AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF TITTLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY*

ALEX R. PIQUERO Temple University National Consortium on Violence Research

MATTHEW HICKMAN Temple University

Classic statements of control theory propose that individuals who are controlled or bonded will be more likely to be deterred from deviance, while those who are not controlled or bonded will be more likely to turn to deviance. In a recent restatement of control theory, Tittle (1995) offers an alternative viewpoint. Though he agrees that a lack of control (a control deficit) can lead to repressive forms of deviance (predation, defiance, and submission), Tittle also asserts that overcontrol (a control surplus) may lead to autonomous types of deviance (exploitation, plun- der, and decadence). Terming it control balance theory, Tittle argues that the amount of control to which one is subject relative to the amount of control one can exercise (i.e., the control ratio) affects not only the probability that one will engage in a deviant act, but also the specific form or type of deviance. In this article, we focus on one of the key hypotheses of control balance theory: an individual’s control bal- ance ratio predicts deviant behavior. We examine this hypothesis using two vignettes designed to investigate the repressive acts of predation and defiance. Segmented, nonlinear regression results yield mixed evi- dence in that both control surpluses and control deficits significantly predict predation and defiance. The theoretical implications of our results for control balance theory are discussed.

In Control Balance, Tittle (1995) presented a general theory that was designed to account for all forms of deviance. Largely built as an inte- grated theory of crime that borrows concepts from multiple theories, con- trol balance, in essence, holds that the amount of control to which one is subject relative to the amount of control one can exercise determines the probability of deviance occurring as well as the type of deviance likely to occur (Tittle, 1995:135). Guided by the position that control is a central

*We would like to thank Bob Bursik, Charles Tittle, and four anonymous reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. This article benefited significantly from their suggestions. Please address all correspondence to: Alex Piquero, Temple University, Department of Criminal Justice, Gladfelter Hall (5th Floor), Philadelphia, PA 19122. E-mail: [email protected]. CRIMINOLOGY VOLUME37 NUMBER2 1999 319 320 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN concept in conformity (e.g., Gibbs, 1989, 1994; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi, 1969; Nye, 1958; Reckless, 1961; Reiss, 1951; Sampson and Laub, 1993), Tittle (p.183) asserts that when an individual’s control ratio is balanced (i.e., the amount of control to which one is subject is equal to the amount of control one can exercise), conformity will result. Control imbalances, on the other hand, are related to nonconforming behavior and can take one of two forms. A control deficit emerges when the numerator of the control balance ratio (the amount of control to which one is subject) exceeds the denominator of the control balance ratio (the amount of con- trol one can exercise). A control surplus emerges when the numerator of the control balance ratio is less than the denominator of the control bal- ance ratio. According to Tittle (p.143), being controlled is a continuous variable conveying the extent to which the expression of one’s desires and/or impulses is potentially limited by other people’s abilities (whether actually exercised or not) to help, regulate, hinder, and/or punish, or by the physi- cal and social arrangements of the world. On this deficit side of the con- trol balance ratio, various forms of repressive deviance help individuals “escape” control deficits in an effort to return the control balance ratio to equilibrium, if only temporarily. The manner in which these individuals compensate for their control deficit is to turn to deviant acts (e.g., preda- tion, defiance, or submission) that attempt to restore control balance. Similarly, individuals who exercise control over others tend to engage in deviance in order to “extend” their control. Since individuals with control surpluses are always seeking more control, their deviant actions result in further disequilibrium, if only temporarily. For Tittle, exercising control is a continuous variable reflecting the degree to which one can limit other people’s realization of their goals or can escape limitations on one’s own behavioral motivations that stem from the actions of others or from the physical and social arrangement of the world. The way these individuals compensate for their control surplus is to turn to deviant actions involving exploitation, plunder, and decadence. On this surplus side of the control balance ratio, autonomous deviance helps individuals extend control surpluses. While control balance adopts the premise of extant control theories that constraint on ability to act is a key variable in explaining crime and/or deviance (Tittle, 1995:142), an interesting distinction between control bal- ance theory and its earlier control predecessors is the notion that both low control and high control may lead to crime and deviance in certain situa- tions (see also Nye, 1958). This prediction stands in sharp contrast to pre- vious accounts of control theory (Hirschi, 1969), which assert that only low control leads to crime and deviance. Where Tittle’s theory diverges from these other control theories is in the possibility that higher control does, in TImLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY 321 some cases, lead to crime and deviance.1 For heuristic purposes, we present a graphical presentation of the con- trol balance ratio in Figure 1. By hypothesizing that both low and high amounts of control can lead to deviance, the control balance curve poses a direct challenge to the linearity prevalent in many criminological theories, a challenge that Tittle (1997:lOl) expressly set out to accomplish.2 Figure 1 The Continuum of Control Balance

I Control Control Control Deficit Balance Surplus

THE NOTION OF DEVIANCE IN CONTROL BALANCE

Tittle (1995:124) defines deviance as “any behavior that the majority of a given group regards as unacceptable or that typically evokes a collective response of a negative type.” He further elaborates on six different types of deviance, which shift in direction to the right and left of conformity (pp. 137-141,189). On the surplus side of the continuum, to the right of con- formity, there are three autonomous forms of deviance: exploitation, plun- der, and decadence. On the deficit side of the continuum, to the left of

