NEW TAJIK MINISTER OF WAR IN ISIS: A HARBINGER OR MESSENGER?

Introduction The terrorist group known as Daesh, the Islamic State in Iraq and (ISIS), the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) identified the Central Asian region as the area of Khorasan, once an ancient territory occupied today by modern Iran, and Afghanistan. Khorasan is supposed to become part of greater Islamic Caliphate; one Daesh is trying to create today in the Middle East.

This article will mostly focus upon the struggle of Tajikistan’s government with ISIS, its external and internal difficulties and challenges; as well as provide a brief overview about Tajikistan’s security relations with two great powers in the region: Russia and the US.

The summer of 2016 turned out to be quite testing and complex in terms of security for the entire Central Asian region. One can mention terrorist attacks in Aqtobe on 5 June 2016; an armed incident in Almaty on 18 July 2016; a car bombing at the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek in September 2016 and others. Main security event for Tajikistan is surely the news about its former special police unit (OMON) commander Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov becoming a new ISIS Minister of War. This article will look at this latest issue from a more detailed and analytical angle in an attempt to explain what it can possibly mean for Tajikistan and broader Central Asian nations in terms of security.

Gulmurod Khalimov Once President Imomali Rahmon described ISIS as “the plague of the new century”, warning that any Tajik citizen joining the terrorists shall “burn in Hell.” [1] In May 2015 Tajikistan’s Interior Minister’s colonel Gulmurod Khalimov had famously defected to ISIS, leaving his country’s law enforcement agencies highly surprised. He commanded OMON, a special police unit to combat criminals and militants. In a short video that came soon after his departure the colonel briefly explained his biography mentioning he studied and trained both in Russia and the US with special operations forces. In Russia he trained with elite “spetsnaz” forces. He threatened to bring jihad back home addressing both the President Imomali Rakhmon and his ministers. Most importantly in his threats to his countrymen he claimed that there are many brothers from Khorasan who dream about establishing a Caliphate in Tajikistan to be run under the Sharia law.

One month later, in June 2015 Dushanbe issued an international arrest warrant with the help of INTERPOL for the colonel. The charge against him is alleged membership of a terrorist group. [2]

The US State Department included the fact of defection of Khalimov in its security report, calling it a “game changer” for ISIS in Central Asia. Later the State Department issued alerts for American citizens travelling to Tajikistan, particularly in Southern provinces bordering with Afghanistan.

In late August 2016 the report emerged that Gulmurod Khalimov had replaced Tarhan Batirashvili known as Abu Omar al-Shishani (Omar the Chechen) killed during the US air strike in July.[3] Thus Khalimov now became a top field commander within the military ranks of ISIS.

Almost immediately on August 30 2016 the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice Program posted an offer for $3 million for information “leading to the location, arrest, and/or conviction of Gulmurod Khalimov (variant Halimov), a key leader of the terrorist group ISIL”. There Khalimov is described as a former Tajik special operations colonel, police commander and military who is also an active recruiter. Since late September 2015 he was Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 with his name being on the sanction list of the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaida Sanctions Committee as well.[4]

In the week leading up to the 25th anniversary of Tajik Independence on 9 September some servicemen received anonymous text messages in Khalimov's name promising to "congratulate" them with the Independence Day. Tajik Security services rushed to investigate the matter, though nothing so far indicated that threat has been implemented.

Around the same time another harrowing event occurred in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. On 30 August a car broke into and then exploded within the compound of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek leaving three people injured. In the aftermath two belonging to Tajikistani citizens were recovered, one of them being Zoir Khalilov, an ethnic Uighur as the State Committee on National Security (GKNB) security service confirmed. Meanwhile Tajik law enforcement agencies insist that the two Tajik holders are currently fighting in the Middle East and could not have possibly been physically present there during the attack. Kyrgyz authorities on the other hand are blaming East Turkestan Islamic Movement.[5] Both countries, along with Russia are obviously investigating all the possible clues to identify the real perpetrators behind the attack.

