From Elysian Fields to the Guillotine?

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“From Elysian Fields to the Guillotine?

The Dynamics of Presidential and Prime Ministerial Approval in Fifth Republic France”*

Richard S. Conley Associate Professor Department of Political Science University of Florida 234 Anderson Hall Gainesville, FL 32611 (352) 392-0262 x 297 [email protected]

* Author gratefully acknowledges grants provided by the Department of Political Science, University of Florida, and Dr. Gayle Zachmann, Director of the University of Florida Paris Research Center, for this article. Field research was completed in Summer 2003 and 2004 at the Université Aix-Marseille III and the Institut d’Études Politiques d’Aix-en-Provence, and in Fall 2003 at the Centre américain de Sciences-Po in Paris, France.

Keywords: France, public opinion, president, prime minister, job approval, cohabitation, divided government.

Bio: Richard S. Conley is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida (Gainesville). His research focuses on presidential politics and comparative executives. He is author of The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government (2003) and editor of Transforming the American Polity: The Presidency of George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism (2005). His articles have appeared in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Congress and the Presidency, Political Research Quarterly, and American Politics Research. “From Elysian Fields to the Guillotine?

The Dynamics of Presidential and Prime Ministerial Approval in Fifth Republic France”

Abstract

This article develops an integrative framework for explaining variation in monthly presidential and prime ministerial approval in Fifth Republic France. Melding theories of executive approval in the Anglo-American and French literatures, the empirical model closely examines macroeconomic indicators alongside contextual factors, such as cohabitation, temporal effects, and variables specific to French socio-political culture. The study refines prior models by utilising the autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) technique to improve forecast estimates. The study also incorporates new archival data on unemployment to avoid measurement error. The results of the time-series analyses confirm that poor macroeconomic conditions yield larger drops in presidential approval. Similarly, short-term impacts of strikes and “rally effects” are consistently greater for changes in public confidence in the president. The import of time-decay effects and electoral factors varies dramatically for first and subsequent prime ministerial appointments. The few systematic studies of executive approval in Fifth Republic France have centred primarily on the influence of macroeconomic factors on public approval trends (Anderson 1995;

Hibbs 1981; Lafay 1981; Lecaillon 1980; Lewis-Beck 1980). Most are limited to the first three presidents—De Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard d’Estaing—and their prime ministers, spanning

1960-79. Rather than produce consensus, these studies have generated divergent and sometimes contradictory results about the impact of unemployment and inflation on presidential and prime ministerial approval.

The inconsistent findings in the Anglo-American or French literature suffer from a number of theoretical and contextual lacunae, in addition to significant measurement difficulties. Changing political and economic contexts in France across the Fifth Republic demand an updated and more thoroughly refined analysis. First, the condition of cohabitation—when a president squares off against a prime minister heading an opposition majority or coalition of opposition parties in the

Assemblée nationale—has been dealt to presidents on the Left (Mitterrand) and the Right (Chirac) since most of the above-cited studies were completed. It is unclear whether macroeconomic trends carry similar effects on presidents and prime ministers during cohabitation periods. Second, much of the scholarship is dated insofar as structural unemployment has formed a consistent government context since the mid-1970s. Third, scholars have relied on the number of unemployed workers as the key index in empirical models in the absence of a time-series of the percentage unemployed.

Comparing the number of unemployed workers for the early period of the Fifth Republic with the last several decades raises concerns about model misspecification and measurement error. Finally, intriguing hypotheses about short-term variation in executive approval posited by French scholars, including the effect of “rally effects,” incidences of domestic terrorism, and first and subsequent prime ministerial appointments have attracted little attention in quantitative models.

This research develops a more integrative framework for explaining variation in aggregate, monthly presidential and prime ministerial approval in Fifth Republic France (1960-mid 2003).

The study closely examines macroeconomic indicators alongside contextual factors, temporal effects, and variables specific to French socio-political culture. The analysis expands the time period for analysis significantly and refines prior models by utilising the autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) technique to improve forecast estimates. The study also incorporates a measure of the percent unemployed in France dating to 1960 for a more accurate analysis of the impact of joblessness over time.

The article unfolds in several stages. The next section presents a brief, comparative synopsis of executive approval over the course of the Fifth Republic and explores hypotheses that seek to explain variation in mass support. The third section details the methodology employed for modeling presidential and prime ministerial approval, followed by the results of the empirical analysis. The concluding section reprises the implications of the analysis for the institutional balance of the dual executive in Fifth Republic France.

II. APPROVAL OF THE FRENCH DUAL EXECUTIVE: SYNOPSIS AND THEORY

The time-series of approval ratings for French presidents and their prime ministers was compiled from IFOP and SOFRES sources.1 Figure 1 presents approval data spanning all five presidents and seventeen prime ministers in the Fifth Republic through August 2003. A closer examination of key trends enables us to establish and assess a number of hypotheses that can be systematically tested through regression analysis.

[Figure 1]

The early presidents of the Fifth Republic, De Gaulle and Pompidou, maintained relatively stable public approval ratings. Greater volatility in the initial and final approval ratings for the subsequent three presidents—Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, François Mitterrand, and Jacques Chirac—

3 is clearly visible. Following the divisive 1974 election, Giscard took office with the lowest initial approval rating of all presidents in the Fifth Republic at just 44 percent. Both Mitterrand and

Chirac began their terms well above 60 percent, fell below the 40 percent threshold within 18 to 24 months, and then gradually recovered to position themselves for reelection victories. However,

Mitterrand left office in 1995 the most unpopular president thus far in the Fifth Republic with a rating below 40 percent.

Prime ministerial ratings tend to track presidential approval. Per se, however, presidential approval does not offer much of an explanation for changes in public confidence in prime ministers

(r = .20). A more important tendency is that prime ministers appointed at the beginning of the president’s first or second septennat (seven year term) appear to benefit from a more substantive honeymoon period or état de grâce (Parodi 1997, 92-93). Initial appointees may garner more political capital. First appointments are “constrained” choices for presidents insofar as they tend to appoint prime ministers from the bloc of deputies who were most supportive of their candidacy in the second round of the presidential election. Discretionary appointments between legislative elections are often viewed as the “men and women of the president” without commensurate electoral legitimacy (Portelli 1997, 22-23).

Time appears to take a heavier toll on prime ministers’ approval fortunes. The occupants of the Hôtel Matignon typically suffer a much more steady and rapid decline in public support. Prime ministers typically start their terms at relatively high levels of approval, followed by a steady and sometimes dramatic decline—as the cases of Mauroy (1981-84), Rocard (1988-91), Cresson (1991),

Bérégovoy (1992-93), Balladur (1993-95), Juppé (1995-97), and Raffarin (2002-) suggest. The visible drops in support are consistent with the “time/competence paradox” thesis noted by many scholars (see Stimson 1999; Strøm 1990). Executive decisions inevitably disappoint some in the electorate, precipitating a decline in job approval.

Presidential Domination of the Prime Minister and the Advent of Cohabitation

Presidents’ public approval ratings have outpaced their prime ministers’ by significant margins, particularly during De Gaulle’s terms (Parodi 1971). De Gaulle’s successful, if constitutionally dubious referendum on the direct election of the president enhanced his and his successors’ claims to be the only representative of all the people (Ehrmann 1983, 7-11). Moreover,

De Gaulle established the precedent that the president could “sack” prime ministers at will, despite any such formal-constitutional authority. Subsequent presidents have followed this exemplar.

