The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007
Does the Price of Watermelons Matter? Economic Performance and Political Legitimacy in the Islamic Republic of Iran A. Nicholas Gossen
Despite Ayatollah Khomeini’s famous to which that gap has affected the political comment that the Iranian revolution was “not legitimacy of the Iranian regime. about the price of watermelons,” the Islamic Republic of Iran was in part founded on economic PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY promises of redistribution, equality, and justice. The strength of this rhetoric has formed a core The Economic Performance/Public Support basis of political support for the regime, but it has Dynamic also established public expectations that the The relationship between economic Islamic Republic has been chronically unable to performance and public meet. Many analysts have cited Iran’s poor support for a political Despite Ayatollah economic performance since the revolution and regime or incumbent Khomeini’s famous resulting public dissatisfaction as a key weakness administration is a of the clerical regime and a potential source of its subject that has received comment that the downfall. Indeed, this is a crucial element of the substantial attention in Iranian revolution was argument advanced by advocates of stronger developed countries, “not about the price of multilateral economic sanctions against Iran in particularly Britain and the dispute over its nuclear program. However, the United States. Due to watermelons,” the underlying this logic is an implicit assumption the paucity of high- Islamic Republic of Iran that regime legitimacy is tied to economic quality survey data was in part founded on performance. While intuitively appealing, this collected in developing assumption bears further scrutiny, particularly if countries, relatively little economic promises of it forms a basis for American policy decisions corresponding research redistribution, equality, towards Iran. The primary goal of this paper is to on these political systems and justice. exists. The research that does exist focuses
Nicholas Gossen, Fletcher MALD 2007, is a primarily on support for newly democratic second-year student concentrating in International regimes. One of the more well-documented
Business Relations and Southwest Asia and Islamic studies of this subject was conducted by Steven
Civilizations. He spent the summer of 2007 working Finkel, Edward Muller, and Mitchell Seligson, for Fletcher's SWAIC program in Baku with who use longitudinal surveys conducted in Costa
Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rica and West Germany in the midst of economic crises to assess the extent to which economic examine the political and economic factors that performance affected incumbent popularity and have caused the gap between economic rhetoric 1 regime support. They find that overall support and performance in Iran, and to assess the extent for the democratic political regime remained very
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 al Nakhlah high throughout the crisis, while opinions of effect of economic performance on political incumbent performance declined substantially. legitimacy in Iran, the conclusions developed They conclude that democracies that enter from research on emerging democracies serve as economic crises with high levels of legitimacy are a working hypothesis, which is then tested capable of maintaining regime support even in against available data from Iran to judge whether the face of dissatisfaction with particular leaders. or not the same results can be observed there. Shifting focus to Africa, Michael Bratton and The Islamic Republic of Iran is not a Robert Mattes use survey data from Ghana, democracy. Political authority lies ultimately with Zambia, and South Africa to examine whether the Qur’an and proximately with the Rahbar (the support for these democratic regimes is ‘intrinsic’ Supreme Leader), rather than with its citizens. (an end in itself) or ‘instrumental’ (a means to an However, the Islamic Republic does contain 2 end). They conclude that “approval of strong representative elements. The Majles (the democracy remains performance-driven; but Iranian parliament) and the president are elected approval hinges less on the government's directly by the citizens, though the list of eligible capacity at delivering economic candidates is carefully screened by clerical goods than its ability to authorities to ensure proper guarantee basic political [D]emocratic regimes “Islamic” credentials and political 3 rights.” Indeed, they find that do not rely primarily on viewpoints that are acceptable to “when other relevant factors are economic performance the regime. In using the findings from emerging democracies as a controlled for, citizen for legitimacy. Instead, perceptions of economic falsifiable hypothesis for Iran, I delivery have no discernible it is their ability to meet assume that it is the not the effects on the endorsement of the political needs of democratic elements of the regimes democracy in either Zambia or cited above that give them their 4 their citizens that forms South Africa.” In other words, core political characteristics, but for most citizens the political the core of their public rather their republican elements. In benefits of the democratic support. other words, I hypothesize that it is regime outweigh its economic not democracy per se that affects benefits – or lack thereof. A public opinion in the democratic similar study of post-communist democratic states regimes studied above, but rather what is often in Eastern Europe, conducted by Geoffrey Evans called the “democratic process”—voting, and Stephen Whitefield, comes to largely the representation, competing political parties, etc. A same conclusion, finding that “when support for finding that economic performance affects marketization is controlled for, there is very little political legitimacy in Iran would reject this link from economic experience to support for hypothesis. On the other hand, a conclusion that 5 economic performance does not influence political democracy.” legitimacy in Iran would argue in favor of this The consistency of these conclusions across hypothesis that Iran’s republican government divergent social and political settings leads to a produces a similar phenomenon to that which is fairly robust conclusion that democratic regimes observed in democracies. do not rely primarily on economic performance Accurately gauging public opinion in Iran is for legitimacy. Instead, it is their ability to meet a challenge. The government keeps tight control the political needs of their citizens that forms the of public polling activities to prevent the core of their public support. While poor economic collection and dissemination of information that performance can, and often does, decrease public might undermine regime policies. For example, support for an incumbent administration, it does the head of Iran’s National Institute of Public not undermine the democratic regime itself. Opinion, Behrouz Geranpayeh, was imprisoned Methodology in 2002 after publishing a poll showing that 75 percent of Iranians favored a resumption of These findings are robust in the context of 6 democracies, but do they apply to Iran given its diplomatic relations with the United States. In an unique mixture of representative and theocratic environment where the government actively elements? Due to the scarcity of reliable survey hinders the ability of researchers to measure data, this is a challenging question to answer. In public opinion, it is difficult to devise a the absence of such data, this paper must employ methodology that can cleanly and definitely a more circuitous approach. In order to assess the answer the present research question.
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 3 To address this concern, I have cast my net religious foundations (bonyads) to provide for the broadly, relying on a variety of information needs of the poor, and developed a massive sources. In addition to economic and historical system of subsidies (both directly and indirectly analysis of Iran’s political economy, this paper through preferential exchange rates). Taken as a makes use of three primary data sources: survey whole, these policies have been consistently 7 data from the 2000 World Values Survey (WVS), a inefficient and counterproductive, measured poll conducted in 2006 by the Program on either by the standard of pure economic growth 8 International Policy Attitudes, and Iranian print or by the conception of economic justice that media coverage. Each data source has its formed the core of revolutionary rhetoric. Since limitations (see endnotes for a more detailed the Islamic Republic’s creation, inflation has 11 discussion). Taken together, however, they averaged 21 percent per year. The constitute the most direct and contemporary unemployment rate is currently estimated to be sources available about political and economic around 20 percent, a figure that rises to nearly 50 issues in Iran. percent among Iranians between the ages of 25 12 Using Iranian print media to analyze and 29. Foreign direct investment remains all Iranian public opinion as a whole presents a but non-existent in Iran, and subsidies currently 13 particular challenge due to the fact that Iranian consume nearly 25 percent of Iran’s GDP. newspapers are subjected to intense government scrutiny and censorship. In the 2006 “Press The Revolution’s Economic Legacy Freedom Index” compiled by Reporters Without Despite these desultory results, a number of nd Borders, Iran was placed 162 out of 168 countries political factors have foiled the few serious ranked, reflecting the severe limitations placed attempts at reform that have taken place. First, 9 on reporters and editorialists. However, Iranian the small cadre of political insiders and bonyad newspapers express a surprisingly wide range of chiefs – both well positioned to benefit from opinion regarding many of the economic issues distortions in the Iranian economy – have grown examined in this paper. Thus, while Iranian print staggeringly wealthy media should not be taken to represent the full under the Islamic Khomeini’s death in spectrum of opinion within Iran, it can be Republic. The Bonyad-e 1989 deprived the analyzed within the framework of the discourse Mostazafan for example, Islamic Republic of the that the clerical regime deems to be acceptable. the largest of the revolutionary single leader whose Economic Policies and Political Consequences foundations, had by unquestioned religious the mid-1990s become and political authority Impact of a Fragmented Revolutionary Alliance the largest economic entity in the Middle could decisively break The Iranian Revolution was the product of 14 many different groups bound together by their East. One analyst political deadlocks. shared dislike of the Shah’s regime. While estimates that the religious conservatives, Marxists, nationalists, foundation currently produces about 11 percent of 15 and merchants each protested the Shah’s Iranian GDP. These organizations have not 10 economic management of Iran, their specific hesitated to use their money and influence to critiques of his performance were widely fight any challenges to the economic status quo divergent. In the revolution’s aftermath, these that has benefited them so greatly. disparate parties formed a fractured foundation The second impediment to reform is the fact upon which the new regime’s economic policies that Khomeini’s death in 1989 deprived the would be built. Proposals ranged from the total Islamic Republic of the single leader whose collectivization of the economy to preserving the unquestioned religious and political authority existing free-market system, with only marginal could decisively break political deadlocks. The changes designed to make it more just and effect has been a diffusion of political power and ‘Islamic.’ the creation of a tremendous amount of The end result of this political debate was a institutional and political inertia. While political syncretic compromise that appropriated elements leaders can – and have – pushed economic policy of the Marxist agenda and presented them in in one direction or another, other political players religious terms. The government nationalized almost always retain enough clout to push back thousands of firms, created a system of large and effectively preserve the status quo. With the
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
4 al Nakhlah notable exception of exchange rate unification support. When asked to rate their views of (eliminating tiered, fixed exchange rates and private vs. state ownership of business on a scale letting the currency float) in 2003, most attempts of one to 10 (with one representing “private at economic reform in Iran have been short-lived ownership of business should be increased” and and unsuccessful. 10 representing “government ownership of Third, this tendency toward political inertia business should be increased”), the mean has been exacerbated by the enduring power of response from Iranians surveyed in 2000 was the revolution’s emotional and rhetorical legacy. 5.67—almost perfectly 16 Khomeini’s singular popularity and his political in the middle. [E]conomic issues are apotheosis in the iconography and rhetoric of the Likewise, when asked by far the most Islamic Republic have made it extremely difficult to rate their opinions to break with his legacy, however imperative on income inequality important concern of doing so might be from a policy perspective. The on a scale of one to 10 the Iranian public . . . . political costs associated with a public repudiation (with one representing In 2007, the frequency of any aspect of Khomeini’s thought would be “incomes should be unbearably high for all but the most popular made more equal” and and vitriol with which politician. 10 representing “we Iranian newspapers need larger income have criticized the CONTEMPORARY PERCEPTIONS OF differences as ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE incentives”), the mean Ahmadinejad These factors have led to an obvious gap response was 5.66 – administration about again, almost perfectly between the Islamic Republic’s economic rhetoric 17 inflation far exceeds in the middle. While and its performance. But how is this gap viewed any other single issue. in the context of Iran today? By examining data a wide range of from the 2000 WVS and Iranian print media opinion is expressed on coverage of several central economic issues we these questions, the Iranian population as a can develop tentative answers to this question. whole is surprisingly moderate about these issues Based on a review of these data sources, it is that once formed core, popular demands of the clear that economic issues are by far the most revolution. important concern of the Iranian public. In the WVS, 51 percent of respondents said that “a high Inflation and Fiscal Policy level of economic growth” should be the top Examining Iranian press coverage of priority for the country in the next 10 years, with economic issues provides a more nuanced look at another 23 percent saying it should be the second the views expressed on these issues. In 2007, the highest priority. By way of comparison, the frequency and vitriol with which Iranian second highest priority was that “people have newspapers have criticized the Ahmadinejad more say about how things are done,” which was administration about inflation far exceeds any identified by only 18 percent of respondents as other single issue. The criticism is direct and the top priority. The large number of newspaper unsparing, specifically pinning the blame on the stories and editorials that focus on economic expansionary fiscal and monetary policy of the matters further reflects the political importance of Ahmadinejad administration. The price of this issue. tomatoes, for example, has become a synecdoche Today, as during the revolution, discontent for the problem of inflation in general, with with the economic status quo is a driving political newspapers tracking their price in various force. But while economic issues remain at the top regions and government officials frequently of the agenda, public opinion about the direction being asked about their price. At a speech that should be taken on those issues has changed presenting his annual budget to the Majles in substantially. Evidence from the 2000 WVS January, Ahmadinejad was heckled by members suggests that widespread public enthusiasm for for underestimating the current price of tomatoes the redistributionist and statist economic goals of by nearly 50 percent. In response, he suggested 18 the revolution has waned. Many of the economic that they shop someplace less expensive. issues that formed the core of the revolution’s economic agenda now fail to capture majority
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 5 Faced with the political costs of inflation, the seems that they have accepted their 23 Ahmadinejad administration has adopted various defeat in this challenge. techniques to deflect or diffuse the issue. For many months, government officials and their By focusing on the plight of the poor, rather than sponsored media outlets simply denied that the economy in general, critics achieve two goals. inflation was any higher than it had been in First, they protect themselves from political recent years. More recently, as the effects have retribution by situating their complaints within become increasingly obvious, officials have dealt the acceptable discourse of the Islamic Republic. with the issue by blaming merchants for Second, they implicitly undermine the legitimacy ‘profiteering’ -- raising prices to line their own of the administration by pointing out its failure to 19 pockets at the expense of the poor. accomplish one of the fundamental tasks that Ahmadinejad himself has been on the Khomeini set out for the regime. Despite being defensive over the issue, deeply critical of the Ahmadinejad arguing at a January 23, 2007 By focusing on the administration, such critiques press conference that the implicitly buttress the legitimacy of government has been trying to plight of the poor . . . the Islamic Republic by measuring protect Iranian farmers: “We critics . . . protect the administration against the could have imported tomatoes themselves from rhetoric of the revolution. Criticizing from abroad in order to bring the administration is not the same as the price down, but we did not political retribution . . . criticizing the regime, and the do so in order to protect [and] . . . implicitly Islamic Republic is careful to allow domestic producers.” In undermine the the former in order to avoid the response, one paper reminded latter. its readers that Ahmadinejad legitimacy of the had not shown such concern administration by Subsidies about Iranian farmers the year pointing out its failure Subsidies have been an issue of before, when he had allocated intense political debate in recent millions of rials for the import to accomplish one of months, particularly regarding of fruits to keep prices low the fundamental tasks gasoline subsidies. High subsidies 20 around the Persian New Year. that Khomeini set out keep the domestic price of gasoline The effect of inflation on at around 30 cents per gallon, the poor has been one of the for the regime. costing the Iranian government 24 rhetorical tropes that nearly $6 billion in 2006. Domestic newspapers and parliamentarians from across the energy consumption has increased dramatically ideological spectrum have repeatedly employed over the lifetime of the Islamic Republic, rising to 21 25 to criticize administration policies. For example, 40 percent of domestic production in 2006. This, the Iranian Labor News Agency quotes a labor in turn, has led to substantial environmental leader in the province of Gilan as saying “The problems such as air pollution, which according ninth government made many promises to World Bank estimates annually costs Iran the 26 concerning economic issues and ways to resolve equivalent of 1.6 percent of its GDP. the plight of the workers. Unfortunately, In response to these budgetary and however, not only none of these promises have environmental costs, gasoline rationing was so far been fulfilled, the plight of the workers is imposed in Iran in late June 2007, leading to a 22 worsening day by day.” Another paper writes: brief wave of protests and rioting across the country. The political damage to the What has made the price increase Ahmadinejad administration from this decision intolerable for people during the last was considerable--at least partially in response to couple of years was not the sole the public outcry about rationing he dismissed 27 problem of the increasing prices but the his Minister of Petroleum in August. While denial of the statesmen. Iranian officials public ire has focused on the president, the need did promise the nation that they would for rationing was widely acknowledged across do all they could to provide the lower the political spectrum among parliamentary class of the society a better life but have leaders. As one conservative editorialist wrote failed to achieve this goal. In fact, it before the rationing decision had been made,
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
6 al Nakhlah “the fuel subsidy, especially the gasoline public. Pity (for the poor) should not be allowed subsidy, in Iran has grown to an intolerable to harm the economy, destroy the environment point, such that the current situation can not and waste time and energy, and ultimately put 28 31 persist any longer.” pressure on the weak.” Another representative Despite this agreement across ideological responded to the proposal with an answer that lines, various factions of the Majles and the could have come straight from a Western Ahmadinejad administration have been locked in economics textbook: an intense political battle over the appropriate level and time frame for rationing and subsidy We are opposed to having quotas and 29 cuts. Members of the Majles, concerned with the coupons, and the main reason for this effect of gasoline opposition is the harm this will do to The choice between rationing on tourism the people. One of the great economic populism and revenues in regions consequences of two-rate petrol with outside of Tehran, quotas is inflation. The most correct way technocratic detachment successfully lobbied of providing petrol given Iran's 32 from public opinion is a the Ahmadinejad conditions is to have it at one rate. particularly challenging administration for a one-time allowance of Clearly the current debate is a far cry from the one in a political setting an extra 100 liters per pseudo-Marxist rhetoric of the revolution. with little tradition of car in order to allow The enormous and potentially ruinous costs deferring to positive families to take their of gasoline subsidies have forced the Majles, and traditional summer to a certain extent even the Ahmadinejad economic expertise at the holidays in August administration, to face the limits of ideologically- 30 expense of normative and September. The driven policymaking. However, in doing so, exhortations to support administration, they have incurred the wrath of a public raised however, has rejected on the economic promises of the revolution. The the needs of the poor. parliamentary political turmoil that has ensued demonstrates the proposals to allow corner that Iran’s leaders have backed motorists to buy market-price gasoline above themselves into: fundamental economics their fixed-price ration limit-–fearing that such a demands that they change course, but policy would increase inflation and cause further fundamental politics will not allow them to do so. political damage. In some ways, this policy debate is EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ON unremarkable. After all, the reduction of REGIME LEGITIMACY subsidies has been a source of political contention This brief review of Iranian print media in developing countries throughout the Middle demonstrates that the country’s poor economic East and the world. However, in Iran the performance has clearly left many Iranians ideological and rhetorical legacy of the revolution unhappy. The larger question, however, looms large in the debate, creating a difficult remains: has poor economic performance made hurdle for reformers to overcome. The choice them unhappy with the Islamic Republic? In between economic populism and technocratic other words, has the regime’s failure to meet its detachment from public opinion is a particularly economic promises undermined its legitimacy? challenging one in a political setting with little This paper’s review of literature on the tradition of deferring to positive economic relationship between regime support and expertise at the expense of normative economic performance indicated that, at least for exhortations to support the needs of the poor. democracies, regime support can weather long But the sheer scope of the problems created periods of poor performance. However, applying by gasoline subsidies appears to have shifted the these observations to the case of Iran is debate in the direction of fiscal restraint and the complicated by two factors: 1) despite importance of economic expertise. One representative elements, it is not a full parliamentarian, after the Ahmadinejad democracy, and 2) the poor economic administration publicly discussed vetoing the performance of Iran does not represent a Majles’ attempts to increase the price of gasoline temporary aberration but rather a consistent in April, responded: “Doing this will undermine government and parliament's standing with the
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 7 trend of the past 28 years, with little hope for by far the most trusted institution across this and structural reform in sight. other demographic categories. Even among The editorials and opinion articles presented respondents who say they “never” or “practically in the preceding section provide useful insight never” attend religious services, 52 percent into various points of view about the Iranian report having confidence in religious institutions. economy and its management by the current Parliament and the government generally enjoy administration. Newspapers, however, cannot the confidence of a substantial majority of the directly criticize the current regime without population (71 percent and 69 percent, suffering severe legal and professional respectively), albeit at lower levels than those consequences. It is therefore necessary to turn to enjoyed by “churches.” In addition to strong the WVS polling data to get a sense of how long- support for the institutions themselves, a majority term discontent with the economy may have of Iranians also expressed general satisfaction affected general Iranian perceptions of the clerical with public office-holders – 64 percent reported regime. Since the WVS data was collected in themselves to be “very satisfied” or “fairly 34 2000, it is obviously impossible to draw any satisfied” with “the people in national office.” direct conclusions about what has happened Conversely, only a minority of the population under the Ahmadinejad administration, which expresses confidence in the press, major began in 2005. However, the 2006 PIPA polling companies, and civil services. allows for some general conclusions to be drawn Whatever disappointments Iranian citizens about where public opinion stands today. may have in the economic performance of the A basic level of support for the clerical Islamic Republic, the regime’s core institutions – regime can be seen in the fact that in 2000 the church, government, and parliament – have Iranians still said that they have confidence in the retained significant depth and breadth of support institutions that form the basis of the regime. The in Iranian society. Furthermore, the WVS data chart below, based on the WVS survey, presents shows that many of the anti-Western complaints a vivid picture of Iranian perceptions of major of the revolution still retained their political social institutions: salience in 2000. An overwhelming 85 percent of What degree of confidence to you have in…? (Percent Iranians say that they consider “exploitation, by responding “a great deal” or “quite a lot”) force, of [Iran’s] natural resources by a powerful Education Level country” to be a “serious” or “very serious” problem. “Western cultural imperialism” is Overall Low Medium High deemed to be a “serious” or “very serious” problem by 71 percent of Iranians. The continued Churches 86 92 87 80 resonance of these issues nearly three decades after the revolution suggests that they play an Parliament 71 75 68 67 important role in Iranian politics. These figures provide a numerical illustration of how Iranian Government 69 73 68 65 leaders have been able to submerge internal political dissent by focusing public attention on Civil Western interference in the region. Whether or 45 49 45 40 Services not such rhetorical decisions are made based on genuine belief or crass political calculation is largely irrelevant. Either way, the fact remains The Press 36 40 37 32 that distrust of the economic, political, and cultural influence of the West is widespread Major 30 30 30 28 throughout Iranian society. Politicians who speak Companies about and act upon those sentiments are rewarded with political support.