1. Another important distinction in control balance is that motivation is not con- stant as it is in other conceptions of social control (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Hir- schi, 1969). 2. In the original presentation of his theory, Tittle (1995) noted specific predic- tions about the type of deviant act that would occur as one moved in either direction from a balance of control. In response to Braithwaite’s (1997) critique, Tittle (1997) appears to step back a bit from this claim. Here, we are not concerned with the speci- ficity of different types of deviant acts; rather, we provide a more general empirical test. 322 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN conformity, there are three repressive types of deviance: predation, defi- ance, and submission. The first repressive form of deviance is predation. This type of act involves direct physical violence and includes theft, sexual assault, rob- bery, property crime, sexual harassment, and parental use of guilt to elicit child attention. The second form of repression is defiance, or challenges to conventional norms. These acts violate normative expectations but are undertaken to avoid inflicting much harm upon the desired object of hos- tility. Examples of defiant acts include vandalism, violating curfew, unconventional sexual behavior, and sullenness by a marital partner. The final type of repressive deviance is submission. This form of deviance con- sists of “passive, unthinking, slavish obedience to the expectations, com- mands, or anticipated desires of others” (Tittle, 1995139). Examples of submissive acts include helping repress others to please power holders and allowing oneself to be physically abused, humiliated, or sexually degraded. Three autonomous types of deviance are also explained by the theory. The first type takes the form of exploitation. Tittle defines exploitation as indirect predation, such as using others to do your dirty work and contract killings. The second autonomous act in control balance is plunder. Acts that are plunderous are committed by individuals or organizations who “pursue their own ends with little awareness or regard for much else” (Tit- tle, 1995:139). Examples of plunderous acts include pollution by oil com- panies and attempted genocide directed against racial or ethnic groups by powerful segments of a population. The third and final autonomous type of deviance concerns decadence. Decadent acts are irrational acts, which are completed according to Tittle (p.139), “only by whim of the moment.” Examples of decadent acts include group sex with children and humiliating people for entertainment.3 By itself, a control imbalance only presents a potential for deviance to occur. Much like routine activity models of offending (Cohen and Felson, 1979), Tittle contends that actual deviance is a product of predispositional and situational motivation, constraint, and opportunity. The predisposi- tion toward deviant motivation is a product of one’s innate bodily and psychic needs, an “almost universal” (Tittle, 1995:145) desire for auton- omy, and most important, the individual’s control ratio (p.177). Actual deviant motivation emerges when an individual becomes aware of the con- trol imbalance and the possibility that a deviant act will alter hidher con- trol ratio in a favorable way (i.e., escape a control deficit or extend a control surplus). This awareness results from situational provocations of

3. While some readers may question whether some of the types of behaviors out- lined by Tittle are deviant, our purpose here is much more limited. The types of devi- ance are presented as outlined in the original statement of the theory. TITTLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY 323 various forms, frequencies, and intensities, such as verbal insults, the arri- val of yearly income tax forms, or being denied publication in a scholarly journal . Motivation alone is posited to be strongly predictive of unspecified devi- ance. Predicting specific forms of deviance, however, requires an exami- nation of the interaction of motivation with constraint. First, consider Tittle’s definition of constraint: Constraint refers to the probability, or perceived probability, that potential control will actually be exercised. The control ratio indi- cates the extent to which control efforts can potentially be brought to bear against a person; constraint refers to the actual probability that potentially controlling reactions will be forthcoming. Constraint then, is a product of three factors: the control ratio, the seriousness of a given act that might activate controls embedded in the control ratio, and the chances that the behavior in question will be discovered by those for whom it is serious (called “risk”)(1995:167-168, in original). Like motivation, constraint is strongly linked to the control ratio and both elements interact in a manner very similar to the balancing act of the con- trol ratio (p.145). For example, Tittle argues that “an individual with 100 units of behavioral motivation to do a particular thing is not likely to do it if he or she also faces 100 comparable units of constraint, whereas an indi- vidual with 10 units of motivation but only 1 unit of constraint has a much better chance of committing the act” (p.168). Like control ratios, relative magnitude is what is important, not necessarily absolute magnitude. The last element to consider, opportunity, is an essential and discrete variable in Tittle’s theory: “No matter how favorable the motivational and constraint configuration, the actual likelihood of deviance occurring depends on there being an opportunity for it to happen” (p.169). This element seems relatively simple on the surface, but Tittle notes that oppor- tunity is highly situational, and thus, both the frequency and magnitude of opportunities are important considerations. Regardless, Tittle (p.177) points out that opportunity for some kind of deviance is almost always present. The theory is more complex than described above, but a greater level of detail is beyond the scope of this study. In its preliminary, empirical role, this study serves two purposes. First, it provides the impetus for a mea- surement strategy for conceptualizing control balance and the control bal- ance ratio. Second, it uses the control balance ratio to predict one criminal and one deviant act. Although we follow closely Tittle’s state- ments on measurement and design, we cannot provide a comprehensive and all-inclusive empirical test of the entire theory in terms of identifying 324 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN and specifying all causal processes, estimating interaction effects, and explaining all different kinds of crime and deviance. However, prelimi- nary investigations such as this one are necessary when developing meas- ures for empirical tests of theories, especially with regard to control balance theory since measurements of control balance ratios do not exist in secondary data archives (Tittle, 1995, 1997). Several reviews of the theory have been produced (Braithwaite, 1997; Curry, 1998; Savelsberg, 1996; Singer, 1997). Although we forego a detailed evaluation of the criticisms surrounding control balance theory, due to its import for our purposes, it is worth briefly highlighting state- ments made by Braithwaite. Specifically, Braithwaite (1997) offers four modifications to the theory. First, he suggests streamlining the major assumption. In this regard, he argues that it would be better to say simply that people want more control, however much they already possess. Sec- ond, he posits that categories of autonomous deviance should be col- lapsed. Braithwaite’s main challenge here is that the qualitative distinctions among the categories of deviance are imprecise. Third, he suggests transforming the formulation into a theory of predation. In essence, Braithwaite thinks that most forms of defiance (i.e., predation) dealt with by the theory are simply different ways in which individuals engage in self-benefit by taking advantage of other people or the environ- ment. Finally, he suggests treating submissiveness as a unique, nondeviant response.4 Braithwaite notwithstanding, in this initial test we accept the main assumptions and arguments offered by Tittle, and assess the relationship between the control balance ratio and crime/deviance. This hypothesized relationship is one of the most fundamental predictions found in the the- ory, and its validity is important if the theory is to make a contribution to criminological theory. In this vein, our approach is similar to the one employed by Grasmick and colleagues (1993) in their initial empirical test of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory of crime. METHODS As Tittle (1997:108) has pointed out, no secondary data exist for mea- suring control ratios for anybody. Thus, there is a need for systematic col- lection of relevant data. In the beginning of the spring 1998 semester, a questionnaire was distributed to several undergraduates enrolled in differ- ent types of criminal justice courses. The survey instrument contained a number of questions and offense scenarios designed to assess control bal- ance theory. The students in attendance on the day the questionnaire was