Prime ministers are fusibles2 or “fall guys” who serve at the president’s pleasure. They are expected to act as lightening rods to deflect public anger away from the president (Parodi 1997, 94).

Figure 1 shows that during the last two incidences of cohabitation—with centre-right Prime

Minister Édouard Balladur (1993-95) and Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin (1997-2002) leading the National Assembly—the tradition of presidential dominance in public approval has been inverted. Cohabitation prime ministers’ own electoral legitimacy may explain their domination of presidential approval. All three legislative elections (1986, 1993, 1997) that produced an opposition government were repudiations of the president and his parliamentary majority—votes-sanction in

French parlance. It is under cohabitation that the prime minister, as head of a parliamentary-centred regime, appears to sustain a level of electoral legitimacy tantamount to first appointments. The puzzle is to explain why the president’s approval seemingly benefited from cohabitation from 1986-

88 and 1997-2002. One hypothesis is that Mitterrand and Chirac were able to turn to the more symbolic roles of the president and slowly rehabilitate their public esteem.

The Macroeconomy, Strikes, Rally Effects: Additional Hypotheses

Other factors not readily visible in Figure 1 may explain the short- and long-term dynamics of executive approval. The general state of the economy—typically measured by inflation and unemployment—is thought to carry a long-term impact in France, as in other countries (e.g., see

Anderson 1995; Hibbs 1981; Lafay 1981; Lewis-Beck 1980). Civil discontent may also explain temporary slides in mass opinion. The parallel erosion in support for President Chirac and his first prime minister, Alain Juppé, from 1995-97 is believed to have been provoked by negative public evaluations of economic policies, scandals, and a wave of national strikes (Portelli 1998). And some French scholars have suggested a “rally ’round the flag” effect for presidents. As chief of state, the president is the symbol of French foreign policy and the guardian of republican institutions (see Zarka 1992, 242-45). When he defends French interests abroad or the nation comes under attack from international or domestic terrorism, the public may turn to him as a unifying force.

The task ahead is to unravel the complex puzzle of approval dynamics by integrating the disjointed parts of Anglo-American and French theory into a comprehensive empirical model.

III. METHOD AND DATA

The econometric models of presidential and prime ministerial approval utilise the autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) technique to correct for serial correlation problems in the approval time-series. This type of regression model may be specified as ARIMA

(p, d, q), where p = the number of lags of the dependent variable (approval); d = the number of times the data are differenced; and, q = the number of moving average terms for the error terms in the model. The application for presidential and prime ministerial approval is ARIMA (1, 0, 1) and

(1, 0, 0), respectively. Following the established literature on time-series data, partial autocorrelation plots and correlograms of lags of presidential and prime ministerial approval were generated to determine the appropriate model.3 An ARIMA (1, 0, 1) model predicts the change in the dependent variable as an average change, plus some fraction of the previous change in the dependent variable (p), in addition to some fraction of the random error in the preceding period (q)

(i.e., u t-1 for the presidential model). Since ARIMA models typically explain a high percentage of

6 the model variance, several summary statistics were calculated and reported to assess the models’ efficacy.4

All data for the analysis are available on the author’s web site or by request.5 The general equation for the approval models may be expressed as follows:

Approval = a + ß1(Months in Office) + ß2(Postelection) + ß3(Backswing) + ß4(Legislative Election) + ß5(Unemployment) + ß6(Change in CPI) + ß7(Strikes) + ß8 (Rally) + ß9(Terrorism) + ß10(Cohabitation) + e

Definitions

Months in office tracks each president’s and prime minister’s time in office for each term.

The variable measures the relative “costs” associated with governing and the anticipated loss of support over time. The minimum value for president’s time in office is 40 months (De Gaulle, second term) and the maximum value is 84 for a complete septennat (Mitterrand, Chirac 1995-

2002). Prime ministers’ months in office range from a low of just 8 for Maurice Couve de Murville

(1968-69) to 74 for Georges Pompidou, whose premiership bridged De Gaulle’s first and second terms.

Postelection is a measure of alternance in the presidential model, in other words, when control of the Élysée has changed parties or ideological colour.6 The variable is coded 3 in the new president’s first month, 2 in the second month, and 1 in the third month. The variable is particularly useful as a control in the model. As Figure 1 showed, Giscard began his term some 20 points below the point where Pompidou’s had ended. Similarly, Chirac began his first term some 35 points higher than Mitterrand’s last poll. The postelection variable ensures that the high popularity of new presidents, when compared to their immediate predecessors, does not introduce unnecessary measurement error into the model. For prime ministers, postelection (first appointments made by the president) and secondary appointment variables are employed with a similar coding.

Backswing is a variable that measures the three month period prior to an incumbent president’s re-election bid. The variable was coded following Anderson’s (1990) criteria—1 for the first month, 2 for the second month, and 3 for the month of the election. Contrary to Anderson’s expectation, however, there are reasons to anticipate a decline in the president’s approval over this period. As presidents’ records come to light during the election period and they engage in campaigning, it is reasonable to expect that the electorate may become more sharply divided or fragmented. For similar reasons, as the incumbent prime minister lends support to the president’s campaign (or seeks to distinguish his stances from the president under cohabitation), his approval may also decline as the government’s record comes under heightened scrutiny.

Legislative elections is coded 3 for the month immediately preceding a regularly scheduled election, 2 for two months before the election, and 1 for three months before the election.

Incumbent presidents and prime ministers are expected to increasingly lose support as the legislative campaign draws to a close. The effect should be greatest for the prime minister, who must directly defend policy decisions by the government, whatever the president’s connection to the legislative majority and its agenda. Falling poll numbers may foreshadow a vote-sanction whereby voters “punish” the incumbent prime minister’s and/or president’s party in the legislature in the next election.7

Unemployment is a six-month moving average of the monthly percentage of unemployed workers (taux de chômage) from January 1960 through August 2003. A moving average is employed to gauge the trend in employment conditions, which forms a critical backdrop to public evaluations of French executives. Utilising the monthly difference in unemployment rates is too subtle a measure, evidencing little inter-month change and missing the broader contextual environment of governance. For the period 1960-1965 data were calculated by the author from figures on unemployed workers provided in the monthly Statistiques du Travail et de la Sécurité

Sociale, published by the Ministère des Affaires Sociales. The data are housed at the INSEE

(Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques) Paris headquarters. The data for other years are from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (French labour force statistics), the Annuaire rétrospectif de la France, 1948-88 (1990) and the INSEE web site.

As unemployment rises, executive approval should decline. Beginning with the oil crisis of the 1970s France has suffered a grave structural unemployment problem. Unemployment nearly tripled under Giscard’s septennat from 2.7 percent to 7.5 percent, and reached double-digits under

Mitterrand in September 1986. Since the mid-1980s unemployment has hovered between 8.5 and just above 12 percent. The question is whether presidents or prime ministers are held more or less or jointly responsible for this economic reality.