33 Another somewhat surprising result from “Churches” are by far the most trusted the WVS is that Iranian citizens tend to rate their institution in Iran, with 86 percent of the political system relatively highly when compared respondents reporting “a great deal” or “quite a to other countries; of the 51 countries included in lot” of confidence in the institution. While the the 1999-2004 wave of WVS polling, Iran’s mean level of confidence decreases somewhat among score was the 11th highest. There are many people with higher levels of education, it remains cultural and methodological factors that might
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
8 al Nakhlah influence these ratings, but unless one responding to the question “how much respect is completely discounts the objectivity of the there for individual human rights nowadays in survey, Iran does not appear to be a country on our country?” A further 49 percent said “some,” the brink of a fundamental crisis of legitimacy. It 27 percent said “not much,” and 7 percent said is particularly interesting to note how much these was “no” higher Iran scores (5.84 on a scale of 1 to 10, with respect for [D]espite widespread 10 being “very good”) than its neighbors, individual Pakistan (3.80) and Turkey (2.94). human rights. dissatisfaction with the Without longitudinal survey data it is This data country’s economic impossible to assess with any certainty how does not allow for performance and the current views on these specific issues may have changed a definitive since 2000. As described above, economic rejection of the administration’s economic dissatisfaction is high. There have been hypothesis that mismanagement, the two corruption scandals, political battles, and a economic public opinion surveys number of other factors that might have performance has diminished the legitimacy of the regime in the eroded regime examined in this paper show past seven years. On the other hand, oil legitimacy in no evidence of a widespread revenues are up, enabling the government to Iran – that would crisis of legitimacy. spend lavishly on social programs and only be possible infrastructure development. Additionally, with more specific questions and consistent time- increased diplomatic and military pressure from series data. However, if such an effect exists, it is the United States may have generated a rally- not pronounced enough to significantly impact round-the-flag effect, boosting the legitimacy of the stability and legitimacy of the regime. The the regime. Islamic Republic has been in economic crisis to Despite these uncertainties, there is little one degree or another for the duration of its indication that a precipitous collapse of public existence, as evidenced by the fact that GDP per support has occurred in recent years. The 2006 capita has not yet returned to pre-revolutionary PIPA poll shows that Iranians still consider levels. If a strong relationship existed between political representation to be a core value. When economic performance and regime legitimacy, asked “how important is it for you to live in a surely it would be visible by now. But despite country that is governed by representatives widespread dissatisfaction with the country’s elected by the people?” the mean response was economic performance and the current 9.1 (on a scale where 1 represents “not at all administration’s economic mismanagement, the important” and 10 represents “absolutely two public opinion surveys examined in this important”). Given the theocratic elements of paper show no evidence of a widespread crisis of Iran’s governmental structure, Iranians also gave legitimacy. Iranians rate their government more a fairly high assessment of the republican nature highly than the citizens of many other countries of the regime. When asked “how much do you in the world with far superior economic records think Iran is governed by representatives elected in recent decades. by the people?” the mean response was 6.9 (on a scale where 1 represents “not at all” and 10 CONCLUSION represents “completely”). While these questions This analysis of press coverage of economic are not directly comparable to any of the question affairs and public opinion data shows that – on the 2000 WVS, they buttress the observation despite widespread and vocal discontent with the that fundamental components of political economic performance of the country – there is legitimacy remain strongly in place: a majority of little evidence to indicate that such discontent has Iranians value political representation and undermined the legitimacy of the regime. This consider their government to be fairly finding is consistent with quantitative research on representative. Public opinion about the democracies, which shows that poor economic government is by no means positive on all performance is insufficient to undermine the issues, however; many Iranians appear legitimacy of an otherwise popular regime. The unimpressed by the extent to which their Islamic Republic appears to be sufficiently government respects individual rights. Only 21 representative in its governmental structure that percent of Iranians responded that there was “a its political dynamics behave in a similar fashion: lot” of respect for individual human rights when popular dissatisfaction with economic
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 9 performance gets pinned on the administration, elections and suppressing political dissent is a not the regime. Furthermore, much of the media dangerous business. As long as elections are criticism directed at the current administration is widely perceived as being basically free and fair couched in terms that affirm the underlying (within the highly restrictive limits set by the legitimacy of the regime as a whole. By Iranian Constitution), much of public pressure for criticizing the administration for failing to live up increased performance will fall on the elected to the ideals of the revolution, opponents may administration, not the clerical regime. It is damage the reputation of the administration, but telling that Iran’s closest brush with regime they cement the normative and political change since the revolution was not the result of centrality of the Islamic Republic. Indeed, the economic turmoil but of the decision by hard line very fact that the regime allows such open elements to use force to suppress peaceful student criticism of economic policy in the press suggests demonstrations in July 1999. that they find political value in it. Third, these findings imply that American None of this is meant to imply that the and European sanctions directed at the Iranian Iranian population is monolithic in its support for civilian economy as a whole may be somewhat the Islamic Republic. Polls show that Iranians are limited – or even negative – in their effect. If unhappy with the regime’s lack of commitment economic performance is not a key legitimizing to individual human rights, and that public factor for the Iranian regime, then it is unlikely support for the radical religious, economic, and that sanctions alone will precipitate a change in social goals of the revolution has Iranian nuclear policy or other waned. Iranian support for the Any Iranian president, contentious issues. Economic government is neither uncritical hardship caused by Western nor unambiguous, but this paper regardless of his sanctions might harm the finds no evidence to suggest that political orientation, popularity of President the regime is widely viewed as will find it far easier to Ahmadinejad but it would be illegitimate. Indeed, the WVS unlikely to undermine support polling indicates that, at least in adopt a confrontational for the clerical regime. On the 2000, Iranian citizens viewed stance towards the contrary, it would be more likely their political system more West rather than a to rekindle the nationalist, anti- favorably than those of many Western spirit of the revolution. other countries throughout the conciliatory one, a Fourth, the survey data region and the world. situation that will tend presented here suggests that This conclusion has broad to increase as confrontational foreign policy implications for the future of Iran, towards America and the West as well as for American foreign economic performance will likely remain an important policy towards Iran. First, it worsens. component of Iranian domestic suggests that domestic regime politics. Until substantial change is highly unlikely in the near or economic reforms are possible, future Iranian medium-term future. The dismal state of the presidents will face the unenviable prospect of Iranian economy is the single most important being held responsible for the performance of an issue in Iranian politics today, yet this discontent economy over which they have little control and does not translate into a desire for regime which is riddled with structural deficiencies. This change. A more likely course of events is that will always negatively impact their popularity worsening economic conditions will eventually and political power, creating an incentive to turn build sufficient support for reform to overcome to popular issues that will rally public opinion. the political barriers inherited from the Anti-Western sentiment remains strong among a revolution and move the Iranian economy in a majority of Iranians and particularly among more market-oriented direction. various elements of the government’s power Second, the findings of this paper suggest structure. Any Iranian president, regardless of that regime change – if and when it occurs -- will his political orientation, will find it far easier to not be because of poor economic performance. adopt a confrontational stance towards the West Rather, the catalyst will likely be the failure of rather than a conciliatory one, a situation that will the Islamic Republic to deliver on the political tend to increase as economic performance promises of the revolution. From the perspective worsens. of the clerical regime, therefore, meddling in
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
10 al Nakhlah Finally, these findings point to a surprising a fundamental level, the Islamic Republic flexibility and durability in the Islamic Republic. appears to remain a legitimate form of Paradoxically, the dismal economic performance government in the eyes of most Iranians. In the of Iran under this regime reveals an underlying final analysis, Ayatollah Khomeini may have strength rather than a weakness. If the Islamic been right – the Iranian revolution was not about Republic can withstand a quarter-century of very the price of watermelons and neither was the lean years, the longest conventional war of the Islamic Republic that it founded. Twentieth Century, and continual pressure from a hostile superpower, it is unlikely to crack any The views and opinions expressed in articles are time soon. Economic reform will be one of the strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily central issues in Iranian politics for years to come. represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and It seems unlikely, though, that a failure to reform Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia will lead to another revolution. To be sure, there and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher are large pockets of profound political discontent School. within Iran and among Iranian expatriates. But at
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 11
Works Cited
1 Steven E. Finkel, Edward N. Muller, and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Economic Crisis, Incumbent Performance and Regime Support: A Comparison of Longitudinal Data from West Germany and Costa Rica,” British Journal of Political Science 19 (3) (July 1989): 329-351. 2 Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental?” British Journal of Political Science31(3) (July, 2001): 447-474. 3 Ibid., 447. 4 Ibid., 471. 5 Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, “The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies,” British Journal of Political Science 25 (4) (October 1995): 485-514. 6 Reporters Without Borders, “Polling institute chief jailed,” October 4, 2002.
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
12 al Nakhlah
10 Ibid., 15-19. 11 International Monetary Fund data. 12 Peter David. “The Revolution Strikes Back: A special report on Iran.” The Economist, July 21, 2007, 9. 13 Ibid. 14 Sohrab Behdad. “From Populism to Liberalism: The Iranian Predicament,” in Parvin Alizadeh, ed. The Economy of Iran: Dilemmas of an Islamic State. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 112. 15 A. Karbasian, Bodje v bodje rizi-ye dolati dar Iran [Budget and Budget Planning in Iran] (Tehran: Banking Institute of Tehran, 1999). Quoted in Javad Amid and Amjad Khadjikhan, Trade, Industrialization and the Firm in Iran: The impact of government policy on business (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 72. 16 By way of comparison, Egypt (1999) and Iraq (2004) are substantially more supportive of government ownership, with a mean response of 6.68 and 6.93, respectively. Turkey (2001), on the other hand, is somewhat more supportive of private ownership, with a mean of 5.17. 17 On this issue, Iranian public opinion is barely distinguishable from American public opinion (1999), which has a mean response of 5.72. 18 Budget speech to Majles by Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad, Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television, January 27, 2007. Available from World News Connection. 19 “'Lack of Supervision' Blamed for High Food Prices,” Iran Daily, February 7, 2007. Available from World News Connection. 20 Hamid Reza Shokuhi, "Analysis of the president's interview broadcast by TV Channel Two. Twenty other questions for the president," Mardom Salari. January 26, 2007. Available from World News Connection. 21 See, for example: “Stubbornness with whom, and why!?” Aftab-e Yazd. August 23, 2007. Available from World News Connection. 22 “Official Says Government Promises Failed Workers, Situation Worsening Daily,” Iranian Labor News Agency, January 31, 2007. Available from World News Connection. 23 “Prices are Skyrocketing,” Gilan-e Emruz. February 10, 2007. Available from World News Connection. 24 United States Department of Energy. Iran Country Analysis Brief, August 2006,
© The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University
The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization F all 2007
The Rise of Islamic Banking and Finance in Central Asia Geoffrey F. Gresh
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and and finance has grown in the last decade to rise of new nation-states in 1991, the Muslim become a significant force for positive change. republics of Central Asia and the southern Caucasus have witnessed the arrival of Islamic Lastly, the IDB acts as an important instrument of banking and finance to the region. The Islamic legitimacy for the ruling elite and neo- Development Bank (IDB) has been a catalyst for nomenklatura of the region who continue to the increased spread of finance projects in the experience a rise in opposition from radical region that are compliant with Islamic principles Islamic forces. like no usury or riba. This paper examines the important role of the IDB and other Islamic Background banking and financial institutions in promoting Islamic banking and finance is on the rise socio-economic development across the region. and taking root in Central Asia. Since the collapse Moreover, a majority of the Central Asian and of the Soviet Union and formation of new nation- southern Caucasian republics view Islamic states in 1991, Muslim republics in the region banking and finance as important tools with have witnessed a significant increase in Islamic which to channel the energies of radical Islamic financial institutions. Moreover, Islamic banking opposition groups. Despite moderate success in and finance has been viewed by Islamic scholars the region, the IDB has confronted significant as an innovative way for the former Soviet obstacles in trying to propose Islamic finance to republics of this region these governments because of a strong Soviet to form an economic In the last decade, legacy and volatile politics. Although the Muslim bloc with other Islamic Islamic banking and countries outside of republics remain influenced by elements from finance have become their Soviet past, including a command economy Central Asia, ultimately and one-party political system, Islamic banking leading to a greater significant forces for market advantage in a positive change in the Geoffrey F. Gresh , MALD 2007, is former editor-in- competitive global region. chief of al-Nakhlah. He is also a former Rotary economy. One of the Ambassadorial Scholar to Turkey and Presidential keys to accessing global markets is by sponsoring Fellow at the American University in Cairo. national and regional socio-economic Currently, he is a doctoral student in international development, and liberal economic reform. The relations at the Fletcher School with concentrations in prevailing Soviet legacy in these Muslim Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization, republics, especially the notion of a centrally- International Security Studies, and Maritime Studie.s planned economy, has greatly hindered such
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah
development. However, with the advent of finance have become significant forces for positive Islamic banking and finance, the Muslim change in the region. The IDB acts as an important republics of Central Asia and the southern instrument of legitimacy for the ruling elite and Caucasus have already experienced a significant neo-nomenklatura of the region who continue to boost in socio-economic development that will experience a rise in opposition from radical hopefully continue long into the future. Islamic forces. Throughout the twentieth century, Islam was For the purposes of this article, the rise of an important cultural and religious outlet for the Islamic banking and finance will be compared people of Central Asia despite its repression among the six Muslim republics of the former under Communist rule. As the Muslim republics Soviet Union: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, of this region grow more exposed to new forces of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and global change, including market forces, a Kyrgyzstan. Each has incorporated Islamic communications and information revolution, as banking and finance to varying degrees well as radical Islam, their governments are depending on the nature of its political system struggling to adapt and create new political and and economy in the post-Soviet era. The IDB has economic structures to survive in an increasingly acted as the primary catalyst in this process of interconnected world. Under these new pressures incorporation. It has most successfully entered of global change, many regional rulers have clung the financial services sector of the economy in even stronger to their previous modes and countries that have adopted more liberal methods of governing under a command economic reforms, most importantly Azerbaijan economy and one-party political system, while and Kazakhstan. In any case, for both of these other leaders have attempted to liberalize national countries it will be shown that the IDB has had to markets in a global economy. deal with the complex politics of a rentier state The Soviet legacy continues to plague the that have developed over the past decade due to modern development of most former Soviet the rise of oil and gas revenues. States are republics in Central Asia, making it more classified as rentier states when a substantial complicated for the penetration of Islamic portion of the national revenue is generated from banking and finance to the region. Nevertheless, a local natural resource like oil or natural gas. In with the assistance of the Islamic Development order for Islamic banking and finance to take a Bank (IDB) based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia there stronger hold in these countries, as well as in has been a noteworthy increase of Islamic banking other regional rentier states like Turkmenistan and finance in the region. This article examines and Uzbekistan, it is believed that the political the important role of the IDB in promoting socio- ruling elite must be involved in the formation and economic development across the region. subsequent financial benefits of Islamic banking Moreover, a majority of the Central Asian and and finance. southern Caucasian republics view Islamic banking and financial institutions as important Islam in Central Asia outlets through which to channel the energies of Despite Soviet suppression of public radical Islamic opposition groups. Despite religious expression, Islam, and in particular witnessing moderate success in the region, the Sufism or Islamic mysticism, has played an IDB has confronted significant obstacles in its important role in the history and culture of each promotion and development of Islamic financial of the six republics examined in this study. Since institutions for regional governments because of the fall of the Soviet Union, political Islam has the strong Soviet legacy and precarious political moved to the forefront of the political arena across situations that prevail. Even with the persistence the region. Islamic groups, exemplified by the of their Soviet past, Muslim states in the region rise of Hizb ut Tahrir—a global Islamic party that are experiencing a growth in Islamic banking and seeks to unify Muslims under an Islamic state or finance. In the last decade, Islamic banking and Caliphate—have grown more interconnected,
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 3 organized, and violent in an age of modern Islamic financial institution like the IDB positively communications, leaving many leaders of the because of its ability to help respective region troubled by the situation. In most cases, governments promote both Islam and socio- the government’s initial reaction is to repress any economic development. Islamic banking and alleged terrorist or opposition group. In a country finance, where no usury or riba is permitted, has like Uzbekistan, for example, President Karimov only just begun to take root across the region and has repeatedly thwarted any semblance of an could be used as an instrument to channel the Islamic movement through violent action, energy of Muslims who desire greater inclusion of whether justified or not. Such violent action has Islam in government. only turned many people against the Uzbek Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, each government. Moreover, President Karimov faces of the Central Asian Republics has joined the IDB: the dilemma of having to deal with neighbors like Azerbaijan (1992); Kyrgyzstan (1993); Tajikistan and Afghanistan that—due to Turkmenistan (1994); Kazakhstan (1995); inadequate rule of law systems—can provide safe Tajikistan (1996); and Uzbekistan (2003). By 1997, havens to groups such as the IMU and Hizb ut- the IDB established a regional office in Almaty, Tahrir. Kazakhstan to foster the Bank’s efforts in social Despite the rise of violent Islamic forces, and economic development of the countries in the Islam remains a relatively stable force in the region. The regional office in Almaty (ROA) has Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, effectively become the hub for IDB group Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan. As for operations in the area. 3 Turkmenistan, conventional Islam has been On a wider scale, the IDB seeks to establish a greatly transformed by President Niyazov, greater communications and trade link among placing it in a special category of its own. Islamic countries around the globe. In this In general, Islam remains an omnipresent capacity, the IDB explicitly endeavors to link force across the region and leaders of the former Soviet republics of this region with individual republics have worked since the 1990s countries from the Organization of the Islamic to incorporate greater elements of Islam into inner Conference (OIC): “The IDB is committed to structures of government. Increased piety among bringing the transition economies of the CIS Muslims across the region in the last decade has [Commonwealth of Independent States] countries led to more vocal protest against the secular (all land-locked) closer to the OIC member governments of the region. 1 Since most of the countries by fostering trade and investments and current governments have maintained many of disseminating the best practices through the old Soviet structures, they are now institutional and capacity building assistance.” 4 increasingly pushed by their respective Specifically, many of the IDB’s projects are related populations to incorporate more aspects of Islam. to building infrastructure (i.e. roads, Most government leaders have sough to resist telecommunications, airports, and canals) and such change because it represents a shift in the social development (construction and equipping power structure of the ruling elite. A balanced of school and hospitals). The IDB has also been fusion of Soviet structures and Islam will remain a active in financing the construction of Islamic major hurdle for governments to overcome in the schools and vocational centers across the region. 5 future. 2 Table 1.1 lists a breakdown of the how much each country received cumulatively from the IDB IDB and the Arrival of Islamic Banking and up to March 2003, as well as the amount of Finance in Central Asia projects currently sponsored by the IDB. Table 1.2 With Islam’s growing importance across cites the amount of financing received by sector. Central Asia, a majority of the countries in the In line with the IDB’s core mission statement of region view the presence of an international linking up OIC countries with the CIS countries, the transportation sector was the most heavily
