Investigation into contraband entering a prison and related issues

June 2008 Investigation into contraband entering a prison and related issues

June 2008 Ordered to be printed Victorian government printer Session 2006-08 P.P. No. 102 3

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To

The Honourable the President of the Legislative Council and

The Honourable the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly

Pursuant to section 25 of the Ombudsman Act 1973, I present to the Parliament the report on my own motion investigation into contraband entering a prison and related issues.

G E Brouwer OMBUDSMAN 5

Contents GLOSSARY 6 Executive Summary 8 INTRODUCTION 11 BACKGROUND 13 Dame Phyllis Frost Centre (DPFC) 13 Policies and procedures 14 Statistical information 15 Role of the Security and Emergency Services Group (SESG) 18 investigation 20 Methodology 20 Conducting and recording searches 20 Dog squad search operations 23 Urine testing and analysis 25 Gatehouse security 27 Reception 28 Record keeping of contraband seizures 29 Seizure register 29 Evidence bags 31 Storage of contraband 32 Transfer and disposal of contraband 32 Intelligence gathering and analysis 34 Vetting of staff for criminal history 37 conclusions 39 recommendations 41 attachments 43 A. Victorian prisoner health study - drug use 43 B. Number of contraband items seized from visitors 44 and prisoners 2005-2006 C. Seizure register 45 D. Victoria Police property receipt 46 E. Seized contraband register 47 F. Evidence bag 50 G. Recruitment of Correctional Officers 51 glossary ANCD Australian National Council on Drugs

Collator A prison officer responsible for managing information received about prisoners and staff

Commissioner’s Requirements Documented standards for the operation of private prisons

Contraband Banned items and substances that have entered the prison unlawfully. Contraband includes: illicit drugs, weapons, alcohol, food items and drug paraphernalia such as needles and syringes

Corrections Inspectorate A former unit in the Victorian Department of Justice which reported to the Secretary with independent advise on the operation of the corrections system. It was replaced in August 2007 by the OCSR which has similar functions

Corrections Victoria The government body within the Victorian Department of Justice that oversees the management of Victorian adult prisons

Director’s Instructions Documented standards for the operation of public prisons

Drop safe A type of safe that has a swing door at the top that allows articles to be tipped into the body of the safe

ERG Emergency Response Group at Dame Phyllis Frost Centre 7

Evidence bags A plastic bag where contraband items seized in the prison are required to be placed (Example at Attachment F)

Healthy Prison Review A whole-of-prison review conducted against a ‘healthy’ prisons framework

IDU Identified Drug User

OCSR Office of Correctional Services Review

PROTEL Proactive Intelligence System, a database used to record prisoner information and to record incidents and information arising from within the prison system.

Seizure Register A record of information kept by a prison in relation to seizure of contraband (Example at Attachment C)

SESG Security and Emergency Services Group Executive summary The Dame Phyllis Frost Centre (DPFC) is the maximum security prison for women in Victoria. Staff had expressed their concerns to my office about the search and seizure procedures, and the receipt, recording and disposal of contraband, including illicit drugs, at DPFC. I commenced an own motion investigation into contraband as I was concerned that poor administrative practices were putting at risk the security and safety of staff, prisoners and the community.

The investigation raised broader issues of how to effectively prevent contraband, in particular illicit drugs, from entering a prison and how to detect and deal with such contraband when it is found.

Proper policies and procedures are critical to operating a safe, secure and humane prison. Such policies and procedures make individual custodial officers accountable and facilitate practices compliant with prescribed standards to prevent the entry and availability of contraband in the prison system.

Contraband is a source of significant concern in a prison because of the harm that it can cause. Illicit drugs, in particular, carry a substantial health risk through the transmission of blood-borne viral diseases such as HIV, hepatitis B and hepatitis C. There is also the possiblity of drug overdoses and risky actions to obtain the illicit drugs within the prison. Furthermore, when contraband can be readily obtained in a custodial facility, the potential for violence among prisoners increases, as well as bullying, standover tactics and conflict over debts. It also increases the risk and creates opportunities for misconduct or corruption among staff.

Generally, the availability of contraband contributes to a weakening of good governance within a prison and undermines the aims of making a prison environment safe and secure. Perceptions about inadequate control and poor security, even widespread lawlessness can be created and this can undermine public confidence in the prison system.

A well run prison, in my view, should have effective policies and procedures in place to ensure that contraband is effectively prevented from entering the prison and being available to prisoners. Close monitoring of prisons is required to ensure policies and procedures are implemented.

My investigation at DPFC included: an inspection of the prison; interviews with a number of witnesses; and a review of how contraband is dealt with by prison authorities through an examination of the records of searches and seizures of contraband. 9

My investigation identified that while there are clear instructions for conducting searches and seizures, staff do not always comply with these. It also found that there is significant room for improvement in the manner in which contraband is dealt with at DPFC. Furthermore, I believe these findings have relevance to all prisons in Victoria.

My investigation identified weaknesses in the manner in which searches are conducted at DPFC and in the recording of such searches. I also noted deficiencies in the accountability processes in dealing with contraband once it had been seized. The retention of seized illicit drugs for extended periods of time was of concern. Action is required to ensure that seized items are audited regularly and disposed of properly.

I consider that the manner in which intelligence is analysed, recorded and acted upon, must be improved. Information about prison officers, especially if it involves corruption, should be investigated promptly by Corrections Victoria. I am also of the view that prison officers and other relevant correctional staff should be subject to regular vetting for criminal history. This is particularly the case when a prison has responsibility for children in its care, as at DPFC.

As a result of my investigation, I have made a number of recommendations, including that Corrections Victoria:

• review and re-design its Seizure Register to provide greater accountability for the recording of contraband seized during searches • review the search and drug-testing procedures at DPFC to ensure that testing is carried out on a random basis to limit possible abuse of the process without security being compromised • replace the current evidence bags used at DPFC for seized items with a bag designed to improve accountability, and review evidence bags in use in all Victorian prisons • undertake a review of storage arrangements for seized items in all Victorian prisons • review its practices and procedures relating to intelligence analysis to ensure that its intelligence reports are properly analysed and acted upon where necessary • introduce criminal record vetting of all staff every five years. The survey data I sought during my investigation supports the claim that illicit drugs are present in Victorian prisons. My investigation focussed on systemic issues regarding searching, seizing, receiving, recording and disposing of contraband, including illicit drugs. I have taken up with Corrections Victoria that any allegations or information of concern is appropriately investigated and acted upon where necessary.

The Department of Justice (DOJ) supports my recommendations and ‘accepts that there is an opportunity to improve staff compliance with procedures, and to strengthen processes to minimise drug use in prison’. In addition, DOJ responded that the ‘report has provided some valuable indications of areas for review and focus for DPFC to continue to improving its capability to minimise drug contraband entering the facility’. 11

INTRODUCTION In the first half of 2007 I received a number of complaints from DPFC employees about contraband entering the prison and about the way in which it was dealt with by prison staff. These complaints included that prison officers were not searching prison cells, and yet were signing the register to indicate that they had; and that prison officers were not adequately recording and disposing of seized contraband.

My concern about these complaints is that they point to poor administrative practices, which directly impact on the safety and security of prison staff, prisoners and the broader community. Given the range and number of complaints, I decided to conduct an investigation on my own motion under section 14 of the Ombudsman Act 1973.

On 1 June 2007 I advised the Minister for Corrections and the Secretary of the Department of Justice of my intention to conduct an investigation into DPFC with respect to:

• search procedures at DPFC, including records relating to searches • the receipt, recording and disposal of contraband, including illicit and prescription drugs seized at DPFC.