Colonel Khalimov currently is the only known Central Asian militant of such high military ranking and background: he comes not only directly from the Tajik Interior Ministry, but he also headed the OMON, and attended training courses in the worlds’ best military sites. Therefore both Tajik, Russian and Central Asian officials have concerns that Khalimov acquired and may someday exploit strategic information about the defence plans of Dushanbe; training methods of security forces; or Russian and possibly Chinese plans to support and assist CA region.

Tajikistan’s domestic affairs and Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan The poorest country in Central Asia Tajikistan received its 40% GDP share from the migrant remittances, mostly from Russia and . This share had started falling drastically over the last two years due to the deteriorating economic situation in Russia. Fall of the ruble in turn affects negatively prices in Tajikistan, whose enormous dependence on remittances became almost legendary. Some analysts believe that main reasons for rapid radicalization of the Tajik society are economically driven; high level of unemployment, social marginalization and injustice, lack of necessary social benefits and other serve as additional contributors to the brewing social-political unrest.

According to one report ISIS pays its fighters around $400-$500 per month as opposed to $175 a month in Tajikistan.[6] Thus, many fear that economic and financial incentives can serve as additional luring factor for Tajik men to join ISIS.

Another regular Central Asian watcher Noah Tucker believes that apart from financial incentives, potential recruits join ISIS ranks to also “embrace Islam as an identity that offers solidarity, a sense of belonging and an explanation for economic hardship and discrimination that they experience”.[7]

It is no secret that common an established route for Central Asian fighters to reach Syria is via Russia. From there they fly directly to and later cross the border on foot. It is especially true for Tajik migrants working in Russia where they form enclosed, almost isolated communities with many easily succumbing to Islamic radicalization. Reasons are numerous, including: long hours of hard work (like in the construction area), sense of cultural isolation, marginalization and abandonment by their own government. In fact radicalization of most Central Asian migrants occurs in Russia.

An additional reason, analysts assume lies in the fact of severe governmental crackdowns on Islam and its believers in Tajikistan. Starting from 2014-2015 Tajik authorities have been applying strict and severe measures against its own population attempting to restrict the level of islamization among the youth. The measures included the ban on wearing the hijab for women and forceful shavings of men’s beards. Today minors are not allowed to visit the mosques, and children cannot attend public religious ceremonies; private religious education was outlawed.[8]

Despite the real threats ISIS presents for the entire world and the Central Asian region Western experts tend to perceive the crackdown on Islamists by the Tajik authorities as authoritative and somewhat unjustified.

On August 28 2015, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was completely banned. It was country’s first and only religious party that remained in the Parliament since the end of the Civil War in 1997. The country’s Justice Ministry dissolved the IRPT due to lack of membership; party’s 58 regional branches were closed. Later IRPT was classified as a terrorist group. Moreover authorities had accused that its members share similar goals and ideas as ISIS. Many IRPT members were forced to leave the country fleeing from the persecutions and arrests. Additionally all the literature belonging to the party including their web-site, newspapers, audio and video materials were banned and outlawed. Even foreign media located in Tajikistan were requested not to bring, distribute and reproduce it.

Leader of the IRPT Muhiddin Kabiri was included on INTERPOL’s wanted list for direct organization of the armed insurgency conducted by Deputy Defense Minister Abduhalim Nazarzoda in September 2015, which later was called a coup. Interior Ministry charged the IRPT members with terrorism, extremism and the attempt to stage a state coup as well as few assassinations; the details remain unclear as all those criminal cases are classified.[9]

Some outside observers believe the more the Tajik government will keep pressuring and tantalizing the victims, or the suspects, as police put it, the more radicalized they might become as well as other people from their surroundings. It can also entail the underground support for IRPT locally as the number of its external supporters and sympathizers would grow consequently.[10] In other words Dushanbe is trying to fight the external signs instead of addressing the issue on a much more deep and genuine scale. Among many reasons driving Tajik youth to radicalization one can mention extreme poverty, poor social reforms, huge outflow of labor force abroad, and stringent governmental measures to prevent the population in its pursuit of Islamic religion.[11]

Meanwhile Dushanbe cannot face something much more ominous and real: the increasing flow of Tajik militants within ISIS ranks, including colonel Khalimov’s defection. Up to date there is no clear information on precise number of Central Asian militants fighting on the side of ISIS: in 2015 the estimates on Tajik fighters within ISIS were 300 people.

