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level HQs. To this end, one of the primary objectives of HFM-163 was to examine the principal operative goals of NATO operational level HQs are and how they can be improved. This paper discusses the responses to a NATO survey by Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from Kosovo Force (KFOR) HQ, Pristine, Kosovo about what process improvements these SMEs viewed are needed to facilitate the operative goals of a NATO operational level HQ.

1.0 INTRODUCTION The environmental circumstances in which military forces have to operate are changing and have been changing rapidly for some time now. Operations are more distributed than before, multinational in composition, increasingly reliant on complex technologies, and involve non-traditional foes (Lichacz, 2009). In the face of such changes to military operations, there has been growing research activity examining the factors and issues related to improving performance in NATO operational level HQs. To this end, researchers have examined the impact of different national and organisational cultures, languages, goals, C2 systems, technologies, and teamwork and leadership skills on a coalition’s effectiveness to achieve their objectives (Yanakiev & Horton (Eds.), 2012). The results of this work have been the identifi cation of several specifi c gaps in current knowledge and awareness involving cultural and organisational challenges in coalition operations as well as the need to develop models and tools for understanding,

33 explaining and measuring different aspects of effective adaptation and cooperation in multi-national coalitions (NATO HFM-138 Final Report, 2008). In an effort to build upon these past and continuing research efforts, HFM RTG-163 was established to explore issues related to enhancing the organisational effectiveness of NATO operational level HQs. Specifi cally, the goal of the group was to develop a defi nition of organisational effectiveness, an understanding of the barriers to organisational effectiveness, an understanding of the enablers of organisational effectiveness, and a theoretical framework and model of organisational effectiveness within NATO operational level HQs. To achieve this goal, HFM RTG-163 organised two focus group discussions with SMEs from the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany (October 2008) and from the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia, USA (June 2009). As well, the group developed a questionnaire and survey to be administered to members of KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo to examine this group of individuals’ views on the various input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e., operative goals) factors in the theoretical model of organisational effectiveness postulated by HFM-163 (Yanakiev & Horton (Eds.), 2012). This paper reports on the fi ndings from the NATO questionnaire and survey presented to the members (henceforth referred to as SMEs) from KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo with respect to their views regarding what process improvements are needed to facilitate the operative goals of a NATO operational level HQ.

2.0 METHOD This section briefl y describes the materials, participants, and procedures used by the NATO HFM-163 TG to collect data with regard to the SMEs views on process improvements for the operative goals of a NATO operational level HQ (see Blais et al, 2012 for a more detailed discussion of the entire questionnaire and survey). The context of the data collection process was on Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO).

2.1 Questionnaire 2.1.1 Materials The 89-item questionnaire included several background questions pertaining to the participant’s age, sex, nationality, fi rst language, rank (if military), etc., and items designed to adequately represent/cover all of

34 the input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e., operative goals) factors in the theoretical model postulated in HFM-163 Final Report (Yanakiev & Horton (Eds.), 2012). With respect to the output factors, the participants evaluated the effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “We seek information as needed.”) and decision making (e.g., “Organisational decisions are made in a timely manner.”) within the HQ as well as the shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (e.g., “The mission is clear”) (Blais et al, 2012). 2.1.2 Participants and Procedure One hundred and three military members (as well as 33 civilian KFOR HQ personnel, but these results will not be discussed further here), citizens of 24 NATO and PfP countries, originating from various HQ branches (see Blais et al, 2012 for more detail regarding the demographic composition of the sample, completed the questionnaire). Data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo (refer to Blais et al, 2012 for more information on the procedure). The participants completed the questionnaire in a conference facility in groups of approximately 25 participants. The chair of NATO HFM RTG- 163 introduced the multinational research team as well as the goals of the research. He also informed the participants the survey was completely anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary. Each testing session lasted approximately 30 and 45 minutes.

2.2 Interviews 2.2.1 Materials In line with the questionnaire, the semi-structured interview protocol tapped into the theoretical model postulated in HFM-163 Final Report (Yanakiev & Horton (Eds.), 2012). It included background questions as well as items pertaining to the input and output factors (for more information on the full content of the protocol, see Blais et al, 2012). The interviewers asked the participant to share their perceptions in regards to the effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “How does information sharing work in this HQ?”) and decision making (e.g., “How does decision making work in this HQ?”) within the HQ and the level of shared awareness (e.g., “To what extent is there a shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities in this HQ?”) within the HQ. The interviewers probed for additional information by asking (a) what worked (i.e., in terms of the

35 output factor) well/did not and why; (b) about the most critical aspect(s) (i.e., in terms of the input factors) infl uencing (positively or negatively) the output factor; and (c) how the output factor could be improved.

2.2.2 Participants and Procedure As with the questionnaire data, the qualitative data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo (refer to Blais et al, 2012 for more information on the procedure). Members of the NATO RTO HFM-163 TG conducted a total of 15 interviews, with the participants being mainly at the Assistant Chief of Staff level, covering J1-J5, J8, Headquarters Support Group, different structures of the MCA, and JIC. Thirteen of the participants were military offi cers (i.e., Colonel or Lt Colonel), and the participants were citizen of 10 NATO and PfP nations. The interviewers worked in pairs: One of them asked the questions, while the other member recorded the interview and asked additional questions as needed. Before starting the interview, the interviewers informed the participant the interview was completely anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary, and they asked for the participant’s permission to be audio-recorded. Each interview lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes.

3.0 RESULTS Utilising the outcomes from the focus groups (Yanakiev, Lichacz & Paris, 2012) and a review of the literature (Bisig et al, 2012), HFM-163 defi ned organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs as “...the degree of fi t, or alignment, among various dimensions of organisational effectiveness such as organisational structure, processes, people, and culture towards the achievement of a main goal” (Bisig et al, 2012). However, because offi cial goals are not always readily assessable, HFM-163 defi ned the primary operative goals (i.e., goals that management can use to evaluate organisational effectiveness) of the NATO operational HQs as: (a) the effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision making, and (c) an improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (see Bisig et al, 2012, for more detail).

3.1 Information Sharing The SMEs in this study were unanimous in their view that effective and timely information sharing is an important operative goal of organisational effectiveness within a coalition HQ. Managing information is the HQ’s way of handling information or knowledge. A HQ’s effectiveness is tied to its ability to acquire missing information and manage the available

36 information. In current C2 environments, decisions about the planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling of operations is dependent upon coordinated information processing effort from various human and technological sources of information (Rovira, McGarry & Parasuramen, 2007; Lichacz, 2008). Team performance is, in part, the result of team members effectively performing their interdependent tasks. Information sharing and situation awareness (SA) are widely recognized to be important factors in achieving effective team performance outcomes. Effective information sharing has been linked to improved SA which is a critical cognitive skill required for maintaining awareness, knowledge, and understanding of events in our immediate and future environment (Lichacz & Farrell, 2005; Bolstad & Endsley, 2003). Teams that share task-related information are more likely to have better SA, make better decisions and have better overall performance outcomes than teams that do not exchange information (Bolstad & Endsley, 2003; Endsley & Jones, 1997; Salas et al, 1995). According to the SMEs in this study, a particularly important barrier to organisational effectiveness in current coalition HQs is a “lack of communication and poor information sharing process”. The information sharing problem is certainly multi-dimensional insofar as the solution to improved information sharing requires both technological and human involvement. To this end, the SMEs in this study proposed a number of potential process improvement strategies to enhance information sharing within a NATO operational level HQs: (a) changing people’s minds about sharing information; (b) full spectrum technical interoperability; (c) HQs as learning organisations; (d) social networking; (e) standing operating procedures; and (f) leaders need to serve the coalition and not their nation.

3.1.1 Changing Peoples’ Minds about Information Sharing In order to improve information sharing within the HQ, the SMEs indicated the need for a strategy for changing people’s minds and attitudes about their “reluctance to share information”. Numerous reasons can exist for people not wanting to share information. For example, there could be language and cultural barriers that prevent information sharing. Also, information is a source of personal power and people might see themselves as key sources of information if they hold on to information. Regardless of the reasons, information sharing needs to be more prevalent than is the current situation. To this end, leadership might be a key facilitator of better information sharing. Leadership should be encouraged to create an environment

37 of information sharing by encouraging and rewarding behaviours that demonstrate open fl ow of communication, such as meeting face-to-face and following through when messages are sent via email or phone calls. Similarly, leadership must discourage the hoarding of information. There must be adherence to information fl ow through the chain of command but it must not be allowed to be used as a mechanism for hoarding knowledge (Banko, 2011).

3.1.2 Full Spectrum Technical Interoperability Another important barrier to information sharing that was acknowledged by the SMEs is a “lack of technological interoperability” across national systems. Not only does a lack of technological interoperability hamper information sharing, but it also creates diffi culties for cooperation among the different troop-contributing nations in the coalition. To be sure, full spectrum technological interoperability is not restricted to technologies for sharing information from point A to point B. As such, gaps in technological interoperability can also refer to a lack of proper technologies required for a proper records management system, for a central repository for information, and for technological Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for storing information (Banko, 2011).

3.1.3 HQs as Learning Organisations The SMEs also indicated that information sharing could be enhanced through the development of the HQ as a learning organisation. That is, an organisation that highly values lessons learned process and considers each coalition members’ cooperation as a contribution to mutual learning. Ultimately, such a learning organisation could work toward breaking down barriers that prevent information sharing. To this end, the introduction of an effective mentoring program could be set up to support handover procedures so that new members of the HQ do not have to “start from scratch” every time they arrive at the HQ. This would result in ensuring that new members of the HQ are equipped with all of the relevant information about the HQ they require to do their jobs properly and immediately. This program could also assist members to learn from the information sharing mistakes of their predecessors to ensure smoother and more complete information exchanges for future troops. The SMEs in this study identifi ed differing rotation practices in NATO HQs as a barrier to information sharing. As a result of discussions with SMEs, the NATO HFM-163 TG identifi ed rotation practices in NATO HQs as another potential barrier to organisational effectiveness; the SMEs mentioned several problematic aspects of these practices including the

38 absence of handover/mentoring programs, transition gaps, and the lack of synchronization in national rotations (Bisig et al, 2012; Yanakiev, Lichacz & Paris, 2012). Mentoring programs could be developed to ensure the proper documenting and sharing of information as well as helping to integrate new personnel into the existing organisation so that they do not feel isolated and therefore prone to not share information. Currently, different national and NATO education and training systems exist amongst NATO allies which likely include differing information sharing procedures. Ideally, the ability to harmonize these educational and training programs would do well to mitigate the potential differences in information sharing procedures across nations. Alternatively, a mentoring program could be developed as a more cost effective way to close this gap in educational and training programs to ensure the members of the HQ can develop social and organisational skills to ensure the sharing of information. The lack of cultural awareness training to facilitate intercultural competencies for NATO members was cited by the SMEs as another barrier to information sharing. Members of the military in any NATO country belong to organisations with related command structures and share some experiences in common. However, they also tend to behave in ways that are consistent with cultural norms for their own country. Several decades of research have led to the identifi cation of dimensions of culture that shape individual behaviours; these behaviours affect team performance in both civilian and military settings (NATO HFM-138 Final Report, 2008). Accordingly, a mentorship program could be developed to help NATO members to fully leverage the diverse perspectives of their members while also being able to reach closure and move to action when this is required.

3.1.4 Social Networking Some of the SMEs consider the tour-of-duty length of most members in the HQ too short (typically 4 – 6 months) noting that learning and the development of social networks take a long time to develop and by the time these networks are established the coalition partners are getting ready to leave. Conversely, some of the SMEs mentioned that most participating nations prefer comparatively short periods of rotation because the high intensity of the operations contributes to high stress levels for the military personnel. Nonetheless, ultimately, different rotation cycles hurt organisational effectiveness because it creates diffi culties in the adaptation among the national representatives and development of social networks.

39 Ad hoc meetings and informal get-togethers in open environments within multi-cultural settings (e.g., ice-breakers/social events) have been identifi ed as important ways to bring people together and ultimately increase information sharing. The social component/cohesion associated with these get together develops the nature and quality of emotional bonds of friendships, liking, caring, and closeness among group members. The social cohesion that can result from these forms of social networking facilitate commitment to task, task cohesion, and an action component seen in terms of communication, teamwork, and collective action. Similarly, social support involves signifi cant others giving tangible support in the form of material assistance or information, advice, and guidance that helps the individual function effectively in daily life. Both cohesion and social support incorporate aspects of a social group. Cohesion facilitates the productivity of the group member and the group as a whole. In a similar way, social support enables individual adjustment and effective interpersonal relationships (Griffi ths, 2007). This in turn would likely enhance the sharing of information within the HQ. The strength of military unit is the workforce employed within. The existence of positive internal relationships among co-workers is one of the most important components of a successful work environment; personality confl icts are a leading cause of problems in the workplace. Research has shown the military personnel view “personality issues” as one of the leading chokepoints of information fl ow and a major obstacle to getting work done (Banko, 2011). Within the context of personality issues, individuals can quickly learn to go around those people to get the information required to do their work. However, working outside of the established processes can create obstacles to the smooth fl ow of information. Accordingly, open communication, via social networking and informal get-togethers could work to mitigate “personality issues” by providing venues to develop social cohesion and thus prevent, manage, or resolve disagreements (Banko, 2011).

3.1.5 Standard Operating Procedures The SMEs suggested the introduction of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the transition of positions in the HQs in order to avoid gaps in handovers and to transfer lessons learned. SOPs describe in a step-by-step manner how to perform a particular task to ensure that tasks are performed consistently and correctly. The assumption underlying any SOP is that it is the most effi cient and effective way of performing a task (Banko, 2011). Having consistent ways of working is essential to the smooth functioning of any organisation. However, when changes are required to SOPs, the HQ

40 should develop a standardised template and a process to how to change an SOP – a meta-SOP. The lack of organisational knowledge because lessons learned are not systematically passed on represents an important barrier to information sharing. Moreover, there are often gaps in the processes for debriefs for many personnel returning from a NATO assignment which in turn erodes appropriate information sharing that can slow down the integration of new members into a NATO operational level HQ. 3.1.6 Leaders Need to Serve the Coalition and not their Nation There was consensus among the SMEs regarding the notion that HQs will be effective only if the leader is not there to serve his/her nation but rather to serve the goals of the HQ. Having in mind the complex character of current NATO operations, SMEs identifi ed the need to have leaders who make decisions and are able to prioritise confl icting items without national biases. The SMEs deemed the elimination of national political caveats for mission execution as a priority task because such caveats challenge trust among nations and therefore erode information sharing. The SMEs consider nation-centric politics, related to imposing restrictive caveats to employ the troops during the operation as a major negative infl uence on a coalition’s effectiveness. The problem is that the troops are forced to work around these political barriers, which at times increases the immediate risk to the people on the ground. This in turn undermines the trust among coalition partners which in the end can serve to disrupt information sharing within the HQ (Banko, 2011).

3.2 Decision-Making Decision-making in military settings, as in many different settings, is a dynamic on-going process of identifying or creating multiple options, choosing among alternatives by integrating the differing perspectives and opinions of team members, implementing optimal solutions, and monitoring the consequences of these solutions. Decision-making in the military is typically directed towards some goal. Ultimately, the extent to which the HQ’s decision-making is effective lies in the quality, timeliness and effi ciency and the decision-making process itself. The SMEs noted that political-military decision-making regarding participation in NATO coalition operations contributes to poor decision- making within the NATO operational level HQ. Among the most frequently mentioned problems within this context are unclear and unstable goals, changing tasks and lack of common understanding of goals and mission end state among coalition partners.

41 The second group of factors put forth by the SMEs relates to the improvement of strategic decision-making processes for planning and implementing a NATO coalition operation. Among the most discussed factors was the need to introduce NATO standardisation for education and training for coalition operations. The SMEs agreed that the HQ staffs have to have prior experience working together as a group. Moreover, they considered pre-deployment training on how to work in NATO/coalition environment as a necessity. Experience through deployments, exchange and/or international positions were most often cited as the best training one can have to improve decision-making ability. In the absence of such experience, formal mentoring programs could be established in the HQ to improve decision-making abilities (Banko, 2011). Finally, the SMEs deemed the elimination of national political caveats for mission execution is a priority task because such caveats challenge trust among nations and thereby hinders appropriate and relevant decisions-making abilities.

3.3 Shared Awareness of Tasks and Responsibilities Maintaining shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities operates to preserve a common picture of the tasks and responsibilities in an HQ. Unless the HQ can ensure a clear, accurate, and common understanding of those duties, its organisational effectiveness may be compromised. Indeed, shared awareness has been identifi ed as an important component of successful military team performance (Bolstad & Endsley, 2003; Matthews, et al 2004; Riley, Endsley, & Cuevas, 2006; Salas, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995). In team settings, developing good shared awareness is not an easy task as this process is dependent upon the communication, exchange, and coordination of information within and between team members (Lichacz, 2009; Bolstad & Endsley, (2003; Salas, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995; Cannon- Bowers & Salas, 1990; Endsley, 1995). All SMEs believed that a shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities was very important for the effectiveness of the KFOR HQ as it saves time, improves the quality and timeliness of decision making, helps initiative, enables synchronisation of effort and harmonises work, and facilitates collaboration. However, the opinions differ as to whether there is an adequate awareness or not. Some SMEs believed that there was enough shared awareness. These SMEs noted that they are all informed about tasks, and if necessary, if they are affected by the task. Other SMEs indicated that there is no problem with shared awareness. One SME believed that it was more of an issue for the civilian personnel than for military personnel because it is a standard and commonly known structure for the military personnel. Others emphasised that it is a general problem in the HQ. Apart

42 from the general understanding of what one’s branch is doing, some SMEs felt that there is little shared task awareness. Some SMEs mentioned that you may only have shared awareness if you are required to work together with different branches. Most SMEs agreed that improvement is needed but diffi cult. As critical aspects for the improvement of shared awareness, the SMEs proposed (a) standardisation of roles and structures for all NATO nations; (b) fl at hierarchical structure; (c) a structure like in the Naples’ HQ with a knowledge development centre; (d) horizontal coordination between the branches; (e) understanding of operational planning system; (f) key- leader/in-theatre/national training; (g) less rotation; (h) military experience; (i) regular meetings to share information; (j) willingness to bring people together; (k) establishing (informal) relationships; (l) having a genuine interest in the job and expectations of others; and (m) shared data base or shared work place.

4.0 SUMMARY A quick overview of the SME’s responses, given the volume of information allocated to the process improvements for each of the operative goals identifi ed by HFM-163, gives the impression that information sharing might well be the most important operative goal for facilitating organisational effectiveness in a NATO operational HQ. While it is true that each operative goal: (a) the effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision making, and (c) an improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities are all very important to organisational effectiveness, it might be the case that it is information sharing that is the bedrock of better decision-making and shared awareness. However, at the end of each interview, the SMEs had the opportunity to respond to what they thought were the most important aspects required to improve the effectiveness in the KFOR HQ. Their statements are summarised and listed as follows: • Give more responsibility and freedom to act for the lower levels in the chain and command; • Need to better understand operational planning process; • Have motivational meetings of the commander with key-leaders/staff where he/she informs the staff of his/her goals; • Centralise leadership; • Fill positions for at least 1 year; • Spread rotations more evenly during the year; • Improve training and experience;

43 • Send preparation packages to HQ personnel before starting deployment; • Suffi cient job experience and background; • Select effective personnel; • Improve formal and informal information sharing systems; • Improve cultural interoperability; • Need to better understand the environment of KFOR and Kosovo in general; • Interact more in the local community to facilitate a better understanding of the local population and • Be proactive and make assessments about the future.

5.0 REFERENCES [1] Lichacz, F. M. J. (2009). Calibrating Situation Awareness and Confi dence within a Multinational Coalition Operation. Military Psychology, 21, 412-426. [2] Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 3-1 – 3-17). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [3] NATO HFM-138 (2008). Final Report of the NATO RTO Human Factors and Medicine Panel, Research Task Group 138 on “Leader and Team Adaptability in Multinational Coalitions (LTAMC). Supreme Allied Command Transformation, Futures and Engagement, Concept Development and Experimentation.” NATO. [4] Blais, A. R., Granеnsen, M., Bisig, E., Bjшrnstad, A. L., Hof, T., Lichacz, F. M. J., Lyons, J. J., Moser- Whittle, E. A., Valaker, S., and Yanakiev, Y. Chapter 4 – Method. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 3-1 – 3-17). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [5] Yanakiev, Y., Lichacz, F. M. J., and Paris, C. Chapter 2 – Results of Subject-Matter Expert Focus Group Discussions. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 3-1 – 3-17). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [6] Bisig, E., Hof, T., Valaker, S., Szvircsev Tresch, T., Seiler, S., and Bjшrnstad, A. L. Chapter 3 – Theoretical Framework and Model. In: Y.

44 Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO, 2012. [7] Rovira, E., McGarry, K., and Parasuramen, R. (2007). Effects of imperfect automation on decision making in a simulated command and control task. Human Factors, 49, 76-87. [8] Lichacz, F. M. J. (2008). Augmenting our understanding of the relationship between situation awareness and confi dence using calibration analysis. Ergonomics, 51, 1489-1502. [9] Lichacz, F. M. J. & Farrell, P. S. E. (2005). Situation Awareness and the Calibration of Confi dence within a Multi-National Operational Net Assessment. Military Psychology, 17, 247-268. [10] Bolstad, C. A., & Endsley, M. R. (2003). Measuring shared and team situation awareness in the army’s future objective force. In Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 47th Annual Meeting (pp. 369 - 373). Santa Monica, CA: The Human Factors Society & Ergonomics Society. [11] Endsley, M. R., & Jones, W. M. (1997). Situation awareness, information dominance and information warfare. Tech Report 97-01. [12] Salas, E., Prince, C., Baker, D. P., & Shrestha, L. (1995). Situation awareness in team performance: implications for measurement and training. Human Factors, 37, 123-136. [13] Banko, K. M. Joint Headquarters Organisational Effectiveness Study: Human Factors Issues. DRDC CORA LR 2011-103. 15, July, 2011. [14] Griffi ths, J. (2007). Further Considerations Concerning the Cohesion-Performance Relation in Military Settings. Armed Forces & Society, 2007, 34, 138-147. [15] Bolstad, C. A. and Endsley, M. R. (2003). Measuring shared and team situation awareness in the army’s future objective force. In Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 47th Annual Meeting, October 2003, Denver, CO, pp. 369-373 (Santa Monica, CA: The Human Factors Society and Ergonomics Society). [16] Matthews, M. D. Strater, L. D., & Endsley, M. R. (2004). Situation awareness requirements for infantry platoon leaders. Military Psychology, 16, 149-161. [17] Riley, J. M., Endsley, M. R., Bolstad, C. A., & Cuevas, H. M., 2006, Collaborative planning and situation awareness in army command and control. Ergonomics, 49, 1139-1153.

45 [18] Salas, E., Prince, C., Baker, D. P., & Shrestha, L. (1995). Situation awareness in team performance: Implications for measurement and training. Human Factors, 37, 123-136. [19] Cannon-Bowers, J. A. & Salas, E. (1990, April). Cognitive psychology and team training: Shared mental models and team training. Paper presented at the 5th annual meeting of the Society for Industrial and Organisational Psychology, Miami, FL. [20] Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37,32-64.

46 IMPROVING ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS OF OPERATIONAL COALITION HEADQUARTERS: THE IMPACT OF CULTURAL DIMENSIONS

Dr. Delphine Resteigne Dr. Ann-Renee Blais Chair of Sociology Defence Research and Royal Military Academy Development Canada, Toronto Avenue de la Renaissance 30 1133 Sheppard Ave W., P.O. Box 2000 1000 Brussels Toronto, ON M3M 3B9 BELGIUM CANADA [email protected] [email protected]

ABSTRACT Multinational cooperation in operations is not new but since it has now become the norm in operations the aim of this paper is to look at the professional interactions in those very diverse operational settings. In the framework of the work done by the NATO HFM 163/ RTG on “Improving the Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations”, our attention has been focused on the collaboration of military personnel in NATO headquarters. Based on a mixed- methods approach with questionnaires and semi-structured interviews conducted at KFOR HQ (Kosovo), we will here discuss the results referring to the infl uence of cultural dimensions on the organisational effectiveness of the HQ. Given the relative static nature of this workplace, as a complementary vision, we have also included another model which has been developed on the basis of qualitative researches conducted by Resteigne & Soeters in a riskier environment, that is, at Kabul airport (HQ KAIA).

1.0 MODEL OF ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AND ITS CULTURAL DIMENSIONS Effective organisations ensure their operative and offi cial goals are aligned both in terms of their fi t with the external environment and in terms of their fi t with other factors internal to the organisation. To put it simply, the term organisational effectiveness describes the degree to which an organisation realizes its goals (Etzioni, 1964). The theoretical model below hypothesizes that the transformation processes, which include a) information sharing, b) quick and timely decision making, and c) developing a shared awareness, infl uence the effectiveness of a military coalition operation’s headquarters.

47 The NATO HFM-163 Research Task Group (RTG) defi ned organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs as “...the degree of fi t, or alignment, among various dimensions of organisational effectiveness such as organisational structure, processes, people, and culture towards the achievement of a main goal” (Bisig et al., 2012, p 6).

Figure 1: Model of Organisational Effectiveness (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 7)

Broadly said, we can affi rm that one of the main offi cial goals of NATO HQs is to provide effective Command and Control (C2) to its troops on the ground. Operative goals that support achieving the offi cial goal are (a) increasing effective and timely information sharing, (b) increasing effective and timely decision making, and (c) improving shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities. Previous research on organisational effectiveness has revealed that structure, people, processes, and culture must be aligned towards these operative goals in order for the main goal to be reached effectively (Porter, 1996). Among these factors that we believe should be internally aligned in order to support reaching the operative goals, we will here analyse the role played by the cultural dimensions in more detail. Culture needs indeed to be aligned with the structure and process factors as well, in order for the organisation to function properly. For instance, even if structure and processes are aligned in terms of fl at hierarchy and decentralised processes, the operative goals may not be reached unless there also is a culture of autonomy. Likewise, the cultural aspect of improvement orientation, together with a fl at hierarchy and decentralised processes, may need to be aligned with fl exibility in order to have a positive effect on the operative goals.

48 2.0 DIMENSIONS OF CULTURE In those professional settings with a high degree of internal and external diversity (Manigart & Resteigne, 2013), cultural dimensions refer to various elements. Culture encompasses both organisational and national cultures but can also echo other dimensions, such as norms and values of the different branches of the military (as we will see in the second model developed in Section 5). Various cultural aspects play an important role in a multinational HQ, but we have chosen to focus primarily on organisational culture as this aspect specifi cally addresses the values and work practices of a NATO HQ.

