DOCSLIB.ORG

ILARIA POGGIOLINI Italian Revisionism: Status and Security Problems 1943-1956

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
ILARIA POGGIOLINI Italian Revisionism: Status and Security Problems 1943-1956 ILARIA POGGIOLINI Italian Revisionism: Status and Security Problems 1943-1956 in ROLF AHMANN, ADOLF M. BIRKE, AND MICHAEL HOWARD (eds.), The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security 1918-1957 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp. 327-359 ISBN: 978 0 19 920503 5 The following PDF is published under a Creative Commons CC BY-NC-ND licence. Anyone may freely read, download, distribute, and make the work available to the public in printed or electronic form provided that appropriate credit is given. However, no commercial use is allowed and the work may not be altered or transformed, or serve as the basis for a derivative work. The publication rights for this volume have formally reverted from Oxford University Press to the German Historical Institute London. All reasonable effort has been made to contact any further copyright holders in this volume. Any objections to this material being published online under open access should be addressed to the German Historical Institute London. DOI: Italian Revisionism: Status and Security Problems 1943-1956 ILARIA POGGIOLINI TWO DISILLUSIONMENTS: I 9 I 9 AND I 943 Italian expectations were fulfilled neither by the post-war settlement of 1919, nor by that of 1947. As a victorious power in 1919 and as a defeated nation in 1947, Italy experienced a strong feeling of resentment against the foremost actors of peace negotiations. This resentment was the result of frustrated expectations and twice gave rise to revisionist policies in the post-war years. Both in the inter-war period and after the Second World War, the first step towards revisionism was the disappoint- ment of peacetime expectations. In 1919 these expectations had been built on the promises of territorial aggrandizement laid down in the London Pact of 26 April 1915. 1 There was less reason for optimism after Italy's unconditional surrender in 1943. However, with the fall of the Fascist regime and 1 According to the London Pact, Italy was supposed to receive the South Tyrol and the country of Gorizia-Gradisca (already promised in part by the Central Powers), plus Trieste, Istria, and parts ofCarinthia, Carniola, and Dalmatia. Italy was also granted a free hand in Albania and equal participation in the partition of Turkish possessions and German colonies, if any. In return Italy pledged herself to enter the war on the side of the Entente powers in a month; see R. Albrecht-Carrie, Italy and the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1938). A NATO fellowship (1987-8) to pursue research on Italian revisionism and security problems after the Second World War enabled the basic work on this topic to be undertaken. I remain extremely grateful to this institution for the financial support provided. An article by E. T. Smith on a related topic ('From Disarmament to Rearmament: the United States and the Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947', Diplomatic History, 13 (1989), 359-82) appeared too late to be taken into consideration in this essay. I. POGGIOLINI Italy's 'cobelligerency' on the side of the Allied powers,2 Italian expectations were directly related to Allied promises of a 'just peace'. Yet the process of translation from disillusionment to the elaboration of a coherent revisionist policy was different after each world war. After the First World War, during the political agony of the liberal state, Italian leaders were constantly under internal political pressure. The Italians felt that their victory-as the poet d' Annunzio said-had been 'mutilated' both by Wilson's crusade against secret diplomacy and by the lack of support from the Entente powers.3 The general feeling of dissatisfaction with the peace settle- ment focused largely on the issue of the halo-Yugoslav border.4 At the peace negotiations, in fact, Italy had demanded the enforcement of the London Pact and had put forward an additional demand for Fiume (Rijeka). After a direct clash between delegates from Italy and from the other victorious powers, the Paris Conference ended with the question of the halo-Yugoslav border unresolved. It was only after Italy signed the Treaty of Rapallo with Yugoslavia on 12 November 1920 that she gained the entire Giulian Region, while Dalmatia went to Yugoslavia. According to the peace settlement the city of Fiume, although under d' Annunzio's control, was to become an independent state. Under Mussolini-after the Treaty of Rome with Yugoslavia of 27 January 1924-Fiume came under Italian sovereignty. But there was good reason for internal disappointment concerning Italian interests in Africa and Asia Minor after the peace negotiations. Italy 2 E. Aga Rossi, L'ltalia nella sconfitta: politica interna e situazione interna;:ionale durante la seconda guma mondiale (Naples, 1985); B. Arcidiacono, 'Le Precedent italien' et Les origines de la guerrefroide: Les Allies et ['occupation de l'ltalie 1943-1944 (Brussels, 1984); E. Di Nolfo, 'L'armistizio dell'8 settembre come problema internazionale', Otto Settembre 1943: l'armistizio italiano 40 anni dopo (Rome, 1985), 65-82. 