Smart Regulation of Harmful Internet Content
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THE BUSINESS of CENSORSHIP: CONTENT MANAGEMENT and the CHINESE ECONOMY By
THE BUSINESS OF CENSORSHIP: CONTENT MANAGEMENT AND THE CHINESE ECONOMY by JOSHUA CLARK B.A. (Hons.), Queen's University at Kingston, 2009 MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2010 ©Joshua Clark, 2010 Abstract Content control and censorship on the Internet are increasingly important topics for scholars of democratization, media and communications. Most studies have examined the relationship between the Internet, content management and various elements important to democratization such as the formation of civil society organizations. This thesis attempts to expand this discussion by examining the effects of online content management on economic systems, using the People's Republic of China as an example. China features a globally integrated economy that is increasing dependent on manufacturing and services while simultaneously maintaining one of the most extensive online content management systems in the world. This paper attempts to show how the Communist Party of China is able to reconcile the need for connectivity in order to drive their economy while maintaining political control. It also discusses the long-term implications of this strategy. The first section consists of a series of quantitative and qualitative tests to determine how various classes of websites are managed. These tests reveal that in order to maintain the flow of information necessary for a globally integrated economy, the Chinese Communist Party utilizes strategies that manage but not block the information flows related to business. This survey is followed by a case study examining the relationship between Google and China, and the implications of Chinese regulation and control for the broader economy. -
West Censoring East
West Censoring East The Use of Western Technologies by Middle East Censors 2010-2011 Executive Summary The OpenNet Initiative has documented network filtering of the Internet by national governments in over forty countries worldwide. Countries use this network filtering as one of many methods to control the flow of online content that is objectionable to the filtering governments for social, political, and security reasons. Filtering is particularly appealing to governments as it allows them to control content not published within their national borders. National governments use a variety of technical means to filter the Internet; in this paper, we analyze the use of American- and Canadian- made software for the purpose of government-level filtering in the Middle East and North Africa. In this report, the authors find that nine countries in the region utilize Western-made tools for the purpose of blocking social and political content, effectively blocking a total of over 20 million Internet users from accessing such websites. 1 The authors analyze as well the increasing opacity of the usage of Western-made tools for filtering at the national level. Helmi Noman and Jillian C. York authored this report. ONI principal investigators Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain authored the foreword. Noman is a Senior Research Fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, and is a Berkman Center Research Affiliate. York is the coordinator for the OpenNet Initiative at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. The authors would like to thank James Tay of Citizen Lab for technical support and test data analysis. -
Everyone's Guide to Bypassing Internet Censorship
EVERYONE’S GUIDE TO BY-PASSING INTERNET CENSORSHIP FOR CITIZENS WORLDWIDE A CIVISEC PROJECT The Citizen Lab The University of Toronto September, 2007 cover illustration by Jane Gowan Glossary page 4 Introduction page 5 Choosing Circumvention page 8 User self-assessment Provider self-assessment Technology page 17 Web-based Circumvention Systems Tunneling Software Anonymous Communications Systems Tricks of the trade page 28 Things to remember page 29 Further reading page 29 Circumvention Technologies Circumvention technologies are any tools, software, or methods used to bypass Inter- net filtering. These can range from complex computer programs to relatively simple manual steps, such as accessing a banned website stored on a search engine’s cache, instead of trying to access it directly. Circumvention Providers Circumvention providers install software on a computer in a non-filtered location and make connections to this computer available to those who access the Internet from a censored location. Circumvention providers can range from large commercial organi- zations offering circumvention services for a fee to individuals providing circumven- tion services for free. Circumvention Users Circumvention users are individuals who use circumvention technologies to bypass Internet content filtering. 4 Internet censorship, or content filtering, has become a major global problem. Whereas once it was assumed that states could not control Internet communications, according to research by the OpenNet Initiative (http://opennet.net) more than 25 countries now engage in Internet censorship practices. Those with the most pervasive filtering policies have been found to routinely block access to human rights organi- zations, news, blogs, and web services that challenge the status quo or are deemed threatening or undesirable. -
