The Growth of Global Internet Censorship and Circumvention: a Survey
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THE BUSINESS of CENSORSHIP: CONTENT MANAGEMENT and the CHINESE ECONOMY By
THE BUSINESS OF CENSORSHIP: CONTENT MANAGEMENT AND THE CHINESE ECONOMY by JOSHUA CLARK B.A. (Hons.), Queen's University at Kingston, 2009 MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2010 ©Joshua Clark, 2010 Abstract Content control and censorship on the Internet are increasingly important topics for scholars of democratization, media and communications. Most studies have examined the relationship between the Internet, content management and various elements important to democratization such as the formation of civil society organizations. This thesis attempts to expand this discussion by examining the effects of online content management on economic systems, using the People's Republic of China as an example. China features a globally integrated economy that is increasing dependent on manufacturing and services while simultaneously maintaining one of the most extensive online content management systems in the world. This paper attempts to show how the Communist Party of China is able to reconcile the need for connectivity in order to drive their economy while maintaining political control. It also discusses the long-term implications of this strategy. The first section consists of a series of quantitative and qualitative tests to determine how various classes of websites are managed. These tests reveal that in order to maintain the flow of information necessary for a globally integrated economy, the Chinese Communist Party utilizes strategies that manage but not block the information flows related to business. This survey is followed by a case study examining the relationship between Google and China, and the implications of Chinese regulation and control for the broader economy. -
Poster: Introducing Massbrowser: a Censorship Circumvention System Run by the Masses
Poster: Introducing MassBrowser: A Censorship Circumvention System Run by the Masses Milad Nasr∗, Anonymous∗, and Amir Houmansadr University of Massachusetts Amherst fmilad,[email protected] ∗Equal contribution Abstract—We will present a new censorship circumvention sys- side the censorship regions, which relay the Internet traffic tem, currently being developed in our group. The new system of the censored users. This includes systems like Tor, VPNs, is called MassBrowser, and combines several techniques from Psiphon, etc. Unfortunately, such circumvention systems are state-of-the-art censorship studies to design a hard-to-block, easily blocked by the censors by enumerating their limited practical censorship circumvention system. MassBrowser is a set of proxy server IP addresses [14]. (2) Costly to operate: one-hop proxy system where the proxies are volunteer Internet To resist proxy blocking by the censors, recent circumven- users in the free world. The power of MassBrowser comes from tion systems have started to deploy the proxies on shared-IP the large number of volunteer proxies who frequently change platforms such as CDNs, App Engines, and Cloud Storage, their IP addresses as the volunteer users move to different a technique broadly referred to as domain fronting [3]. networks. To get a large number of volunteer proxies, we This mechanism, however, is prohibitively expensive [11] provide the volunteers the control over how their computers to operate for large scales of users. (3) Poor QoS: Proxy- are used by the censored users. Particularly, the volunteer based circumvention systems like Tor and it’s variants suffer users can decide what websites they will proxy for censored from low quality of service (e.g., high latencies and low users, and how much bandwidth they will allocate. -
Self-Censorship and the First Amendment Robert A
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy Volume 25 Article 2 Issue 1 Symposium on Censorship & the Media 1-1-2012 Self-Censorship and the First Amendment Robert A. Sedler Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp Recommended Citation Robert A. Sedler, Self-Censorship and the First Amendment, 25 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 13 (2012). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol25/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ARTICLES SELF-CENSORSHIP AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT ROBERT A. SEDLER* I. INTRODUCTION Self-censorship refers to the decision by an individual or group to refrain from speaking and to the decision by a media organization to refrain from publishing information. Whenever an individual or group or the media engages in self-censorship, the values of the First Amendment are compromised, because the public is denied information or ideas.' It should not be sur- prising, therefore, that the principles, doctrines, and precedents of what I refer to as "the law of the First Amendment"' are designed to prevent self-censorship premised on fear of govern- mental sanctions against expression. This fear-induced self-cen- sorship will here be called "self-censorship bad." At the same time, the First Amendment also values and pro- tects a right to silence. -
The Velocity of Censorship