3 F. D'Amoja, 'La politica estera italiana da Caporetto alla Conferenza della Pace', Archivio Storico Messinese (1969-71), 55-130; B. Cialdea, 'La sicurezza europea e la pace del 1919-1921, Storia e Politica, 13 (1974), 546-81; G. Rumi, Alie origini delta politica estera fascista (1918-1923) (Bari, 1968); G. Rochat, L'ltalia nella prima guerra mondiale: problemi di interpreta;:ione e prospettive di ricerca (Milan, 1966). 4 D. I. Rusinow, Italy's Austrian Heritage 1919-1946 (Oxford, 1969); L. Valiani, La dissolu;:ione dell'Austria-Ungheria (Milan, 1966). Italian Revisionism neither gained more power, nor obtained control of the new Albanian state. Despite the many issues unsatisfactorily resolved for the Italians, Fiume was the major 'emotional factor'. 5 Between d'Annunzio's occupation of the city and the final settle- ment under Mussolini, de facto and de jure policies were not reconciled. However, the Fiume affair and Mussolini's subsequent policy of aggression and conciliation did not aim to attain a wide range of revisionist goals. It was only between 1925 and 1933 that Mussolini took a stand on the controversy over the peace treaties of 1919-20, with the result that revisionism become an issue.6 But Fascist revisionism did not establish itself as a means of non-fulfilment of treaty obligations. Nor did it go further than supporting the minor revisionist powers against the French security system.7 Mussolini argued that Italian revisionism would pursue international stability by means of peaceful change. Indeed, Italy was not in a position to gain from the actual revision of the peace treaties. As soon as Hitler seized power in Germany, in fact, Fascist revisionism clearly revealed its political inconsistency.8 It lost its autonomous anti-French character and its aim of controlling Balkan revisionism, and became instrumental to the re- emergence of Germany. The Second World War and the fall of Fascism put a dramatic end both to Italy's inter-war revisionism and to her expansionist goals. With the dissolution not only of the regime but also of the state and the army, and the monarchy itself compromised, Italy was the first enemy country which was forced to surrender 'unconditionally', in 1943. Although this surrender left no shadow of doubt about the condition of the country, Italy's declaration of war on Germany, her 5 See Albrecht-Carrie, ltal, and the Paris Peace Conference, w3, also quoted in B. C. Novak, Trieste r941-i954 (Chicago, 1970), 30. See also Novak's interesting comparative remarks on Italy's policy towards Fiume and Trieste after the Second World War, ibid. 6 L. H. Burgwyn, II revisionismo fascista: la sfida di Mussolini alle grandi potenze nei Balcani e sul Danubio 1925-1933 (Milan, 1979). 7 E. Di Nolfo, 'II revisionismo nella politica estera di Mussolini', ll politico, 1 (1i54), 18. R. De Felice, Mussolini e Hitler: i rapporti segreti 1922-1933 (Florence, 1983). I. PoaGIOLINI 'cobelligerency', and the ambivalent attitude of the United States produced an ambiguous situation, which was only to become more so in the course of the following year. The Italian government, subjected to rigid limitations under the armistice, succeeded in gaining diplomatic recognition, with the support of the Soviet Union, which had been excluded from the occupation of Italy. The British preliminary peace plan faded because of opposition to Bonomi (Badoglio's successor), while the Americans, although not against the new government, kept postponing decisions concerning Italy's future status. The 'New Deal for Italy' elaborated by Churchill and Roosevelt at the end of the year officially brought Allied policy into line, promising support to the Italian government but also excluding any substantial change in the armistice regime.9 By the end of January 1945, Italy was again experiencing feelings of resentment against the victorious powers. The protagonists of the occupation policy were aware of the profound differences in the way they perceived Italy's role and needs. This divergence of views and the mutual lack of understanding between Washington and London would have escalated endlessly if the British economic situation and the problem of relations with the Soviet Union had not persuaded both parties to avoid a direct clash of opinion. 10 Between Potsdam and Moscow, inter-Allied peace diplo- macy addressed the question of whether the Italian settlement was to take priority over those of Germany's ex-satellites. Italy expected that if the Italian case was given priority, the country's future would soon be clarified. But the untimely breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) set up by the Conference of Potsdam left Italy with no indications of what her position in international relations was supposed to be. Furthermore, the following sessions of the CFM in the spring and summer of 1946 witnessed-against the 9 E.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Bank of the European Union (Sabine Tissot) the Authors Do Not Accept Responsibility for the 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 Translations