This investigation was also informed by my recent review of the former Victorian Corrections Inspectorate, which in turn followed a recommendation from my investigation into Conditions for persons in custody (July 2006)1. The role of the Inspectorate included monitoring and reporting on the compliance of prisons in accordance with Corrections Victoria policies, procedures and standards. In early 2007 the Inspectorate had conducted a Healthy Prison Review of DPFC during which my investigators were observers.

In August 2007 I provided DOJ with the preliminary conclusions of my review of the Inspectorate. This included an assessment of a number of the Inspectorate’s investigation reports. As a result, the Inspectorate has been restructured and renamed the Office of the Correctional Services Review (OCSR). The performance of the OCSR remains under review by my office, following commitments made by the Secretary of the Department of Justice in response to my preliminary conclusions.

1 Report of Ombudsman Victoria and Office of Police Integrity, July 2006 In 2005 I also conducted an investigation into the administrative procedures relating to drug testing in Victorian prisons. It identified a number of concerns and deficiencies in relation to the recording and documenting of drug testing. This provided further contextual information for the current investigation.

Concerns about the effectiveness of measures to deal with illicit drugs and other contraband in prisons have led to questions being raised in Parliament (Hansard 4 December 2007) and to media reports (The Age 25 October 2006; 14 January 2008; The Herald Sun 20 January 2008). Ombudsmen in Tasmania (Report on an Inquiry into Risdon Prison 2001) and in Western Australia (Report on an Investigation into Deaths in Prisons 2000) have also identified concerns about illicit drugs in prison.

I note that major efforts have been directed at reducing and discouraging the supply and use of illicit drugs in prison. The problem is well documented both at the national level, through the National Corrections Drug Strategy 2006-2009, and at the state level through the Victorian Prison Drug Strategy 2002.

The Victorian Prison Drugs Strategy 2002 seeks to improve ways of keeping drugs out of prison (through illicit drugs supply control, detection and deterrence strategies) and to reduce prisoner drug use (through treatment and health and safety initiatives).

The National Corrections Drug Strategy 2006-2009 reports that in Victorian prisons 55 per cent of all prisoners reported that their offences were committed either to support drug use or under the influence of drugs. Similar figures were reported for New South Wales. More than three quarters of prisoners reported using illicit drugs in the six months prior to their current prison term.

More significantly, during their current term of imprisonment approximately 60 per cent of prisoners reported drug use on at least one occasion; around 33 per cent of injecting drug users continued to inject drugs in prison; and a smaller percentage reported that they began using drugs and injecting drugs for the first time in prison. 13

BACKGROUND Dame Phyllis Frost Centre

DPFC is managed by Corrections Victoria and is Victoria’s main women’s correctional facility. It opened in 1996 and is located 26 kms from Melbourne in the outer western suburb of Deer Park on Melbourne’s outer west. The facility has a wire fencing perimeter that permits viewing into the prison by the public. DPFC is surrounded on three sides by vacant land and on the fourth by the car- park and entry points. While DPFC is classified as a maximum security facility, it accommodates women prisoners of all security rating levels. Prisoner categories include reception, remand, sentenced, management and protection.

DPFC has a design capacity to accommodate 250 female prisoners. In April 2008 it held an average of 193 prisoners. It has a range of accommodation, including single cells (in reception, management, protection and special care units); 10- bed communal units and five-bed cottage-style units. A small number of young children (up to the age of four years) are accommodated with their mothers. The facility also has a block designed for prisoners requiring protection and another block for prisoners with behaviour management issues. The layout of the prison has recently been modified through building and infrastructure projects. These have included an expansion and upgrade of the visits centre, medical centre, and prison industry and education facilities, as part of the 2005 Better Pathways Strategy: an Integrated Response to Women’s Offending and Re-Offending. The Strategy also aims to improve employment and training opportunities and other programs for women prisoners.

Women prisoners are acknowledged to have complex treatment and support needs, often linked to substance abuse, poor mental and physical health, including chronic illness and communicable diseases. Policies and procedures

Corrections Victoria procedures that are relevant to my investigation are contained in the Correctional Management Standards for Women’s Prisons. The Standards incorporate the requirements contained within the Crimes Act 1986 and international conventions, and reflect the National Standard Guidelines for Corrections in Australia 2004. For public prisons, like DPFC, the standards are incorporated in the Director’s Instructions; and for private prisons, they are contained in the Commissioner’s Requirements. All prisons derive local operating procedures from these standards. Revised sets of standards were implemented during 2006. The updated standards reflect developments in correctional theory, policy and practice. Key underlying principles are: the containment of prisoners in a safe, secure, humane and just manner; and the engagement of prisoners in positive behavioural change.

The standards are important for prison accountability because they establish the minimum requirements for service delivery in Victorian prisons. They serve as a benchmark against which the performance of the system can be monitored, and thus provide the basis for ensuring accountability and a consistent level of service delivery across the system. Accountability arrangements include regular performance reporting (Service Delivery Outcomes) by each prison to Corrections Victoria. The newly established OCSR, reporting directly to the Secretary of the Department of Justice, also has an oversight role through its investigation and review activities.

My investigation considered the following policies and procedures:

• Director’s Instruction No: 1.4—Contraband • Director’s Instruction No: 1.5—Searches and Patrols • Director’s Instruction No: 1.9—Preservation of Evidence • DPFC Operating Procedure No: 1.4/1—Contraband • DPFC Operating Procedure No: 1.4/1—Searches and Patrols • Director’s Instruction No: 3.9—Substance Deterrence and Treatment • Director’s Instruction No: 3.10—Detection and Testing—Drug and Alcohol Use. 15

Statistical information

To assist my investigation into illicit drugs at DPFC, I sought statistical information from several sources, including survey data from prisoners and staff, and data on contraband items seized.

Survey information was obtained from the Healthy Prison Review of DPFC, conducted by the Corrections Inspectorate in 2007. The surveys involved a sample of prisoners and staff. The aim was to provide information on whether the facility was performing at an acceptable level in relation to ‘healthy’ prison conditions and to custodial management. While I recognise the need for caution in interpreting any survey results, the findings are of interest. The survey of prisoners included a question: have you ever used drugs at DPFC? – six per cent said ‘yes often’, 13 per cent said ‘yes now and then’, while 66 per cent of the 32 respondents said they had never used drugs at DPFC. To a related question: whether it is easy to get hold of drugs in this prison – 25 per cent of prisoners strongly agreed and 19 per cent agreed that it was easy; while only 16 per cent disagreed/ strongly disagreed. I understand that the survey results for other Healthy Prison Reviews indicate that self-reported drug use at DPFC is lower than at other prisons.

When a sample of staff at DPFC were similarly surveyed, one of the questions was: whether it is fairly easy for prisoners to get hold of drugs at DPFC – 27 per cent strongly agreed that it was, while 51 per cent agreed. Thus three-quarters of the staff surveyed believed that prisoners had easy access to drugs at DPFC. In response to a related question, staff were asked; whether the Victorian Prison Drug Strategy has assisted to reduce drug taking at DPFC – a total of 49 per cent of respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed that it had assisted.

These recent survey findings in relation to DPFC add weight to the results of the Prisoner Health Study conducted on behalf of Corrections Victoria by Deloitte Consulting in 2003 across all Victorian prisons. In the survey, questions about drugs were asked of a state-wide sample of prisoners. The responses showed the significant scale of the drug problem in Victorian prisons. Prior to their current imprisonment, 78 per cent of non-Aboriginal female prisoners had taken illegal drugs at some stage of their life. Highly relevant to my present investigation was the finding that more than 14 per cent of female prisoners and more than 13 per cent of non-Aboriginal male prisoners said that they had injected illegal drugs while in prison. The relevant results from the Deloitte Consulting survey are shown in Attachment A.