4. For a response to these challenges, interested readers should consult Tittle (1997). TITTLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY 325 administered were asked to participate in the study during the class period. The voluntary nature of the study was announced and no student refused to participate. The full sample of 165 respondents included 89 males and 76 females.5 Through listwise deletion of missing cases, the sample was reduced to 146. Analysis of missing data yielded no significant influence of cases lost by missing data (available upon request). The use of convenience samples to test criminological theories has been the subject of much debate (Hagan and McCarthy, 1997; Jensen et al., 1978; Williams and Hawkins, 1986). The main objection is one of repre- sentativeness. Readers may question the use of students to assess the merit of control balance theory. In our defense, we to four arguments. First, Tittle (1995269) has asserted that limited assessments of his theory could make use of “any sample of individuals and any realm of control.” College students can easily be conceptualized in a control bal- ance framework. After all, they can exercise control over others and also be subject to the control of others. Given the generality claims in control balance theory, testing the theory with a college student sample would appear to provide an appropriate empirical test. So long as the data are collected with questions geared toward such a sample, the resulting infor- mation should be able to provide preliminary evidence regarding control balance theory. Second, large public universities contain a moderate number of individ- uals whom Matza (1964) would consider to be “marginal offenders,” par- ticularly for the types of acts which we investigate here (e.g., Mazerolle and Piquero, 1997, 1998; Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Piquero and Tib- betts, 1996). In this vein, college students are a relatively high-risk group for the particular offenses and deviant acts explained herein. Third, the behaviors we assess include incidents that may be relatively serious from a crime control and public safety perspective and are not uncommon to uni- versity-aged respondents. Finally, it should be noted that, for a theory in an early stage of develop- ment such as control balance, few opportunities and resources exist for original data collection. Since the most pressing need in evaluating control balance theory is the systematic collection of data, we view the college student sample as presenting a unique opportunity to provide a prelimi- nary indication for the direction for future research.

SCENARIOS Under an adaptation of the factorial survey methodology developed by Rossi and Anderson (1982), each respondent was asked to read a series of

5. Our sample closely mimics demographics of the university in general (available upon request). 326 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN scenarios and respond to a battery of questions regarding each scenario. Vignettes or scenarios are short depictions of events that individuals may readily find themselves involved in at some point in their lives. This method differs from conventional data collection in perceptual social con- trol research in that it uses hypothetical, third-person scenarios of offend- ing to elicit responses. A self-administered questionnaire was distributed that presented respondents with realistic scenarios describing the conditions under which deviant acts were committed by different actors. For this analysis we cre- ated two scenarios, one for the criminal act of predation in the form of an aggravated assault, and the other for the deviant act of defiance in the form of unconventional sexual practices. The predation scenario follows: Brian is standing in Shampoo, a dance club, with his friends drink- ing beer. Another patron, David, bumps into Brian from behind, causing him to spill beer all over his shirt and pants. Brian’s friends can’t help laughing at him. Brian turns around and David, smiling, says “sorry” and spins around to continue dancing with his friends. Brian taps David on the shoulder and says, “Hey, you just made me spill beer all over the place!” David stops dancing, stares directly into Brian’s eyes and asks him, “Do you have a problem?” Brian says, “Yeah, why don’t you get me another beer?” David pushes his finger into Brian’s chest and asks, “Why don’t you get on your knees and beg?” Brian hits David in the face with his fist, and a fight breaks out between them. After reading the predation scenario, respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would do what Brian finally did. Responses were measured on a scale from zero (no chance at all) to 10 (100% chance). The defiance scenario follows: Bill and Lisa have been dating for six years and have recently got- ten engaged. One night in bed, Bill asks Lisa if she would be inter- ested in having another partner join them in bed for fun one evening before they get married as their “last hurrah.” At first, Lisa’s reaction is one of concern because she begins to think that Bill is getting tired of her. In fact, Lisa’s initial reply is “No, I don’t think I am ready for that.” Over the next few weeks, Bill and Lisa have sex less frequently than they did before. Lisa wonders if his lack of interest is a result of her unwillingness to consider a third partner. Throughout this time period, Lisa thought more about the request and thinks that it actu- ally might be “fun.” One Friday night after dinner, Lisa tells Bill that she has reconsidered her position and would actually like to try the threesome. A few nights later at the shore, Bill, Lisa, and another partner engage in sexual activities. TITTLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY 327