    The book is published and printed in Luxembourg by 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 15, rue du Commerce – L-1351 Luxembourg 3 (+352) 48 00 22 -1 5 (+352) 49 59 63 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 U [email protected] – www.ic.lu The history of the European Investment Bank cannot would thus mobilise capital to promote the cohesion be dissociated from that of the European project of the European area and modernise the economy. 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 The EIB yesterday and today itself or from the stages in its implementation. First These initial objectives have not been abandoned. (cover photographs) broached during the inter-war period, the idea of an 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 The Bank’s history symbolised by its institution for the financing of major infrastructure in However, today’s EIB is very different from that which 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 successive headquarters’ buildings: Europe resurfaced in 1949 at the time of reconstruction started operating in 1958. The Europe of Six has Mont des Arts in Brussels, and the Marshall Plan, when Maurice Petsche proposed become that of Twenty-Seven; the individual national 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 Place de Metz and Boulevard Konrad Adenauer the creation of a European investment bank to the economies have given way to the ‘single market’; there (West and East Buildings) in Luxembourg. Organisation for European Economic Cooperation. has been continuous technological progress, whether 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 • 1958-2008 in industry or financial services; and the concerns of The creation of the Bank was finalised during the European citizens have changed.
    [Show full text]
  • Future of Europe
    FUTURE OF EUROPE The White Paper process: from Rome to the European Parliament elections in 2019 The White Paper on the Future of Europe was presented by President Juncker on 1 March. It marks the beginning of a process for the EU27 to decide on the future of their Union. A series of ‘Future of Europe Dialogues’ will be held across Europe’s cities and regions. As part of the White Paper process, the Commission will also present a series of five Reflection Papers on key themes for Europe’s future. President Juncker’s State of the Union Speech in September 2017 will take these ideas forward before first conclusions could be drawn at the December 2017 European Council. This will help to decide on a course of action to be rolled out in time for the European Parliament elections in June 2019. 01/03 March 2017 Commission White Paper on the Future of Europe 09/03 - 10/03 European Council / Meeting of EU27 25/03 Rome Summit at the event of the 60th anniversary of the Treaties of Rome 26/04 April European Pillar of Social Rights, accompanied by initiatives on access to social protection, the revision of the Written Statement Directive, the implementation of the Working Time Directive and the challenges of work-life balance faced by working families April Commission reflection paper on the social dimension of Europe 29/04 Extraordinary European Council May May Commission reflection paper on harnessing globalisation May Commission reflection paper on the deepening of the Economic and Monetary Union 26/05 - 27/05 G7 Summit, Taormina, Italy June June
    [Show full text]
  • Marica Karakaš Obradov Croatian Institute of History Zagreb, Croatia
    STUDIA HUMANISTYCZNO-SPOŁECZNE (HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL STUDIES) 13 Edited by Radosław Kubicki and Wojciech Saletra 2016 Marica Karakaš Obradov Croatian Institute of History Zagreb, Croatia MIGRATIONS OF THE CROATS DURING AND IMMEDIATELY AFTER WORLD WAR II Introduction In the “dark decade” between 1939 to 1949, which was marked by the World War II, an exceptionally large number of people in Europe was ,,on the move“. Around 60 million pople were migrating in different directions, most of them within Central and Eastern Europe. Immediately after the war, 20 million people were displaced.1 During that period, all national/ethnic groups in Croatia were affected by different kinds of migration. As regards minorities, German and Italian populations were especially affected by migrations, Hungarian to a lesser extent. These minorities had a signifi- cant share in the overall population. Smaller national/ethnic groups, such as Czechs2, Poles and Jews3 were also moving after the war.4 Serb population was the target of the NDH revenge, as a reaction to the oppression against the Croats in the Yugoslav 1 D. Stola, Forced Migrations in Central European History, “International Migration Re- view”, no. 2, 1992, p. 330; M. Mesić, Izbjeglice i izbjegličke studije (Uvod u problematiku), “Revija za socijalnu poltiku”, no. 2, 1994, pp. 113-123. 