Prisoners who reported injecting illegal drugs in prison were also asked about needle sharing and the use of clean needles: …an estimated 25 per cent of young prisoners who inject drugs within the system are sharing needles…alarmingly, of those prisoners who reported that they had shared a needle the last time they injected illegal drugs in prison, high percentages …reported that the needle was not cleaned prior to using it. (Deloitte Consulting, 2003, p48)

Other Victorian survey findings in the Australian National Council on Drugs (ANCD) evaluation report of 2004, entitled Supply, demand and harm reduction strategies in Australian prisons – implementation, cost and evaluation, indicate that 26 per cent of prisoners reported injecting drug use in prison, with five per cent reporting daily use.

I also sought information about contraband items seized in Victorian prisons during searches of prisoners and visitors. The Security and Emergency Services Group (SESG), which has a central role in detecting and controlling the supply of drugs and other contraband in prisons, has compiled seizure statistics for 2005-06 across Victorian prisons (see Attachment B).

The data provided has been adapted into tables and is presented below. Table 1 shows four categories of seized items (other drug-related items such as syringes are excluded) from visitors to each prison in 2005-06 (note: Bendigo Prison closed in 2005). Table 2 shows the items seized from prisoners in each prison in 2005-06.

Table 1: Contraband items seized from visitors in Victorian prisons 2005-2006

Number and type of contraband items seized from visitors

White Prescription Prison Cannabinoids Powder Medication Alcohol Total % of Total

Fulham 19 11 1 5 36 32% Beechworth CC 1 0 0 17 18 16% PPP 7 3 4 1 15 14%

Barwon 5 3 2 0 10 9% Dhurringile 4 0 2 4 10 9% MAP 5 1 2 0 8 7% DPFC 4 1 0 0 5 5% Ararat 0 0 3 0 3 3% Loddon 2 0 0 1 3 3% Langi Kal Kal 2 0 0 0 2 2% Bendigo 1 0 0 0 1 1% Tarrengower 0 0 0 0 0 0% 111 100%

Source: adapted from 2006 Security Compliance Review, SESG. 17

Table 2: Contraband items seized from prisoners in Victorian prisons 2005-2006

Number and type of contraband items seized from prisoners

White Prescription Prison Cannabinoids Powder Medication Alcohol Total % of Total

PPP 2 14 30 13 59 27% Fulham 23 6 22 7 58 26% DPFC 5 10 16 2 33 15%

Barwon 4 5 13 3 25 11% MAP 4 3 6 0 13 6% Loddon 0 1 9 0 10 5% Ararat 0 2 5 0 7 3% Tarrengower 1 0 5 1 7 3% Langi Kal Kal 0 0 2 1 3 1% Bendigo 0 0 2 0 2 1% Dhurringile 1 0 0 1 2 1% Beechworth CC 0 0 0 0 0 0% 219 100%

Source: adapted from 2006 Security Compliance Review, SESG.

Of all items seized across the prison system, one third (34 per cent) were from visitors, with the highest proportion (32 per cent) of seizures at Fulham Correctional Centre where the items were mainly in the form of cannabinoids; and two-thirds were seized from prisoners, with Fulham and Port Phillip Prisons having the highest proportion of items seized.

A comparison between Tables 1 and 2 shows that at DPFC there were more seizures of contraband items from prisoners (33 items) than from visitors (5 items). Indeed, DPFC is the third-highest of all prisons in terms of the number of items seized from prisoners. Only Fulham and Port Phillip Prison have greater numbers. In terms of the types of items seized at DPFC, it appears that ‘white powder’ and ‘prescription medication’ were the most frequent. Role of the Security and Emergency Services Group (SESG)

SESG has the key responsibility within Corrections Victoria for a number of security and management functions in relation to prisons. Its role includes:

• emergency response to incidents in all Victorian prisons • managing the dog squad, which consists of dog and handler teams, for detecting a range of drugs, as well as for person and property searching • high security/high protection escort of prisoners • coordination of random and targeted urine testing of prisoners in public prisons • intelligence coordination, including collation, analysis and dissemination of information relevant to prisoners and prison officers • regular reviews of security and emergency management compliance at all public prisons.

In July 2006 SESG conducted a security compliance review of DPFC, which measured the performance of DPFC against Corrections Victoria requirements. This review followed an earlier review in June 2005. My office was provided with a copy of the 2006 review and, for the purpose of my investigation, I have relied on its data relating to seizures of contraband. The 2006 review was in draft form at the time of my request to Corrections Victoria in October 2007. It should also be noted that the Corrections Inspectorate conducted a targeted review of security at DPFC in 2004 and a review of the management of core SESG functions in 2005.

While the results of the 2006 SESG review ‘show a considerable improvement in security compliance for DPFC when compared to the previous review [June 2005]’, the Executive Summary states that one of the predominant issues arising from its 2006 review was ‘contraband and seizures processes [which] do not comply with Director’s Instructions’. It is in the area of contraband and seizure processes, which SESG marked as high priority items, that six review items were assessed at DPFC as being non-compliant—more than any other high priority area. 19

The SESG review noted:

In [the] June 2005 Security and Emergency Procedures Compliance Review there were one hundred and four issues of non compliance and seven areas identified as predominant issues. Two of the predominant issues from the previous security review have been identified as predominant issues again in this security review. These are:

• Contraband and seizure process • Perimeter security.

Issues relating to the drug seizure processes identified by SESG included:

• the length of time seized drugs are being held by the prison • the weighing and recording of drugs related seizures • the correct disposal of seized drugs.

The review further stated that:

The evidence safe contained evidence bags of seized items (including drug items) dating back to November 2000. There are also numerous seizures recorded in the Seizure Registers that have been disposed of without all of the information required in the Seizure Register being recorded, e.g.

• Date and time • Name and rank of authorising officer • Manner of disposal • Name and signature of disposing officer, and • Name and signature of accompanying officer.

SESG identified in a clear and non-ambiguous way that over several years there were non-compliant administrative practices at DPFC in relation to the entry and availability of contraband, with a particular reference to jewellery. It would appear from the complaints I received in 2007, which led to this investigation, that little or no effective remedial action had been taken to address the identified deficiencies. INVESTIGATION Methodology

My investigation officers interviewed a number of staff from DPFC, a supervisor from SESG and members of Victoria Police. Information was specifically sought from a number of persons within Corrections Victoria on areas related to my own motion investigation. Also brought to my attention were a number of concerns from witnesses about the processes and systems in place at DPFC to manage the handling and recording of contraband, including illicit drugs. In this context my officers examined the Corrections Victoria procedures and examples of search and seizure records. Background information was also analysed, including the Victorian Prisons Drug Strategy and related documents.

DPFC, like all other Victorian prisons, employs a range of strategies to detect and prevent contraband from entering the prison, and to prevent its availability and use. There are also policies and procedures to be followed for recording these processes when they are applied. My investigators examined evidence in relation to both these aspects.

Conducting and recording searches

All accommodation, including cells and common areas at DPFC, is subject to both random and periodical searches by prison staff.

Director’s Instruction No: 1.5—Searches and Patrols provides details of the search procedures. My investigators identified that DPFC had in place the required search registers as identified in that instruction. The instruction states that:

Cell and dormitory searches will be conducted on an unannounced and irregular basis, and on a frequency considered necessary for the security and good order of the prison.

Minimum levels of general and routine cell control will be established in compliance with the requirements of current drug strategies; cells or accommodation occupied by identified drug users will be subject to a higher level of searching.