After reading the defiance scenario, respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood that they would do what Lisa finally did. Responses were measured on a scale from zero (no chance at all) to 10 (100% chance). We recoded the two dependent variables to 0/1 because control balance is designed to account for the probability of offending (Tittle, 1995171, 177, 194). Thus, values registering a 0 indicate a zero probability of offending, while values of 1 or greater were recoded to 1 and suggest some nonzero probability of engaging in the act portrayed in the scenario. The responses to both of the questions following each scenario serve as out- come variables in this investigation. Similar to previous work by Nagin and Paternoster (1993), the scenarios were framed in settings familiar to the respondents and with regard to detail and contextual specificity, such as presenting details of the circum- stances of the offense, naming of locations, and so on. This strategy has been used successfully in recent empirical research on rational choice, social control, deterrence, self-control, and general strain theory (Bach- man et al., 1992; Klepper and Nagin, 1989a, 1989b; Mazerolle and Piquero, 1997,1998; Nagin and Paternoster, 1993; Piquero and Tibbetts, 1996). We were careful to construct scenarios that were not uncommon to the respondents. In fact, when we asked about the realistic nature of the sce- narios, the majority of the respondents reported them to be “very believable. ” In general, the primary weakness of this approach is that an expressed intention to offend is not synonymous with actual offending. However, relevant research has demonstrated that a person’s intention to perform a particular behavior should be highly correlated with the actual perform- ance of that behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Research designed to assess this claim has yielded a very high correlation (r = 35) between intentions and actual behavior (Green, 1989). Kim and Hunter’s (1993) recent meta-analysis on the topic of intentions and actual behavior pro- vided evidence of a strong relationship between the two. At this early stage in the development of the theory, it is difficult to classify deviant acts accurately within the control balance framework. For example, with regard to the defiance scenario, some readers may suggest that Lisa’s actions were more submissive than defiant. While we view this as a potential criticism, we believe that Lisa’s decision to engage in a threesome is an act of defiance for two reasons. First, Tittle (1995139) defines submission as “passive, unthinking, slavish obedience to the expec- tations, commands, or anticipated desires of others.” The defiance scena- rio used herein does not portray submission as Tittle (1995) intended. For example, Lisa can imagine alternative responses “over the next few weeks,” and ultimately decides that, upon reaching the conclusion that it “might be fun,” she will participate in the act. She is not acting out of 328 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN passive, unthinking, or slavish obedience. Thus, under Tittle’s definition, Lisa is not acting out of such a low level of relative control that she has lost all sense of realistic possibilities other than to do as told. Second, Tittle (1995) provides a number of actions that may fall into the defiant and submissive realms. For example, submissive acts include those such as “eating slop on command, and helping repress others to please power holders” (pp. 139-140), while defiant acts include “extramarital and premarital sex when norms prohibit it, homosexual behavior, out-of-con- text flirtatiousness, and activities like swinging” (p.269). It appears that Lisa’s decision to engage in the threesome lies more in the context of unconventional sexual behavior or, more broadly, defiance. This distinc- tion is important because her behavior appears to be a challenge to the conventional norms of monogamous sexual behavior and not necessarily a rejection of those norms.6 Turning to the predation scenario, it could be argued that some respon- dents may have perceived the situation as entailing some form of self- defense rather than predation in the form of aggravated assault. Yet, if the act portrayed in the scenario is self-defense, this type of nondeviant act would still be consistent with Tittle’s (1999137) expectation that predation “includes both criminal and noncriminal deviance and may include some predatory acts that are not deviant at all.” Further, in many instances, an act of self-defense may be the result of experiencing a control deficit after a provocation. This is important in light of Tittle’s observation that “devi- ance may not occur if there are no provocations to raise the person’s con- sciousness” (p.175). In the predation scenario, David made Brian acutely aware of his relative control deficit when he (a) spilled beer on him and (b) pushed his finger into Brian’s chest.’ Based on these two circum- stances (i.e., provocations), Brian still could have chosen not to punch David. It is because of this choice that we believe the act portrayed in the scenario is one of predation in the form of an aggravated assault. This is

~~ ~ 6. Even if one were to argue that Lisa’s action was one of submission rather than defiance, the theory would still predict a positive effect of deficit control ratios on this particular type of action (Tittle, 1995:180). Nevertheless, it points to a broader issue that Tittle (p.285) observed concerning the ambiguity in the distinctions among the types of deviance explained by control balance. In recent commentary, Tittle (1997:lOS) has acknowledged the difficulty in classifying acts as defiant or submissive and has agreed with Braithwaite (1997) that submission should receive treatment as a unique, nondeviant response. We return to the broader theoretical implications of this defiancehbmission distinction in the discussion section. 7. Interestingly, Brian’s friends were laughing at the fact that David spilled beer all over his shirt. This is important to bear in mind since “attempts to rectify an imbal- ance of control through defiant or predatory acts have more effect when witnessed by peers than when undertaken alone” (Tittle, 1995:164). TITTLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY 329 consistent with Tittle (p.137), who would include assaultive acts as exam- ples of predatory offenses. In general, we believe that our scenarios are adequately designed to capture potential situations that individuals may find themselves in.

MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES Following Tittle (1995:266-267), we measure the control balance ratio perceptually. Various domains such as school, work, family, relationships, religion, physical and social environment, and society at large, all feed into the control balance ratio. These domains also operate in global and spe- cific situational contexts. Thus, individuals could have a particular control balance ratio at work, at school, at home, on an athletic team, in the com- munity, and in life in general. Above all else, it must be remembered that when measuring the control balance ratio, it is important to include domains of life that are relevant to the sample under investigation. In an ideal world, one would have multiple measures of the control ratio in a variety of different realms, including static, dynamic, and situational con- texts. However, our purpose is much more limited yet in line with Tittle (1995:267), who argues that “the most important measure is of the overall, general control ratio” and that “specifically focused ratios [should] be derived first and then combined to create the general measure.’’ We asked our respondents questions relating to the degree of control they exercise over specific others, objects, and circumstances, as well as the degree of control specific others, objects, and circumstances exercise over them (e.g., Tittle, 1995:267). Specifically, we asked individuals to rate the degree of control they have over friendships (overall), specific friend- ships within your overall circle of friends, relationships with significant others, performance in school (grades), job/employment, familial relation- ships, recreational activities, society as a whole, physical environment (such as the ability to control heat, coldness, regularity of food, cleanli- ness), your physical body (such as avoiding or regulating illness, fatigue, andlor appearance), and other people (such as neighbors, solicitors, repair people).g Response options ranged from 0 (no control) to 5 (medium con- trol) to 10 (total control). Respondents were also asked to rate the degree

~ ~~ 8. We should point out that, for the most part, the items that make up the control balance ratio are static, whereas control balance ratios that are situation-specific are more dynamic in type. By static we imply that we measure an individual’s perceptions of particular control items at one particular point in time. This, of course, does not tap into the possibility that such domains vary over time (day to day, month to month, year to year), or even across situations. Such dynamic control balance ratios are worthy of investigation given their import for the theory. While both types may be important, our purpose here is much more limited in that we concentrate on more static control bal- ance ratios. 330 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN of control these same things have over them. Once again, response options ranged from 0 (no control) to 5 (medium control) to 10 (total control). We also printed a slightly modified definition of control (Tittle, 1995:143) at the top of the survey instrument and discussed it with the respondents immediately prior to survey administration: Being able to exercise control can be defined as having the ability to limit the behavioral options of others by (1) withholding or granting things that are useful to them as they try to achieve their goals, (2) imposing or withholding things that are unpleasant to them as they try to achieve their goals, or (3) overcoming physical or social structural barriers as you try to achieve your own goals. We thought that this procedure would lend greater construct validity to the measures of control we obtained. Next, we constructed the control balance ratio. Following Tittle (1995:267), we first sum the items for the amount of control one is subject to and obtain a total. We call this total amount of control to which one is subject. Second, we sum the items for the amount of control one can exer- cise. We call this total amounr of control one can exercise. Third, we take the ratio of the amount of control to which one is subject relative to the amount of control one can exercise. This produces the overall control bal- ance ratio. We conducted a reliability analysis for each of the two compo- nents listed above. Cronbach’s alpha for the amount of control to which one is subject was equal to .86, suggesting good scale reliability. A similar result was obtained for the amount of control one can exercise (a= .80). We also conducted a factor analysis for the two components of the control balance ratio. The results were supportive of a single underlying factor accounting for the majority of variance explained within each of the two components. (Detailed results for the reliability and factor analysis are available upon request.) Generally speaking, the theory takes into consideration motivation, con- straint, opportunity, and provocation, though the first three of these appear central for an initial empirical test. As discussed above, motivation is largely influenced by the control balance ratio, but it may also be influ- enced by several other factors. In this study, we use two other items that have been shown in previous research to influence individuals’ criminal decision making. One of these items is the pleasure, or thrill, associated with the act portrayed in the scenario. Much research has documented the influence of this factor in criminal decision making (e.g., Katz, 1988; Nagin and Paternoster, 1993). Following each scenario, respondents were asked: “On a scale of 0 to 10, how exciting would it be to engage in the act por- trayed in the scenario?” Response options ranged from 0 (not exciting) to TITTLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY 331

10 (very exciting). Consistent with previous research (Akers et al., 1979), we also take into consideration the influence of deviant peers as a motivat- ing factor. After the presentation of each scenario, respondents were asked the following question: “On a scale of 0 to 10, how many of your friends have engaged in the act portrayed in the scenario?” Response options ranged from 0 (none) to 10 (most). Following Tittle (1995:167-168), we measure constraint as an (1) indi- vidual’s perception of the seriousness of the specific act and (2) an individ- ual’s perception of the risk associated with the act. In previous theoretical work, these have been referred to as moral beliefs (Bachman et al., 1992) and perceived sanction threats (e.g., Nagin and Paternoster, 1993), respec- tively. Two items followed each scenario that measured these components of constraint. The first was a single item that measured an individual’s perception of the seriousness of the act: “On a scale of 0 to 10, how mor- ally wrong is the act portrayed in the scenario?” Response choices ranged from 0 (not wrong) to 10 (very wrong). The second item measures an individual’s perception of the risk of being caught for each specific act. The question was phrased: “On a scale of 0 to 10, rate the risk of getting caught by committing the act portrayed in the scenario.’’ Response options ranged from 0 (not likely) to 10 (very likely). The next component of the theory that we take into consideration is opportunity. Since Tittle argues that some opportunity is almost always present for some kind of deviance, we are essentially building in the same opportunity for all respondents by placing them into the same situation. Thus, opportunity in this investigation is held constant through the scenarios. We add controls for age, prior behavior, sex, religiosity, and low self- control as possible control balance contingencies. Age is measured contin- uously. Prior behavior is measured as an individual’s involvement (no/ yes) in the past few months with each respective criminaydeviant act that was specific to each scenario. Religiosity is coded 1 if the respondent prac- tices some sort of religion, 0 otherwise. Low self-control is measured by the Grasmick et al. (1993) scale.9 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables in the analysis.