2 S. Selinić, Jugoslovensko-čehoslovački odnosi 1945–1955, Beograd 2010, pp. 333-351. 3 During the war, some Jews from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina saved themselves by fleeing to safer areas, and some were spared, because they were in the so-called mixed mar- riages. Some individuals were awarded the status of the so-called „Honorary Aryan“ for „hav- ing obliged the Croatian people“, in the opinion of represetatives of the Ustasha authorities.
    [Show full text]
  • The Buildup of the German War Economy: the Importance of the Nazi-Soviet Economic Agreements of 1939 and 1940 by Samantha Carl I
    The Buildup of the German War Economy: The Importance of the Nazi-Soviet Economic Agreements of 1939 and 1940 By Samantha Carl INTRODUCTION German-Soviet relations in the early half of the twentieth century have been marked by periods of rapprochement followed by increasing tensions. After World War I, where the nations fought on opposite sides, Germany and the Soviet Union focused on their respective domestic problems and tensions began to ease. During the 1920s, Germany and the Soviet Union moved toward normal relations with the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922.(1) Tensions were once again apparent after 1933, when Adolf Hitler gained power in Germany. Using propaganda and anti-Bolshevik rhetoric, Hitler depicted the Soviet Union as Germany's true enemy.(2) Despite the animosity between the two nations, the benefits of trade enabled them to maintain economic relations throughout the inter-war period. It was this very relationship that paved the way for the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 and the subsequent outbreak of World War II. Nazi-Soviet relations on the eve of the war were vital to the war movement of each respective nation. In essence, the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on August 23, 1939 allowed Germany to augment its war effort while diminishing the Soviet fear of a German invasion.(3) The betterment of relations was a carefully planned program in which Hitler sought to achieve two important goals. First, he sought to prevent a two-front war from developing upon the invasion of Poland. Second, he sought to gain valuable raw materials that were necessary for the war movement.(4) The only way to meet these goals was to pursue the completion of two pacts with the Soviet Union: an economic agreement as well as a political one.
    [Show full text]
  • A Statistical Portrait of Croatia in the European Union
    A statistical portrait ofCroatia in the European Union 1 July 2013 28 A statistical portrait of Croatia in the European Union 1 July 2013 A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the National and University Library in Zagreb under 847054 ISBN 978-953-273-051-7 © Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2013 Reproduction of content other than photos is authorised, provided that the source is acknowledged. Those using data from this publication are requested to state the source: ‘A statistical portrait of Croatia in the European Union, 1 July 2013’ Cover illustration: © Croatian Bureau of Statistics Photos: chapters 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 © Andrew Redpath; Cover, key data and chapters 2, 5, 9, 10, 11 and 13 © Simon Allen; chapter 4 © Vlado Bartolić; chapter 12 and annex © Marianne Iđaković Reproduction of photos is allowed for non-commercial purposes and within the sole context of this publication. Typeset in Calibri. Foreword Zagreb 1 July 2013 This publication —A statistical portrait of Croatia in the European Union — provides a wide range of statistical analysis showing the place of Croatia within the European Union (EU) on the day of its accession. The data presented include economic, social and environmental statistics providing an overview of the position of Croatia with respect to the 27 other members of the European Union and the EU candidate countries. As well as becoming the 28th member of the European Union, Croatia has applied to become a member of the European economic area (EEA); beyond the 28 EU Member States the EEA includes three of the four countries of the European free trade area (EFTA) and so this publication also includes data for the EFTA countries.
