Euro-Scepticism As Party Strategy: Persistence and Change in Party-Based Opposition to European Integration Sitter, Nick

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Euro-scepticism as party strategy: persistence and change in party-based opposition to European integration Sitter, Nick

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Sitter, N. (2003). Euro-scepticism as party strategy: persistence and change in party-based opposition to European integration. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 32(3), 239-253. https://nbn-resolving.org/ urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-60319

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Parteien, die eine grundsätzlich oder bedingt ablehnende Haltung der europäischen Integration gegenüber vertreten, sind im gesamten politischen Spektrum zu finden. Ein kursorischer Blick auf die europäische Parteienlandschaft zeigt, dass Mitte-Links- und Mitte-Rechts-Parteien eher nicht zur Übernahme einer grundsätzlich euro-skeptischen Position tendieren, obwohl sie bestimmte Aspekte der europäischen Integration ablehnen mögen, wenn diese programmatischen Zielen zuwiderlaufen. Bis auf einige bedeutende Ausnahmen beschränkt sich die prinzipielle Ablehnung auf Parteien an den Rändern des politischen Spektrums bzw. auf Parteien, die spezifische Interessen und Identitäten re- präsentieren. Basierend auf der Annahme, dass die Entscheidung einer Partei für die Annahme einer europa-skeptischen Haltung bzw. deren Modifikation eine strategische ist, untersucht der Beitrag die Wurzeln für den Euroskeptizismus der Partien und die Dynamiken seiner Unveränderlichkeit bzw. seines Wandels. Die Parteistrategie ist untrennbar mit der Position der Partei im jeweiligen Parteien- system verbunden und wird von der Abwägung der folgenden vier, das Wesen einer politischen Partei bestimmende Ziele bestimmt: dem organisatorischen Überleben, der Umsetzung spezifischer pro- grammatischer Ziele (policies), der Stimmenmaximierung (votes) und der Ausübung von Regierungs- gewalt (office). Obwohl viele, wenn nicht sogar fast alle Parteien Strategien der sog. Catch-all- Parteien oder Kartellparteien verfolgen, hat doch eine beachtliche Anzahl an Parteien alternative oder gemischte Strategien gewählt. Die euro-skeptischen Tendenzen der Parteien und die Anreize für eine solche ablehnende Haltung werden mit diesen unterschiedlichen Strategien in Zusammenhang gebracht und analysiert. Folgenden Fragen wird nachgegangen: Warum übernehmen Parteien euro- skeptische Positionen und warum verändern sie diese? Die „Zähmung der Widerspenstigen“ oder die Abschwächung des Euroskeptizismus kann über Veränderungen in der Gewichtung der vier Ziele oder den Rahmenbedingungen erfolgen oder über eine Kombination aus beiden.

1. Introduction after EU) might be seen as dichotomous, opposition to participation in European integration Parties across the political spectrum in both ranges from absolute rejection to scepticism West and East Central Europe have adopted about particular initiatives. Euro-scepticism stances opposed to or critical of their country’s entails opposition to something specific, but participation in European integration. Most there is considerable variety in the bases for this party systems have, at one point or another, fea- opposition. This diversity suggests that Euro- tured at least one such party. The sheer diver- scepticism is not a single issue, let alone a clea- sity of Euro-scepticism in terms of contents, vage, and this is reinforced by its occurrence intensity and location in the party systems sug- across several policy dimensions (Taggart/ gests that it might not be particularly useful to Szczerbiak 2001; Sitter 2001). Perhaps the most approach it as a single phenomenon. Although useful distinction, particularly with respect to the question of whether to join the European the dynamics of change, is between opposition Economic Community/European Union (here- to European integration in principle and more