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
4 Al Nakhlah
financed in the region. Lastly, it should be noted and economic environments in which to establish that the tables include Albania, which remains Islamic banking and finance. outside the scope of this paper because of its location, and exclude Uzbekistan since it only Kazakhstan joined the IDB in 2003. In addition to the establishment of private Islamic banks, the IDB and Kazakhstan have US Dollars Current developed a strong partnership in supporting Country (millions) Projects social and economic development. Good relations Albania US$ 59.844 17 between the two, a thriving Kazakh economy, and Azerbaijan US$ 81.660 19 a relatively strong banking sector have led to the Kazakhstan US$ 76.275 20 opening of a regional office of the IDB in Kyrgyz Kazakhstan. For the IDB, Kazakhstan is also a US$ 64.839 16 Republic model for Islamic banking and finance in the Tajikistan US$ 63.141 18 region because of the government’s success in Turkmenistan US$ 74.345 11 incorporating both the IDB and other private Islamic banks into its banking system. Moreover, TOTAL US$ 420.104 101 Kazakhstan has continued to permit liberal Table 1.1: Distribution of IDB Financing by Country reforms in the banking sector that allow more up to 2003 (cumulative) Source: Islamic Islamic banking. These reforms stand in contrast Development Bank 6 to President Nazarbayev’s political actions aimed at consolidating his political power and economic Sector US Dollars (millions) % wealth through oil revenues. Nonetheless, in the Transport US$137.398 34.5 past decade the IDB has sponsored some of the following important projects: Utilities US$100.047 25.2 • US$9.57 million as a loan for the Almaty- Agriculture US$75.893 19.1 Gulshad road project. The project, traversing through industrial and Social US$56.480 14.2 agricultural areas, is expected to assist the Others US$19.700 5.0 people in the project area to improve their Technical US$8.149 2.0 economic situation through greater assistance accessibility to new markets and trade 9 TOTAL US$397.667 100.0 routes. Table 1.2: Distribution of IDB Financing by Sector up • At the initiative of the IDB, fifty Saudi to 2003 (cumulative) Source: Islamic Development businessmen set up the Central Asian Bank 7 Investment Company in Kazakhstan for 10 accomplishing development projects. Currently, IDB Group operations across • US$20 million loan for financing the Central Asia exceed US$650 million. 8 It is reconstruction of the Astana-Vishnevka believed that the IDB’s development of these stretch of the Astana-Karaganda highway in 11 different sectors will stimulate economic growth central Kazakhstan. and expose these countries to greater trade • US$13.6 million was allotted for financing opportunities in the global market. for the construction of an academy at the Having looked at the broader regional role of Kazakhstan University of Law and the IDB in Central Asia, the individual country 12 Humanities. assessments provided below allow for a more • US$14.7 million was issued as a credit line targeted examination of how both the IDB and to finance leasing for three major Kazakh Islamic banking have faired across the region. commercial banks—Kazakh People’s Bank Each country possesses very different political
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 5
(an open-type joint-stock company), Kazakh as an important Islamic banking hub that has Commerce Bank (an open-type joint-stock promoted innovative Islamic products for use in company), and the Bank TuranAlem (an Islamic banking and finance around the world. 13 open-type joint-stock company). Specifically, the IDB regional director has worked • US$30 million allocated to finance a project to promote a relationship between the National upgrading two sections of the Astana- Bank of Kazakhstan and Malaysian banks to 14 Almaty highway. facilitate the introduction of new banking programs to Kazakhstan such as lending facilities Kazakhstan has invested greatly in its IDB to assist its yet-to-be developed financial system.16 membership. It was recently rewarded for its involvement in 2003 when Kazakhstan’s former Azerbaijan head of the Presidential Administration and Due to its Islamic practices and commitment current Industry and Trade Minister, Adilbek to socio-economic development, Azerbaijan has Dzaksybekov, was elected chairman of the IDB sought, in recent years, to strengthen its 17 Board of Governors. Although not explicitly relationship with the IDB. In fact, the IDB is set stated, naming this Kazakh official who is part of to open a local branch in Baku next year, further Nazarbayev’s ruling elite and clan structure contributing to a successful partnership with demonstrates that the IDB understands the way Azerbaijan. In the past decade some of the IDB 18 politics and business works in a rentier state like projects have included: Kazakhstan. In other words, for any international • US$10 million in assistance for refugees, financial institution to succeed in a country including the construction of schools, controlled in large measure by a small clan-based businesses, and roads, after the signing of a ruling elite, it must work to establish good ceasefire with Armenia in 1994 over the 19 relations with the rulers of the leading clan while Nagorno-Karabakh. at the same time ensuring that their members • US$9.8 million for a finance loan to reclaim receive a cut in any financial transaction. and cultivate 300,000 hectares of saline 20 Nevertheless, this election is a significant soil. accomplishment for Kazakhstan—demonstrating • US$9 million interest free loan to help the extent to which relations with the IDB have restore schools, apartment buildings, and increased in recent years. Islamic banking and other government installations after the 21 finance through the IDB will no doubt continue to 2000 earthquake. thrive in the future because of Kazakhstan’s • US$58 million in advantageous loans for the relatively stable political situation and flourishing financing of an electrical energy project, the economy. Islamic banking and construction of the Khachmaz substation, In addition to and the laying of an electricity transmission finance through the Kazakhstan’s successful 22 line in 2004. involvement with the IDB will no doubt • US$22 million in assistance for IDB, it is important to 23 continue to thrive in implementing a road project. note that the director of the future because of • US$13.5 million credit to construct a the Central Asia substation in Xacmaz (northeastern Kazakhstan’s relatively regional IDB office, Nik Azerbaijan) to connect it to the Yasma- stable political Zainal Abidin Nik Derbent high voltage power line which situation and Yusuf,15 has also connects the energy system of Azerbaijan sought to establish 24 flourishing economy . with Russia. In recent years, Azerbaijan better relations has looked to the IDB for assistance in between Kazakhstan and Malaysia. This 25 relationship is significant because Malaysia serves developing its non-oil energy sector.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
6 Al Nakhlah
• US$10.4 million project financing loan for instability, including violent attacks carried out by 26 the construction of the Valvalacay bridge. the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in 28 recent years. As a Muslim country, Azerbaijan can use the Since becoming a member of the IDB, IDB as a positive force in helping calm Islamic Kyrgyzstan has greatly benefited from IDB opposition groups within Azerbaijan. Although projects because of the importance of socio- there are no major radical and violent Islamic economic development for the country. It is also groups that critically threaten President Aliyev’s believed that the government has benefited from administration, the Azeri government is being able to tout its involvement with an nevertheless aware of the regional trend towards Islamically-compliant financial institution to increasing religiosity and a subsequent rise in opposition groups who want Islam to play a violent Islamic groups. Moreover, with Chechnya greater role in government. According to Akayev, to the north, Iran to the South, Iraq to the Islam has always played an important role in his southwest, and Afghanistan to the east, government as a legitimizing and unifying 29 Azerbaijan must remain attentive to its instrument. Akayev’s demonstrated belief in population to ensure that radical Islamic forces do Islam explains Kyrgyzstan’s significant relations not undermine the Aliyev regime. Therefore, it is with the IDB. In the past decade, for example, the alleged that in the past decade the Aliyev family IDB has sponsored some of the following has used its membership with the IDB to programs: demonstrate to Islamic leaders its compliance • In 1997, a US$10 million loan for with Islamic practices in such areas as socio- establishing power transmission lines, a 27 economic development. However, due to the US$3 million loan for the supply of medical fact that Azerbaijan has developed into a rentier equipment and a US$280,000 grant for state under the Aliyev family, where more than 60 conducting a feasibility study on a 222-km 30 percent of the GDP comes from oil and gas sales, road. national socio-economic development has proven • In 2001, US$9.5 million was issued for insufficient—paying off fellow clan members to project finance to upgrade the airport in the stay in power is more important for the Aliyev town of Osh. family than widespread national development. • US$36.4 million was credited for project The IDB has demonstrated its abilities to finance to upgrade a road connecting 31 succeed in the financial sector of the Azeri Kazakhstan with Kyrgyzstan. economy. Thus, Islamic banking and finance • US$54 million has been allotted to thirteen might be an area the government wants to projects in recent years for public health, develop in future years. Moreover, thanks to the industry, power engineering, and 32 strong track record of the IDB in promoting socio- transportation. economic development, Islamic banking and Despite having received a significant project finance may act as an important legitimizing tool finance support from the IDB, Kyrgyzstan for the future of the Aliyev presidency. remains a very poor and undeveloped country with a weak banking sector. While Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan works to stabilize the political situation, Islamic Since the Tulip Revolution that peacefully finance projects will most likely be limited to overthrew President Akayev in 2005, more low-risk sectors like transportation or public Kyrgyzstan’s political situation has remained health. Nevertheless, the IDB will remain a relatively unstable because of a lack of political positive catalyst in promoting Islamic banking cohesion and widespread corruption. In addition, and finance for a government that seeks to align Kyrgyzstan has witnessed a rise in radical Islamic with moderate Islamic forces like the IDB. activity that further contributes to political
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 7
Turkmenistan Muslim base, and to organizations like Hizb ut- Under President Niyazov, Islamic finance Tahrir, that he is catering to their demands and projects have been relatively limited because of incorporating greater Islamic components into his desire to wield tight control over government. In the last few years, Karimov has Turkmenistan’s society and economy. Indeed, faced increased opposition to his rule from President Niyazov has welcomed foreign direct Islamic activists, forcing him to find alternative investment and other finance projects to develop solutions other than violent oppression when Turkmenistan’s lucrative natural resources dealing with opposition groups. because profits from the exportation of gas flow As a land-locked country, the IDB has directly to the President’s coffers that help fortify sponsored programs that aim to link Uzbekistan his rule. However, anything in the area of socio- with other OIC members, including those economic development has been very limited. countries like Iran with seaports. In the past three Although Turkmenistan has been a member of the years, IDB has sponsored several important IDB since 1994, the IDB has played a relatively projects and signed many significant treaties: limited role in development because of tight • US$30 million in loan financing, co-financed political control of its activities. The following is a with the Asian Development Bank, to list of some of its projects: improve water supply to major cities • US$8 million approved in 1993 for the around the country, including Bukhara and construction of a road linking Turkmenistan Samarkand. 37 33 • with Iran. US$54 million grant: Of this amount US$15 • US$9.7 million as a loan to the government million will go the National Bank for for the construction of a Diagnostic Center Foreign Economic Activity to finance small 34 Project in 1999. business projects; US$12.5 million will be • In 1996, the IDB financed a multi-million spent on modernizing an asphalt factory, dollar project co-sponsored by constructing roads and buying equipment Turkmenistan and Iran to build the for these purposes; US$25 million will be Turkmen section of a 711 km Trans-Asia- spent on the construction of an electricity Europe fiber-optic communications line. line from two existing power stations; and Eventually, the fiber-optic cable will link US$143,000 will be spent on preparing a 35 project on setting up an investment Frankfurt and Shanghai. company. 38 • Uzbekistan In 2005, the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector, a Akin to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan is run by member of the IDB Group, and the National an authoritarian leader that has consistently Bank of Uzbekistan signed an agreement of adopted economic policies to keep him in direct cooperation to further develop the Uzbek control of the economy. In the last thirteen years, private sector. 39 for example, Uzbekistan has only attracted $700 million worth of foreign direct investment. This is In the three years following Uzbekistan’s surprisingly low for a country of 25 million with induction into the IDB, the IDB has already significant quantities of natural resources and established a strong presence within the minerals like gold, copper, lead, and zinc. 36 country—providing the Uzbek government with Nonetheless, Uzbekistan’s new membership into considerable financing and sponsorship of the IDB can be interpreted as the government’s numerous projects. This trend will likely continue way of confronting the critical rise in Islamic in the future. President Karimov has experienced opposition to President Karimov’s rule. In other significant opposition in recent years to his rule words, President Karimov is likely using his from the conservative Muslim population and the membership to the IDB as a way to prove to his arrival of the IDB can be used by Karimov as an
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
8 Al Nakhlah
instrument to quiet Islamic opposition forces that For the time being, it appears as if want Islam to play a more prominent role in Islamically-compliant finance projects will government. continue across Tajikistan. However, the full establishment an Islamic banking system remains In addition to the Tajikistan to be seen in the near future. Tajikistan must first lucrative oil and gas Given that address socio-economic development that will profits made by these Tajikistan is one of the alleviate poverty and promote greater economic four countries, there poorest and most growth before being able to consider underdeveloped incorporating Islamic banking into its national has been a rising trend countries in the world, banking system. Moreover, Tajikistan’s of rentier state the presence of Islamic transborder populations of Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and formation across the banking and finance Mesketian Turks located in the Ferghana Valley region. structures have been leave Tajikistan a very unstable and volatile limited to national region for any investor. Despite a volatile infrastructure projects political situation, the relative success of the sponsored by the IDB. Tajikistan remains a very Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) bodes well for an rural and segmented society with more than 70% active Muslim population that desires greater of the population living in rural areas because of a incorporation of Islamic practices into the upper mountainous terrain that covers approximately levels of government. Therefore, it is very 90% of the country. The following is a list of some probable that both Iran and the IDB will continue of the finance projects sponsored by the IDB: to finance more socio-economic development • US$52.4 million provided in credit and projects in the future because of the population’s technical aid as part of the IDB’s three year propensity to support Islamic institutions. program (2001-2003) to develop Tajikistan’s social and economic sectors—health, 40 transport, education, energy, irrigation. Conclusion • US$9.1 million as loan financing for the In just over a decade, the Muslim republics of construction of the Sharon Igor Road Project the former Soviet Union in Central Asia and the 41 in 2001. southern Caucasus have proven to be prime • US$2.5 million as loan financing for the candidates for the establishment of Islamic 42 Emergency Surgical Care Center in 2001. banking and finance. Although primarily • US$64 million allotted in 2003 to go toward landlocked, the countries of this region for the financing some of the 124 projects proposed first time are being linked to a greater network of by the government of Tajikistan, including commerce and trade throughout the Muslim ventures in hydro-energy, the extraction of world with the help of the IDB. Not only has an gold and silver, and transport organization like the IDB effectively 43 infrastructure. demonstrated its support for socio-economic • US$11.6 million to build five mini- development, but it has also provided the six 44 Muslim republics of this study with a means to hydroelectric power stations in 2005-06. remain Islamically-compliant when running
various banking and finance projects that promote In addition to financing projects, the IDB has national development. also sponsored Islamic business conferences to Although the region has experienced relative spark investment interest in Tajikistan. In 2003, success in promoting Islamic banking and finance for example, the IDB invited more than 150 projects, this paper also addressed the dilemmas investors from various Islamic countries around faced by the industry across the region. Most the world to Tajikistan for a three-day conference 45 importantly, the industry has had to deal with the on investment and business opportunities. pervasive Soviet legacy that continues to infiltrate
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 9
both politics and the economy. Most of the that have engulfed the region in the past decade, republics have continued with centralized they have been forced to fuse old Soviet structures planning and maintain tight control over the with new Islamic ones. As posited in this paper, it banking sector. However, the two countries with is believed that most of the countries in the region large oil resources and wealth, Azerbaijan and have used the IDB to demonstrate Islam’s Kazakhstan, have demonstrated a tendency incorporation into government effectively. towards more liberal reform due to greater Moreover, these governments can use Islamic exposure to international market forces—one banking and finance to further mitigate vocal reason, perhaps, why each country has been more Islamic opposition groups that have rejected the receptive to sponsor Islamic banking and finance secular-style rule that has emerged since the projects. Conversely, Turkmenistan and collapse of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan both have substantial natural gas Indeed, the IDB has penetrated to varying resources but—because of their dictatorial degrees all of the Muslim republics of Central tendencies—the leaders of both countries Asia and the southern Caucasus. However, only continue to maintain tight control over both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan appear to have the society and the national economy, thus making it most promising future in the area of Islamic more difficult for IDB to penetrate. banking and finance. The other four countries are In addition to the lucrative oil and gas profits either presently too politically unstable and made by these four countries, there has been a economically underdeveloped, as in the case of rising trend of rentier state formation across the Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, or too politically region. This paper attempted to illustrate the closed, like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. complexities faced by an international financial Nevertheless, Islamic banking and finance has institution like the IDB when trying to open up only just begun to flourish in a region that is ripe financial and banking facilities. Due to the nature for socio-economic development and the of the ruling clan system that has prevailed since establishment of Islamically-compliant financial the collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent and banking institutions. petrodollar windfall, the IDB has had to operate in a manner that does not threaten the various The views and opinions expressed in articles are clan-based political structures, especially in strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily countries like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. represent those of al-Nakhlah, its Advisory and Moreover, it is believed that the IDB approves of Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia the policy of catering to the rentier state structure and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher where the ruling elite must remain an integral School. part of any banking and finance projects. In any case, if Islamic banking and financial institutions desire to expand business and operations in the future, they must account for the politics of these rentier states. Aside from the difficulties faced in building relations with a rentier state, the rise of religiosity and Islam across the region has also been a major issue for the six Muslim republics examined in this paper. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the governments that formed in the 1990s were largely secular in nature and still mired in a closed Soviet-style one party system. However, due to the influence of rising radical Islamic forces
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
10 Al Nakhlah
WORKS CITED
1 Poonam Mann, “Religious Extremism In Central Asia,” Strategic Analysis: A monthly journal of the IDSA 25, no. 9 (December 2001), Accessed through CIAO Net (Viewed November 14, 2007). 2 For a good synopsis of the role of Islam in Central Asia, see International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Islam and the State , ICG Asia Report no. 59, July 10, 2003. 3 Islamic Development Bank, Regional Office Almaty, Annual Report 1425H , 5:
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 11
21 “Islamic banks gives Azerbaijan 9M to eliminate aftermath of 2000 quake,” BBC Monitoring , August 22, 2003, Accessed through Lexus Nexus (Viewed March 24, 2006). 22 “IDB to allot $58M to Azerbaijan,” AssA-Irada , December 27, 2004, Accessed through Lexus Nexus (Viewed March 24, 2006). 23 “Saudi Arabia: IDB allocates $22 MLN for Azerbaijani road projects,” InfoProd , May 18, 2004, Accessed through Lexus Nexus (Viewed March 24, 2006). 24 “Islamic Development Bank to finance energy project in northern Azerbaijan,” BBC Monitoring , July 23, 2004, Accessed through Lexus Nexus (Viewed March 24, 2006). 25 “Islamic Development Bank pledges more funding for Azerbaijan,” BBC Monitoring , January 5, 2005, Accessed through Lexus Nexus (Viewed March 24, 2006). 26 “Azeri Leader, World Islamic Bodies Discus Cooperation in Saudi Arabia,” BBC Monitoring , March 11, 2005, Accessed through Lexus Nexus (Viewed March 24, 2006). 27 More empirical research and study is needed to further solidify this thesis that the IDB acts a legitimizing tool for former Soviet Union governments that want to quiet Islamic opposition. 28 Alisher Khamidov, “Kyrgyzstan: Organized Opposition and Civil Unrest,” Eurasianet.org , December 16, 2002:
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
12 Al Nakhlah
43 “Islamic Bank Chief Says 64M dollars Allotted to Support Tajik Businesses,” BBC Monitoring , September 25, 2003, Accessed through Lexus Nexus (Viewed March 20, 2006). 44 “Islamic Bank to invest in Tajik mini-hydroelectric stations,” BBC Monitoring , April 14, 2005, Accessed through Lexus Nexus (Viewed March 20, 2006). 45 “Some 170 investors from Islamic World attending conference in Tajikistan,” BBC Monitoring , September 25, 2003, Accessed through Lexus Nexus (Viewed March 20, 2006).