The Internet Beyond Borderless Versus Balkanized
POROUS TERRITORIES: THE INTERNET BEYOND BORDERLESS VERSUS BALKANIZED LUKE MUNN Western Sydney University (Australia) [email protected] Abstract: If the internet was once viewed as a borderless realm, critics now warn it is in danger of being “balkanized”, splintering into nationalized fragments. Certainly nation-states increasingly see the Internet as “their” internet, a national space to be regulated and actively shaped. The first half of this article charts the technologies that appear to place this vision within reach: data localization, internet shutdowns, and internet filtering. These moves promise to exert sovereign control, to make the inter- net an extension of national territory. Yet by drawing on two recent events in China, this article argues that these territories are messy and their borders are permeable. Pro-government activists jump across the firewall in order to attack individuals and organizations who threaten the stability and security of their motherland. Simultane- ously, individuals scale the firewall in order to question the party line and express solidarity with democratic movements, undermining the political and technical boundaries established by their nation. Internet architectures create a condition where territorialization is constantly being both amplified and undermined by “extra- territorial” activities. These practices demonstrate the everyday porosity of internet territories, providing a messier portrait that goes beyond the dichotomy of borderless vs balkanized. Keywords: territory, fragmentation, balkanization, internet, China. When nations speak of the internet today, they no longer use the language of the virtual, but of soil. At the dawn of the internet, cyberspace was framed as a new realm decoupled from the state. This digital sphere stretched across the globe, making it essentially ungovernable. -
Threat Modeling and Circumvention of Internet Censorship by David Fifield
Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship By David Fifield A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Professor Deirdre Mulligan Professor Vern Paxson Fall 2017 1 Abstract Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship by David Fifield Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Research on Internet censorship is hampered by poor models of censor behavior. Censor models guide the development of circumvention systems, so it is important to get them right. A censor model should be understood not just as a set of capabilities|such as the ability to monitor network traffic—but as a set of priorities constrained by resource limitations. My research addresses the twin themes of modeling and circumvention. With a grounding in empirical research, I build up an abstract model of the circumvention problem and examine how to adapt it to concrete censorship challenges. I describe the results of experiments on censors that probe their strengths and weaknesses; specifically, on the subject of active probing to discover proxy servers, and on delays in their reaction to changes in circumvention. I present two circumvention designs: domain fronting, which derives its resistance to blocking from the censor's reluctance to block other useful services; and Snowflake, based on quickly changing peer-to-peer proxy servers. I hope to change the perception that the circumvention problem is a cat-and-mouse game that affords only incremental and temporary advancements. -
Data Localization Requirements Across Different Jurisdictions 70
The Localisation Gambit Unpacking Policy Measures for Sovereign Control of Data in India 19th March, 2019 By Arindrajit Basu, Elonnai Hickok, and Aditya Singh Chawla Edited by Pranav M Bidare, Vipul Kharbanda, and Amber Sinha Research Assistance Anjanaa Aravindan The Centre for Internet and Society, India Acknowledgements 2 Executive Summary 3 Introduction 9 Methodology 10 Defining and Conceptualizing Sovereign Control of Data 11 Mapping of Current Policy Measures for Localization of Data in India 13 The Draft Personal Data Protection Bill, 2018 13 Draft E-commerce Policy (s) 17 RBI Notification on ‘Storage of Payment System Data’ 19 Draft E-Pharmacy Regulations 20 FDI Policy 2017 20 National Telecom M2M Roadmap 21 Unified Access License for Telecom 21 Companies Act, 2013 and Rules 21 The IRDAI (Outsourcing of Activities by Indian Insurers) Regulations, 2017 22 Guidelines on Contractual Terms Related to Cloud Services 22 Reflecting on Objectives, Challenges and Implications of National Control of Data 24 Enabling Innovation and Economic Growth 24 Enhancing National Security and Law Enforcement Access 34 Law Enforcement Access 34 Protecting Against Foreign Surveillance 36 Threat to fibre-optic cables 37 Widening Tax Base 40 Data Sovereignty and India’s Trade Commitments 41 A Survey of Stakeholder Responses 48 Data Localisation Around the World 49 Conclusions and Recommended Approaches 61 Annexure I 70 Mapping Data Localization Requirements Across Different Jurisdictions 70 Annexure 2 75 A survey of stakeholder responses 75 1 Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Pranav MB, Vipul Kharbanda, Amber Sinha, and Saumyaa Naidu for their invaluable edits and comments on the draft. -
Weather Investment
