Cornell International Law Journal Volume 31 Article 5 Issue 3 Symposium 1998 Sovereignty by Subtraction: The ultM ilateral Agreement on Investment Robert Stumberg Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Stumberg, Robert (1998) "Sovereignty by Subtraction: The ultM ilateral Agreement on Investment," Cornell International Law Journal: Vol. 31: Iss. 3, Article 5. Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol31/iss3/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Sovereignty by Subtraction: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment Robert Stumberg* Introduction ..................................................... 492 I. Overview of the MAI Sovereignty Debate .................. 496 A. Trade-Offs in the MAI Negotiations .................... 496 B. Defining Sovereignty as the Balance of Power .......... 498 C. Main Features of the MAI ............................. 501 D. Sovereignty Preservation Arguments ................... 503 1. Preemption by Federal Courts ...................... 503 2. Administrative Implementation ..................... 504 3. Legislation ........................................ 504 E. Likelihood of Conflict Arguments ..................... 506 1. Trade Is Not Investment