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007
Iraqi Kurdistan: The Internal Dynamics and Statecraft of a Semistate1 Matan Chorev
The semistate possesses many of the features The third section will emphasize how this commonly associated with the modern nation- experience impacts and shapes the worldview state but remains unrecognized as a sovereign and strategic calculus of the Kurdish leadership. entity. Semistates (such as Abkhazia, Nagorno- The third section will emphasize how this Karabakh, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Iraqi experience impacts and shapes the worldview Kurdistan) inhabit the central conflict fault-lines and strategic calculus of the Kurdish leadership. of Southwest Asia’s strategic landscape at the dawn of the twenty-first century. In order to The Logic of Semistates concoct effective conflict management approaches, Since the attacks of September 11, 2001 directed policymakers must develop a framework for attention to the failed state of Afghanistan, the comprehending internal dynamics and statecraft dangers that weak and failing states present to of these entities. How do they function in the international security have been well absence of international recognition? What impact documented. However, the preoccupation, did the dynamics of conflict and political among policymakers and academics alike, with development under such conditions have on the the stark bipolarity of “strong” and “weak” states nature of the semistate? What is the entity’s has obscured the fact that the modern nation-state resultant worldview and statecraft? comes in innumerable forms. Article I of the 1933 Knowledge of the factors that contributed to Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties the ambiguous status of Iraqi Kurdistan in the of States outlines the four basic elements of aftermath of the first Gulf War statehood: 1) a permanent is imperative to analyzing the The relevance and future population; 2) a defined territory; behavior of the Kurdistan of the state to 3) a government; and 4) a Regional Government (KRG) in international politics capacity to enter into relations the post-Saddam era. After a with other states. Yet already in cursory introduction to the came under increased 1981, before it became concept of the semistate, this scrutiny as the pace of fashionable to proclaim the fading paper will explain what “globalization” hastened of the state as the central actor in sustained Iraqi Kurdistan’s international relations, political ambiguous status throughout at the end of the theorist David Easton, the 1990s and the impact it had twentieth century. highlighted the multiple on Kurdish politics. conceptions of the term by identifying over 140 definitions.2 The relevance and future of the state to international politics came under increased scrutiny as the pace of “globalization” hastened Matan Chorev (MALD ’07) is a Researcher at the 3 Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, at the end of the twentieth century. The Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. octogenarian protagonist in this narrative, James Rosenau, argued that “the dynamics of
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah
globalization, taken together, contend that the at the same time making key interest new, post-Cold War arrangements have lessened groups in both camps worse off. Even if the role of the state, that a central feature of the a settlement is reached, it is unlikely to arrangements is a continuing disaggregation of do more than recognize the basic logic authority in all parts of the world and all walks of and its attendant benefits.10 life.”4 The defining tension, he suggests, is between “worldwide forces pressing for Pål Kolstø argues that five factors contribute integration and those fostering fragmentation,” a to the viability of unrecognized states in the phenomenon he coined as “fragmegration.”5 absence of strong state structures.11 First is the Rather than decrying the passing of the successful nation-building that these semistates nation-state, however, it is instructive to recall have undertaken, which is premised on the J.P. Nettl’s view of “the state” as a conceptual common experience of conflict with the state from variable, as opposed to a generic unit of analysis. which they are trying to secede, the existence of a This view allows for analysis that is more common enemy, and the relative homogenous discriminating and sees the state as being more population that exists within the separatist entity. or less “state-like” along a continuum of Second, semistates are militarized societies. The “stateness.”6 To demonstrate, it is certainly the armed forces play a crucial role in deterring the case that some states fall short of virtually all parent state and, as a result, military leaders performance-based criteria of internal legitimacy, have become political and economic figures as yet retain their international recognition, or well, often with a keen interest in maintaining “juridical statehood” as equal sovereigns. These their positions of privilege. Third, the parent “quasi-states,” or what today one calls failed state – be it Iraq, Somalia, or Georgia – is states, hold on to their legal protections from typically a weak state unable to retake the intervention and interference but lack the separatist state or to attract the breakaway capacity or will to provide the services and population to return to its domain. Fourth, resources their citizens demand of them.7 external patrons provide a vital lifeline for the Contrast this with the semistate (or the more semistate. Finally, the “international community” accepted, but problematic, de facto state) that plays a crucial role, for as long as it facilitates an fulfills the four features of the Montevideo treaty ongoing and frequently stalled negotiation but lacks the international personality of quasi- process between the breakaway region and the states. Scott Pegg explains: “The quasi-state is parent state, it is complicit in the prolonged legitimate no matter how ineffective it is. existence of the semistate. Conversely, the de facto state is illegitimate no The semistate’s “economic pathologies” are matter how effective it is.”8 an important product and driver of the benefits of Absent legitimacy, the semistate still stalemate equation.12 Most semistates fail to displays “impressive longevity.”9 Although the develop self-sufficient economies due to several particularities of each individual entity are factors: the destruction wrought by the protracted influenced by the state from which it is seceding, insurgency and conflict with the metropolitan scholars have identified commonalities of internal state, the inability to construct a favorable and external dynamics that contribute to investment climate due to an uncertain legal protraction of ambiguity. Charles King contends climate (what Pegg refers to as the “economic cost that a key factor is the benefits that both the of non-recognition”), and the presence of a parent and the separatist states accrue from substantial illicit economy and its linkages with stalemate: the ruling elite, all of which are exacerbated by the absence of international monitoring and It is a dark version of Pareto efficiency: accountability.”13 Before analyzing the case of the general welfare cannot be improved Iraqi Kurdistan, it is instructive to place it in its – by reaching a genuine peace accord appropriate historical context. allowing for real reintegration – without
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 3
Kurdayetî and the Challenges to Kurdish by the Turks.” The installation of Shaikh Mahmud Nation-Building Barzinji as governor of Sulaimaniyah by the British was premised on the belief that British The segmented nature of Kurdish society recognition of his status would grant him and the intra-group dynamics in Iraqi Kurdistan sufficient authority to govern over Kurdistan. consistently combined to undermine Kurdayetî When the disastrous 1920 Arab Revolt shifted the (Kurdish national identity) and the political focus of the colonial administration from nation- objectives of their decades-long struggle. The building to exit, the British concluded that the Kurds were historically divided among three “clannish” Kurds would be unable to construct a ethnically defined communities (Arab, Persian, single Southern Kurdish state and thus and Turkish) and lived on the fringes of powerful discouraged the colonial administration from empires (The Ottoman to the west, and the taking any risks in supporting their autonomy. Safavid and Qajar to the east). After World War I, Intra-Kurdish strife bolstered those voices in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman advocating for disengagement and consolidation Empire, the Kurdish population soon found itself of Sunni Arab rule. spread across four new regional Resultantly, the British nation-states - Syria, Turkey, Intra-Kurdish strife experience in Iraq—not unlike Iraq and Iran. The nature of bolstered those voices the present American political space in each country advocating for experience—was one of grand created differing narratives of ambitions subdued. The British group history and status that in disengagement and state-building aspiration for turn impacted the opportunities consolidation of Sunni Iraq, devolved to the for political action for Kurdish 14 Arab rule. Resultantly, the construction of a “‘quasi-state,’ nationalists. For example, the one which bore the appearance unchanging restrictive political British experience in Iraq— of a de jure national polity but space in Turkey, lowered the not unlike the present whose institutions were in fact opportunity for a constructive American experience—was a façade built in order to allow relationship between Ankara Britain to disengage.”15 and the Kurds in the southeast, one of grand ambitions During the Kurdish and in turn encouraged armed subdued. Revolt of 1961-1975, Sunni- insurrection and alienation. In chauvinism; an unstable political center in Iraq, by contrast, the political space was far more Baghdad; Kurdish internal splits in the north; ambivalent, which resulted in a great variability and the obstructionist behavior of regional in the expression of nationalism over time. In neighbors and great power competitors would addition, the Kurds lack a unified or systemized consistently merge to undermine the resolution of dialect; they never managed to embrace religion the Kurdish issue in Iraq. In an effort to expand as a uniting factor; and they consistently found its control across the country, each new greatest resonance in strong micro-societal (i.e., leadership cadre in Baghdad would reach out to tribal) attachments. the Kurdish leadership with offers of autonomy The latter allowed Baghdad and regional and democracy. Baghdad’s Kurdish management neighbors to divide the Kurds to turn a struggle policies, however, “were not real attempts to against it into an intra-Kurdish conflict. open political space, but rather time-gaining Moreover, this segmented nature of Kurdish tactics to help consolidate power.”16 Over time, society combined with specific intra-group the wide gap between the rhetorical overtures dynamics in Iraqi Kurdistan to undermine the and the leadership’s willingness and ability to political objectives of the Iraqi Kurds decades- carry out tangible policy changes would long struggle. At three crucial moments in the undermine the relationship and compromise history of the Iraqi Kurds—the post World War I would once again fluctuate towards hostility.17 effort at independence, the 1961-1975 Kurdish Beyond competing Arab and Kurdish Revolt, and the birth of the semistate in 1991— nationalisms and shifting power struggles internal struggles doomed their aspirations. between the civilian and military elements in On November 7, 1918, the British and Baghdad, the internal clash in the 1960s pitted French declared their shared goal of liberation for the traditional players of Kurdish nationalism— the Kurds, “who have for so long been oppressed the tribal and religious leaders led by Mullah
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
4 Al Nakhlah
Mustafa Barzani and his Kurdish Democratic sharing agreement between the PUK and KDP Party (KDP)—against the new, urban-led resulted. Incredibly, the parties did not differ intelligentsia of Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim over the political future or identity of an Ahmad. The division was essentially “a contest emerging state. As Gareth Stansfield argues, between the religious and the secular, the “After 1991, attempting to describe how the primordial and the parties differed in their social bases nationalist, tradition versus An oft-repeated Kurdish and political program was a futile atheistic Marxism.”18 proverb says that the exercise; only their mutual The actions of Abd al antipathy remained.”20 Beyond Salam Arif, who overthrew Kurds have no friends but historical animosity, however, the Iraqi leader Abd al Karim the mountains. two parties’ asymmetric access to Qasim in February 1963, revenue heightened competition. exemplified these dynamics. In an effort to The KDP controlled the western portion of the consolidate his power and unwilling to repeat the country, including the strategic Ibrahim Khalil failures of his predecessors in countering the (Khabur Bridge) border crossing with Turkey. fighting prowess of the Kurdish peshmerga forces The customs fees on licit and illicit trade with (literally, “those who face death”), Arif sought to Turkey provided the regional authorities with infiltrate the Kurdish movement. He invited their seemingly sole source of income, estimated Mullah Mustafa to sign a peace agreement with at approximately $750 million annually. The him in Mustafa’s personal capacity rather than as PUK held the eastern portion of the country, the leader of the KDP. . Mustafa accepted, and where its trade with Iran paled in comparison. like Shaikh Mahmud before him, prioritized The international aid program exacerbated personal hegemony in Kurdistan above Kurdish the tension over revenue in several ways. First, autonomy from Baghdad. As a result, the the absence of a long-term development plan Talabani-Ahmed group broke with the KDP and combined with the injection of humanitarian aid proceeded to accept arms and assistance from contributed to the emergence of an underground Baghdad to fight the KDP’s forces. Thus the economy controlled by networks of traditional revolt against Baghdad came to a standstill. families and entrepreneurs, both deeply In the eyes of many Kurds, the tragic connected to the political parties. Second, in this internal Kurdish war of 1994-1998 undoubtedly new economic landscape accelerating disparity serves as “the blackest moment in Kurdish came about between those who organized to history.”19 The preconditions for the war between profit from the new sources of income and the the KDP and Talabani’s Patriotic Union of majority who still lived in abject poverty. Third, Kurdistan (PUK)—animosity between two major the aid community further fragmented the factions, competition for resources, destructive territory of Iraqi Kurdistan by creating price international aid efforts, and interference from differentials between different regions, which in neighboring states—had much in common with turn set off internal rivalries and power struggles earlier periods of strife in the region, and the among entrepreneurial elements of the KDP and consequences—the failure to secure the goals of PUK. As Natali concludes, “Rather than trying to the insurgency—were the same. The Kurdish strengthen intra-Kurdish unity, donor agencies uprising in March 1991, just weeks after US and foreign governments encouraged President George H. W. Bush called on Iraqis to fragmentation by treating the two main leaders, rise up against Saddam Hussein, was brutally [Massoud] Barzani and Jalal Talabai as individual suppressed. Hussein, however, was unable to party leaders.”21 reach an agreement with a divided Kurdish The degree to which each party had become leadership. Admitting that the peshmerga indeed dependant on external rival sponsors further controlled the urban centers, he withdrew his exacerbated the economic drivers of conflict. forces and entire administrative capacity from Turkey paid the KRG $13.5 million in August Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds suddenly found 1993 after the KDP gave it the green light to themselves obliged to govern and administer the conduct cross-border operation against the entire northern region of Iraq. Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a guerilla group In an effort to achieve internal legitimacy, waging a bloody battle with Turkish security the Kurdish leadership organized immediate forces. At the same time, however, Turkey elections; a dead-heat and an ensuing power- cooperated with Hussein’s economic tactics
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 5 against the Kurds by taking the Old Iraqi Dinar Several internal and external drivers served (no longer in circulation in the rest of Iraq) out of to sustain the ambiguous status of Iraqi Kurdistan the economy, limiting cross-border trade, and for over a decade. As will be demonstrated, these creating incentives for commercial traffic to go drivers simultaneously reinforce and chafe one through Mosul, which was under Saddam another and have created important Hussein’s control.22 Similarly, Iran guaranteed repercussions for the region today. support to the PUK in return for the party’s assistance against the Kurdistan Democratic Party External Drivers of Iran (KDPI), at the same time that it gave The end of the Cold War (and the increased financial support to the Islamic Movement of pace of globalization typically associated with it) Kurdistan (IMK) to fight the PUK. Complicating brought about a marked expansion in the Kurds’ the picture further, the KDP secretly negotiated access to transnational space, defined as the with Hussein to remove the PUK from Erbil. In “externally based opportunity structures such as what became known as “The Invasion of Erbil,” diasporic networks, international governmental the KDP fought alongside Iraqi government organizations, host-country democratic systems forces and repelled the PUK from the regional and advanced telecommunication systems that capital. The PUK recovered, however— with provide new forms of support or constraint to Iranian support—and a ceasefire line between the Kurdish nationalist ambitions.”26 The external parties held and served as the de facto partition of drivers that allowed Iraqi Kurdistan to survive on Iraqi Kurdistan. Thus, the “endless the margins of the state system are in large opportunities” that followed the 1991 elections measure a by-product of this space. These drivers were squandered.23 served to simultaneously advance, reconfigure, The repercussions of the conflict that began and place limitations on Kurdayetî and the nature in 1994 and ceased only in 1998 after significant of Kurdish autonomy and self-rule. international intervention were multifold. First, it Kolstø argues that, “for most quasi-states, enabled opponents of Kurdish autonomy to frame the support from an external patron is crucially the independence movement as “pre-modern, important, and their survival chances would be divided, tribal, and hence incapable of drastically reduced should it be withdrawn.”27 representing Iraqi Kurdistan in any International protection sustained Kurdistan’s institutionally enshrined autonomy or political ambiguous status by safeguarding it from the self-determination.”24 Second, internally, Kurdish Iraqi parent state and perturbed neighbors on the society took on elements of a “‘post-civil war one hand while at the same time placing society,’ in which the heritage of domestic conflict limitations on Kurdish self-rule on the other, has strengthened and even institutionalized the through the unintended consequences of patronage relations, primarily through the international aid. The aid effort, which feared maintenance of different forms of scarcity.”25 abrogating Iraq’s territorial integrity, proved Today’s KRG is a product of the evolution unwilling to transition from emergency and trajectory of the Kurdish struggle for self- humanitarian support to a more sustainable rule. An oft-repeated Kurdish proverb says that program, and thus failed to encourage “social the Kurds have no friends but the mountains. restructuring at the local levels.”28 This only The above brief review of Kurdish history ought increased the resonance of party, tribal, and to reveal that they might indeed have no worse geographic identities that have consistently enemies than themselves. The internecine challenged Kurdish nationalism. Thus, by conflicts in Kurdistan consistently prevented the neglecting to work to establish the preconditions maturation of the Kurdish “insurgent state” for a self-sufficient economy, a productive towards either fully autonomy or independence, industry, a functioning agricultural sector, a causing important repercussions for the present functioning system of higher education and internal politics and the worldview of the human capital, political development, and Kurdish leadership. structural reform, external patronage allowed Iraqi Kurdistan to survive, but not to thrive. The “Logic” of Semistatehood in Iraqi Lowered barriers to participation in the Kurdistan global economy, combined with the simultaneous technological and information revolutions, also
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
6 Al Nakhlah
contributed to the KRG’s ability to survive in an and geographic identities. The “accidental” otherwise most unpropitious disposition. The arrival of self-rule, and the ensuing formation of technology and information revolutions gave the the KRG, did not eliminate these patronage KRG access to the Kurdish diaspora, and helped networks. Instead, they were institutionalized in it fill the knowledge, advocacy, and resource a form of neo-tribal confederations wrapped gaps created by the unwillingness of the around the flag of democracy. Like mafia families “international community” to delineating their spheres of invest in long-term Like mafia families authority, the two Kurdish parties development and institution delineating their divided up Iraqi Kurdistan into building in Iraqi Kurdistan. separate governance zones after the Lowered barriers to spheres of authority, the civil war. This arrangement of participation in the global two Kurdish parties “elite accommodation”30 brought a economy were partially divided up Iraqi notable degree of stability to Iraqi responsible for the emergence Kurdistan from which the parties of “illicit economies,” which Kurdistan into separate and their affiliated support played a pivotal role in Iraqi governance zones after networks profited. The Kurdistan’s functioning. the civil war. “international community’s” However, like other facets of comfort level with, and interest in, the changing transnational space, the effects of the status quo, reinforced the division. these on Kurdish self-rule were mixed; they Despite positive gains in terms of increased advanced it by bringing in much needed stability, these divisions severely undermined revenue and other resources, but they the project of state building. To do this more undermined the development of strong state- effectively, the Kurdish leadership adeptly institutions and served as a principle factor in the manipulated the “politics of fear,” by reminding factional fighting of the mid-1990s. their constituents of the external threat from their The notion that the regional environment is neighbors and the looming specter of Hussein’s hostile to an emerging independent Kurdish state return. The result was that internal opposition or even hardened Kurdish autonomy is an was suppressed as any additional internal understatement. Iraqi Kurdistan’s neighbors used challenge would invite external intervention, as it as a leverage point on Saddam but were it did in past episodes. The expectations of the equally comfortable colluding with him against KRG were thus low as nearly any alternative to any developments in the north inimical to their Hussein was seen as an improvement. Low interests. After the 2003 war in Iraq, this dynamic public expectations for state-building efforts, in has been heightened, by fulfilling neighbors’ turn, led to inadequate attention to the rule of fear that it would embolden Kurdish national law, healthy civil-military relations, and movements in their respective countries. investment in other elements of the public sector. However, some policymakers are beginning to Moreover, fears of redistribution of control believe that a stable and autonomous Iraqi inhibited existing leadership from attempting to Kurdistan might advance key interests. For clarify the status of Iraqi Kurdistan. This lack of example, one view in Turkey’s diplomatic and incentive for clarifying the area’s status existed military circles argues that bringing Iraqi on Hussein’s side as well; he feared a response Kurdistan under Turkey’s sphere of influence by the “international community” if he forcibly could create an important buffer against an retook the north, and, under the sanctions Iranian-dominated Shi’i Iraq.29 It remains to be regime, benefited from having five million less seen whether the post-Iraq war strategic calculus people to feed. of neighboring states will alleviate or exacerbate The dependency on external sources of historic tensions with Iraqi Kurdistan. revenue, monetary constraints, unemployment and economic recession, illicit economy, Internal Drivers corruption, and rent-seeking behaviors, all Through the course of the Kurdish struggle, served to allow little maneuver room for the each of the polity’s centers of power built, Kurdish leadership. They simply lacked the sustained, and maintained political and economic means to pursue the kind of state-building project support networks heavily intertwined with tribal that could sustain a truly autonomous entity.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 7