ÖZP, 32 (2003) 3 239 contingent opposition linked to specific inter- accommodate a wide range of policies, party- ests. Szczerbiak/Taggart’s (2000) ‘hard’ and based Euro-scepticism is shaped by the party ‘soft’ labels are now widely used to capture this system. If the question concerns the ‘taming of distinction. Although even this still allows for the shrew’, the starting point is that there is no ‘shades of blue’ (Batory 2002), it provides a single united ‘shrew’ but many ‘shrews’ of very rough classification and aids identification of different characters. And any ‘taming of the changes in parties’ Euro-scepticism. In these shrew’ is part of the national party system dy- terms, the ‘taming of the shrew’ is a matter of namic. softening Euro-scepticism, as parties shift from The central question concerns the conditions principled to contingent opposition or its inten- under which parties come to oppose participa- sity is reduced. A small number of parties have tion in European integration and how this op- even abandoned Euro-scepticism altogether. In position is softened (or hardened). Approach- what follows, these dynamics are explored in ing this from a (rational) actor’s perspective, the terms of party strategy. elaboration and modification of stances on Eu- Euro-scepticism may be thought of as an ropean integration is considered a matter of party ‘empty box’, into which a broad range of policy strategy. If (drawing on Sartori 1976; Strøm positions can be put. Yet the box is not com- 1990a; Pennings 1998) parties are defined as pletely empty, and it does not exist in a vacuum. organisations that seek to propel candidates to First, Euro-scepticism is elaborated as opposi- elected office in pursuit of certain policy aims, tion to a specific project. When EU policy is then the party leadership faces four goals which opposed on the grounds that there is too much often entail some kind of trade-off: i) the sur- or too little regulation/redistribution/interven- vival of the party; ii) the pursuit of its preferred tion in any given area, the policy content of policy outcomes; iii) the pursuit of votes; and Euro-scepticism is cast in opposition to exist- iv) the quest for executive office. The first sec- ing (or proposed) policy. Second, most Euro- tion, below, outlines three broad strategies that scepticism is expressed in terms of policy not constitute responses to these challenges. The only at the EU level but also at the national level. first one is associated with the catch-all model Opposition is usually linked to a preferable do- of political parties, while the other two are al- mestic alternative. Each EU policy has a range ternatives. The subsequent four sections each of domestic policy ‘alleles’ (to borrow a term address one of the four goals, relating these to from biology, which denotes possible alterna- incentives for Euro-scepticism. The empirical tives to a specific gene), one of which Euro- evidence is drawn predominantly from second- sceptic parties subscribe to for any given policy ary sources, published country-specific analy- debate. A degree of consistency across these ses, with a view to capturing the key cases and ‘policy alleles’ within a party is usually sought, full variation in the EU member, quasi-member and Euro-scepticism is therefore shaped by a and prospective member states. party’s position on related policies. Third, party platforms are usually designed with reference to the party’s domestic competitors, and incen- 2.Party Strategy – Three Patterns of tives to contest European integration therefore Opposition in Europe depend on other competitors’ strategies. The only common basis that most Euro-sceptic par- Although broad trends in party organisation, ties share is nationalism, at least in the sense electoral competition and policy have been ob- defined by Gellner (1983): a political doctrine served in Europe over time, this should not ob- that holds that the world is divided into nations scure the fact that distinct types of party strat- and that national and political units should be egy persist. The extent to which parties adapt congruent. However, like Euro-scepticism, na- and change depends on their organisation and tionalism says little about policy (Schopflin preferences, and on how they interpret chal- 1995). In short, although Euro-scepticism can lenges, almost as much as on the actual chal-

240 lenges. Some are more immune to contagion suit of office, and therefore votes, is defined as from their competitors than others. Whereas the aim of political parties in classic rational most of the large centre-right and -left parties choice analyses (Downs 1957; Riker 1962; have faced strong incentives to adapt to their Axelrod 1970). This has been supplemented by competitors’ organisational and strategic focus on parties’ pursuit of policy, which shapes changes, whether in the form of contagion from both their coalition games and their pursuit of the left in the shape of successful social demo- votes (de Swaan 1973; Budge/Laver 1986; crat parties (Duverger 1954) or the catch-all Dunleavy 1991). Moreover, policy goals may parties on the centre-right (Kirchheimer 1966; be achieved without formal participation in coa- Epstein 1967), others have proven more resist- litions and formal participation may actually ant. Katz/Mair (1995, 2002) find that many entail costs in terms of association with unpopu- catch-all parties are becoming more modern lar policies (Laver/Schofield 1990; Strøm ‘cartel’ parties, but point out that these parties 1990b; Laver/Shepsle 1996). The pursuit of face challenges by for example protest parties votes, policy and office are thus linked, but (Wolinetz 2002). Across Western Europe many maximising one may require merely sacrificing parties have found the catch-all model difficult one of the others (Müller/Strøm 1999). To com- to imitate, or rejected this model. This applies plicate this relationship further, a fourth goal – to communists (Bosco 2000) and greens survival of the party – may be inferred by draw- (Richardson/Rootes 1995) on the left, agrarian ing on the literature on party organisation (Arter 2001) and denominational parties (Panebianco 1988). The party leadership is con- (Hanley 1994) in the centre, and new populist strained by the rest of the party, the activists in parties on the right (Taggart 1995). Compara- particular, and the need to maintain a minimum ble strategies have been attempted, with vary- degree of consistency with respect to the par- ing degrees of success, in post-communist East ty’s identity and core values. In the light of the Central Europe (Sitter 2002a). These alterna- divisive impact the EU question has had on tives are a matter of strategy rather than party many Scandinavian and British parties, this last organisation. Even if, over time, most parties point is far from trivial (Saglie 2000; Baker may employ more full time professional party 2003). This is linked to the party’s raison d’être, officials, rely more on public funding and less its core identity and principles, particularly in on activist mass memberships, or use the media the case of parties that have their roots in pro- and pollsters more extensively, it does not nec- test against or opposition to other parties essarily follow that they abandon their strate- (Mathieu 1999). These fours goals are set out gies of interest representation or protest. In other in figure 1. words, even if party organisations and tactics Party strategy is therefore defined as the par- converge, strategies for competition remain dif- ty’s overall, more or less coherent, approach to ferent if some parties decide not to attempt to these four goals. Taking a leaf out of the disci- catch all of the electorate.