2.1 Organisational Culture Organisational culture is formed by the set of values and norms that infl uence its organisational members’ interactions with each other and with people outside the organisation (Jones, 2004). It refers to dominant values and norms that have developed over time and become stable elements of the “routine” of the headquarters. An organisation’s culture can be used to increase organisational effectiveness (Smircich, 1983), because it infl uences the way members make decisions, understand and deal with the organisation’s environment, what they do with information, and how they behave (Cook & Yanow, 1993). Organisational culture concerns values and norms that one holds about actual work practices (Berg & Wilderom, 2006). So, what are these organisational values and how do they infl uence organisational members’ behaviour? Values are criteria that people use to establish which types of behaviour are desirable or undesirable (Jones, 2004). Two kinds of values can be distinguished (see Figure 2), terminal and instrumental values. Terminal values represent end-states that people and the organisation want to achieve, such as excellence, reliability, innovativeness, stability, and predictability. Instrumental values, on the other hand, are desirable strictly conditional on their anticipated consequences (e.g., working hard, being creative and courageous, being conservative and cautious, taking risks, and maintaining high standards). These values are preferable mode of behaviour in order to attain the terminal values. An organisation’s culture consists of the end states that the organisation wants to accomplish (i.e., its terminal values) and the modes of behaviour that the organisation supports (i.e., its instrumental values). The NATO HQ’s mission statement and offi cial goals, that is, supporting the troops on the ground by agility and fl exibility of the processes and stability of the organisational structure, should be refl ected in the terminal values it adopts.

49 Also, for the NATO HQ staff to understand and be able to act in accordance with the instrumental values, the NATO HQ should develop specifi c norms, rules, and standard operating procedures that typify its specifi c instrumental values.

We believe that for NATO HQs to be able to attain its operative goals, its terminal cultural values must refl ect fl exibility and agility in its processes, yet stability in the organisational structure, and its instrumental cultural values should include trusting each other, being open to diversity, and having an improvement orientation. The larger the degree to which the NATO HQs has developed these cultural values, the more likely the operative goals will be attained

In the case of our research conducted in a joint and multinational Figure 2: Terminal and Instrumental Values (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 14) operational setting, NATO HQs’ members show high diversity in national backgrounds and expertise. On the one hand, high diversity within teams and organisations can cause integration problems, low cohesion, and dissatisfaction, which in turn can affect the team’s effectiveness negatively (Jackson, Brett et al., 1991; Wagner, Peffer et al., 1984). On the other hand, in such multinational workplaces, an organisational culture that promotes openness to diversity stimulates team cohesion and allows the innovative and creative potential of the heterogeneity to be exploited. In organisations valuing an improvement-oriented culture, members demonstrate a high level of proactivity in trying to improve work, processes, and routines. This can lead to improved collaboration between different departments and an increased emphasise on effi cient cooperation among employees. Specifi cally in this respect, being open to and able to manage national cultural differences constructively should be important.

2.2 Leadership Culture In line with the previous two dimensions of national and organisational cultures, we could also add the leadership culture, that is, the management style, as the general attitude and behaviour of a leader in his or her dealings with subordinates. Although not our main focus, one national cultural difference, closely related to the leadership style, may be relevant to our

50 hypotheses. The notion of power distance is defi ned as “the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept power to be distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 1991, p. 28). Cultural differences in power distance infl uences whether or not people from different countries are used to and prefer to work in more hierarchic and centralized types of organisations or whether or not they, conversely, are used to and prefer to work in fl atter and more decentralized types of organisations (Hofstede, 1991, 2001). This suggests that power distance may moderate the proposed relationships between a fl atter structure and greater decentralization in processes (i.e., the organic organisation variables) and fl exibility and the operative goals variables.

2.3 Level of Trust When analysing interactions in an operational compound, even if those interactions happen in an HQ and not in the heat of the battle, the level of trust between colleagues is also of great importance. Team members who trust each other are better able to examine and improve team processes, and self-manage their own performance (Friedlander, 1970; Golembieski & McConkie, 1975). Moreover, employees report that the absence of trust interferes with the effective functioning of work teams (LaFasto & Larson, 2001; Costa, 2003) has examined the relation of trust with team performance and stated that high trust in teams indicates a high perception of task performance. Therefore, trust is an important condition for the effective functioning of teams in organisations. As we will also see in Section 5, the level of trust is particularly at stake in high-risk environments where people tend to return to what is more familiar to them.

3.0 METHOD This section briefl y describes the materials, participants, and procedures used by the NATO HFM-163 RTG to collect data via a mixed-methods (i.e., quantitative and qualitative) approach (see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail).

3.1 Questionnaire The 89-item questionnaire included several background questions pertaining to the participant’s age, sex, nationality, fi rst language, rank (if military), etc., and items designed to adequately represent/cover all of the input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e., operative goals) factors in the theoretical model previously described. One hundred and three military members (as well as 33 civilian KFOR HQ personnel, but these results will not be discussed further here),

51 citizens of 24 NATO and PfP countries, and originating from various HQ branches (see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail regarding the demographic composition of the sample), completed the questionnaire. Data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo. The respondents completed the questionnaire in a conference facility in groups of approximately 25 participants. The chair of NATO HFM RTG-163 introduced the multinational research team as well as the goals of the research. He also informed the participants the survey was completely anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary. Each testing session lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes.

3.2 Interviews In line with the questionnaire, the semi-structured interview protocol tapped into the theoretical model previously described (see Figure 1). It included background questions as well as items pertaining to the input and output factors (for more information on the full content of the protocol, see Blais et al., 2012). As with the questionnaire data, the qualitative data collection took place also in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo. Members of the NATO HFM-163 RTG conducted a total of 15 interviews, with the participants being mainly at the Assistant Chief of Staff level, covering J1- J5, J8, Headquarters Support Group, different structures of the MCA, and JIC. Thirteen of the participants were military offi cers (i.e., Colonel or Lt Colonel), and the participants were citizen of 10 NATO and PfP nations. The interviewers worked in pairs: One of them asked the questions, while the other member recorded the interview and asked additional questions as needed. Before starting the interview, the interviewers informed the participant the interview was completely anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary, and they asked for the participant’s permission to be audio-recorded. Each interview lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes.

4.0 ANTICIPATED HYPOTHESES AND RESULTS 4.1. Quantitative Results1 The set of culture variables (i.e., team trust, improvement orientation, and openness to diversity), entered third in the hierarchical regression models, explained between 4% and 11% of the variance in the output variables above and beyond that explained by the structure and process

1 For a broader analyse of the results, see chapter 5 of the fi nal report (Blais et al., 2012).

52 and people variables. The models showed that team trust was a signifi cant, positive, predictor of all of the output factors. Improvement orientation was also a signifi cant, positive, predictor of shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities. With respect to the link between improvement orientation and shared awareness, it is important to note that, from the perspective of the literature on organisational culture cited previously, it is emphasised that attitudes, such as improvement orientation, need to be shared within the HQ in order to lead to positive outcomes at an organisational level. Ilgen et al. (2005) suggest that models focusing on how team processes develop overtime should carefully consider the possibility that an output factor at one point in time may become an input factor at a later stage in the ongoing processes.

4.2. Qualitative Results2 The qualitative results suggested a similar positive relationship between team trust and information sharing. However, according to the interviewees, it is also possible for this relationship to be in the opposite direction, with more timely and effective information sharing leading to greater team trust. Most of the SMEs spoke positively about the multinational component of the HQ and preferred to talk about “challenges” rather than “negative aspects” regarding the fact that the HQ was composed of personnel from 30 different countries. A common opinion was that multinationality, in general, is positive in that it brings different perspectives and solutions to problems. It is also good for the individual, who becomes more open- minded by learning about other nations, cultures, and perspectives. Still, the SMEs generally believed that a multinational HQ is less effective than a national HQ. Arguments for this view were based primarily on the reality that people are on shorter assignments in a multinational HQ, and the communication problems that arise due to varying English language skills. Furthermore, national caveats were mentioned as a problem by two of the SMEs. However, some of the SMEs believed that individual effectiveness is improved when working in a multinational HQ since you want to make a good impression of the country that you are representing. In relation to the model, the SMEs to some extent related multinationality to the different operative goals and input factors. As shown in Figure 3, the SMEs mentioned multinationality positively impacts decision making,

2 For a broader analyse of the results, see chapter 6 of the fi nal report (Bisig et al., 2012).

53 because it brings new perspectives and solutions to problems into the HQ.. On the other hand, SMEs reported that multinationality, if it generates communication problems and misunderstandings, negatively impacts information sharing but also shared awareness, because differences in the national training, methods, and procedures may make reaching a common understanding of methods and procedures diffi cult. At a strategic level, this can also be linked to national interests, as hidden agendas may lead to different aims.

Figure 3. Relationship between cultural dimensions and the operative goals (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 8, adapted)

In regards to trust, the SMEs indicated that there was a quite high level of trust in the KFOR HQ. But, as we can see in the following sentences, the notion of trust can be understood in different ways. There were mainly two themes concerning trust, which could relate either to the personality of the SMEs or to the defi nition of the term itself. Some of the SMEs expressed that they trust other members of the HQ by default, that is, they trust a person until that proven wrong. Two of the SMEs related this to the military structure: There is a job description and a rank, and trust is based on the person adhering to their job description and rank (e.g., “I always trust soldiers until I realise somebody does not deserve trust.”).The other opinion was that trust has to be established, based on informal relationships and daily work (i.e., products).

54 Two of the SMEs talked about differences between organisational/offi cial trust and individual trust (e.g., “Offi cial trust is there from the beginning, while individual trust has to grow, like in families or friendships.”). Since the interview question was not specifi c to a certain type of trust, a reason for these different opinions might be that some SMEs referred to offi cial trust (i.e., based on organisation, formal role, job description) and others to individual trust (i.e., related to a specifi c individual). These different types of trust were also refl ected in the SMEs’ views on what was considered critical in order to establish trust, that is, informal information sharing, face-to-face-meetings, openness and acceptance of differences, compliance with rules, and delivery of requested products on time. The way a situation of mistrust was handled within the HQ differed between the participants. One SME said: “I supervise and give feedback on how to improve.” Another SME stated: “When I realise I cannot trust someone, I go to someone else, and there is no time to give a second chance.” One SME believed that there are cultural differences in how a situation of mistrust can be handled: “Some people feel uncomfortable by feedback.” The third dimension – improvement orientation- refers to the various initiatives in place in order to improve work, processes, and routines. As to whether there existed such formal procedures and whether they had concrete examples in mind, SMES disagreed. Some believed the HQ was improvement oriented, some believed it was not: “I would say ideas are accepted and the HQ tries to improve wherever they can and are asked to do so” said one SME. “No, I think it is about maintaining the status-quo. […] And it’s probable that it [improvement orientation] doesn’t happen because people don’t have time in their course of rotation,” stated another SME. These ambivalent opinions might be caused by different leadership styles as stated by another SME: “Sometimes yes, sometimes no. It depends on the persons who have the leadership of this HQ.” SMEs noted that there defi nitely was a need for improvement and innovation to manage all the new and complex tasks. They also mentioned proactivity was possible and allowed: “Everyone, in his own area of responsibility, has the authority and also the possibility to prepare something and to provide his proposals for improvement or whatever.” Crucial for this proactivity and improvement orientation in general is information sharing. In terms of the formal procedures required for improvement orientation to occur, the SMEs specifi ed Lessons Learned (LL), regular revisions of Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), After Action Reviews (AAR), and monthly Assessment Cycles (AC).

55 But the impact of these procedures was met with doubt: “But I am not sure if they have much infl uence on the improvement. It’s more a consequence of the rotation. When you leave and get your AAR too late, the new crew has to start again. I don’t think my experience will have an infl uence on the persons that come after me.” Some SMEs could not give any examples of formal improvement procedures, but several people described informal ways of improving day-to-day work: “We change our working routines when we see that there are some weaknesses or gaps. Furthermore, we always try to fi nd a way to make the work easier and better. That’s always in our minds and we are trying to improve our procedures and make things run smoother.” In relation to the model, the SMEs to some extent related improvement orientation to the different operative goals and input factors (see Figure 3). They mentioned that improvement orientation is positively impacted by the fl exible structures and processes of a HQ, by a leadership that listens to the opinions and suggestions of its subordinates, by shared awareness, and by an effective and timely formal and informal information fl ow. On the contrary, they also stated that improvement orientation is negatively impacted by high rotation of staff, because leadership style changes and organisational memory gets lost.

5.0 COMPLEMENTARY MODEL3 As we have already mentioned when discussing the previous model, if cooperation can sometimes provide learning opportunities and lead to greater work satisfaction, it does not always have positive results, and certainly not if it consists of people and organisations from different nationalities who have to temporarily work together. Based on their studies conducted in various operational settings (i.e., NATO, UN & EU missions), Resteigne and Soeters (2008) have identifi ed eight relevant factors that may help explain why international collaboration between military personnel sometimes fails and sometimes fl ourishes. In addition to dimensions related to organisational and national cultures, Resteigne and Soeters’ model also underlines other related factors which have an impact on professional interactions and, consequently, on the operative goals describes previously. Focussing on the collaboration between military personnel in multinational compounds, the following model is thus more encompassing.

3 For more details on the theoretical model, see Resteigne (2012) and Soeters et al. (2008).

56 Factors of infl uence Professional Interactions

- Cultural distances - Collaboration - Personnel composition of teams - Communication - Status of units and task cohesion - Identity - Technology - Level of trust - Organisational set-up of the mission - Motivation - Shift in bargaining power - Social and cultural - Danger and threats Factors of infl uence awareness - Cultural distances - Personnel composition of teams - Status of units and task cohesion - Technology - Organisational set-up of the mission - Shift in bargaining power - Danger and threats

Figure 4: Cultural and organisational factors of collaboration in multinational compounds (Resteigne & Soeters, 2008 & 2012)

5.1 Cultural Distances International cooperation is intercultural cooperation, bringing together people with different demeanors, languages, cognitive schemas, and values (Hambrick, Canney, Snell & Snow, 1998; Adler, 2002). Despite some elements of shared military culture, cultural differences also exist between military organisations, even within the ones belonging to NATO (Soeters, Poponete & Page, 2006). It does not seem too speculative to assume that, within NATO, an Anglo-Saxon cultural “complex” exists, consisting of the so-called ABCA-countries (i.e., America, Britain, Canada, and Australia) who indeed have a common history as well as elaborate forms of joint defence policies, and practices. Given these cultural disparities, ABCA- armed forces know lesser degrees of civilianization than armed forces from the West European continent. But, even among NATO countries, clear cultural differences between nationalities have existed and continue to do so, notably between soldiers from “old” and “new” NATO member states. These differences are detrimental to the development of mutual trust, because the partnering organisations

57 lack non-verbalized sets of congruent expectations and assumptions about each other’s prerogatives and obligations (Smith & Van de Ven, 1994).

5.2 Personnel Composition of the Teams The “national demography” of teams and organisations plays a role in the success of international collaboration (Adler, 2002). Several decades ago, Kanter (1977) has famously demonstrated that the quantitative distribution of men and women in organisations plays a major role in explaining social dynamics in gender-mixed work situations. More recent studies have revealed a U-shape-relation between national composition and performance. High and low heterogeneous teams outperform groups that are moderately heterogeneous (Earley & Mosakowski, 2000; Adler, 2002), showing the least amount of confl ict, the most effective communication patterns, and the highest level of satisfaction, planning, and cooperation. Highly heterogeneous teams generally emphasise rules and practices that are inclusive and tend to be more open to their participants’ ideas and input. Moderately heterogeneous teams – for instance, teams composed of two or three more or less equally sized nationalities – on the contrary, tend to generally display more dysfunctional interactions, accusing one another of not fully understanding or even being the source of a problem.

5.3 Status of the Unit and Task Cohesion Military organisations are characterised by a high degree of functional and structural differentiation, based on the existence of ranks, military branches, functional groupings, and front versus rear positions. One special distinction refers to so-called “elite units.” Elite units – such as Special Forces, air manoeuvre, and airborne troops – are designed and trained to operate under dangerous conditions, and to use and sustain violence. These units generally are considered to be high status groups and tend to emphasise group bonding, disregarding and actually looking down upon others (Winslow, 1999). In correspondence with their inner directed elite culture, these units are less likely to accept orders, instructions, and inspections from people who do not belong to their units. Not surprisingly, the “leave- no-man-behind” ideology is particularly strong among elite’ troops, but it is noteworthy that this ideology specifi cally pertains to casualties of the own unit and not to casualties of other units, not even if they belong to their own national forces (Wong, 2005). In today’s fuzzy operations, however, displaying an open mind and developing ties to others in the mission is of fi rst importance. If such a “bridging” attitude is lacking, units tend to become isolated and oblivious to negative feedback from other parts of

58 the organisation, while also tending to stick to internal (i.e., within unit) communication and territorial behaviour (Browne, Lawrence & Robinson, 2005). 5.4 Technology The cultural impact on air force operations seems to be far less pervasive than among land forces. Air forces, especially the ones operating in NATO, are subject to isomorphing, technology-driven impulses (Dimaggio & Powell, 1991). In the air forces, uniformity in technologies reduces variation in human behaviour, and, hence, the impact of the cultural factor decreases. Land operations – especially the ones in non-combat operations – however, allow for much more variation in procedures and behaviour. These operations are far less technology-based, but they do require an “elaborate and well-orchestrated interaction among groups members” (Hambrick, Canney, Snell & Snow, 1998).

5.5 Organisational Set-up of the Mission The way tasks in multinational operations are organized and allocated seems to play a role in the success of international military collaboration. The work that needs to be done in a collaborative effort of many can be divided in at least two different ways (Thompson, 1967; Argyle, 1991): Parallel tasking, in which (national) units are assigned their own geographical area of responsibility where they can act fairly independently, versus reciprocal tasking, in which each (national) unit, on the one hand, is providing a discrete, complementary contribution to the whole while, on the other hand, being supported by the whole and, hence, impregnated by the other units. Parallel tasking, that is, the allocation of specifi c geographical areas of responsibility to different national units, implies a separation strategy which will produce positive outcomes, if the work of one unit has no impact on the work of another and vice versa. In a reciprocal tasking, either assimilation (i.e., one group submits to the dominating group), or integration (i.e., the formation of a “third culture”) may follow. As we noticed earlier, assimilation can be observed in technology-driven operations or when one nation clearly outperforms the other nations and indeed is deemed to be superior by these nations. If the other nation’s (claimed) superiority is not accepted, however, cooperation is likely to be strained. The integration outcome is more likely to occur if the commander successfully sets super- ordinate and super-national goals, emphasising goal interdependence and goal sharing, as well as a strong common code and culture.

59 5.6 Shifts in Bargaining Power Shifts in the balance of bargaining power between partners may render inter-organisational arrangements unstable to the extent that these arrangements can be unexpectedly or prematurely ended (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Such shifts in the power balance may occur when one partner acquires suffi cient (local) knowledge, skills, and resources to eliminate a partner’s dependency and make the inter-organisational arrangement in fact obsolete.

5.7 Danger and Threats When people and organisations experience adversity, forms of mental and organisational rigidity are likely to occur. Under conditions of threat, information processing is restricted and control is constricted, leading to increased stereotypical thinking and lesser degrees of individual and organisational fl exibility and even inducing “primitive forms of reaction” (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981). People under such threat conditions focus their frustration on out- groups, cling to values that are essential to their own common identity and worldview, and tend to reject people who are different (Schimel et al., 1999). The international military cooperation is quite likely to develop less smoothly if there are signals indicating that life-threatening situations may occur in the area of operations.

5.8 Multinational Framework The type of multinational framework (i.e., NATO, UN or UE) has an infl uence on the organisational effectiveness and on the general conduct of the mission. Even if we have underlined some differences among NATO countries, military personnel generally have a clear preference for working in NATO missions. This is not really surprising because, for more than 50 years, the Alliance has tried to encourage SOPs, common training and exercises, and other shared doctrinal elements.

6.0 DISCUSSION 6.1 Conclusions The NATO HFM-163 RTG developed and tested a model of organisational effectiveness in operational NATO Headquarters (HQs). The model included input factors, the operative goals of the organisation, and the relationships between the input factors and operative goals.

60 Among the cultural dimensions, team trust was a signifi cant, positive, predictor of all of the output factors. Improvement orientation was also a signifi cant, positive, predictor of shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities. The qualitative results suggested a similar positive relationship between team trust and information sharing. However, it is also possible for this relationship to be in the opposite direction, with more timely and effective information sharing leading to greater team trust. With respect to the link between improvement orientation and shared awareness, those attitudes need to be shared within the HQ in order to lead to positive outcomes at an organisational level. With respect to the second model, we expect international military cooperation to be more diffi cult, if this multi-organisational arrangement a) is moderately heterogeneous in composition, b) concerns interactions between soldiers from the European continent and from ABCA countries, or from “higher status” versus “lower status” militaries, c) concerns interactions between so-called “elite” and “non-elite” units, d) is less technology-driven, e) is based on organisational set-ups in which structural and cultural elements do not fi t, f) has experienced a shift in bargaining power between the partnering organisations, g) is executed under conditions that are experienced to be life-threatening, and h) is conducted in a non NATO-multinational framework.

6.2 Limitations The greatest strength of this study resides in the fact that the theoretical model was developed and tested via a multi-method (i.e., qualitative and quantitative) approach. However, factors external to the organisation and to the context of the operation were not examined in this study. The model explicitly concentrates on the internal relationships between the input factors and operative goals. This might reduce its validity in terms of different environmental conditions. For example, the same relationships might not exist under other –external- conditions. In terms of the empirical scope of this study, we tested our model in the relatively peaceful Kosovo and the KFOR HQ. To account for other dynamics, we added fi ndings from the model of Resteigne and Soeters (2008), developed on the basis of data collected in the context of high intensity confl icts. Because we conducted the study at only one point in time, we cannot infer causality. Future research should thus conduct an empirical test of the model in a longitudinal manner, where the direction of the relationships

61 amongst the input factors and operative factors could be investigated over time. Alternative models of causality could also be tested. Finally, the quantitative results are based upon a single (i.e., self-reporting) method of data collection, which might reduce their validity.

6.3 Implications for Practice In order to foster information sharing, Valaker et al. (2012) recommend developing training programs to enhance teamwork and team trust. Besides training programs, it might be necessary to encourage more dialogue and more connections among the various NATO STO Task Groups related to coalition issues and within the operational community. When training for operational requirements, personnel should be trained in a multinational context, and, if possible, the teams that will be working together in deployment should also train together. The NATO School Key Leader Training may accommodate this recommendation, which needs to complement training requirements. In addition, the expectations individuals have towards the mission and the kind of organisation they prefer needs to be taken into account. Several points could be used as a starting point to include individuals in a multinational HQ. Valaker et al. (2012) recommend integrating cultural adaptability education and training as a necessary pre-requisite to taking a NATO assignment. They also suggest establishing strict qualifi cation criteria for the manning of multinational HQs, including language profi ciency, to improve the contribution of all national individuals. In order to enhance the collaboration among military personnel but also with (local) civilians, they recommend developing the cultural awareness training of the personnel, participating in NATO multinational operations, and fostering intercultural competences. Facilitating information sharing between people and, consequently, the various countries operating in those multinational settings would also enable organisational effectiveness within a coalition HQ.

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65 LEADER AND TEAM ADAPTABILITY IN COALITION TEAMWORK

Dr. Janet Sutton Dr. Nancy Houston U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory NATO Allied Command AFMC 711th Human Performance Wing Transformation (ret) Human Eff ectiveness Directorate Human Factors Branch Technology and Human 1200 California Street #15A Wright-Patterson AFB OH, USA San Francisco, CA. 94109 2215 1st Street [email protected] [email protected]

ABSTRACT Future military operations will be characterised by joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) collaboration, and these operations will be business as usual by 2015 (Objective Force in 2015, White Paper, Final Draft, 2002). No matter what the type of mission, operational and team diversity will fl uctuate. The ability to appropriately adjust personal interaction strategies (i.e. “adaptability”) based on the environment is key for successful military transformation and will require individual and team adaptability. Research has shown a lack of skill in multinational teamwork to be a signifi cant barrier to adaptability (Klein & Pierce, 2001; Pierce, 2002). Cultural competence is a critical enabler of effective performance on planned and ad-hoc multinational teams. Barriers to cultural competence and cultural adaptability include perceptual, interpretive, and evaluative biases. Differences in culturally based perceptual patterns can be problematic given that interpretation and evaluation of behaviour is a critical element of teamwork. A number of research activities resulted in development of GlobeSmart Commander, a computer-based instructional program that can be used to develop and enhance cultural adaptability of military personnel.

1.0 INTRODUCTION Over the years, researchers have attempted to classify behaviours rooted in cultural values or cultural orientation that could affect social interactions, including those of multicultural teams. Most agree that there is a tendency for individuals of the same nationality to have similar behaviour patterns and that those behaviours vary by degree depending on where an individual’s values fall along a theoretical continuum. Questions asked included:

66 • Are there ineffi ciencies evident in a multinational military environment that can be attributed to scan inability of individuals to adapt? • What are the direct and indirect infl uences of national culture on military leadership and teamwork? • How do we train and educate individuals, leaders, and teams (military and non-military) on how to adapt their behaviour, as necessary, to avoid frustration, distrust, confl ict, etc.?

2.0 CULTURE, VALUES, AND BEHAVIOUR Culture is the totality of socially transmitted behaviour patterns, arts, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought typical of a population or community at any given time. It is the acquired knowledge used to interpret experience, form values, create attitudes and infl uence behaviour. Culture is derived from collective experiences arising from group´s social, political, and physical surroundings. Values are basic convictions that people have regarding what is right and wrong, good and bad, important and unimportant. Values are relatively stable, not subject to sudden shifts or impulses of the moment, and serve as a standard for judging the behaviour of others. Our behaviour refl ects both our culture and our values. Our surface or observable behaviour is impacted by values and assumptions that are not readily observable. No matter who we are, we receive information through one of the fi ve senses – capacities that we are born with. However, that information passes through a series of fi lters as our brain processes it. The work of Klein, Pongonis, and Klein provided a “Cultural Lens” model for looking at performance improvement on culturally diverse teams (Klein, Pongonis, & Klein, 2000). The work suggests that interactions among members of multinational teams will improve if team members could see the world through each other´s eyes. We all have our own patterns of thinking; feeling; and acting which we learned throughout our lifetime. Many of these fi lters been acquired in early childhood, because that is when we are most susceptible to learning and assimilating. Once patterns of thinking; feeling and acting have established themselves; we must unlearn these before we can learn something different; and unlearning is more diffi cult than learning for the fi rst time. Research has identifi ed national group differences in cognitions associated with thinking (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Norenzayan & Nesbett, 2000). Interpretation and evaluation of communications and events, a problem inherent in multicultural teamwork, is a barrier to cultural adaptability.