At the same time, a multitude of other they do on securing independence or hardened economic problems also undermined state autonomy. building in Iraqi Kurdistan. Primary among these, the KRG was not able to resurrect the The Statecraft of the KRG in the New Iraq commercial agricultural sector. Most Kurds In the lead-up to and aftermath of deserted the sector and pursued economic Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Iraqi Kurdish activities that could provide them with short-term leadership, cognizant of the persisting capital accumulation. This included the selling of endogenous and exogenous constraints on its capital assets, smuggling, chopping down trees, behavior, adopted a shrewd and realistic strategy and collecting scrap whose principal interest is to preserve the de facto Since the fall of Saddam, 31 metal. independence of Kurdistan. To secure this stated billions of dollars were Unemployment vital interest, Iraqi Kurds made a strategic injected into the Kurdish during this period decision to participate fully in the Iraqi national was estimated at economy from state project, support the U.S. occupation, and work to around 80 percent. accelerate the political and economic coffers and international Those employed development of the Kurdistan Region. investment, but the KRG typically earned The Kurdistan Region was recognized as a wages far below lost significant levels of legal region of a federal Iraqi state by the the 1,500-2,000 permanent constitution, adopted in the October control to the central Swiss Dinar 2005 referendum. The provisions of the government. UNICEF estimated constitution served to legitimize, on an as needed to international level, Kurdistan’s de facto autonomy support a family of five. By the year 2000, only and self-rule. In fact, the arenas in which where 15,000 people were able to pay any sort of taxes federal law supersedes regional law in the Iraqi 32 to the KRG, and 20 percent of Kurds still lived constitution are limited and severely in the mujamma’at, or Hussein’s settlement circumscribed. These are: control over foreign 33 towns. The vast majority of Iraqi Kurds lacked affairs (although federal regions are granted consistent access to electricity, water, and other offices within Iraqi embassies), defense policy basic services. Those with the means to leave the (even though the KRG retains control over its region, typically the skilled laborers and highly own military, or “Guards of the Region”), the educated cadres, did so, resulting in a ruinous printing of money (importantly, Baghdad cannot brain-drain. levy taxes against the will of a regional By all accounts the “black market” became government), and regulation of weights and the most important component of the economy. measures. This had important socio-political repercussions. It Nonetheless, important elements of increased income disparities and created “an dependency endure. The KRG minister of uneasy dichotomy in Iraqi Kurdistan between the finance suggested that Iraqi Kurdistan’s economic majority who are destitute and a minority of picture deteriorated after the Iraq war. While the 34 merchants who are extremely wealthy.” economy of the KRG was smaller before the war, Coupled with the existence and dominance of the the KRG could exercise more control over it. neo-tribal networks, this offered incentives for the Since the fall of Saddam, billions of dollars were continuance of the status quo. injected into the Kurdish economy from state Finally, although the political imperatives of coffers and international investment, but the securing self-rule and autonomy are indeed high, KRG lost significant levels of control to the central the Kurds have shown, particularly after 2003, an government. Since 2003, 95 percent of the inclination toward flexibility in their demands for revenue of the KRG has derived from the central sovereignty—for the sake of economic stability government’s oil revenues, a share that amounts and growth. As Natali argues, “Contrary to to 17 percent of the total Iraqi national budget. popular claims, most Kurds today would prefer Under this arrangement, the central government continued stability and growth rather than can exercise significant leverage over the KRG. economic decline or conflict for the cause of The persistence of patronage and clientalist 35 independent statehood.” This is largely due to networks exacerbate poor development indicators the fact that the clientalist networks that sustain in the region. Rather than using the new sources the current leadership rely on this far more than
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
8 Al Nakhlah
of capital to improve the desperate condition of The Kurdish leadership is trying to advance the agriculture and infrastructure sectors or to its interests in a methodical and prudent fashion. develop other sustainable industries, the Kurdish Whether or not it succeeds remains to be seen. leadership allocated 64 percent of its budget to Although it has thus far managed to stave off government salaries—in essence paying people destabilizing behavior from its neighbors, the not to work and furthering patronage behavior. prospect of intervention remains realistic. A cross- Although the KRG passed a law in January 2006 border skirmish with the PKK in the fall of 2007 unifying the PUK and KDP suggests that Turkey’s administrations, some ministries, Should the Iran crisis patience with the PKK safe- including Finance, Peshmerga escalate, opposition haven in northern Iraq is Affairs, Justice, and Interior, remain Kurdish elements, coming to an end. Should the bifurcated. The government in Iran crisis escalate, opposition Erbil remains largely symbolic; based in Iraqi Kurdistan, Kurdish elements, based in Prime Minister Nerchivan Barzani might be encouraged to Iraqi Kurdistan, might be still has no executive authority in intensify their anti- encouraged to intensify their PUK-territory. Moreover, the anti-Ahmadinejad operations, benefits to be gained from the Ahmadinejad prompting Iranian special division of the spoils of Iraqi operations, prompting forces to take action as well. Kurdistan remain. For instance, as Iranian special forces to However, the event that looms of October 2007, the KDP (Korek) most closely on the horizon is and PUK (Asiacell) maintain take action as well. the referendum on Kirkuk, separate cell phone companies in originally scheduled to take their respective territories, and the services do place before the end of 2007, but presently not communicate with one another. delayed to a future, yet unannounced, date. As However, to improve its image and prevent the different parties organize to proclaim the oil- a return to economic isolation, the KRG launched rich city, northern Iraq is sure to experience new a massive public relations campaign called “The levels of violence and foreign interference Other Iraq.” The campaign was the product of a heretofore unseen in that part of the country. partnership between the Kurdistan Development Internally, there is also reason for concern, Corporation (KDC) and the KRG to “promote and as evidence suggests that the KRG is “losing the implement inward investment opportunities in race for good governance.”38 The post-2003 boom the stable and prospering Kurdistan Region in in the economy has improved the lives of only a Iraq.”36 The KRG’s approach was to paint itself as small minority of the Iraqi Kurdish population. a second Dubai—a global hub of business and Ongoing resentment over the lack of telecommunications. Othman I. Shawni, the improvement in the provision of basic services KRG’s Minister of Planning, asserted, “The has strengthened the only political actors able to region will attract more than $2 billion in the first challenge the PUK-KDP-dominated public year [of the plan] in four major sectors and high sphere: the Islamic parties. In Halabja, the town return on investment is guaranteed due to the decimated by Hussein’s chemical weapons attack, big demand for these facilities.”37 As part of these citizens demonstrated their displeasure with the efforts, a massive mall is being constructed in KRG by setting fire to the monument for the Erbil, directly across from the historic citadel and victims on March 16, 2006. During the same the ancient souk, which will be home to 6,000 month, students from the University of stores and offices as well as a massive Sulaimaniyah took to the streets in a Ukrainian- underground garage. The citadel itself, the oldest style “orange protest” against KRG corruption. continuously inhabited place in the world, was Mohammed Ihsan, Minister of Extra-Regional recently emptied of its inhabitants and is Affairs, argues that the the hurdles to mobilize currently being renovated as a tourist attraction. the population behind the Kurdish National The “Dream City” – a shopping and amusement project are now much higher now than they were complex – is being built outside Erbil. The Korek in 1992: “People are no longer willing to live in Tower promises to be the tallest building in all of abject poverty for the sake of the nationalist Iraq and the American Village, a housing cause. The democratic experience has brought complex eerily reminiscent of the suburbs of high expectations.”39 Denise Natali elaborates: Arizona or New Mexico, is nearly complete.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 9
The commitment to Kurdish nationalism that will go far beyond the issue of recognition and once defined political life in pre-2003 Iraqi the redrawing of state borders. Such solutions Kurdistan has vanished. What has emerged might provide short-term stability but will likely instead is an undertaking to protect Kurdish sow the preconditions for future conflicts. As this interests at politically expedient moments, but no case study exemplifies, the drivers that sustain strategy to ensure the ideological and political the ambiguous status of semistates require a engagement of the masses in the long term. much more sophisticated approach than the Absence of social capital - networks, norms, and cartographic entrepreneurship that brought about social trust that facilitate coordination and their existence in the first place. cooperation for mutual societal benefit - has further weakened societal engagement to Kurdish nationalism. Changing norms in the liberalizing Iraqi state have encouraged short- term interest maximization, namely revenue generation, and not a shared sense of struggle and suffering for the Kurdish nation.40 It remains to be seen how this shifting “social contract” will impact the behavior of the Kurdish leadership. While one official admitted that without a “leadership purge” things will not change, others were The dynamics inherent more confident that in of Iraqi Kurdistan’s change will come through a gradual, protracted state of long-term ambiguity have greatly transition. undermined its chance for long-term Conclusion The dynamics sustainability as an inherent in of Iraqi independent entity Kurdistan’s protracted state of ambiguity have greatly undermined its chance for long-term sustainability as an independent entity. In his research, Kolstø found that “there are strong reasons to believe that, if any of the unrecognized [semistates] of today’s world should succeed in achieving international recognition, most of them will end up not as ‘normal’ or fully fledged states but instead transmute into recognized [failed-states].”41 Moreover, the imperative of stability in northern Iraq over the coming years suggests that the status quo will persist. This implies that the economic and political dilemmas that undermine sustainable development in Iraqi Kurdistan are only likely to continue—and in turn cause the type of authority crisis often associated with the deficient internal The views and opinions expressed in articles are legitimacy of weak and failing states. strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily The future of Iraq, Somalia, the Balkans, and represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and other conflicted regions will require policymakers Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia and academics alike to confront the realities of and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher semistates. The dilemmas they are likely to face School.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
The Fletcher School Online Journal for Issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Issue 3: Spring 2005 – No. 2
Works Cited
1 I am indebted to the Fletcher School and Tufts University for their generous financial support of essential field research in Iraqi Kurdistan during the winter of 2006/2007. 2 David Easton, "The Political System Besieged by the State," Political Theory 9, (3) (1981): 307. 3 As numerous and diverse as the definitions of “state” are, the seemingly infinite conceptions of “globalization” have rendered the term meaningless. According to the U.S. Library of Congress’ catalogue, in the 1990s, about 500 books were published on globalization. Between 2000 and 2004, there were more than 4,000. Between the mid-1990s and 2003, the rate of increase in globalization-related titles more than doubled every 18 months. Panjaj Ghemawat, “Why the World Isn’t Flat,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2007: 55.. 4 James N. Rosenau, The Study of World Politics: Globalization and Governance, 2 vols., vol. 2 (London: Routledge, 2006), 2. 5 Ibid. 6 See J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics 20 (4) (1968). 7 See Robert H. Jackson, “Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World,” International Organization 41 (Autumn 1987) 8 Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Brookfield: Ashgate, 1998), 5. 9 Barry Bartmann, Henry Srebrnik, and Tozun Bahceli, eds., De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 2004), 246. 10 Charles King, "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States," World Politics 53 (2) (2001): 526. 11 Pål Kolstø, "The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States," Journal of Peace Research 43 (6) (2006): 729. 12 Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 64. 13 Kolstø, 729. 14 Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno-Political Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 125. 15 Toby Dodge, Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and History Denied (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 10. 16 Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 58. 17 Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1973), 169. 18 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), 316. 19 Interview, Hassen Aziz, Head of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Military Services, Sulaimaniyah, Iraq,December 2006. 20 Gareth R.V. Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 96. 21 Denise Natali, "The Spoils of Peace in Iraqi Kurdistan," (Middle East Studies Association Conference 2005), 8. 22 Interview, Sarkis Aghajn, Minister of Finance, Erbil, Iraq, January 2007. 23 Interview, Dr. Hania Mufti, former director of the Middle East branch of Human Rights Watch, Amman, Jordan, December 2006. 24 David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 211. 25 Michiel Leezenberg, "Iraqi Kurdistan: Contours of a Post-Civil War Society," Third World Quarterly 26 (4-5) (2005): 640. 26 Natali, The Kurds and the State, 160-161. 27 Kolstø, 733-734. 28 Natali, The Kurds and the State, 168.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 Fall 2007 11
29 Matan Chorev, “A Conversation with Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith,” al-Nakhlah (Spring 2007),
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007
Charisma in Modern Islamic Revolutionary Movements: The Case of Ahmad Shah Massoud Casey G. Johnson
Introduction: Thinking Outside The Chat Room interesting as biography, but of little value as a Security Studies is inundated with criterion upon which foreign policy decisions scholarship devoted to highlighting the ways in could be based. which technology (particularly the internet) is From an analysis standpoint, the vital defining terrorist organizations, militias, question is not only how do we identify a 1 revolutionary movements,and criminal networks. charismatic leader and their followers? But how Still, much as technology has altered our (and for what) do we use this information? This perspective of daily life, there is a danger of article begins by broadly re‐evaluating the becoming too narrowly focused on technology as modern typology of charismatic revolutionaries. a means of explaining emerging and evolving Next it examines charismatic leadership within an revolutionary movements. and not enough focus historical Islamic context. Finally, it explores on the charismatic leaders that continue to charisma in the context of Afghan society and, motivate, define, and drive revolutionary particularly, the case of mujahideen leader Ahmad movements It is far from certainthat the Internet Shah Massoud during the Soviet occupation and has deposed the charismatic leader of his or her Taliban take over of Afghanistan. These central role in rallying, organizing, and spurring sociological, religious and cultural layers provide revolutionary movements. Indeed, for every a definite context in which to ground the virtual cell and skillfully produced martyrdom amorphous idea of charismatic leadership, with video, there is a Moqtada al Sadr or a Sheik the overarching goal to differentiate the adroit Hassan Nassrallah. propagandist from the true charismatic. However, Despite the centrality of charismatic leaders identifying charismatic leaders alone is of limited today, and throughout history, attempts to utility. The real challenge—and the real foreign analyze the attributes of these leaders, and then to policy tool—is to identify not only which evaluate them empirically have been at dismissed generals, ideologues and revolutionaries possess as inherently subjective. Charismatic leadership is charisma, but which of these leaders are capable of transitioning from the role of an inspiring Casey Johnson, Fletcher MALD 2008, has worked as revolutionary to the role of a leader within an freelance reporter/photographer in Afghanistan, and established political system.? If we can identify as a correspondent for the United Nation’s news and which leaders possess the characteristics and analysis network, IRIN News, in the self‐declared abilities to make the transition from the battlefield Republic of Somaliland. to the statehouse without losing their charismatic hold upon the populace, then we may begin to
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah understand with whom we should engage in and apply Weber’s theory to leaders as diverse as 6 dialogue, and what their triggers, needs and Gandhi, Hitler, Lenin, and Mandela. Others reject constraints are. the applicability of an inherently religious concept to a secular system, and denounce the way in Charisma Defined which the theory’s value‐free framework claims to The modern term ‘charisma’ is derived from compare the charisma of men like Gandhi and 7 the Greek, kharizesthai, translating literally as Hitler objectively. 2 “divine favor.” In ancient Greece the person In a speech on leadership in the twentieth possessing charisma was considered to be in good century, historian Arthur Schlesinger was blunt in favor with the gods. Charisma was not something his criticism of charisma as an analytic tool. “Most that could be won with hard work or the contemporary usage of the word charismatic is accumulation of knowledge, but was instead metaphorical,” Schlesinger said. “[T]he word has bestowed supernaturally upon the individual. In become a chic synonym for heroic or even just for 8 return for this gift of grace, the individual became popular.” Schlesinger was right to deride the a direct conduit for the divine messages of the modern metaphorical drift of the term charisma. 3 gods. In many cases it has become a handy epithet Not surprisingly the belief that a bestowed upon romantically conceived supernatural leader would arise and inspire a revolutionaries by fawning journalists. Moreover, devoted following based upon preternatural charisma in the modern Islamic context is ability and divine gifts seemed subjective and increasingly exploited only after the death of the inapplicable to questions of social science, much leader in what appears to be an attempt to furnish less the study of warfare and living evidence of the modern revolutionary leaders. Indeed, the Ahmad Shah deceased’s martyrdom status. And so for two millennia Massoud leveling a steely, Indeed, the Ahmad Shah charisma—more as a belief than a Guevara-esque gaze from Massoud leveling a steely, theory—remained rooted in its two-story posters in Guevara‐esque gaze from religio‐mystic origins. In the early two‐story posters in 20th century, however, German downtown Kabul is the downtown Kabul is the result sociologist Max Weber attempted result of an Afghan of an Afghan government to transfer the theory of government desperately desperately seeking both a charismatic leadership from the seeking both a national national hero and a symbolic purely religious realm of hero and a symbolic rallying point in a period of prophets, seers, and mystics to the rallying point in a period of change and uncertainty. socio‐political world of However, by the time of his revolutionaries, demagogues, and change and uncertainty. death at the hands of two 4 civil rights leaders. According to Algerian suicide bombers Weber, a person possessing charisma has “a carrying stolen Belgian passports and posing as certain quality […] by virtue of which s/he is set journalists, Massoud was indeed the very figure apart from ordinary people and treated as around whom Afghans and the international endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at community rallied in their effort to defeat the 9 least specifically exceptional powers or Taliban. 5 qualities.” Though still subjective in nature, An ethnic Tajik, Massoud earned the nom de charisma was, for Weber, a legitimate way in guerre The Lion of Panjshir after his successful which leaders obtained, consolidated, and defense of the Panjshir Valley (his birthplace and maintained authority. the home of Afghanistan’s Tajik community) from Throughout the 20th century, scholars the Soviet and Taliban campaigns. Massoud had debated the validity of Weber’s theory of become so vital to the resistance that the Afghan charismatic leadership. Dekmejian and United Front initiated a disinformation campaign Wyzsomirski, Spencer, and Schweitzer, interpret to prevent confirmation of his death until a week