Figure 1: Party goals and strategy 2.1. Party Goals and Party Strategy Coalition Politics The strategic decision whether to maximise votes by appealing to the entire electorate (the ! catch-all strategy), to seek to represent the in- Party Party Electoral terests of a specific part of the electorate (inter- Organisation " Strategy # Appeal est representation), or capture general protest $ against the mainstream consensus (protest), is the product of parties’ preferences in terms of Policy Goals their goals – survival, policy, votes, office. Pur-

241 plines of military and business studies, strategy heimer’s and Katz’s/Mair’s analyses the dy- may be defined as the link between goals and namic process that leads toward the catch-all their achievement (Von Clausewitz 1832) or, and cartel model is one in which the major par- paraphrasing Porter (1980/1998, xxiv), as a ties respond to and imitate each other’s success- broad formula for how a party is going to com- ful innovations. The old, candidate-driven elite pete – a combination of what its ends should be parties were challenged by well-organised so- and by which means these should be pursued. cialist mass parties that drew on trade unions, Each goal is potentially contentious. First, se- mass membership and class-oriented ideology. curing support from and maintaining the unity The response involved not only contagion in of the party organisation involves questions terms of organisation and campaigns, but also about the party’s identity, ideology, internal or- an effort to defeat the class appeal by invoking ganisation and links to external organisations. a wider catch-all appeal targeting the entire elec- A party may remain committed to its original torate. Coupled with increasingly independent goals, or outgrow them over time as they are party elites, the role of the media and focus on achieved or lose salience. It may accord con- salient issues rather than divisive ideologies, the siderable weight to ideology – a given frame- result is the catch-all ideal type. This entails a work for analysing issues – or downplay it, or shift toward more professionalised parties, more even move toward ideological pluralism. Inter- independent of external organisations, which nal organisation, particularly organised factions, focus on competence and managerial skills as affects the leadership’s freedom of action. The much as issues, and employ public relations- same holds for links with external organisations, style campaigns. It is associated with a shift in from interest groups and trade unions to the party’s income, from membership dues to churches or grassroots movements. Second, state subsidies and a wider range of contribu- policy pursuit and interest representation entails tions. Whereas the mass party represents soci- not only balancing and prioritising different and ety to the state, the catch-all party is a link be- sometimes conflicting policy goals, but also tween the two; the cartel party comes closer to aligning new policy positions with existing plat- representing the state to society. The catch-all forms. Third, electoral appeal often involves a strategy thus entails maximising votes and trade-off between broad catch-all appeal and prioritising the pursuit of office, while playing appeal to a core constituency, or between cen- down ideology and policy commitments and to tripetal competition centred on the median voter some extent marginalising party activists in fa- and centrifugal campaigns that strengthen a par- vour of professionals. This process of organisa- ty’s profile. Fourth, coalition games by defini- tional and strategic adaptation is driven by the tion involve compromise with competitors. main parties’ competition with each other, and Drawing on the West European experience, shapes the left vs. right (or at least the central) three broad sets of party strategies are identi- dimension in a party system. This is the first fied. The first is linked to the catch-all and car- and main pattern of opposition: left vs. right. In tel models of party organisation, while the sec- most of Western Europe, social democrats came ond and third represent alternative strategies for to define the ‘left’, while conservatives and lib- competition. erals struggled (sometimes inconclusively) to constitute the ‘right’. A similar process has oc- curred in East Central Europe after 1989, but 2.2. Party Strategy and Patterns of yielded outcomes that sometimes make the use Opposition of ‘left’ and ‘right’ in the conventional West European sense somewhat problematic. Although some of the attributes of the cartel However, a number of parties eschewed the and catch-all party ideal types can be found in catch-all strategy in favour of retaining focus most parties, these models are linked to a par- on a section of the electorate, often reflecting ticular, dominant, form of party. In Kirch- cleavages other than the ‘owner vs. workers’

242 division, notably what Lipset/Rokkan (1967) parties often take the cartel party’s organisational cast as state vs. church, centre vs. periphery and features to the extreme as far as leadership domi- rural vs. urban interests. Parties face a funda- nance, populist appeal and innovative cam- mental choice whether they seek to shape the paigning is concerned, although some new left main dimension of the party system and com- parties feature flatter organisation and stronger pete primarily along this left vs. right dimen- ideology than their mainstream social democrat sion, or to circumvent it. Several parties have rivals. They have tended to be excluded from chosen the latter, mobilising voters along cross- coalition games, although this may be chang- cutting cleavages or policy dimensions. West- ing. Far right parties have participated in govern Europe features several parties that repre- ernment in Italy, Austria and the Netherlands, sent specific ethnic or cultural minorities, eco- and support minority centre-right coalitions in nomic interests and/or champion regional au- Denmark and Norway. tonomy, captured in the term ‘territorial poli- Finally, a number of parties have adopted tics’ (Rokkan/Urwin 1983). Although these par- mixed strategies. Several new populist parties ties have chosen to compete across the left vs. have made concerted efforts to establish them- right dimension, they have perforce staked out selves as more mainstream parties (Harmel/ positions along this dimension. Electoral com- Svasand 1997). Forza Italia, which was petition and coalition games make such align- launched in the run-up to the 1994 election, ment obligatory, and most agrarian, religious and epitomises the transformation from new popu- regional parties have aligned themselves be- list party to mainstream centre-right party (Do- tween the social democrat left and liberal/con- novan 1994). Mečiar’s Movement for a Demo- servative right. The second pattern of opposi- cratic Slovakia achieved something similar, de- tion is therefore competition across the left vs. fining one pole of the government vs. opposi- right axis, focussing on the interests of a spe- tion dimension in Slovakia (Sitter 2002b). Oth- cific constituency. In most of these parties the ers have moved partially toward catch-all strat- organisation tends to retain stronger power over egies, as when the Norwegian, Swedish and the leadership than in the catch-all model, be- Finnish agrarian parties changed names to Cen- cause they are organised around a stricter set of tre parties between 1957 and 1965, broadening interests or identities. Ideology, or commitment their original agrarian focus to rural or regional to the party’s original aim, is likely to be impor- interests (Arter 1999, 2001). tant. Consequently, other things being equal, policy goals are likely to outweigh vote- maximisation or the quest for office. A third set is made up of parties that attempt 2.3. Party Strategy and Euro-Scepticism to circumvent left vs. right competition by competing on the flanks of the party system or in For most political parties Euro-scepticism – protest against its core consensus. The commu- the elaboration of a platform opposed to par- nist and fascist anti-systems parties that emerged ticipation in (aspects of) European integration across Europe in the wake of the First World – has been a deliberate and explicitly consid- War made up the extreme anti-system variety. ered choice (see country cases in Taggart/ Their counterparts after the Second World War Szczerbiak, forthcoming). This may be consid- may in some cases have toned down the anti- ered a question of party strategy, and as such system stance, but were largely eschewed by the linked to the three types of strategy above. Ex- mainstream parties. In the 1970s some were trapolating from Euro-scepticism in Scandina- crowded out by new populist parties in the shape via (Sitter 2001): The catch-all strategy is hardly of anti-tax protest parties on the right and new compatible with hard Euro-scepticism, partly socialist, radical and green parties on the left. because hard opposition to the EU is associated This constitutes the third pattern of opposition, with strong ideological commitment and partly at the flanks of the system. If anything, these because the integration process has been a gov-