Threat from Afghanistan The general security situation is further worsening around the Tajik- Afghan border. Widely known expert on Taliban Akhmed Rashid writes that over 5,000 Central Asian militants are fighting in northern Afghanistan.[12]

The likelihood is that the Taliban and ISIS might attempt to attack the southern border of Tajikistan. Though objectively speaking such danger exists along the entire border between Afghanistan and Central Asian Republics. Tajik-Afghan border though is the longest and most porous one, with mountainous terrain replacing the steppes and open forest areas. In other words it is widely assumed that if the Taliban decides to go North, the Tajik-Afghan border will be their first choice: first point of entry. And this is something that Russian leadership deeply fears.

Throughout 2015 Russia has been providing military and technical assistance to Tajikistan to enhance the borders and equip border guards. Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu claimed that these measures are fundamentally impacting the larger stability in the region. He acknowledged that both Russia and Tajikistan are facing collective security challenges in the region, that is steadily deteriorating. He also admitted the emergence of ISIS in Afghanistan.[13] In this regard Moscow is determined to rearm and equip Tajik Armed Forces, to enhance the security of the Russian base there and assist in air defense.

Additional complications stem from the fact that in 2013 during the negotiation process between Dushanbe and Moscow about updated terms and conditions for hosting Russian 201 Military Base in Tajikistan the Islamic group called Jamaat Ansarullah claimed it was against it. They called the agreement anti-islamic and demanded that the government of Tajikistan to reject it, threatening with negative consequences if not acted upon.[14] Jamaat Ansarullah is currently banned on the territory of Tajikistan, being recognized as an extremist and terrorist organization. The 201 Russian Military Base is located in Dushanbe and Kurgan-Tube and is the biggest Russian base abroad, with number of forces reaching up to 7000.

Meanwhile the does not plan to quit the region altogether and is keenly following the unfolding events. However Washington has its own challenges in the region, namely human rights issues that openly clash with the politics driven by the Pentagon. US gradually started providing military technical assistance to the Central Asian Republics in various forms and formats since they gained their Independence.[15] Sometimes this sort of assistance is heavily criticized due to non- compliance with certain human rights norms and regulations. For example John Heathershaw, long-time analyst on Tajikistan largely criticized United States security and military assistance to Tajikistan citing Khalimov’s case as an example: “By providing considerable military training to Tajikistan’s security services during the regime’s crackdown on the [opposition] Islamic Revival Part … the US government has associated its counter-terrorism efforts with this campaign. [S]uch military assistance is likely to be counter-productive and should be stopped.”[16]

At the same time the US is also interested in regional stability within Central Asia and its overall security due to their specific geopolitical goals concerning other big powers: Iran, China, Russia and Afghanistan. But US assistance to Tajikistan remains minimal.

Conclusion In June 2015 Tajik President claimed that over 100 citizens of Tajikistan are dead as a result of fighting for ISIS. That suggests that total number of Tajik citizens in the Middle East must be substantially higher than the authorities care to reveal. According to Rahmon “one of the basic reasons for the attraction of youth to such organizations is their longing to earn more money and property in a short period of time. They, trusting the deceitful promises of foreign emissaries, take the path of death”.

Apparently Colonel Khalimov decided to become one of them. He, one might argue, had put Tajikistan on the map for anti-ISIS coalition countries: most never realized how serious Tajik Islamists have become or that they had such prominent presence within ISIS ranks before. However the Khalimov case can also be isolated and therefore should not be exaggerated. After all people like Khalimov stop representing the countries they came from once they cross the Syrian border. In effect they renounce their and change their identities: they all become brothers.

On the other hand, is it possible that Khalimov should be perceived as a harbinger instead? What if, there are many more like him that can defect and flee to Syria from Central Asia? Khalimov may become a precedent that is likely to repeat itself again in the region. By latent Islamists scattered throughout Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan Khalimov might be perceived as a hero of some sort; a man to follow; a potential leader who can unite Central Asians under one single banner.