Invest in the MEDA region, why, how ? Algeria Egypt / Israel / Jordan / Lebanon / Libya / Morocco / Palestinian Authority/ Syria / Tunisia / Turkey PAPERS & STUDIES n°22 April 2007 Collective work driven by Sonia Bessamra and Bénédict de Saint-Laurent Invest in the MEDA region, why how ? References This document has been produced within the context of a mission entrusted by the European Commission to the Invest in France Agency (AFII), assisted by the Istituto Nazionale per il Commercio Estero, ICE (Italy) and the Direction des Investissements, DI (Morocco), to develop a Euro‐Mediterranean Network of Mediterranean Investment Promotion Agencies (« ANIMA»). The n°of the contract is: ME8/B7‐4100/IB/99/0304. ISBN: 2‐915719‐28‐4 EAN 9782915719284 © AFII‐ANIMA 2007. Reproduction prohibited without the authorisation of the AFII. All rights reserved Authors This work is the second edition of a synopsis guide realised with contributions from various experts working under the ANIMA programme, especially for the writing of the project web site pages. The following authors have participated in the two editions: In 2006, Sonia Bessamra (free‐lance consultant) and Bénédict de Saint‐ Laurent (AFII) have fully updated the content, assisted by Pierre Henry, Amar Kaddouri, Emmanuel Noutary and Elsa Vachez (ANIMA team, translation, revisions); The former 2004 edition, which provides the guide frame, was directed by Bénédict de Saint‐Laurent (ANIMA, co‐ordination, synopsis, rewriting, data), Stéphane Jaffrin (ANIMA, on line implementation, some updates) and Christian Apothéloz (free‐lance consultant, co‐ordination), assisted by Alexandre Arditti, Delphine Bréant, Jean‐François Eyraud, Jean‐Louis Marcos, Laurent Mauron, Stéphanie Paicheler, Samar Smati, Nicolas Sridi et Jihad Yazigi (various thematic or country articles). -
Deep Packet Inspection and Internet Censorship: International Convergence on an ‘Integrated Technology of Control’1
Deep Packet Inspection and Internet Censorship: International Convergence on an ‘Integrated Technology of Control’1 Ben Wagner, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München and Universiteit Leiden Introduction* The academic debate on deep packet inspection (DPI) centres on methods of network management and copyright protection and is directly linked to a wider debate on freedom of speech on the Internet. The debate is deeply rooted in an Anglo-Saxon perspective of the Internet and is frequently depicted as a titanic struggle for the right to fundamentally free and unfettered access to the Internet.2 This debate is to a great extent defined by commercial interests. These interests whether of copyright owners, Internet service providers, 1 (Bendrath 2009) * A first draft of this paper was presented at the 3rd Annual Giganet Symposium in December 2008 in Hyderabad, India. For their advice and support preparing this paper I would like to thank: Ralf Bendrath, Claus Wimmer, Geert Lovink, Manuel Kripp, Hermann Thoene, Paul Sterzel, David Herzog, Rainer Hülsse, Wolfgang Fänderl and Stefan Scholz. 2 (Frieden 2008, 633-676; Goodin 2008; Lehr et al. 2007; Mueller 2007, 18; Zittrain 2008) Deep Packet Inspection and Internet Censorship: International Convergence on an ‘Integrated Technology of Control’1, by Ben Wagner application developers or consumers, are all essentially economic. All of these groups have little commercial interest in restricting free speech as such. However some might well be prepared to accept a certain amount of ‘collateral damage’ to internet free speech in exchange for higher revenues. It can be argued that more transparent and open practices from network service providers are needed regarding filtering policy and the technology used. -
"Splinternet" – Danger for Our Citizens, Businesses and Society?
"Splinternet" – Danger for our citizens, businesses and society? Once upon a time, there was the World Wide Web (www). Just as it was invented by Sir Tim Berners-Lee. John Perry Barlow wrote the "Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace" in 1996. The Internet was a great promise of freedom. It worked like a continuation of the Gutenberg invention, the printing press: the Internet gave a voice to all citizens whose views and attitudes were suppressed by the media and elites. This had and has great political consequences. 30 years later the opinion about the internet changed: It was thought that monopoly companies like Google, Facebook, etc. control Big Data and Artificial Intelligence, and therefore control us. However, politics followed suit and began to regulate. The concern now is that the state will disenfranchise citizens and restrict companies. There is a fear of new totalitarian regimes. And in this situation, the Internet ("splinternet") is increasingly fragmented. National "Internet" networks are emerging. States treat the Internet as an extension of their national territory. The most recent example is Russia, where Kremlin laws ensure that national Internet traffic goes through state nodes and the state has the right to shut down the global Internet: a sort of digital Iron Curtain. The champion of the national Internet is China. The state monitors and controls Internet content, blocks foreign services and companies (like Facebook) and replaces them with national services and companies that are in line with the Communist Party. The "Great Firewall" is successful. The number of states imitating China's Internet policy is growing: Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, but also Thailand and Vietnam etc. -