243 Figure 2: Parties and strategy

Protest: Catch-all: Interests: Competing at the flanks Defining left vs. right Cross-cutting left vs. right – 1880 Elite party – 1880 – Mass party – 1919 – Anti-system party Interest party – 1945 – Catch-all party – 1970 – Protest and new Cartel party Single issue party populist parties ernment-driven process. However, parties that mitment, it is more likely to be located at one find themselves considerably to the left or right (or both) wings of any particular policy dimen- of the European consensus may face greater in- sion than at the centre. Euro-sceptic appeal centives to adopt Euro-sceptic stances. This has might therefore limit a party’s appeal to ‘neu- been linked to the development of EU economic tral’ voters. Yet the question’s salience varies policy (Marks/Wilson 2000), but is also associ- partly with the links between the domestic and ated with being out of office. By contrast, the EU level (timing of elections, treaties, referen- interest-oriented and protest strategies lend dums etc.). Participation in coalition govern- themselves more easily to alignment against ments that are party to EU deals may involve European integration, inasmuch as protest at the considerable costs for Euro-sceptic parties. domestic and EU level can be mutually rein- Given that the strategies of cross-cutting and forcing (Taggart 1998), and specific interest flanking opposition entail at least partial rejec- such as protection of agriculture is not always tion of the catch-all strategy, these dynamics compatible with participation in European inte- cannot be expected to play out the same way gration (Batory/Sitter forthcoming). across the three strategies. Inasmuch as European parties operate in a multi-level party system (Deschouwer 2000), they are under pressure to adapt to changing 3.Party Identity and Organisation – the institutional parameters and policies at both Corner Stone of Opposition to European domestic and EU level. The two long term goals Integration – related to party organisation and policy preferences – are more likely to be affected by sub- The first of political parties’ four goals – sur- stantial developments such as discrepancies vival of the organisation – warrants focus on between ideology or policy at the two levels than the party’s origins and long-tern evolution as by institutional pressure. If a party’s core val- well as its organisation and links with extra-par- ues are incompatible with supranational govern- liamentary organisations. These factors lie at the ance or its ideology and policy preferences jar core of Panebianco’s (1988) analysis of party with those of the EU, there is a substantive base organisation and power. The genesis of parties, for Euro-scepticism (figure 3a). On the other in terms of how they emerge as central organi- hand, the more immediate concerns of maxim- sations that diffuse throughout the polity or pe- ising votes and winning office are more sensi- ripheral organisations that penetrate the core, tive to institutional pressure, and may provide and their links with external sponsoring organi- incentives for a party to soften Euro-scepticism sations, allows for distinctions within and across (figure 3b). The party’s position relative to its party families. Focus on the origins of parties target electorate depends on a mixture of the two helps prevent problematic classifications of for types of pressure. If opposition to European in- example the Scandinavian protestant Christian tegration is linked to policy or ideological com- parties as continental-style Christian democrats.

244 Figure 3A: Long term goals and incentives for Euro-scepticism

The party’s origin and identity, in terms of salience to members Core policy preferences Compatible with supranational Focus on national governance and participatory democracy Core policy preferences compatible with EU No Euro-scepticism Soft Euro-scepticism membership Core policy preferences incompatible with EU Soft Euro-scepticism Hard Euro-scepticism membership

Figure 3B: Shorter term goals and incentives faced by Euro-sceptic parties

Vote-seeking Coalition government Pro-EU electorate Anti-EU electorate Coalition politics exerts Abandon Euro-scepticism Soften Euro-scepticism moderating effect Coalition politics exerts Soften Euro-scepticism Harden Euro-scepticism little moderating effect