Change in CPI is the standard index of inflation. The variable is measured as the change in the consumer price index for all goods between the current month and the same month of the previous year. Data are seasonally adjusted and taken from the Annuaire rétrospectif de la France,

Séries longues, 1948-88, and from INSEE for 1989-2003. The data range from .001 percent for periods in the 1960s and 1990s to over 16 percent in the 1970s. As costs soar, executive approval should fall. Inflation should have the most profound impact upon President Giscard and his prime ministers. The rate of change was over 14 percent at the beginning of Giscard’s septennat. High inflation in the 13-14 percent range also spilled over to Mitterrand’s first term. High prices were far less of a concern for Mitterrand during his second term or for Chirac. Monthly inflation averaged between 1 and 2.5 percent from 1988 through 2003.

Strikes and Demonstrations. France’s formidable unions (syndicats) frequently view attempts to reform state functions as fundamental attacks on acquis sociaux (entitlements) attained over time. One central difficulty for presidents and prime ministers is that public sympathy typically sides with the protestors, not the government—whether it is a question of the student

9 protests of May 1968 (Kravetz 1968) or the theatre performers’ actions that canceled cultural festivals around the country in Summer 2003.8 Strikes and major demonstrations are coded as a dummy variable for the month in which they occur and are expected to have a negative short-term impact on executive approval. Data were obtained from Annuare rétrospectif de la France, séries longues 1948-1988 and from Lenormand Céline, Chronologie indicative de l’histoire du movement ouvrier français de la Révolution française à la fin des années 2000.

Rally effects. Rally effects comprise major international crises and significant presidential foreign policy events, including autonomous troop deployments, and are expected to yield a short- term increase in presidential approval. Data for rally effects from 1960-1995 were compiled from

La Cinquième République 1958-1995: L’Histoire au jour le jour, Le Monde Dossiers et Documents.

Data for 1996-2002 were assembled using the searchable archives of the Paris daily Le Monde and annual Dossiers et Documents published by Le Monde, which traces major events of the year For this period, events which received the attention of at least 3 articles were included.9

Domestic Terrorism. Terrorist acts on French soil have been a continuing problem since the mid-1970s. Attacks have been perpetrated not just by international terrorist organisations but also by regional groups clamouring for independence, most notably Corsican, Basque, and Breton nationalists. In similar fashion to the coding for rally effects, data for international and domestic terrorist incidents were assembled from La Cinquième République 1958-1995: L’Histoire au jour le jour, Le Monde Dossiers et Documents and the Paris daily Le Monde. Like international crises and military actions, domestic terrorism incidents are expected to have a short-term, positive effect on presidents’ monthly approval.

Cohabitation. As noted earlier, cohabitation prime ministers’ approval generally surpassed that of Mitterrand (1993-95) and Chirac (1997-2002). Yet these presidents’ mass support rebounded throughout the cohabitation period. Dummy variables for periods of cohabitation and

10 interaction terms for cohabitation and macroeconomic trends are employed to gauge more precisely the relative effect of a divided executive on approval dynamics.

IV. RESULTS

The ARIMA analyses accentuate a stronger and more direct linkage between changes in public evaluations of the president and macroeconomic conditions, strikes, and rally effects. The summary statistics for Table 1 show that the ARIMA (1,0,1) model for presidential approval provides a good fit for the data.10

Time and Electoral Cycle Effects on Presidential Approval

The constant in the first model in Table 1 suggests that all things being equal, presidents in the Fifth Republic can expect an initial approval rating in the mid-60s. But time takes an inevitable toll. They must make use of their leverage during a brief honeymoon period to set the national agenda whilst the public gives them the benefit of the doubt. Presidents can expect to lose a full percentage point in public support after approximately 10 months. For a president completing a septennat, the effect translates into an expected loss of 8.4 percent by the end of his term.

Presidents completing a quinquennat (5 year term) after the 2002 referendum can expect a “natural” loss of 6 percent in approval by the end of their tenure.

[Table 1]

The “postelection” variables affirm several important historical points about presidential

“honeymoons” in the French context. Holding other factors constant, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing commenced his term in 1974 at a relatively sharp disadvantage. His poor showing in the first round of the elections, divisions on the Right in the second round, and a troubled economy robbed him of an état de grâce. The negative coefficient for Giscard shows that his initial public confidence was nearly 14 percent lower compared other presidents. This “inverse” honeymoon dynamic did little to bolster his ability to wage battle against the challenges of high unemployment and high inflation.

By contrast, both Mitterrand (1981) and Chirac (1995) benefited from a surfeit of public confidence at the ouset of their first terms—in part a reflection of the outgoing leader’s lack of popularity.

Each started his septennat with a honeymoon effect of over 20 percent, followed by a “natural” decline of approximately 7 percent in each of the following two months.

The impact of electoral cycles on presidential approval is mixed. The insignificance of the backswing variable shows that incumbent presidents seeking reelection do not consistently receive any temporary increase or decrease in approval in the months leading up to the presidential election.

However, the regular electoral cycle for the National Assembly does negatively impact presidents.

Three months before the législatives presidents can expect a loss of just over a half percent in approval, and by the time of the election, that figure increases to just under two percent. Prime ministers—particularly first appointments—suffer a greater loss as elections approach, as will be discussed later. The point for the moment is that as the record of the incumbent government is placed under greater public scrutiny, presidents are also thrown into the spotlight, which evidently precipitates a slight disadvantage in their approval.

Macroeconomic Conditions and the Élysée: From Stagflation to Structural Unemployment

Presidents are clearly the target for public anger over rising prices and unemployment. The first model in Table 1 shows that for each increase of 1.8 percent in the consumer price index they lose a full percentage point in approval. But inflation, like unemployment, has fluctuated significantly across the Fifth Republic. For the 43 year period of the analysis, inflation ranged from

__ a low of .1 in the 1960s to a high of 16.4 percent in January 1975 ( X ? 5.1). To better grasp the impact, Table 2a presents the “mean effects” of changes in the consumer price index on each president’s monthly approval ratings across time. The mean effects were calculated by multiplying the ARIMA coefficient for inflation by the maximum, minimum, and average values for the

12 indicator during each president’s term. These data emphasize how inflation has disproportionately affected presidents’ approval across the Fifth Republic.

[Table 2a]

Inflation most consistently eroded public support for Giscard. Prices jumped dramatically in

Pompidou’s last six months in office, spiking from 7 percent to just over 11 percent. Giscard inherited this worsening economic context. Between the time of Pompidou’s death in April 1974 and Giscard’s first poll in June 1974 the inflation rate rose to over 13 percent. The trend continued steadily upwards, reaching 16.4 percent in January 1975—just 6 months into his term. The ARIMA model forecasts that at its highest level inflation cost Giscard over 9 points in public approval.

Prices stabilised in the late 1970s, only to rise again from single digits in 1978 to just under 13 percent by the time Giscard prepared to campaign for the 1981 election. For Giscard the apex of price increases occurred at two highly inauspicious points during his presidency—at the outset of his term as he sought to manage a fractious centre-right parliamentary coalition dominated by

Gaullists, and at the end of his term as he sought to convince the electorate of his economic management.

The early decline in Mitterrand’s approval is also partially attributable to the rise in prices during his first two years in office. Inflation remained in double digits during the initial 15 months of Mitterrand’s first septennat, costing him between 7 and 8 and a half percent in public support.

