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Understanding Taliban Treatment of Women in Afghanistan

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Understanding Taliban Treatment of Women in Afghanistan 1 Anti -ModernistIslam:UnderstandingTalibanTreatmentofWomenin Afghanistan By LarryP.Goodson AssociateProfessor DepartmentofInternationalStudies BentleyCollege(untilSummer2002) (Now)AssociateProfessor NationalArmyWar College E-Mail:[email protected] 1 2 UnderstandingTalibanTreatmentofWomeninAfghanistan Introduction TheTalibanofAfghanistanenactedextremelyseveregenderpolicieswheninpowerin Afghanistan.Thesepoliciesshockedinternationalobserver s,ledtoprotestsandcampaignsby variouswomen'sgroups,andaddedtoanimpressionthattheTalibansupportedananti - modernistIslam.TheTalibanthesepolicieswiththeclaimthattheShariasupportssuch measuresasdothetraditionalcustomsofAfghanistan.Justashortlistoftheirgenderpolicies includesforbiddingwomentoworkoutsideofthehome,requiringwomentowearahead -to -toe coveringwhentheyventureoutintopublic,forbiddinggirlsfromattendingschool,preventing womenfromgoingoutinpublicunlessaccompaniedbyaclosemalefamilymember,preventing womenfromwearingcertainkindsofclothingorjewelry,applyingharshpunishmentsfor fornicationandadultery,andusingcapturedwomenfromAfghanistan’sinternalwarassl aves. AmongtheeffectsofthesepolicieswerethatAfghanistan’swomencametoexperiencethe lowestlifeexpectancyandliteracyratesinAsia,thehighestinfantmortalityrateinAsia,and substantiallyincreasedincidencesofbeggingandprostitutionthanbeforetheriseoftheTaliban (WorldAlmanacandBookofFacts2000,1999,768;UnitedNationsChildren’sFund, “Statistics,”www.unicef.org/statis/,1999;InterviewsandpersonalobservationsinAfghanistan in1992and1997). Manyscholarshave arguedthatIslamdoesnotrequiresuchstringenttreatmentof womenandhavecastigatedtheTalibanaccordingly.YettheTalibanbecamethemost celebratedIslamistmovementofthe1990s,inspiringradicalMuslimsaroundtheworldand promotingtheTalib anizationofneighboringcountries.ThissupporthelpedtheTalibanto 2 3 maintaintheirradicalpolicies(notonlytowardwomen,butalsowithregardtosupportfor terrorism,drugtrafficking,andethniccleansing),despitetheircondemnationandrejectionbythe vastmajorityoftheworldcommunity. WhydidtheTalibanchoosethispathwithregardtogenderissues,whichdeviatessofar fromthe“straightpath”ofIslam,aswellasfromthenormsoftheinternationalcommunityof thetwenty -firstcentury ?HowdidAfghanistan’swomenrespondtotheTaliban’sgender policiesand,what,dotheyexpectfromthecurrentregime?WesawthattheTalibandidnot moderatetheirpoliciesunderpressurefromthesecularWestandmoremoderateIslamicregimes -- orperhapssuchpressurewasnotexerted,sinceafterSeptember11th ,theWestdeterminedto ousttheTaliban.Thischapterattemptstoanswerthesequestions,butbeginswithacareful descriptionofTalibanpoliciestowardwomen. Themostcontroversia landperhapsonlywell -developedpartoftheTalibanprogramwas intheareaofsocialpolicy.AnIslamizationideologywasmostevidentintheTaliban'ssocial policy,especiallywithregardtothetreatmentofwomenandgirls,butalsowithregardtoa rangeofpolicies,suchasthoseconcerningreligiouspractices,minorityrights,and entertainment. NogovernanceissueattractedsuchnegativeattentiontotheTalibanastheirpolicy towardwomen.Fromthebeginningoftheirperiodofrule,theTa