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The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2007 Does the Price of Watermelons Matter? Economic Performance and Political Legitimacy in the Islamic Republic of Iran A. Nicholas Gossen Despite Ayatollah Khomeini’s famous to which that gap has affected the political comment that the Iranian revolution was “not legitimacy of the Iranian regime. about the price of watermelons,” the Islamic Republic of Iran was in part founded on economic PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND METHODOLOGY promises of redistribution, equality, and justice. The strength of this rhetoric has formed a core The Economic Performance/Public Support basis of political support for the regime, but it has Dynamic also established public expectations that the The relationship between economic Islamic Republic has been chronically unable to performance and public meet. Many analysts have cited Iran’s poor support for a political Despite Ayatollah economic performance since the revolution and regime or incumbent Khomeini’s famous resulting public dissatisfaction as a key weakness administration is a of the clerical regime and a potential source of its subject that has received comment that the downfall. Indeed, this is a crucial element of the substantial attention in Iranian revolution was argument advanced by advocates of stronger developed countries, “not about the price of multilateral economic sanctions against Iran in particularly Britain and the dispute over its nuclear program. However, the United States. Due to watermelons,” the underlying this logic is an implicit assumption the paucity of high- Islamic Republic of Iran that regime legitimacy is tied to economic quality survey data was in part founded on performance. While intuitively appealing, this collected in developing assumption bears further scrutiny, particularly if countries, relatively little economic promises of it forms a basis for American policy decisions corresponding research redistribution, equality, towards Iran. The primary goal of this paper is to on these political systems and justice. exists. The research that does exist focuses Nicholas Gossen, Fletcher MALD 2007, is a primarily on support for newly democratic second-year student concentrating in International regimes. One of the more well-documented Business Relations and Southwest Asia and Islamic studies of this subject was conducted by Steven Civilizations. He spent the summer of 2007 working Finkel, Edward Muller, and Mitchell Seligson, for Fletcher's SWAIC program in Baku with who use longitudinal surveys conducted in Costa Azerbaijan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Rica and West Germany in the midst of economic crises to assess the extent to which economic examine the political and economic factors that performance affected incumbent popularity and have caused the gap between economic rhetoric 1 regime support. They find that overall support and performance in Iran, and to assess the extent for the democratic political regime remained very © The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue – Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA – Tel: +1.617.627.3700 2 al Nakhlah high throughout the crisis, while opinions of effect of economic performance on political incumbent performance declined substantially. legitimacy in Iran, the conclusions developed They conclude that democracies that enter from research on emerging democracies serve as economic crises with high levels of legitimacy are a working hypothesis, which is then tested capable of maintaining regime support even in against available data from Iran to judge whether the face of dissatisfaction with particular leaders. or not the same results can be observed there. Shifting focus to Africa, Michael Bratton and The Islamic Republic of Iran is not a Robert Mattes use survey data from Ghana, democracy. Political authority lies ultimately with Zambia, and South Africa to examine whether the Qur’an and proximately with the Rahbar (the support for these democratic regimes is ‘intrinsic’ Supreme Leader), rather than with its citizens. (an end in itself) or ‘instrumental’ (a means to an However, the Islamic Republic does contain 2 end). They conclude that “approval of strong representative elements. The Majles (the democracy remains performance-driven; but Iranian parliament) and the president are elected approval hinges less on the government's directly by the citizens, though the list of eligible capacity at delivering economic candidates is carefully screened by clerical goods than its ability to authorities to ensure proper guarantee basic political [D]emocratic regimes “Islamic” credentials and political 3 rights.” Indeed, they find that do not rely primarily on viewpoints that are acceptable to “when other relevant factors are economic performance the regime. In using the findings from emerging democracies as a controlled for, citizen for legitimacy. Instead, perceptions of economic falsifiable hypothesis for Iran, I delivery have no discernible it is their ability to meet assume that it is the not the effects on the endorsement of the political needs of democratic elements of the regimes democracy in either Zambia or cited above that give them their 4 their citizens that forms South Africa.” In other words, core political characteristics, but for most citizens the political the core of their public rather their republican elements. In benefits of the democratic support. other words, I hypothesize that it is regime outweigh its economic not democracy per se that affects benefits – or lack thereof. A public opinion in the democratic similar study of post-communist democratic states regimes studied above, but rather what is often in Eastern Europe, conducted by Geoffrey Evans called the “democratic process”—voting, and Stephen Whitefield, comes to largely the representation, competing political parties, etc. A same conclusion, finding that “when support for finding that economic performance affects marketization is controlled for, there is very little political legitimacy in Iran would reject this link from economic experience to support for hypothesis. On the other hand, a conclusion that 5 economic performance does not influence political democracy.” legitimacy in Iran would argue in favor of this The consistency of these conclusions across hypothesis that Iran’s republican government divergent social and political settings leads to a produces a similar phenomenon to that which is fairly robust conclusion that democratic regimes observed in democracies. do not rely primarily on economic performance Accurately gauging public opinion in Iran is for legitimacy. Instead, it is their ability to meet a challenge. The government keeps tight control the political needs of their citizens that forms the of public polling activities to prevent the core of their public support. While poor economic collection and dissemination of information that performance can, and often does, decrease public might undermine regime policies. For example, support for an incumbent administration, it does the head of Iran’s National Institute of Public not undermine the democratic regime itself. Opinion, Behrouz Geranpayeh, was imprisoned Methodology in 2002 after publishing a poll showing that 75 percent of Iranians favored a resumption of These findings are robust in the context of 6 democracies, but do they apply to Iran given its diplomatic relations with the United States. In an unique mixture of representative and theocratic environment where the government actively elements? Due to the scarcity of reliable survey hinders the ability of researchers to measure data, this is a challenging question to answer. In public opinion, it is difficult to devise a the absence of such data, this paper must employ methodology that can cleanly and definitely a more circuitous approach. In order to assess the answer the present research question. © The Fletcher School – al Nakhlah – Tufts University Fall 2007 3 To address this concern, I have cast my net religious foundations (bonyads) to provide for the broadly, relying on a variety of information needs of the poor, and developed a massive sources. In addition to economic and historical system of subsidies (both directly and indirectly analysis of Iran’s political economy, this paper through preferential exchange rates). Taken as a makes use of three primary data sources: survey whole, these policies have been consistently 7 data from the 2000 World Values Survey (WVS), a inefficient and counterproductive, measured poll conducted in 2006 by the Program on either by the standard of pure economic growth 8 International Policy Attitudes, and Iranian print or by the conception of economic justice that media coverage. Each data source has its formed the core of revolutionary rhetoric. Since limitations (see endnotes for a more detailed the Islamic Republic’s creation, inflation has 11 discussion). Taken together, however, they averaged 21 percent per year. The constitute the most direct and contemporary unemployment rate is currently estimated to be sources available about political and economic around 20 percent, a figure that rises to nearly 50 issues in Iran. percent among Iranians between the ages of 25 12 Using Iranian print media to analyze and 29. Foreign direct investment remains all Iranian public opinion as a whole presents a but non-existent in Iran, and subsidies currently 13 particular challenge due to the fact that Iranian consume nearly 25 percent of Iran’s GDP. newspapers are subjected to intense

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