Mitterrand’s lot improved as inflation came under control by the time he had to face the electorate.

The index fell significantly to just 2 and a half percent by his 1988 reelection campaign. The relative stability of inflation in the 1990s had little tangible effect on Chirac’s approval.

Unemployment trends form a critical and inescapable context for president’s approval fortunes. The first ARIMA model in Table 1 forecasts that a rise of 1 percent in unemployment yields a drop of about 1.4 percent in presidential approval. The minimum value for the six-month

13 moving average of unemployment was -.84 percent in August 1961 and reached a maximum value

__ of 11.08 percent in March 1994 ( X ? 5.31). The moving average has hovered between approximately 8 and 11 percent since the 1980s. Ceteris paribus, the model forecasts that

Presidents like Mitterrand and Chirac, who presided over unemployment rates at 10 percent, damaged their approval by approximately 14 points.

The first model in Table 1 provides a “standardised” account of the impact of economic factors on presidential approval for the totality of the Fifth Republic. The 1960s were a period of extremely high employment alongside a concomitant transformation of the French state, which benefited public esteem for De Gaulle and Pompidou. But economic conditions eroded rapidly in the 1970s, foreshadowing the advent of structural unemployment. The six-month moving average of unemployment jumped from just over 1 percent to more than 6.5 percent between 1974 and

1981—a figure that shaved an expected 9 percent off of Giscard’s job approval. The moving average of unemployment remained between 6 and 11 percent for all of Mitterrand’s two terms and

Chirac’s first term.

The governing context of the last three presidents of the Fifth Republic raises several questions. First, did the dramatic increase in unemployment during Giscard’s presidency negatively impact his approval beyond what the standardised coefficient would suggest? Second, did structural unemployment under Mitterrand and Chirac cause an even steeper decline in their approval than the first model forecasts?

To test these hypotheses, slope dummies were introduced in the second model in Table 1 for each president on the unemployment indicator, as well as for periods of cohabitation (discussed momentarily). Slope dummies are interaction terms that test the “additive” effect of unemployment for a particular time frame (see Hanushek and Jackson 1977). Due to colinearity between the slope dummies and inflation during Giscard’s and Mitterrand’s terms, the inflation variable was dropped

14 in the second model shown in Table 1.11 Altering the slope dummies for the last three presidents of the Fifth Republic and estimating successive ARIMA models revealed that only the term for

Giscard’s septennat reached statistical (and substantive) significance.

The second model in Table 1 underscores that Giscard was “double penalised” for the rapid rise in unemployment. The model indicates that presidents can typically expect a drop of approximately 1.3 percent public approval for each increase of 1 percent in unemployment. The slope dummy for Giscard shows that he suffered an additional drop of 1.4 percent in approval for a

1 percent increase. All told, for each percent increase in unemployment during his septennat,

Giscard’s popularity fell by nearly 2.7 percent.

[Table 2b]

The mean effects of unemployment shown in Table 2b accentuate an irony for Giscard. The average rate of unemployment during his septennat was approximately 4 percent. The mean effect on his approval, however, was a 10 percent drop—similar to the effect for Mitterrand and Chirac, despite unemployment rates having essentially doubled in the latter two presidents’ terms. The rapid growth in the condition of “stagflation”—high unemployment and rising prices—took a heavy toll on Giscard’s septennat as the public and the Élysée struggled with the effects of economic dislocation and readjustment.

Even as inflation has come under control in the contemporary period, presidents are hard pressed to escape blame for joblessness. The mean effects in Table 2b show that as a contextual variable, unemployment lowered the overall approval ratings of Mitterrand and Chirac by 10 to 12 percent compared to De Gaulle and Pompidou, who presided over a post-war economic boom.

Structural unemployment is thus a key characteristic that differentiates the opinion leadership capacity for presidents of the early and contemporary periods of the Fifth Republic.

The Puzzle of Cohabitation and Rebounding Presidential Approval

The coefficients for the dummy variables for cohabitation in the first model in Table 1 confirm that the first and third incidences boosted presidents’ public approval, controlling for other factors. During the first cohabitation from 1986-88 public confidence in François Mitterrand increased by an average of about 5 percent. Similarly, in the extended period of cohabitation from

1997-2002 Jacques Chirac benefited from an average increase of approximately 5 percent in approval. The findings appear paradoxical, given that the legislative elections that yielded the first and third cohabitations were ostensibly a backlash against the president and his parliamentary party.

Only the second cohabitation, with Édouard Balladur as prime minister, did not reinforce public confidence in the president. The Socialists garnered only 19 percent of the national vote in the first round in 1986 (compared to 32 percent in 1986)—their worst showing since 1958.

Scandals surrounding Mitterrand, an economic downturn, and internecine warfare in the Socialist camp scarcely aided the president’s standing (Jaffré 1994, 147).

Closer analysis of the data in the second model in Table 1 suggests that the public partially suspended negative evaluations relative to the unemployment context during the first and third cohabitations. The slope dummies for unemployment during cohabitation show a positive impact of about a half a percentage point during the first and third cohabitations, which must be subtracted from the impact of the continuous variable for the entire Fifth Republic. Thus, rather than losing about 1.3 percent for each increase of 1 percent in the unemployment, a percentage point rise in unemployment netted Mitterrand and Chirac a loss of only three-quarters of a point during cohabitation. Table 2b highlights the mean effects, underscoring that the unemployment rate under cohabitation cost these two presidents far less in the court of public opinion than for their terms overall—despite the fact that unemployment rates during the two cohabitations were roughly the same as for the entirety of these two presidents’ septennats.

As the next section takes up in greater detail, there is no direct evidence that the public shifted blame for the state of the economy to the prime minister. But there is some empirical support for the thesis that the reversion to prime ministerial government under cohabitation translated into greater public sympathy for cohabitation presidents, who were effectively sidelined in the domestic policymaking process absent a parliamentary majority. Presidential exploitation of the bully pulpit cannot be underestimated. Mitterrand’s astute manipulation of the ordonnances controversies and Chirac’s attempts to share credit for popular policies helped compensate for extremely weak institutional positions and enabled both presidents to regain approval momentum.

^ Analysis of forecast errors ( y ) in presidential approval from Table 1 indicate that the models underestimate support for Mitterrand by some 5 percent in mid-summer 1986. Similarly, his approval was 3 percent higher than expected by early 1987. Prime Minister Chirac’s approval, by contrast, was between 1 and 3 below the expected value in summer 1986, and between 2 and just

^ over 5 percent below the predicted value in early 1987 ( y from Table 4). The effects are contextual. In July 1986 Chirac pushed ahead quickly with increasingly unpopular plans to privatise 65 longstanding state-owned enterprises. For several months Mitterrand publicly opposed

Chirac’s hope to bypass the National Assembly and implement the changes by decree or ordonnance. Mitterrand used his Bastille Day address to explain his rationale for refusing to sign the decree and to castigate the Prime Minister and his Government for allegedly hasty policies that threatened the “national interest.” He placed the responsibility for denationalisations squarely on the shoulders of the parliamentary majority. The subsequent deliberation in Parliament was so divisive that Chirac, rather embarrassingly, was forced to peg the responsibility of the Government to the bill after less than an hour of debate. In late 1986 Mitterrand would use similar tactics to thwart Chirac’s attempts to reform the electoral system by decree. In both cases, Chirac’s bid to upstage the president backfired in the court of public opinion (Maus 1991).