libanturnedtheclockbackon women’srightsinAfghanistanbyinstitutingapolicybasedonamutatedversionoftraditional Pushtunwaliconceptionsofawoman’splaceandroleinsociety.IntraditionalPushtunareas, womenalwaysledarestrictedlif e,astheirvirtuewasconsideredintegraltofamilyandclan honor.Thetidesoftwentieth -centurysecularizationandmodernizationinAfghanistanprovided greateropportunitiesforwomentoparticipateinpubliclife,especiallyinnorthernandurban 3 4 ar eas.Thiswastrue,withsomelimitations,untiltherecentascendanceofIslamists.Atthat timetheassociationofCommunismwithmodernizationunderminedthestatusofwomenand introducedsubstantialrestrictionsontheirlivesonceagain.TheTali ban,however,madethe issueofwomen’srolesandstatusacornerstoneoftheirIslamizationprogram.Indeed,the policiestowardwomenandgirls,inconjunctionwiththelawandorderpolicies,inmanyways constitutedthecenterpieceofTalibanpublicpolicy. PriortotheTaliban'srisetopower(inKandaharin1994,Heratin1995,Kabulin1996, andmostofnorthernAfghanistanafter1998),womeninAfghanistantraditionallyhadbeen treatedasinferiortomen,botheconomicallyandlegally.UndertheShariah,daughtersreceived halfasmuchinheritanceassonsandfemaletestimonycountedhalfasmuchasmaletestimony incourt.Womenhadlessaccesstomoney,eventheirdowriesandbrideprices,lessrecourseto divorce,andlittlefreedominterms oftheirsexualityorfamilyplanning.Ontheotherhand,a woman’sstatuscouldvary“accordingtothewoman’sageandthenormsofthesocialandethnic groupstowhichshebelonged”(Kakar,1979,171).Amongallgroups,olderwomenhadgreat influence withinthehome,butusuallyverylittleoutsideofit.Attitudestowardpurdah,veiling, andfemaleseclusionvariedbygroup,withsouthernPushtunsandUzbeksamongthemoststrict, whileHazaras,Nuristanis,powindas,andsomeTajikswerelessstrict .Amongthelargestethnic group,thetribalPushtuns,whohavedominatedthecountrysince1747,Pushtunwali(thetribal codeofthePushtuns)overlappedwithandattimessupplantedtheShariahasasourceoflegal doctrineanddisputesettlement.Push tunwali’sprimarythemesgovernedmalebehavior,and gavespecialattentiontothatbehaviorthatcenteredondisputesarisingoverwomen,land,and honor.SomeimportantthemesofPushtunwaliinclude melmastia andmehrmapalineh (both concerninghospitali tytoguests),nanawati (therightofasylum),badal(bloodrevenge),tureh 4 5 (bravery),meranah(manhood),` imandari (righteousness),ghayrat(defenseofpropertyand honor),andnamus(defenseofthehonorofwomen)(Dupree,1973,126;Quddus,1987,67-76; Singer,1982,46-59). Thetwentiethcenturysawagradualimprovementinthestatusofwomeninpartsof Afghanistan,primarilyKabulandtheothermajorurbanareas.Especiallyimportantwerethe modernizingreformsunderAmirHabibullahKhan(1901-1919,whointroducedmodern educationtoKabul;KingAmanullah(1919-1929),whoattemptedtoeducatewomen,reform discriminatorymarriagepractices,andfreewomenfromtheveil;andKingZahirShah(1933- 1973),duringthelateryearsofhisrule.Ledbymembersoftheroyalfamily,womenwere educatedinlargernumbersfromthe1950sonwards,andespeciallyinKabultheywereableto workingovernmentoffices,droptheveil(after1959),andrunforpublicoffice(from1965). ThesefreedomscontinuedundertheleftistnationalistgovernmentofMohammadDaoud(1973- 1978). TheCommunisttakeoverinAfghanistanin1978begantheprocessthatledtothe currentdeclineinwomen’sstatusthere.DuringtheperiodofCommunistrule(1978-1992), womeninKab