Although parties can and do change, and may acceptable price for free trade, though the Brit- transcend their original aims and organisation, ish and Czech cases suggest that this varies with a degree of continuity characterises most par- policy (Hanley 1999). Only more protectionist ties. Parties’ identities therefore tend to shape or traditionalist strands of conservatism, some debates on how they should respond to new of which emerged as significant in post-com- questions such as European integration. munist East Central Europe, are difficult to rec- In the light of the three main ideological oncile with European integration in principle. strands that have given rise to broad centre-left In Western Europe the major parties as a rule and -right parties it is hardly surprising that played down ideology as they adopted catch- Euro-scepticism is the exception rather than the all strategies. Much the same holds for the so- rule. Nationalism sits uneasily with both socialist cial democrat and reform communist parties in and liberal ideology (Schopflin 1993, 1995). East Central Europe. The centre-right is how- Even if liberals have at times allied with nation- ever divided between parties that sought to in- alists, their primary focus on the individual voke a ‘return to the West’ and those that in- rather than community renders such marriages voked the inter-war historical legacy (Sitter fragile. Something similar holds for socialism’s 2002b). The latter, and those that model them- primary focus on class, even if some socialist selves on British Thatcherites, are more prone parties have seen free market European integra- to Euro-scepticism. tion as a threat. In both cases Euro-scepticism The second factor related to parties’ origins is contingent. On the centre-right, Catholic and structures is internal organisation. Herein Christian democracy’s acceptance of the lies the key to the catch-all parties’ potential for supranational church and its doctrine of Euro-scepticism. By adopting ‘broad church’ subsidiarity meant that multi-layered authority strategies that welcome a range of interests and and the principles behind European integration degrees of ideological commitment, both social- were familiar (Wilke/Wallace 1990). Even free ist and conservative parties allow for more or market conservatives, particularly in Scandina- less nationalist factions. To the extent that these via, usually find supranational arrangements an factions are associated with protectionist inter-

245 ests, or more traditionalist nation-oriented val- However, elsewhere the EU has been seen as ues, they have much in common with territorial the ally of minorities and regional parties rather interest parties. In the British, German and than a threat (De Winter 2001). French party systems the currents that may be Finally, protest parties make fertile ideologi- considered the equivalent of the territorial op- cal ground for Euro-scepticism inasmuch as position in Scandinavia have remained within opposition to the prevailing consensus at the the mainstream parties, albeit often at the mar- domestic level may be extended to the EU level. gins. The challenge for catch-all parties is how This is the core of Taggart’s ‘touchstone of dis- to handle internal dissent on the European ques- sent’ thesis, which concludes that “protest par- tion. ties may use their position on the EU as one The third element that may shape parties’ means of differentiating themselves from the broad pro- or anti-European commitment is ex- established parties” (1998, 382). Openly nation- ternal organisations that sponsor the party. Al- alist parties are obvious candidates for Euro- though the catch-all model entails a decline in scepticism. East Central Europe boasts the key extra-parliamentary organisations’ influence, examples, from Mečiar’s Movement for a protectionist trade unions have strengthened Democratic Slovakia (Henderson 2001) to Po- Euro-sceptic strands within social democrat land’s League of Polish Families (Szczerbiak parties in cases where the EU is perceived as 2002), but Austria’s Freedom Party (Fallend more free-market-oriented than the state 2002) and Denmark’s Progress and Danish Peo- (Ashford 1992; Ryden 2000; Saglie 2000). In ple’s Parties are important West European cases. post-communist East Central Europe there has On the left flank, left-socialist parties (Chris- been some scope for protectionism on the cen- tensen 1996) and unreformed communists have tre-right as well, from churches as well as from opposed European integration as too free-mar- the trade union wing of Solidarity in Poland (see ket oriented and insufficiently internationalist. country chapters in Taggart/Szczerbiak forth- In terms of the origins, ideology and identity coming). of parties this distinction between mainstream The principal exceptions to these generalisa- catch-all parties and their rivals suggests that tions are parties that have eschewed the catch- there are considerable differences among par- all strategy, and have more or less retained fo- ties’ propensities to Euro-scepticism. With a few cus on the ideology, interest or identity on which significant exceptions, catch-all parties provide the party was originally based. Norway provides much poorer bases for principled opposition to the two classic examples: the old liberal left European integration, although many feature spawned two new parties during the interwar Euro-factions. The importance of how dissent era, an agrarian party designed to represent is handled was amply illustrated by the Norwe- farmers’ interests and a peripheral Christian gian Labour Party’s 1972 and 1994 referendum party created to put forward pietist candidates campaigns: the first caused a split while the sec- (Nelsen 1993). Similar parties were established ond was more permissive (Saglie 2000). As far elsewhere in the Nordic region. Like the North- as hard Euro-scepticism is concerned, the pro- ern Irish unionist parties these peripheral par- test and interest parties provide more fertile ties have perceived the EU as a threat to their ground. core ideology and values. The Norwegian Cen- tre party still does, as do the East Central Euro- pean agrarian parties (Batory/Sitter forthcom- 4.Party Policy – the Content of ing). The Scandinavian Christian parties have Euro-Scepticism adopted more ambivalent approaches to Euro- pean integration than their continental counter- If a party’s identity is the cornerstone of its parts, based partly on their dissident origins approach to European integration, its policies (Madeley/Sitter 2003). The same holds for many provide the content of Euro-scepticism. Yet post-communist ‘Christian national’ parties. policy preferences are by nature more contin-