    [Show full text]
  • CROATIAN ACCESSION to the EUROPEAN UNION Economic and Legal Challenges CROATIAN ACCESSION to the EUROPEAN UNION Economic and Legal Challenges
    CROATIAN ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION Economic and legal challenges CROATIAN ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION Economic and legal challenges Editor Katarina Ott Institute of Public Finance Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Zagreb Publishers Institute of Public Finance, Zagreb, Katanèiæeva 5 http://www.ijf.hr Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Zagreb, Medvešèak 10 http://www.fes.hr For publishers Katarina Ott Rüdiger Pintar Editor Katarina Ott English translation Graham McMaster Cover design Vesna Ibrišimoviæ Copies 1000 Design and Print Gipa Zagreb d.o.o., Zagreb, Magazinska 11 CIP - Katalogizacija u publikaciji Nacionalna i sveuèilišna knjinica - Zagreb UDK 339.923(497.5:4-67 EU)(082) 061.1(497.5:4-67 EU)(082) CROATIAN accession to the European Union : economic and legal challenges /editor Katarina Ott ; <English translation Graham McMaster>. - Zagreb : Institute of Public Finance : Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003. Izv. stv. nasl.: Pridruivanje Hrvatske Europskoj uniji. ISBN 953-6047-30-6 (Institut). - ISBN 953-7043-05-3 (Zaklada) 1. Ott, Katarina I. Europska unija — Hrvatska — Gospodarska prilagodba 430314079 CONTENTS Authors vii Foreword xii Acknowledgements xiv Abbreviations xv 1. Croatian accession to the European Union: economic and legal challenges 1 Katarina Ott 2. Macroeconomic aspects of Croatia’s accession to the European Union 25 Dubravko Mihaljek 3. Banking and financial matters on Croatia’s road to the European Union 67 Velimir Šonje 4. Comparison and harmonisation of the Croatian tax system with the tax systems in the European Union 89 Hrvoje Arbutina, Danijela Kuliš, Mihaela Pitareviæ 5. State aid in the European Union and Croatia 113 Marina Kesner-Škreb, Mia Mikiæ 6. The European Union as determinant of Croatian trade policy 139 Ana-Maria Boromisa, Mia Mikiæ 7.
    [Show full text]
  • MEMORIAL MEDAL of the RIJEKA EXPEDITION (Medaglia
    Prister: Spomen-medalja ekspedicije u Rijeku Num. vijesti, broj 72., Zagreb, 2019. SUMMARY MEMORIAL MEDAL OF THE RIJEKA EXPEDITION (Medaglia commemorativa della spedizione di Fiume) The Croatian Sabor (parliament) broke off state links with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on 29 October 1918. On that day the Croatian National Council in Rijeka received the order from Zagreb to take over rule in the city. Dr Rikard Lenac (1869- 1943) was appointed Governor of Rijeka, but this did not resolve the situation. The newly-created State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, founded on 29 October 1918, could not defend Croatia’s rule in Rijeka. Conflict broke out between Croatia and Italy, and to prevent it the Joint Allied Command was established on 3 November 1918. The regular Italian army was also part of the international forces, and this showed itself decisive for the further fate of the city. On 16 November 1918, units of the Italian army broke into the Governor’s Palace, evicted Dr Rikard Lenac from it, took over Rijeka and occupied Sušak. A serious dispute broke out among the Allies because of Rijeka, and the situation in the city was at boiling point because in the spring of 1919 almost twenty thousand armed Italians were stationed there, and also several battalions of British, French and American soldiers. Under international pressure, the Italian National Council was disbanded and the members of the Rijeka Legion were banished from the city. On 27 August 1919, the First Regiment of Sardinian Grenadiers also had to leave Rijeka. This military unit was transferred to Ronchi near Trieste.