The Velocity of Censorship: High-Fidelity Detection of Microblog Post Deletions Tao Zhu, Independent Researcher; David Phipps, Bowdoin College; Adam Pridgen, Rice University; Jedidiah R. Crandall, University of New Mexico; Dan S. Wallach, Rice University This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX Security Symposium. August 14–16, 2013 • Washington, D.C., USA ISBN 978-1-931971-03-4 Open access to the Proceedings of the 22nd USENIX Security Symposium is sponsored by USENIX The Velocity of Censorship: High-Fidelity Detection of Microblog Post Deletions Tao Zhu David Phipps Adam Pridgen [email protected] Computer Science Computer Science Independent Researcher Bowdoin College Rice University Jedidiah R. Crandall Dan S. Wallach Computer Science Computer Science University of New Mexico Rice University Abstract terconnected through their social graph and tend to post about sensitive topics. This biases us towards the content Weibo and other popular Chinese microblogging sites are posted by these particular users, but enables us to mea- well known for exercising internal censorship, to comply sure with high fidelity the speed of the censorship and with Chinese government requirements. This research discern interesting patterns in censor behaviors. seeks to quantify the mechanisms of this censorship: Sina Weibo (weibo.com, referred to in this paper sim- how fast and how comprehensively posts are deleted. ply as “Weibo”) has the most active user community of Our analysis considered 2.38 million posts gathered over any microblog site in China [39]. Weibo provides ser- roughly two months in 2012, with our attention focused vices which are similar to Twitter, with @usernames, on repeatedly visiting “sensitive” users. -
Internet Freedom in China: U.S. Government Activity, Private Sector Initiatives, and Issues of Congressional Interest
Internet Freedom in China: U.S. Government Activity, Private Sector Initiatives, and Issues of Congressional Interest Patricia Moloney Figliola Specialist in Internet and Telecommunications Policy May 18, 2018 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R45200 Internet Freedom in China: U.S. Government and Private Sector Activity Summary By the end of 2017, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had the world’s largest number of internet users, estimated at over 750 million people. At the same time, the country has one of the most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regimes in the world. PRC officials have argued that internet controls are necessary for social stability, and intended to protect and strengthen Chinese culture. However, in its 2017 Annual Report, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, RSF) called China the “world’s biggest prison for journalists” and warned that the country “continues to improve its arsenal of measures for persecuting journalists and bloggers.” China ranks 176th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index, surpassed only by Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North Korea in the lack of press freedom. At the end of 2017, RSF asserted that China was holding 52 journalists and bloggers in prison. The PRC government employs a variety of methods to control online content and expression, including website blocking and keyword filtering; regulating and monitoring internet service providers; censoring social media; and arresting “cyber dissidents” and bloggers who broach sensitive social or political issues. The government also monitors the popular mobile app WeChat. WeChat began as a secure messaging app, similar to WhatsApp, but it is now used for much more than just messaging and calling, such as mobile payments, and all the data shared through the app is also shared with the Chinese government. -
Title: the Emerge of Constitutional Government in Vietnam Author: Pham Duy Nghia
Title: The Emerge of Constitutional Government in Vietnam Author: Pham Duy Nghia This paper has been submitted to the conference ‘Vietnam: political and economic challenges and opportunities’ at the Australian National University on 3 October 2019 This is a preliminary version. It is not for quoting or citations. Do not remove this note. The Emerge of Constitutional Government in Vietnam Pham Duy Nghia* “In order to institutionalize the Party program to build Socialism, we the people of Vietnam, make this Constitution”. Preamble 2013 Constitution of Vietnam I. Introductory Overview Long synonymous as war, since 1986 transformed from one of the poorest countries into a low middle-income country, Vietnam is now one of the most dynamic emerging countries in the world1. With 95 million population, reaching the development level compatible to the Philippines or Egypt2, Vietnam is home for millions of private business and an attractive destination for foreign direct investment. The life of million Vietnamese was improved, poverty significantly reduced, by 2035 more than half of Vietnamese population are projected to join ranks of global middle class with consumption of $15 a day or more3. Aggressively integrated into the global economy, Vietnam is party of dozen free trade agreements, including Vietnam-EU, Vietnam-Japan, and CP- TPP4. In regard of trade openness, Vietnam ranks globally the fifth among the most open economies in the world, just following Luxembourg, Hongkong, Singapore, and Ireland5, with total trade more than double the size of its GDP. In contrast to rapid changes in dismantling the command economy and embracing market reforms, the political system undergone less visible evolution. -