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 3 10 later. In less than a week, however, the events of documentaries, or even first‐hand, scholarly field September 11, 2001 would transform the Afghan research of the leaders themselves, we cannot United Front. This coalition of militias went from help but view the leader through a tinted lens. a cornered and increasingly desperate resistance, Simply, it is in the mind of the follower that a to the entry point for the United States’ bid to oust charismatic leader emerges and it is from these the Taliban and capture or kill Al Qaeda leader followers that the charismatic derives his and suspected 9/11 mastermind, Osama bin authority. Indeed, the central tenet of charisma is Laden. the effectual relationship between the leader and The nature of the attack on Massoud—a his followers. If we are asking, who is a suicide mission carried out with a bomb charismatic leader? One answer may simply be to concealed in a video camera—and the fact that it find the leader towards whom the sentiments of 14 was carried out just two days before the 9/11 awe and enthusiasm are directed. Dekmejian terrorist attacks, fueled allegations that the two and Wyszomirski offered the same starting point 11 events were directly linked. If this is the case, in their charismatic assessment of the Madhi of then bin Laden, it could be argued, recognized Sudan: Massoud as the lynchpin of the resistance and as a key U.S. ally in the event of American retaliation The ultimate judgment of the leader’s 12 on Taliban and Al Qaeda targets. The Central “goodness” or “badness” or “genuiness” Intelligence Agency (CIA) had also identified or “spuriousness” lies solely with his Massoud as an indispensable leader of the followers. The opinions of “outsiders” or mujahideen resistance to the Taliban. Though “noncommunicants” who have not both bin Laden and the CIA understood the succumbed to the leader’s charisma are centrality and charismatic power of Massoud’s irrelevant. Whatever the leader’s personal unquestioned leadership, it can easily be qualities or morality, the fact remains that conjectured that bin Laden may have acted on this these were acceptable to his followers and understanding in making the strategic decision to proved instrumental in convincing them 15 eliminate him. The CIA was forced to settle for of the truth of his message. whatever leader remained. After Massoud’s death, the battle‐hardened These Followers are essentially incapable of general, Mohammed Fahim stepped in to achieving order on their own, and their lack order continue the fight with the U.S. to push the is never more apparent or urgent than in times of Taliban back into the tribal areas along the crisis or upheaval. Thus they are awed by the Afghanistan‐Pakistan border. Even the most leader’s intellect and ability to put forward a brilliant commander, however, would not be able coherent vision of the (often incomprehensible) 16 to fill the void left by Massoud’s death. An reality that is war. An informative example of assessment by Jane’s Intelligence Review ten days this type of charismatic leadership is found in an after Massoud’s assassination touched upon the account of a mujahideen war council, led by vital and ultimately mysterious nature of Massoud, the night before an attack on Taliban charismatic leadership. “While seen as a competent positions in the Panjshir Valley in 2001. and reliable military commander,” the report states, “the self-effacing Fahim has none of the personal His commanders—many of them charisma, strategic vision, and political sense that over older than he, most veterans of the Soviet the years underpinned Massoud's unchallenged leadership.”13 So what exactly did Massoud have that war—listened in slightly chastised silence, Fahim lacked? To determine this we need to examine like schoolboys who hadn’t done their those Massoud led. homework. “The type of operation you The chief problem with using a charismatic have planned for tonight might not be so rubric to analyze a revolutionary leader (or any successful, but that’s okay; it should leader for that matter) is the very subjectivity of continue,” [Massoud] said. “This is not charisma itself. If we look at journalistic accounts, our main target. We’re just trying to get
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
4 Al Nakhlah them to bring reinforcements so they take well as the need to build consensus often casualties. The main thrust will be overwhelm a charismatic revolutionary. As elsewhere.” Massoud was so far ahead of Arthur Schweitzer noted in Theory and Political his commanders that at times he seemed Charisma, “Administrative staffs and economic unable to decide whether to explain his support will squeeze out the original charismatic thinking or to just give them orders and quality as soon as the movement becomes a 17 22 hope for the best. consolidated regime.” According to this theory, the routinization of a charismatic revolutionary At the outset of internal conflicts, the dignity essentially kills his charisma. Yet the relatively and purpose of belonging to a resistance long periods of routine rule by Mussolini, Hitler, movement, combined with the charismatic Nehru, and Mao seem to refute the self‐ leader’s strategic vision, are often enough to destructive nature of the charismatic 23 secure and maintain loyalty. As Weber noted, revolutionary. when there is a chronic state of war the However, if it is possible to retain charisma charismatic figure able to channel strategic during the period of routinization it is not, prowess becomes a permanent fixture. As Spencer necessarily, probable. It must first be determined notes: “The prototype of such a figure might be whether the nature of Not only must a the war leader or general who is recognized as the charisma of the 18 being formidable at his craft, but nothing more.” particular leader is charismatic leader be able Yet, because of the one‐dimensional nature of this essentially one‐ to represent the needs of type of charisma, the revolutionary’s power is dimensional mastery followers, the leader must 19 fleeting and can vanish in defeat. The leader or multi‐dimensional also be willing to possessing battlefield mastery but little representation. This undertake tedious representational or organizational skills often is an essential first finds it difficult in times of peace to institute the step in evaluating a administrative endeavors, social, economic and political changes they fought revolutionary’s coalition building, and the so brilliantly to secure. ability to assume the normalization of foreign This transition from martial to political traditional reigns of relations. leadership constitutes the spectrum of the government. Not leadership cycle. “At the culmination of the only must a charismatic leader be able to cycle,” Dekmejian and Wyszomirski explain, “the represent the needs of followers, the leader must leader will have presided over a transition from also be willing to undertake tedious charismatic authority to one that increasingly administrative endeavors, coalition building, and relies upon ‘rational‐legal’ means of legitimacy; the normalization of foreign relations. with the passage of time the system may also During his campaigns against the Soviets 20 acquire traditional legitimacy as well.” The throughout the 1980s and again during his progression from guerilla leader to traditional resistance to the Taliban in the 1990s, Massoud government leader is known as routinization. proved a master at uniting and coordinating an Based on the legitimacy derived from his ethnically diverse coalition of Uzbek, Hazara, charisma, the leader must build a foundation for a Takjik, and even Pashtun mujahideen forces. new, lasting order. In order to ensure such Formed in May 1990 in a bid to oust the stability, routinization should occur “at the height communist‐backed Najibullah government (still of charismatic leadership, before inevitable clinging to power four years after the Red Army 21 reverses erode the leader’s charisma.” had been expelled) the National Commanders Yet, switching over to an administrative Shura (NCS) was a coalition composed of, among framework, while still retaining the charismatic others, the abrasive Uzbek Socialist Rashid quality that allowed the leader to inspire a Dostum and Ismail Khan, a former Captain in the following and ascend to a position of power, has Afghan National Army that had since taken up proven difficult. Associated political trappings as command of a mujahideen force in the eastern
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 5 province of Herat. In a move to alleviate the ever‐ decision to await the external leadership with present ethnic tensions within the coalition, whom he had become increasingly disillusioned, Massoud opened a military academy at his base in rather than exploit the power vacuum to create an the Panjshir Valley to train volunteers from indigenously controlled government, would come 24 various provinces. Additionally, Massoud to haunt him. As former Northern Alliance instituted a parallel government to address the resistance member Neamatollah Nojumi writes, needs of the mainly Tajik community in the “The personal charisma of a nationally and Panjshir Valley in order to build and maintain internationally recognized mujahideen leader like popular support for the mujahideen. Ahmed Shah Massoud could have played a More than the other mujahideen parties significant role in the establishment of a wider within Afghanistan at the time, Massoud relied influence of the NCS in Afghanistan…. In this strongly upon local sources for the economic case, the external leaders would not have had any 28 development of the region. In addition to other choice but to cooperate with the NCS.” promoting local small businesses and instituting a The transitional government that assumed parallel government to address the basic social power was headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani, needs of the largely Tajik Population inhabiting Massoud’s longtime friend and head of the the Panjshir Valley, Massoud was also able to Pakistan‐based Jamaat‐e‐Islami party (JIA). 29 coordinate the evacuation of civilians in the valley Massoud was appointed Defense Minster. From in advance of mujahideen battles with the Red the outset, however, the situation in Kabul did not 25 Army. By instituting a parallel government and allow for any rational‐legal or routine institutions creating a wartime economy, the people of the to take hold. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Panjshir Valley could now offer input in the the Pakistani‐based Hezb‐i‐Islami party (HIH) 26 resistance effort. Nearly a decade after he began and longtime nemesis of Massoud, refused to these reforms in the Panjshir Valley (and amidst a recognize the new JIA‐controlled government and string of debilitating defeats at the hands of the attacked Kabul with the backing of Pakistan’s Taliban in the north), Massoud proved an Inter‐Services Intelligence (ISI). Essentially, effective international statesmen and orator when Massoud and his Northern Alliance forces had addressing the European Union in Paris and gone from resistance movement to acting Strasbourg in an effort to galvanize international government to government under siege. This support for his increasingly beleaguered nearly180‐degree reversal of their previous resistance. This range of skills shows Massoud to position and strategic thinking occurred in only have been more than just a general or student of eight months. The switch from guerilla resistance Mao. However, the routinzation of Massoud’s to embattled government confounded any chance charismatic leadership never occurred. There are for Massoud to progress from the mastery to the several reasons for this lack of routinization in the representational phase of charismatic leadership. case of Massoud that deserve closer examination. A period of calm that allows re‐adjustment is When Afghanistan’s Soviet‐backed therefore a necessary first condition for the communist government led by President routinization process to occur. This is not merely a Najibullah finally crumbled on April 26, 1992, period of adjustment to the bureaucratic Mohammed Nabi Azimi, the general in charge of trappings of the state government system, but a Kabul’s military garrison asked Massoud to enter time for a deeper psychological shift away from Kabul and assume the role of head of state. guerilla philosophy wherein not losing and living Though he was the most popular Northern to fight another day is winning. Such an Alliance figure and had an organized Mujahideen environment did not exist for Massoud in Kabul force under his direct command, Massoud during his brief term as Defense Minister, and, as refused. Instead, he contacted the resistance’s a result, routinization never happened. However, external leadership in Pakistan and waited three to understand the events that occurred after the days for the interim government to arrive from fall of Kabul better, we need to look further back 27 Peshawar before entering the city. Massoud’s
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
6 Al Nakhlah to Massoud’s emergence as a charismatic leader their prophetic nature, their spiritual qualities, and to charisma’s Islamic roots. and their knowledge of, and ability to communicate with, God. Ahmad Shah Massoud, Charisma in Islam however, like many modern Muslim charismatics, When King Zahir Shah was overthrown in is not easily categorized as supernatural or secular 1973 by his cousin, the Soviet‐backed Mohammed . Supernatural charismatics claim to speak on Daud, the CIA and the ISI began to channel arms behalf of God, or to be agents of the divine, and to resistance movements via radical Islamic often espouse millenarian goals. Secular leaders parties located in Pakistan. Ahmad Shah Massoud rely less on divinity and more on a combination of and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar were both upper‐ strategy, mastery and popular appeal.Though middle class engineering students at the possessing a devoted following, they may have no University of Kabul when they crossed into real organization skills or desire to lead in the Pakistan to found and traditional sense. Revolutionary leaders, be they In the Islamic lead two of the most Islamic or Marxist are usually of a secular militant Islamic parties: character in their reliance on strategy, tradition, therefore, the JIA and HIH organization, military prowess, and rhetoric. charismatic respectively. Their Thus, we can identify secular charismatics—be leadership is defined immediate goals included they religiously affiliated or not—as leaders who by essentially what is the expulsion of are more prepared to make the transition to believed to be a communists from traditional forms of government. The secular supernatural calling. Afghanistan, and both charismatic can be a devout Muslim (such as parties were inspired by Massoud) fighting to expel what were considered
the Ikhwan ul Musilmeen Soviet infidels and godless communists from or Muslim Brotherhood. Founded in 1928, The Afghan soil. Brotherhood sought the creation of an Islamic It is also important to remember that during 30 state through revolution. the twenty years Massoud spent at war, his As it relates to a study of charismatic attitude and strategy changed. He essentially leadership, it is important to note the emphasis moved from the strict ideology of the Muslim that the Muslim Brotherhood’s model of political Brotherhood to the pragmatism of a nationalism Islam places on a single charismatic leader. As based upon the theory of an Afghanistan for Taliban scholar Ahmed Rashid explained, “The Afghans.This shift was driven, in part, by his obsession of radical Islam is not the creation of frustration at the continued involvement of the ISI institutions, but the character and purity of its in Afghan politics in the years following the leader, his virtues and qualifications and whether Soviet withdrawl. Massoud’s devotion to Islam his personality can emulate the personality of the remained consistent, but the necessity of 31 Prophet Mohammed.” The notion that a pure adaptation, the cornerstone of guerilla warfare, leader, or “guided one.” imbued with baraka (the forced him to change. Though the praise heaped Sufi term roughly translated as charisma) will upon The Lion of Panjshir at every official Afghan arrive to save the Islamic world is central to the State gathering would have us believe otherwise, 32 popular Sunni belief system. Massoud was far from the righteous idealist; he In the Islamic tradition, therefore, was a realist caught in a geopolitical game he was charismatic leadership is defined by essentially not prepared to fight. what is believed to be a supernatural calling. The Islamic tradition differs from the Greek and The Split of the Afghan Resistance Movement Christian traditions in that those who receive the Most studies on the politics of the Afghan call are vital only in founding communities and resistance movement describe the conflict 33 not in leading or administering them. between mujahideen rebel groups in terms of Thus, in the Islamic tradition, the early religion, essentially reducing everything to charismatic leaders were valued primarily for differences between fundamentalist Islamic
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 7 parties like Hekmatyar’s HIH and the more schism in the external and internal resistance moderate, but often no less militant, parties like should come as no surprise. Rabbani and Massoud’s JIA. “This simple When a charismatic leader emerges after a dichotomy,” explains Shah M. Tarzai in his study revolutionary movement has begun, the of cleavages within the Afghan resistance movement (in this case the Afghan resistance) movement, “is misleading because there are few may divide into those who reject and those who ideological differences (with respect to Islam) accept the charismatic leader. The people of 34 between the warring factions.” In fact, as Tarzai Afghanistan gradually began to accept Massoud’s explains, the principle split in the resistance unifying vision, and various other mujahideen occurred along an internal‐external axis. Taking a leaders were forced to either accept (Dostum) or page out of the colonial playbook, the ISI was able reject (Hekmatyar) Massoud’s charismatic hold to use aid and favor to keep the Afghan resistance over the people of Afghanistan. So why, with this divided in order to control whichever movement overwhelming support of the people of 35 eventually won the battle for Kabul. To this end, Afghanistan and the grudging respect (or fear) of Islamabad channeled CIA arms to the various various mujahideen leaders, did Massoud hesitate mujahideen factions based upon the factions’ to take control? Why, when presented the keys to willingness to toe the Pakistani line, not according Kabul, did Massoud hesitate? to need. How does this internal‐external split relate to Afghanistan’s Charismatic Lineage an analysis of charismatic leadership? A key In Afghan society, religion and government 38 feature of the internal resistance was the have historically remained separate. Within this emergence of a new military leadership. These societal structure a mujahideen’s first loyalty is to internal commanders were preoccupied with the his commander, who is usually a relative or a practical problems of waging guerilla war against tribal leader. This mirrors the general hierarchy of an asymmetrical enemy while simultaneously loyalties within Afghan society: family, clan, tribe, maintaining, repairing, or building “economic ethnicity, and religion. Though religion is the least 36 and administration infrastructures.” Despite powerful according to this breakdown, Islam is attempts by the external leadership to control often considered the one commonality shared by their counterparts inside Afghanistan, the need all Afghans; it has therefore been used as an for the latter to make and carry out decisions and ideological rallying cry to unite disparate tribes form or break alliances on a daily basis gave birth against a common enemy. to a new, practical leadership type. This type of Yet, in a culture in which the “Charisma can pass leader was sustained not by funding or status, people generally follow into offices or along but by successful battle plans, inspiring rhetoric, leaders rather than causes, blood lines to and a strategic unifying vision. In short, these ideology will only take you were leaders who could bring order to the chaotic so far. As a war hero, ethnic kinship groups.” life of the average Afghan during the war years. unifier, and visionary, Though Massoud was a founding member Massoud seemed to be a logical candidate to head of JIA and a close confidant of Rabbani, the a new Afghan state. party’s external head, he was first and foremost a In Afghanistan, however, there exists a military leader of this new order. To quote Tarzai substantial obstacle to even the most charismatic again, “Massoud is a good example of the of leaders. From the founding of the modern modernizing counterelite within the Internal Afghan state in 1747 until the Taliban took control Resistance … [H]e not only defended the liberated of the country in 1996, the country was a territory of the Panjshir Valley but also provided monarchy in which ethnic Pashtuns from the education and literacy programs, medical care, Durrani tribe ruled continuously. The Taliban and agricultural development for the civilian movement, though often characterized as a return 37 population in the liberated territories.” That to traditional Islamic ways of governing, was thus Massoud’s popularity (and power) created a an anomaly. In the end, neither the communists,
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
8 Al Nakhlah the resistance parties that battled for power using only a value‐free leader/follower dynamic following the Soviet withdrawal, nor the Taliban would result in a partial assessment, and an could create an alternative source of legitimacy incomplete framework. A useable framework comparable to the monarchy (Tarzai 1991, 481). requires context, history, motives, and belief. It is Interestingly, this continuous Durrani‐led only through a careful analysis of modern context, government is, itself, a form of charisma known historical precedent, and overarching cultural 39 as “transferred” or “hereditary” charisma. As behaviors that we can truly begin to evaluate Spencer notes, “Charisma can pass into offices or whether a revolutionary labeled a charismatic in 40 along blood lines to kinship groups.” This idea today’s world can successfully transition into the of hereditary charisma is not unique to world of traditional government. Afghanistan. Within the Islamic context it is believed that charisma could be inherited within The views and opinions expressed in articles are the family and clan of Muhammad. As Watt strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily explains, “Most … regarded Muhammad’s cousin represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and and son‐in‐law Ali as his charismatic successor, Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia from whom the charismata were transmitted to and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher certain of his descendants. The party who held School. 41 these beliefs was known as the Shi’ites”. Being a Tajik, Massoud was well aware of the tribal glass ceiling. Though this barrier could likely not have prevented him from grabbing the reigns of power, Afghan history instructs that, he had done so, his term of conventional leadership would have been short‐lived. There is reason to believe that Massoud understood this and that he was contemplating this very fact during those three long days that Kabul sat vacant. These concepts of ingrained tribal prejudices and transferred charisma are difficult for the western mind—that thrives on the idea of upward mobility—to accept.
