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When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full thesis title", University of Southampton, name of the University School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination http://eprints.soton.ac.uk UIIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON ABSTRACT FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIESCE POLITICS fester of Philosophy POLICIIG SERIOUS PUBLIC DISORDER: THE SEARCH FOR PRIHCIPLES, POLICIES AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS by Tony Michael Moore The paper examines the influence of central government on the police response to serious public disorder; the effectiveness or otherwise of the law and the way in which it is used by the police in their response to such disorder, and searches for sone principles which need to be followed if the police are to maintain the general support of the communities in which they are required to act. Some comparisons are made, and differences highlighted, between the police commander in his response to serious public disorder, once it has broken out, and the military commander in battle. But, guided by lessons from history, the paper principally concentrates on the environment in which the operational police commander is required to act in responding to actual or potential serious public disorder, pointing out that he is dependant for his success on firstly, an effective system of command and control; secondly, on an intelligence system which feeds relevant and accurate information on which he can make sound and informed decisions; and thirdly, the physical resources, e.g. personnel and equipment, and the approved tactics which enable him to restore public tranquility once disorder has broken out. But before he can use the physical resources effectively, he must have a sound strategy for dealing with actual or potential disorder. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON POLICING SERIOUS PUBLIC DISORDER: THE SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND OPERATIONAL LESSONS VOLUME 1 OF 2 VOLUMES by TONY MICHAEL MOORE MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS) JULY 1992 POLICING SERIOUS PUBLIC DISORDER: THE SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AID OPERATIONAL LESSONS LIST OF CONTENTS 70LUKE I Acknowledgements 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 1: A Critique of the Published Materials 17 Section A - National Strategy- Chapter 2; Maintains the Queen's Peace - The Police as an Agency of Government 40 Chapter 3: Operating within the Law 80 Section B - The Environment of the Operational Commander Chapter 4: Command and Control 118 Chapter 5: Tactical Options and Related Equipment 154 Chapter 6: Strategy 192 Chapter 7: A Re-exmination of the General Principles of Policing and their applicability to Public Order 229 Chapter 8: Studies of Policing Serious Public Disorder and their Analytical Deficiencies 264 VOLUME II Appendix A: Causes and Types of Disorder 275 Appendix B: The Importance of Intelligence 303 Bibliography 335 ACEHOWLEDGEMENTS This paper addresses one of the most controversial issues in modern policing - the response to threatened or actual outbreaks of serious public disorder. Despite my own practical experience in the policing of serious public disorder, gained whilst serving with the Metropolitan Police, and the theoretical experience, gained primarily whilst on the staff at The Police Staff College, Bramshill, the research on which it is based would not have been possible without the help of a number of serving and retired police officers. I am particularly grateful, therefore, to the Chief Constable of Hampshire, John Hoddinott, who invited me to visit the Public Order Training Centre of the Hampshire Constabulary and talk to his Chief Instructor, David Holt; also to Chief Superintendents George Crawford and Roger Barr, who allowed me to visit the Metropolitan Police Public Order Training Centre at Hounslow on two occasions, after my retirement from the police. I also had meetings with Assistant Chief Constable Malcolm Popperwell (now retired) and some of his senior officers in the Avon and Somerset Constabulary, about the 1980 Bristol riot; with Deputy Chief Constable Paul Leopold (now retired) and some of his senior officers in the Vest Midlands Police, about the 1985 Handsworth riot; with Assistant Chief Constable Terry Watson (now retired) and some of his senior officers in the South Yorkshire Police, about the miners' strike of 1984/85; and with Commander Alex Marnoch (now retired) and soue of his senior officers in the Metropolitan Police, about the 1985 Brixton riot. Insofar as the 1985 Tottenham riot was concerned, I had meetings with Chief Superintendents David French and William Sinclair, and lengthy correspondence with Commander David Polkinghorne