And the most important question to ask is whether Tajikistan’s government is ready to act if Khalimov decides to return to his home country and fight the jihad there? Are they prepared to find, identify, intercept and prevent many more from joining him? After all it is still unclear about the exact number of Tajik foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Again no information is available about the numbers of the new Tajik recruits there.

Colonel Khalimov created a precedent within Central Asian security space of high ranking Special Forces officer serving as an active top field commander inside ISIS ranks. This fact alone should be taken gravely and duly. Now Colonel Khalimov has also become a recruiter and it is possible he may have kept and maintained certain influence among his former subordinates and comrades back in Tajikistan. It is also likely that Khalimov might exploit this advantage to gain and reap more benefits for himself in the future. Most importantly Colonel Khalimov took something that can never be returned: his knowledge, his skills, his high-class training at the top facilities in the world. And this person therefore is even more dangerous than it appears.

Both Tajikistan and other Central Asian authorities should take every available measure to step up and reinforce their domestic security. Another important issue is how to prevent new recruiters from getting radicalised in the first place. And finally the government of Tajikistan should adopt nation-wide strategy of how to handle already radicalised youth and stop them from reaching the Middle East or Afghanistan following those who already left.

References 1. Trouble in Tajikistan. The ISIS obsession of President Emomali Rahmon could lead to further turmoil by Cholpon Orozobekova//25.09.2016 2. http://www.interpol.int/notice/search/wanted/2015- 35977//29.09.2016 3. Defections, infiltrations bringing ISIL enhanced military expertise by Bill Gertz, Special to WorldTribune.com, http://worldtribune.com/life/defections-infiltrations-bringing-isil- enhanced-military-expertise// 21.09.2016 4. Rewards for Justice - Reward Offer for Information on ISIL Terrorist Gulmurod Khalimov, Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/08/261373.htm//03.10.2016 5. Kyrgyzstan says Uighur militant groups behind attack on China's embassy by Olga Dzyubenko, http://www.reuters.com/article/us- kyrgyzstan-blast-china-idUSKCN11C1DK//05.10.2016 6. Average monthly wage in Tajikistan stands at 820 somoni, http://news.tj/en/news/average-monthly-wage-tajikistan-stands- 820-somoni//30.09.2016 7. Noah Tucker, ‘Islamic State Messaging to Central Asians Migrant Workers in Russia’, CERIA Brief No. 6, George Washington University, February 2015 8. Tajikistan police shave beards of 13,000 men 'to tackle radicalism', http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/tajikistan-police- shave-beards-of-13000-men-to-tackle-radicalism- a6825581.html//9.09.2016 9. Tajikistan Bans Leading Opposition Party, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 163 by Edward Lemon, https://jamestown.org/program/tajikistan-bans-leading-opposition- party/#.V9pkhvmLSCp//25.09.2016 10. Trouble in Tajikistan by Casey Michel, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/11/trouble- tajikistan-151104085616528.html//23.09.2016 11. Таджикистан: как живут семьи арестованных исламистов, нора Саркорова, Русская служба Би-би-си, Душанбе, http://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2016/01/160122_tajikista n_islamist_party_arrests//30.09.2016 12. Jihad’s New Frontier: Tajikistan by AHMED RASHID, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/opinion/jihads-new-frontier- tajikistan.html?_r=0//21.09.2016 13. Министр обороны РТ: Таджикистан поддерживает операцию России в Сирии, http://news.tj/ru/news/ministr-oborony-rt-tadzhikistan- podderzhivaet-operatsiyu-rossii-v-sirii//03.10.2016 14. Tajik officer's defection to Isis highlights US support for repressive regime, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/02/isis- defection-gulmurod-khalimov-tajikistan//23.09.2016 15. ‘More than 100’ Tajiks killed fighting for ISIS, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/asia/2015/06/26/-More-than- 100-Tajiks-killed-fighting-for-ISIS-.html//05.10.2016 16. Edward J. Lemon. (2016) Building resilient secular citizens: Tajikistan’s response to the Islamic State. Caucasus Survey 4:3, pages 261-281.; accessed October 13, 2016