67 We are all subject to selective exposure (seeing what we want to see), selective attention (paying attention to things that are important to us, and selective retention (remembering what we want to remember). People tend to categorise their experiences, make assumptions about those experiences, and then draw conclusions regarding those experiences. For example if you were asked to “picture a fi re” what do you imagine? Some people would see a camp fi re while others might see a fi replace in a home or ski lodge and still others might see a house burning or a fi eld on fi re. These structured categories help individuals identify the same phenomenon through time. People categorise so that they may respond quickly and appropriately when in similar situations (Korzenny, 1984). Categorised information is framed within one’s own cultural context. Meaning is assigned to the categories and thinking, then, falls into embedded patterns. Therefore, assumptions about communications, people, and events may be inaccurate if the information was categorised incorrectly initially. Stereotyping is a form of categorisation that inhibits cultural adaptability when it is maintained in the face of contradictory experience and is used to evaluate others.

3.0 CULTURE TYPES AND IMPACTS There are many different types of culture. We often think of culture as the easily observable traits such as language, dress, and food; however, the unobservable traits may be the most important ones. Culture is shared (based on interaction), learned not inherited, evolves over time and consists of both observable and unobservable characteristics. There is no right or wrong culture – just cultures that are different from ours. Our cultural background helps us interpret experience, form values, create attitudes, and it infl uences our behaviour. National culture is the one that is probably the most obvious since it consists of readily observable traits such as customs and values associated with where we were born and raised as well as unobservable traits such as power relationships, attitudes, and expectations. In addition to culture that emerges from shared national experiences, cultural experiences emerge in organisations or professions. These cultures are learned, can have many subgroups and are about “how we do things around here.” Organisational cultures also have a high impact on our behaviour. People dress and act differently if they work for a large corporation like Deutsche Bank or IBM than if they work for Green Peace or McDonalds. Within the military there are different cultures for the different branches and even for different jobs in the same branch. Within military subcultures are air, land,

68 maritime, special operations, intelligence, etc. NATO has an organisational culture with subgroups including civilian and military cultures. So before our brains even get to the information processing stage, the information received has been fi ltered through both observable and non- observable cultural fi lters. These cultural dimensions impact our reasoning and judgment thus affecting our situation awareness and our ability to detect and solve problems. Thus, one of the fi rst problems that we have in sharing information and establishing shared situational awareness is that none of us sees the same piece of information in the same way because our “cultural lens” fi lters what we see and how we interpret it. We don’t see things as they are; we see them as we are. Our behaviour is shaped by history, religion, ethnic identity, language, and evolves in response to various outside pressures and infl uences. These behaviours and cultural biases can either enhance or damage mission execution. The ability to adapt, as necessary, to differences in cultural infl uences on behaviour is a key success factor for effective multinational teams. We can’t escape our cultural background but we can recognise the role of culture and develop an appreciation for the cultural backgrounds of others. Thus, the ability to adapt, as necessary, to differences in cultural infl uences on behaviour is a key success factor for effective multinational teamwork. When team members carry different culturally shaped expectations for roles and team processes it can make it more diffi cult to interpret and match commander’s intent (Granrose & Oskamp, 1997). Leaders and team members need cultural awareness to have knowledge of an adversary’s or allies’ motivation, intent, and will. A “culturally competent” person would attempt to look through another person’s “cultural lens” and understand the need to adapt their behaviour, as necessary, to ensure mission success. In fact, a key point here is to note is that people can adapt their own behaviour rather than expecting the other person to adapt. The following example, contributed by Meridian Eaton Global, illustrates three very different perspectives based on both national and organisational culture. From a German offi cer: “In my country, you speak up only if you have something important to add; silence is okay. In the U.S., however, people seem to feel it’s bad to be silent, and they will speak up, in a meeting for example just to let others know that they are there. Many of us interpret this behaviour of the Americans as either stupidity or arrogance…” From a British offi cer: “Why don’t the Americans down the hall just come and talk to me! They often leave me a voicemail instead of walking

69 10 seconds to my desk or calling to speak to me directly, even when they know that I’m here…This seems very cold and impersonal to me.” From an American offi cer: “I know I’ve been accused by my colleagues of leaving them too many voicemails, but from my perspective it’s simply a way of not interrupting them and giving them a message that they can listen to when they have time to deal with it.” Nowhere is the cultural diversity inherent in multinational teams more prevalent than at the operational level. Joint Task Force teams often have the capacity for more creative approaches to problem solving, but they can also experience diffi culties in coordination, aligning team members to complete tasks, and error-checking. In these culturally diverse groups, failure to understand the impact of culture on thoughts and behaviour often results in distrust, confused priorities, frustration, misunderstanding, even confl icting goals. Truly culturally adaptive leaders and teams have the ability to think and adapt faster than the enemy and to enable effective collaboration with coalition partners, especially in environments of uncertainty and ambiguity, and unfamiliar cultural circumstances. Individuals can have signifi cantly different culturally based cognitive biases that infl uence their behaviour. In concert with cognitive biases of others, these behaviours will either enhance or damage team performance. Leaders and team members who recognise those biases and understand the implication of culture’s impact on situation assessment, coordination, assigning of roles and responsibilities, and support behaviour are better prepared to adapt, as needed, to ensure mission success. Understanding the relationship between culture, behaviour and teamwork, and mission performance is critical. “Using one’s own cultural standards to evaluate the behaviours of other cultural groups occurs more frequently than misperception or misinterpretation of communications, people, situations, and events” (Adler, 1986). The link between culture and teamwork is made when it is understood that culturally based cognitive biases can infl uence behaviour that will ultimately enable, or hinder, team performance. Cultural differences may be seen within a team context. Pierce (2002) proposed that situation assessment, coordination, roles and responsibilities, and support behaviour are four fundamental aspects of team performance that are consistent across teams, multinational or not. Complexity introduced by culture can affect: • Information exchange including information about member resources and constraints, team tasks and goals or mission, environmental characteristics and constraints, or priority assignment among subtasks;

70 • Coordination of responses with task timing requirements or with responses of other members, including activity pacing, response sequencing, and time and position coordination; • Assigning roles and responsibilities such as the need for role interchange and the matching of member resources, skills, abilities, prior knowledge, task information, numbers, etc., to subtask requirements.; and • Support behaviour that are the processes of monitoring individual and team activity, identifying problems, and adjusting team and member activities in response to errors and omissions or the attainment or lack of attainment of standards of performance. All of the elements above contribute to effective teamwork and mission execution. The inability to adapt, as needed, to the infl uences of culture on thoughts and behaviour can result in imperfect situational awareness, which can lead to inaccurate situation assessment, and fl awed or delayed decision making. Understanding other cultural perspectives provides a foundation for dealing with cultural diversity in multinational teams. What can be done to help develop cultural adaptability?

4.0 TRAINING CULTURAL ADAPTABILITY Cultural adaptability refers to the ability to understand one’s own and others’ cognitive biases and to adapt, as necessary, to ensure successful team performance. This skill is comprised of three components: cultural competence, teamwork, and the desire and ability to adapt your behaviour. The foundation of cultural adaptability is cultural competence. Cultural competence is the ability to recognise that infl uences of thoughts and predisposition to action frequently have deep cultural roots. It is an understanding of the dominant values and orientations of each culture, keeping in mind that those values and orientations are not predictive of behaviour but do provide a guiding model. The second component of cultural adaptability is teamwork. Whether multinational or not, there are fundamental aspects of performance that are consistent across teams. There are two facets to adaptability, the third component of cultural adaptability. After recognising culturally based behaviours (i.e., cultural competence) and understanding the implication of those behaviours (i.e., teamwork), truly adaptable individuals (1) have knowledge about how to adapt their own behaviour when working with others whose culture is not their own, and (2) make a personal choice to adapt their behaviour, as needed, to enable effective teamwork.

71 The GlobeSmart® Commander is an instructional tool designed to provide military teams performing command and control functions at the operational level with the information and skills they need to adapt. This web-based tool was developed through a North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) Concept Development and Experimentation project. The techniques demonstrated to improve cultural adaptability can be applied across the broad spectrum of uses including humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping operations, counter-terrorism, and crisis management. The GlobeSmart Commander provides the fl exibility to serve decentralised, distributed, and highly mobile coalition headquarters as well as multicultural staff in centralised, co-located, and stationary headquarters. It facilitates a shortened learning curve for “coming-up-to-speed” when working in multinational environments and enables assessment of team effectiveness. Trainees can determine where they lie within each range of the six cultural dimensions addressed in the training that impact ways of working and performance. The dimensions refl ect culturally-based values identifi ed in the culture research literature and are: • Group Orientation (Independent vs. Interdependent) refers to preference for individual initiative and action or emphasises the interests of the team as a whole. Independent refers to an orientation to taking individual initiative and action. Interdependent refers to a more group-oriented approach to task completion, among other things, emphasising the interests of the team as a whole over individual needs or interests. • Power Distance (Egalitarian vs. Status) shapes preference for mutual consultation in decision making (i.e., an egalitarian relationship orientation) or for a greater deference to rank and hierarchy (i.e., a hierarchical relationship orientation). • Decision Risk Orientation shapes preference for rapid action and risk- taking (i.e., risk orientation) or for more cautious, calculated actions based on ample information (i.e., restraint orientation). • Task Accomplishment Methodology refers to a preference for immediate attention to getting the job done with less attention paid to establishing trusting relationships with others in order to accomplish the task or for establishing strong, trusting relationships within the team as a pre-requisite to task accomplishment. • Communication Style refers to a preference for direct, open and explicit communication or for more indirect communication with others where careful attention is paid to context or to implicit meanings in a given message. • Time Orientation refers to a preference for making choices on a narrow time-horizon (i.e., short-term time orientation) or for considering

72 the impact that choices will have over a longer span of time (i.e., long-term time orientation. The GlobeSmart® Commander computer-based training provides: • An introductory lesson to raise awareness of the impact of culture on individual and team performance including examples from the fi eld in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at subsequent multinational exercises; • A survey to identify one’s preferred style with regard to the behavioural dimensions discussed above (developed by Meridian Eaton Global with the assistance of Dr. David Matsumoto at San Francisco State University) • Creation of an individual’s profi le representing each of the six dimensions; • Six behavioural learning modules and one team training module; • The ability to learn about culturally-based behavioural profi les of many nations represented in the National Atlantic Treaty Organisation and Partnership for Peace as well as selected other nations. Each module begins with a video scene in which it is demonstrated how cultural differences can have a negative impact on team performance. A narrator then explains the key differences between the two sides of the particular cultural dimension represented in the model. For example, one video presents what can happen when one person has a direct style of communicating and another has an indirect communication style. The student is then allowed to look at that situation from both viewpoints and learn how the diffi cult situation could have been avoided. A series of interactive exercises is included in the training to ensure that students understand and can apply the lessons learned. The training highlights the importance of developing relationships and the impact that the perceived lack of trust based on cultural differences has on overall team performance. Ultimately, GlobeSmart® Commander teaches students how to recognise that certain behaviours can be culturally based and not indicative of personality or other personal characteristics of an individual. Better yet, the student will learn how to deal effectively with others whose viewpoint for decision-making or problem-solving is different from their own.

5.0 REFERENCES [1] Adler, N. J. (1986). International dimensions of organisational behaviour. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. [2] Fleishman, E. A., & Zaccaro, S.J. (1992). Toward a taxonomy of

73 team performance functions. In R.W. Swezey & E. Salas (Eds.) Teams: Their training and performance. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. [3] Granrose C. S. & Oskamp S. (1997), Cross-cultural work groups: an overview. The Clarmont Symposium on Applied Social Psychology. Sage Publications. [4] Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. [5] Houston, N. (2011, June). Human Challenges in NNEC. Paper presented at the 2011 NATO Network Enabled Capability Conference. [6] Houston, N. & Eshelman-Haynes, C. (2011). Cultural Aspects of Information Sharing and Collaboration. Militaire Spectator, 180(11), 480- 486. [7] Klein, G. & Pierce, L. G. (2001, June). Adaptive teams. Proceedings of the 2001 6th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium, Annapolis, MD: Department of Defence Cooperative Research Program. [8] Klein, H.A., Klein, G., & Mumaw, R.J. (2001). A review of cultural dimensions relevant to aviation safety. Wright State University, General Consultant Services Agreement 6-1111-10A-0112. [9] Klein, H.A., Pongonis, A., & Klein, G. (2000). Cultural barriers to multinational C2 decision making. Paper presented at the 2000 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. [10] Kluckhohn, F. & Strodtbeck, F. L. (1971). Variations in value orientation. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson. [11] Korzenny, B. A. G. (1984). Intercultural Communication Training for Adult Educators, Lifelong Learning Adult Years, 7(4), 7-9, 27. [12] Markus, H., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98(2), 224-253. [13] Norenzayan, A. & Nesbett, (2000). Culture and causal cognition. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9(4), 132-135. [14] Objective Force in 2015, White Paper, Final Draft (2002). http:// objective force.army.mil/pages/OFin2015WhitePaper(fi nal).pdf. [15] Pierce, L. G. (2002). Barriers to adaptability in a multinational team. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 46th Annual Meeting, 225-229. [16] Pierce, L. & Pomranky, R. (2001). The Chameleon Project for

74 adaptable commanders and teams. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 45th Annual Meeting, 513-517. [17] Sutton, J. L. (2003). Validation of cultural awareness training concept. Poster presented at the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 47th Annual Meeting, http://www.hfes.org/meetings/2004menu.html. [18] Sutton, J. L., & Edelmann, V. (2005). Proceedings of the 10th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium. Retrieved from http://www.dodccrp.org/10thICCRTS/Pres_track9.htm [19] Sutton, J. L., & Gundling, E. (2005). Enabling Cultural Adaptability. In C.A. Rodriguez & R. Poisson (Chairs), Strategies to maintain combat readiness during extended deployments – A human systems approach. Symposium conducted at the HFM-124/RSY, Prague, Czech Republic. [20] Sutton, J. L., & Pierce, L. G. (2003). A framework for understanding cultural diversity in cognition and teamwork. Proceedings of the 8th international Command and control Research and Technology Symposium, Washington, D.C.

75 THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE ORGANISATION: LEADERSHIP, TRAINING, AND ROTATION PRACTICES

Dr. Ann-Renee Blais Dr. Delphine Resteigne Defence Research and Chair of Sociology Development Canada, Toronto Royal Military Academy 1133 Sheppard Ave W., P.O. Box 2000 Avenue de la Renaissance 30 Toronto, ON M3M 3B9 1000 Brussels CANADA BELGIUM [email protected] [email protected]

ABSTRACT Our focus here will be on the people factor within the framework put forward by the NATO HFM-163 Task Group (i.e., improving the Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations). After describing the theoretical model, focusing on the people factor (i.e., leadership, training, and rotation practices) specifi cally, as well as summarising the method, we will briefl y describe and discuss the results obtained via a mixed-methods approach (i.e., a questionnaire and semi-structured interviews) at KFOR HQ (Kosovo). We will conclude with some implications for practice.

1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Review of the Theoretical Model The NATO HFM-163 Task Group (TG), drawing from the input of subject matter experts (SMEs) (Yanakiev, Lichacz, & Paris, 2012) and a review of the literature (Bisig, Hof, Valaker, Tresch, Seiler, & Bjornstad, 2012), defi ned organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs as “...the degree of fi t, or alignment, among various dimensions of organisational effectiveness such as organisational structure, processes, people, and culture towards the achievement of a main goal” (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 6). The TG also identifi ed two offi cial goals of NATO HQs: (a) implementing Non-Article 5 crisis response operations, and (b) providing effective Command and Control to the troops on the ground (Bisig et al., 2012). Because offi cial goals are not always readily assessable (Bisig et al., 2012), however, the TG further defi ned three operative goals (i.e., goals that management can use to evaluate organisational effectiveness): (a) the effective and timely sharing of information, (b) effective and timely decision making, and (c) an improved shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (see Bisig et al., 2012 for more detail).

76 Effective organisations ensure their offi cial and operative goals are aligned both in terms of their fi t with the external environment and in terms of their fi t with other factors internal to the organisation (Bisig et al., 2012). Consequently, the NATO HFM-163 TG identifi ed, from a review of existing models of organisational effectiveness (Bisig et al., 2012) as well as from SMEs’ experience with organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs (Yanakiev et al., 2012), four broad categories of internal factors particularly relevant to NATO HQs: (a) structure, (b) processes, (c) people, and (d) culture. Previous research has shown that these factors must be aligned towards the operative goals in order for the offi cial goals to be reached effectively (Bisig et al., 2012). Therefore, NATO HQs’ decisions with respect to their structure, processes, people, and culture ought to be in line with their operative goals. Figure 1 illustrates this theoretical model.

Figure 1: Model of Organisational Effectiveness (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 7, adapted)

1.2 The Role of the People in the Organisation The people factor, fundamental to the effectiveness of an organisation, and a crucial factor in many effectiveness models (Bisig et al., 2012), is the focus of this paper. Following upon the feedback of SMEs (Yanakiev et al., 2012), the NATO HFM-163 TG paid particular attention to the sub- categories leadership, training, and rotation practices.

1.2.1 Leadership In discussion with the NATO HFM-163 TG, SMEs mentioned the effectiveness of a HQ is, for the most part, a matter of leadership style (Bisig et al., 2012; Yanakiev et al., 2012). This fi nding is in line with the work of Bass and Avolio, and colleagues (e.g., Bass & Avolio, 1994), who have studied the impact of leadership style on organisational effectiveness extensively.

77 Transformational leaders enhance the morals, motivation, and morale of their followers (vs. transactional leaders, who attend to their followers’ immediate self-interests (Bass, 1999). In fact, transformational leadership entails moving followers beyond their immediate self-interests through charisma, inspiration, individualised consideration, or intellectual stimulation; it strives to elevate followers’ maturity levels, ideals, as well as their concerns for achievement, self-actualisation, and the wellbeing of others, the organisation, and society (Bass, 1994). The notions of transformational and transactional leadership can refer to teams or organisations as a whole; for example, members of transformational teams inspire each other, care about each other, and identify with their team’s goals, and organisational practices and policies can stimulate employee empowerment, esprit de corps, and creative fl exibility (Bass, 1994). A transformational leadership style has been associated with a long list of desirable individual- and organisational level outcomes, such as followers’ greater satisfaction with their leader, accrued effort, and increased ratings of leadership effectiveness (Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996). It also has been related to follower performance at the individual, group, and business unit levels (Howell & Avolio, 1993; Judge & Bono, 2000; Pillai & Meindl, 1998). Moreover, followers of transformational leaders typically display greater trust in their leaders and greater job satisfaction (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Bommer, 1996), as well as greater commitment to their organisations (Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996). With no doubt, the multinational aspect of leadership is critical in the context of NATO HQs. Leaders interacting with subordinates from the same cultural background tend to agree with their subordinates insofar as authority, objectives, responsibilities, possible courses of action, etc., are concerned, and as a result, the interactions normally are mutually satisfying and successful (Bisig et al., 2012). However, when the leader and subordinates come from different cultural backgrounds, their notions of leading and following tend to collide (Kьhlmann, 2005, as cited in Bisig et al., 2012). However, Bisig and colleagues noted that, within the context of transformation leadership, there is no need for cultural congruence; for example, Bass (1997; as cited in Bisig et al., 2012) showed transformational leadership was the (perceived) ideal leadership style not only in the United States, but also in such diverse countries/cultures as Canada, India, Japan, the Netherlands, and Singapore, and was consistently a greater predictor of success than were other leadership styles.

1.2.2 Training The NATO HFM-163 TG identifi ed training as another crucial factor in their model of organisational effectiveness (Bisig et al., 2012; Yanakiev

78 et al., 2012). The lack of proper training specifi c to working in coalition operations might be an impediment to organisational effectiveness in NATO HQs; indeed, Bisig et al. noted that, without adequate pre-deployment training, individuals lack key competencies (e.g., situational and cultural awareness) and end up working with virtual strangers without fi rst having been able to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities. The authors further speculated training is most likely to have a meaningful impact on the HQ’s operative goals when delivered within a job-specifi c and skills- focused context; for example, they argued that an important aspect of NATO pre-deployment training is the process of team building, because teams in multinational HQs are typically heterogeneous. As stated in Bisig et al. (2012), research on team heterogeneity and diversity has resulted into mixed fi ndings. While some authors have linked increased diversity to superior performance (perhaps in part because heterogeneous teams possess greater potential and richer perspectives), others have argued that increased diversity is associated with a lack of integration and greater dissatisfaction and hence has a negative impact on team effectiveness. Thus, heterogeneity appears to be infl uencing effectiveness via multiple channels that can be either performance enhancing (e.g., diversity, creativity) or reducing (e.g., low cohesion; see Bisig et al., 2012 for a more comprehensive review). Despite this confl icting evidence, the NATO HFM-163 TG highlighted the importance of pre-deployment training in promoting team cohesion as a mechanism to foster the innovative and creative potential of diverse teams. Bisig et al. (2012) noted that, even though future team members normally know their hierarchical position and task(s) during deployment, their integration only begins when they deploy (Ilgen, LePine, & Hollenbeck, 1999, as cited in Bisig et al., 2012). Bisig et al. argued that, without integration, team members cannot embrace the interpersonal activity that leads to shared awareness and collective strength, thus their participation is essential and should be encouraged as early as the pre-deployment training stage (Barzantny, 2005, as cited in Bisig et al., 2012). Beginning at that stage, the development of shared perceptions, attitudes, and values can lead, over time, to shared interpretations and understanding, thereby reducing potential misunderstandings (Maanen & Schein, 1979, in Bisig et al., 2012). It is worth noting, however, that this process requires some time and may only be possible in the long run; thus, it is likely more easily achievable for nations that have longer deployments/rotations than it is for those nations that have shorter ones.

79 1.2.3 Rotation Practices As a result of discussions with SMEs, the NATO HFM-163 TG identifi ed rotation practices in NATO HQs as another potential barrier to organisational effectiveness; the SMEs mentioned several problematic aspects of these practices including the absence of handover/mentoring programs, transition gaps, and the lack of synchronisation in national rotations (Bisig et al., 2012; Yanakiev et al., 2012). Studies on personnel rotation have revealed a number of possible causes for the negative impact of rotation practices on performance, according to Bisig et al. (2012). Hartman, Stoner, and Arora (1992, as cited in Bisig et al., 2012), for example, showed that newcomers have to acquire knowledge and skills concerning structure, processes, and equipment after each rotation. In addition, new members of the NATO HQ can experience frustration, isolation, and deprivation of a group identity (Harpaz, 2002, as cited in Bisig et al., 2012) or diffi culties in adopting new social structures and rules (DeSanctic & Poole, 1994; Tyre & Orlikowski, 1994, as cited in Bisig et al., 2012) which, as a result, can lead to lower organisational effectiveness.

1.3 Hypotheses Insofar as the people input factor is concerned, the NATO HFM- 163 TG hypothesised that, in order for a NATO HQ to have a greater likelihood of attaining its three operative goals, its leadership must endorse a transformational style, its staff must actively participate in NATO pre- deployment training, and its rotation practices must be coordinated (a comprehensive handover must also be assured (Bisig et al., 2012).

2.0 METHOD This section briefl y describes the materials, participants, and procedures used by the NATO HFM-163 TG to collect data via a mixed-methods (i.e., quantitative and qualitative) approach (see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail). 2.1 Questionnaire 2.1.1 Materials The 89-item questionnaire included several background questions pertaining to the participant’s age, sex, nationality, fi rst language, rank (if military), etc., and items designed to adequately represent/cover all of the input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) and output (i.e., operative goals) factors in the theoretical model previously described (see Figure 1; for more information on the full content of the questionnaire, see Blais et al., 2012).

80 As described extensively in Blais et al. (2012), with respect to the people factor, the participants rated the level of transformational leadership (e.g., “My superior consistently drives for better outcomes.”) and the effi ciency of the rotation practices (e.g., “The different rotation cycles reduce our performance.”) within the HQ. Those participants who had taken part in NATO or national pre-deployment training prior to joining the HQ also evaluated the effectiveness of their pre-deployment training in preparing them for their work in the HQ (e.g., “Pre-deployment training helped me understand the informal social network”, Blais et al., 2012). With respect to the output factors, the participants evaluated the effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “We seek information as needed.”) and decision making (e.g., “Organisational decisions are made in a timely manner.”) within the HQ, as well as the shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (e.g., “The mission is clear”, Blais et al., 2012). 2.1.2 Participants and Procedure One hundred and three military members (as well as 33 civilian KFOR HQ personnel, but these results will not be discussed further here), citizens of 24 NATO and PfP countries, and originating from various HQ branches completed the questionnaire (see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail regarding the demographic composition of the sample). Data collection took place in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo (refer to Blais et al., 2012, for more information on the procedure). The participants completed the questionnaire in a conference facility in groups of approximately 25 participants. The chair of NATO HFM RTG- 163 introduced the multinational research team as well as the goals of the research. He also informed the participants the survey was completely anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary. Each testing session lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes.

2.2 Interviews 2.2.1 Materials In line with the questionnaire, the semi-structured interview protocol tapped into the theoretical model previously described (see Figure 1). It included background questions as well as items pertaining to the input and output factors (for more information on the full content of the protocol, see Blais et al., 2012). The interviewers asked the participants to describe the HQ with respect to each input factor, including leadership (e.g., “How would you describe the

81 leadership in this HQ? By leadership we mean how the leader communicates and interacts with his subordinates.”), training, (e.g., “What kind of pre- deployment training did you receive [national, NATO, other, none]?”), and rotation practices (e.g., “Briefl y describe the rotation process in this HQ.”). In addition, the interviewers inquired about unique aspects of the factor (e.g., “Does the leadership style vary [nations, branches, persons, situations]?,” “What works well/not so well?”, “Could you give some examples?”). The interviewers asked the participant to share their perceptions in regards to the effectiveness and timeliness of information sharing (e.g., “How does information sharing work in this HQ?”) and decision making (e.g., “How does decision making work in this HQ?”) within the HQ and the level of shared awareness (e.g., “To what extent is there a shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities in this HQ?”) within the HQ. The interviewers probed for additional information by asking: (a) what worked (i.e., in terms of the output factor) well/did not and why; (b) about the most critical aspect(s) (i.e., in terms of the input factors) infl uencing (positively or negatively) the output factor; and (c) how the output factor could be improved. 2.2.2 Participants and Procedure As with the questionnaire data, the qualitative data collection took place over fi ve days in October 2010 in KFOR HQ, Pristine, Kosovo (refer to Blais et al., 2012, for more information on the procedure). Members of the NATO RTO HFM-163 TG conducted a total of 15 interviews, with the participants being mainly at the Assistant Chief of Staff level, covering J1- J5, J8, Headquarters Support Group, different structures of the MCA, and JIC. Thirteen of the participants were military offi cers (i.e., Colonel or Lt Colonel), and the participants were citizen of 10 NATO and PfP nations. The interviewers worked in pairs: One of them asked the questions, while the other researcher recorded the interview and asked additional questions as needed. Before starting the interview, the interviewers informed the participant the interview was completely anonymous and their participation was entirely voluntary, and they asked for the participant’s permission to be audio-recorded. Each interview lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes.