Conclusion However, the irony of the charismatic leader ultimately undone by a charismatic institution is a tempting, though ultimately simplistic, way of concluding this study of the charisma of Ahmad Shah Massoud. In the end, this is just one of myriad factors that contribute to his charismatic profile. As we have seen, these factors include innate mental capacity, an unflagging conviction in the rightness of one’s actions, and the ability to order a chaotic world. However, chief among these explanations is the relationship between the leader and his followers. It is because of this basic relationship that all charismatic frameworks must be sufficiently value‐free to allow comparison between charismatic individuals as diverse as Hitler and Gandhi. Yet, to attempt to compare the magnetism of a despot and a symbol of peace
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 Works Cited
1 Leaders of revolutionary, resistance, and/or terrorist organizations in the twentieth and early twenty‐ first centuries have been almost exclusively male. One interesting exception is the case of Alice Lakwena. A priestess claiming divine guidance and offering salvation for the Acholi people of Northern Uganda, Lakwena formed the Holy Spirit Movement after Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army swept to power in 1986. From the remains of this cult‐like militia, Josephy Kony (Lakwena’s nephew) formed the Lord’s Resistance Army. 2 The term charisma finds an interesting parallel in the Greek word genus (genius). Like charisma, the Greeks believed that genius was either given at birth or divinely bestowed. It is no coincidence that true charismatics are often described as possessing an understanding of situations and events that is more than just knowledge. 3 Friedrich, Carl J.. Political Leadership and the Problem of the Charismatic Power. The Journal of Politics (1)(1961) 16. 4 Tucker, Robert C. The Theory of Charismatic Leadership. Daedalus (97) (1968) 731. 5 Weber, Max. Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Translated by A. M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons. (NY: The Free Press. 1947) 6 Dekmejian, Richard H. and Margaret J. Wyzsomirski. Charismatic Leadership in Islam: The Madhi of the Sudan. Comparative Studies in Society and History (2) (1972) 193‐214. Spencer, Martin E.. What is Charisma. The British Journal of Sociology (3) (1973) 341‐ 351. Schweitzer, Arthur.Theory and Political Charisma. Comparative Studies in Society and History (2) (1974) 150-181. 7 Friedrich, Carl J. Political Leadership and the Problem of the Charismatic Power. The Journal of Politics 1: (1961) 16; and Tucker, Robert C. The Theory of Charismatic Leadership. Daedalus (97) (1968) 731-756. 8 Friedrich, 16 9 Bearak, Barry. A Nation Challenged: Yesterday’s Hero; Kabul’s New Rulers Lament a Leader Who Died Too Soon. The New York Times, November 25, 2001. http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/doclist (accessed November 11, 2006). 10 An anti‐Taliban coalition, also known as the Northern Alliance, commanded by Massoud and composed of an often fractious array of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Hazaras and Pashtuns. 11 A direct link between Massoud’s death has never been definitively proven, and Al Qaeda has never officially claimed responsibility. 12 Sirrs, Julie. Afghan United Front Ready to Help US Forces. Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, October 19, 2001. http://www8.janes.com/Search/documentView (accessed November 11, 2006). 13 Davis, Anthony. Ahmadshah Massoud: The ‘Lion of Panjshir’ Assasinated. Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 21, 2001. http://search.janes.com (accessed November 11, 2006). Italics added for emphasis. 14 Spencer, 351 15 Dekmejian and Wyszomirski, 199 16 Spencer, 345 17 Junger, 212 18 Spencer, 350 19 Ibid., 346 20 Dekmejian and Wyszomirski, 198 21 Ibid. 22 Schweitzer, 180 23 Ibid. 24 Nojumi, Neamatollah. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the Region. (New York: Palgrave, 2002) 92 ‐107
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 10 Al Nakhlah
25 CNN. 2001. Massoud: US Forgot its ‘Moral Responsibility’ in Afghanistan, September 1998. http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/trade.center/massoud.html (accessed on November 17, 2006). 26 This reliance on local resources was done not so much to foster a mutual stake in the war effort, but because an increasingly independent and powerful Massoud had run afoul of the external leadership in Pakistan. 27 Nojumi, 109 28 Ibid., 112 29 Ibid., 110 30 Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001) 86. 31 Ibid. 32 de Waal, Alex. 2004. Counterinsurgency on the Cheap. London Review of Books,15. http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/contents.html (accessed on November 17, 2006). 33 In his journal article, The Conception of the Charismatic Community in Islam, W. Montgomery Watt explains the ultimate purpose of Islam’s “founding charismatic.” “The prophet,” Watt writes, “was necessary to found the Islamic community, but once that community had been founded there was no compelling need for a leader with the same charismata as Muhammad.” Watt, W. Montgomery. The Conception of the Charismatic Community in Islam. Numen (7) (1960) 78. 34 Tarzai, Shah M.. Politics of the Afghan Resistance Movement: Cleavages, Disunity and Fragmentation. Asian Survey (6) (1991) 480. 35 Ibid., 492 36 Ibid., 486 37 Ibid., 486‐487 38 Ibid., 481 39 Watt, 78 40 Spencer, 343 41 Watt, 78
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007
Review of The Price of Fear: The Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror by Ibrahim Warde Rebecca S. Hekman
On November 7, 2001, amid much fanfare, but not before a significant blow was dealt to an the U.S. led a global shutdown of Al-Barakaat, a important actor in the Somali economy, one large Somali remittance company headquartered which “provided a real service to a country 4 in Dubai. The first major target in the financial devastated by war and famine.” Every aspect of war on terror, the company stood accused of the case was known by Somalis, many of whom providing $15-25 million annually to Al-Qaeda. were bankrupted, cut off from telephone service, U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill called Al- and laid off from work as a result—and it left 1 Barakaat “the quartermasters of terror”; Bush them with a strong feeling of injustice. announced that the strike was predicated on International cooperation and goodwill toward “solid and credible” evidence that the company the U.S suffered as well.
was “operating ‘at the service of mass Warde finds the unmitigated disaster of the 2 murderers.’” Simultaneous police raids in four Al-Barakaat shutdown to be symptomatic of the U.S. states, Canada, Italy, Switzerland, and the many problems with the other 9/11-inspired UAE were hailed as a resounding success. confrontation: the so-called ‘war on terrorist Having ostensibly interrupted Al-Qaeda’s financing.’ Begun in haste to show decisive communications and made a significant dent in action and dominated by martial overtones, the the organization’s finances, the strike was also to financial war has swept uncover a wealth of information for law up many innocents in its enforcement wake. It has worked to Warde sets out What followed would receive far less disintegrate Islamic systematically attention—at least in the U.S. The case against financial institutions from debunking the axioms, Al-Barakaat unraveled. The company had kept the global economy, and scrupulous records of all transactions, and its driven terrorist financing assumptions, and 3 cooperation with the FBI proved “exceptional.” further underground—all myths that have In the end, Al-Barakaat was exonerated of all the while turning up created the “parallel charges of terrorist financing and its assets were little of value. Much like universe” of the unfrozen— U.S. conduct in other facets of the war on financial war, such as terror, the war on the thoroughly Rebecca S. Hekman, Fletcher MALD 2010, UCLA terrorist financing has discredited yet Law School JD 2010, is focusing her research on garnered few allies for judicial training in post-conflict justice system the U.S. along the way. persistent myth of reconstruction, with Afghanistan as a case study. Her Thus, for all the self- Usama Bin Laden’s concentrations at Fletcher are Law and Development congratulation and $300 million personal and Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization. uncritical praise for the financial war, inherent fortune. dysfunctions in nearly
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah every aspect have ensured that, at best, it has laws are, however, designed to “frame the done little to protect us against terrorist attacks guilty,” and thus “hinge[]”—dangerously—“on 14 and, at worst, it “may endanger America’s the designation of public enemies.” Moreover, national interests and the security of the world in with the opening of world financial markets, the long term.”5 these tactics are now being used on a global To urge U.S. policy in a more productive scale. Financial attacks serve as proxies for direction, Warde sets out systematically military action, and their effects are similar to debunking the axioms, assumptions, and myths modern “sanitized high-tech warfare”: they are that have created the “parallel universe”6 of the politically popular at home, while ensuring that financial war. “Financial warriors” often assert the aggressor country no longer “feels” what it 15 that money is the “lifeblood,” or “oxygen,” of does. The particular paranoia that has 7 terror. This axiom relies on what Warde calls surrounded 9/11 has also created a kind of “six the “master assumption of the financial war”: that degrees of separation” logic, so that any person terrorist operations are supported by a vast, yet or entity with suspected “links to terror” may be 8 16 finite, stash of hidden cash. Supporting both of targeted. The Al-Barakaat episode is only one, these is the thoroughly discredited yet persistent high-profile example; Warde describes numerous myth of Usama Bin Laden’s $300 million individuals, companies, and personal fortune, often said to legitimate charities around the form the basis of financing for Warde argues that “it 9 world that may also be counted as Al-Qaeda. is not clear that any of the financial war’s “collateral Contrary to common 17 damage.” conceptions, the costs of recent the new financial The fixation on money as the terrorist attacks have been safeguards put in 18 “mother of intent” for acts of terror negligible—and are steadily place in response to has also caused financial warriors to decreasing. (Costs for 9/11 were approach terrorist funding in the some $300,000-$500,000 over the September 11 much same way as money two years; the July 2005 attacks would, in and laundering. Warde finds this use of underground bombings in of themselves, have an inapplicable framework to be at London cost less than $1,000.) the root of many of the financial These figures underscore one of caught the money—let war’s dysfunctions. Indeed, money Warde’s central arguments, that alone prevented the laundering’s motive (crime-for- “terror does not exist because attacks.” profit); procedures (disguising the there is money; rather, money 10 origins of huge amounts of “dirty” appears where there is support for terror.” The money and injecting them back into the formal September 11 Commission Report revealed that economy); and actors (small numbers of drug terrorist financing fluctuates, and tends to appear 11 lords or crime families) are fundamentally largely in response to political events. Thus, the different than those of new terrorist financing. financial warriors’ obsession with money as the The most prevalent form of terrorism today is root of all terrorist attacks—an explanation that politically and ideologically motivated. Relying surfaces in the wake of every new attack— on a broad and largely amorphous support “obscure[s] the fluid nature, as well as the system, it uses small, unnoticeable amounts of ideological and political character, of radical 12 “clean” money to fund criminal acts. Islamic terrorism.” As Warde convincingly argues, these The financial warriors’ faulty assumptions differences have crucial implications for law have created defective methodologies, and enforcement. The money trail simply does not Warde takes aim at those as well. Following the yield clues in the fight against terrorist financing, 13 “money trail” has produced some notable and financial institutions are not in a position to successes in the past; after all, it was a Mexican help. Thus, as Warde suggests, despite a virtual bank account that eventually led to the White bureaucratic explosion, “it is not clear that any of House in the Watergate scandal. These successes, the new financial safeguards put in place in combined with the ramping up in recent decades response to the September 11 attacks would, in of the successive wars on crime, drugs, and now and of themselves, have caught the money—let 19 terror, have led to a significant expansion in law alone prevented the attacks.” Moreover, severe enforcement’s power—and incentives—to seize measures meant to punish and intimidate have assets of suspected criminals. Powerful forfeiture
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 3 the opposite effect of intensifying animosity and toward winning the cooperation of the motivation. unhardened ranks whose non-committal Thus, despite bombastic rhetoric and a complicity with terrorism provides essential flurry of bureaucratic activity since September 11, support. In this effort, according to Warde, “the 20 2001, international acts of terror are on the rise. principle question ought to be, ‘why is there Warde finds financial warriors’ methods not only support for terror?’”27 The money-laundering ineffective but also counterproductive in driving paradigm, which “obscure[s] the fluid character terrorist financing further underground. He of the terrorist threat” and criminalizes and argues that they provide punishes the support system on a massive scale, terrorists with clear must thus be discarded.28 Moreover, the Bush Despite bombastic signals as to how not to administration’s systematic exclusion from rhetoric and a flurry of get caught and, in some policymaking of persons with cultural, religious, bureaucratic activity cases, serve as fodder for linguistic, and technical expertise likewise must radicalism. In this regard, be reversed. Warde recommends “low-key since September 11, Warde laments the steady policies that are all but invisible to the public,” 2001, international deterioration of the image including reliance on cooperation and diplomacy, acts of terror are on of the United States in the and “radical streamlining” of the ballooning Islamic world and the terrorist finance bureaucracy.29 the rise. alienation of the voice of While Warde praises the 9/11 Commission moderate Muslims. Report for its “sheer accumulation of fact and 30 Warde dedicates an entire chapter to providing detail,” similar accolades could be bestowed on an objective history of Islamic charities. He notes his work. He shines when lining up fact and that the financial war’s assault on those in the detail to reveal the holes in the financial war’s mainstream in particular has provided founding assumptions. His treatment of the Bin considerable support to the argument that the Laden personal fortune and the Al-Barakaat war on terror is actually a war against Islam. embarrassment are exemplary in this regard. If Disconcertingly, financial warriors still claim his project has a weakness, it is that, at times, he unequivocal success in combating terrorist is unable to fill the void left by this 21 financing. In fact, Warde notes a distinct lack of deconstruction with anything but more 31 learning in the financial theater and finds it speculation and plausible conjecture. astounding that, despite changing attitudes and However, rather than a true weakness, this strategies in nearly all other aspects of the war on shortcoming may in fact simply demonstrate how terror, the financial war has been subjected to much there is that we just don’t know about how very little scrutiny. These trends are all the more to undermine terrorist financing and prevent acts alarming for the wealth of reliable information of terror. As Warde writes: “At the intersection of available undermining the financial war’s the shadowy world of terror and the opaque 22 foundations and methodologies. Nonetheless, world of finance, terrorist financing remains little financial warriors’ response to each new act of understood, and a great deal of research needs to 32 terror consists of “doing more of the same—only be done on the subject.” Judging from the 23 more forcefully.” progress of the financial war and the greater war Despite his heavy criticism of the financial on terror, that research will be both difficult and war, Warde notes that money can be a time-consuming. In this regard, Warde has made “significant facilitator and enabler”24 in acts of an invaluable contribution to filling the void. terror. Furthermore, he warns that this role will Whether policymakers take notice remains to be only gain prominence as terrorists attempt to seen. acquire weapons of mass destruction. As a solution, he offers an “alternative, support-based The views and opinions expressed in articles are paradigm”25 based in part on the lessons strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily provided by counter-insurgency efforts.26 represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and Warde’s paradigm re-orients the financial “war” Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia away from menacing projections of power and and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher School.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
4 Al Nakhlah
Works Cited
1 Ibrahim Warde, The Price of Fear: The Truth Behind the Financial War on Terror (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007), 96. 2 Ibid., 95. 3 Ibid., 99. 4 Ibid., 97. Warde notes that, in 2001, remittances from Somali immigrants around the world provided Somalia’s largest source of income, at ten times the amount of foreign aid. Al-Barakaat accounted for a large portion. The biggest employer in Somalia, the company also ran the country’s largest bank, largest phone system, and only water-purification plant. The shutdown resulted in the reduction of Al-Barakaat remittances by half, the cutting off of phone service for 25,000 subscribers, and the layoff of 700 employees. Ibid., 101-02. 5 Ibid., xiv. 6 Ibid., xiv. 7 Ibid., xv. 8 Ibid. 9 According to Warde, the $300 million figure first surfaced in 1996 on a State Department “fact sheet,” and represents a division of the estimated assets of the Bin Laden Group ($5 billion at the time), divided by an estimate of the number of sons (20). $250 million was then rounded up to $300 million. Warde notes: “The calculation rested on vague estimates and many dubious assumptions about the Bin Laden family, inheritance laws and practices, the actual worth of the privately held company, and its ownership structure.” Ibid., 6. Perhaps more remarkably, this figure has remained stable, despite Bin Laden’s having been stripped of his Saudi citizenship, disowned by his family, and dispossessed of his shares in the family business in 1994; expelled from Sudan and stripped of his holdings in that country in 1996; having been a guest and “sometime patron” of the Taliban regime between 1996 and 2001; and having been mostly on the run since 1998. The myth persists today—and is often embellished, sometimes as significantly as by adding a zero. See ibid., 6-9. 10 Ibid., xix. 11 Thus, despite a “relentless escalation” of the financial war in the 100 days following the attacks of September 11, donations to Al-Qaeda increased substantially—correlated to the war in Afghanistan. Ibid., 173. 12 Ibid., 15. 13 Ibid., 25. 14 Ibid., 26. 15 Ibid., 32-33. 16 Ibid., 58. 17 Ibid., 93. 18 Ibid., xv. 19 Ibid., 169. 20 Warde notes a 56 percent increase in 2003, a 300 percent increase in 2004, and a 400 percent increase in 2005. Ibid., 189. 21 Examples abound. In an address to the United Nations on September 14, 2005, President Bush announced that “terrorist financing has been drained.” Ibid., 153. In December of 2005, the 9/11 Commission assigned an A minus—the best grade in an “otherwise dismal” report card— to the government for its conduct of the financial war. Ibid., 153. A 2007 memoir by former Treasury Undersecretary for International Affairs John B. Taylor discussed his “great successes in ‘starving terrorists of funding’” and claimed that “he and his financial warriors managed to ‘prevent and suppress’ the financing of terrorism.” Ibid., 189. Tellingly, top government officials continue to cite the Al-Barakaat shutdown as a spectacular victory. Ibid., ix.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 5
