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To “Shaping” Technology GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY WATCH 2012 THE INTERNET AND CORRUPTION Transparency and accountability online ASSOCIATION FOR PROGRESSIVE COMMUNICATIONS (APC) AND HUMANIST INSTITUTE FOR COOThematicPER reportsATION / 1WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Hivos) Global Information Society Watch 2012 Global Information Society Watch 2012 Steering committee Anriette Esterhuysen (APC) Loe Schout (Hivos) Coordinating committee Karen Banks (APC) Monique Doppert (Hivos) Valeria Betancourt (APC) Project coordinator Valeria Betancourt Editor Alan Finlay Assistant editor Lori Nordstrom Publication production Mallory Knodel Proofreading Valerie Dee Lori Nordstrom Graphic design Monocromo [email protected] Phone: +598 2 400 1685 Cover illustration Matías Bervejillo Financial support provided by Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries (Hivos) Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) Global Information Society Watch Published by APC and Hivos 2012 Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Licence <creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0> Some rights reserved. ISSN: 2225-4625 ISBN: 978-92-95096-85-1 APC-201301-CIPP-R-EN-DIGITAL-176 In search of transparency: From “using” to “shaping” technology Arne Hintz and Stefania Milan and to bypass the traditional gatekeepers such as Cardiff University and The Citizen Lab, mass media, infrastructure providers and the state . University of Toronto In this way it has constituted a crucial tool for civil www .cardiff .ac .uk/jomec and citizenlab .org society campaigners and social movements, with recent examples including the widely debated role In an age in which power equals “the possession, of technology in the “Arab Spring” . However, as assimilation and retailing of information as a basic its uses have progressed, so have the attempts by commodity of daily life,”1 transparency has become both public and private actors to control and restrict a luxury and is no longer a given . Cyberspace is what was previously seen as borderless, “free” and populated by an ever-growing number of invisible uncontrollable cyberspace . The filtering of web barriers making knowledge sharing and circulation content has become a common practice across the difficult, such as strict copyright enforcement and globe, and states in both the East and West now re- content-based discrimination . Digital technologies, strict (and persecute) the dissemination of content 2 however, can contribute to increase transparency deemed illegal or illegitimate . Intermediaries such and fight corruption . They can amplify and facilitate as internet service providers (ISPs) and search en- grassroots mobilisation, and allow an unprecedent- gines are increasingly enlisted by governments to ed outreach and scaling up of protest . Numerous control and restrict access to content, effectively initiatives that work towards creating and expanding becoming proxy censors . Access to infrastructure transparency happen in the realm of technological and online services has been shut down, particu- activism or at the level of policy activism . Here we larly in times of political turmoil (for example in want to point to three of them: Anonymous, Wiki- Egypt in January 2011), and the “three strikes” laws Leaks and the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative in France and elsewhere restrict people’s internet (IMMI) represent different ways – yet with shared access if they violate intellectual property law by characteristics – in which digital technologies can downloading copyrighted content . The contro- help leverage the grassroots demands for trans- versies on net neutrality – initiated in the US and parency . They demonstrate how technology can increasingly spreading to other jurisdictions – have be used, but also how it needs to be shaped and highlighted the role of network providers as po- developed in order to enhance social and political tential gatekeepers who may discriminate against change . They emerge at the intersection between some content, for example dissident or non-profit content and infrastructure concerns, and they content . Access to critical resources such as funding therefore demonstrate the need to combine trans- increasingly takes place online through companies parency as a political goal with transparency of the such as PayPal: their decision to withdraw services technological infrastructure that serves to advance or limit access can cripple a media organisation, as this demand . In what follows we illustrate these happened with WikiLeaks . Finally, with the ubiquity three instances of internet-enabled and internet- of electronic communication, the “capacity of the focused mobilisation, and we explore, in particular, state to gather and process information about its how they address, implicitly and explicitly, a chang- citizens and about the resources and activities with- 3 ing environment for online communication . in its space is growing by orders of magnitude .” We are witnessing a trend toward systematic and Net challenges and opportunities During its short history as a public communica- 2 According to the OpenNet Initiative, 47% of the world's internet users experience online censorship, with 31% of all internet users tion platform, the internet has enabled people to living in countries that engage in "substantial" or "pervasive" spread information further and wider than before, censorship . OpenNet Initiative (2012) Global Internet Filtering in 2012 at a Glance, blog post, 3 April . opennet .net/blog/2012/04/ global-internet-filtering-2012-glance 1 Sterling, B . (1993) The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the 3 Braman, S . (2006) Change of State: Information, Policy, and Power, Electronic Frontier, Bantam, New York . MIT Press, Cambridge, p . 314 . 34 / Global Information Society Watch ongoing surveillance of all online data, and the ero- opinions, and against the International Federation sion of judicial oversight and established notions of of the Phonographic Industry for its pro-copyright due process . Recent examples include the EU Data battles and its prosecution of the free sharing of Retention Directive, “lawful access” legislation in cultural goods . During the Egypt internet blackout Canada, and the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and in 2011, Anonymous used a variety of technological Protection Act (CISPA) in the US .4 Internet compa- means to facilitate information exchange between nies are gathering significant amounts of user data Egypt and the rest of the world, providing citizens and are increasingly forced to hand over data to with alternative communication infrastructure . Ef- governments . For example, Google received 5,950 forts to uncover secret information have included requests by the US government for the disclosure Operation HBGary, named after a security firm of user data in the first six months of 2011 alone, a whose CEO, Aaron Barr, had announced he had number which was up 70% from 2010 . identified the network’s most active members and The previously free and open environment for cit- threatened to hand them over to the FBI . Anon ac- izens’ online communication is rapidly transforming tivists hacked Barr’s Twitter account, downloaded into a restricted and controlled space, and inter- some 70,000 emails and documents and published net activists have had to take these changes into them online, uncovering proposals by the company account . Efforts to use the internet for advancing to the US Chamber of Commerce to discredit WikiLe- social change are therefore complemented by, and aks, and thereby providing useful information on intertwined with, activism that addresses the plat- secret collaborations between state agencies and form itself by opening new technological avenues security firms . for information exchange, looking for and exploiting Having originated in online chat rooms that fo- unrestricted spaces, and advocating policies that cused on (largely politically incorrect) pranks, the allow for free communication . Net activism, in this network has maintained an orientation to the “lulz” respect, encompasses web-based collective action – a neologism that derives from LOL (“laughing out that both addresses the openness and accessibil- loud”) and indicates the fun associated with pranks . ity of network infrastructure and exploits the latter’s Its particular approach to the defence of free ex- technical and ontological features for political or pression has been marked by irony and disruption . social change . Examples include electronic distur- Unsurprisingly, the authorities in several countries, bance tactics and hacktivism, self-organisation and most prominently the US and the UK, have not autonomous creation of infrastructure, software been willing to see the fun of DDoS attacks and and hardware hacking, and online leaking . In the internet break-ins and have rigorously persecuted following sections, we will briefly introduce and dis- Anonymous . Despite its sometimes illegal and of- cuss three current initiatives whose goals combine ten deliberately annoying approach, we maintain infrastructure and political change . that several of the network’s actions and revelations have, in fact, increased transparency and have shed Mobilising for transparency: light on interesting secrets . Anonymous, WikiLeaks and IMMI A similarly prominent but more formal initiative One of the most prominent examples of net activ- against information secrecy has been WikiLeaks . ism in recent years has been the loose network Founded in 2006 as an online platform for whistle- “Anonymous” . Its self-identified
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