Long Road to Democracy 29
INTRODUCTIONI VIETNAm’s iCE AGE In January 2011, the Arab Spring transformed Tunisia. Egypt followed suit. Then Burma had its own spring. But no spring ever came to Vietnam. On the contrary, the political chill deepened. When National Assembly speaker Nguyen Phu Trong took over as Vietnamese Communist Party general secretary, he was ready to do anything to maintain order and, above all, stay in power. He inaugurated a new era marked by a growing crackdown on journalists and bloggers. Since his promotion, those who refuse to submit to the single party’s censorship have been subjected to waves of arrests, trials, physical attacks and harassment. The Trong era’s statistics are impressive, if not glorious. In 2012 alone, the Vietnamese authorities prosecuted no fewer than 48 bloggers and human rights activists, imposing a 3 total of 166 years in jail sentences and 63 years of probation. Vietnam is now the world’s second biggest prison for blogger and netizens, after China. Relative to population size, the situation is much worse in Vietnam than China. A total of 35 bloggers and netizens are currently detained just for exercising their right to information and expression, of whom 26 were arrested since Trong took over. The new Vietnamese strongman’s achievements including reinforcing the human and technological resources assigned to Internet surveillance, and the constant adoption of new repressive laws and directives. The latest, called Decree 72, makes it illegal to use blogs and online social networks to share information about news developments. It marks a new low in the regime’s campaign against use of the modern Internet as a tool of independent information and troublesome counterweight to Vietnam’s traditional media, which are kept under tight party control. -
The Right to Development and Internet Shutdowns
D Mburu Nyokabi, N Diallo, NW Ntesang, TK White & T Ilori ‘The right to development and internet shutdowns: Assessing the role of information and communications technology in democratic development in Africa’ (2019) 3 Global Campus Human Rights Journal 147-172 https://doi.org/20.500.11825/1582 The right to development and internet shutdowns: Assessing the role of information and communications technology in democratic development in Africa Deborah Mburu Nyokabi,* Naa Diallo,* Nozizwe W Ntesang,*** Thomas Kagiso White**** and Tomiwa Ilori***** Abstract: The right to development is generally assessed as an all-inclusive right. It is regarded as a rallying right in which all other rights are mostly realised. The progressive nature of the right to development in realising other rights as a benchmark to a society’s development has become popular even beyond legal jurisprudence to include other qualitative fields of knowledge. The role played by information and communications technology in the realisation of this right has also been acknowledged, particularly in the digital age. However, this progress has not been even across regions in the world. While some regions have experienced a fast-paced development due to ICT, several countries in Africa have been held back due to unfavourable state and non-state policies that have had negative impacts on human rights and democratic development on the continent. This article assesses the impact of ICT on the right to development, particularly as a rallying right, and the way in which the internet, a major component of ICT, has affected the right. The article especially considers the effects of network disruptions on human rights and democratic development that have become rife in the region. -
The Impact of Disinformation on Democratic Processes and Human Rights in the World
STUDY Requested by the DROI subcommittee The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world @Adobe Stock Authors: Carme COLOMINA, Héctor SÁNCHEZ MARGALEF, Richard YOUNGS European Parliament coordinator: Policy Department for External Relations EN Directorate General for External Policies of the Union PE 653.635 - April 2021 DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES POLICY DEPARTMENT STUDY The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world ABSTRACT Around the world, disinformation is spreading and becoming a more complex phenomenon based on emerging techniques of deception. Disinformation undermines human rights and many elements of good quality democracy; but counter-disinformation measures can also have a prejudicial impact on human rights and democracy. COVID-19 compounds both these dynamics and has unleashed more intense waves of disinformation, allied to human rights and democracy setbacks. Effective responses to disinformation are needed at multiple levels, including formal laws and regulations, corporate measures and civil society action. While the EU has begun to tackle disinformation in its external actions, it has scope to place greater stress on the human rights dimension of this challenge. In doing so, the EU can draw upon best practice examples from around the world that tackle disinformation through a human rights lens. This study proposes steps the EU can take to build counter-disinformation more seamlessly into its global human rights and democracy policies. -
