Understanding Metaphor: a Relational Frame Perspective Ian Stewart and Dermot Barnes-Holmes National University of Ireland, Maynooth
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The Behavior Analyst 2001, 24, 191-199 No. 2 (Fall) Understanding Metaphor: A Relational Frame Perspective Ian Stewart and Dermot Barnes-Holmes National University of Ireland, Maynooth The current article presents a basic functional-analytic interpretation of metaphor. This work in- volves an extension of Skinner's (1957) interpretation of metaphor using relational frame theory (RFT). A basic RFI' interpretation of a particular metaphor is outlined, according to which the metaphor acquires its psychological effects when formal stimulus dimensions are contacted via the derivation of arbitrary stimulus relations. This interpretation sees the metaphor as involving four elements: (a) establishing two separate equivalence relations, (b) deriving an equivalence relation between these relations, (c) discriminating a formal relation via this equivalence-equivalence rela- tion, and (d) a transformation of functions on the basis of the formal relation discriminated in the third element. In the second half of the paper, a number of important issues with regard to the RFT interpretation of metaphor are addressed. Key words: metaphor, relational frame theory, equivalence-equivalence, transformation of func- tions, nonarbitrary relations In psychology, especially cognitive psychology, of an object or event" (pp. 81-82). The characterizing the processes involved in the comprehension of metaphor is not only an in- extended tact is a feature of more com- teresting challenge in its own right, but the spec- plex verbal behavior that occurs when ification of those processes also constitutes a a response is evoked by a novel stim- good test of the power of theories of language ulus that resembles a stimulus previ- comprehension in general. (Ortony, 1993, p. 4) ously present when a response was re- Behavior analysis has had relatively inforced. Metaphorical verbal behavior little to say on the topic of metaphor.' is a subtype of this latter class of be- Indeed, for the main contribution made havior that takes place "because of the in this area we have to turn to the control exercised by properties of the largely interpretive work of Skinner stimulus which, though present at re- (1957). Skinner classified this phenom- inforcement, do not enter into the con- enon as a subtype of the "extended tingency respected by the verbal com- tact." The tact is a behavioral relation munity" (p. 92). The following is an that is defined as "a verbal operant in example of Skinner's interpretation of which a response of a given form is metaphor: evoked (or at least strengthened) by a particular object or event or property When for the first time a speaker calls someone a mouse, we account for the response by noting certain properties-smallness, timidity, silent Requests for reprints may be addressed to movement and so on-which are common to the Dermot Barnes-Holmes, Department of Psy- kind of situation in which the response is char- chology, National University of Ireland, May- acteristically reinforced and to the particular sit- nooth, Maynooth, County Kildare, Ireland (E- uation in which the response is now emitted. mail: [email protected]). Since these are not the properties used by zo- ' Traditionally, a distinction is made between ologists or by the lay community as the usual metaphor and simile based largely on structural basis for reinforcing a response we call the ex- differences (i.e., simile incorporates the phrases tension metaphorical. (p. 93) "like," "as," or "as if," whereas metaphor does not). Because the current interpretation and model of metaphor are functional analytic, these A somewhat similar analysis of meta- structural differences have been ignored for the phor, in which Skinner (1989) once time being. Subsequent work may well discover again provided a behavior-analytic in- that there is an important functional basis to the traditional distinction between metaphor and terpretation of familiar real-world simile, but consideration of this issue is beyond events, appears in Recent Issues in the the scope of the current article. Analysis of Behavior. 191 192 IAN STEWART & DERMOT BARNES-HOLMES When we speak of weighing evidence we are tional responding. All animals that are using a metaphor. But a metaphor is a word that is "carried over" from one referent to another capable of complex forms of learning on the basis of a common property. The com- may be trained to make discriminations mon property in weighing is the conversion of on the basis of nonarbitrary or physical one kind of thing (potatoes or evidence) into an- relations between stimuli (e.g., louder other (a number on a scale or a verdict). Once than, larger than, differently colored we have seen this kind of thing done with po- tatoes it is easier to see it done with evidence. from). However, according to RFT, ... We could also say that weight becomes ab- language-able humans, having pro- stract when we move from potatoes to evidence. longed exposure to certain contingen- The word is indeed abstracted