3.0 RESULTS 3.1 Questionnaire As shown in Figure 2, the 103 participants rated the HQ as above average (i.e., with “average” being about 2.5 out of 5) with respect to the effectiveness of its rotation practices and its level of transformational

82 leadership (Blais et al., 2012). Of those 103 participants, the 73 participants who had taken part in some form of pre-deployment training (i.e., NATO or national) evaluated that training as above average (Blais et al., 2012). As Figure 3 displays, participants perceived the KFOR HQ as operating with above average effectiveness and timeliness insofar as information sharing and decision making were concerned, as well with above average levels of shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (Blais et al., 2012).

Figure 2: Mean Ratings on the Input Factors (N = 103; Blais, Lyons, Bjornstad, & Moeser-Whittle, 2012)

Figure 3: Mean Ratings on the Operative Goals (N = 103; Blais et al., 2012)

83 The results associated with the quantitative data modelling showed a greater level of transformational leadership was predictive of more effective and timely information sharing and decision making within the NATO HQ (but there were no relationships between these factors and the level of shared awareness within the HQ; see Blais et al., 2012, for more detail regarding the multiple regression analyses. Contrary to the hypotheses, rotating practices were not related to the operative goals (Blais et al., 2012). For those participants who had taken part into some form (i.e., NATO or national) of pre-deployment training prior to joining the HQ, more effective training was indicative of more effective and timely decision making within the HQ (but there were no relationships between training effectiveness and the other operative goals (Blais et al., 2012).

3.2 Interviews 3.2.1 Leadership According to Bisig, Granasen, Valaker, and Marklund (2012), the participants (i.e., interviewees) had a very positive view of the leadership at NATO HQ. They referred to the highest-level leadership in a positive fashion, describing it as rather formal and typical of a military HQ with a clearly-defi ned chain of command and rules (Bisig et al., 2012). Within the branch, they described the leadership style as less formal as well as “inclusive,” “respectful,” and “supportive,” among other positive characteristics, and several participants emphasized their superiors were approachable and open to suggestions prior to making decisions (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 7). The interviewees also highlighted that not only did their superiors encouraged discussion (e.g., open discussion could take place without rank being a factor within this HQ) but also offered guidance and enough time to solve tasks (Bisig et al., 2012). On the other end, Bisig et al. noted that one of the participants felt military members did not easily accept civilians, leading to communication problems between civilian and military personnel. As a further example of effective leadership, Bisig et al. (2012) reported that some of the participants mentioned the Commander’s daily briefi ngs, which, according to the interviewees, contributed to a common view of priorities, a better understanding of the Commander’s intent, and a forum for information sharing. Several of the participants mentioned the sharing of information and interactions as crucial aspects of effective leadership. For example, one of the participants pointed out that information sharing ought to be better in multinational HQs than in national HQs as a result of the frequent rotations in multinational HQs (Bising et al., 2012).

84 3.2.2 Training Because pre-deployment training is a national responsibility, the extent and quality of the training received obviously differed between participants. Bisig et al. (2012) reported that some of the participants had taken part in national training only, while other had received both national and international training. Prior to being deployed, most of the participants had completed the two-week KFOR Key Leader Training course located at the KFOR HQ, according to Bisig et al.; this training was well received, in that the participants thought it facilitated the early days of deployment, and many of them stated the course should be mandatory. The interviewees discussed training in light of personal experience and of whether or not the position was a staff or fi eld position, with fi eld positions requiring more training (Bisig et al., 2012). They stressed that training should be mandatory given the constant changes in the HQ, however they also recognized that second or third deployments required less training (Bisig et al., 2012). Insofar as the content of pre-deployment training was concerned, the participants mentioned cultural training, training regarding the political situation in Kosovo, training pertaining to the structure and operations of KFOR as well as to the technical resources available in the HQ, and time management and language (for non-native English speakers) training would be highly desirable, according to Bisig et al.

3.2.3 Rotation Practices Bisig et al. (2012) noted that most of the participants had experienced a handover/takeover (HOTO) period of one to two weeks: For those participants who had taken part in a two-week HOTO, they typically took a “back-seat” role (i.e., mainly observing what their predecessor was doing) in the fi rst week and switched places with their predecessor in the second week, doing most of the work under supervision. However, the time committed to the HOTO, as well as its process, varied between nations (Bisig et al., 2012). The participants considered two weeks to be suffi cient, and some even mentioned one week might be enough provided new personnel had previous deployment experience (Bisig et al., 2012). According to Bisig et al., one of the participants stressed that administrative in- and out-processing issues were very time consuming, and that, in the case of a two-week HOTO, half of that time was spent dealing with such issues. The interviewees expressed the general opinion that the HOTO process together with the short rotation cycles reduced the effectiveness of the HQ by impeding institutional memory, which in turn increased the time required

85 to learn the work (Bisig et al., 2012). The participants in the MCA division felt this is was particularly true in their case, given their close personal relationship with the members of the Kosovo Security Forces (Bisig et al., 2012). According to Bisig et al., they stressed that developing these relationships was especially challenging in this context, because nations did not always send personnel with the right competencies, and because the assignments were simply too short. On the positive side, one of the participants expressed the opinion that rotations were positive in that they brought “new eyes and new solutions” to the HQ (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 9). However, the interviewees’ opinions diverged with respect to whether or not rotations should be concentrated to a few times a year or evenly spread out by branch (Bisig et al., 2012). They mentioned that, in the MCA division, for example, evenly-spread rotations were necessary due to the need to maintain good relations with the Kosovo Security Forces; other participants believed that if the rotations were concentrated to a few times a year, effi ciency would be improved in the HQ (Bisig et al., 2012). Of note, one of the participants stressed the Chief and Deputy should not rotate at the same time (Bisig et al., 2012). In closing, Bisig et al. (2012) emphasised the importance of well-trained personnel matching the demands of their job, deployment experience, and well-planned and suffi ciently long HOTO periods as critical in fostering an effective HQ, despite its ever-changing personnel.

3.2.4 Relations to Operative Goals According to Bisig et al. (2012), the participants linked effective leadership to increased information sharing through the Commander’s daily briefi ngs (see Figure 4 for a representation of this relationship), to improved decision making through openness to suggestions/opinions and suffi cient time to solve tasks, as well as to greater shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities also through the briefi ngs, which the participants thought helped create a common picture of priorities and understanding of the Commander’s intent. As far as pre-deployment training was concerned, the participants in Bisig et al. (2012) highlighted its positive impact on the rotation practices; they believed training reduced the loss of effectiveness during the HOLO period. The participants also stressed training led to a better understanding of the structure and processes of the HQ thereby increasing shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (Bisig et al., 2012).

86 Figure 4. Th e Relationships between Leadership and the Operative Goals (Bisig et al., 2012, p. 8)

With respect to rotation practices, the participants brought up their negative impact on information sharing, due to organisational memory loss; they also stressed that information sharing ought to be more effective in multinational (vs. national) HQs because of the frequent rotations in multinational HQs (Bisig et al., 2012). Even though rotation practices had a positive impact on decision making trough a regular input of fresh perspectives, they also resulted into a negative impact on decision making in the cases where the Chief and Deputy rotated in/out simultaneously (Bisig et al., 2012). Lastly, according to Bisig et al., the participants stressed the negative effect of rotation practices on the shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities, in that they, again, linked rotations to organisational memory loss. 3.2.5 Suggestions for Improvement At the end of the interview, each participant had the opportunity to make suggestions as to how to improve the effectiveness of the HQ. Bisig et al. (2012) summarised these suggestions which included, with respect to the people factor: (a) hold motivational meetings of the Commander with key leaders/staff where the Commander shares his goals and says “thank you;” (b) fi ll positions for at least a year; (c) spread rotations more evenly during the year; (d) improve training; and (e) send preparation packages to HQ personnel prior to deployment.

87 4.0 DISCUSSION The NATO HFM-163 TG aimed to develop and test a model of organisational effectiveness in operational NATO HQs via a multi-methods approach. The model described input (i.e., structure, processes, people, and culture) factors, the operative goals of the organisation (i.e., effective and timely sharing of information and decision making, and shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities), and the relationships between the input factors and operative goals. The TG identifi ed the four categories of input factors and the three operative goals based upon interviews with SMEs (Yanakiev et al., 2012) and existing general and military models of organisational effectiveness (Bisig et al., 2012), also emphasising factors of particular relevance to military HQs (e.g., rotation practices) (Valaker et al., 2012). With respect to the people factor in particular, the TG hypothesised that, in order for a NATO HQ to have a greater likelihood of attaining its three operative goals, its leadership must endorse a transformational style, its staff must actively participate in NATO pre-deployment training, and its rotation practices must be coordinated (a comprehensive handover must also be assured; Bisig et al., 2012). 4.1 Conclusions In line with the hypotheses, the results associated with the quantitative data modelling found a greater level of transformational leadership was predictive of more effective and timely information sharing and decision making within the NATO HQ (Blais et al., 2012). Blais et al. also reported that, for those participants who had taken part into some form of pre- deployment training prior to joining the HQ, more effective training was indicative of more effective and timely decision making within the HQ. The qualitative data also refl ected the importance of an effective style of leadership and its ties to the operative goals (Bisig et al., 2012). The interviewees had a remarkably homogenous view of what they considered to be effective leadership in the context of a multinational HQ, according to Bisig et al. In line with the quantitative results, the interviewees believed effective leadership had a marked positive infl uence on both information sharing and decision making (Bisig et al., 2012). This fi nding resonates with previous research in that it suggests military leaders are not merely engaging in planning and analytic thinking (Resteigne and Soeters (2009), as cited in Valaker et al., 2012), in their study of military leaders at Kabul Airport, found they often acted based upon their intuition and devoted a lot of time to building interpersonal relationships. Another people factor the interviewees particularly focused on was pre-deployment training as a means to reduce the loss in effectiveness

88 caused by the frequent rotations of personnel (Valaker et al., 2012). They also emphasized its positive impact on shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities through its fostering of a common understanding of the HQ’s structure and processes (Valaker et al., 2012). 4.2 Limitations The greatest strength of the NATO HFM-163 TG resides without a doubt in its empirical test of a theoretical model of organisational effectiveness via a multi-methods approach. Valaker et al. (2012), however, acknowledged that the work’s focus on the organisational effectiveness of a Coalition’s HQ implementing Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation and on the internal processes in this HQ limited the external validity (i.e., generalisability) of its fi ndings to other contexts. The authors noted that they tested their model in the relatively peaceful Kosovo and the KFOR HQ, hence high intensity confl ict situation HQs or static HQs may experience very different realities. Valaker et al. also mentioned causality could not be inferred given the nature of the data collection; longitudinal data should be collected in the future, with the relationships between the input and output factors investigated over time. Furthermore, Valaker et al. stressed the fact that the quantitative analyses were based upon a single (i.e., self-reporting) method, thereby potentially reducing the validity of these results, and that the small sample size decreased the likelihood of fi nding signifi cant relationships in the data.

4.3 Implications for Practice Valaker et al. (2012) concluded with practical implications drawn from the overall work of the NATO HFM-163 TG; for example, they suggested training in transformational leadership to enhance common attitudes in NATO HQs. They emphasised the inconsistency in the level of HOLO information and the diffi culty in infl uencing pre-deployment national training but noted that expanding key leader training in the HQ to personnel other than the leaders could help train personnel better (Valaker et al., 2012). Valaker et al. also suggested the fostering of cohesion and common understanding through joint, multinational, pre-deployment training for all personnel and the harmonisation of the rotation cycles among national positions in the HQ and synchronise the national rotations of troops.

5.0 REFERENCES [1] Barling, J., Weber, T., & Kelloway, E. K. (1996). Effects of transformational leadership training on attitudinal and fi nancial outcomes: A fi eld experiment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81, 827-832.

89 [2] Bass, B. M. (1999). Two decades of research and development in transformational leadership. European Journal of Work and Organisational Psychology, 8, 9-32. [3] Bass, B. M. & Avolio, B. J. (Eds.). (1994). Improving organisational effectiveness through transformational leadership. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. [4] Bisig, E., Granansen, M., Valaker, S., & Marklund, J. (2012). Chapter 6: Interview Analysis. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 6-1 – 6-21). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [5] Bisig, E., Hof, T., Valaker, S., Szvircsev Tresch, T., Seiler, S., & Bjornstad, A.L. (2012). Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Model. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 3-1 – 3-17). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM- 163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [6] Blais, A.-R., Granansen, M., Bisig, E., Bjornstad, A. L., Hof, T., Lichacz, F., Lyons, J.J., Moser-Whittle, E. A., Valaker, S., & Yanakiev, Y. (2012). Chapter 4: Method. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 4-1 – 4-6). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [7] Blais, A.-R., Lyons, J.J., Bjornstad, A.L., & Moser-Whittle, E.A. (2012). Chapter 5: Results. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 5-1 – 5-13). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [8] Howell, J. M., & Frost, P.J. (1989). A laboratory study of charismatic leadership. Organisational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 43, 243-269. [9] Judge, T. A., & Bono, J. E. (2000). Five-factor model of personality and transformational leadership. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 751-765. [10] Lowe, K. B., Kroeck, K. G., & Sivasubramaniam, N. (1996). Effectiveness correlates of transformational and transactional leadership: A meta-analytic review of the MLQ literature. Leadership Quarterly, 7, 385-425. [11] Pillai, R. & Meindl, J. R. (1998). Context and charisma: A “meso” level examination of the relationship of organic structure, collectivism, and crisis to charismatic leadership. Journal of Management, 24, 643-664.

90 [12] Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., & Bommer, W. H. (1996). Transformational leader behaviors and substitutes for leadership as determinants of employee satisfaction, commitment, trust, and organisational citizenship behaviours. Journal of Management, 22, 259-298. [13] Valaker, S., Blais, A.-R., Granansen, M., Bjornstad, A.L., Lichacz, F., Yanakiev, Y., Cohen, I., Resteigne, D., & Bisig, E. (2012). Chapter 7: Discussion. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 7-1 – 7-8). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [14] Yanakiev, Y., Lichacz, F., & Paris, C. (2012). Chapter 2: Results of Subject Matter Expert Focus Group Discussions. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 2-1 – 2-6). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.

91 HOW TO REDUCE THE CHALLENGES OF A MULTINATIONAL CONTEXT? (IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE)

Capt. (BGR-N) Prof. D. Sc. Yantsislav Yanakiev 82 Evlogi & Hristo Georgievi, Blvd., 1504, Sofi a, Bulgaria G. S. Rakovski National Defence Academy Defence Advanced Research Institute [email protected]

ABSTRACT This paper presents and analyses a number of lessons learned and implications for the practice regarding possible options to reduce the challenges of a multinational context. They are summarised in the following groups: (1) Political-military decision-making when multinational operations are planned and executed; (2) Professional military education and training for the participants in multinational operations and missions; (3) Processes improvement strategies in a multinational HQs; (4) Developing a new organisational culture in the post-modern Armed Forces; (5) Building up and developing of competences for multicultural communication; (6) Enhancing the leadership training of military for their participation in multinational military operations; (7) Enhancing the individual, organisational and national trust among coalition partners; (8) Specialised English language training; (9) Development of scientifi c applied researches for identifi cation of factors infl uencing the effectiveness of the integration of the military in a multinational and multicultural environment. The analysis of the results from NATO STO HFM Task Group HFM-163 “Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations” is expected to further deepen theory and expertise on managing multi-nationality in coalition operations to successfully meet the desired end state of these operations.

1.0 INTRODUCTION During the post-Cold War era there has been a signifi cant increase in the number of military operations that involving many nations willing to contribute forces as part of multinational coalitions. These coalitions have to execute a variety of operations like peacekeeping, peace enforcement, anti-terrorist, confl ict prevention, restoring stability, search and rescue, humanitarian aid, etc. The process of internationalisation of the military, participating in coalition operations and multinational formations like NATO Rapid

92 Reaction Force is among the most important distinctiveness of the post- modern defence organisations (Moskos, Williams & Segal, 2000). Researchers and practitioners agree that the political legitimacy of a given operation, the acceptance by the local population and the cost- effectiveness of the mission are among the most important advantages of these multinational coalitions. At the same time, the effectiveness of the multinational forces has been a controversial issue over a long period of time. Recent studies show that the main turbulences that could diminish the effectiveness of international coalitions are different goals, differences in logistics, education and training of troops, different doctrines, intelligence sharing and language barriers as well as leadership skills (Stewart, et al., 2004; Soeters & Szvircsev Tresch, 2010). In addition, different national and organisational cultures, concepts of tactics and mission planning, different disciplinary codes, different command and control systems, equipment and armament, and payment differences can be viewed as challenges to the coalitions’ effectiveness (Klein & Haltiner, 2005). Moreover, Sutton and Pierce identifi ed national cultural behaviours associated with high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance to clearly impact team performance in the areas of situation assessment, coordination, assigning roles and responsibilities, and support behaviour (Sutton & Pierce, 2003; Sutton, Pierce at all., 2006). The factors described above operate as organisational and cultural barriers to effective collaboration in multinational settings, and are related, to a large extent, to the preparation of military leaders and teams to work in a coalition environment. To summarise, multinational coalition forces are complex assemblies of people, both military and civilians, representing diverse national and organisational cultures, with different education and training, doctrines and concepts, organisational structures, decision-making procedures, etc. In such a complex situation the question how to manage multinationality in order to reduce the challenges of a multinational context turns into one of the most important components of the improved global cooperation in current and future military operations.

2.0 BACKGROUND The conclusions and recommendations in this paper are based on 4-year research project implemented by a multinational research team of NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Task Group Human factors and Medicine (HFM) -163 “Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations”. Researchers from 10 NATO, Partnership for peace (PfP) and Mediterranean Dialog (MD) countries contributed to the team

93 work (Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the U.S.). In addition, NATO ex-offi cio bodies were represented in the group (NATO School – member, NATO ACT and NATO Defence College – observers). The entire technical report was recently published by NATO Science and technology Organisation (STO) in 2012 and it is available online for any interested colleague (Yanakiev & Horton (Eds.), 2012). The analysis of the results from NATO STO Task Group Human Factors and Medicine (HFM) -163 is expected to further deepen theory and expertise on managing multi-nationality in coalition operations to successfully meet the desired end state of these operations. We believe that the conclusions and recommendations will help improving political-military decision-making regarding participation of the military in international coalition operations. Some of the conclusions might be useful also for improving professional military education and training to work in multinational environment. The most important of the practical implication are summarised in the following rows.

3.0 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS A number of implications for the practice regarding possible options to reduce the challenges of a multinational context can be summed up in several groups. They are not ordered strictly in accordance with their importance. The goal was to identify most important factors that enable or hinder successful multinational cooperation in current military operations and to apply a system approach to reduce the challenges of multinationality. In this sense all of the suggestions are equally important and they must be viewed as system to be adequate to the complex character of the multinational coalition operations. The fi rst group of issues concerns political-military decision-making when multinational operations are planned and executed. First of all, clear and stable goals and tasks as well as comprehensive approach to doctrines and concepts are a must to ensure common understanding of mission end-states among coalition partners. In addition, the effectiveness of coalition operations strongly depends on reducing the capability and technology gaps amongst the coalition partners and enhancing the technological interoperability in national systems to improve information sharing and cooperation among different contributing nations in the coalition. Last but not least, the decision-makers should minimise the restrictive national caveats in the employment of the troops during the operation. This is an important issue that directly infl uences the level of trust among the coalition partners.

94 Second group of issues relates to professional military education and training for the participants in multinational operations and missions. Having in mind the nature of current military operations, one can identify joint, multinational and interagency education of the military leaders as a key factor for coalition operations effectiveness. In addition, cohesion and a common understanding can be created by joint, multinational pre- deployment training when possible for all members of the organisation. Joint efforts and shared experiences create the power. Besides, it would be useful for the leaders to receive education in broader scale that develops their social competencies and builds new skills corresponding to the new tasks performed in these operations. This includes knowledge and skills how to interact with civilian agencies; how to work with local population and local authorities in the host country; how to react in hostage situations; how to restore public order; how to handle media, etc. It is very important to promote understanding among the military professionals and to help them identify many actors (diplomatic, military, NGOs, media, etc.) They should be prepared to assist the work of the civilian organisations and to understand the way these organisations work. Apart from this, the issue about developing and maintaining a national system for deriving lessons-learned and including them into the training of the participants in multinational operations and missions deserves particular attention. The third group of practical implications covers processes improvement strategies in multinational HQs. One of the most important steps is to facilitate the information sharing as an enabler of organisational effectiveness within a coalition HQ. This can enhance mutual trust and confi dence among coalition partners. In addition, the synchronisation of the rotation timeframes among national positions in the HQ and the national rotations of troops is also factor that can improve the organisational effectiveness of the multinational formations. Moreover, it is very important to build HQs as learning organisations, i.e. to improve the organisational knowledge trough a streamlined lessons learned process. To achieve this goal it would be useful to introduce an effective mentoring program to support hand-over procedures for the key command and staff positions in a multinational HQ. Last but not least, a special attention must be paid on manning and assigning the right qualifi ed people on the right positions in order to guarantee the unproblematic integration of the military and civilian personnel in multinational setting. The fourth group of recommendations relates to the necessity of developing a new organisational culture in the post-modern Armed Forces, which to be interoperable with those of the NATO allies and other coalition partners. Focus must be on such identifi ed problems as insuffi ciently

95 developed culture of sharing information with coalition partners, the existing culture of a fear of making wrong decisions, lack of skills for creating and developing informal social networks which is important for the implementation of the tasks of a multinational coalition, etc. This way the process of improving the human interoperability in coalition operations will be supported. The fi fth group of recommendations is especially devoted to building up and developing of competences for multicultural communication, i.e. of cultural adaptability and cross-cultural competence when working in a multinational environment. It is highly necessary to undertake actions for including a specialised training of the military in the subject of multicultural communication aiming to an open and receptive approach to the foreign culture of the local population as well as of the colleagues from other nationalities. Training and developing of cross-cultural competence is to be an imminent part of the professional military qualifi cation. Attention must be drawn to the specifi cs of national and organisational (military) culture of the coalition partners, the leadership styles of command, system of values, ethics and morality, habits and customs. Also, the process has to include a general knowledge of the region of the mission, history and culture of the local population. This way the military will perform their tasks better and the local population will accept them easier. Last but not least, the military leaders should be provided with suffi cient information in order to understand the culture of the adversary, particularly when participate in counter-terrorist operations. It would be useful to think of the integration of the existing knowledge in the sphere of the factors which infl uence the effectiveness of the work of military in a multinational environment and the acquired from the practice experience. They should become subjects in the training focused on the development of cultural adaptability across NATO-member states and a Joint Publication be offered in order this training meant to build up and develop multicultural communication competences in coalition environment to be standardised. Some training tools have been already developed to improve the quality of cross-cultural competence enhancement such as GlobeSmart® Commander and Cross- Cultural Competence Trainer (See: www.globesmartcommander.com; www.defenseculture.org). Briefl y, the cultural adaptability education and training should become a necessary pre-requisite to take an international assignment. The sixth group of recommendations relates to the need of enhance the leadership training of military for their participation in multinational military operations. Our study undoubtedly shows that leadership and the leadership style are among the most important factors which infl uence

96 upon effectiveness of coalition operations. Sometimes the diametrically different leadership styles and the systems for training of leaders in the coalition deserve a special attention. The good leadership is critical for operational effectiveness. There is a need of strong leader who listen to people, who can make decisions quickly, and who can make the best of a bad situation. The leader in multinational operations must be adaptable to change, i.e. to develop the ability to learn from mistakes and quickly adjust to the situation. All these impose the necessity of implying effort for standardising the leadership training in NATO, developing and adopting common requirements and approaches to training leaders, especially when they are prepared for participation in coalition operations. The seventh group of suggestions is focused on the ways to enhance the individual, organisational and national trust among coalition partners. One of the statements used most frequently by the respondents in our study is that the professionalism and responsibility leads to higher respect on behalf of the colleagues from the other nations. In addition, they think that it is important everyone to communicate with respect, regardless of the size of the national contingent, rank and the previous experience in international missions. Moreover, honesty and openness in relations with foreign colleagues contributes to the increasing of mutual trust. Likewise, mutual understanding and support among the colleagues from different nationalities will be achieved by stimulating social networking and the development of informal networks. These are among the key factors for improving teamwork in multinational setting and successful task accomplishment. The eighths group of recommendations relates to the specialised language training. Apparently, the specialised language training of the military is still a problem which impairs their effective integration in a multinational environment. It would be better if the will to solving this problem focuses on both, their general language training (e.g. problems in understanding English spoken by native speaker, use of idioms, abbreviations, contractions, etc.), as well as culturally differentiated attitudes when working in a multinational environment. It is crucial the language to be accepted as a bearer of a specifi c culture towards which we tend to adapt. Apart from this, a special attention is to be paid on the specialised language training (English for Special Purposes) which to improve the knowledge and skills in using military terminology, studying documents, forms, procedures, etc. applied in a NATO staff/ mission. Only after overcoming the above-mentioned shortfalls a common understanding will be assured, which we believe is fundamental for the successful integration in multinational teamwork.

97 Last but not least in their importance come the recommendations related with the development of scientifi c applied researches for identifi cation of factors infl uencing the effectiveness of the integration of the military in a multinational and multicultural environment. One of the core topics that needs further development is the one connected with the trust between coalition partners and the factors which infl uence the formation of this attitude. This is of a great importance because current research shows that trust links with the attitude and readiness to share information among coalition partners which has an impact on the organisation and effectiveness of the coalition. Along with this, a priority should be given to the topic of human performance improvement in current military operations which applies to NATO Long Term Capability Requirements. The experience gained in the implementation of joint multinational projects in the framework of the NATO Science and Technology Organization will be of a great use in this respect and will support the process of the management decision making in the training and participation of the military in multinational coalition operations.