The third cohabitation (1997-2002), unlike the first, benefited the approval ratings of both

President Chirac and Prime Minister Jospin. Chirac’s popularity was frequently 2-3 points higher than the models predict. Similarly, Jospin’s approval exceeded forecasts by nearly a point and a half (?=3.69) over the entire cohabitation and by nearly two and a half points in the first eighteen months. Jospin had consciously distanced himself from Mitterrand’s legacy and launched appeals across partisan divides. Chirac’s better-than-expected job approval may have pivoted on his falling back to the symbolic role as head of state and his grassroots campaigning in the provinces. With the parliamentary RPR in disarray after the 1997 dissolution, he was able to distance himself from internal party conflict. He won high marks for personal warmth and energy (see Méchet 2002). He selectively criticised the Government’s policies with which he disagreed most, but also carefully saluted popular policies enacted by the Jospin Government that enhanced public entitlements, such as the 35 hour work week and universal health insurance (Elgie 2002, 305-09).

The first and third cohabitations demonstrate how presidents’ ability to transform their role from central policymaker to head of state and supra-partisan guardian of the Constitution aided approval fortunes. Such dynamics are not inconsequential in light of Mitterrand’s and Chirac’s reelection victories.

Short-Term Impacts on Presidential Approval: Strikes and Rally Events

Presidents are assigned much of the blame for civic unrest. Both models in Table 1 show that strikes yield a short-term decline of about 2 percent in the president’s approval during the month of the strike or demonstration. Major strikes or demonstrations rarely occur suddenly.

Rather, they are often the result of an admixture of union agitation, public posturing, and legislative debate well in advance of protests. The immediate impact on presidential approval likely owes to the fomentation of public sector discontent following an impasse in negotiations between syndicats and the government. Table 1 also shows a significant lagged effect. Presidents continue to lose

18 upwards of a percentage point several months after the strike or demonstration. Two presidents—

Charles De Gaulle and Jacques Chirac—were subject to the most fluctuation in public confidence owing to civic strife.

De Gaulle’s terms were a time of intense social conflict. Of the 45 strikes and major demonstrations catalogued between 1959 and 2003, 19 (41%) took place from 1960-1969 for an average of one strike or major demonstration every five and one-half months. The most memorable set of strikes took place in the student uprising of May 1968, during which De Gaulle’s public approval fell by some 8 points over previous months—an exceptional decline. The general strikes in April 1961, May 1966, May 1967, and the miners’ strike of March 1963, were associated with decreases in public confidence from roughly 2 to 4 percent, consistent with the “stylised” coefficient for strikes in the regression models in Table 1.

Jacques Chirac ranks second in terms of the frequency of strikes from 1995 through mid-

2003. A total of ten events took place over these eight years for an average of one every ten months. The most pivotal events occurred in 1995 and 1996—the beginning of Chirac’s septennat—when strikes by transportation workers and truckers in protest of the Juppé

Government’s proposed social security reforms paralyzed the nation. The advent of these strikes were one factor in erasing Chirac’s état de grâce, already in jeopardy with the resumption of nuclear weapons tests in the Pacific. His public confidence dropped between 2 and 4 percent in late

1995. By early 1996 Chirac’s turn toward budgetary austerity compounded a lack of public confidence in his economic management and plans to combat unemployment (Portelli 1998, 15).

Contrary to expectations, French presidents do not receive a significant bounce in approval for terrorist incidents on French soil. However, they do benefit from rally effects in the international realm. The coefficients in Table 1 show that presidents typically receive about a 2 and a half percent boost in public opinion in the month following a rally event. The effect remains in

19 the third month, but declines to about a percentage point. The lag in the effect may owe simply to the timing of opinion polls, which may be conducted prior to the rally event in any given month.

Alternatively, the lag may suggest that the public requires several weeks following an incident to retrospectively evaluate the president’s actions.

Nevertheless, the magnitude of rally effects for French presidents pales in comparison to the

10 to 20 percentage point increases from which American presidents frequently benefit (see

Edwards 2002). Political cultural factors may explain why neither military actions, largely confined to the African continent, nor significant international crises bolster confidence more in the Élysée.

Mitterrand’s support for the American-led coalition in the Gulf War of 1991 is a case in point about public ambivalence toward military actions. His public approval increased from the upper 50s during the crisis in Kuwait and peaked in Spring 1991 in the low-60s. This 7 point “bounce” was far less than the 20-plus percent increases for US President George H.W. Bush and British Prime

Minister John Major (Zarka 1992, 241).

Mitterrand’s relatively late support for military action might be one factor in a small rally effect. But the larger lesson of the Gulf War is the more profound, underlying skepticism of such actions among the French compared to Americans or Britons that undercuts significant rally effects.

Once decided, Mitterrand masterfully employed the symbolism of his “chief of state” role through public outreach to marshal unity behind the allied coalition (Duporier 1992, 126; 144). Yet many

French simultaneously evidenced a strong desire to avoid participation in any war that might entail potentially negative economic consequences (Lellouche 1991). A strong majority of French expected major protests against the war at the outset of allied military actions. Moreover, a majority of younger French (18-25) expressed solidarity or sympathy with the pacifist movement, which has roots in France’s libertarian as well as Catholic political traditions (Dupoirier 1992;

Winock 1991).

Prime Ministerial Approval: The Fortunes of “Fusibles”

Table 3 presents the ARIMA (1,0,0) model of prime ministerial approval for first appointments, and Table 4 for secondary appointments. Dividing the analysis in this manner not only avoids colinearity problems with the inclusion of all seventeen prime ministers in a single model, but most importantly it enables us to test differential effects of time in office and contextual variables for the two types of appointees. The R2 statistic shows that the models explain overall levels of variance slightly lower than the presidential approval models, but a somewhat higher level

2 of the variance in month-to-month changes in approval, as noted by the R D statistic.

[Tables 3 and 4]

Public views of prime ministers appear to be somewhat more “individualised” compared to presidents. Nonetheless, the models confirm several expectations. Prime ministers do not benefit consistently from rally effects in either the international or domestic realms. They do, however, share some of the blame with presidents for inflation and strikes. And honeymoon and time-decay effects are dramatically different for first and secondary appointments.

One of the most remarkable differences between first and secondary prime ministerial appointments is the speed with which the latter lose public confidence. The constants in Tables 3 and 4 show that all things being equal, first and secondary appointees begin their terms at approximately 48 and 52 percent, respectively. The time-decay function for first appointments is similar to presidents: They lose approximately 1 percentage point for every 10 months in office.

Secondary appointments, by contrast, lose a full percentage point after just less than 4 months in office. The robust results lend credence to the hypothesis that primary appointees, whom presidents typically choose from the bloc of deputies most supportive of their campaign, garner greater political legitimacy in the eyes of the public.12

Compounding the starker time-decay function for secondary appointments is the lack of honeymoons for prime ministers selected between presidential elections. Though some of the coefficients for the post-election variables in Table 4 for individual prime ministers in the early

Fifth Republic are statistically insignificant (Couve de Murville, Fabius), they are pointed in a negative direction. Other secondary appointees who began their premierships 20 to 30 percent below the average, like Pierre Messmer and Raymond Barre, undoubtedly suffered in the polls early in their terms due to the public’s ignorance of their personae.