in the sense of its cies of reinforcement that operate with- being drawn away from its original referent, but it continues to refer to a common property, and, in the verbal community, also demon- as in the case of metaphor, in a possibly more strate responding on the basis of de- decisive way. The testimony in a trial is much rived or arbitrarily applicable relations. more complex than a sack of potatoes, and These relations are defined not by the "guilty" probably implies more than "ten physical properties of the relata per se pounds." But abstraction is not a matter of com- plexity. Quite the contrary. Weight is only one but by additional contextual cues. aspect of a potato, and guilt is only one aspect One important example of arbitrarily of a person. Weight is as abstract as guilt. It is applicable relational responding is the only under verbal contingencies of reinforce- phenomenon of stimulus equivalence. ment that we respond to single properties of things or persons. In doing so we abstract the For example, if a language-able human property from the thing or person. (p. 7) is taught to match an arbitrary Stimu- lus A to an arbitrary Stimulus B and to According to the Skinnerian account, match Stimulus B to an arbitrary Stim- therefore, metaphor may be conceptu- ulus C, then, without further training, alized as the abstraction, via one par- he or she might subsequently match A ticular subtype of verbal behavior (i.e., to B, B to C (thus showing symmetri- the extended tact), of a common phys- cal responding), C to A (thus showing ical property from two different types transitive responding), and A to C of environmental event. This behavior- (thus showing combined symmetrical al interpretation, however, does not de- and transitive responding). In other tail how a repertoire of metaphorical words, the person now treats the three verbal behavior (especially complex stimuli as mutually substitutable or human metaphor) develops from a pre- equivalent. sumably simpler repertoire of formal Relational frame theory takes the property abstraction. This is perhaps view that stimulus equivalence, and the key question left unanswered by what has been called a transfer of func- Skinner's analysis. However, Skinner's tion through equivalence relations, pro- work does provide the basis for a mod- vide an important basis for the behav- em behavioral treatment of metaphor ior analysis of symbolic relations and using the conceptual and empirical human language more generally. From framework of relational frame theory an RFT perspective, one of the impor- (RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & tant properties of a symbol is that its Roche, 2001; see also Barnes-Holmes, psychological functions are based to Barnes-Holmes, & Cullinan, 2000, for some extent on the transfer of func- a systematic synthesis of the Skinner- tions through equivalence relations. ian and RFT interpretations of verbal Suppose, for example, that a young behavior). boy enjoys a glass of Cokes (Stimulus A) for the first time and is then told by RELATIONAL FRAME THEORY a school friend that Coke is like anoth- er drink called PepsiT3 (Stimulus B). If Relational frame theory is an ap- the boy is subsequently asked "Would proach to human language and cogni- you like a Pepsi?" he may well re- tion that treats these phenomena as ex- spond positively. This transfer of ap- amples of arbitrarily applicable rela- petitive function is based on the di- UNDERSTANDING METAPHOR 193 rectly established psychological func- ed below that will be overcome only tion of the word Coke, which was through further empirical research. paired with actual Coke, and the de- rived symmetry relation between the RELATING RELATIONS: words Pepsi and Coke (i.e., Coke is A KEY PROPERTY OF like Pepsi). In effect, the boy does not METAPHORICAL LANGUAGE need to experience Pepsi directly in or- der for him to "think" that it will be a The first published RFT study that pleasant drink. This basic concept of a was directly relevant to the analysis of transfer of function in accordance with metaphor focused on the closely relat- stimulus relations forms the core of the ed area of analogy (Barnes, Hegarty, & RIFT approach to language and cogni- Smeets, 1997; we will consider the re- tion (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, lation between analogy and metaphor 2001). at a later point in the article). Specifi- In this article we will describe how cally, Barnes et al. used what they RFT has used the concepts of equiva- called equivalence-equivalence re- lence and transfer of function to ana- sponding to construct a relational lyze metaphor both conceptually and frame interpretation of analogical rea- empirically. This RFT interpretation soning. In the authors' own words, builds on the earlier work of Skinner Consider ... the following question based on the (1957) by showing how a repertoire of classic proportion scheme (A: B :: C: ?); "ap- metaphorical verbal behavior might ple is to orange as dog is to (i) sheep, or (ii) develop from a simpler repertoire of book?" If "apple" and "orange" participate in an equivalence relation in the context "fruit," formal property abstraction.