4.0 LESSONS LEARNED1 In this last part of the paper some lessons learned with respect to improvement of organisational effectiveness of coalition operations are summarised based on the results from our study. 4.1 Political-military Decision-making when Multinational Operations are Planned and Executed • Set clear, stable goals and tasks to ensure common understanding of mission end-states among coalition partners. • Apply a comprehensive approach to doctrines and concepts to enhance the organisational effectiveness of coalition operations. • Harmonise national and NATO education and training systems. • Increase the level of NATO pre-deployment training. • Minimise the capability and technology gaps among the coalition partners, and enhance the “technological interoperability” in national systems to improve information sharing and cooperation among the different troop-contributing nations in the coalition.

1 This part of the paper builds upon Valaker, S., Blais, A.-R., Granansen, M., Bjornstad, A. L., Lichacz, F., Yanakiev, Y., Cohen, I., Resteigne, D., & Bisig, E. (2012). Chapter 7: Discussion. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 7-1 – 7-8). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.

98 • Minimise the restrictive national caveats in the employment of the troops during the operation as a means to enhance the coalition operation’s effectiveness.

4.2 Professional Military Education and Training for the Participants in Multinational Operations and Missions • Create cohesion and a common understanding by joint, multinational, pre-deployment training when possible for all members of the organisation to include leadership. • In addition to traditional military education, provide broader-scale education for the military leaders that develop their social competencies. • Promote understanding among the military professionals to help them identify many actors (diplomatic, military, NGOs, media, etc.) in modern military operations. • Maintain a national system for deriving lessons-learned and including them into the training of the participants in multinational operations. 4.3 Process Improvement Strategies in NATO HQs • Adopt NATO standards as a must for all daily procedures. • Harmonise the rotation timeframes among national positions in the HQ and synchronise the national rotations of troops to improve the organisational effectiveness of the multinational formations. • Build HQs as learning organisations, i.e. to improve the organisational knowledge trough a streamlined lessons learned process. • Introduce an effective mentoring program to support handover procedures for the key command and staff positions in multinational HQs. • Enhance mutual trust and confi dence, encourage members of the HQ to freely express their opinions and beliefs. • Establish a process of social networking and the development of informal networks as a key factor for improving organisational effectiveness and successful task accomplishment. • Establish a clear and common understanding of HQ tasks and responsibilities. • Facilitate the information sharing as an important enabler of organisational effectiveness within a coalition HQ. • Focus special attention on manning and assigning the right qualifi ed people on the right positions in order to guarantee the unproblematic integration of the military and civilian personnel in multinational setting. • Establish strict qualifi cation criteria for the manning of multinational

99 HQs, including language profi ciency to improve the contribution of all national individuals. 4.4 Building up and Developing Cultural Adaptability and Cross- Cultural Competence when working in a Multinational Environment • Training and developing of cross-cultural competence is to be an imminent part of the professional military edukation. • Integrate the cultural adaptability education and training as a necessary pre-requisite to take a NATO assignment. • Apply modern training tools that have been already developed to improve the quality of cross-cultural competence enhancement such as GLOBESMART® COMMANDER and Cross-Cultural Competence Trainer. • Enhance cultural adaptability across NATO-member states via development of Allied Joint Publication on Cross-Cultural Education and Training.

4.5 Enhancement of the Leadership Training of the Military for their Participation in Multinational Operations • Leadership and the leadership style are among the most important factors which infl uence upon effectiveness of coalition operations. • Diametrically different leadership styles and the systems for training of leaders in the coalition deserve a special attention. • Strengthen the role of the leadership in order to ensure, commitment to the mission, as a factor that shapes the organisational culture in the HQ. • Harmonise the different leadership styles within the multinational HQ. • Develop the ability to learn from mistakes and quickly adjust to the situation. • Further efforts for standardising the leadership training in NATO are needed to develop and adopting common requirements and approaches to training leaders for coalition operations. • Get training in transformational leadership style. • Moderate the impact of national caveats by a fl exible leadership style.

4.6 Enhancement of the Individual, Organisational and National Trust among Coalition Partners • The professionalism and responsibility leads to higher respect on behalf of the colleagues from the other nations.

100 • Communicate with the colleagues with respect, regardless of the size of the national contingent, rank and the previous experience in international missions. • Honesty and openness in relations with foreign colleagues contributes to the increasing of mutual trust. • Mutual understanding and support among the colleagues from different nationalities will be achieved by stimulating social networking and the development of informal networks.

4.7 Enhancement of Specialised English Language Training • Focus on both, general language training (e.g. problems in understanding English spoken by native speaker, use of idioms, abbreviations, contractions, etc.), as well as culturally differentiated attitudes when working in a multinational environment. • A special attention is to be paid on the specialised language training (English for Special Purposes) which to improve the knowledge and skills in using military terminology, studying documents, forms, procedures, etc. applied in a NATO staff/mission.

4.8 Further Development of Scientifi c Applied Researches for Identifi cation of Factors Infl uencing the Effectiveness of Coalition Operations • Human performance improvement in current military operations, which applies to NATO Long Term Capability Requirements, is the main avenue for further research activities. • Trust between coalition partners and the factors which infl uence the formation of this attitude should be among the main topics of future research projects. • Another important aspect of research is the defi nitions of perceived organisational and operational effectiveness among those of the subordinated HQs and forces, as well as, cooperating with civilian organisations, local police and military, the local populace and local forces, etc. • In addition to continuing our research from a longitudinal perspective, a fruitful avenue of exploration would be to apply or examine the NATO STO HFM RTG-163 fi ndings within the context of different operational environments and within different coalition commands. In so doing, we can begin to identify, propose, and demonstrate solutions to coalition interoperability ineffi ciencies due to human factors, technology, personnel, and procedural characteristics of coalition HQs.

101 • Several factors related to the commander’s role should be taken into account in further research. For example, the different interpretations of effectiveness of various commanders, the commander’s role in creating a suitable organisational structure, the effect of change of commander, trust as it is developed by different commanders, as well as the commander’s role in enhancing information could be examined further. In addition, fl exibility in relation to different environments, knowledge of troops as a precursor to decision making, information sharing across boundaries, and how rotation processes may or may not impair learning are topics for further elaboration. • The operational environment can be included in future research models along with other tactical forces, civilians, and adversaries. Other cultural dimensions such as Power Distance, time orientation, and national culture differences can be included in future refi nements of our model and its empirical testing.

5.0 CONCLUSION The objective of our research activities was to reinforce and consolidate the efforts of the social and behavioural scientists from interested NATO, Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialog nations. We do believe that our research contributed to identifi cation of critical factors (barriers and enablers) of effective cooperation in coalition operations. In addition, we hope that the research fi ndings can help military leaders identify training gaps that can be addressed in future pre-deployment training and improved ways of working in a multicultural environment. In this regard, one should stress the important role of the international collaboration in the framework of NATO Science and Technology Organization for the development of adaptive performance in multinational coalitions.

6.0 REFERENCES [1] Moskos. Ch., J. Williams, D. Segal. R. (Eds.) The Post-modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War. Oxford University Press, New York, 2000, 2–12. [2] Stewart. K., et al. (2004) Non-technical interoperability in multinational forces. Retrieved from: http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2004/ ICCRTS_Denmark/abstracts/130.pdf. [3] Soeters, J. & Tresch Szvircsev, T. (2010). Towards cultural integration in multinational peace operations. Defence Studies, 10(1-2), 272-287.

102 [4] Klein P. & Haltiner K. (2005) Multinationality as a challenge for armed forces. In Giuseppe Caforio and Gerhard Kьmmel (Eds.), Military Missions and their Applications Reconsidered: the Aftermath of September 11th. Oxford: ELSEVIER Ltd. [5] Sutton, J. L. & Pierce, L. G. (2003). A framework for understanding cultural diversity in cognition and teamwork. Proceedings of the 8th International Command and control Research and Technology Symposium, Washington, D.C. [6] Sutton, J. L., Pierce, L. G., C. Shawn Burke, & Salas, E. (2006) Understanding adaptability: A prerequisite for effective performance within complex environments. Advances in Human Performance and Cognitive Engineering Research, 6, 143–173. doi:10.1016/S1479-3601 (05)06005-4. [7] Valaker, S., Blais, A.-R., Granansen, M., Bjornstad, A.L., Lichacz, F., Yanakiev, Y., Cohen, I., Resteigne, D., & Bisig, E. (2012). Chapter 7: Discussion. In: Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 7-1 – 7-8). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO [8] Y. Yanakiev, & J.S. Horton (Eds.), (2012). Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations. RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM- 163) TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO. [9] www.globesmartcommander.com, www.defenseculture.org.

103 LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR THE BULGARIAN NAVY IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS BY NATO SUPPORT AGENCY – GENERAL SERVICES PROGRAMME (Benefi ts and Lessons Learned)

Capt. (N) ret. Plamen Dimitrov G. S. Rakovski National Defence Academy, 82 Evlogi & Hristo Georgievi, Blvd., 1504, Sofi a, Bulgaria, Command & Staff Faculty, Navy Chair [email protected]

ABSTRACT This paper examines issues related to improving logistic support for the Bulgarian naval ships in their participation in multinational operations and exercises under the auspices of NATO, EU and UN in remote areas from their permanent naval bases. This publication points out benefi ts, lessons learned and recommendations for improving logistic support of the Bulgarian Navy based on the current participation in operations and exercises abroad and the use of port services through the NATO Support Agency (NSPA).

1.0 INTRODUCTION This article was provoked by the recent and expanding participation of the Bulgarian Navy ships in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea international operations such as “ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR”, “UNIFIL MAROPS”, “UNIFIED PROTECTOR”, “NOBLE MIDAS”, “BLACKSEAFOR”, as well as in different multinational exercises in NATO member countries - “NUSRET” in Turkey, “ARIADNE” in Greece and “POSEIDON” in Romania. The global trends indicate that in the coming years naval operations should make a major contribution to the prevention and management of crisis. For the preparation and planning of their participation in multinational operations, it is of particularly high importance to provide logistic support to ships abroad. This function is always responsibility and liability of the sending country. The aim of this publication is: (1) to analyse the existing experience from the Bulgarian naval participation in operations abroad; (2) to draw

104 conclusions and to make recommendations for improving of the logistic support of the Bulgarian warships; (3) to make recommendations for the adoption of the best practices implemented by other NATO member states. Besides its interactions within the framework of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria, the Navy interacts also with its coalition and regional partners. Participation in these international structures is our national contribution to international security and the fulfi lment of our commitments to the Alliance. In exchange, for the participation of the Bulgarian Navy in NATO operations, the Republic of Bulgaria will benefi t from collective defence in the framework of the Euro-Atlantic security system, building regional trust and prestige, making use of new forms of training, and improving military cooperation.

2.0 PARTICIPATION OF THE BULGARIAN NAVY IN OPERATIONS AND INITIATIVES WITH THE ALLIES In the future, Bulgaria will most likely be engaged in multinational military NATO–led operations conducted with allies or coalition partners. These multinational operations may also be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Navy directly fulfi ls the commitments of the Republic of Bulgaria to NATO, EU and UN, and its role to enhance peace and stability in the Black Sea area will mature with participation in: 1). Operations, missions, permanent groups and exercises with NATO and EU allies as: – multiple participation in the operation “ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR” for the control of shipping in the Mediterranean, under the Article 5 of Washington Treaty; – the inclusion of naval forces as a part of NATO Response Force (NRF) and the forthcoming participation in the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMG) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Maritime Groups (SNMCMG). 2). Operation “UNIFIL MAROPS” of the United Nations along the coast of Lebanon. 3). Different regional initiatives such as Confi dence & Security Building Measures (CSBM) and Black Sea Naval Co-Operation Task Group “BLACKSEAFOR”.

105 4). Inclusion of the naval forces as a part of the battle groups to the European Rapid Reaction Force. The certifi cation and maintaining the readiness of the Bulgarian forces declared to NATO and the EU is a priority for the Navy. Supporting international peace and security in operations and missions of NATO and the European Union in response to crises, confl ict prevention, combating terrorism and participation in operations and missions of the UN, OSCE and other coalition formats, the Bulgarian Navy will be involved with the declared forces for a period of three to six months per year using its own resources that are the equivalent to the participation of one frigate. Bulgaria has declared its commitment to NATO to maintain three ships - two frigates and one minesweeper in the state of readiness to participate in NATO missions. One frigate is declared for participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. In the new package “Capability Goals-2013”, the number of declared ships was increased with the addition of a mine hunter and a minesweeper. The composition of the declared ships for NATO and the EU will be unchanged after 2014. At present the Navy has prepared and certifi ed at different levels 5 ships: two class E-71 frigates, two class “Sonya” minesweepers and one class “Flower” mine hunter.

3.0 THE NATO SUPPORT AGENCY (NSPA) In order to ensure that multinational operations are supported effectively and effi ciently, every NATO participating nation needs to coordinate its logistic activities and rationalise its use of logistic resources through mutual support arrangements. After the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 and the adoption of the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance, it was decided to establish a new NATO Support Agency (NSPA). 3.1 The NATO Agency Reform The NATO Support Agency (NSPA) is the main NATO’s integrated logistics and services provider Agency, combining the former NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), the Central Europe Pipeline Management Agency (CEPMA) and the NATO Airlift Management Agency (NAMA). The NSPA is the executive body of the NATO Support Organisation (NSPO), of which all 28 NATO nations are members. Those nations are represented in the NSPO Agency Supervisory Board (ASB) which directs and controls the activities of the NSPA.

106 The mission of the NATO Support Agency is to provide responsive, effective and cost-effi cient logistics support services for systems and operations. This support is provided – in times of peace, crisis and war, wherever required – to NATO nations, NATO military authorities and partner nations, both individually and collectively. The NATO Support Agency plays a critical role in the achievement of NATO’s objectives, particularly within the Smart Defence Initiative. The NSPA is a fully customer-funded agency, operating on a “no profi t – no loss” basis. The Agency works actively with the industry of NATO member nations to accomplish its main tasks. From the baseline after the Lisbon summit the North Atlantic Council (NAC) established three primary objectives: (1) increasing effectiveness; (2) increasing effi ciency; and (3) increasing savings. The other important objective is to preserve capability and service delivery. 3.2 The Naval Logistics Support Partnership Current Users The Naval Logistics Support Partnership (NLSP) was established in 2010 (replacing the former Port Services Support Conference) and is comprised of 11 member NATO navies (Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Norway, Turkey, Spain and the UK), 4 Trial navies (Bulgaria, Romania, Sweden, Latvia), and 8 Observers (Canada, Montenegro, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, NATO Maritime Command – MARCOM, and EU NAVFOR). The main mission of NLSP is to meet the needs of the NLSP member states in terms of military effectiveness by providing contracted solutions for their navies. This includes providing fuel and services in more than 460 foreign ports worldwide. Trial member nations are authorised to make a trial use of the services at an administrative cost of 1000 EUR per logistic request (LOGREQ) in order to assess the benefi ts of the project. This trial period is not limited in time and trial member states may subsequently opt to join the NLSP. At each nation’s request, NSPA is continuing to expand its services to cover a growing range of activities, such as the provision of critical spare parts, freight forwarding to foreign ports, emergency maintenance and repair of naval equipment and systems (including dry-docking and underwater repair), as well as providing outline agreements for commonly used naval systems, and cross servicing agreements. The NSPA has assured access contracts with main ship agents who provide the services. These contracts are established through international competition to ensure their cost-effectiveness.

107 The Republic of Bulgaria is a full member of the NATO Support Organisation (NSPO) since January 1, 2005 and since August, 2007 the country is a trial nation at the Naval Logistics Support Partnership (NLSP). The Bulgarian Ministry of Defence (MoD) joined the former Port Services Support Conference of the NATO Maintenance and Support Agency by the Decision №559/2007 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria. In this regard, there is a signed bilateral “Protocol on the provision of Port services for the Bulgarian Navy” between NSPA and the Ministry of Defence which regulates the terms and conditions of logistic support. During the participation of our ships in multinational operations in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and in various exercises, the Navy have committed 77 LOGREQs by NSPA in foreign ports from 2007 to 2013. This is an average of 12 LOGREQs and approximately 300 KEUR operational turnovers per year. For a period of 6 years the administrative expenses paid to NSPA for the logistic support amounted to 40 470 EUR or an average of 6 744 EUR per year.

Figure 1 Number of LOGREQs

Sourse: Presentation of the 8-th Naval logistic Support Partnership Committee meeting

Refuelling in foreign ports is the most expensive cost not only for our vessels, but also for vessels from other NATO countries. For that reason, the NSPA signed contracts at the most competitive price after an international competition with selected providers of fuel in certain ports in different regions worldwide. NSPA tries to obtain the lowest possible price through international competitive bidding.

108 In the year 2011 NSPA proposed a change in the cost sharing formula, to align it to the new reality generated by the fuel business. So, NSPA made signifi cant number of LOGREQs changes in the contract policy during the past years, negotiating prompt-payment discounts (aggressive discounts). If the fuel bill is paid from NSPA within 4 days of receipt of the invoice, the agency receives a discount of up to 2,5%.

Figure 2 Sourse: Presentation of the 8-th Naval logistic Support Partnership Committee meeting

3.3 Future Administrative Financial Model The operational turnover of marine fuel has repeatedly increased in recent years by more than 100% annually. The supply of fuel in 2002 by NSPA, was of 2,7 MEUR, in 2012 it had already reached 35 MEUR and for the year 2013 it has reached 23 MEUR as of October, 2013. From the fi gure 2 one can see that in 2012 the amount of discounts received reaches over 700 KEUR. These funds cover administrative costs and forecasts indicate that in the year 2013, these costs can be covered at 100%. All this leads to the reduction in the administrative costs for the project. The challenge NSPA set is to achieve a neutral/negative administrative cost by 2013 (Fig. 3). The NLSP has proposed to implement a new administrative model, starting in 2014. With the objective to secure the future of the NLSP and to reserve fi nancial resources NSPA has implemented a fi xed annual contribution for every nation since 2013. Member nations are billed 20 KEUR as “full

109 Figure 3

Sourse: Presentation of the 8-th Naval logistic Support Partnership Committee meeting share” once the number of LOGREQs reaches 50 requests or the value reaches more than 1 MEUR or they are billed 10 KEUR as “half-share”. Trial nations are billed 1 KEUR per LOGREQ (except for the fi rst year 0,5 KEUR per LOGREQ) and this amount is an income that reduces the administrative cost for the member nations. This contribution model with fi xed annual costs has been effective in 2013 and the surplus generated from the aggressive discounts will be kept under an approved distribution formula. The idea of this distribution formula is to divide the surplus into 2 parts – 50% is immediately returned into the account for the free usage of the Nations and 50% as a Drawdown fund (Liquidation fund). The purpose of the NLSP Drawdown fund is to create a savings account, based on annual contributions of the NLSP member nations, to face eventual future costs, if a drawdown or liquidation of the partnership occurs. Because the NLSP Drawdown fund is a savings account, it was established that the maximum amount of the fund would be the equivalent of the Loss of Job Indemnity (LOJI) of the technical staff who are mainly dedicated to the NLSP activity, in the amount of 200 KEUR. The maximum amount of the fund can be changed with the agreement of all NLSP member nations. In this connection, the proposal of the NSPA for active membership in NLSP for all Trial nations and Observers is obvious and not negligible.

4.0 THE BENEFITS FOR THE BULGARIAN NAVY The use of logistic support by the NSPA for port services ensures timely and quality supplies and services provided at competitive, low and in many

110 cases fi xed prices for the fi xed current ports from the selected Husbanding or Fuel agencies. This greatly facilitates the logistic support of the Bulgarian naval ships in foreign ports. The crew of the ship does not become involved with the choice of Husbanding agency during the short time in the ports, does not make cash payments, the quality and timely delivery are guaranteed and are in compliance with established procedures. There is daily widespread support (24hours/7days) provided promptly by Contractor’s personnel, based on the LOGREQ and confi rmed with the supply offi cers. In addition, upon the receipt of the requested delivery of goods and services, the commander/logistics offi cer of the ship signs the documents and fi lls a Quality Assessment Form (QAF) for the quality of delivery that is later sent to the NSPA. If there is a considerable disagreement with Husbanding or Fuel agencies there is an opportunity to make and send a Discrepancy Report (DR). Through the existing contracts with the selected Husbanding and Fuel agencies, the fees for the majority of the provided supply/services are competitive and fi xed at certain ports. Of course, these fees vary depending on the region where the services are used, the ship displacement, the duration of stay in port and other factors. Concerning the crew of the ship, they need to precisely prepare a LOGREQ and send it to the NLSP Contractor (Husbanding or Fuel agency) up to 5 days before the arrival of the ship in the port. To help the supply offi cer the NLSP specialists have provided а price list for those ports that already have signed contracts. First, the logistics offi cer of the ship should specify the prices of the services from the Husbanding agency before the actual executing of the LOGREQ. Second, he/she is always free to request full price estimates from contractors and has to know that additional costs could be invoiced by contractor during religious/offi cial holidays and regional weekend. The fuel price should be provided prior to supply by the contractor. Further an increase in the quantity of supplies leads sometimes to a decrease in the unit price. The NSPA together with Contractors maintains and promptly updates a database of fi xed and “at cost” prices of the services offered at those ports where it has contracts (Jackport database). There are more than 460 of those ports in 105 countries, and they include price data for 41 port services. The Jackport information is provided to all countries participating in the NLSP for advance planning of the necessary fi nancial resources and of course LOGREQs.

111 The logistics offi cer of the ship should know that in some of the Jackport there are premium prices for the fuel and not all means of fuel delivery (trucks, barges etc.) have fl ow meters or adjustable pressure capability. If the ship is out of the port less than 12 hours for participation in exercises, there is no extra fi rst day agency fee for a subsequent visit to the port. Constant contact with representatives of NLSP is recommended on the phone/email before and after visiting a port. It is preferable that the logistics offi cers of the ship be thoroughly prepared before the exercise. Attention to precision and accurately preparing every LOGREQ, striving to create only one LOGREQ with a request of fuel (if it is possible) and planning of the replenishment of fuel in the specifi c ports, where NSPA have a Fuel Supply Contract (FSC). The Husbanding or Fuel agency is required to provide a pro-forma invoice at the time of delivery with the aim of getting information to the Commander of the ship regarding prices and documents of origin and quality. The NSPA makes payments directly to the related Husbanding or Fuel contractors in the relevant currency for the country and each Customer nation reimburses it in EURO. In practice there is a deferred payment for supply/services provided to the Customers. The next overall aim of NLSP is to provide one fuel contractor for all ports in a given area of operations and integrated with Husbandry via the LOGREQ procedure. Naturally, the administrative cost of managing the project is an additional increase in real costs for port services per every vessel. Payments for the services and supplies are carried out directly from the Bulgarian MoD, avoiding cash payments at ports and there is constant monitoring and control of the invoice process by specialists from NLSP and the fi nance department of the MoD.

5.0 LESSONS LEARNED All actions, procedures and document templates for the crews of the ships are developed by NLSP and submitted with the document “Operating Procedure” OP-LG-20 on 10 April, 2013. It is imperative that the Commanding Offi cers (CO) and/or Supply Offi cers (LO) of the ship and any other person with delegated ordering authority and of course the planning offi cers in the Navy, have good knowledge of OP-LG-20. Having this in mind it could be said that the plan for supplying fuel with LOGREQ should be accurate and the amount requested for delivery should be not changed. The Fuel agency always covers the costs already incurred for delivery at the expense of

112 the Customer. Short notice changes will cause problems in fuel deliveries and may be more expensive. In specialised ports for logistic support to the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, the supply of fuel is committed to Defence Energy Support Centre (DESC) of the Defence Logistics Agency (DLA), USA. There are 3 Defence Fuel Supply Points (DFSP) – Souda, Crete; Augusta and Sigonella, Italy; and Rota, Spain. The fuel supply costs are the lowest and therefore these are the most preferable ports to refuelling. It is quite clear when there is a need for refuelling in military Ports and DFSP for the ships of NATO countries, involved in tactical groups and formations, that all the procedures are in accordance with the ALP-1 and STANAG 1200 “Procedures for Logistic Support between Navies and Naval Port Information”, ratifi ed by Bulgaria. When carrying out the logistic support of Bulgarian ships abroad, it appears that in some cases it is more appropriate for the Commander of the ship (CO) to have more leeway to spend a part of the funds, according to the specifi c conditions of each port. When visiting military ports, it is necessary to send in advance a LOGREQ from the ship to the military authorities at the port. After receiving their offer for logistics support, the CO of the ship should decide whether it is better or necessary to engage NSPA. In summary, the services provided by the NSPA Husbanding and Fuel contractors are correct, timely and good in terms of quality of supplies and services. This is proven by the Quality Assessment Forms fi lled out by the crews of the ships after the completion of each logistic request. So far the Discrepancy Reports made by the commanders of Bulgarian naval ships have been very few.

6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS The general conclusion from what has been already said is that the assessment of the participation of the Bulgarian ships in NLSP project of the NATO Support Agency is positive. Therefore, I would like to suggest an in-depth study on the participation of Bulgaria in this project. According to the results of this study, there should be actions taken in order Bulgaria to become a full member in the NLSP programme. The Navy experts and the national representative meetings in NLSP should prepare a detailed analysis of the participation in the NLSP project.

113 Finally, we have to choose between Trial status and Membership as soon as possible because it will cost us more to remain as a Trial member. In the future the administrative cost for NLSP is expected to be reduced. Bulgaria has to expedite the decision-making process in a timely manner and to maximise the value of the Naval Logistics Support Partnership. At the beginning of the second decade of the XXI century it can be concluded that the Bulgarian armed forces have gained extensive experience in multinational operations under the auspices of the UN, NATO, and EU and in the composition of an international coalition. The Bulgarian soldiers perform worthy missions and continue to build the prestige of the Republic of Bulgaria as a reliable and respected ally.

7.0 REFERENCES: [1] Naval Operations Doctrine, NP 3.1, MoD. [2] Protocol on the Provision of Port Services for the Bulgarian Navy, August, 2007. [3] Decision №559/2007 of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria. [4] Operating Procedure, OP-LG-20, April, 2013. [5] Presentations and Decision sheets of the 6, 7 and 8-th Naval Logistic sSupport Partnership Committee meetings. [6] NSPA Procurement Regulations. [7] NSPA Quality Assurance Regulation.

114 MODEL OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN PUBLIC SECTOR INSTITUTION BODIES IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS

Col. Nikola Stoyanov 82 Evlogi & Hristo Georgievi, Blvd., 1504, Sofi a, Bulgaria G. S. Rakovski National Defence Academy, Command and Staff Faculty

ABSTRACT This paper presents a model of collaboration between public sector institution bodies in emergency situations, focusing on the inter-organisational collaborative capacity. The main dimensions of this model are: (1) People – individual collaborative capacity; (2) Purpose and strategy; (3) Structure; (4) Lateral processes; (5) Incentives and reward system; (6) Organisational culture; (7) Leadership. There are internal factors as well as several external that are related to the environment which infl uencing collaborative capacity between different institutions in emergency situations. The central idea is the need of alignment of the operational goals and the offi cial goal of the organisations that can be met by formations pursuing common results. The analysis of the results from inter- organisational collaborative capacity is expected to further deepen theory and expertise on managing crisis to successfully meet the desired end state of these activities.