Table 4 shows that the exceptions to the rule of “inverse honeymoons” include Pierre

Bérégovoy, Mitterrand’s fifth prime minister, and the two most recent cohabitation prime ministers,

Balladur and Jospin. Bérégovoy rode a high wave of initial popularity—some 15 to 20 points higher than the norm in his first two months in office. He took the reigns of the National Assembly following Mitterrand’s sacking of Édith Cresson, who had become an albatross around the neck of the Socialists.13

The higher initial popularity of cohabitation prime ministers Édouard Balladur and Lionel

Jospin (approximately 23 and 20 percent greater than the mean approval rating, respectively, in their first month) reflects the unique political circumstance of their premierships. Long before the regularly scheduled legislative elections of 1993, Balladur was widely presumed to be the next incoming leader of the National Assembly. A strong majority of French expected a victory for the

Right well in advance of the elections and wanted him to take an active role in governing (Duhamel

1994; Grunberg 1994). Similarly, Jospin’s early agenda was greeted with significant optimism across the political spectrum. His plans to combat unemployment and undertake reforms aimed at modernising the state, including legislation guaranteeing equality of the sexes, allowing civil unions, and undertaking judicial reforms, resonated with the public (Le Gall 2000, 38-39). Because

Balladur and Jospin successfully contested legislative elections that were interpreted as direct

22 rebukes of the incumbent president, their appointments and subsequent états de grâce resembled much more the context of a first appointment—but one divorced from any presidential latitude over the choice.

The post-appointment coefficients in Table 3 show are typically positive, but only

Mitterrand’s first appointment, Pierre Mauroy, benefited from a significant honeymoon effect.

Mauroy’s extremely high popularity (he began at 71% in the polls) came on the heels of much enthusiasm for the Socialists’ domestic agenda. As that verve faded by the time of Mitterrand’s policy reversals in 1983, so too did Mauroy’s public approval. The central point is that while few first appointments profit from high honeymoon effects, their monthly rate of approval decline is two and a half times slower. They are thus able to retain a greater level of political clout over time. But they must also take caution not to upstage the president or threaten to overtake his public standing.

Pompidou, angered by Jacques Chaban-Delmas’s failure to consult with him on new policy initiatives following the 1969 presidential election, fired the prime minister when he came under a cloud of scandal (see Chastenet and Chastenet 1991, 432-41). Mitterrand’s sacking of Michel

Rocard, nicknamed the prince des sondages (prince of polls) for his steady popularity, was a product of interpersonal tensions (Colombani 1989). Rocard’s departure hampered his chances of gaining control of the Socialist Party or winning the presidency in 1995 (Thody 1998, 117).

Another important distinction between first and second appointments is the rate at which their popularity falls during presidential campaigns. The approval ratings of secondary appointees drop at twice the pace. The backswing variable in Table 4 shows that incumbent prime ministers lose just less than 3 points a half month out from the presidential election. The decline grows to about 8 and a half percent by the May presidential election. Some of the effect stems from the lack of political capital and growing unpopularity of secondary appointments supporting the president’s campaign—such as Raymond Barre in 1981. Yet another part of the effect is connected to

23 incumbent cohabitation prime ministers running for the Élysée. Their own government’s records were thrown into the spotlight as they campaigned against the incumbent president (Chirac 1988,

Jospin 2002) or they contested an open race against formidable opponents in their own party and on the other side of the ideological spectrum (Balladur 1995). Traditional and in-party electoral cleavages materialised and cost the prime minister a loss of public support as he simultaneously attempted to govern the National Assembly and run for the nation’s highest office.

Secondary appointments do not lose additional public confidence heading into legislative elections. The time-decay impact has already taken a substantial toll—as in the cases of Raymond

Barre in 1978 and Laurent Fabius in 1986, both of whose premierships were several years old by the législatives. First appointments suffer a much larger drop as legislative elections approach, but it is important not to overstate the effect. The only first appointment to contest a regularly scheduled legislative election was Alain Juppé in 1997 (De Gaulle had reappointed Pompidou following the 1965 presidential elections). Public support for Juppé fell by about 3 percent as the campaign period got underway and culminated in the predicted decline of about 9 percent by the

May/June elections of 1997.

There is mixed evidence in Tables 3 and 4 about the extent to which prime ministers are directly held responsible for poor economic conditions. In both models unemployment is statistically insignificant and is signed in the wrong direction. The results are not the product of colinearity with inflation.14 It may be that the time-decay function indirectly captures some of the effect of unemployment on prime ministerial approval. Apart from Barre, those prime ministers who faced significant jumps in the unemployment rate were secondary appointments, including

Laurent Fabius, Jacques Chirac (1986-88), Pierre Bérégovoy, and Édouard Balladur. Such time- decay effects may an artifact of public impatience with the paucity of solutions to redress economic stagnation.

Inflation does show a direct relationship to prime ministerial approval. The ARIMA model highlights that the French public appears to hold the Élysée and Matignon jointly responsible for high prices. The coefficients for the change in the consumer price index in Tables 3 and 4 show a slightly higher substantive effect compared to presidents. Regardless of the nature of the prime minister’s appointment, an increase of approximately 1.3 percent in inflation lowers approval by a full percentage point.

The effect of inflation on prime ministerial approval, as on presidential approval, is “time- bound.” The model predicts that at its highest levels during Raymond Barre’s premiership (13.9%), inflation cost him a drop of nearly 10 percent in approval. Similarly, the model forecasts that the steady rise of inflation during Pierre Mauroy’s three year mandate—from just over 7 percent to 14.9 percent in the month in which he was sacked by Mitterrand—lowered his approval by over 9 and a half percent. Mauroy’s misfortune in the court of public opinion, like that of Mitterrand’s early first term, was indubitably shaped by runaway prices.

Prime ministers do not get a “pass” from the public for civic strife, even if the negative effect of strikes on job approval is somewhat greater—and lasts longer—for presidents. Prime ministers consistently lose about a percentage point in approval the first month of a strike. The 95% confidence intervals are between 2 and a half to just under 1 percent. The low points for Raymond

Barre and Alain Juppé are notable. Barre and his majority sustained several major national strikes and violent confrontations in protest of the government’s economic agenda in Fall 1976 and Spring

1977. Similarly, Juppé’s unpopular attempts to reform the social security system led to nationwide public sector strikes as the economy foundered and unemployment rose in 1995/96 (Portelli 1998).

V. CONCLUSIONS

This research lends new insights into the factors that have shaped variation in executive approval in Fifth Republic France. The central contributions of the analysis pivot on the

25 clarification of the effect of macroeconomic trends on presidential and prime ministerial approval, the impact of cohabitation, and the testing of theories about short-term fluctuations and differences between first and subsequent prime ministerial appointments.