TESTING CONTROL BALANCE WITH A NONLINEAR MODEL Linear relationships force the rate of change in the mean of the depen- dent variable, with respect to an independent variable, to be constant over

9. The scale evidenced good reliability and factor analysis yielded results consis- tent with the presence of one underlying factor (available upon request). 332 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum - - Estimated for Both Scenarios CB Ratio (Subject to/Exercised) .80 .27 .12 1.32 Sex (Male = 1) .54 .50 0.00 1.00 Religiosity .70 .46 0.00 1.00 Low Self-Control 37.12 10.45 16.00 67.00 Age 22.83 4.24 18.00 46.00 Predation Specific Intentions to Commit Predation .72 .45 0.00 1.00 Prior Predation .25 .43 0.00 1.OO Moral Beliefs-Predation 6.07 2.42 0.00 10.00 Perceived Risk-Predation 6.76 3.07 0.00 10.00 Peers Commit Predation 5.07 3.05 0.00 10.00 Exciting to Commit Predation 3.13 3.09 0.00 10.00 Defiance Specific Intentions to Commit Defiance .51 .50 0.00 1.00 Prior Unwanted Sex .18 .52 0.00 3.00 Moral Beliefs-Defiance 5.79 3.45 0.00 10.00 Perceived Risk-Defiance 3.33 3.19 0.00 10.00 Peers Commit Defiance 2.59 2.71 0.00 10.00 Exciting to Commit Defiance 4.85 3.92 0.00 10.00 all values of that and every other independent variable in the model (Rawlings, 1988:376). Tittle’s (1995) theory, however, hypothesizes a non- linear effect of the control balance ratio on criminal and deviant acts. Modeling the of the control balance ratio in a linear fashion would be inconsistent with theoretical expectations: “Since a number of the causal linkages are nonlinear, the tools routinely used in research, espe- cially those normally used to estimate causal models, cannot be employed in straightforward fashion to assess the empirical adequacy of this theory” (Tittle, 1995176). As a result, the use of a nonlinear modeling technique becomes necessary. For our purposes, we turn to a form of nonlinear modeling known as segmented regression. Our estimation procedures were completed with SYSTAT (1997), version 7.0.

SEGMENTED REGRESSION In a segmented model, the formula for a predicted value changes for different values of one or more variables. In this analysis, the formula for the effect of the control balance ratio on crime and deviance is of central concern. Specifically, a segmented model is one in which the predicted value is equal to z when the control balance ratio is less than 1 and the predicted value is z+ for values larger than one. In other words, seg- mented models are defined using Boolean logic in which the expression evaluates to 0 when the expression is false and to 1+ when it is true. The TITTLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY 333 segmented model is linear in the parameters and can be fitted using least squares (Rawlings, 1988).10 The model expression is as follows: Y = (cbr I1)* p1 + (cbr > 1)*p2 + lsc* p3 + sex* p4 + peers* p5 + risk* p6 + morals* p7 + pleasure* pg + prior* p9 + religiosity* plo + age* pll, where Y refers to the dependent variable in question (i.e., probability of predation and deviance), cbr = the control balance ratio (i.e., values less than or equal to 1 correspond to a surplus and values greater than 1 corre- spond to a deficit),ll lsc = low self-control, sex (coded 0 female, 1 male), peers = peer involvement for each act, risk = probability of being caught for each act, morals = moral beliefs against each act, pleasure = pleasure associated with each act, prior = prior involvement in each act, age = age of the respondent, and pi.ll refer to parameters to be estimated by the model. In the model expressed above the “join” points (i.e., regions in the X space) are known. It is important to note that the initial part of this

10. In nonlinear regression, it is practical to find the least squares estimate by direct search procedures rather than by first obtaining the normal equations and then using numerical methods to solve these equations iteratively (Neter et al., 1985472). We utilized the Gauss-Newton method. This approach uses a Taylor series expansion to approximate the nonlinear regression model with linear terms and then employs ordi- nary least squares to estimate the parameters. This approach works effectively in non- linear regression applications (Neter et al., 1985475). Moreover, this method produces more accurate estimates of the asymptototic standard errors and covariances and can converge in fewer iterations and more quickly than other algorithms, such as Quasi- Newton and Simplex (SYSTAT, 1997:456). To examine the robustness of our results, we also fitted our models with a “robust” maximum-likelihood estimator in SYSTAT. We obtained results substantively similar (i.e., sign, strength, and significance) to those obtained from least squares. Finally, we note that in nonlinear regression it is not possi- ble to obtain exact confidence intervals for each of the parameters estimated in the model. As a result, asymptotic (large sample) approximations are provided. 11. We estimated the surplus side of the control balance ratio in two ways. In the first approach, we recoded all of the values that were less than or equal to 1 as 0. We did this because the expected probabilities associated with surplus control ratios of .7 and .l, for example, are believed by control balance to be identical (i.e., 0) and should not be predictive of the types of criminal and deviant acts that we investigate. In the second approach, we did not recode these values to 0; instead, we opted for two catego- ries to be modeled in the expression: those scoring less than or equal to 1 are on the surplus segment of the control balance ratio while those scoring greater than 1 are on the deficit segment of the control balance ratio. Either approach of conceptualizing the surplus side of the control balance ratio yielded substantively similar conclusions (i.e., sign, strength, and significance of the coefficients). To remain as close as possible to the expression of the theory, we utilize the second method discussed. This method parti- tions the control balance ratio into two segments, one that contains those individuals with a control surplus and one that contains those individuals with a control deficit. As values increase linearly in either direction, the theory predicts a higher probability of engaging in the act. However, according to Tittle, only deficit (not surplus) control ratios should significantly predict acts of predation and defiance. 334 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN model has a variable (cbr) that is associated with two parameters (pl and pz). Their values are conditional on the value of cbr. The nonlinear model works in five steps. First, the starting values of the parameters are selected by the program. The model expression is then evaluated for the first case in double precision resulting in an estimate. Second, a loss is computed by squaring the residual for the first case. Third, this procedure is repeated for all of the cases in the data and the loss is summed over cases. Fourth, the summed loss is then minimized using the Gauss-Newton algorithm. Finally, iterations continue until both convergence criteria are met or the maximum number of iterations is reached.