Once searched, a cell or dormitory should not be left in disorder, but should be left as close as possible to the condition in which it was found. Prisoners’ personal property will be treated with care and respect, and not wilfully discarded, damaged or misplaced.

Wherever possible, an accommodation search will be conducted by at least two officers in order to corroborate the correctness of the search. Officers conducting an accommodation search will: 21

• upon entering the accommodation, pause and observe in order to gain an overall impression of the surroundings, then proceed to first search any anomalies attracting attention • systematically search all items and fixtures • attend to floors, walls and ceilings, being alert to evidence of tampering, eg. mortar being removed • examine hollow cavities within accommodation, particularly tubular bed legs and ventilation points • check accommodation furniture, including beds, bench slates attaching points, remove drawers, and check underside of items • check in and around toilets, using a probe mirror to check for items suspended in the toilet’s plumbing • check prisoner clothing and bedding, including mattress and pillows • check personal effects, toiletries and behind pictures and wall hangings • check for health and safety hazards • check for property which is in excess to the Authorised Cell property list.

A number of staff told my officers that there was insufficient time to conduct the search in the detailed manner described by this Director’s Instruction.

Whenever a search is conducted at DPFC, Corrections Victoria requires the manual completion of a Search and Inspection Register by the officers conducting the search. Each unit at DPFC has its own register. The information recorded is:

• area or accommodation searched or inspected • occupant’s name • cell number • date • time • name of searchers (print) • items removed or recovered • referred to • prisoners informed of items seized • signature of searchers.

My investigation identified that some officers recorded the exact timing of the search of areas or individual cells in the Search and Inspection Register, while others recorded the same time for all searches undertaken on that day. Witnesses stated that it was time-consuming to keep returning to the register, which is kept at the central control desk of the unit, to record the time of each search and then undertake the next search. Officers who were interviewed admitted that it was not practical to comply with the Director’s Instructions on searches due to the time it took to conduct a full search as specified. One officer stated that on occasion some prison officers did not undertake any searches of the accommodation areas, yet the registers were still completed as if the search had been conducted and signed off by the supervising officer.

In my report released in December 2005 (PP No 179), entitled Investigation into the Handling, Storage and Transfer of Prisoner Property in Victorian Prisons, I noted that:

• the operating procedures regarding cell searches should be conducted by at least two officers • specific areas of the cell must be searched and the results of the search recorded.

I note from the sample of registers inspected and evidence obtained from prison officers that at times there is still the practice of only one officer conducting a search.

It is my view that when the same time has been recorded for a number of different cell or common area searches, there is clearly no capacity to assess the nature and duration of the search. This also raises doubts about whether or not the searches have been undertaken.

Given the requirements for a search in the Director’s Instructions, I am of the opinion that the majority of searches conducted at DPFC could best be described as cursory or perfunctory checks, rather than proper inspections. In my view the register should better reflect what action, if any, that the officers actually took.

I am also concerned that the registers do not accurately reflect the nature of the searches undertaken. It is of little value to have a record indicating that a search has been conducted when, in reality, there has only been a cursory check or indeed at times no check at all.

An option to overcome inaccurate completion of the register would be to categorise the type or level of search conducted. This would allow the registers to more accurately reflect the nature or extent of the search conducted and thus ensure that each unit is subject to an appropriate level of searching at intervals determined by DPFC and Corrections Victoria. For example, where a less stringent search is required, fewer officers could be used; while for more robust searches a minimum of two or more officers would be required.

The registers should include information to reflect the search category, the time taken and the officers involved, thus providing greater transparency and accountability. I am of the opinion that cells should generally be searched by a minimum of two officers, although some operational flexibility should be allowed where this is appropriate. 23

DOJ acknowledged that the Director’s Instructions need to better reflect the different levels of security of a prison or a unit. In doing so the procedures should identify that the intensity of searches may alter depending on the type of search and availability of increased resources, such as additional staff, specialist equipment and drug detection dogs.

I am particularly concerned about the reports that some officers do not undertake a search at all, and yet complete the register as if a search has been conducted. There is no audit procedure in place to identify when and where such falsification of the registers has occurred.

Dog squad search operations

In addition to routine searches, DPFC is supported in the searching of prisoners and staff by the attendance of officers from SESG with drug detection dogs. Drug detection dogs are specifically trained to identify illegal drugs on people and property. As well as playing a key role in detection, the dogs can also have a considerable deterrent effect on prisoners, visitors and staff.

Both SESG and the Emergency Response Group (ERG) at DPFC, which is drawn from the prison’s staff, have responsibilities which include conducting unannounced searches. ERG staff interviewed by my officers raised concerns about the effectiveness of the random searches that they conduct. They identified that a key element of the searches is that their timing and location be unannounced. A lack of secrecy of the operation reduces the chances for non-compliant visitors, prisoners and staff to be detected and reduces the deterrent impact.

Corrections Victoria and DPFC face difficulties in relation to the extent to which they can control the secrecy of the random search operations. Concerns were raised during my investigation that the required level of secrecy for these random search operations is rarely if ever achieved for one or more of the following reasons:

• The transfer of prison officers from mainstream rosters signals that an unannounced search is imminent. Due to other commitments by SESG, it relies on support for its operations from the prison ERG. In the case of DPFC, its ERG plays a significant role in organising prison officers to assist in searches. Suspicions of imminent searches are heightened when a number of female officers are taken off mainstream duties. • SESG must use female prison officers from DPFC in searches as it does not have sufficient numbers of its own female staff. • Entry into the prison by visitors or prison officers slows down when a search is being conducted. This acts as a signal to anyone attempting to bring contraband into DPFC. • Prisoners have access to telephones and can warn visitors of a planned or actual search, although their calls are capable of being monitored.

I have been informed that in 2007 there was a significant reduction in the number of dog squad attendances at DPFC compared with 2006. I understand that this was the result of a significant demand placed on the resources of SESG during that period. For example, SESG was responsible for the security and escort of a number of prisoners being held for alleged terrorism offences at Barwon Prison (now held at the Melbourne Assessment Prison). The SESG supervisor who was interviewed by my officers stated that, notwithstanding the resource issue, SESG had always responded to requests for assistance from DPFC, and had met the benchmark for the number of searches required.

While the following recommendations have specific applicability to DPFC, I believe that there are lessons to be learned from this investigation that have wider relevance to the Victorian prison system.

Recommendation 1 Corrections Victoria direct staff to ensure that the details recorded in the Search and Inspection Registers accurately reflect the nature, timing and duration of the search conducted.

Recommendation 2 Corrections Victoria develop and present a refresher training program to all operational staff on searches, exhibit handling and recording of searches.

DOJ response DOJ agrees with the importance of vigilance in the completion of cell searches, conducted by at least two officers; and the need for clear and valid completion of search and seizure registers and with the importance of review and improvement of record keeping for searches and seizures. 25

Urine testing and analysis

It has been estimated that Victorian prisoners are urine tested for illicit substances on average nine times a year. Urine analysis of prisoners is a widely used means of benchmarking the prevalence of drug use in prisons. It also provides the prison with intelligence to develop strategies to respond to new ways of bringing drugs into the prison, drug use and for targeting individual prisoners.

Like all other prisons, DPFC is subject to the monitoring and review of its urine testing program by SESG, which prepares an annual report identifying the number of positive urine samples compared with the benchmark set by the Commissioner. The following comment is made in the 2006 SESG review:

The benchmark prescribed by the Commissioner for positive urines at this prison is 15.29 per cent (that is, 15.29 per cent positive to illicit drugs from the random general sample taken from 5 per cent of the prison population). The year-to-date benchmark shows an average rate of 2.56 per cent, which is well below the Commissioner’s required outcome. The table and bar graph also illustrate the effectiveness of targeted urine sampling, which identifies prisoners responsible for drug use based on staff observations and prison intelligence.