The analysis of executive approval highlights the transformation of the French Fifth

Republic from “hyperpresidentialism” under De Gaulle (Schain and Keeler 1996) to alternance and cohabitation in the 1980s and 1990s. Approval dynamics of the dual executive are more

“presidency-centric” with respect to the economy, social strife, and rally effects. Direct election of the president arguably increased accountability but also expectations with which contemporary occupants of the Élysée have been unable to keep up in an era of structural unemployment. On the other hand, in two of three cases cohabitation has enabled presidents to reformulate their institutional role and reposition themselves in the electorate. Cohabitation prime ministers’ challenges to presidents have met with the formidable media resources of the Élysée—sometimes in conjunction with presidents’ formal constitutional powers (Mitterrand), and at other times in the bid to criticise and share credit in policy accomplishments (Chirac). Ironically, despite cohabitation presidents’ institutionally weak position in terms of policymaking, they were able to reestablish dominance of opposition prime ministers in the realm of public opinion.

The textures of public approval of the executive in France, like the country’s history more generally, are often brusque, colourful, and even subject to the occasional revolution—but always tinged with strokes of intrigue and sophistication. Presidents still hold the upper hand over their prime ministers, even if they do so from a position of institutional weakness under cohabitation or within an environment of increasing electoral volatility. The path leading to the Place de la

Bastille, where so many a French leader lost his head, is still shorter from Matignon than it is from the Élysée.

Figure 1 Presidential and Prime Ministerial Approval in Fifth Republic France, 1959-2003

De Gaulle, 1959-69

30 Percent Approval Debre Pompidou 20

10 Couve de Murville 0 Jun-59 Jun-60 Jun-61 Jun-62 Jun-63 Jun-64 Jun-65 Jun-66 Jun-67 Jun-68 Dec-58 Dec-59 Dec-60 Dec-61 Dec-62 Dec-63 Dec-64 Dec-65 Dec-66 Dec-67 Dec-68 President Prime Minister

Pompidou, 1969-74

Percent Approval Messmer 20

10 Chaban-Delmas

Jun-69 Jun-70 Jun-71 Jun-72 Jun-73 Feb-70 Feb-71 Feb-72 Feb-73 Feb-74 Oct-69 Oct-70 Oct-71 Oct-72 Oct-73 Aug-69 Dec-69 Apr-70 Aug-70 Dec-70 Apr-71 Aug-71 Dec-71 Apr-72 Aug-72 Dec-72 Apr-73 Aug-73 Dec-73

President Prime Minister

Giscard, 1974-81

30 Chirac Percent Approval 20 Barre 10

0 Jun-74 Jun-75 Jun-76 Jun-77 Jun-78 Jun-79 Jun-80 Sep-74 Sep-75 Sep-76 Sep-77 Sep-78 Sep-79 Sep-80 Dec-74 Dec-75 Dec-76 Dec-77 Dec-78 Dec-79 Dec-80 Mar-75 Mar-76 Mar-77 Mar-78 Mar-79 Mar-80 Mar-81

President Prime Minister

Figure 1 (continued)

Mitterrand, 1981-95

Balladur 80 (cohabitation) 70 60 50 Rocard 40 Chirac 30 Mauroy Fabius (cohabitation) Percent Approval 20 Cresson Beregovoy 10 0 Jun-81 Jun-82 Jun-83 Jun-84 Jun-85 Jun-86 Jun-87 Jun-88 Jun-89 Jun-90 Jun-91 Jun-92 Jun-93 Jun-94 Dec-81 Dec-82 Dec-83 Dec-84 Dec-85 Dec-86 Dec-87 Dec-88 Dec-89 Dec-90 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94

President Prime Minister

Chirac, 1995-2003

Jospin 80 (cohabitation) Raffarin 70

30 Percent Approval 20 Juppe 10

0 Jun-95 Jun-96 Jun-97 Jun-98 Jun-99 Jun-00 Jun-01 Jun-02 Jun-03 Feb-96 Feb-97 Feb-98 Feb-99 Feb-00 Feb-01 Feb-02 Feb-03 Oct-95 Oct-96 Oct-97 Oct-98 Oct-99 Oct-00 Oct-01 Oct-02

President Prime Minister

Table 1 ARIMA (1,0,1) Model of French Presidents’ Approval, 1960-2003

Model 1 Model 2 ß Coefficient / S.E. ß Coefficient / S.E. Month in Office -.10**** -.08*** (.03) (.03) Giscard x Post Election (1974) -4.50** -4.30*** (2.02) (1.97) Mitterrand x Post Election (1981) 6.81**** 5.02**** (.81) (.97) Time/Electoral Chirac x Post Election (1995) 6.81**** 7.21**** Variables (1.99) (1.84) Backswing .13 .06 (.64) (.62) Legislative Election -.64* -.61* (.43) (.42) Change in Monthly CPI (%) -.56** ______(.26) Unemployment, 6 month moving average (%) -1.38**** -1.26**** (.29) (.29) Unemployment x Giscard ______-1.41** (.72) Unemployment x Cohabitation 1 ______.52** (.30) Economic Context Unemployment x Cohabitation 2 ______.04 (.26) Unemployment x Cohabitation 3 ______.48** (.27) Strikes (t) -1.92*** -1.96**** (.54) (.54) Strikes (t-1) -1.11** -1.07** (.54) (.54) Strikes (t-2) -.81* -.84* (.57) (.57)

Rally Event (t-1) 2.57**** 2.52**** Rally Effects (.58) (.59) Rally Event (t-2) 1.44*** 1.47*** (.63) (.62) Domestic Terrorism (t-1) .77 .86 (.81) (.81) Cohabitation 1 (Mitterrand, 1986-88) 5.32** ______(2.36) Divided Government Cohabitation 2 (Mitterrand, 1993-95) .80 ______(2.84) Cohabitation 3 (Chirac, 1997-2002) 5.08** ______(2.50) Constant 65.22**** 61.85**** (2.59) (2.16) AR (1) .90**** .90**** (.03) (.03) Model Parameters MA (1) -.24**** -.25**** (.05) (.05) Sigma 3.56**** 3.56**** (.10) (.10) N 504 504 Adjusted R2 .831 .831 Summary 2 R .339 .318 Statistics D RMS (residual mean square) .159 .159 2 % s due to ?0 (model mean) .871 .870 2 % s due to ?1 (AR & MA terms) .124 .124 *** p <.001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 (one-tailed) Dependent variable is the president’s monthly approval. See note # 8 for a full explanation of summary statistics and calculations.

Table 2a “Mean Effects” of Inflation on Presidential Approval*

Consumer Price Index Effect on Presidential Approval High Low Mean High Low Mean Effect Effect Effect De Gaulle 7.1% 1.1% 3.8% -4.0% -.62% -2.1% Pompidou 11.4 4.4 6.0 -6.4 -2.5 -3.4 Giscard 16.4 8.9 11.2 -9.2 -5.0 -6.3 Mitterrand 15.0 1.5 4.9 -8.4 -.83 -2.4 Chirac 2.4 .10 1.4 -1.3 -.06 -.78 * Effects calculated from Model 1 in Table 1, controlling for unemployment.