246 gent than identity, and may evolve faster than a (Hanley 1999), criticising the EU from a free party’s identity or organisation. Even if a par- market and Atlanticist perspective. ty’s policy preferences remain relatively stable, As far as the parties that compete across the their correlation with EU policy may change or left vs. right dimension are concerned, core alternatives may become obsolete. The policy policy preferences are often the key to Euro- content of the ‘box’ labelled Euro-scepticism scepticism. Or so the Euro-sceptic ‘territorial’ may therefore change with the evolution of party parties that have turned pro-EU suggest. A com- preferences, domestic policy and/or EU policy. bination of pietism, defence of national sover- For the catch-all parties the central question eignty and specific concerns such as the EU al- has been to what extent the EU represents a cohol policy shaped Euro-scepticism in the move from the domestic status quo in a desir- Norwegian Christian People’s Party and the able or undesirable direction, particularly with Finnish Christian League (SKL 1999). How- respect to economic policy. This explains the ever, the latter has since reversed its position, propensity of the centre-right and -left parties partly as a consequence of EU membership to resist or welcome European integration as the (SKL 2003). Likewise, whereas the Nordic EU shifts between free market orientation and agrarian parties (except the catch-all Danish regulation-oriented integration (Hooghe/Marks/ Venstre, Bille 1994) share ideological bases that Wilson 2002). The most prominent examples are conducive to Euro-scepticism because the are the British Labour Party’s conversion from parties represent the periphery against a pro-EU hard Euro-sceptic to pro-EU in the decade after centre, their differences can be explained in the 1983 defeat, and the almost parallel but terms of policy. The Swedish party converted milder rise of Euro-scepticism among Conserva- to a pro-EU stance after the Social Democrats’ tive right-wing ranks (Daniels 1998; Garry U-turn, but this was driven by a re-evaluation 1995). The same sometimes holds for foreign of access to the Single Market and the Com- policy. A combination of economic policy, cor- mon Agricultural Policy (Ryden 2000). A simi- poratism, neutrality and consensual democracy lar process is underway with respect to fisher- shaped Sweden’s approach to the EU up to 1990 ies policy and the Progressive Party in Iceland. (Miles 1997). Whereas Social Democrat Prime The reverse process is rarer, but can be found in Minister Erlander aborted the first emergent EU the Italian Lega Nord’s hardening Euro-scepti- debate in 1961 by declaring membership incom- cism in the second half of the 1990s. Its last patible with Swedish neutrality, the party re- Euro-election programme called for a confed- versed positions swiftly after the collapse of the erate union, advocating communities’ ‘consti- Berlin Wall and adopted a pro-EU stance as early tutional right of annulment’ of the application as October 1990. In post-communist East Cen- of EU law, thus rejecting the ‘continental su- tral Europe the question is complicated by the per-state’ (Lega Nord 1999). ‘underdeveloped’ nature of the conservative It is less surprising that the salient policies of right (Schopflin 1993). To the extent that par- parties that operate on the left and right flanks ties focus more on collective values than the free tend to conflict with EU policies, inasmuch as market, they have reasons to question the liber- they oppose the mainstream consensus. Left- alising impact of EU membership. The increas- socialists’ and unreconstructed communists’ ingly populist turn of the liberal Federation of opposition to (‘capitalist’) European integration Young Democrats (Fidesz) in Hungary after its partly reflects the EU’s focus on market inte- poor showing in the 1994 elections opened for gration, and other protectionist parties in post- a shift to soft Euro-scepticism as the party be- communist Europe have been drawn toward came increasingly critical of big (international) similar stances. In the Netherlands the new List business (Batory 2002). However, in the Czech Pim Fortuyn adopted the Euro-sceptic stance of Republic Klaus’s Civic Democrats (ODS) its leader (Harmsen 2002), but the EU question adopted much the same approach as the soft has been more problematic for populist anti-tax Euro-sceptic wing of the British Conservatives parties on the far right in countries for which