Table 3: Positive urine results 1 July 2005–30 June 2006

DPFC Number / % Targeted positives 8.2 Targeted tests collected 10.99

Year % 7.46 Random Positives 9 Random tests collected 3.15 Year % 2.56 Benchmark 15.29

Source: adapted from 2006 Security Compliance Review, SESG Although the total varies slightly, these samples indicated the following illicit substances:

• Benzodiazepines 33 • Opiates 26 • Cannabis 24 • Amphetamines 10 • Tricyclics 1

I note that in general only benzodiazepines and tricyclics are prescribed restricted substances (i.e. issued by medical practitioners). The other substances are illegal drugs of addiction.

According to Corrections Victoria, there are seven categories from which prisoners are selected to be urine tested:

1. Random general – for example, a random sample of seven prisoners at DPFC is tested each week as determined by a computer-generated list. 2. Random Identified Drug Users (IDU) – re-testing each week from a computer generated random selection of 20 per cent of those prisoners known to have previously used drugs in prison. 3. Drug Free Incentive Program – the mandatory testing component of those prisoners seeking to remove their IDU status under the Drug Strategy. 4. Reception – obtaining benchmark samples for newly received prisoners. 5. Targeted – where a prisoner is suspected of using drugs or following an incident where drug use may have been involved, or after an unescorted leave from prison. 6. Program – testing of prisoners undertaking Drug and Alcohol treatment programs. 7. ‘Voluntary’ testing – where prisoners undertake regular testing as a condition of being considered for parole or because of a court order, or to satisfy Department of Human Services in relation to the custody of children.

I understand that the 2006 SESG report does not break down the urine testing results by category. It is worthy of consideration to conduct this further analysis in order to identify problem prisoner groups and to improve strategies.

While the base rate of detection of illicit drugs in prisons is usually found to be low, it is well known that prisoners have ways to get around the process, although the use of random urine testing may to some extent overcome this. In the ANCD evaluation study cited earlier, survey results indicate that some prisoners circumvent urine testing procedures, for example, by flushing and masking illicit substances. This raises concerns about the overall effectiveness of urine testing in reducing drug use. 27

The effectiveness of random drug testing at present can be compromised by the following:

• Prisoners may know when they will be tested – between 11.30am and 3.30pm on a weekday. This means that a prisoner can time their drug use in order to minimise the chance of a positive test. • Urine testing rarely takes place on weekends as it would disrupt visits. • Timing of testing is too predictable, thus limiting the deterrent impact. • Staff may be suspicious about a sample being ‘cold’ or ‘clear’, indicating that it may have been substituted by another prisoner’s urine or that it may involve urine collected at a time when the prisoner was clear of drugs. • As the results of urine testing are not available for one to two weeks, this hampers the efforts by the prison to act in a timely manner.

Given this, I note that Corrections Victoria is considering ways of increasing the unpredictability of urine testing.

Gatehouse security

The gatehouse is the primary entry point to DPFC for all visitors, prisoners and staff. Searching visitors and prisoners at the entry to the prison is an important way of preventing contraband, including drugs, from coming into prison. Visitors can be banned from further visits if found with contraband or have contact visits reduced to ‘box’ (non-contact) visits. They may also face criminal charges.

While I did not specifically examine perimeter security of the prison, there would be benefit in reviewing this aspect as it is another means by which contraband could also be introduced into the prison. I note that the perimeter of the prison is surrounded by an anti-climb weldmesh fence which, while permitting viewing into the prison by the public, has microphonic detection and taut wire security. I understand that in 2006, SESG identified numerous weaknesses in this regard creating opportunities for security breaches.

My investigation was particularly directed at the movement of prisoners, visitors and staff through the gatehouse. It is to be noted that visitors include children who may be harder to challenge if suspected of harbouring contraband. The other entry point to the prison is through the ‘sally port’, which is used by prison escort vehicles. The 2006 SESG report noted compliance with the review items for that area.

My investigators observed that DPFC did not have the same stringent level of security systems at the gatehouse as other maximum security prisons. Reception

When entering the prison most remanded and sentenced female prisoners are initially held in the reception unit. This allows sentenced prisoners time to adjust to the requirements of prison life and for prison officers to make an assessment of the prisoner for placement within the prison. It also provides for short-term remand prisoners to be held separately from the mainstream prison population. All new receptions are, where practicable, urine tested within seven days.

Management and senior prison officers have identified reception as the most problematic area for managing drugs entering the prison.

The reception of women prisoners is covered by a local operating procedure. Women prisoners are strip-searched but are not subject to an internal body cavity search. Where prisoners are suspected of carrying drugs internally, they are placed in the management unit.

Recommendation 3 Corrections Victoria review the search and drug testing procedures at DPFC to ensure that testing is carried out on a random basis to limit possible abuse of the process without security being compromised.

DOJ response DOJ is continuing work across prisons to ensure that drug testing remains unpredictable to prisoners.

Recommendation 4 Corrections Victoria conduct a review of the perimeter security of DPFC.

DOJ response Recommendation supported. 29

Record keeping of contraband seizures

A critical and integral element in an agency’s accountability and corporate governance processes is good record keeping. Without good records, whether they are manual or electronic, audit and inspection processes are limited and investigations are made more difficult. It has been said that ‘it is not enough to make someone accountable for something and to hold them accountable, someone must also be accountable for keeping adequate records so that the [external scrutiny] can undertake the review and reconstruction which is a necessary ingredient in any accountability process’ (cited by B. Reed Accountability in a shared services world Discussion Paper No. 10, Austalian Government Information Management Office 2005). In the context of the current investigation of DPFC, good record-keeping practices should be associated with an understanding and appreciation by staff of the role that records perform; without this there can be significant vulnerability.

Seizure register

My investigators were provided with a copy of a page from the Seizure Register (see Attachment C). I have the following concerns about this Register for recording any contraband seized at DPFC:

• Only one copy of the Seizure Register is kept and it is located in the security supervisor’s office. However, there is no indication that the item identified in Attachment C was physically received by the collators, who are the prison officers responsible for managing information about prisoners and staff. • The most likely scenario is that the collators were not present in the office; that the register was completed by the officer(s) making the seizure, in the absence of the collators; and that the seized items were placed in the drop safe or given to the collator at some later point in time. • The Seizure Register requires the name and signature of the officers handing in the seizure to be recorded, as well as the name and signature of the person receiving it. There is no indication on the Register when the items were actually lodged with the collator. While the date of seizure is recorded, it is equally important to know when the drugs have been lodged with and receipted by the collator. • There is no indication of the evidence bag containing the contraband item on the record in the Seizure Register that my investigators examined, nor is any provision made for it in the Register. • The ‘if disposed of’ section in the Register should require the recording of the names and signatures of the officers involved when the seized item is transferred from one officer to another. These issues raise concerns about the adequacy of the accountability process for the item that was seized at DPFC. The Seizure Register should have been better secured within or at a designated location and should only have been completed by those receiving the seized item (i.e. the collators or other authorised officers responsible for the security of the item). The number of persons responsible (usually the collators) for the receipt of seized items should be kept to a minimum.

Again, I consider that this matter raises an issue of wider relevance across the prison system and that Corrections Victoria should ensure that Seizure Registers at all prisons have adequate accountability processes in place.