ulandtheothergovernment-controlledlargecitiessuchasKandahar,Heart, Jalalabad,andMazar -i-Sharifenjoyedgreaterfreedomthaneverbefore,becomingamajorityof thestudentpopulationatKabulUniversity,servinginparamilitaryunits,workinginall professionalsectors,andservinginhighrankinggovernmentpositions(includingonePolitburo member,AnahitaRatebzad).ThemajorityofAfghanwomen,however,livedinthecontested countrysideorweredrivenintoexileaspartoftheworld’slar gestrefugeepopulationfrom1981- 1996.TherefugeecampsofPakistanprovidedsanctuaryforthemujahideen(holywarriors) whoeventuallydefeatedtheSovietUnionanditspuppetgovernment.Thecampsalsobecamea 5 6 fertilegroundforthenewIslamistid eologyofmanyofthemujahideengroups,whichin combinationwiththedramaticallydifferentlivingconditionsthantraditionalAfghanvillages, curtailedwomen’sfreedomofmovementandledtoaretreatonceagaintotheveil.Thecamps alsobredanew generationofAfghanfighters,whocameofageinadrasticallyalteredsociety, wherewomen’sstatusandcontroloverwomen’sbehaviorandactivitiesbecamesymbolsofthe differencesbetweentheCommunistgovernmentsandtheirmujahideenopponents.Caughtina societyundergoingrapidtransformation,manyyoungboysfailedtolearnthetraditionalbalance thatexistedamongruralAfghansintheirattitudestowardwomen —thatwomenweretobe controlled,butalsorespected. ThefalloftheNajibullahgovernmentin1992usheredinaperiodofcivilwarand warlordismbetweenvariousrivalsforpowerinAfghanistan.Whileshiftingcoalitionsbattled forcontrolofKabul(centeredgenerallyonPresidentBurhanuddinRabbani’sTajik -dominated partyJamiat -i-Is lamiononeside,andPrimeMinisterGulbuddinHekmatyar’sPushtun- dominatedHezb -i-Islamipartyontheotherside),variousregionalwarlordsandlocal commanderscontrolleddifferentareasofthecountry.Goodgovernanceandtheruleoflaw wereoftenabsentfromAfghanistanduringthisperiod,andwomensufferednotonlythroughthe continuationofthewar,butinsomeplacesbecamethevictimsofmolestation,abduction,and rape.Indeed,oneofthereasonsofferedbytheTalibanfortheirearlycampai gntocapture Kandaharin1994wastoeliminaterapaciouslocalcommanderswhohadpreyedonwomen(and youngboys)fortheirownpleasure.Morerealistically,theTalibanwereaPakistanimilitiabent onstabilizingAfghanistanandthusallowingittobecomeatradecorridortoandfromCentral Asia.TheirremarkablesuccessinAfghanistanoverthepastsixyearshasnotbeenwithout defeatsandsetbacks,however.Yetaftereachsetback —andaftereachmajortriumph—the 6 7 Talibanhavetightenedupevenfurtherintheirpoliciestowardwomen.Itappearsasifthe position,activities,andbehaviorofwomenarethemostimportantissuestotheTaliban,andthat theirpoliciestowardwomenarethecornerstoneoftheirnationalpolicy.Why? First,theTalibanaredividedinternallyintovariousfactionsandgroupings.Manyofthe rank-and-filesoldiersareimpoverishedteenagerswithlittleexposuretotheworldoutsideofa madrassa.SomeobserversbelievetheTalibanleaderswishtomoderatetheirstance onwomen, butfearalienatingtheirbaseofsupportamongthehard -lineelementswithintheirranks.Others thinkthattheTalibanleadershipfearsthe“corrupting”influenceexposuretowomenwouldhave ontheirteenagedfollowers,whohaveledsheltered livesuntilnow.AsDupreenotes,“The authoritiesaredependentontheiryoungmilitiaasabaseofpower,buttheyarelessthan sanguineabouttheirrealabilitytocontrolthem”(InMaley,1998,151).Thesecondreason
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