Table 2b “Mean Effects” of Unemployment on Presidential Approval*

Unemployment – 6 Month Effect on Presidential Approval Moving Average High Low Mean High Low Mean Effect Effect Effect De Gaulle 1.0% -.84% -.07% -1.3% +1.1% +.09% Pompidou 1.1 -.03 .60 -1.4 +.04 -.76 Giscard 6.6 1.0 3.9 -17.6 -2.7 -10.4 Mitterrand 11.1 6.0 8.5 -14.0 -7.6 -10.7 Mitterrand x 9.3 8.6 9.0 -6.9 -6.4 -6.7 Cohabitation 1 Mitterrand x 11.1 10.0 10.6 -13.5 -12.2 -12.9 Cohabitation 2 Chirac 11.0 7.5 9.3 -13.9 -9.5 -11.4 Chirac x 10.9 7.5 9.1 -8.5 -5.9 -7.1 Cohabitation * Effects calculated from Model 2 in Table 1.

Table 3 ARIMA (1,0,0) Model of French Prime Ministers’ Approval, 1960-2003 (First Appointments)

ß Coefficient / S.E. Month in Office -.11**** (.03) Chaban x First Appointment (1969) -.20 (4.30) Chirac x First Appointment (1974) -2.69 (5.56) Time/Electoral Mauroy x First Appointment (1981) 9.02**** Variables (1.07) Rocard x First Appointment (1988) 3.21 (2.80) Juppé x First Appointment (1995) 2.83 (4.82) Raffarin x First Appointment (2002) 1.57 (2.61) Backswing -1.55** (.91) Legislative Election -2.98**** (.36) Change in Monthly CPI (%) -.65* (.43) Unemployment, 6 month moving average (%) .65 (.53) Economic Context Strikes (t) -1.06* (.87) Strikes (t-1) -.88 (.93) Strikes (t-2) -.67 (.82)

Rally Event (t-1) 1.02 Rally Effects (1.03) Domestic Terrorism (t-1) .90 (.89) Constant 48.49**** (4.86) Model Parameters AR (1) .88**** (.02) Sigma 4.56**** (.09) N 485 Adjusted R2 .595 Summary 2 R D .505 Statistics RMS (residual mean square) .416 2 % s due to ?0 (model mean) .824 2 % s due to ?1 (AR term) .139 *** p <.001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 (one-tailed) Dependent variable is the prime minister’s monthly approval. See note # 8 for a full explanation of summary statistics and calculations.

Table 4 ARIMA (1,0,0) Model of French Prime Ministers’ Approval, 1960-2003 (Secondary Appointments)

ß Coefficient / S.E. Month in Office -.27**** (.03) Pompidou x Secondary Appointment (1962) -4.17**** (1.57) Pompidou x Secondary Appointment (1965) 1.78 (.6.03) Couve de Murville x Secondary Appointment (1968) -1.78 (1.82) Messmer x Secondary Appointment (1973) -10.06**** (1.40) Barre x Secondary Appointment (1976) -7.73**** (.91) Fabius x Secondary Appointment (1984) -.82 (1.62) Time/Electoral Chirac x Secondary Appointment 4.51 Variables (cohabitation, 1986-88) (4.88) Cresson x Secondary Appointment (1991) -1.49** (.80) Bérégovoy x Secondary Appointment (1992) 8.06**** (1.20) Balladur x Secondary Appointment 7.26**** (cohabitation, 1993-95) (1.11) Jospin x Secondary Appointment 7.15**** (cohabitation, 1997-2002) (.82) Backswing -2.84*** (.58) Legislative Election -1.18 (1.01) Change in Monthly CPI (%) -.62** (.36) Unemployment, 6 month moving average (%) .45 (.57) Economic Context Strikes (t) -.95* (.66) Strikes (t-1) -.69 (.72) Strikes (t-2) -1.55** (.67)

Rally Event (t-1) 1.06* Rally Effects (.69) Domestic Terrorism (t-1) .82 (.66) Constant 52.44**** (4.92) Model Parameters AR (1) .92**** (.02) Sigma 3.94**** (.11) N 485 Adjusted R2 .618 Summary 2 R D .494 Statistics RMS (residual mean square) .411 2 % s due to ?0 (model mean) .847 2 % s due to ?1 (AR term) .117 *** p <.001 ** p < .01 * p < .05 (one-tailed) Dependent variable is the prime minister’s monthly approval. See note # 8 for a full explanation of summary statistics and calculations.

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Notes

1 Author is grateful to Stéphanie Breuzard of the Paris office of SOFRES for providing the complete time series for Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s septennat from 1974-81.

2 The word “fusible” in French comes from the verb fuser, which connotes a circuit-breaker.

3 Data were analysed using STATA 6.0; correlograms were analysed using McCleary and Hay

(1980) and Kendall and Ord (1990) as a reference to determine the appropriate ARIMA model.

4 These indicators include not only the adjusted R2 (total variance explained by the model) but also

2 RMS (root mean square in variance), RD (variance in the monthly change in approval explained by the model), and the percent of the total variance owing to the autoregressive and moving average indicators in the model.

Adjusted R2 = 1 – MSE/MSY, where MSE=SSE/(n – k – 1) and MSY = SSY/(n – 1), when k parameters are added to the model (e.g., 504 – 15 – 1, or 488).

? 2 _ 2 SSE = ? ? and SSY = ? ? ? ? y ? y ? ? ? y ? y ? ? ? ? ? __ 2 2 ? ? R D ? 1- MSE / MSS?Y , where MSS?Y ? SS?Y /(n ? 1) and SS?Y ? ? ? ?y ? ?y ? ? ?

2 % s due to ?1 is the percent of variance owing to the model mean (?0) or autoregressive/moving

2 2 average indicators (?1), calculated as ? (y – ?i) / ? (y)

Residual Mean Square = 1/N * SSE

6 Giscard was right of center, but was the first non-Gaullist elected to the Élysée.

7 Regularly scheduled legislative elections that fall within a president’s term constitute a bellwether on executive performance analogous to American mid-term elections. The regularly scheduled elections include 1962 (November), and March 1967, 1973, 1978, 1986, 1993, and 1997.

8 In summer 2003 67% of respondents said they supported or sympathized with the theatre performers’ strikes. See “Les Français face au mouvement social des intermittents du spectacle,”

Sondages CSA, .

9 De Gaulle’s actions in Algeria from 1959-61 were not included as rally effects. Algeria, unlike other French colonies at the time, was considered a political entity belonging to metropolitan France and had minimal representation in the National Assembly.

10 2 The interpretation of the R D statistic is that the model explains approximately 34 percent of the variance in the monthly change in presidential approval—a quite respectable figure, even though the data were not differenced. The autoregressive and moving average coefficients account for 12.4 percent of the overall variance.

11 The simple correlation between unemployment and the consumer price index during Giscard’s term is .64.

12 The inclusion of dummy variables in the model (not shown) for secondary appointments who sustained dramatic drops in public approval over a short period of time—notably Édith Cresson— does not alter the coefficient.

13 Cresson’s was known “mainly for her lack of tact in talking about other countries, describing the

Japanese as having all the characteristics of ants, and opining that all Englishmen must be homosexuals because none of the men in London turned round to look at her as she walked along the street” (Thody 1998, 117).

14 Dropping the inflation variable and re-estimating the equation with interaction terms for successive prime ministers under the last three presidents (not shown) revealed that only the coefficient for Raymond Barre was slightly significant—perhaps not unexpectedly given his sobriquet as the “prime minister of unemployment.”