    [Show full text]
  • Steps to European Unity Community Progress to Date: a Chronology This Publication Also Appears in the Following Languages
    Steps to European unity Community progress to date: a chronology This publication also appears in the following languages: ES ISBN 92-825-7342-7 Etapas de Europa DA ISBN 92-825-7343-5 Europa undervejs DE ISBN 92-825-7344-3 Etappen nach Europa GR ISBN 92-825-7345-1 . '1;1 :rtOQEta P'J~ EiiQW:rtTJ~ FR ISBN 92-825-7347-8 Etapes europeennes IT ISBN 92-825-7348-6 Destinazione Europa NL ISBN 92-825-7349-4 Europa stap voor stap PT ISBN 92-825-7350-8 A Europa passo a passo Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1987 ISBN 92-825-7346-X Catalogue number: CB-48-87-606-EN-C Reproduction authorized in whole or in pan, provided the source is acknowledged Printed in the FR of Germany Contents 7 Introduction 9 First hopes, first failures (1950-1954) 15 Birth of the Common Market (1955-1962) 25 Two steps forward, one step back (1963-1965) 31 A compromise settlement and new beginnings (1966-1968) 35 Consolidation (1968-1970) 41 Enlargement and monetary problems (1970-1973) 47 The energy crisis and the beginning of the economic crisis (1973-1974) 53 Further enlargement and direct elections (1975-1979) 67 A Community of Ten (1981) 83 A Community of Twelve (1986) Annexes 87 Main agreements between the European Community and the rest of the world 90 Index of main developments 92 Key dates 93 Further reading Introduction Every day the European Community organizes meetings of parliamentar­ ians, ambassadors, industrialists, workers, managers, ministers, consumers, people from all walks of life, working for a common response to problems that for a long time now have transcended national frontiers.
    [Show full text]
  • Downloaded from Brill.Com09/29/2021 06:03:36AM Via Free Access
    International international criminal law review Criminal Law 20 (2020) 405-491 Review brill.com/icla The Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj: A Symptom of the Fragmented International Criminalisation of Hate and Fear Propaganda Mohamed Elewa Badar1 Professor of Comparative and International Criminal Law, Northumbria Law School, Northumbria University, Newcastle, UK [email protected] Polona Florijančič Legal Researcher and Consultant, Slovenia [email protected] Abstract In 2016, the icty Trial Chamber found one of the greatest hate and fear propagandists of the Yugoslav wars, Dr Vojislav Šešelj, not guilty on all counts of the indictment. A full comprehension of the role the propaganda played was lost and the partial reversal of the judgment at the Appeals Chamber provided little improvement in this regard. Yet the blame does not solely rest with the Chambers but also with the Prosecution and an utterly fragmented law applicable to hate and fear propaganda. This article looks in depth at the Šešelj case in order to highlight the many hurdles to effective prosecution, some specific to the case and others symptomatic generally of propaganda trials. It then takes a multi-disciplinary approach in presenting the nature of hate and fear propaganda to suggest a broader way of looking at causality as well as to argue for re- form of the current applicable law. 1 The authors are very grateful to Professor Predrag Dojčinović, Dr. Wibke K. Timmerman, Pro- fessor Gregory S. Gordon, Professor Richard Ashby Wilson and Ms Clare Lawson for their me- ticulous reading of the paper and their most valuable comments and inputs.