1.0 MODEL DESCRIPTION In order to achieve synergy and effi ciency of the activities of the institutions responsible to managing emergency situations, they need to ensure alignment of the operational and the main goals in accordance with the internal factors of organisation’s effectiveness and those of the external environment. The model under consideration (Fig. 1) is an attempt to present the main internal factors of organisational effectiveness, the alignment of the operational and the main goal (mission) of the organisations involved in crisis response operations. The mission or the main goal is to achieve synergy and to provide effective command and control in emergency situations. The existing studies of the organisational effectiveness of coalition operations show that this mission can be met by effective and timely sharing of information, effi cient and timely decision-making and shared awareness of tasks and responsibilities (Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.),

115 Figure 1. Collaborative model of controls in emergency situations

116 2012). The problem is that most of the current studies focus on the factors internal for the organisation, while the interrelationship between the internal and external factors, or those related to operational context is not deeply examined. The suggested model for collaboration of military and civilian authorities in emergency situations allows simultaneous measurement of internal (organisational) and external factors or the operational context factors. Organisational factors determine the internal attitude of the members, culture, leadership practices, structure, objectives and strategy of the organisation for collaboration. Through them one can assess the ability that it has to cooperate with other organisations in pursuit of the same objectives. Collaboration however, is a complex process, which examines also the infl uence of external factors in order to fully describe its nature. External factors can be various, such as historical experience of collaboration, legal basis, social and economic mechanisms, institutional and structural factors, fi nancial framework, stakeholders and network interaction. In the general case, when it is not possible to examine all the external factors only those who are supposed to have major impact on collaboration between organisations, such as the social context (environment) and external communications that largely summarise external variables, can be analysed in detail. The Inter-organisational Collaborative Capacity Model (ICC) of Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen (2006) is well suited tool for assessing and improving the capacity for inter-agency cooperation. The ICC model is built on the star model of Galbraith (Galbraith, 2011). According to ICC model, the design of an organisation has fi ve areas and these areas defi ne the organisation’s ability to collaborate with other institutions. Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen (2006) use the “star model” to offer “a systematic diagnosis of the organisational factors that both enhance and hamper collaboration and at the same time control the actions to improve the capacity for cooperation”. They determine the ability of collaboration as “the ability of the organisation to enter into, develop and maintain systems of collaboration between organisations in the pursuit of collective outcomes” and assume that ability for collaboration increases the probability of implementing the mission by the inclusion of scattered resources. Hocevar and colleagues show that the fi ve components of the “star model”, namely strategy, structure, processes, rewards and people can be related to collaboration in terms of “success” factors as well as in terms of factors “barriers”. The model I developed for assessment of organisations in the public sector, but derived from the model of Galbraith, it inherits some of its shortcomings, when one needs to measure the

117 cooperation between organisations. The model describes the determinants that affect the organisation’s ability for collaboration, without considering the impact of external factors of operational environment. Leader infl uences the behaviour of employees in fi ve categories by alignment policies through complex relations that make up the model. At the same time, the leader with his/her skills and ability to motivate and persuade followers also is a factor that largely determines the values necessary to develop collaboration. The ICC model, however, has not a scale that measure leadership styles and abilities and, therefore it cannot examine the correlation of leadership with other factors which is another weakness. In the light of the aforementioned, the question arises about the role of leadership in the process of cooperation, which requires it to be included in the model as a separate factor. The topic of the importance of organisational culture for collaboration remains central. Organisational culture should also be established as a single factor, because it generates values that form attitudes among members for or against partnerships with other organisations. It is also the basis for the creation of the structure of the organisation and in formulating its strategy and objectives. Hocevar, Thomas, & Jansen model does not measure the magnitude and direction of the relationships between the areas that determine it. These areas include the factors that have different effects on the general policy of the organisation, including collaboration. The central idea of alignment of policies is diffi cult, because the shortage of skills in a particular area can’t be offset by increasing the capacity in another area. For example, an increase in remuneration or the individual capacity of the participants in the collaboration will hardly compensate any gaps in the objectives and the strategy of the organisation. All this requires incoming factors, determining collaborative capabilities of bodies to align with the operating factors mentioned above in order to get the model fi nished. According to the described ICC model, the organisation’s collaborative capacity is determined on the basis of the analysis of 12 factors presented below: • „Need to collaborate” – used to describe the necessary motivation and effort to overcome the inertia of the current situation and to generate changes in structures, processes and behaviour of the organisation. • „Strategic collaboration”– emphasizes the establishment of long-term goals of cooperation and considers the interests of other organisations. It focuses on the role of leadership in taking inter-organisational objectives and discussions with leaders of other organisations. • „Resource investment” – a measure of the extent to which respondents feel that their organisation invests fi nance, organisational and human resources for inter-organisational collaboration.

118 • „Structural fl exibility“ – a measure of the degree to which respondents perceive the organisation as a fl exible, able to change rapidly and modify policies, processes, procedures in the interest of cooperation • „Incentives and reward system” – assesses the extent to which perceived by the respondents infl uence of collaboration, activities and results on remuneration, career development and promotion. • „Metrics for collaboration” – assesses the extent to which the organisation has established criteria for measuring effort and performance standards of collaboration. • „Information sharing” – determines the extent to which the organisation has established mechanisms for fl ow and exchange of information between organisations. • „Collaborative learning” – assesses the extent to which the organisation has set aside resources for training, working with other organisations to learn lessons and develop strong norms for learning from other organisations. • „Social capital” – assesses the extent to which the organisation's employees take the initiative to build relationships and know how to interact with other organisations. • „Individual collaborative capacity” – includes questions that focus on the skills and expertise, understanding and knowledge about the work and vision of other organisations, the desire to participate in decision making and in seeking collaboration with them. • „Barriers to collaboration” – a measure of the extent to which respondents perceive the presence of different factors – the individual's ability to collaborate, role confl ict, policies and procedures in cooperating organisations and others as barriers to collaboration. • „Interagency teams” – assesses the ability of the group for further coordination between the various organisations, face the common problem area that requires cooperation. As a result of the analysis of these factors, it becomes clear which ones promote collaboration and which act as barriers. They can be grouped in fi ve areas: (1) people; (2) strategy and objectives; (3) structure; (4) processes, and (5) incentive system. These groups are presented in the fi gure 1 and will be discussed in the text below.

1.1 People – Individual Collaborative Capacity Individual factors are the core of the models that describe and measure the ability of organisations to collaborate. In the scientifi c literature it was found that there are different interpretations for the constructs that determine

119 individual factors, but the most suitable for the purpose of the study are the personal characteristics, employment status, skills and abilities, and work experience. When we talk about the impact of individual factors on collaboration between institutions in emergency situations, we cannot miss the education and functional trail that every member of the organisation has. Under the functional trace we must understand the specialisation that people receive as a result of education, training and work experience. Leaders the graduated management sciences have higher individual capacities for collaboration in comparison to those who have studied in universities with other majors. This is because these leaders who have graduated management sciences are less concerned with the uncertainty and risk associated with collaboration, because they have learned to manage risk. Following this perspective, several empirical studies, confi rm the relationship between the functional trace of managers and their strategic decisions (Huxham, Chris & Siv Vangen, 1996; Snider & Marvin. 2003). The level of education is also important in the development of collaboration. Leaders with higher education are more likely to develop cooperation than those with lower education. It can be assumed that those managers with higher degree have more abilities that make them confi dent to manage collaboration with other organisations. Furthermore, graduates create more personal connections and relationships with people from different areas, thanks to the many forums and courses they have attended. Cooperation requires different skills and abilities than those when working in one organisation. These are the ability to develop and maintain interpersonal relationships, based on trust and reciprocity, communication skills, ability to seek consensus and resolve confl icts, ability to understand the interdependence of the members of the various organisations. Collaboration would not be possible without the organisation’s members, particularly those in management positions, who have developed communication skills. The construction and maintenance of collaboration entails some risk. To open the borders of their own organisation, to share ideas, knowledge and experience without clear guarantees for success is assuming greater responsibility and risk. Experience of the organisation gained over the years in some form of relationship with other entities will serve as a catalyst in the development of collaboration. 1.2 Purpose and Strategy The aim is explicit formulated intention and desire of the organisation to its direction of development and pursued results. It is an essential component of organisational policy and is largely determined by the level of ambition of its leaders and the resources that the organisation has. When it comes to cooperation, target is seen as an ideal category that defi nes the reasons

120 why institutions and/or organisations decided to collaborate. Partnership can happen only at the time when there is a recognised and desirable need, organisations to build and develop relationships that lead them to a collective result. The aim of collaboration can hardly be accurately determined when the partner organisations realise that they exhibit a dual identity. On the one hand they pursue internal institutional purposes and on the other hand they make efforts to achieve shared outcomes. In this situation, the objective occurs simultaneously as a dynamic and frustrating. In the same context some authors argue that there is a signifi cant discrepancy between the self-interest of the organisation in the implementation of its organisational mission, maintaining identity other than the purpose of cooperation and collective interest in the task of cooperation and maintenance responsibility of the collaborating partners (Thomson, Perry & Miller, 2007, p. 27). Authorities for emergency management that intend to form effective collaboration should discuss their own and collective missions and interests. Their wishes would later support the previous commitments of a joint project. On the basis of the agreement for the interests and intentions of the partners there must be an agreement expressing that they will remain autonomous, but wish to support the work necessary to solve the general problem. We have to say that preserving the autonomy of the organisation is often in confl ict with the desire for open borders and sharing of knowledge and resources. Collective and self-interest must be clearly distinguished and explicitly confi rmed, so that each knows what the other aims to achieve (Huxham & Vangenm 1996, p. 9). After this change, all parties should have a sense of collective direction and as a result they must be able to develop an agreement, highlighting how they plan to achieve the common goals together. Strategy and tasks relate to how the partners coordinate their actions to achieve the objectives of collaboration. The strategy represents a wide range of means and methods by which the partners aim to facilitate the achievement of the collaboration and the tasks are specifi c activities that allow cooperation to fulfi l its objectives and to implement the strategy (Bailey & Koney, 2000, p. 30). To improve the effectiveness, successful collaboration should establish formal structures (committees and subcommittees) to maintain the identity of the specifi c and complex strategy and objectives (Gadja, 2004, p. 71; Banks, 2009, p. 498). Formal structures such as committees are groups of participants, representing various organisations in collaboration, attracted to perform specifi c tasks. These tasks are delegated according to the specialisation of the committee and understanding of the purpose of the collaboration. Attracted by the leaders these groups act as managers. It is important to note the distinction between leaders and managers. Leaders focus on what to do and who can do it, while managers focus on when, where and how to be fulfi lled the tasks (Snider, 2003, p. 28). In other words, “ the leader does the

121 right things and the manager does things right”. The interpretation of this simple defi nition means that the leader sets the direction (strategy), stating the purpose and set the limits and managers use management approaches in managing subordinates to achieve the objective by operating in the assigned frame in the most effective way. Managers can monitor the effectiveness of cooperation by defi ning the participating personnel for testing specifi c areas of the target areas, specifi c tasks and joint evaluation of the implemented strategy, while facilitating the integration of different organisations in the partnership process. Management strategy and objectives through formal structures reduce tension between partners. Representatives of various organisations, especially those who are at the top, become more committed to collaborative objectives, when appointed to work with members of the partner organisation. Occurrence of different organisational cultures during joint actions, promote conceptual belief of participants that positively contribute to the synergistic capacity of collaboration. To obtain synergy between partners’ formal structures (committees and subcommittees) should be set up to support the establishment of specifi c and complex strategies and objectives.

1.3 Structure Organisational structure is a formal system of tasks and relations of the authorities that govern people by coordinating their actions and utilize resources to achieve organisational goals. Organisational structure shapes the behaviour of individuals and the organisation at all. The authors are not unanimous in its view for the distribution of power. Distribution of power is a problem which is fl attened in the negotiations that accompany every collaboration project. The historical experience we have when creating alliances and partnerships, tells us that leading party gets most power in the union to avoid the “stalemate” situation. The size of the invested resources and responsibility may be crucial determinants in the distribution of power. When we pursue common objectives of the controls in emergency situations, the creation of a common structure for decision-making and management process is imperative. Participants in this common structure for decision- making set the vision and strategy of working together in pursuit of common outcomes. Hocevar, Thomas & Jansen (2006) consider this structure as an interagency group. Throughout the history of relations between governments of Defence, Ministry of Interior and other agencies in emergency situations, it has never created interdepartmental group or any other coordinating body. Any of the authorities pursue their organisational goals within the organisational autonomy, and managerial performance fi nds its expression only in coordinating efforts with other institutions to written procedures.

122 1.4 Lateral Process We have to consider the process as the way that the organisation meets its objectives within the organisational structure. If the structure is the anatomy of the organisation, the processes are its physiology. Grey (1989) shows planning and agreement on basic rules as an essential step in ensuring that the parties take responsibility for the process. The same author argues that the cooperation will be reinforced if key players create a common and acceptable regulatory framework for work. During times of crisis and decision-making is needed to have intermediaries. It is important to know that because even when there is agreement unexpected confl icts may occur thereafter. Communication is the key to the process of collaboration and encompasses all verbal and non-verbal forms which occur in the partnership process. It shows how communication channels are established within the organisation, to and from it to other partner organisations, but also to wide public. Exchange of information between organisations laid the foundation for the development of collaboration. Transparent communication and open trusting relationship between the partners suggest confi dence. Communication is important in terms of sharing of cultural values and knowledge necessary to achieve the intended results. Good communication between members of the collaborating organisations is one of the prevention of confl ict points that would arise in the process of working together. The controversies which obligatory accompany the partnership and teamwork can be resolved in its infancy with only dialogue and mutual respect of interests. Communication can take various forms, on such technical means (telephone and internet) to verbal communication, face to face, which is the essential part of communication and an important condition for the sharing of information without the “distortion”. As Dale Carnegie said, “ but one that should be able to talk to you, he would be able to listen”. Listening in most cases proved more diffi cult skill of speaking. It is the easiest way to learn much more about the other or about other organisations, in addition to demonstrating respect for the subject of collaboration. Communication is a complex process that depends on many variables – personal values and expectations, personal differences, hierarchy relations, disruptive behaviour of some members, culture, generational differences, gender, and differences in pay, historically accumulated contradictions and others. Many of these variables can become barriers to effective communication, which lay a learning process for the study of the characteristics of the organisational culture of the partner institution at the beginning of the collaboration. 1.5 Incentives and Rewards System Collaboration is an important activity for any organisation to be left to chance, the process to develop on its own. For this reason, the organisation’s

123 policy is to motivate members, and also to encourage them to build relationships with members of other organisations, as this is one of her goals. There are various defi nitions of incentives’ systems, but the defi nition of the Wild best meets the study (Wild, 1973). It examines the system of incentives “as a deliberately created working condition that activates specifi c behaviour” Analysing literature one can conclude that the system of incentives is a combination of monetary and non-monetary incentives that encourage collaboration between parties of the partner organisations. It could be argued that the system of incentives is a tool to achieve these objectives through the motivation of members. Different institutions have different organisational structures and different organisational processes that are infl uenced by the organisational culture and their history. In this sense, the incentives and rewards system depend on the organisational cultures of the participating parties in collaborative project. It follows that we must study two types of culture that are faced in this process. One type is the organisational cultures of different parties, and the other is the culture of the new entity in the form of an interagency group or coordinating body. The system of rewards and incentives only work if both types of cultures support its operation. Many factors infl uence the incentive systems. It is necessary to know the requirements for the design, implementation and successful operation of the system of incentives. Incentive systems should be transparent and open, simple and easy to understand, objective, fl exible, controllable and resistant to tampering. The system of rewards and incentives shall be constituted so that to meet the expectations of the organisational members for the recognition they should get on regarding their commitments to collaboration project. Financial bonuses are one side that motivates them to be active participants in the partnership, but they are not the only incentive mechanism. Human nature is arranged so that people have a need to receive recognition that no material expression. Employees want to see themselves to be appreciated and feel signifi cant, which corresponds with their desire for career development and the system should encourage it. Collaboration occurs only by recognized need for member’s partnership, which refl ects the strategy and purpose of the organisation. Some members have an inner conviction that collaboration with other institutions enhances the ability to achieve higher performance and brings greater benefi ts. These members are motivated and strive for development collaboration, regardless of whether they receive rewards and incentives. Rational strategy of the organisation is to use these employees as ardent propagandists of the idea of partnership. They can play the role of informal leaders and to carry away employees who doubt the benefi ts of collaboration. Leaders are the people most interested in the success of collaboration as they choose subjects of partnership and responsibility for it. At the same time, for a certain proportion of staff

124 collaboration is an unnecessary activity and they are indifferent. For this reason, incentives policy should be directed primarily at them. 1.6 Organisational Culture There are so many defi nitions of culture as are its actors; everyone has their own idea of what it is and how it manifests itself. One of the most commonly cited defi nitions is those of E. Schein, which deals with the organisational culture as a set of dominant values and norms of the leading characteristics of an organisation based on the assumption that enable you to understand the nature of realism and manifesting itself in internal unnatural creatures or artefacts of a culture (Schein, 1985). In the literature, culture is seen as part of an organisational system because it allows the study of the relationship between cultural patterns of the participants in an organisation and other subsystems or signs of organisation such as technology, structural solutions, methods of management, organisational effectiveness and etc. In terms of collaboration between organisations is important that organisational culture is the starting point for the formulation of objective and strategy, but also a model for development, interpretation and selection of programs for joint action and is a factor that shapes the behaviour and actions of people, not only the organisation but also in interpersonal relationships. Moreover, it plays a unifying role that led to the standardisation of the actions of members of the organisation, as well as adaptive role in the way people of an organisation are the carriers of their own values and actions and the existing cultural pattern modify their former system of values through cultural infl uence of the environment. Understanding organisational culture allows members of the co-operating organisations to know how to operate within an organisational culture. Speaking the same “organisational language” is vital to the success of collaborative organisations. By “organisational language” is meant a set of principles, rules and procedures that are the mechanism through which partner organisations (institutions) operate. Ways of behaviour in public organisations, according to their characteristics in a changing social order, a sense of harmony to achieve common goals becomes essential condition for organisational success. The view of Adler shows that there is a need of a change of cultural domination to cultural cooperation, which means the establishment of a new organisational culture (Adler, 1986). What are the organisational values on practices and how they affect the behaviour of the members of the organisation? Values are criteria that people use to determine what type of behaviour is desirable or undesirable. We can distinguish two types of values – internal and instrumental. Inner values represent the results that people and organisations want to achieve, such as excellence, reliability, innovation, stability and predictability. Instrumental values of

125 the other methods are desirable behaviour such as hard work, creativity and courage, conservative and cautious, risk-taking and maintaining a high standard. Whatever the classifi cation of organisational culture is, the existing cultural model undoubtedly determines the strategy and objectives of the organisation. 1.7 Leadership Building common ground and increasing trust among members in organisations requires effective leadership. Leaders defi ne the stages of this organisational dynamics to enable the organisation to achieve remarkable results. An important component of leadership is the deployment of shared values in an organisation. Chrislip and Larson (1994) focus on the most common principles of the leaders of the collaborative institutions. They found that these leaders are resolute visionaries, but their vision is focused on how people can work together constructively, instead of personal vision or resolution of specifi c issues. These researchers observed that the leaders defi ne their roles and practices differently from traditional leaders. They displayed several principles of leadership for cooperation: • Inspiring commitment and action. • Supervises the people as equal resolve. • Building on the broad-based participation. • Maintain hope and participation. • Helpful leadership. • Leadership as a process. Collaborative leaders are rarely authoritarian and intrusive, and leadership is often shared among several people. Their role is to facilitate constructive interaction in the network is not working for her. Considering the foregoing, it is clear that leadership and trust are important to improve collaboration. Without leadership, collaboration probably would not have the same meaning for the purposes of its manifestation. Leadership as a pure concept does not automatically improve collaboration. Methodology is needed for its adequate measurement and determination. By analysing these fi ve areas, which gives us an idea about the state’s ability to collaborate is running the fi rst stage of the process model. In the second stage, are analysed and measured the factors, determining operational objectives of institution authorities in emergency situations - effective and timely sharing information, effi cient and timely decision- making, shared sense of tasks and responsibilities to a priori given criterion. Operational objectives are tools (methods) wherewith bodies achieve

126 effective collaboration, because of that they are harmonized with internal factors which infl uence collaboration. The third point of the model is learning and training to improve the skills of collaboration. The actual time required for training and practice depends entirely on the volume and the pursued objectives. After the implementation of the third stage it is made a re-measurement and analysis of the achieved results, and then it is applied the corrective action. It is implemented feedback whereupon the process is repeated until the objectives are achieved.

2.0 CONCLUSIONS The objective of my research activities was to reinforce and consolidate the efforts of public sector institutions in emergency situation. It is believed that inter-organisational collaborative capacity study will contribute to identifi cation of critical factors (barriers and enablers) of effective cooperation in emergency situation. In addition, we hope that the research fi ndings can help leaders responsible for crisis management to identify condition and process gaps that can be addressed in future training and improved ways of working in an inter-institutional environment. In this regard, one should stress the important role of the collaboration between various organisations for the effective performance in emergency situations and crisis management operations.

3.0 REFERENCES: [1] Adler, N.J., (1986) International Dimensions of Organisational Behaviour. Boston: Kent Publisher Company, 85–86. [2] Bailey, Darlyne and Kelly Koney. 2000. Strategic alliances among health and human services: From affi liations to consolidations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. [3] Chrislip, D. & Larson, C. (1994). Collaborative leadership, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. [4] Gadja, Rebecca. 2004. Utilizing collaboration theory to evaluate strategic alliances. American Journal of Evaluation 25(1): 65-77. [5] Gray, B. 1989 Collaborating: Finding Common Ground For Multiparty Problems, San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass. [6] Galbraith, J. R. (2011). The star model. Retrieved from http://www. jaygalbraith.com/pdfs/Star Model.pdf. [7] Hocevar, S. P., Thomas, G. F., & Jansen, E. (2006). Building collaborative capacity: An innovative strategy for homeland security

127 preparedness. In Beyerlein, Beyerlein & Kennedy (Eds.) Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work Teams: Innovations through Collaboration, 12, pp. 263-283. Elsevier JAI Press. [8] Huxham, Chris and Siv Vangen. 1996. Working together: Key themes in the management of public and non-profi t organisations. International Journal of Public Sector Management 9(7): 5-17. [9] Snider, Marvin. 2003. Compatibility breeds success. Westport, CT: Praeger. [10] Schein, Edgar, 1985. Organizational culture and leadership. San Francisco : Jossey-Bass Publishers. [11] Thomson, Ann Marie; James Perry and Theodore K. Miller. 2007. Conceptualizing and measuring collaboration. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 19(1): 23-56. [12] Wild, J. (1973). „Organisation und Hierarchie“ ZFO, 42(1) 45-54. [13] Y. Yanakiev, & J. S. Horton (Eds.) (2012), Improving Organisational Effectiveness of Coalition Operations (pp. 7-1 – 7-8). RTO-TR-HFM-163 AC/323(HFM-163)TP/476. Neuilly-Sur-Seine, France: NATO STO.

128 U.S. STRATEGIC DEFENCE PRIORITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Prof. Dr. Carol Atkinson School of International Relations University of Southern California 3518 Trousdale Parkway, VKC 330 Los Angeles, CA 90089-0043 [email protected]

ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to examine recent U.S. Department of Defense strategic guidance to U.S. military forces and to discuss the implications of this guidance for multinational operations. The article begins with a general historical overview of how the United States has thought about its national security goals and strategy; it then assesses how this vision has been evolving in recent years. As the United States has drawn down its deployed combat forces from approximately 200,000 soldiers to fewer than 90,000 (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3.) the U.S. Department of Defense has begun transitioning to prepare itself more fully for future threats of the coming decade. The future strategic environment envisioned by U.S. policymakers will guide this transition process and is described in many venues and in many documents. This article will discuss four of the most important recent documents guiding U.S. strategic planning: (1) Joint Vision 2020 published in 2000 by the offi ce of the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); (2) U.S. President Barack Obama’s National Security Strategy published in 2010, (3) U.S. President Obama’s Strategic Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense published in January 2012; and (4) the U.S. CJCS’s Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 published in September 2012. These documents show the evolution of U.S. strategic vision during the fi rst decade of the 21st Century. They make clear that partner nations, particularly in Europe, will be asked to assume more responsibilities and pay a greater portion of the costs to ensure a stable and secure world.

1.0 OVERVIEW OF U.S. STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN THE 20th CENTURY During the 20th Century, U.S. national security strategists and policymakers were most concerned with threats emanating from powerful states. The great wars of the century were fought by the United States against other countries: Germany, Japan, North Korea, North Vietnam, and

129 Iraq. In the later half of the century, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were defi ned as the primary threat to the United States and its allies around the world. In this context, U.S. strategic defence planning focused on deterring and, when necessary, fi ghting other states whose armed forces would engage each other on air, land and sea battlefi elds. U.S. military theorists and practitioners stressed the use of overwhelming force to achieve decisive victory as their preferred strategic approach. While the focus was on the Soviet threat, other types of threats, such as terrorism, were not ignored. Yet, terrorism was primarily viewed as an overseas phenomenon affecting other countries not the U.S. homeland. In some cases terrorism was seen as either state-sponsored or, at the least, state condoned; with the implication that it was a threat emanating from states for which they could be held accountable. The main focus of U.S. defence planning during the 20th Century was against other states and strategic planners preferred strategies that would use overwhelming, decisive military force to deter adversaries, and fi ght and win when necessary. The U.S. military would conduct operations with its allies, but would be prepared to fi ght unilaterally. Some of the transnational and human security concerns that have engaged policymakers in the 21st Century, such as the use of strategic communication, “wars of ideas,” or moral implications of warfare were not absent from strategic discussions. Certainly in the aftermath of Vietnam there was a great deal of self-refl ection within the United States on how wars should be fought and the goals for which American soldiers should be asked to fi ght and die for. But on the whole, the focus remained on the use of overwhelming force to achieve decisive victory against the armed forces of other states. Unfortunately, but perhaps not unsurprisingly, the end of the Cold War did not usher in an era of peace, as had been hoped for, but exposed and accelerated various transnational phenomena that challenged the U.S. military’s strategic culture. The 21st Century is barely underway; nevertheless, there has been a signifi cant shift in how the United States plans to deter or counter threats to its security. Attention now focuses more and more on transnational phenomena and the role of allies and partners.

