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The Polish Conspiracy; Full Story of the Polish-Goebbels Plot to Save Hitler, April 11-April 30, 1943

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The Polish Conspiracy; Full Story of the Polish-Goebbels Plot to Save Hitler, April 11-April 30, 1943 Digital Kenyon: Research, Scholarship, and Creative Exchange Rare Books and Manuscripts Special Collections 1943 The Polish Conspiracy; Full Story of the Polish-Goebbels Plot to Save Hitler, April 11-April 30, 1943 George Audit Follow this and additional works at: https://digital.kenyon.edu/rarebooks Recommended Citation Audit, George, "The Polish Conspiracy; Full Story of the Polish-Goebbels Plot to Save Hitler, April 11-April 30, 1943" (1943). Rare Books and Manuscripts. 15. https://digital.kenyon.edu/rarebooks/15 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Special Collections at Digital Kenyon: Research, Scholarship, and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Rare Books and Manuscripts by an authorized administrator of Digital Kenyon: Research, Scholarship, and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact [email protected]. " .. the Germans would like to obtain peace with Britain and the U.S.A. on the condition that the latter would break with the Soviet Union ; or on the con­ trary, that they would like to obtain peace with the Soviet Union on the condition that it break with the U.S.A. and Britain."- STALIN. THE POLISH CONSPIRACY Full Story of the Polish-Goebbels Plot to save Hitler, APRIL 11- APRIL 30, 1943 BY · GEORGE AUDIT * A Russia To-day Pamphlet TWOPENCE How was this aim to be achieved ? The Polish Conspiracy In the first place by a foreign diplomacy and Press and Radio campaign concentrating on three main themes: "the defence of The Plan to Save Hitler Germany European civilisation against Bolshevism"; the impregnability of Germany's defences in the West; the impossibility of the Allied Nations becoming sufficiently united to defeat Germany for many T Stalingrad the main strategy of Fascist Germany in its years to come. bid to conquer the world was brought crashing in ruins. In the second place, by a concentration of Nazi propaganda A The German plan to deprive the Red Army of its offen­ fire against the known weak places in the structure of the demo­ sive power, and then to turn to the West in order to impose a cratic alliance. The battles of 1942 and 1943 had proved that the Fascist peace on the world, was decisively routed. Stalingrad and " invincible German soldiers " were very far from invincible; the Rostov, El Alamein and Tripoli, created fresh bright prospects of invincible German liars of Goebbels' Propaganda Ministry were a speedy ending of the war and the complete destruction of Nazi called on to see if they could do better. Germany. The Casablanca Conference held out the promise that The main instrument in the plot was the propaganda machine within the next nine months Britain and America would profit by which Goebbels controlled- the most dangerous ever possessed the opportunity created by the Red Army's winter victories to by any tyranny in the history of mankind. All its resources were launch an offensive in Europe "on the widest scale." set to work. The whole Press of Fascist-occupied Europe, the The Second Front was still delayed, and the delay enabled the hundreds of broadcasting stations sending out "one o'clock news" German army partly to restore its military situation in the South; and "nine o'clock news " to Europe's 350 million people, applied yet, in spite of this, the Alliance of the democratic peoples against themselves day and night to this one end. At least a dozen Fascism grew steadily stronger. Such was the situation when the "news" agencies, and powerful short-wave stations broadcasting German Government early in 1943 laid its new and well-planned a non-stop service to Africa, India, the Near East, the Far East, conspiracy to snatch a victory from what appeared to be a South America, the United States and Australia, carried the poison desper<).te position. The conspiracy was planned on so large a abroad. : scale that no kind of concealment was possible. The basic aim ,was to recreate throughout the· world by a flood of anti-Bolshevik diplomatic activity and propaganda the conditions which had Earlier incidents: Polish blackmail attempts made possible Munich and all other previous Fascist successes; against the Soviet Union · the main weapon was that " bolshevik bogey " which had already served Fascism so well. In order to understand the full significance of the act by the This point was made very clear by Joseph Stalin in his 1943 Polish Government which caused the breach, it is necessary to re­ May Day Order of the Day: - view briefly earlier Polish attempts to extort territorial concessions " To judge from reports in the foreign press, one can con­ from the Soviet Union. Little more than a month earlier the clude that the Germans