    [Show full text]
  • Miklós Mitrovits Background to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact Legends
    Miklós Mitrovits Background to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact Legends and Facts The old debate about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which was signed in Moscow on 23 August 1939, has resurfaced. The alliance between Nazi Germany and Communist Soviet Union has been a matter for controversy since the time of signing. Even contemporaries had difficulties comprehending how two countries with such diametrically opposing ideologies could come to an agreement. Surely, these contemporaries did not know about the secret clause attached to the pact of non-aggression, which divided Central Europe between the two powers. It was in the context of this agreement that the Wehrmacht attacked Poland on 1 September 1939, and the World War II began. Then, on 17 September, the Red Army attacked Poland, too. On 28 September the two totalitarian dictatorships negotiated and fixed the exact boundaries of occupied territories. The world was already aware of Hitler’s ambitions. The Anschluss had taken place by then and Czechoslovakia was no more. Therefore, it was not the interest driven attitude that surprised European public opinion but Stalin’s response and approval. The anti-Fascist Left and supporters of the Soviet Union were and are still unwilling to face Stalin’s real nature and his readiness to make a pact with Hitler and eradicate independent states. Hence their repeated efforts to blame powers of Western Europe or even, lately, Poland. This takes place on each anniversary. For example, on 23 August 2009 the Russian state television screened a “documentary” that made an effort to convince spectators that Western Europe and Poland were responsible for the pact.
    [Show full text]
  • Yugoslavia ANO Italy
    c (19 l- ) YUGOSlAVIA ANO ITAlY BY J. B. TITO Marshal of Yugoslavia DR. JOSIP SMODLAKA Commissioner of Foreign Affairs In the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia FRAN BARBALICH Expert on ltalo-Yugoslav Problem Edited, with a Foreword by LOUIS ADAMIC THE UNITED COMMITTEE OF SOUTH-SLAVIC AMERICANS NEW YORK, N. Y. Foreword HIS material deals with one of the most challenging .. boundary T questions in contemporary Europe. On its solution depend not only the fate of a vast number of people, Yugoslavs and Italians, living in the disputed regions, but the future relations between Yugoslavia and Italy, both vitally important countries, and the peace in Europe and the world. It is very likely that in the next several months the Italo-Yugoslav border problem will become a matter of frequent front-page headlines. This material is offered as an invitation to understanding on the part of Americans and others-as a glimpse into the principles and con­ siderations involved in Europe's politico-territorial problems. By now nearly everyone in the United States knows who Tito is. Dr. Smodlaka's official position in the present Yugoslav political picture is given in the by-line over his piece. In his mid-seventies, a Additional copies of this pamphlet are deeply cultured, widely-traveled European, a scholar and humanist, available at 5¢ each. one-time Yugoslav minister to the Vatican, he is the grand old man of the Yugoslav Peoples' Liberation Movement. Thf problem of Italo­ Yugoslav relations has long been his special field. His article, trans­ lated by the staff of the United Committee of South-Slavic Americans, is taken from the June-July, 1944, issue of Nova f ugoslavija (New Yugoslavia), "a journal of political and social questions," published in Liberated Yugoslavia.
    [Show full text]
  • Media and Propaganda in the Independent State of Croatia] (Zagreb: Hrvatski Institut Za Povijest, 2016)
    Review of Croatian History 13/2017, no. 1, 229 - 275 Mario Jareb, Mediji i promidžba u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj [Media and Propaganda in the Independent State of Croatia] (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2016) Summary The Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska – NDH) belonged to the Axis “New Europe”, and on its soil various German and Italian institutions, as well as military forces, were strongly present. It is, therefore, not unusual that its internal structure rested on similar settings. Ruling Usta- sha Movement led by Ante Pavelić sought to transform Croatia into a totalitarian state by implementing solutions that had been previously developed by National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy. To- talitarian movements and regimes in general treated media and propa- ganda as a powerful weapon to pro- mote their ideological and political goals and to win supporters and faithful followers. So most of them invested a lot of energy and substan- tial funds in the building and opera- tion of powerful media and propaganda systems. The NDH authorities looked similar- ly on media and propaganda, and it is precisely the NDH to be considered as the first state formation on Croatian soil which devoted considerable attention to them. That state attempted to build a special system under state control and supervision of the ruling Ustasha Movement. The key element of the policy within that system was the strengthening and building of media to turn them into a powerful and effective media and propaganda machine. Its task was the promotion of ideas and goals of the govern- ment and ruling Ustasha Movement, as well as the suppression of any hostile action.
    [Show full text]