2.0 U.S. STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN THE EARLY 21st CENTURY In the initial years of the 21st Century, U.S. strategic thinking had evolved little from its conceptual framework coming out of the Cold War. It was a conceptual framework premised on a vision of the United States as the triumphant and only remaining super power. The Chairman of the Joint

130 Chiefs of Staff’s strategic vision for U.S. military planners and warfi ghters that was published in 2000 is a good illustration of this.

2.1 Joint Vision 2020, published in 2000 The U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Henry Shelton, issued the Joint Staff’s strategic vision in June of 2000. Joint Vision 2020 described the strategic context for U.S. military forces and was designed to serve as a guide for the force structure of the U.S. military up to the year 2020 as the U.S. military “prepare[d] now for an uncertain future.” (Shelton, 2000, p. 1). The purpose of the document was to describe the human talent and operational capabilities that would be needed in 2020 in order that the U.S. military would be able to dominate “across the full spectrum of military operations – persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of combat” (Shelton, 2000, p. 1). Joint Vision 2020 defi ned the strategic environment as one in which the United States would continue to have global interests and would need to be prepared for adversaries that would have access to the same types of technology as the United States. These adversaries would seek to adapt and to counter U.S. capabilities through asymmetric approaches (Shelton, 2000, pp. 4-5). In order to accomplish the objectives that the U.S. national command authorities might give to it, U.S. military forces would need the manpower and capabilities for “full spectrum dominance – the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations” (Shelton, 2000, p. 6). This range of military operations encompassed diverse activities to include: large-scale combat operations, peacekeeping, non-combatant evacuation operations, nation assistance, counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance, protection of shipping, and support to U.S. civil authorities (Shelton, 2000, p. 7). There was only a brief discussion in Joint Vision 2020 of the role that allies and partner nations would play. This discussion centered on issues of compatibility of technology and interoperability of information systems (Shelton, 2000, pp. 16-17). In other words, U.S. defence planning focused on U.S. forces that would have the capability and manpower to act on their own in a very wide range of operations.

2.2 National Security Strategy, published in 2010 The al-Qaida attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, and the subsequent diffi culties for U.S. military forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan highlighted the need for an updated strategic vision. These events made clear that international security (the security “inter” or between

131 states) was becoming less relevant and security in its human, global, and transnational senses needed to be addressed in more detail. Paradoxically, the United States had become more threatened by forces unleashed by weak and failing states rather than by powerful states. Threats to human security from global phenomena such as climate change, resource scarcity, and poverty produced transnational security threats that readily fl owed across borders from terrorism to refugee fl ows to piracy. These phenomena were facilitated and accelerated by transnational social and political networks facilitated through cheap and globally available internet connectivity. Ten years later, in its 2010 National Security Strategy, the Obama Whitehouse characterised the global security environment as one of “sweeping change” in which “the success of free nations, open markets, and social progress in recent decades [had] accelerated globalisation on an unprecedented scale. This [had] opened the doors of opportunity around the globe, extended democracy to hundreds of millions of people, and made peace possible among major powers.” (U.S. Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, May 2010). Yet, while globalization brought opportunities, it also “intensifi ed the dangers we face – from international terrorism and the spread of deadly technologies, to economic upheaval and a changing climate.” (U.S. Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, May 2010). In the 2010 National Security Strategy, the top national security priority was defi ned as weapons of mass destruction in the hands of violent extremists and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to additional states; with the strategy stating: “there is no greater threat to the American people.” (U.S. Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 4). Yet, the strategy also identifi ed as top priorities: dismantling al-Qaida and its affi liates, building balanced and sustainable economic growth, promoting respect for human rights, and addressing climate change (U.S. Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, May 2010, pp. 4-5). According to the national security strategy statement, these threats could not be effectively dealt with solely through the use of military force in the traditional sense of conducting war and combat operations; nor could they be handled only by states operating solely within their own geographic borders. Because the threats were transnational in nature, they would require the United States to partner with, or at least seek to work with, multiple levels of government agencies as well as nongovernmental entities from corporations to infl uential individuals. The United States would pursue comprehensive engagement that would include the United States’ traditional allies as well as “centres of infl uence” including Russia, China, and India; emerging new partners; and “peoples not just governments” (U.S. Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, May 2010, pp. 11-12).

132 2.3 U.S. Strategic Defense Guidance, published in 2012 The national security strategy was directed toward the U.S. federal government as a whole, not just the U.S. Department of Defense. In April 2011, President Obama directed a review of Department of Defense (DOD) missions and strategies that would be needed to support the new security strategy and also to identify budgeting priorities in order to meet federal spending reductions mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011. This act required the DOD to identify roughly $500 billion in cost reductions over the next decade (Catherine Dale & Pat Towell, 2012, p. 2). The resulting strategic defense guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, was published in January 2012. The defence strategy contained in this document will likely serve as the blueprint for U.S. force planning over the next decade, although the force structure and DOD spending levels may be revised as a consequence of the spending cuts triggered by the budget sequestration in 2013 and an increasing U.S. budget defi cit (Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, 2012, p. 2). Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense is the U.S. President’s latest defence strategy for the United States. The President and his national security staff developed the guidance in consultation with civilian and military leaders within the Department of Defense to include the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Services, and the Combatant Commanders (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012). The purpose of the document was to identify U.S. strategic interests and priorities in order to guide U.S. defence spending. It was shaped within the context of several signifi cant events that included the conclusion of U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, fi scal constraints in the aftermath of the 2008 fi nancial crisis, and reductions in federal spending mandated by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012). This newest strategic defence guidance is forward looking and seeks to describe the capabilities that will be needed by the U.S. military (also referred to as the Joint Force) in 2020.1 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defence is a follow-on vision to the National Security Strategy, but directed specifi sally at the Department of Defense. The guidance re-emphasised that U.S. military forces will need to be prepared to engage within a “global security environment [that] presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities” that will require the use of “all elements of U.S. national power.” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, p. 1) This statement is not

1 The term “the Joint Force” refers to Department of Defense capabilities and usually means the integrated capabilities and/or units of all services of the U.S. military.

133 surprising and follows from the themes presented in previous guidance. Also unsurprising is the list of the primary missions that the Joint Force will need to be prepared to accomplish: • Counter-terrorism and irregular warfare; • Deter and defeat adversaries; • Project power despite anti-access and area denial challenges; • Counter weapons of mass destruction; • Operate effectively in cyberspace and space; • Maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent; • Defend the homeland and provide support to civil authorities; • Provide a stabilising presence; • Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations; • Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief, and other operations (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, pp. 4-6). These missions fl ow from the National Security Strategy of 2010 and other previous defence planning documents; most of the missions are enduring from past generations. What is new in the guidance is the refocus of U.S. military strategy to the Asia-Pacifi c region and repeated mention of burden sharing with allies and partners. The United States’ “rebalance to the Asia-Pacifi c region” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, p. 2) seeks to counter several U.S. national security concerns: (1) maintaining the free fl ow of commerce through the Indian Ocean and the broader Asia-Pacifi c region; (2) maintaining peace and stability particularly on the Korean peninsula; and (3) managing the U.S. relationship with an increasingly powerful China. U.S. allies and partners in Asia-Pacifi c are described as “critical to the future stability and growth of the region.” In order to meet these challenges, the guidance states that the United States will invest resources in order to develop a “long-term strategic partnership with India” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, p. 2) as well as with current Asian allies and emerging partners in order to “to ensure collective capability and capacity for securing common interests.” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, p. 3). Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense continues the reorientation of the U.S. Department of Defence away from building forces to fi ght and win wars on a unilateral basis to building partnerships that share the burdens of building peace and stability. Not only are partnerships of key importance in the Asia-Pacifi c region, but also globally. The guidance explained that building the capacity of partner

134 nations is an important U.S. interest because partners help the United States to share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership. The guidance goes on to say that across the globe, the United States “will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations – including those in Africa and Latin America” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, p. 3). While the United States seeks to build a global network of allies and partners, European allies remain very important to U.S. national security. The guidance is clear that “some of America’s most stalwart allies and partners” are European and that Europe is the United States’ “principal partner in seeking global and economic security” and it “will remain so for the foreseeable future.” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, pp. 2- 3). Europe remains critically important to U.S. national security because peace and prosperity in Europe as well as a strong and vital NATO is not only essential to the security of Europe, but to future global security. The guidance explained: “most European countries are now producers of security rather than consumers of it. Combined with the drawdown in Iraq and Afghanistan, this has created a strategic opportunity to rebalance the U.S. military investment in Europe, moving from a focus on current confl icts toward a focus on future capabilities” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, p. 3). In sum, the U.S. military forces in the year 2020 will need the capabilities to act unilaterally to confront and defeat aggression, but partner nations, particularly in Europe, will be expected to shoulder more of the responsibilities and burdens. The global community will be expected to help with many of the tasks necessary to ensure global peace, stability, and security. As President Obama states in his opening statement, the United States is “joining with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosperity, and human dignity. And the growing capabilities of allies and partners create new opportunities for burden-sharing” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2012).

2.4 Joint Force 2020, published in 2012 Joint Force 2020 is the capstone concept for U.S. joint operations meaning that it is a strategic vision for how U.S. military forces will operate in the year 2020. The document directly fl ows from and provides doctrinal support for the defence strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. Joint Force 2020 was formulated and published by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as his guidance to the U.S. military as a framework for conceptualisng future

135 security challenges and the operational doctrine that will be needed to meet those challenges as the United States draws down its military forces in the Middle East and shifts its attention to Asia-Pacifi c. Joint Force 2020 focuses on what is new and different in the strategic environment and serves as a bridging document between President Obama’s strategic defence guidance and the CJCS’s directions that will be given to soldiers. Joint Force 2020 emphasises that the military is only one instrument of national power and it is clear throughout that the U.S. military should expect to work with a variety of partners and to expand the number of partnership opportunities from previous eras. The CJCS explained that “the nature of confl ict in the world is enduring” however, the means to deal with confl ict is not just the job of the military, but also the job of U.S. government agencies that will need to work together with each other as well as with nongovernmental organisations, foreign governments, multinational institutions, industry, allied armed forces, and the like (Dempsey, 2012, p. 1). The U.S. military should be given the resources to accomplish the primary missions identifi ed in the Defense Strategic Guidance (listed above) to include having the ability to project decisive military force. This is basic and straightforward support for the President’s national security strategy. Most of these resources have already been programmed. About 80% of U.S. military capabilities and force structure for the year 2020 are either already in existence or currently under development (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3). Thus, the CJCS cautions that only 20% of the force structure could be signifi cantly changed to address issues that were raised in 2012. Because the defence acquisition process requires a long time horizon, the most important advancements, according the CJCS, would “come through innovations in training, education, personnel management, and leadership development” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3). The U.S. Congress is also focused on skills that military commanders will need to support the strategy. For example, the U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (an investigative arm of the U.S. Congress) identifi ed gaps in the professional military education curricula. Investigators found that the U.S. military staff and war colleges could play an important role in support of Joint Force 2020 by providing curricula to improve the ability of U.S. military offi cers to anticipate and respond to uncertainty as well as how to operate on intent through trust, empowerment, and understanding (U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce, 2013, p. 14). According to the CJCS, the security environment in the year 2020 will be characterised by greater stability in terms of state governance, but this stability will be increasing threatened by non-state actors, individuals, and

136 other adversaries who will have access to highly destructive technologies from weapons of mass destruction to sophisticated computer codes: “the diffusion of advanced technology in the global economy means that middleweight militaries and non-state actors can now muster weaponry once available to only superpowers. The proliferation of cyber and space weapons, precision munitions, ballistic missiles, and anti-access and area denial capabilities will grant more adversaries the ability to infl ict devastating losses” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 2). This evolution in the threat environment is both a cause and a consequence of transnational dynamics that allow individuals quicker access to information through social media and social networks. In addition, advances in communication technologies such as mobile phones with video cameras are in the process of changing not only the nature of warfare but also the nature of global politics. Now information can reach people around the world very quickly and as a consequence the U.S. military and its operational partners must be prepared for “intense media scrutiny, a dynamic that potentially invests otherwise inconsequential actions with strategic importance” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3). The security paradox, that there is greater stability in terms of inter-state dynamics but increasing challenges in the global commons, is a situation that cannot be addressed by the United States alone according to the CJCS, but will require a “globally integrated approach” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 3). The U.S. military will need to be “globally postured” and capable of combining quickly with mission partners “across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organisational affi liations” (Dempsey, 2012, p. 4). Partner nations and their militaries will play several signifi cant roles as can be inferred from the list of capabilities that the U.S. military will need in order to operate as a globally integrated force. These eight key capabilities are: 1. The use of “mission command” that empowers individuals to exercise their own judgment and emphasises decentralisation of decisions and trust between individuals. 2. The ability to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in all domains. 3. Global agility to include smarter positioning of forces and greater use of prepositioned assets. 4. Partnering with U.S. government agencies, partner militaries, and nongovernmental partners. 5. Flexibility in basing and employing forces across geographic boundaries and command lines. 6. Cross domain synergy. 7. Increased use of low-signature, small-footprint capabilities such as cyberspace and special operations.

137 8. Increased ability to discriminate targets and minimise unintended consequences (Dempsey, 2012, pp. 4-8). Partner nations contribute to key capabilities from participating in multinational operations to providing bases for U.S. military personnel, U.S. military equipment, or the prepositioning of supplies. Partner nations may have special expertise in domains that do not necessarily involve the use of military force; from banking to energy resources to diplomacy. Partner nations may provide capabilities that allow small-footprint operations and they may also provide intelligence that helps to minimise unintended damage or consequences. As Joint Force 2020 states, these are key contributions. According to the CJCS, the unwillingness or the inability of partner nations to work with the United States or the unwillingness or the inability of the United States to work with partner nations would degrade the ability of the U.S. military to operate as a globally integrated force and promote international security and stability (Dempsey, 2012, p. 14).

3.0 SUMMARY The United States stood at the apex of military power at the end of the Cold War. It was the sole remaining superpower after decades long competition for social, political, and military hegemony. The end of the Cold War was one of the most important geo-political events of the 20th Century; yet at the same time there was an even more profound technological revolution underway. This revolution, primarily in information technologies, has changed the character of how we live our lives. Today, information fl ows readily and cheaply across borders. Images and information about events are produced not only by news agencies, but by each of us as we use our cell phones and computers. Commerce is conducted through electronic signals rather than with the exchange of paper currency. In the global commons, national security (the security of states) can no longer be addressed by any one state contained within its own borders. Countries, such as North Korea, that attempt to do so, are still threatened by forces that transcend borders: climate change that leads to drought, famine, and refugees; information available on the internet that contradicts state propaganda; international cyber-surveillance; cyber-attack; or the freezing of bank accounts and electronic transfers of assets. Even for the most powerful states, geographic borders serve as less of a barrier as the al-Qaida’s attacks on the United States demonstrated. The global strategic environment continues to undergo rapid change. This article has taken a snapshot view of what this process looks like in the fi rst decade of the 21st Century by examining four documents that describe

138 the strategic environment as it is envisioned by U.S. policymakers. Today the United States no longer seeks global hegemony, but pursues global leadership. In a world where threats are global in nature, a global approach will be the only viable means to ensure security. In the global commons, security is both a global asset and a global responsibility. From the U.S. perspective, partner nations as well as partnerships with non-state entities will play an important, and in some cases vital, role in the national security strategies of the United States. The military will remain central, yet these strategies are also evolving to encompass a much more diverse array of instruments and partners.

4.0 REFERENCES: [1] Catherine Dale and Pat Towell, “In Brief: Assessing the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG),” U.S. Congressional Research Service, R42146, August 13, 2013. [2] Dempsey, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, 2012. [3] Henry H. Shelton, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2020, U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, Washington, DC, June 2000. [4] Martin E. Dempsey, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman’s Strategic Guidance to the Joint Force, February 6, 2012, p. 3 [5] U.S. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012, no page number (Secretary of Defense’s introductory letter dated 5 January 2013). [6] U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce, Joint Military Education: Actions Needed to Implement DOD Recommendations for Enhancing Leadership Development, Report 14-29, October 2013. [7] U.S. Whitehouse, National Security Strategy, May 2010.

139 CULTURAL MINEFIELDS AND COALITION FORCES

LCDR Dr. Leedjia Svec Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Directorate of Research Development and Strategic Initiatives, 366 Tuskegee Airmen Drive, Patrick AFB, FL 32925, U.S. [email protected]

ABSTRACT Cultural competence is a vital component of many missions in today’s mili- tary. Cultural competence enables one to further a mission, save resources, and save lives. Conversely, a lack of cultural competence may bring about challenges to mission completion, requirement for more resources, waste of resources, and destruction of lives. Cultural competence involves many components. One particu- lar component is cultural heritage and protection of cultural property. Cultural property is comprised of the physical, social, and psychological com- ponents that defi ne one’s culture. This may be a representation of a deity, a sacred space, a social practice such as going to the market, or a belief such as a local legend. The cultures to which these items belong are the owners; disregarding this fact may lead to severed connections, poor communication, retaliation, poor public relations, and even violence. Cultural property and its protection is a matter of law, heritage, human rights, and strategy. Few formal studies have been conducted with regard to Cultural Property Protection (CPP) and the military; training CPP as well as understand- ing the current state of it in the military remains an important and needed area for understanding. Such information can be utilised to guide policy, training, and future directions.

1.0 INTRODUCTION TO CULTURAL HERITAGE Cultural heritage is “a source of identity and cohesion for communities.” Cultural heritage lays the foundation “for vibrant, innovative and prosper- ous knowledge societies” (UNESCO, 2008). “In today’s interconnected world, culture’s power to transform societies is clear. Its diverse manifesta- tions–from our cherished historic monuments and museums to traditional practices and contemporary art forms–enrich our everyday lives in count- less ways” (UNESCO, 2008). Cultural heritage encompasses a wide range of both tangible and intangible elements.

140 Tangible elements include “monuments, buildings and sites with his- torical, aesthetic, archaeological, scientifi c, ethnological or anthropologi- cal value” and “outstanding physical, biological and geological formations, habitats of threatened species of animals and plants and areas with scientifi c, conservation or aesthetic value” (UNESCO, 2008). Tangible objects may include clothing, technology, gravesites, buildings, walls, roads, dishes, and more. Tangible items are typically more visible as well as visual, able to be seen and held. It is important to recognise that many people will be familiar with grand or popular places and objects of tangible heritage, such as the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul, Turkey. However, the places or objects that are less known to the public, the places and objects that do not appear grand, historic, or pretty–such as rock formations held sacred by Native Americans in upstate New York, U.S.–are of no less importance. Intangible aspects of cultural heritage include “traditional festivals, oral traditions, customs, ways of life, traditional crafts, dance, music, theatre, cuisine recipes…landscapes, industrial remains, and other various forms common to humankind” (UNESCO, 2008). Intangible cultural heritage may include practices, such as going to the market or travelling a particular route (Rush, 2012). How individuals make decisions, engage in life events such as weddings, birthdays, and funerals, and conduct their lives all have the potential to refl ect a given cultural custom handed down through the ages. As with tangible heritage, intangible cultural heritage may not be ob- vious or elaborate, yet its allowance is paramount. Some people may say or prefer “happy saint’s day” rather than “happy birthday” on their day of birth, for example. Both tangible and intangible cultural heritage may serve as a form of memory, a connection to the past, or be representative of different aspects of a given group’s culture (religion, family, etc.). They encompass iden- tity and enrich the diversity of people throughout the world. The practice of having tea in Bosnia-Herzegovina is one example of both tangible and intangible cultural heritage. The teapots are tangible, while the practice of having tea with others and the recipes used are intangible. They are both important and offer a window into what is signifi cant to the culture this heritage belongs to.

2.0 IMPORTANCE OF CULTURAL HERITAGE When people think about their home country, they may think of a spe- cifi c place with pride. They may tell others about it, hoping to convey the beauty, history, or unique elements it possesses. They most certainly want to convince others to see or experience it. Many times, people do not need

141 to be from a place to experience the pride and emotions that are attached to it. They understand its signifi cance and worth, even if it does not be- long to them. This is the nature of cultural heritage. Heritage is “our legacy from the past, what we live with today, and what we pass on to future gen- erations. Our cultural and natural heritages are both irreplaceable sources of life and inspiration” (UNESCO, 2008). An individual heritage may be unique to a given culture, but all cultures share the common thread of cul- tural heritage. The importance of cultural heritage cannot be overstated; it is “a driver and enabler of sustainability … a source of meaning and belong- ing … a wellspring of creativity and innovation essential for all societies today” (Bokova, 2013). The value of cultural heritage does not just lie in psychological con- cepts, such as pride, or social concepts, such as identity. Cultural heritage has an infl uence on economics and international relations as well. In 2009, for example, U.S. forces expanded their camp in Afghanistan without tak- ing the local culture and landscape into account (Phillips, 2009). As a result, ancient but still utilised water systems were blocked off or contaminated, upsetting the local villagers. The U.S. then had to pay reparations and was not able to work with the locals as intended. Both tangible and intangible cultural heritage may be threatened by economic instability, outside infl u- ence, allies, and enemies (Matsuda, 1998). As the likelihood of working with and within other cultures increases, it is all the more important to con- sider cultural heritage.

3.0 CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE MILITARY There are many news headlines featuring militaries behaving poorly to- ward others’ cultures, such as the base expansion in Afghanistan. Another illustration involves the looting of an Iraqi museum after occupation. Ad- ditionally, both the U.S. and U.K. had not ratifi ed the Hague Convention, which caused political issues in allies’ home countries for supporting the U.S. invasion. This also angered the Italians and negatively impacted their working relationship with the U.K., which distracted British forces as they engaged in fi xing their political situation, taking away from the mission at hand. As a result, U.S., British, Italian, and Polish forces faced signifi cant challenges working together on this issue, as they were not on the same page of understanding. The impact of cultural heritage mistakes is signifi cant and harmful; however there are also examples of military respect for cultural heritage. The recent coordination of the no-strike list heritage information between coalition forces enabled the U.S. and the U.K. to demonstrate respect for the cultural heritage of Italians and Libyans, for example. Heritage preser-

142 vation is a force multiplier and offers the opportunity to aid in rebuilding relations within countries. It is a way to show respect to coalition forces and generate valuable opportunities to partner in positive ways. It also contrib- utes to unifi ed operations, may save lives and dollars, and is an important part of the new counter insurgency (COIN) strategy. Both the positive and negative illustrations point to the importance of education and training in the military.

4.0 PRESENT STUDIES Both these illustrations raise the question, what is the current state of understanding and training for military members with regard to cultural heritage? Literature reviews reveal few actual studies. The extent of cul- tural heritage knowledge is little known and may be an untapped resource for allied forces. A series of studies was conducted to assess current under- standing of cultural property protection within the U.S. military and to de- termine the effectiveness of a training aimed at increasing cultural property protection awareness, knowledge, and comfort within the military setting. It was hypothesised that participants would vary in their level of awareness, knowledge, and comfort of cultural property protection, and that all would show a signifi cant improvement in knowledge scores post-training. Factors such as deployment experience would be examined for potential correlation with measures such as awareness.

4.1. Methods A 14-question pre-read survey was developed to assess participants’ demographics, awareness, knowledge, and effi cacy with regard to Cultural Property Protection (CPP). Demographics included questions on CPP train- ing and cultural property destruction. Awareness included values, laws, and procedures, while knowledge examined know-how, such as how to beddown in a protected structure or communicate information about the structure. Effi cacy assessed one’s comfort with engaging in the knowledge- based tasks. After participants completed the pre-survey, they were either asked to read one of two hard copy manuals on CPP that they were given or they were given instruction in equal opportunity (EO) subjects. The CPP manuals were developed by the Combatant Command (COCOM) Cultural Heritage Action Group. Both manuals connected concepts of cul- tural property protection with well-established military operations con- cepts. One manual, “The Cultural Minefi eld: A Manual on Cultural Prop- erty Protection for the Operator Forward”, (Rush, 2012) was 76 pages and took approximately 2 hours to complete. The other manual, “A manual for cultural property protection in the deployed environment,” (Rush, 2012)

143 was 12 pages and took no more than 45 minutes to complete. After reading the manual (or receiving general EO knowledge), participants completed a post-read survey. A 24-question post-read survey was administered to assess awareness, knowledge, and comfort, in addition to feedback on the manual itself. The surveys utilized a 1–5 rating scale with 1 representing no awareness, knowl- edge, or comfort and 5 representing absolute awareness, knowledge, and comfort with different aspects of cultural property protection. Participants were solicited primarily in person. Participants were informed that it was a volunteer opportunity and that, should they decide to participate, they would fi ll out a pre-read survey, read the manual (or not), and complete a post-read survey. Participants were divided into “Study One” and “Study Two” to refl ect that they were recruited from different sources and received different man- uals. 4.2 Study One Results Study one utilised the full-length manual and participants primarily from Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute’s (DEOMI) Leadership Team Awareness Seminar (LTAS). A total of 30 participants engaged in the study. All participants received the pre-test and post-test, but 18 partici- pants received the manual, while 12 did not receive the manual for control. Participant demographics are illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Study One Demographics

Gender 75% Male and 25% Female

Race 58% White, 33% Black, and 9% Other 53% Army, 13% Navy, 13% Marines, 9% Air Force, Service and 12% Civilian 37% E-7–E-9, 37% O-4–O-6, 10% O-1–O-3, 10% GS- Rank 11–GS-14, and 6% Other 35% HR, 17% Infantry, 17% Science,14% Legal, 10% Occupation Supply, and 7% Aviation Deployed Status 63% Deployed and 37% Not deployed Cultural Training 93% No cultural training and 7% Cultural training 8% Witnessed destruction (pre-), 92% No witness Witnessed Destruction 17% Witnessed destruction (post-) , 83% No witness

144 Average pre-read scores indicated that participants had limited aware- ness for all measures regarding CPP (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Study 1 Average Rating Pre- and Post-

Participants averaged a 2-point increase in all measures on the post-test, indicating they were more aware, knowledgeable, and comfortable with CPP after reading the manual. Participants in the control group showed lim- ited awareness for all measures regarding CPP (Figure 2) but did not show the increase in scores with post-assessment, supporting the idea that the change in scores coming from the test group was caused by the manual.

Figure 2. Study 1 Average Rating Pre- and Post- (No manual)

145 All participants marked that the manual would be helpful for deploy- ments and if they were given the manual they would read it. Participants rated the manual as extremely useful on average and found the formatting just right with elements (such as pictures or lists) in place.