22 Warde notes that the 9/11 Commission Report stands out in the regard. Other sources include memoirs and books from former Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, former counterterrorism “czar” Richard Clarke, and Michael Scheuer, who headed the “virtual Bin Laden station” at the CIA. Ibid., 5. 23 Ibid., 167. 24 Ibid., 173. 25 Ibid., 181 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., xix. 28 Ibid., 175. 29 Ibid., 181, 180. 30 Ibid., 5. 31 Examples in this regard include his spare explication of hawalas (informal remittance systems) as well as his treatment of the financial attacks on the mainstream Islamic charities. In telling the stories of the latter, although Warde thoroughly discredits lawsuits as a source of accurate, objective information, he is forced to rely primarily on court opinions and statements by prosecutors and defense attorneys. See ibid., 71-74, 139-45. 32 Ibid., 176.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007
Interview with Itamar Rabinovich: Walking the Tightrope of Middle East Diplomacy Michael Mylrea
In an attempt to revive peace talks, Israeli Prime modest. Minister Ehud Olmert recently met with Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas at his residence in Given the problems of the Bush administration Jerusalem. Once again, Palestinian and Israeli leaders and the fact that it is an administration that is on appear to be at an important crossroads. Is peace on the its way out and bogged down in Iraq, coupled horizon? Or will violence erupt? Tough questions loom with the weakness of Abu Mazen and that Hamas ominously. The complex environment of Middle East is in control of Gaza, and diplomacy is like walking a tightrope, where each the fact that the Syrians The Palestinians have negotiation rests on a delicate balance between peace can rock the boat through higher expectations and war. As Israel’s former Ambassador to the United Lebanon and through and the sizable gap States and Chief Negotiator to Syria, Itamar their influence on Hamas between expectations Rabinovich has walked this tightrope, negotiating and Islamic Jihad, the through some of Israel’s most challenging times. sense is that it is not the has already led to a Former Ambassador Rabinovich sat down with al right time to go for final postponement in the Nakhlah to shed light on his diplomatic experience, status negotiations. peace talks. offering important lessons from the past and his unique Therefore, the Israeli perspective on the future challenges and opportunities policy would be to try to in the Middle East. look for what we sometimes call a declaration of principles, which would not exact that high of a October 31, 2007 price from the Olmert government, and which would be accompanied by Israeli gestures on the What does Israel hope to accomplish at ground such as release of prisoners, removal of the upcoming peace summit? And, how roadblocks, and maybe dismantling of illegal will current events in the region affect its settlements. This is the Israeli expectation, but not ability to realize these goals? the Palestinian expectation. So, the Palestinians I think Israeli expectations, in anticipation of have higher expectations and the sizable gap the peace summit as it is referred to, are quite between expectations has already led to a postponement in the peace talks. I think the Michael Mylrea is a managing editor of Al Nakhlah postponement occurred because Secretary Rice the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and and her team realized there would not be enough researcher at Harvard Law School’s Berkman Center atn time for them to narrow the gap sufficiently for MIT.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 Al Nakhlah
some kind of success to emerge out of the because in order to make a deal you have to pay a conference. price and it is painful. The question is if the alternative is more painful or less painful and if The violence that preceded the Oslo peace the rewards offered by the alternative are large negotiations and Israel’s withdrawal from enough to make up for the pain. the Gaza Strip appears to have made the Another important variable is the concept of Israeli public pessimistic about the time. Is time working for me or against me? If it’s upcoming peace process. Furthermore, working for me, let me wait. If time seems to be recent violence between Hamas and Fatah working against me, let me a make a deal now. and continued Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied territories, also And of course the decision makers and mediators paint a pessimistic picture of the latest need to be able to read these trends correctly and peace initiative from a Palestinian make a good judgment call. You know, it’s not a perspective. This has led a number of mechanical process where you go by the criteria scholars to warn that another round of and measure them. It’s often a question of instinct failed peace negotiations could trigger a that politicians and diplomats need to have. third intifada. Could you touch on the consequences of raising high In your book, “Waging Peace” you expectations for the current peace talks? mention that “the first step to When there is failure, there is a sense of understanding the complexity of the despair and exasperation that could lead to [Arab-Israeli] dispute is recognition that another outburst of violence. It could play into the there is no single Arab-Israeli dispute but hands of Hamas, who would then say, “we told a cluster of distinct, interrelated you, there is no hope on this path and you have to conflicts.”i Could you give an example of join our path, and the only way is violent how the interplay of other regional resistance.” So the answer is yes. And then, of conflicts contributes to the complexity? course, there is a domestic price of failure for all Indeed, it is complex. We have had the parties involved. I think one of the Bush conflict for more than 60 years now, and the peace administration’s purposes is to try and end eight process for 34 years now has not been concluded years in office with something positive in the successfully. This bears testimony to the context of the Middle East against the back drop complexity and difficulty of the conflict. For of Iraq, and a resonant failure is not what they example, consider how the Gulf War weakened have in mind. the PLO and enabled Baker to invite a Palestinian delegation to Madrid without the PLO. There is Considering the severity of the always interplay of regional politics. The art of consequences of failed negotiations, how policy making and planning is the ability to read do you know when it is the right time to the trends correctly even when total information negotiate? What criteria need to be in is not always available. place in the context of Middle East diplomacy? What should be Israel’s role in finding a In conflict resolution theory, there is an solution to the Fatah and Hamas split? important concept of ripeness. You need to Actually, I think it’s not the right thing for identify when a conflict is ripe or almost ripe for Israel to try and engineer Palestinian politics. The resolution. There is positive and negative product of Israeli engineering will always be ripeness. Positive ripeness is when parties can illegitimate. But Israel can act indirectly. If Israel expect benefits, and negative ripeness is when thinks Fatah as a secular, nationalist, and they are under pressure and feel despair. The pragmatic group is the answer to Hamas, it can, prospect of what a negotiation can produce for without being too transparent, try to help Fatah. you has to be more enticing than the status quo
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 3
Do you believe Fatah will be able to hold distribution of financial resources, and regional the West Bank? What do Israel's actions demography. Without massive investment in (or lack thereof) in this current crisis mean development projects, creating jobs for the for the future of the Palestinian territories, ii unemployed, and raising the standards of living Israel and the region? in the Arab world, there will not be political I think Fatah can retain its control over the stability in the region. So, comprehensive peace West Bank. Israel can be helpful and is helpful in would mean a first step towards investing in and that regard because Israel’s presence in the West addressing the real underlying problems. Bank is very concrete unlike that in Gaza, which is cut off from Israel. And, therefore, I think that In my experience working on bilateral Fatah’s ability to retain its control over the West trade negotiations between Palestinians Bank is quite good. Its ability to recapture Gaza is and Israelis, I’ve often heard a number of questionable and of course the enduring situation Palestinians say that the only reason of a divided Palestine is not conducive to Israel even considers peace is to open up peacemaking. I’m afraid there is not much Israel the borders to take advantage of business can do about it, except to live with it. opportunities that would present themselves.iii Do you believe there is any Could you imagine a viable vision of a truth to that argument? If not, from where divided Palestinian State? does that argument stem? It is not going to be very viable. Not a state, No. But this argument is not surprising. In a but state‐led. This means that as long as you have state of conflict there are always these mutual divided authority among the Palestinians, it is complaints and paranoia. I’ve also heard an going to be very difficult to come to a final status argument from Palestinians who believe that the agreement. Israelis actually want to control them economically, replacing one form of control with When you were a chief Israeli negotiator another, and Palestinians will end up being with Syria during negotiations in 1993, it providers of cheap labor to a more powerful and was really the first time that sophisticated Israeli economy. Syria and Israel came close to a Without massive So this is not the only peace agreement. During that investment in argument in town. time the Syrian position was: development projects, “full peace for full withdrawal.” creating jobs for the What position do you The Israeli demands were: foresee the U.S. playing quality peace, normalization and unemployed, and in creating an water issues. In the background, raising the standards environment for a peace the Oslo peace accords of living in the Arab agreement between presented a window for peace Israeli and Syria, and between Palestinians and world, there will not be how would that affect the Israelis. Since then a lot has political stability in the region? changed. What would a region. So, It’s not a peace comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement, but an peace agreement mean for the comprehensive peace improvement of relations. Of region? would mean a first step course, peace between Syria Comprehensive peace would towards investing in and Washington would mean a lot because the real problems and addressing the real include an American decision, of the region go well beyond the underlying problems. as it was in the 1990s, to try Israeli‐Palestinian conflict. The main and work out a peace deal problems are overpopulation, discrepancy between Syria and Israel. And quite a few Israelis between populations and resources, unequal would be supportive of that. It wouldn’t
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
4 Al Nakhlah
necessarily be something negative that America Iran was one of the first nations to would need to push down the throat of Israel. The recognize Israel, and had a close political obstacles to American‐Syrian understanding are alliance with Israel during the era of the not found in the Golan issue, but more in the fact Pahlavi dynasty. Though hostility towards that Syria is seen as an Iranian client. I think the Israel accompanied Khomeini’s rise to U.S. will demand Syria distance itself from Iran power and the Islamic revolution in Iran, is there anything from the previous narrative with as precondition to building a future that could be built upon in terms of relationship between Washington and Damascus. repairing the current relationship between But I personally believe that as long as the Bush in Israel and Iran? administration is in place, this peace agreement is It doesn’t translate immediately. But it not likely to take place. However, if the U.S. were shows that there is no underlying national conflict able to pull Syria away from the Iranian orbit, it between Iran and Israel. It’s not going to happen would be a diplomatic coup. But I don’t think it anytime soon, but at some point in the future a could happen soon. close relationship or at least a normal relationship
could be restored. But for that How could you make it There is no real there would have to be a change happen? national conflict of regime. This is an absolute You open a confidential dialogue. precondition. You lay your cards on the table between Iran and
and try to play them well. It’s not Israel. In an article you wrote for easy. But this is not easy if the the Israeli daily Haaretz, you Syrians, as part of this package, want the U.S. to stated that “time is not a neutral factor, recognize their supremacy in Lebanon. The Bush passivity does not lead anywhere, and one administration is not going to do that. The next who does not take initiative, even on a administration maybe yes, maybe no. It’s a very different front, will find himself ultimately difficult situation. reacting to the initiatives of others.”iv Could you touch on this in the context of The situation with Libya was also difficult initiatives taken by other regional powers? considering Gaddafi’s nuclear weapons I wrote that paragraph against the opinion program and support for terrorist groups. of some Israelis who think that all we have to do But in the wake of the U.S. invasion of is play for time, just sit on our assets and try to Iraq, he has bowed to American pressure protect them. Norman Podhoretz, the editor of and moved towards reform. What lessons Commentary, has said that the Cold War ended in diplomacy can be drawn from this for dealing with rogue regimes? because the U.S. had the nerve and ability to stay the course until the Soviet Union collapsed. He Libya represents a great American success believes that Israel should do the same and story. It’s limited, but for Gaddafi to dismantle his something similar will happen. I don’t think so; I nuclear program and cease to engage in terrorism, think we should react. this was a great diplomatic coup for the United
States. React--like the recent Israeli attack in
Syria? Could you see something similar happening from American pressure on I can touch on that, but the truth is I don’t Iran? know. I can only speculate. I assume that the Not right now. I would have loved to see Israeli raid had to do with a joint Syrian‐North this, but I don’t see that now. Korean venture that had a nuclear dimension to it.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 5
I think that is an issue of huge proportions. But, in dialogue. What are your thoughts on a very peculiar way, there is a conspiracy of negotiating with enemy countries? silence: Syria cannot admit that it was caught red You can have secret negotiations and secret handed with the North Koreans, the Bush diplomacy, similar to what the U.S. had in the days of Kissinger between China and the Vietcong I think that much of the administration doesn’t want to destroy its deal as a prelude to a major breakthrough. It has to be damage done to with North Korea, and secret; not in the public limelight. And hopefully Israel’s credibility as a Israel is not interested in you could identify common ground and find a military ally was pushing Syria into a diplomatic solution to the problem. If you find a rectified with the raid in defensive corner. And, solution, wonderful. If you don’t, then you know Syria. therefore, this great story that you have exhausted diplomatic means before remains under the radar. military action needs to be taken. So, I’m actually The situation is reminiscent all for it, if it’s done the right way. of the Egyptian‐Israeli situation between 1971 and 1973, when Sadat spoke of both making peace and What is the advantage of a secret going to war, and ended up going to war and conversation versus open dialogue? making peace later. I hope we don’t have to go Open dialogue is monitored. It is very through the same sequence again. difficult to negotiate when you have to give a daily report to journalists about what was High oil prices and the overthrow of accomplished that day. It is very difficult to move. President Saddam Hussein's regime have There is a time for public diplomacy, at a certain emboldened Iran’s position of power in place and point. But it must be preceded by a the region. Meanwhile, Iran continues to secret negotiation that is not monitored by media build nuclear facilities, sponsor terrorist and publics, where you can make substantial groups, and threaten to destroy Israel. progress and begin to build support for whatever But attempts to isolate and stop Iran from agreement is taking shape before you come out to pursuing this course have failed. What the public arena. role should Israel play in Iran’s moves towards regional hegemony and nuclear How would you describe the general weapons? sentiment of negotiations in the Middle I very much hope that Israel can restrain East? How do your personal relationships itself and not jump to the head of the line. There is and feelings evolve when negotiating on no real national conflict between Iran and Israel. such a high level? Where do you start? And we should not contribute to a perception that You have to build these relationships. It’s a we are national enemies. And it should not also be business‐like enterprise. But at the same time you portrayed as an Israeli problem. It’s a global need to build a human relationship (not that problem, even if the rest of the world refuses to anyone is going to make a concession to you recognize that it is so. And, therefore, we are to be because you smile in a certain way). The human discreet, cooperate behind the scenes, and try to chemistry is a very important component in any encourage the right action, but not, as I said, jump negotiation. to the head of the line. What about when negotiations fail? What A number of American presidential are some of red lines that would make a candidates have argued the need to open military response imperative? up a dialogue with enemy countries like Well, let’s take the raid in Syria. Let’s say the Iran and Syria. The Bush administration prospect of Syria acquiring nuclear capability is a has for the most part stuck to its “Axis of red line. Syria sending large army into Jordan is a Evil” line, which avoids fostering
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
6 Al Nakhlah
red line. An attack from across the border— After the Second Lebanon war, voices shelling—is a red line. There are many red lines. from the American defense establishment began to question if Israel was a strategic What about red lines with the Gaza Strip? asset or a liability for the U.S.? What steps Gaza is a good example. Israel can, not that could be taken to strengthen the strategic it should, come to live with Qassam rockets nature of this relationship? landing in Sderot, but a larger rocket landing on Whatever raid took place in Syria on some strategic asset that we have near or in September 6 took care of that question. I think Ashkelon, which is a major city, is a quantum, that much of the damage done to Israel’s qualitative change. And I think that if credibility as a military ally was rectified with the Palestinians hit Ashkelon or a strategic facility raid in Syria. near Ashkelon there will be massive Israeli action in the Gaza Strip. What lessons can you impart to future Middle East diplomats and negotiators?
Until now, Qassam rocket attacks have The first is patience. Negotiations in the originated from the Gaza Strip. What if Middle East need to be conducted with a lot of that problem evolved to the West Bank, patience. Americans, and oftentimes Israelis, are where a Qassam rocket could hit the heart always in a hurry. Secondly, both Americans and of Israel, shut down air traffic, and Israelis look with contempt upon haggling and severely damage the economy? How will bargaining: you pay a price for that in the Middle that affect future plans for Israeli East because bargaining is part of the game. If you withdrawal? don’t bargain and let up your position, you lose. Israel wants a defensive perimeter around the airport so that it’s safe from missiles. The views and opinions expressed in articles are strictly the author’s own, and do not necessarily What lessons can the U.S. apply to Iraq represent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and from Israel’s evacuations from the Gaza Editorial Boards, or the Program for Southwest Asia Strip or Lebanon? and Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The Fletcher What comes immediately to mind in Iraq is School. if you withdraw unilaterally you have to expect civil war and enemies taking over. You lose control. You cut your losses, but you lose control.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University
Fall 2007 7
Works Cited
i Itamar Rabinovich. Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3. ii The author worked on promoting commercial diplomacy and trade between Palestinian and Israeli parties at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv. iii Itamar Rabinovich, “Courting Syria,” Haaretz, November 24, 2006. Accessed on December 21, 2007 at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/791583.html.
© The Fletcher School – Al Nakhlah – Tufts University