247 EU membership would entail pressure for lower cated at the right wings of centre-right parties taxes and prices. Hence the mixed or even pro- and left of the centre-left parties. Although the EU strategies adopted by the Norwegian and catch-all strategy is usually associated with Swedish right-populists, even if they may share Downsian competition, some catch-all parties their Danish counterparts’ suspicions of EMU choose platforms that pull the party towards the as an interventionist project. left or right flank rather than the centre in at- In this strategy-oriented model, a party’s tempts to influence or shape median-voter pref- longer term propensity for Euro-scepticism is erences rather than accommodate them (Dun- the product of a combination of its identity and leavy 1991). The British Conservatives and core policy aims. Catch-all parties are less prone Forza Italia tried this in 2001, and moved into to ideological opposition to European integra- a more Euro-sceptic policy space. Conversely, tion, but some oppose aspects of it when do- for the British and German centre-left the deci- mestic and EU policy jar. Changing positions sion to compete close to the centre precluded on European integration may therefore be ex- Euro-scepticism (Lees 2002). plained in terms of policy, particularly economic This dilemma is, if anything, stronger for par- and foreign policy. However, this is not the case ties that compete on cross-cutting dimensions to the same extent for interest or protest parties, or at the flanks, because they face tradeoffs be- for which policy preferences and ideology cor- tween targeting their core constituency and seek- relate more strongly. Here the motive for party ing to attract votes from the wider electorate. If formation has tended to be protest or opposi- they target a Euro-sceptic constituency in a pro- tion, and EU or domestic policy change is less EU country, as for example the Swedish Left significant. party or the Hungarian Independent Smallhold- ers, this limits their appeal. Moreover, they may be crowded out if more mainstream parties adopt 5.The Pursuit of Votes – Electoral Euro-sceptic positions, as has been the case with Incentives and Euro-Scepticism the Smallholders and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party after Fidesz’s soft Euro-sceptic turn. Whereas a party’s identity and policy prefer- Even parties that compete on the flanks of the ences shape its overall strategic approach to party system face a trade-off between maintain- European integration, its pursuit of votes and ing their protest-oriented electoral appeal and office affects the way this is translated into ac- attempting to poach voters from their neigh- tual Euro-scepticism. The classic assumption bours. The Austrian Freedom Party, Italian Na- that parties seek to maximise votes suggests tional Alliance and the List Pim Fortuyn have convergence on the median voters in a two-party all played down Euro-scepticism during cam- system, and even a degree of median-voter-cen- paigns in competition with their mainstream tred policy outcomes in multi-party systems centre-right rivals. The Norwegian Progress (Downs 1957). If Euro-scepticism is not a sin- Party provides one of the few cases of the op- gle dimension, but is linked to political compe- posite, as it played down its support for EU tition on existing dimensions, it is unlikely to membership. be salient or strong at the centre of the party The first powerful force that might cause par- system. This is not to say that parties or voters ties to modify or soften their Euro-scepticism is that lie near the median on the left vs. right di- thus the pursuit of votes. However, in most cases mension will not oppose European integration, this results in silence on the European question but merely to suggest that to the extent that they during electoral campaigns rather than durable do, this opposition will be linked to another (ter- change. It has been easier for small parties with ritorial) dimension. As far as the catch-all par- more clearly delineated target electorates to capi- ties are concerned, the median voter is pro-EU, talise on opposition to European integration than whereas the voters for whom opposition to Eu- for catch-all parties. The parties that have ropean integration is salient are likely to be lo- adopted hard Euro-sceptic platforms or long-

248 term soft Euro-scepticism have only persisted ticism when in office. In Greece, PASOK qui- where, as in Norway, Poland and Finland, an etly turned after winning the 1981 election overwhelming share of their core electorate (Verney 1996). The Italian communists’ expe- opposes EU membership. Where the core elec- rience in the 1970s suggests that even aspira- torate has changed towards a more pro-EU tion to office may have a similar effect. Perhaps stance, whether because interests change (Swed- the most blatant case is that of the Finnish Cen- ish farmers) or the party outgrows its origins tre Party in 1994, when Esko Aho’s threat to (the Swedish Christians Democrats), the party resign as party leader and prime minister secured has faced considerable incentives to adopt a pro- a sceptical party’s support for EU membership EU position. (Rauino 1999). Milder versions can be found in the constraints placed on Lega Nord in Italy, the Freedom Party in Austrian and the Polish Peas- 6.The Quest for Office – Executive ant Party (PSL). The main exception to this rule Constraints on Euro-Scepticism so far has been Norway, where centre-right coalitions broke up over European integration in Even if identity and policy preferences are 1971 and 1990 and the current coalition fea- conducive to Euro-scepticism and electoral tures a ‘suicide-clause’ that precludes raising the competition reinforces this, the quest for par- EU question. Together with the Finnish Chris- ticipation in executive office may constrain tian League’s departure from the coalition that party-based Euro-scepticism. If a party’s elec- took the country into the EU and the recent col- toral incentives depend on its nearest competi- lapse of coalitions that included the Austrian tors not having crowded out the Euro-sceptic Freedom Party, the List Pim Fortuyn and the space, this means that the party’s potential coa- Polish Peasant Party, this suggests that not only lition partners are likely to be pro-EU and coa- does office constrain Euro-scepticism, but fail- lition games are likely to exert a constraining ure to adapt to these constraints severely jeop- effect. Because governing parties in EU mem- ardises coalitions. ber states tend to be party to EU policy deals and to defend these (Hix/Lord 1996), executive office is more likely to constrain Euro-sceptics 7.Conclusion – Towards a Tamer Shrew? than pro-EU parties. This also holds for appli- cant countries and countries that participate in The model explored above casts Euro-scepti- aspects of European integration (e.g. the Euro- cism as a product of party strategy, and herein pean Economic Area). Conversely, spells in lies the clue to the ‘taming of the shrew’. A par- opposition are usually the consequence of elec- ty’s decision to adopt or modify a Euro-sceptic toral defeat, and defeat tends to render debates stance is the product of four strategic consid- over party strategy more legitimate and salient. erations: the weight of the party’s identity and Opposition also makes it difficult to buy off or ideology, the implications of its pursuit of core discipline internal dissent. Not only do the mod- policy preferences, the incentives it faces in its erating constraints of office not operate when a pursuit of votes and the constraints of coalition party is in opposition, but Euro-sceptic strands politics. In each case, propensities or incentives within the party may be freer to operate. for Euro-scepticism may be modified. By con- The moderating effect of office appears to trast, few pro-EU parties have moved toward apply across party systems and party strategies. Euro-scepticism for reasons of vote The two main British parties have famously maximisation or office. Party identity and or- proven more Euro-sceptic during spells of op- ganisation make up the starting point identifi- position. Fidesz’s above-mentioned populist cation of the actual or potential ‘shrew’. With turn in Hungary was a reassessment in the light the exception of catch-all parties that draw on of electoral defeat. Severeal Euro-sceptic par- explicitly nationalist ideology, the extent to ties have softened or abandoned their Euro-scep- which catch-all parties provide a fertile base for