and Chief Superintendent Mike Jeffers (both 1 - now retired). More generally, I have been in correspondence with forner Comiuander Leonard Adams, and had meetings with former Deputy Assistant Commissioners John Cracknell and George Rushbrook, all of the Metropolitan Police, and all of whom were immensely experienced at public order policing. To all of them, I am grateful for the contribution they have made. I am particularly indebted to Assistant Commissioner Robert Hunt, of the Metropolitan Police, who was involved in the policing of the Sotting Hill Carnival disorder of 1976; in the Southall disorder of 1979, and in the Brixton disorders of 1985, for allowing me to interview him. He is one of the foremost thinkers on public order policing and the chapter on Strategy Is based on a lecture he gave to senior police officers at The Police Staff College, Bramshill, in 1986. I must thank Susan King and her staff in the Library at the Police Staff College, particularly, during the early stages, Pat Mullender, and more latterly, Juliet Davis, who acquired a range of books, articles from journals and newspaper extracts, without which this paper would not have been so detailed. Finally, I must thank my supervising tutor at Southampton University, Frank Gregory, who pointed me in the right direction at the very commenceinent of this project. July 1992 Tony Moore ii POLICING SERIOUS PUBLIC DISORDER: THE SEARCH FOR PRIICIPLES, POLICIES AID OPERATIONAL LESSONS IFTRODUCTIOB Serious public disorder and riot, or the threat of it, has been a feature of this country for centuries. People have been killed and many have suffered serious injuries. Thousands more have been affected in less traumatic ways. Millions of pounds worth of property has been destroyed; indeed, on occasions, the destruction has been compared with that which takes place during war,(1) It follows that preserving or restoring public tranquility, or "the Queen's Peace" as it is often known, has been, and indeed remains, one of the most important and difficult functions required of the modern police service, since its inception in 1829. Indeed, Stead describes it as perhaps "the gravest of the problems that beset the police authorities and police executives in all ages."(2) It seems strange, therefore, that the study of riot and serious disorder, its causes, its effects and above all the policing of it, has until recently been regarded by many within the police service as a rather perverse and not-to-be encouraged pursuit. And yet, with all the examples behind them there really is no excuse for the failure of senior police officers to respond positively to the challenges they faced, particularly during the last decade. It would be useful at this point to define what is meant by serious public disorder and riot. There are, of course, legal definitions for riot and violent disorder(3) but they are more appropriate to criminal prosecutions than providing this paper with a relevant 'working' definition. Gregory describes a riot as generally "occurring when people in large numbers, and over a prolongued period break a variety of laws, attack the police trying to restore order, loot and damage property." He compares this with "a demonstration which is generally peaceable but which may produce a short-term violent clash with the police."(4) Applying modern-day examples to Gregory's suggestions, the inner-city disorders of 1980, 1981 and 1985, and possibly the Poll Tax demonstation in Central London on 31st March 1990, were riots. On the other hand, Red Lion Square (1974), Orgreave (1984), Stonehenge (1985) and Wapping (1987) were outbreaks of serious disorder because the violence was short-lived and there was minimum damage to property. But, in the case of Orgreave, the police, no doubt having sought legal advice, brought riot charges against a number of those who had been arrested, albeit no-one was convicted. Similarly, after the inner-city disorders in Bristol, in 1980, riot charges were brought against some of the arrested persons, but again no-one was convicted;(5) and where does that leave the Southall disturbances in April 1979 where the violence was over a fairly prolongued period but there was minimum damage to property, other than to show how difficult it is to attempt to separate the two. Therefore, throughout this paper, the terms 'riot' and 'serious public disorder' are inter-changeable. It is the large-scale use of force by one section of the community against property, or against other sections of the community, or against the forces of law and order, to the extent that the normal police resources in the affected area are unable to cope, and special arrangements either have to be made in anticipation, in the case of planned demonstrations and industrial disputes, or have to be implinBnted, in the case of sudden outbreaks of disorder.