DQL (Australia) 20
Digital Quality of Life Global research of 65 countries’ digital quality of life. 2019 © Surfshark 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, by any means whatsoever, without the prior written permission of Surfshark. Table of Contents Table of contents i Tables & Figures ii List of Abbreviations iii 1. Introduction 1 2. Scope 2 3. Methodology 3 3.1 Composite factors 4 3.1.1 Internet Speed 5 3.1.2 Internet Prices 6 3.1.3 Personal Data Protection Legislation 8 3.1.4 E-Government Availability 8 3.1.5 Entertainment Content Availability 10 3.1.6 The Global Cybersecurity Index 10 3.1 The expert panel 12 3.2 Scoring process 13 4. Key Findings 14 4.1 Overall Digital Quality of Life 15 4.2 Highest DQL (Australia) 20 4.3 Lowest DQL (Algeria) 21 4.4 Other Important Insights 22 4.4.1 Price Discrimination 22 4.4.2 Censorship 23 4.5 The Case of China 24 i 5. Global Outlook 26 5.1 Internet Speed 27 5.1.1 Mobile Internet 28 5.1.1.1 The Importance of Mobile Internet for Developing Countries 31 5.1.2 Broadband 31 5. 2 Internet Prices 35 5.2.1 Broadband 35 5.2.2 Mobile 40 6. Entertainment Content Availability 45 7. E-Government Availability 49 8. The Global Cybersecurity Index 52 9. Personal Data Protection Laws 56 10. Conclusions 59 11. Sources 63 12. Annex 1: Dynamic Criteria 68 12.1 Average Wage Data 68 12.2 Internet Speed Tests 69 12.3 Internet Prices 88 i Tables & Figures Equation 1: Index figure for mobile internet speed 6 Equation 2: Index figure for broadband internet speed 6 Equation 3: Average hourly wage 7 Equation -
The Internet and Elections: the 2006 Presidential
ONI Internet Watch 001 2 About OpenNet Initiative’s Internet Watch Reports Internet Watch reports investigate emerging trends in Internet filtering and control. These occasional reports take a detailed look at events, policies, technologies and countries where filtering and content controls are occurring in new and unexpected ways, or where filtering has been alleged but undetected using conventional ONI testing methodologies. They are designed to test hypotheses, refine monitoring techniques, and report on the cutting edge of the global informational battle space. Internet Watch reports are available in download or hard copy from the ONI. ONI Internet Watch 001 3 Executive Summary As Internet penetration increases globally, so too does its importance to political contests. Both the Internet and cell phones were used to mobilize the masses during the recent “colour revolutions” in the former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, which brought down long-standing authoritarian regimes. This first Internet Watch report, which focuses on election monitoring, represents a pilot venture for the OpenNet Initiative. The motivating hypothesis is that in democratically-challenged countries, the openness of the Net is likely to come under increasing pressure at key political times. One key conclusion thus far is that state tampering with the Internet during election periods is likely to be multi- faceted, elusive, less direct, and more difficult to prove than outright filtering and blocking. A second conclusion, based on the first, is that monitoring the Internet for openness during elections is an extremely slippery task that requires the development of new testing methodologies and monitoring capabilities. This report presents the findings of ONI’s efforts to monitor the Internet during the March 2006 presidential elections in Belarus. -
The Digital Divide: the Internet and Social Inequality in International Perspective
http://www.diva-portal.org This is the published version of a chapter published in The Digital Divide: The Internet and Social Inequality in International Perspective. Citation for the original published chapter: Meinrath, S., Losey, J., Lennett, B. (2013) Afterword. Internet Freedom, Nuanced Digital Divide, and the Internet Craftsman. In: Massimo Ragnedda and Glenn W. Muschert (ed.), The Digital Divide: The Internet and Social Inequality in International Perspective (pp. 309-316). London: Routledge Routledge advances in sociology N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published chapter. Permanent link to this version: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-100423 The Digital Divide This book provides an in-depth comparative analysis of inequality and the stratification of the digital sphere. Grounded in classical sociological theories of inequality, as well as empirical evidence, this book defines “the digital divide” as the unequal access and utility of internet communications technologies and explores how it has the potential to replicate existing social inequalities, as well as create new forms of stratification. The Digital Divide examines how various demographic and socio-economic factors including income, education, age and gender, as well as infrastructure, products and services affect how the internet is used and accessed. Comprised of six parts, the first section examines theories of the digital divide, and then looks in turn at: • Highly developed nations and regions (including the USA, the EU and Japan); • Emerging large powers (Brazil, Russia, India, China); • Eastern European countries (Estonia, Romania, Serbia); • Arab and Middle Eastern nations (Egypt, Iran, Israel); • Under-studied areas (East and Central Asia, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa).