DOCSLIB.ORG

New Tajik Minister of War in Isis: a Harbinger Or Messenger?

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
New Tajik Minister of War in Isis: a Harbinger Or Messenger? NEW TAJIK MINISTER OF WAR IN ISIS: A HARBINGER OR MESSENGER? Introduction The terrorist group known as Daesh, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) identified the Central Asian region as the area of Khorasan, once an ancient territory occupied today by modern Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Khorasan is supposed to become part of greater Islamic Caliphate; one Daesh is trying to create today in the Middle East. This article will mostly focus upon the struggle of Tajikistan’s government with ISIS, its external and internal difficulties and challenges; as well as provide a brief overview about Tajikistan’s security relations with two great powers in the region: Russia and the US. The summer of 2016 turned out to be quite testing and complex in terms of security for the entire Central Asian region. One can mention terrorist attacks in Aqtobe on 5 June 2016; an armed incident in Almaty on 18 July 2016; a car bombing at the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek in September 2016 and others. Main security event for Tajikistan is surely the news about its former special police unit (OMON) commander Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov becoming a new ISIS Minister of War. This article will look at this latest issue from a more detailed and analytical angle in an attempt to explain what it can possibly mean for Tajikistan and broader Central Asian nations in terms of security. Gulmurod Khalimov Once President Imomali Rahmon described ISIS as “the plague of the new century”, warning that any Tajik citizen joining the terrorists shall “burn in Hell.” [1] In May 2015 Tajikistan’s Interior Minister’s colonel Gulmurod Khalimov had famously defected to ISIS, leaving his country’s law enforcement agencies highly surprised. He commanded OMON, a special police unit to combat criminals and militants. In a short video that came soon after his departure the colonel briefly explained his biography mentioning he studied and trained both in Russia and the US with special operations forces. In Russia he trained with elite “spetsnaz” forces. He threatened to bring jihad back home addressing both the President Imomali Rakhmon and his ministers. Most importantly in his threats to his countrymen he claimed that there are many brothers from Khorasan who dream about establishing a Caliphate in Tajikistan to be run under the Sharia law. One month later, in June 2015 Dushanbe issued an international arrest warrant with the help of INTERPOL for the colonel. The charge against him is alleged membership of a terrorist group. [2] The US State Department included the fact of defection of Khalimov in its security report, calling it a “game changer” for ISIS in Central Asia. Later the State Department issued travel alerts for American citizens travelling to Tajikistan, particularly in Southern provinces bordering with Afghanistan. In late August 2016 the report emerged that Gulmurod Khalimov had replaced Tarhan Batirashvili known as Abu Omar al-Shishani (Omar the Chechen) killed during the US air strike in July.[3] Thus Khalimov now became a top field commander within the military ranks of ISIS. Almost immediately on August 30 2016 the U.S. Department of State’s Rewards for Justice Program posted an offer for $3 million for information “leading to the location, arrest, and/or conviction of Gulmurod Khalimov (variant Halimov), a key leader of the terrorist group ISIL”. There Khalimov is described as a former Tajik special operations colonel, police commander and military sniper who is also an active recruiter. Since late September 2015 he was Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224 with his name being on the sanction list of the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qaida Sanctions Committee as well.[4] In the week leading up to the 25th anniversary of Tajik Independence on 9 September some servicemen received anonymous text messages in Khalimov's name promising to "congratulate" them with the Independence Day. Tajik Security services rushed to investigate the matter, though nothing so far indicated that threat has been implemented. Around the same time another harrowing event occurred in neighboring Kyrgyzstan. On 30 August a car broke into and then exploded within the compound of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek leaving three people injured. In the aftermath two passports belonging to Tajikistani citizens were recovered, one of them being Zoir Khalilov, an ethnic Uighur as the State Committee on National Security (GKNB) security service confirmed. Meanwhile Tajik law enforcement agencies insist that the two Tajik passport holders are currently fighting in the Middle East and could not have possibly been physically present there during the attack. Kyrgyz authorities on the other hand are blaming East Turkestan Islamic Movement.[5] Both countries, along with Russia are obviously investigating all the possible clues to identify the real perpetrators behind the attack. Colonel Khalimov currently is the only known Central Asian militant of such high military ranking and background: he comes not only directly from the Tajik Interior Ministry, but he also headed the OMON, and attended training courses in the worlds’ best military sites. Therefore both Tajik, Russian and Central Asian officials have concerns that Khalimov acquired and may someday exploit strategic information about the defence plans of Dushanbe; training methods of security forces; or Russian and possibly Chinese plans to support and assist CA region. Tajikistan’s domestic affairs and Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan The poorest country in Central Asia Tajikistan received its 40% GDP share from the migrant remittances, mostly from Russia and Kazakhstan. This share had started falling drastically over the last two years due to the deteriorating economic situation in Russia. Fall of the ruble in turn affects negatively prices in Tajikistan, whose enormous dependence on remittances became almost legendary. Some analysts believe that main reasons for rapid radicalization of the Tajik society are economically driven; high level of unemployment, social marginalization and injustice, lack of necessary social benefits and other serve as additional contributors to the brewing social-political unrest. According to one report ISIS pays its fighters around $400-$500 per month as opposed to $175 a month in Tajikistan.[6] Thus, many fear that economic and financial incentives can serve as additional luring factor for Tajik men to join ISIS. Another regular Central Asian watcher Noah Tucker believes that apart from financial incentives, potential recruits join ISIS ranks to also “embrace Islam as an identity that offers solidarity, a sense of belonging and an explanation for economic hardship and discrimination that they experience”.[7] It is no secret that common an established route for Central Asian fighters to reach Syria is via Russia. From there they fly directly to Turkey and later cross the border on foot. It is especially true for Tajik migrants working in Russia where they form enclosed, almost isolated communities with many easily succumbing to Islamic radicalization. Reasons are numerous, including: long hours of hard work (like in the construction area), sense of cultural isolation, marginalization and abandonment by their own government. In fact radicalization of most Central Asian migrants occurs in Russia. An additional reason, analysts assume lies in the fact of severe governmental crackdowns on Islam and its believers in Tajikistan. Starting from 2014-2015 Tajik authorities have been applying strict and severe measures against its own population attempting to restrict the level of islamization among the youth. The measures included the ban on wearing the hijab for women and forceful shavings of men’s beards. Today minors are not allowed to visit the mosques, and children cannot attend public religious ceremonies; private religious education was outlawed.[8] Despite the real threats ISIS presents for the entire world and the Central Asian region Western experts tend to perceive the crackdown on Islamists by the Tajik authorities as authoritative and somewhat unjustified. On August 28 2015, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was completely banned. It was country’s first and only religious party that remained in the Parliament since the end of the Civil War in 1997. The country’s Justice Ministry dissolved the IRPT due to lack of membership; party’s 58 regional branches were closed. Later IRPT was classified as a terrorist group. Moreover authorities had accused that its members share similar goals and ideas as ISIS. Many IRPT members were forced to leave the country fleeing from the persecutions and arrests. Additionally all the literature belonging to the party including their web-site, newspapers, audio and video materials were banned and outlawed. Even foreign media located in Tajikistan were requested not to bring, distribute and reproduce it. Leader of the IRPT Muhiddin Kabiri was included on INTERPOL’s wanted list for direct organization of the armed insurgency conducted by Deputy Defense Minister Abduhalim Nazarzoda in September 2015, which later was called a coup. Interior Ministry charged the IRPT members with terrorism, extremism and the attempt to stage a state coup as well as few assassinations; the details remain unclear as all those criminal cases are classified.[9] Some outside observers believe the more the Tajik government will keep pressuring and tantalizing the victims, or the suspects, as police
Load more

Recommended publications
  • RUSSIA and CHINA and Central Asia Programme at ISPI
    RUSSIA AND CHINA. ANATOMY OF A A PARTNERSHIP OF AND RUSSIA CHINA. ANATOMY Aldo Ferrari While the “decline of the West” is now almost taken is Head of the Russia, Caucasus for granted, China’s impressive economic performance RUSSIA AND CHINA and Central Asia Programme at ISPI. and the political influence of an assertive Russia in the international arena are combining to make Eurasia a key Founded in 1934, ISPI is Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti Anatomy of a Partnership hub of political and economic power. That, certainly, an independent think tank is a Research Fellow committed to the study of is the story which Beijing and Moscow have been telling at the Russia, Caucasus and international political and Central Asia Centre at ISPI. for years. edited by Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti economic dynamics. Are the times ripe for a “Eurasian world order”? What It is the only Italian Institute exactly does the supposed Sino-Russian challenge to introduction by Paolo Magri – and one of the very few in the liberal world entail? Are the two countries’ worsening Europe – to combine research clashes with the West drawing them closer together? activities with a significant This ISPI Report tackles every aspect of the apparently commitment to training, events, solidifying alliance between Moscow and Beijing, but also and global risk analysis for points out its growing asymmetries. It also recommends companies and institutions. some policies that could help the EU to deal with this ISPI favours an interdisciplinary “Eurasian shift”, a long-term and multi-faceted power and policy-oriented approach made possible by a research readjustment that may lead to the end of the world team of over 50 analysts and as we have known it.
    [Show full text]
  • Youth in Central Asia
    YOUTH IN CENTRAL ASIA: LOSING THE NEW GENERATION 31 October 2003 Asia Report N°66 Osh/Brussels TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. OBSTACLES FOR YOUTH ......................................................................................... 2 A. EDUCATION ..........................................................................................................................2 1. Funding......................................................................................................................2 2. Corruption..................................................................................................................4 3. Access........................................................................................................................6 4. Content.....................................................................................................................10 B. ECONOMIC ISSUES ..............................................................................................................12 C. SOCIAL INTEGRATION .........................................................................................................14 1. Leisure and Sport.....................................................................................................16 2. The Family and Community....................................................................................17
    [Show full text]
  • Temanotat Tadsjikistan: Pass Og ID-Dokumenter
    Temanotat Tadsjikistan: Pass og ID-dokumenter Temanotat Tadsjikistan: Pass og ID-dokumenter LANDINFO – 17. FEBRUAR 2011 1 Utlendingsforvaltningens fagenhet for landinformasjon (Landinfo) skal som faglig uavhengig enhet innhente og analysere informasjon om samfunnsforhold og menneskerettigheter i land som Utlendingsdirektoratet, Utlendingsnemnda og Justis- og politidepartementet til enhver tid har behov for kunnskap om for å kunne løse sine oppgaver. Landinfos rapporter og temanotater er basert på opplysninger fra både offentlige og ikke offentlige kilder. Opplysningene er innsamlet og behandlet i henhold til kildekritiske standarder. Kilder som av ulike grunner ikke ønsker å bli offentliggjort, er ikke nevnt ved navn. Opplysningene som blir lagt fram i rapportene og temanotatene, kan ikke tas til inntekt for et bestemt syn på hva praksis bør være i utlendingsforvaltningens behandling av søknader. Landinfos rapporter og temanotater er heller ikke uttrykk for norske myndigheters syn på de forhold og land som rapportene omhandler. © Landinfo 2011 Materialet i denne publikasjonen er omfattet av åndsverklovens bestemmelser. Uten særskilt avtale med Landinfo er enhver eksemplarfremstilling og tilgjengeliggjøring bare tillatt i den utstrekning det er hjemlet i lov. Alle henvendelser om Landinfos rapporter kan rettes til: Landinfo Utlendingsforvaltningens fagenhet for landinformasjon Storgaten 33 A Postboks 8108 Dep N-0032 Oslo Tel: 23 30 94 70 Fax: 23 30 90 00 E-post: [email protected] www.landinfo.no Temanotat Tadsjikistan: Pass og ID-dokumenter LANDINFO – 17. FEBRUAR 2011 2 SUMMARY The report concerns the rules and procedures for issuance of Tajik travel and identity documents, such as internal and foreign passports and birth certificates. Furthermore, it examines routines for registration of birth, and very briefly the quality of the registrations.
    [Show full text]
  • Charting an Uncertain Course in the Caliphate No
    ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security Issue Charting an Uncertain Course in the Caliphate No. 506 Yossef Bodansky Sep 2017 Charting an Uncertain Course in the Caliphate Yossef Bodansky September 2017 Executive Summary * Despite the ongoing flow of contradictory reports about the death of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – all other activities in and around the Islamic State/Caliphate leave no doubt that the Baghdadi era is effectively over. Senior leaders worldwide no longer expect the Baghdadi-level of central guidance on theological issues from any supreme guide in the Middle East. * Thus, whether Baghdadi is indeed dead or still alive is immaterial. The restructuring of the post-Baghdadi Islamic State/Caliphate has already begun. * Most indicative of the post-Baghdadi era is the sudden and concurrent rise of local senior leaders in the far flung “provinces” of the Islamic State/Caliphate. They introduce an era of greater autonomy resulting from the absence of the all-encompassing central authority of al-Baghdadi and his coterie. * Hence, even in the unlikely case he is alive – Baghdadi is no longer relevant to the evolving Jihad and the fate of the Islamic State/Caliphate. A decentralized and wrathful new Caliphate is rising from the ashes of Baghdadi’s Islamic State with its swarms of incited, indoctrinated and well-trained Jihadists ready to strike and torment the kuffar in each and every corner of the world. His namesake more likely dead than alive – Baghdadi’s horrific global Jihad has just begun. About ISPSW The Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy (ISPSW) is a private institute for research and consultancy.
    [Show full text]
  • “Wanted: Foreign Fighters – the Escalating Threat of ISIL in Central Asia”
    “Wanted: Foreign Fighters – The Escalating Threat of ISIL in Central Asia” Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe (the Helsinki Commission) June 10, 2015 Frank J. Cilluffo Director Center for Cyber and Homeland Security The George Washington University Chairman Smith, Co-Chairman Wicker and distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters. Your leadership in examining this challenge is important because the threat to U.S. interests at home and abroad, and to U.S. allies, is both real and pressing. At the same time, we cannot go it alone: the threat spans national borders, which means that international cooperation and transnational solutions are required. Allow me to begin with a word about how these remarks are organized. This testimony is structured with the bottom line up-front: a thumbnail sketch of the problem accompanied by key recommendations for action. This executive summary is then followed by additional details which serve as context and background for the crucial topline material. The latter is intended to serve as a resource for those with the time and inclination for a deep dive into the subject at hand. The foreign fighter challenge is a matter of serious concern for the United States and its allies. While the foreign fighter phenomenon is not new, its present scale and scope is unprecedented. As individuals from the West travel to conflict zones around the world, they are forming new networks with discrete skills and they are amassing battle experience that may be turned around and redirected at their countries of origin.
    [Show full text]
  • Terrorism in Afghanistan: a Joint Threat Assessment
    Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment Introduction 7 Chapter I: Afghanistan’s Security Situation and Peace Process: Comparing U.S. and Russian Perspectives (Barnett R. Rubin) 9 Chapter II: Militant Terrorist Groups in, and Connected to, Afghanistan (Ekaterina Stepanova and Javid Ahmad) 24 Chapter III: Afghanistan in the Regional Security Interplay Context (Andrey Kazantsev and Thomas F. Lynch III) 41 Major Findings and Conclusions 67 Appendix A: Protecting Afghanistan’s Borders: U.S. and Russia to Lead in a Regional Counterterrorism Effort (George Gavrilis) 72 Appendix B: Arms Supplies for Afghan Militants and Terrorists (Vadim Kozyulin) 75 Appendix C: Terrorism Financing: Understanding Afghanistan’s Specifics (Konstantin Sorokin and Vladimir Ivanov) 79 Acronyms 83 Terrorism in Afghanistan Joint U.S.-Russia Working Group on Counterterrorism in Afghanistan Working Group Experts: Javid Ahmad1 Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council Sher Jan Ahmadzai Director, Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska at Omaha Robert Finn Former Ambassador of the United States to Afghanistan George Gavrilis Fellow, Center for Democracy, Toleration, and Religion, University of California, Berkeley Andrey Kazantsev Director, Center for Central Asian and Afghan Studies, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) Kirill Koktysh Associate Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) Member, Expert Council, State Duma Committee of Nationalities Mikhail Konarovsky Former Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Afghanistan Col. (Ret.) Oleg V. Kulakov* Professor of Area Studies, Military University, Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation Vadim Kozyulin Member, PIR Center Executive Board Researcher, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Thomas F.
    [Show full text]
  • ISIS Type of Organization
    ISIS Name: ISIS Type of Organization: Insurgent territory-controlling religious terrorist violent Ideologies and Affiliations: Islamist jihadist pan-Islamist Salafist takfiri Place of Origin: Iraq Year of Origin: Al-Qaeda in Iraq: 2004; ISIS: 2013 Founder(s): Al-Qaeda in Iraq: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi; ISIS: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Places of Operation: ISIS has declared wilayas (provinces) in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Central Africa, Mali, Niger, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and the North Caucasus. Beyond this, the terror group has waged attacks in Lebanon, France, Belgium, Bangladesh, Morocco, Indonesia, Malaysia, Tunisia, and Kuwait. Overview Also known as: ISIS Al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq1 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers40 Al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers2 Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers41 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)3 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq42 Al-Qa’ida in Iraq – Zarqawi4 Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia (AQM)5 Two Rivers43 Al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers6 Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers Al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers7 44 Al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers8 Qaida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers45 Al-Qaeda Separatists in Iraq and Syria (QSIS)9 Southern Province46 Al-Tawhid10 Tanzeem Qa'idat al
    [Show full text]
  • COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27
    02002R0881 — EN — 14.04.2021 — 123.001 — 1 This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document ►B ►M246 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida organisations ◄ (OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2002 of 3 June 2002 L 145 14 4.6.2002 ►M2 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1580/2002 of 4 September 2002 L 237 3 5.9.2002 ►M3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1644/2002 of 13 September 2002 L 247 25 14.9.2002 ►M4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1754/2002 of 1 October 2002 L 264 23 2.10.2002 ►M5 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1823/2002 of 11 October 2002 L 276 26 12.10.2002 ►M6 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1893/2002 of 23 October 2002 L 286 19 24.10.2002 ►M7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1935/2002 of 29 October 2002 L 295 11 30.10.2002 ►M8 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2083/2002 of 22 November 2002 L 319 22 23.11.2002 ►M9 Commission Regulation (EC) No 145/2003 of 27 January 2003 L 23 22 28.1.2003 ►M10 Commission Regulation (EC) No 215/2003 of 3 February 2003 L 28 41 4.2.2003 ►M11 Commission Regulation
    [Show full text]
  • B M246 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002
    02002R0881 — EN — 04.04.2020 — 116.001 — 1 This text is meant purely as a documentation tool and has no legal effect. The Union's institutions do not assume any liability for its contents. The authentic versions of the relevant acts, including their preambles, are those published in the Official Journal of the European Union and available in EUR-Lex. Those official texts are directly accessible through the links embedded in this document ►B ►M246 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida organisations ◄ (OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2002 of 3 June 2002 L 145 14 4.6.2002 ►M2 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1580/2002 of 4 September 2002 L 237 3 5.9.2002 ►M3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1644/2002 of 13 September 2002 L 247 25 14.9.2002 ►M4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1754/2002 of 1 October 2002 L 264 23 2.10.2002 ►M5 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1823/2002 of 11 October 2002 L 276 26 12.10.2002 ►M6 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1893/2002 of 23 October 2002 L 286 19 24.10.2002 ►M7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1935/2002 of 29 October 2002 L 295 11 30.10.2002 ►M8 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2083/2002 of 22 November 2002 L 319 22 23.11.2002 ►M9 Commission Regulation (EC) No 145/2003 of 27 January 2003 L 23 22 28.1.2003 ►M10 Commission Regulation (EC) No 215/2003 of 3 February 2003 L 28 41 4.2.2003 ►M11 Commission Regulation
    [Show full text]
  • 14.0 Introduction to Forever War
    2 Labyrinth: Forever War 14.0 Introduction toForever War Labyrinth: The Forever War, 2015 - ? is a 1-2 player card-driven boardgame simulating at the strategic level the ongoing bid by Islamist extremists to impose their brand of religious rule on the Muslim world. It continues where Labyrinth: Awakening, 2010 - ? left off and adds new event cards and rules to cover the last five T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S years of history. Since publication of Labyrinth and its first ex- Game Component List ............................................................... 2 pansion, Labyrinth: Awakening, fans of the game have expressed Credits ........................................................................................ 2 a desire to update it based on more recent events, and a variety 14.0 Introduction to Forever War ............................................ 2 of event card ideas and variants have been freely shared online. 15.0 What’s Changed? ............................................................. 2 This second expansion to the Labyrinth game series fulfills that 16.0 Solitaire Play .................................................................... 4 continuing interest by providing up-to-date event cards and allows Scenarios .................................................................................... 5 the game to continue to serve as an effective strategic level model of the ongoing struggles in the Muslim world. First Time into the Maze: Beginner Strategy in Lab: Awk ......... 10 Designer’s Notes .......................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Transformative Networks: the Case of North Caucasian and Central Asian Jihadist Networks
    IJOIS Spring 2017, Volume III Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security Transformative Networks: The Case of North Caucasian and Central Asian Jihadist Networks Caleb Weiss University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Abstract Using two case studies of North Caucasian and Central Asian jihadist networks, this paper explores how each transformed from local movements to transnational organizations. This qualitative paper, which ranges from the late 1980's to present day, has wider connotations, as it argues that personal connections forms through prior conflicts are instrumental in this transformation. 1 Transformative Networks: The Case of North Caucasian and Central Asian Jihadist Networks Caleb Weiss Glossary AfPak -- Afghanistan-Pakistan AK -- Ajnad Kavkaz AQ -- Al Qaeda AQAP -- al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula AQIM -- al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb CE -- Caucasus Emirate HTS -- Hay’at Tahrir al Sham IIB -- Islamic International Brigade IJU -- Islamic Jihad Union IKS -- Imarat Kavkaz v Sham (Caucasus Emirate in Syria) IMU -- Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan IS/ISIS -- Islamic State/Islamic State of Iraq and Syria JaS -- Junud al Sham JMA -- Jaysh al Muhajireen wal Ansar KBK -- Kabarda, Balkaria, Karachay KIB -- Katibat Imam al Bukhari KM -- Kata’ib Muhajireen KTJ -- Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad LMA -- Liwa al Muhajireen wal Ansar MAK -- Maktab al Khidamat SCW -- Syrian Civil War TIP -- Turkistan Islamic Party UBL -- Usama bin Laden IJOIS Spring 2017, Volume III Program in Arms Control & Domestic and International Security Introduction On August 30, 2016, an explosive-laden Mitsubishi Delica van rammed into the gates of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, killing one security guard and injuring several others in the suicide attack.
    [Show full text]
  • Current Affairs November - 2016
    CSS - CURRENT AFFAIRS NOVEMBER - 2016 COMPLIED, ARTICLES, EDITORIALS FOR THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER 2016 12/1/2016 CSSMENTOR.COM COMPILER: SHAHBAZ SHAKEEL WWW.THECSSPOINT.COM | WWW.CSSMENTOR.COM | WWW.CSSBOOKS.NET DOWNLOAD CSS Notes, Books, MCQs, Magazines WWW.CSSMENTOR.COM Download CSS Notes Download CSS Books Download CSS Magazines Download CSS MCQs Download CSS Past Papers CSSMENTOR.COM, Pakistan’s The Best Online FREE Web source for All CSS Aspirants. Email: [email protected] November 2016 Table of Contents PAKISTAN TACKLING ABJECT POVERTY BY M ZIAUDDIN ............................................................................................... 5 PAKISTAN AND THE REVENGE OF GEOGRAPHY BY DR QAISAR RASHID ....................................................... 9 CLIMATE CHANGE AND PAKISTAN BY SIRAJ SHAWA .................................................................................. 12 WHAT IMPACT WILL US ELECTIONS HAVE ON PAKISTAN? ......................................................................... 14 THE WAY OUT: SOLUTION TO CIVIL SERVICE CONUNDRUM LIES WITHIN BY RIAZUL HAQ ....................... 16 TRUMP VICTORY MAY NOT HARM PAK-US TIES: US EXPERTS BY WASEEM ABBASI .................................. 19 THE ENERGY CRISIS: NO END IN SIGHT | EDITORIAL .................................................................................. 21 FROM ‘COLD PEACE’ TO ‘HOT PEACE’ | EDITORIAL .................................................................................... 22 PAK-TURK RELATIONS | EDITORIAL ...........................................................................................................
    [Show full text]