Enquiries were made of prison officers as to whether seizures of any kind were photographed in situ. It was established that photographs were not taken. I am of the view that photographs of contraband should be taken, where appropriate:

• to improve the accuracy and accountability of evidence at Governor’s Hearings • to improve identification of seized item(s) • to complement the manual records of seizures as written description can be insufficent • to assist with the training of new officers (e.g. to help demonstrate a particular method of concealment).

Recommendation 5 Corrections Victoria review and redesign its Seizure Register to provide greater accountability for the recording of contraband seized during searches.

Recommendation 6

Corrections Victoria ensure that when a seizure of contraband including drugs is made, photographs are taken (of the seizure) where appropriate (if practicable in situ).

Recommendation 7 Corrections Victoria ensure that Seizure Registers should only be handled by collators with no unsupervised access to unauthorised officers. 31

DOJ response Recommendations supported. DOJ agrees with the need for more consistency in relation to photographing contraband seizures in situ and considers that it would be more consistent if Corrections Victoria was to incorporate this into a Commissioner’s Requirement.

Evidence bags

Any contraband seized in the prison is required to be placed in an evidence bag (See Attachment F) and given to collators for action and recording on the Seizure Register. This procedure is set out in Director’s Instruction No: 1.4—Contraband.

DPFC prison officers explained that if a seizure takes place during business hours, the officer finding the item will advise the supervisor and the evidence bag and its contents will be lodged with the collator in their office.

After hours the evidence bag is lodged in a safe located in a small closet in the administration block. The type of safe used has a swing door at the top that allows articles to be tipped into the body of the safe, known as a drop safe.

I note that when one of my investigators viewed the safe during an inspection on 6 September 2007 and opened the swing door, an evidence bag was partly accessible. With little effort the evidence bag could have been removed. This is of concern, particularly if the bag had contained illicit drugs.

The evidence bags currently in use do not appear to be designed specifically for the prison system nor are they of a generic type that would satisfy best practice recording requirements. The bags in use appear to be of a type designed for the transfer of evidence to a crime laboratory for forensic analysis. They do not provide for recording the lodgement and handling steps taken.

One senior officer stated that the evidence bag number is not recorded on the Search and Inspection Register. In relation to the Seizure Register, the practice is to record the number in the comments section; however, my investigation found that this is not always done. The officer also stated that there is no audit process to check that the Search and Inspection Register and Seizure Registers are consistent.

I consider that the current evidence bags and the procedure for handling them provide inadequate accountability. As a result there is a risk that officers or other persons may remove some or all of the contents, which makes the current system vulnerable. I am also concerned that the process for recording and tracking the seized contraband has serious flaws that could be exploited. Recommendation 8 Corrections Victoria replace the current evidence bags for seized items with a bag designed to improve accountability. A review of evidence bags in use in all Victorian prisons should also be undertaken. I also recommend that a register is introduced to record the unique identifier of each bag and its use.

DOJ response Recommendation supported.

Storage of contraband

At the time of my investigation DPFC had a safe in the collators’ office for the storage of seized items. I consider that access to seized drugs by unauthorised staff should be restricted. Any illicit drugs and/or prescription medication seized, as well as related contraband and drug paraphernalia, should be properly secured and separated from other property items, and a register used specifically for that purpose. The register should also include a reference to the evidence bag number(s) and, for accountability purposes, refer to the relevant Search and Inspection Register entry.

In this context, I note the major concern expressed in the 2006 SESG report in relation to jewellery items seized from or unclaimed by prisoners. I believe that action should be taken to appropriately record, secure and dispose of such items separate from illicit drugs.

Recommendation 9 Corrections Victoria undertake a review of storage arrangements for seized items in all Victorian prisons.

DOJ response Recommendation supported.

Transfer and disposal of contraband

The Drug Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 provides the legislative framework for the possession of controlled substances. When my investigators attended at DPFC, they were advised by the collators that DPFC had been holding seizures of narcotics in the safe dating back to 2001. I note that this issue was also identified in the report prepared by SESG in July 2006. My investigators noted that the majority of the items in the evidence safe that were old had been disposed of prior to the time of their visits in late 2007. 33

Director’s Instruction No: 1.4—Contraband states:

Officers disposing of articles will record the following details in the Seizure Register:

• date and time of disposal • weight and description of package (where applicable) • name and rank of officer authorising the disposal • manner of disposal • name of officer disposing of the item • name of accompanying officer • Signature of both officers.

The general manager or nominee must sight and sign the Seizure Register on a weekly basis and ensure that those items not required as evidence in a relevant Disciplinary Hearing be disposed of or forwarded to Victoria Police on a monthly basis.

I am advised that the collators had concerns regarding the retention period of the items in the safe and made arrangements to have them collected by Victoria Police on 22 May 2007. Enquiries established that Victoria Police attended at DPFC and collected 40 items described as ‘powders, drugs etc’ and 30 ‘other items’ that were non-specified, some of which dated back to 2001. These items of property were recorded on a Victoria Police property receipt under registration 553/07 (see Attachment D). DPFC provided a schedule of the items handed to Victoria Police and the police have recorded a bulk entry into the property book (see Attachment E).

This issue was discussed by my investigators with the Officer-in-Charge at Melton Police, who stated that he was not aware that items were not being collected. The officer stated that he had concerns given the requirements of the Drug Poisons and Controlled Substances Act and the issues surrounding possession of controlled substances. He stated that the arrangements for the collection of controlled substances from DPFC needed to be reviewed to ensure police and DPFC have complementary processes at the point of exchange. I believe that regular attendance of Victoria Police to collect drugs from DPFC should prevent the practice of long schedules, which encourages short cuts with record keeping.

I consider that the retention of narcotics and other contraband for up to six years is unsatisfactory and audits should have identified this practice and appropriate action taken. Director’s Instruction 1.4 has not been complied with despite the issue being identified by SESG in 2006. On 14 November 2007 a memorandum of understanding was prepared by local police at Melton and a copy provided to this office, identifying that the issue of streamlining the handling and transfer of property (including contraband) between police and DPFC had been addressed. The responsibility for the disposal of any illegal or prescription drugs rests with Victoria Police.

I am of the view that the arrangement between DPFC and Victoria Police is appropriate.

Recommendation 10 Corrections Victoria audit the Seizure Register and seized items at all prisons on a regular basis and endorse the Register to that effect.

Recommendation 11 Corrections Victoria remind General Managers of the requirement to ensure that seized drugs and other contraband are disposed of in accordance with the Director’s Instructions.

DOJ response Recommendations supported. The work to ensure the maintenance of staff attention to and compliance with policies and procedures is critical and continuous improvement is needed to ensure good practice.

Intelligence gathering and analysis

DPFC has two collators. They record information concerning incidents within the prison on the Proactive Intelligence System (PROTEL), a database that has been used since 1992 to record prisoner information. It is also used to record incidents and information arising from within the prison system. The matters that are reported on include information:

• obtained from prisoners regarding other prisoners • obtained from prisoners regarding staff • from staff about prisoners • about staff • about visitors • relating to the good order of the prison. 35

Since its inception PROTEL has recorded 8,301 information reports relating to DPFC. Of these 839 are restricted records. A restricted record is not available for viewing unless the officer has approved access rights to the information.

All General Managers of Victorian prisons have access rights to the PROTEL system, as well as the restricted records relating to their prison. Corrections Victoria requires that the General Manager of each prison sight each restricted record on PROTEL. This information can be viewed online. It is understood that the electronic report relating to a new entry remains active until the General Manager completes a computer-generated action. These reports are also available to senior management in Corrections Victoria and to SESG.

My investigators visited the Intelligence Section of SESG in order to gain an understanding of its role in analysing information reports submitted on PROTEL.