West Censoring East
West Censoring East The Use of Western Technologies by Middle East Censors 2010-2011 Executive Summary The OpenNet Initiative has documented network filtering of the Internet by national governments in over forty countries worldwide. Countries use this network filtering as one of many methods to control the flow of online content that is objectionable to the filtering governments for social, political, and security reasons. Filtering is particularly appealing to governments as it allows them to control content not published within their national borders. National governments use a variety of technical means to filter the Internet; in this paper, we analyze the use of American- and Canadian- made software for the purpose of government-level filtering in the Middle East and North Africa. In this report, the authors find that nine countries in the region utilize Western-made tools for the purpose of blocking social and political content, effectively blocking a total of over 20 million Internet users from accessing such websites. 1 The authors analyze as well the increasing opacity of the usage of Western-made tools for filtering at the national level. Helmi Noman and Jillian C. York authored this report. ONI principal investigators Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain authored the foreword. Noman is a Senior Research Fellow at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, and is a Berkman Center Research Affiliate. York is the coordinator for the OpenNet Initiative at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society. The authors would like to thank James Tay of Citizen Lab for technical support and test data analysis. -
Iclab: a Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement Platform
ICLab: A Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement Platform Arian Akhavan Niaki∗y Shinyoung Cho∗yz Zachary Weinberg∗x Nguyen Phong Hoangz Abbas Razaghpanahz Nicolas Christinx Phillipa Gilly yUniversity of Massachusetts, Amherst zStony Brook University xCarnegie Mellon University {arian, shicho, phillipa}@cs.umass.edu {shicho, nghoang, arazaghpanah}@cs.stonybrook.edu {zackw, nicolasc}@cmu.edu Abstract—Researchers have studied Internet censorship for remains elusive. We highlight three key challenges that must nearly as long as attempts to censor contents have taken place. be addressed to make progress in this space: Most studies have however been limited to a short period of time and/or a few countries; the few exceptions have traded off detail Challenge 1: Access to Vantage Points. With few ex- for breadth of coverage. Collecting enough data for a compre- ceptions,1 measuring Internet censorship requires access to hensive, global, longitudinal perspective remains challenging. “vantage point” hosts within the region of interest. In this work, we present ICLab, an Internet measurement The simplest way to obtain vantage points is to recruit platform specialized for censorship research. It achieves a new balance between breadth of coverage and detail of measurements, volunteers [37], [43], [73], [80]. Volunteers can run software by using commercial VPNs as vantage points distributed around that performs arbitrary network measurements from each the world. ICLab has been operated continuously since late vantage point, but recruiting more than a few volunteers per 2016. It can currently detect DNS manipulation and TCP packet country and retaining them for long periods is difficult. Further, injection, and overt “block pages” however they are delivered. -
State Censor
Mekong Review May 2018 State censor Peter Zinoman Censorship in Vietnam: Brave New World Thomas A. Bass University of Massachusetts Press: 2017 . In terms of protecting free expression and political speech, Vietnam remains something of a global basket case. In its World Press Freedom Index for 2017, Reporters Without Borders ranks Vietnam 175th out of 180 countries, ahead of only China, Syria, Turkmenistan, Eritrea and North Korea. According to Freedom House’s 2018 assessment of the quality of civil liberties and political rights in 210 countries, Vietnam ranks 177th, right between theocratic Iran and deeply authoritarian Belarus. Not exactly the finest of company. While human rights organisations have been grousing about the dismal state of freedom of expression in Vietnam for some time, two obstacles have partially obscured the country’s abysmal record in this area from the purview of outside observers. First is the persistence of a dated understanding of the Vietnamese Communist Party-state derived from its role in the country’s major twentieth-century wars. Owing to the superiority in wealth and firepower of its French, US and Chinese adversaries, the party-state has long been portrayed as a plucky, anti-imperialist “David” poised against a slew of lumbering, hegemonic “Goliaths”. This view has engendered an enduring reservoir of sympathy for the party-state (especially among older Vietnam-watchers who began their careers during the Vietnam War), which has discouraged investigations into its chronic human rights abuses, including its relentless persecution of domestic actors who dare to criticise it publicly. A second obstacle to grasping Vietnam’s poor record on freedom of expression today is the complex and elusive character of the infrastructure of state repression.