HYPOTHESIS According to Tittle, individuals with control deficits-not control sur- pluses-are more likely to participate in acts that symbolize repressive deviance (i.e., predation, defiance, and submission). Given that higher values of the control balance ratio in our analysis correspond to control deficits, to the extent that the theory is correct, this segment or portion of the control balance ratio should exert a significant and positive effect on intentions to engage in predation (aggravated assault) and intentions to engage in defiance (unconventional sexual practices): “Deficit control ratios will always be positively linked to the total chances of committing predatory, defiant, or submissive deviance” (Tittle, 1995180). The same should not hold for control surpluses.

RESULTS The results of the predation analysis are presented in the first four col- umns of Table 2. Six of the nine estimated coefficients are statistically significant at p < .05. As can be seen, the surplus segment of the control balance ratio exerts a significant and positive effect (estimate = .640) on predation. This result is inconsistent with Tittle’s (1995) prediction, and we return to this piece of counterevidence below. The deficit side of the control balance ratio also exerts a significant and positive effect (estimate = .607) on predation. Consistent with Tittle’s expectations, individuals who suffer from control deficits are likely to turn to predative acts to rebalance their control ratios. Turning to the other predictors of the model, low self-control (estimate = .002) fails to exert a significant effect on predation. Moreover, perceived risk (estimate = -.004), perceived pleasure (estimate = .014), age (estimate = -.001), and prior involvement in assault (estimate = -.007) also fail to significantly predict predation intentions. Consistent with previous research (Blumstein et al., 1986), males (estimate = .161) are more likely TITTLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY 335

Table 2. Segmented Nonlinear Regression Estimates

Predation Defiance -- Variable Est. S.E. Est.1S.E. 95% C.I. -Est. -S.E. Est.1S.E. 95% C.I. CBR (Surplus) ,640 ,248 2.583* ,150, 1.131 ,685 ,259 2.642* ,172, 1.197 CBR (Deficit) ,607 ,252 2.413* ,109, 1.105 ,784 ,260 3.012* ,269, 1.299 Perceived Risk -.004 ,011 -.361 -.026, ,018 ,004 ,011 ,348 -.018, ,026 Moral Beliefs -.060 ,015 4.118* -.089, -.031 -.024 ,012 -2.101* -.047, -.001 Peer Experience ,042 ,012 3.573* .019, ,066 ,059 ,014 4.243* ,032, ,087 Thrilling ,014 .013 1.082 -.012, .041 ,044 ,013 3.516* ,019, ,069 Low Self-Control ,002 ,004 .568 -.005, ,009 -.003 ,003 -1.006 -.010, ,003 Religiosity ,130 ,072 1.821* -.011, ,272 -.031 ,079 -.391 -.187, .125 Sex ,161 ,067 2.382* ,027, ,294 -.004 ,088 -.048 -.179, ,170 Prior Behavior -.007 ,059 -I13 -.124, ,111 ,053 ,066 312 -.076, ,183 Age -.001 ,008 -.150 -.016, .014 -.012 .008 -1.523 -.029, ,004 R2 .34 .39 to report intentions to engage in predation. Similarly, the more likely indi- viduals are to have moral inhibitions against predation (estimate = -.060), the less likely they are to report intentions to engage in predation. Some- what counterintuitively, individuals who practiced some sort of religion were significantly likely (estimate = .130) to report intentions to engage in predation. Finally, the more likely individuals are to have peers who have engaged in predation (estimate = .042), the more likely they are to report intentions to engage in predation. The amount of variation explained by this model is .34. In the next four columns of Table 2, we present the results for the devi- ant act of defiance. As can be seen, five of the nine variables exert a sig- nificant effect on intentions to engage in defiance. As was the case for predation, both segments of the control balance ratio significantly predict intentions to engage in defiance. Inconsistent with Tittle, control surplus exerted a positive and significant effect (estimate = .685) on intentions to engage in defiance. On the other hand, and consistent with Tittle, control deficits had a positive and significant effect (estimate = .784) on intentions to engage in defiance. Turning to the other coefficients, individuals who believe the defiant act to be morally wrong (estimate = -.024) were less likely to report intentions to engage in the act. However, individuals whose peers have engaged in defiance (estimate = .059) and individuals who believed the act to be thrill- ing (estimate = .044) were more likely to report affirmative intentions to engage in defiance. Perceived risk of getting caught (estimate = .004), age (estimate = -.012), sex (estimate = -.004), low self-control (estimate = - .003), religiosity (estimate = -.031), and previous engagement in a sexual act against one’s wishes (estimate = .053) failed to significantly predict PIQUERO AND HICKMAN defiance intentions. The amount of variation explained by the model was .39.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this study we set out to provide the first empirical assessment of the basic hypothesis of a relationship between one’s control balance ratio and deviant behavior expressed in Tittle’s (1995) control balance theory. To accomplish this task we collected data in order to measure the control bal- ance ratio, which we operationalized as the amount of control to which one is subject relative to the amount of control one can exercise. Using segmented, nonlinear regression, we examined the effect of the control balance ratio on one criminal act, predation manifested as aggravated assault, and one deviant act, defiance represented by unconventional sex- ual behavior in the form of a three-party sexual experience. The results of our research are mixed. While our results suggest that “an unbalance con- trol ratio . . . predisposes an individual to act deviantly” (Tittle, 1995144-146), the predicted relationships for predation and defiance should only have been significant for those individuals with control defi- cits, and not for those with control surpluses as we found. This result is important given the great care that Tittle took in hypothesizing that cer- tain control imbalances (i.e., surplus/deficit) would be associated with spe- cific types of crime and deviance. We see two important theoretical implications arising from our results. The first concerns the manner in which control surpluses and deficits explain deviance, while the second concerns the qualitative distinctions made by the theory on opposite sides of the control balance continuum. Our results suggest that the theory may be incorrect in its prediction that control deficits are more likely (than control surpluses) to lead to preda- tory acts (and other specific deviant acts) while at the same time being correct about imbalances and general deviance. Braithwaite (1997) antici- pates our finding by suggesting that control balance be reconceptualized as a theory of predation with three major propositions. First, while Tittle explains deviance as an instrument to escape control deficits and extend control surpluses, Braithwaite (1997:79) argues that this postulated ten- dency should be discarded for the more plausible explanation that individ- uals want more control, no matter how much they already have (e.g., Tittle, 1995:145-147). Second, Braithwaite (1997:84) states that the dis- tinctions among autonomous and repressive forms of deviance are vague, somewhat superfluous, and (as yet) unsupported by empirical evidence. Third, Braithwaite (1997:86, 89) questions the difference between repres- sive and autonomous forms of deviance; he concludes that exploitation TITTLE’S CONTROL BALANCE THEORY 337 can be characterized as predation and suggests that by thinking of preda- tion, exploitation, and plunder as threats to personal freedom (where free- dom is defined as nondomination), one can recognize the underlying similarity.12 In this light, both control surpluses and deficits predispose individuals toward acts of predation, albeit for distinctly different reasons: “Predatory deviance is enabled both by having nothing to lose (high defi- cit) and by having little likelihood of losing it (high surplus)” (Braithwaite, 1997:86). Thus, the likelihood of predatory deviance increases with both control surpluses and deficits, with one exception: In cases of extreme con- trol deficit, the victim may be subject to such a high degree of domination that countercontrol is inevitable, fear of countercontrol is high, and preda- tion is extremely unlikely if not impossible. Another important theoretical implication of our analysis concerns the ambiguity in the distinctions among different types of criminal and deviant acts. Although we estimated two segmented regression models that treated the outcomes in a noncontinuous space, Tittle’s (199.5189, 1997:105) construction of qualitative categories of deviance was originally expressed on a continuum branching off to the left and right of the bal- anced control ratio. If Tittle holds to his original claim, how are research- ers to model the influence of particular types of control imbalances on particular types of deviance? Are certain cutoffs necessary to partial out the distinctions among the different types of deviance? In other words, how are researchers to take into account relative positions on the control balance continuum? If control imbalances predict specific types of devi- ance that range from small to medium to large deficits (or surpluses), what numerical value indexes a small, medium, and/or large deficit? For exam- ple, if the control imbalance is equal to .6, is this value hypothesized to predict predation, defiance, or submission? It appears that these distinc- tions are difficult to define empirically, and as a consequence, assess empirically. Further theoretical and empirical work is needed in this regard. While Tittle (1995285) anticipates this potential confound, Braithwaite (1997:83) suggests that the theory should abandon the notion that different types of deviance are associated with different levels of control imbalance. The central issue here is the correspondence between the three zones of control surplus and deficit and the three types of deviance on each of the respective sides of the control ratio. Embedded within this issue is the important theoretical distinction between defiant and submissive actions. Recall that in the scenario involving Lisa’s decision to engage in sexual activities with two other partners, we classified her act as one involving a