4.3 Study Two Results Study Two utilised the shorter manual and participants from the Equal Opportunity Advisor Course (EOAC). A total of 79 participants engaged in the study. In the test group, 27 participants received the pre-test and post-test and the manual, while 52 participants served as control, engag- ing in pre-assessment surveys. Participant demographics are illustrated in Table 2. Table 2. Study Two Demographics

Gender 58% Male and 42% Female 51% Black, 25% White, 10% Hispanic, 10% Other, and 4% Race Asian 58% Army, 22% Air Force, 11% Navy, 3% Marines, 3% Service Coast Guard, and 3% National Guard 67% E-7–E-9, 17% E-4–E-6, 10% O-4–O-6, and 6% O- Rank 1–O-3 42% HR, 14% Supply, 11% Other, 10% Infantry, 8% EO, Occupation 6% Medical, 3% Signal, 3% Aviation, and 3% Legal

Deployed Status 87% Deployed and 13% Not deployed

Cultural Training? 78% No cultural training and 22% Cultural training 9% Witnessed destruction (pre-), 91% No witness Witness Destruction? 12% Witnessed destruction (post-) , 88% No witness

Average pre-read scores indicated that test-group participants had lim- ited awareness for all measures regarding CPP (Figure 3). Participants averaged a 2-point increase in all measures on the post-test, indicating they were more aware, knowledgeable, and comfortable with CPP after reading the manual. Participants in the control group showed limited awareness for all mea- sures regarding CPP (Figure 4) but did not show the increase in scores with post-assessment, supporting the idea that the change in scores of the test group was caused by the manual.

146 Figure 3. Study 2 Average Rating Pre- and Post-

Figure 4. Study 2 Average Rating Pre- and Post- (No Manual)

The majority of participants marked that the manual would be helpful for deployments and that if they were given the manual, they would read it. Participants rated the manual as useful on average and found the formatting just right with elements (such as pictures or lists) in place.

5.0 DISCUSSION Participant demographics were not equal in category representation, with both studies having a majority of Army, male, human resources (HR), deployed, and persons from the E7–E9 rank who had not received cul-

147 tural heritage training nor witnessed cultural heritage destruction. While comparisons could be made on the bases of job, service, gender, etc., they would be limited due to the unequal sample size. Additionally, no Clan- destine Services were surveyed. Future efforts may benefi t from obtaining their input, particularly Clandestine Services who are frequently in forward deployed environments. Pre-test read the majority of participants for both studies had limited awareness of cultural heritage laws and minimisation of damage. These fi ndings are interesting in that a signifi cant number of military members deploy to foreign areas where the awareness of cultural heritage can save lives and dollars. Additionally, a sizable number of participants remarked that this was novel and important information. The value of cultural heri- tage stood out from laws and minimisation as participants had the highest ratings of this measure pre- and post-test for both groups. It follows that the value of one’s cultural heritage may be more easily grasped; however, it is possible that the relevance to the military may need further strengthening for some participants. Examination of knowledge scores pre-test read shows that variations exist within CPP knowledge domains, highlighting certain domains as be- ing less known among the participants tested. The majority of participants did not know how to recover or how to beddown with cultural property for both groups, for example. Post-test read these scores had signifi cantly im- proved but still remained the lowest scores. This fi nding is important in that cultural property is purposely utilised by enemy forces and can be a source of protection from enemy fi re. It follows that knowledge about bedding down with cultural property would be one of the fi rst domains in which to target training. It is also likely that more interactive training is required for these domains as opposed to the written format utilised in the manual. On average, however, participants’ knowledge signifi cantly increased for all knowledge measures after reading the manual for both groups. It is worth noting that the groups did not start out with the same scores on average, with the senior leaders having higher pre-read averages than the non-senior leaders, which would be expected. Many studies in other fi elds, such as HIV prevention, have shown that knowledge does not equal effi cacy or a sense of comfort or belief that one is capable of changing behaviour despite new knowledge that behaviour should be changed (Svec&Wand,2003). Comfort with cultural heritage was assessed to gauge whether participants had the confi dence to engage in cul- tural property protection behaviours. The majority of participants were not comfortable with performance pre-test read; however, a sizable number of

148 participants were comfortable. Comfort with communication was higher, while comfort with execution was lower. It is encouraging that knowledge increased effi cacy. One consideration when examining the data is that deployment status had an infl uence on levels of CPP awareness, knowledge, and comfort. To examine whether this was the case, participants’ data were separated into either having been deployed or never deployed and compared. As would be expected, those who had deployed rated all measures higher (greater awareness, knowledge, comfort) than those who had not deployed, pre-test read, for all measures. The difference, however, was not signifi cant, and those who deployed on average did not rate measures any higher than a 3, or “somewhat.” This suggests that just deploying is not enough to teach matters of CPP. Assessment of the manuals themselves revealed that participants found them usable. The lowest rating, that for pictures, was likely due to image quality as participants remarked that they were hard to decipher. The manual was printed in black and white; therefore, it is important to ensure colour printing of the photographs for maximum effectiveness before the manual is distributed. The manual content was well received. However, the length of the manual was rated as a little too long, which was expressed in the com- ments. One of the purposes of the manual is use in the fi eld; therefore, a short and direct version via app, e-reader, or pocket device may be worth pursuing in conjunction with publication of this manual for further reference. Suggestions included checklists at the end of each section, increasing and clarifying the “so what” factor, and electronic or PowerPoint formats. Service members may appreciate a version that could be viewed on their e-readers. A frequent comment included the importance of cultural heritage knowledge, the novelty of this knowledge to the participants, and the need for more segments of the military to have this knowledge. It is worthwhile to pursue versions that may be aimed at different seg- ments of the population, from the senior leader to the newly enlisted, as well as specifi c to each service. Cultural heritage is a legal matter as well as a human rights, EO, and cultural competence matter. The more often troops are socialised to these concepts, the less often there should be international incidents of cultural heritage actions gone wrong.

6.0 SUMMARY Cultural property and its protection is a matter of law, heritage, human rights, and strategy. Few formal studies have been conducted with regard

149 to CPP and the military; training CPP as well as understanding the current state of it in the military remains an important and needed area for under- standing. Such information can be utilised to guide policy, training, and future directions. This study sought to assess the current state of cultural heritage awareness, knowledge, and comfort as well as the effectiveness and areas for improvement of the cultural heritage training manual. The results of this study indicate that the current state of cultural her- itage awareness and knowledge has room for improvement. Participants somewhat know the value of cultural heritage and are less than somewhat aware of laws or protection. This fi nding is important because service mem- bers will still be held accountable to the law, even if they do not know it. With regard to cultural heritage knowledge, participants are not really knowledgeable; however, this varied with deployment and service. Partici- pants were somewhat comfortable with cultural heritage, and those with more knowledge were more comfortable, as one would expect. While fur- ther studies would be required, it appears that the knowledge provided was enough to increase effi cacy in engaging cultural heritage for the vast ma- jority of participants. Despite variations between participants’ base knowl- edge, participants’ average scores clearly increased in all three areas after reading the training manual. Cultural property protection value was highest pre- and post-training, while knowledge regarding recovery of property was rated lowest pre- and post-training. Differences between those who had deployed or who were in different services were minimised. This fi nding is important in that while not all participants began with the same levels of awareness or knowledge with cultural heritage, they fi nished relatively the same. This is encouraging for maintaining an equal playing fi eld and equitable resources and capaci- ties among service members as they engage in cultural heritage. Future studies should include objective assessment of awareness and knowledge rather than, or in addition to, self-rating. Additional questions should also assess training and experience with cultural heritage. It is known, for example, that the Army has Fort Drum as a place to engage cul- tural heritage, and the Marines are trained on CPP via Defense Institute for International and Legal Studies (DIILS); however, it is not known whether the Navy or Air Force have such resources. An additional measure would be a follow up study to ensure retention of knowledge after training, as well as re-test reliability. Lastly, tracking of incidents and outcomes in the fi eld may be the key to policy and leadership support and ownership. While these factors are known, objective measurement and illustration would be a signifi cant next step.

150 With regard to the manual itself, revisions to create a slightly shorter in- teractive, dynamic, electronic version is recommended. Different educational levels or purposes could be embedded for different leadership levels within the military. The recommendation for collateral duty is also worth consider- ation. Just as participants receive an in-depth training that allows them to help others vote, be fi t, volunteer, keep track of hazardous substances in medical clinics, and more, commands or units that would benefi t from cultural heri- tage training could employ this as a collateral duty. Training could occur at Fort Drum as well as online. This would enable a streamlined advocacy and reach-back capability that service members remarked they needed.

7.0 CONCLUSION These studies sought to examine the following questions: Do service members have the necessary skills to protect cultural property as they de- ploy worldwide? Do service members see the impact of cultural property protection on matters that range from equal opportunity to national security? What is the impact of cultural property training? While the current studies leave room for further refi nement and methodological improvement, they do lend data that is helpful to exploring these questions. The vast majority of participants had no experience with cultural heri- tage training, and had some awareness of cultural heritage value but little cultural heritage knowledge or effi cacy. Participants varied in their under- standing of the connection between cultural heritage and EO or national security as evidenced by specifi c questions and analysis of their comments. Several participants, for example, believed that cultural heritage did not apply to them, while after the training, several participants viewed destruc- tion of property in new light. The impact of cultural property training was measurably signifi cant, with the majority of participants improving on all measures. The biggest difference between the two manuals, as shown in the data, was in assessment; 100% of participants found the longer manual use- ful and would read it, while this was not the case with the shorter manual. Further studies would be required to determine whether this fi nding is a function of group difference or manual difference. In conclusion, cultural heritage is an important process and outcome. Cultural heritage relates to issues faced in deployment as well as in times of peace, in land and on sea. The sheer volume of participants who have deployed but have not received cultural heritage information is alarming; however, the effectiveness of training is encouraging. As a fi nal point, cul- tural heritage is moderately known in the fi eld, has the ability to be success- fully taught, and remains an important component of today’s force.

151 8.0 REFERENCES [1] Bokova, I. (2013, October 28). Director General of UNESCO on the occasion of the inauguration of the exhibition Intangible Cultural Heri- tage for Sustainable Development. Retrieved from http://unesdoc.unesco. org/images/0022/002241/224136m.pdf. [2] Philips, M. (2009). Learning a hard history lesson in ‘Talibanistan.’ The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/news/arti- cles/SB124224652409516525. [3] UNESCO. (2008). Tangible cultural heritage. Retrieved from http:// www.unesco.org/new/en/cairo/culture/tangible-cultural-heritage. [4] UNESCO. (2008). Intangible cultural heritage” Retrieved from http://www.unesco.org/new/en/cairo/culture/intangible-cultural-heritage/. [5] Matsuda, D. (1998). Subsistence Diggers. In K. Gibbons (Ed.) Who Owns the Past?: Cultural Policy, Cultural Property, and the Law (255- 265). Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press. [6] Rush, L. (2012). Cultural property protection as a force multiplier in stability operations.Military Review, 36-43. Retrieved fromhttp://usacac. army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_ 20120430_art008.pdf [7] Rush, L. (2012). The Cultural Minefi eld: A Manual on Cultural Property Protection for the Operator Forward. (Manuscript in Review). COCOM Cultural Heritage Action Group, Fort Drum, NY. [8] Rush, L (2012).A manual for cultural property protection in the deployed environment.(Manuscript in Review).COCOM Cultural Heritage Action Group, Fort Drum, NY. [9] Svec, L., & Wang, H. (2003). A cross and inter cultural assessment of AIDS/HIV behaviors, attitudes, knowledge, and methods. Soochow University, Taiwan & University of Nevada, Reno. American Psychological Society Annual Meeting.

152 STRESSFUL FACTORS IN MODERN MILITARY OPERATIONS

Col. Dr. Iliya Marinov & 1st Lt. Dr. Aneliya Mitkova Military Medical Academy, Sofi a, Bulgaria Centre for Mental Health and Prevention 3 St. “Georgi Sofi yski” Str., 1606 Sofi a, Bulgaria [email protected]

ABSTRACT The present paper refers to the necessity of broadening our understanding about the factors infl uencing the emergence of stress reactions as a result of military deployment. Within the military psychological support system, stress reactions are considered mainly in terms of Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), while the post-deployment syndrome perspective is not yet very popular among the mental health specialists. By recognizing the role not only of the battle stressors, emergent stress reactions could be better understood and thus professional mental health specialists would provide better complex treatment. Taking into account not only the ground stressors, the authors present the results of a psychological study (N=380) investigating the degree by which environmental, cognitive, physiological, emotional and fi eld stressors affect servicemembers during deployment.

1.0 BACKROUND Participation in mission deployments and/or battle exposures has been examined as a situation under extreme conditions which could evoke a wide spectrum of stress reactions in every human being. Experiencing threatening events with imminent jeopardy, concerning life and health, for short or longer periods of time, could lead to traumatic stress reactions in a period from a couple of days to even weeks after the event. Usually these reactions weaken with time, but they could last and could lead to various health conditions. In contrast to many other stress situations, deployment participation can result in psychological traumas with specifi c outcomes in the socio-psychological adaptation of the servicemen/servicewomen. Eventually these problems become obvious after their return back home. One of the main obstructions for servicemembers to successful re- adaptation to everyday life is proved to be the psychological outcome related to stress resulting from battle experience. With veterans suffering from Post

153 Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) the capabilities of integration of the traumatic experience within personal lifetime is dramatically impaired. The traumatic memories could be present in one’s memory not as connected in a coherent storyline, but also as intense emotions with sensory and somatic symptoms. It is highly possible they be evoked in associatively close to the traumatic events situations and/or corresponding stimuli. Through the force of this non-integration of the traumatic stimuli within the cognitive schemes, and their rigidity in time, the “victims” are “frozen” in the trauma as if it is a current experience, instead of seasoning it as belonging to the past. Somatic reactions of individuals with PTSD to specifi c physical and emotional stimuli proceed in the same way as if under actual threat condition. One of the consequences of PTSD represents a generalisation of the expected danger. The world turns to become an unsecure place: harmless sounds provoke reactions of anxiety, usual events are perceived as harbinger of danger, etc. The persevering and relevant activation of „alarm signals” leads to the fact that physical sensitivity loses its signal purpose related to emotional conditions, and as a result it can no longer be referred to as a landmark in any activities. In the continuation of these processes, normal physiological sensations could be additionally loaded with new endangering emotional content. As a result, the proper physiological activity is transformed to source of fear for the person – soldiers suffer from hypervigilance, overreactions to unexpected stimuli and inability for relaxation. They have to cope with the fact not to be understood, to be judged and sanctioned, to deal with problems in human interactions, with professional self-defi ning and effective coping, problems in the sphere of fi nancial budgeting, to engage and preserve their families, and/or close amiable relationships, etc. As a result, the “victims” of PTSD decrease and eventually lose their capabilities for fl exible response to the changed environmental requirements that could result in diffi culties of assimilation of new knowledge, abilities and skills, all along new information processing. The participants in extreme situations, with unexpected traumatic pattern, perceive the ongoing events as an act of violence, while perceiving themselves as victims. From a psychological point of view, the violence damages the most basic beliefs of the personality concerning his/her independence as an invulnerable and valuable human being, all along with the impact in direction to negative ideations about the world as a safe and fairly place. After being a victim of a violent act, one’s own self-perception and perception of the environment are dramatically altered and can never be restored as before. Individuals with PTSD experience perplexity in planning their proper life in aspect of “forbidding” themselves from dreaming and depicturing in

154 their fantasy varieties of valuable outcomes for important situations in their life. In order to preserve themselves from invasion of traumatic experiences, memories and associations related to the extreme condition, the “victims” raise an internal psychological barrier. Hence, for maintaining the strength of this barrier, they reorganize their life in a way not to feel or to imagine different probable outcomes leading to emotionally powerful or intense reactions. Thus, these patterns of built models for cognitive self-restrictions, having the purpose of not allowing emotional impulses to emerge, have a substantial contribution for the impulse control of these “victims”. The reaction to the trauma over again is proved to be one of the main reasons for violence spreading in a large social context. The persecuting obsessive memories and thoughts organise servicemembers in a way to avoid emotions provoking affective invasions. The avoidance mechanisms could take different appearances – for instance, taking a distance from events, objects, situations, people, sounds, or whatever stimuli; or drugs and alcohol abuse for damping the consciousness to be aware/realise the stress; or using processes of dissociation in order to suppress the hurtful experience. The aftermath shows impaired relationships and interactions with other people and adaptive resources decrement. The presence of PTSD symptoms in one of the family or military unit members infl uences the functioning of all the other members as well. By avoiding situations or doings similar to the main trauma, or that could symbolise it, could refl ect unfavourably on relationships with others, to lead to family confl icts, divorces or loss of job. Only part of the soldiers exposed to traumatic experience display PTSD symptoms and this fact raises the “why” question. One way to answer the question could be found in the etiological multifactor paradigm. In order to do that, we have to take into account three groups of factors that in combination and interplay lead to development of PTSD: • Factors related to the traumatic event: severity of the trauma, its uncontrollability and unexpectedness; • Protective factors: resources for past experience processing, availability of social support, mechanisms controlling behaviour; these are imperative for the fact that soldiers having the possibility to talk about the traumatic event and to abreact their emotional experience show to reduce the symptoms; • Risk factors: age and personal maturity at the time of the traumatic event, negative past experience, psychological issues in the anamnesis, poorer intellectual resources and socioeconomic status. Psychological stressors and risk factors in peacekeeping operations as well as in conventional operations in military areas include sudden

155 and unexpected alternations in lifestyle, absence of the family, fatigue, unfavourable climatic conditions, getting accustomed to new cuisine different from the national one, cultural traditions, language barriers, insecurity in deployment duration and processes of demoralisation concerning the mission results (King et al., 1999; Rosebush, 1998). Unique stressors in peacekeeping operations include: 1) Sense of hopelessness when faced to loss of people; suffering and pain, concerning their safety; 2) Boredom, tediousness, and annoyance; 3) Role and functional duty in confl icts; 4) Reproaches and teasing by colleagues and civilians, and 5) Incertitude concerning the rules of engagement in the military area (Bramsen et al., 2000; Litz et al., 1997). Additional stressors, unique for the peacekeeping armed forces, include operations close to the enemy forces. Humanitarian assistance, defence and deterring attacks must be done under conditions of maximum control and protection of the local population and the contingents. On the whole, these stressors concern unique situations after which the deployed soldiers feel inherently changed and enriched with multiform experience in a professional and emotional aspect. All this experience though brings the sensations well known by the scholars from soldiers’ participation in previous wars. An additional stressor, apart from the context and the core of military operations, is the basic belief that stress experience cannot be understood by their family members, friends and even by their colleagues. Research results have shown that subliminal stressors have a continuous negative psychological infl uence and can additionally bolster the PTSD development (King et al., 1999). These phenomena pose the imperative to discuss and reconsider the view concerning the syndromes shown to be different to the well-known to date. The Post-deployment syndrome or the Post-combat syndrome is a chronic syndrome displayed by veterans from different nationalities, having military experience in different locations. During their combat activities, deployed soldiers are very often faced to traumatic incidents and events typical for the theatre of military operations. They could witness deaths, feel responsible for civilian’s death(s), or be involved in serious incidents. Sometimes they are faced with the uncertainty of the mine fi elds, friendly fi res, or other jeopardizing conditions. They could also witness different forms of abuse and cruelties to colleagues and/ or civilian population. Bramsen et al. (2000) have shown results that 85%

156 of the deployed soldiers have taken part or have witnessed shootings, while 47% have seen death or wounded people. The nature and the frequency of the traumatic events vary depending on the location and the specifi cs of a mission. Peacekeeping operations could range from operations with mild risk to operations as in Afghanistan of high risk.

2.0 STUDY DESIGNE AND RESULTS The Centre for Mental Health and Prevention at the Bulgarian Military Medical Academy conducted a combat stressors’ study. Altogether 380 servicemembers took part in the survey (45 offi cers, 84 sergeants and 251 soldiers, both men and women), all of them upon their return back in Bulgaria from an ISAF deployment. The results show equal tendencies in manifestation of different stressors during the deployment for all the military units in Kabul and Kandahar (Fig. 1).

Fig1. Manifestation (in %) of the six stressor categories according to the respondents after deployment in ISAF (Kabul and Kandahar) The categorisation of the studied stressors was achieved through expert judgment from military mental health professionals and has been grouped in six main categories of deployment stressors as follows: Physical stressors – including climate (heat, cold weather, humidity, etc.), environmental (vibrations, noise, etc.) and living conditions (possibilities for maintaining proper hygiene, personal space, etc.) during the deployment; Cognitive stressors – sensory overload or sensory deprivation, lack

157 of clarity, lack of security, isolation, lack of time, unpredictability, organisational dynamics, tough choices or lack of choice, etc.; Physiological stressors – sleep or food deprivation, dehydrogenation, etc.; Emotional stressors – loss of family members or colleagues, the need for support by family members and colleagues and active communication with them, feelings of incertitude; Terrain stressors include three subscales: а) Field stressors – direct experience of events related to the military situation in the area of operation, (e.g.: close calls, blasts in or near the military base; helping wounded people/colleagues; getting into fi rings, etc.); b) Logistic stressors – related to the negative judgment about the equipment (e.g.: poor condition of the equipment or feelings of uncertainty concerning the equipment, etc.); c) Normative stressors – related to the perception about incongruence in the imperatives of the national military rules and the SOPs; d) Stressors related to the attitude toward the deployment – they concern the individual perception for the purpose; meaningfulness of the military operation and the will of their commanders to conduct those attitudes. For sergeants and soldiers from the three units the leading tendency is to the Physical stressors (with a manifestation of 53,39%), followed by the Cognitive stressors (44,67%), Physiological stressors (42,99%), Emotional stressors (34,76%), Terrain stressors (32,83%), and the stressors, related to the attitude toward the deployment (30,8%). Within the subscales of the Terrain stressors, the most notable manifestation is the one of the Normative stressors (38,53%), followed by the Field stressors (33,87%), and the Logistic stressors (20,73%). The most frequent stress factors during deployment are related to climatic conditions and features, pollution, unpleasant odours and noises. The responses obtained from sergeants and soldiers concerning the Cognitive stressors (with a manifestation of 44,67%), show that besides the uniformity of the landscape (х=4,14, with a maximum value of 5), the lack of information of any kind has a high manifestation during an ISAF deployment, too. Sensory overloading is not typical for the 3 contingents (all х≈2,33) but has been a matter of discomfort for 18,3% of the respondents. Concerning the Physiological stressors (with a manifestation of 42,99%), the results show an unfavourable tendency of the Sleep wake cycle. The results from sergeants and soldiers regarding the Emotional stressors (with a manifestation of 34,76%) follow the same trends for the three contingents. Concerning the sense of safety that one will go back

158 home alive, only 3,9% of the respondents (13 servicemembers) have given the answer “rather disagree” or “strongly disagree”, while other 88,4% have given positive answers (for the three contingents х≈4,56). The support from the colleagues is highly evaluated (х≈4,72). The need to be with their families is rated with medium to high results (all х≈3,47). Low scores hold worries about serious injuring and/or life endangering (all х≈1,41) and problems with beloved/family communication/contact (all х≈1,28). According to the sergeants and soldiers from the three contingents, Terrain stressors manifest 32,83% of intensity. In this group the highest intensity is the one of the Normative stressors related to the compatibility of the national service regulations and the SOPs. According to the respondents there is a discrepancy between both (national and international) regulations causing some diffi culties. On the second place, the intensity of the Field stressors proves to be 33,71%. The most frequent ones are related with information about wounded/killed colleagues from the same and from different nationality, and rocket attacks or blasts in or near the military base. According to the survey results, Logistic stressors occupy the third place (with 20,8%). Positive ratings come for the pre-deployment training in equipment usage (for all х≥4,52, with a maximum value of 5). Stressors related to the attitude toward the deployment seem to show the lowest intensity – 30,80%, according to sergeants and soldiers. Respondents from the three contingents give high ratings concerning the estimation of the effi ciency and benefi t of the Bulgarian soldiers’ service (all х≈4,72), as well as the clarity of the assignments (all х≥4,68). They believe that military presence in the area would really bring local improvements (all х≈4,31) and highly rate the military presence in Afghanistan (all х≈4,35). As the respondents rate the intensity of the manifestation of different stressors according to their personal experience during deployment, we could see that in locations like Kabul and Kandahar (Kandahar Airfi eld) the manifestation of the Field stressors is rated with lower intensity than the Emotional, Cognitive, Physiological, Physical and Normative stressors. This result is not related to the area safety, but to the perception coming from one’s own experience. The main reason for the results on Field stressors intensity to be the most unstable one is because the situation in these locations is unpredictable. 3.0 CONCLUSIONS The above picture presenting the complexity of external factors continuously infl uencing a three-month, six-month or longer deployment uncovers the state of readiness reached in “a natural way” by servicemembers

159 on the ground. Under this infl uence, commanders and mental health professionplex policy for assistance and suals must intervene periodically with prevention purposes, not because they can control the external stressors, but because soldiers’ personal resources have to be bolstered and aimed in order to prevent the emergence of stress symptoms. Prevention of Post-deployment syndrome emergence represents a multilevel intervention. From a psychological point of view, on one hand, psychological pre-deployment training must be focused on two main topics: (1) realistic expectations and notions about the peculiarities of the deployment location; (2) elucidation of the symptoms of stress reactions, coping strategies and peer-assistance techniques. On the other hand, during the deployment, in addition to the commanders and peers support, a psychological assistance must be carried out in terms of individual consultations, psychological discussion groups, psychological climate survey, etc. in order to maintain personal resources for coping with external stressors and personal psychological issues. In the post-deployment stage of the cycle, a following-up program must be carried out by unit psychologists and medical personnel in order to assure the most appropriate and timely assistance to the personnel. This compport of servicemembers during military deployments could be carried out only with the interaction between medical and mental health specialists endorsed by the commanders. As a fi rst step in this direction it is important to acknowledge that the so-called “mild stressors” are not harmless but as harmful in the long run as the battle stressors.

4.0 REFERENCES: [1] Bramsen, I., Dirkzwager, A.J.E., Van der Ploeg, H.M.(2000). Predeployment personality traits and exposure to trauma as predictors of posttraumatic stress symptoms: A prospective study of former peacekeepers. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157(7), pp. 1115–1119. [2] King, D.W., King, L.A., Foy, D.W., Keane, T.M., Fairbank, J.A. (1999). Posttraumatic stress disorder in a national sample of female and male Vietnam veterans: Risk factors, war-zone stressors, and resilience- recovery variables. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108, pp.164–170. [3] Litz, B.T., King, L.A., King, D.W., Orsillo, S.M., Friedman, M.J. (1997). Warriors as peacekeepers: Features of the Somalia experience and PTSD. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 65(6), 1001–1010. [4] Rosebush, P.A.(1998). Psychological intervention with military personnel in Rwanda. Military Medicine, 163, pp. 559–563.

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