249 Euro-scepticism depends on their factions. Par- chew catch-all strategies they are less likely to ties that are rooted in protection on specific in- adjust to incentives related to vote maximisation terests or in protest are more prone to Euro-scep- and access to office. The purer the interest or ticism. Policy preferences may both exacerbate protest strategy, the less likely is the effect of and undermine Euro-scepticism. To the extent short term incentives. that some catch-all parties have adopted Euro- The key to parties’ adoption of and changes sceptic platforms, this has been driven by policy in Euro-scepticism therefore lies in party strat- concerns. This kind of Euro-scepticism is there- egy, in the sense of the combined goals that fore soft, or contingent. Given the importance shape competition between parties: survival of of policy to the interest or protest parties, there the party and its core identity, policy preferences, is more scope for policy reinforcing identity- the pursuit of votes and the quest for office. The based opposition to European integration, to advantage of this model over more parsimoni- produce hard Euro-scepticism. However, the ous cleavage- or policy-oriented models of two shorter term dilemmas, how and whether party-based Euro-scepticism is that it brings the to maximise votes and how much to compro- party (or more specifically the party leadership) mise in the pursuit of office, exert potentially back in as the central actor. Parties’ platforms softening effects on most parties. are shaped by more than their policies, even if Hard Euro-sceptic parties are therefore likely policy-focus explains aspects of changes in to be found at the party systems’ cross-cutting party-based Euro-scepticism. Identity and or- dimensions or flanks, in the shape of interest or ganisation provide long term constraints, and protest parties, even if some catch-all parties concerns for votes and office shape short term accommodate factions that oppose EU member- incentives. Moreover, three broad strategies, ship. The Greek, Finnish and Swedish evidence catch-all, interest and protest, are associated with suggests that even hard Euro-sceptic parties may different priorities and choices as far as these soften their opposition to EU membership once four goals are concerned. Euro-scepticism is the country has joined and realistic policy alter- considered a matter of party strategy and, within natives change. Even principled opposition to the parameters made up by the domestic party European integration is subject to incentives for system, policy alternatives and EU policy, both modification if policies change, if expansion its elaboration and change is therefore explained beyond the party’s core electorate is sought, or in terms of actors’ strategic and tactical choices. participation in office secured. Soft Euro-scepticism is more pervasive, and, by definition, more contingent. However, the distinction between catch-all parties that adopt more Euro-sceptic stances in opposition and REFERENCES protest or issue parties that soften Euro-scepticism remains significant. The former is the most Arter, David (1999). From Class Party to Catchall Party? contingent form of Euro-scepticism. Even when The Adaptation of the Finnish Agrarian-Center Party, a catch-all party bases Euro-scepticism on policy in: Scandinavian Political Studies, 22 (2), 157–180. Arter, David (ed.) (2001). From Farmyard to City preferences, the pursuit of votes and achieve- Square? The Electoral Adaptation of the Nordic ment of office constrains Euro-scepticism in Agrarian Parties, Aldershot. practice. Because soft Euro-scepticism is driven Ashford, Nigel (1992). The Political Parties, in: Stephen by policy, it is subject to modification if poli- George (ed.): Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment, Oxford, 119–148. cies or policy alternatives change. The caveat is Axelrod, Robert (1970). Conflict of Interest, Chicago. that this depends on the party leadership’s in- Baker, David (2003). The Shotgun Marriage: Managing terpretation of changes and its ability to carry Eurosceptical Opinion in British Political Parties the party with it. Here interest parties are gener- 1971–2002, Paper presented to the EUSA Confer- ence, Nashville, 27–29 March 2003. ally less flexible. As long as the interest or pro- Batory, Agnes (2002). Attitudes to Europe: Ideology, test parties focus on their core identity and es- Strategy and the Issue of European Union Member-

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252 AUTHOR Recent publications include: “Ever Closer Co-opera- tion? The Limits of the Norwegian Method of European Nick SITTER (b. 1969) is Associate Professor in the Integration”, in: Scandinavian Political Studies, 2003:2 Department of Public Governance at the Norwegian (with K. Eliassen); “Cleavages, Party Strategy and Party School of Management BI, where he teaches EU politi- System Change Europe East and West”, in: Perspectives cal economy, comparative politics and public policy. He on European Politics and Society, 2002:3 and “The Poli- holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Government at tics of Opposition and European Integration in Scandi- London School of Economics and Political Science, and navia: Is Euro-scepticism a Government-Opposition has lectured EU, East and West European politics and Dynamic?”, in: West European Politics, 2001:4. history at the Central European University, the Ameri- can University, Kingston University and Reading Uni- versity. Research interests and publications cover EU Adress: Department of Public Policy, The Norwegian public policy and regulation, European integration, com- School of Management BI, E. Smith vei 15, N-1302, parative party systems and Euro-scepticism. Sandvika, Norway. E-mail: [email protected]

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