I have been advised that every morning SESG staff read and discuss the information reports recorded on PROTEL. SESG then decides the action that is required from their unit; for example, visit a prison with the drug detection dogs or conduct a search of staff on entering the prison. If the matter is serious, it may need to be brought to the attention of the Director of Prisons or the Commissioner, Corrections Victoria. The information may also require dissemination through official channels to Victoria Police.

It is my understanding that not all information recorded on PROTEL requires action, as many reports relate to minor issues. I also understand that PROTEL was not designed as an intelligence tool and therefore its intelligence capacity is limited. While SESG has a separate database to analyse data, it is not regularly used.

It would appear that SESG has a limited capacity to analyse intelligence, given the following deficiencies that were identified during my investigation:

• Minimal analysis has been carried out on intelligence reports regarding staff suspected of corrupt or inappropriate conduct. For example, 11 Corrections Victoria officers were identified as potentially satisfying these criteria. An examination of PROTEL by the SESG supervisor identified that these 11 officers were the subject of a total of 138 information reports (ranging from an inappropriate relationship with a prisoner to providing drugs to prisoners). • When asked what records of analysis were held by SESG, my investigators were presented with one lever arch folder containing staff issues. (Corrections Victoria advised that there were 12 such folders). This was not an official file and the contents contained information on suspect staff members, briefings and information reports. When inspected, the folder contained little or no evidence of analysis, investigation, recommendations, or reporting on the officers identified. • SESG advised that it has limited resources to monitor the Arunta prisoner telephone system. The supervisor stated that priority is given to all high security prisoners.

When SESG does identify a staff member of concern, it is able to:

• refer the reports to the General Manager of the prison and offer assistance • consider whether barrier controls and searches are necessary • pass information on to the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner.

While I acknowledge that there are times when intelligence reports on prison officers may not be capable of being acted upon, for example, because of a lack of information, I consider that, where possible, officers be exonerated or have appropriate action taken against them in a prompt manner.

Another avenue for information sharing is through the ‘Prison Liaison Group’ which includes representatives from Victoria Police (Melton, Caroline Springs and Werribee), SESG and the Operations Managers from DPFC, Barwon Prison, Port Phillip Prison and the Melbourne Remand Centre. The minutes of a number of meetings of this group were reviewed during my investigation and I note the range of issues discussed in these forums. However, as the collators do not attend the meetings, they rely on the relevant Information Reports being forwarded to police through official channels, or on informal feedback from the Operations Managers who attend the meetings.

I believe that reliance on good intelligence and its analysis is critical. Indeed it may be even more so in a women’s prison where the standard methods of drug detection used in men’s prisons are less effective. For this reason I make a number of recommendations for improvements to the management of intelligence in this regard.

Recommendation 12 Corrections Victoria review its practices and procedures relating to intelligence analysis, to ensure that its intelligence reports are properly analysed and are acted upon where necessary. 37

Recommendation 13 SESG create and maintain official Corrections Victoria files for keeping intelligence reports on individuals when a decision has been made that intelligence analysis is warranted. Those files should be maintained in accordance with the Public Records Office requirements.

DOJ response DOJ agrees with the need for continuing development of good intelligence gathering and analysis in particular at DPFC where standard methods of drug detection are of reduced utility. DOJ agrees with the need to investigate serious matters of staff misconduct if evidence is provided.

Vetting of staff for criminal history

In 2004 Mr Kelvin Anderson, Commissioner, Corrections Victoria, made a submission to the Human Rights Commission in relation to Discrimination in Employment on the Basis of Criminal Record (see Attachment G). In part, Mr Anderson wrote:

The general principle governing this policy is that the ability of a person to perform correctional duties will be prejudiced if they have a criminal history, irrespective of when the offence or offences were committed. Because correctional officers are required to personally manage prisoners on a daily basis, it can detract from their ability to supervise if it is perceived by inmates that staff also do not respect the rule of law, and are essentially no different than the prisoners they are required to manage.

Prison officers are subject to vetting for criminal history only on appointment to Corrections Victoria. For the same reasons identified by Mr Anderson above, it is my view that there should be a system for regular vetting of staff. This is a common process for people who hold positions of trust or work with vulnerable people. For example, teachers are required to have criminal history checks every five years in order to retain their registration. People who work with children are also required to have on-going criminal history checks.

An example was brought to my attention by Victoria Police. If a prison officer from DPFC was convicted of an offence in the eastern suburbs of Melbourne, then it would be unlikely that Corrections Victoria would become aware of the conviction, unless an individual police officer decided to inform Corrections Victoria, or the prison officer subject to the conviction disclosed it to Corrections Victoria themselves. The Victoria Police District Officer with policing responsibility for DPFC and a number of prisons in the area, advised that his officers would notify the General Manager of the relevant prison should there be issues with correctional officers, but conceded that other districts may not notify Corrections Victoria.

There are no mandatory reporting requirements placed on Victoria Police to notify Corrections Victoria of criminal convictions against correctional officers. This carries the potential risk for prison officers to have criminal convictions and continue to be employed in the prison system.

Recommendation 14 Corrections Victoria introduce criminal record vetting of all staff every five years.

DOJ response DOJ supports consideration of regular criminal history vetting of correctional staff and this issue will be examined further. 39

CONCLUSIONS There is a widely held perception both among staff and prisoners at DPFC that drugs are easy to obtain in prison, in spite of the extensive efforts made to detect them. That information is of concern when set alongside the data showing relatively low positive drug tests through urine analysis and the low frequency of items seized in searches.

If the search and seizure actions and related activities, such as urine testing, are not carried out properly, it is not surprising that contraband, including illicit drugs, can enter the prison and remain undetected. It would also appear that the low rates of positive urine tests and low numbers of seized items of contraband found at DPFC cannot be taken at face value. Instead they may seriously underestimate or distort the true picture. Corrections Victoria’s own survey results suggest that this may be the case. It would be a mistake to simply assume that supply reduction measures are effective because levels of drug use, as measured by urine analysis and numbers of drug seizures, are relatively low.

What has emerged from my investigation at DPFC in relation to contraband, particularly illegal drugs, is that on the basis of information from a range of sources, there is a gap between what is supposed to happen if policies and procedures are duly followed and what actually takes place. Although the investigation did not specifically consider practices in other Victorian prisons, my conclusions and recommendations are relevant to them as well. The data presented in the 2006 SESG report clearly shows that seizures of contraband items relating to illicit drugs occur in other prisons. The survey results from the Deloitte Consulting study also show self-reported drug use across the prison system.

My investigation at DPFC has identified that while there are clear instructions for the conduct of searches and seizures, staff do not always comply with these. Indeed there is significant room for improvement in the manner in which contraband is dealt with at DPFC. I have identified weaknesses in the manner in which searches are conducted and the recording of searches. I also have concerns about the lack of accountability of contraband once it has been seized. The practice of retaining seized illicit drugs and prescription medication for extended periods of time is of concern and action is required to ensure that seized items are audited regularly and disposed of properly. I consider that the manner in which intelligence is analysed, recorded and acted upon is inadequate. Information about officers, particularly if they involve corruption, should be investigated promptly by Corrections Victoria.

I am also of the view that prison officers and other relevant correctional staff should be subject to regular vetting for criminal history. This is particularly the case when the prison has responsibility for children in its care, as at DPFC.

In conclusion I refer to the evaluation of the Victorian Prisons Drug Strategy. In the summary it states that the Strategy ‘recognises that it is virtually impossible to stop drug use [in prison] entirely’. If this is correct, then prison administrators must address this challenge by taking a more vigorous approach to the early detection of illicit drugs, both at entry to a prison and by way of random drug testing and searches.