12. Braithwaite also points out that submission, defiance, and decadence generally do not pose a similar threat. 338 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN challenge to conventional sexual norms (see Tittle, 1995, 1997). We were led to think of defiance rather than submission because of Tittle’s (1997:104) definition of the concept of submissiveness as “slavish and obe- dient behavior” that “marks the loss of the spirit of resistance” (Tittle, 1997:104). Yet, at some level, Lisa’s actions may be viewed as submissive in nature because she gives in to her fiance’s desire to engage in a three- some, perhaps as a result of his taking away their joint sexual practices. While Braithwaite’s (1997) solution to this problem is to combine defiant and predatory acts into one category of deviance and to treat submissive- ness as a unique, nondeviant response, an open question still remains: What kinds of acts constitute submission and what kinds of acts constitute defiance? The resolution of this issue is important for establishing the validity of the qualitative distinctions among distinct types of deviant acts on the repressive (deficit) side of the control balance ratio. If these distinctions were to remain, a potential resolution would lie in asking individuals to recall the last time they were in a state of mind that could have led to a submissive and/or deviant response to a counter con- trol. The consciousness of the actor, as Tittle (1997:107) describes, at the time of the deviance may help inform the theory as to the decision-making process of individuals in these types of situations. If one were to follow the original outline of the theory, to the extent that individuals envision alternative responses, submission would not be the action to be explained. Rather, that particular act would constitute an act of defiance. The use of qualitative interview techniques could be used to probe the reason(s) why control surpluses were related to acts of predation. In sum, our preliminary empirical foray into testing control balance the- ory, while yielding some mixed evidence regarding the significant influ- ence of surplus control ratios, appears promising enough to warrant continued theoretical and empirical work. We hope that the community of scholars interested in theoretical accounts of criminal and deviant behav- ior will join us in further examinations of control balance.

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Alex Piquero is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice and Research Fellow in the Center for Public Policy at Temple University, Faculty Fellow with the National Consortium on Violence Research, and Network Associate with the MacArthur Foundation’s Research Program on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice. His research interests include criminological theory, criminal careers, quantita- tive research methods, and policing. Matthew Hickman is a doctoral student in the Department of Criminal Justice at Temple University. He received his Master’s Degree in Criminal Justice from Washing- ton State University. His current research interests include police program evaluation, historical aspects of police behavior, and control theories of crime and deviance. 342 PIQUERO AND HICKMAN