would like to obtain peace with Britain Polish Government in London, and its agents in Allied countries, and the U.S.A. on the condition that the latter break with the started an agitation for the settlement of its claims to the Western Soviet Union; or, on the contrary, that they would like to obtain Ukraine and Western Byelorussia. These are non-Polish terri­ peace with the Soviet Union on the condition that it breaks tories, the one a part of the Soviet Byelorussian Republic and the with Britain and the U.S.A. Treacherous to the marrow them­ other a part of the Soviet Ukrainian Republic. Filched from the selves, the German imperialists have the insolence to measure Soviet Union by the imperialist Pilsudski in 1920, at the period of the Allies by their own yardstick, expecting one or other of the the young Soviet Republic's weakness, they were restored to the Allies to swallow the bait." Soviet Union by the Red Army in 1939, when the government of The plot hatched by Goebbels to save Germany from total Rydz-Smigly and Colonel Beck had fled from Poland into hospit­ defeat aimed at nothing less than the mobilisation of all reaction­ able Rumania, leaving their country undefended against the Nazi ary elements in Europe-and a11 the dark forces throughout the hordes. The Polish Government chose recently to annouuce, at world that feared the results of Hitler's defeat-with the object a critfoal time when the Sovlet Union was still bearing almost the first of delaying the Allied blow in the West and, secondly, entire weight of the struggle on land against Nazi Germany, that of arranging a peace that would make the world safe for Fascism. 3 2 it considered the Polish-Soviet agreement concluded in 1941 as to rouse public indignation against the execution of two Polish maintaining the territorial status quo of 1939. Bundists, Alter and Ehrlich. In Britain this agitation had only a Polish duplicity in relation to the Soviet Union is of long limited success. It was possible, however, for the Polish elements standing. When in 1920 the Soviet Government made an offer of leading the campaign to hold a public meeting in London attended peace to the Poles, the Poles expressed willingness to enter into by 500 people in memory and honour of these two Polish would­ negotiations; but this is what Count Skrzynski, Polisli. Foreign be quislings who were executed for spreading propaganda among Minister, had to say of this in his book, "Poland and Peace":- the Soviet troops in favour of a separate peace-and this, too, in " The Soviet proposals were not given any serious considera­ December, 1941, during the most critical period of the Red Army's tion. When, however, parliamentary and democratic policy single-handed struggle with German Fascism. In America the did not permit them to be left without an answer, the question agitation was worked up to greater proportions and such diverse of the place wl).ere the negotiations might be held was raised in elements as the Hearst Press, the Wall Street Journal, and certain such an offensive spirit that the whole question was stopped at American isolationists and leaders of the American Federation of that point." Labour rushed to take part in it. The Polish National Council This is what the late H. H. Asquith said in the House of in London saw fit to issue a statement denying the treachery of Commons on August 10th, 1920, about the Polish-Russian situa­ Alter and Ehrlich and raising doubts as to " the fate of those tion at that time: - thousands of Polish citizens deported to the depths of Russia con­ " There was Poland six months ago, a population stricken cerning whom the Soviet a·uthorities have not yet given sufficient with disease and famine, and, it is not an exaggeration to say, on explanation." the verge of national qankruptcy, and it was under these circum­ stances that she started this campaign. Her· avowed object was to Ground softened for Goebbels get rid of the comparatively limited frontier, not an ungenerous frontier . and to go beyond it to the ancient boundaries of It was in this way that the ground was softened for the new Poland of 1772. As I say, it was a purely aggressive adventure. bid to wreck the unity of the Allied camp which the German It was a wanton enterprise." Propaganda Ministry made on April 11th of this year. On this· Even at the time of the signing of the Soviet-Polish agreement, day the German Transocean agency launched its masterpiece of when hope was widely felt and expressed that the Polish Govern­ anti-Soviet fabrication against the weakest spot in Allied relation­ ment had determined on a good-neighbourly policy towards the ships. It announced:- Soviet Union, there were elements in the Polish emigre Govern­ " 10,000 Polish officers-the entire Polish officer corps-has ment in London which fought to prevent the signing of the agree­ been discovered shot dead through the nape of the neck in the ment.
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