DOJ response DOJ acknowledges that managing contraband in prison requires a balancing of proper security processes against its obligations to fulfil the duty of care to prisoners, to staff and to its obligations to provide humane environments and opportunities for the rehabilitation of prisoners.

Overall DOJ response to the report DOJ supports the recommendations and accepts that there is an opportunity to improve staff compliance with procedures, and to strengthen processes to minimise drug use in DPFC and other prisons.

G E Brouwer OMBUDSMAN 41

RECOMMENDATIONS I recommend that:

1. Corrections Victoria direct staff to ensure that the details recorded in the Search and Inspection Registers accurately reflect the nature, timing and duration of the search conducted.

2. Corrections Victoria develop and present a refresher training program to all operational staff on searches, exhibit handling and recording of searches.

3. Corrections Victoria review the search and drug testing procedures at DPFC to ensure that testing is carried out on a random basis to limit possible abuse of the process without security being compromised.

4. Corrections Victoria conduct a review of the perimeter security of DPFC.

5. Corrections Victoria review and redesign its Seizure Register to provide greater accountability for the recording of contraband seized during searches.

6. Corrections Victoria ensure that when a seizure of contraband including drugs is made, photographs are taken (of the seizure) where appropriate (if practicable in situ).

7. Corrections Victoria ensure that Seizure Registers should only be handled by collators with no unsupervised access to unauthorised officers.

8. Corrections Victoria replace the current evidence bags for seized items with a bag designed to improve accountability. A review of evidence bags in use in all Victorian prisons should also be undertaken. I also recommend that a register is introduced to record the unique identifier of each bag and its use.

9. Corrections Victoria undertake a review of storage arrangements for seized items in all Victorian prisons.

10. Corrections Victoria audit the Seizure Register and seized items at all prisons on a regular basis and endorse the Register to that effect.

11. Corrections Victoria remind General Managers of the requirement to ensure that seized drugs and other contraband are disposed of in accordance with the Director’s Instructions. 12. Corrections Victoria review its practices and procedures relating to intelligence analysis, to ensure that its intelligence reports are properly analysed and are acted upon where necessary.

13. SESG create and maintain official Corrections Victoria files for keeping intelligence reports on individuals when a decision has been made that intelligence analysis is warranted. Those files should be maintained in accordance with the Public Records Office requirements.

14. Corrections Victoria introduce criminal record vetting of all staff every five years.

G E Brouwer OMBUDSMAN 43

ATTACHMENT A

Victorian prisoner health study – drug use

Males Females

Questionnaire Items Non- Non- Aboriginal Aboriginal Aboriginal Aboriginal n = 64 n = 269 n = 13 n = 91 History of drug use Ever taken illegal drugs 55 (85.9%) 173 (64.3%) 10 (76.9%) 71 (78%) Ever injected illegal drugs 33 (51.6%) 113 (42.0%) 7 (53.8%) 60 (65.9%) Drug use while in prison Injected drugs 13 (20.3%) 36 (13.4%) 0 13 (14.3%) Shared needles 10 (15.6%) 27 (10.0%) 0 10 (11.0%) Clean needle 9 (14.1%) 27 (10.0%) 0 11 (12.1%) Ever in a methadone program 7 (10.9%) 36 (13.4%) 4 (30.8%) 30 (33.0%) In a current methadone program 1 (1.6%) 2 (0.7%) 1 (7.7%) 8 (8.8%) Whether the prisoner sought help with drug problems Sought help 12 (18.8%) 57 (21.2%) 4 (30.8%) 35 (38.5%) Sought help before prison 7 (10.9%) 38 (14.1%) 2 (15.4%) 24 (26.4%) Needs help 9 (14.1%) 23 (8.6%) 4 (30.8%) 17 (18.7%)

Source: http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/DOJ+Internet/resources/file/eb81580ffe92854/ Victorian_Prisoner_Health_Study_February_2003_Part1.pdf

ATTACHMENT B

Figure 1: Number of contraband items seized from visitors 2005-2006 by prison

Source: adapted from 2006 Security Compliance Review, SESG.

Figure 2: Number of contraband items seized from prisoners 2005-2006 by prison

Source: adapted from 2006 Security Compliance Review, SESG. 45

ATTACHMENT C ATTACHMENT D 47

ATTACHMENT E

49 ATTACHMENT F 51

ATTACHMENT G

(Source: Corrections Victoria Reference Ref: je CD/05/11534 CF/05/2523 http://hreoc.gov.au/Human_Rights/criminalrecord/submissions/sub65_correctionsvic.html).

Recruitment of Correctional Officers CV’s policy on the recruitment of correctional officers dates from the early 1990s and was drafted following criticism of the former Office of Corrections at a Coroner’s Inquest, that the employment of some prison officers with a criminal history had been tolerated. This policy identifies the offence categories which will automatically disqualify a person from becoming a correctional officer, and those matters which may impact upon employment as a correctional officer. A copy of this policy is attached.

The general principle governing this policy is that the ability of a person to perform correctional duties will be prejudiced if they have a criminal history, irrespective of when the offence or offences were committed. Because correctional officers are required to personally manage prisoners on a daily basis, it can detract from their ability to supervise if it is perceived by inmates that staff also do not respect the rule of law, and are essentially no different than the prisoners they are required to manage. Under these circumstances, there is likely to be an unacceptable breakdown in the effectiveness of correctional officers, for example, when required to give a prisoner a lawful order and ensure compliance. Prison discipline would consequently suffer.

The same consideration applies to community correctional officers, who supervise offenders in the community and are regularly called upon to direct offenders in regard to a wide range of matters. Furthermore, the same policy is applied to support staff in both prisons and community corrections centres. This is because these staff will, in most instances, also have access to prisoners and offenders, and may also be required to access the offender database. The latter contains a wealth of sensitive personal information and the integrity of users is a factor in preventing misuse.

Persons who have committed offences may also be placed under greater pressure by prisoners in situations where their background becomes known, especially where this has resulted in imprisonment. Prisoners may feel that such individuals may be prepared to engage in further unlawful activity, and may exert pressure on them to engage in activities such as the trafficking of contraband into, or out of a prison.

There is also likely to be an increased risk of criminal infiltration of correctional officer ranks if persons with an offence history are recruited. Application process When applying for a position as a correctional officer, both with prisons and community corrections, applicants are instructed that they must declare all offences (other than parking offences) during the application process. Where there is any doubt, they are advised to declare the matter. They are also advised that they must consent to a criminal history check to verify the information provided. If the applicant refuses to consent, their application will not proceed. Where the criminal history enquiry reveals that an applicant has not been honest and truthful in regard to their history, that person may not gain employment despite the actual offence not necessarily incurring automatic disqualification. This is because CV considers the qualities of honesty and integrity to be as important as the absence of an offence history itself.

Criminal history checks for potential correctional officers are a condition of employment and are conducted via Victoria Police and VicRoads in relation to motor vehicle offences. The consent of the individual concerned is always obtained. The check for prison correctional officers involves a national police and fingerprints search, while the enquiry for community correctional staff involves a national name check only. Where a correctional officer is charged with any offence after their appointment, they are required to report this to their immediate manager. If subsequently found guilty, depending on the nature of the offence and the sentence handed down, the officer may be dismissed.

This Office has an agreement with the police that the outcomes revealed by the national name check, and the national fingerprint check will include all findings of guilt, in both adult and juvenile jurisdictions, no matter how old. The offence history policy is then applied to any outcomes. All staff employed by Corrections Victoria, any contractors and volunteers employed at locations, and staff at the two privately operated prisons must comply with the offence history policy.

The application of the current policy for a period of over ten years has resulted in a service which has achieved general community respect and, other than isolated incidents, has been able to steer clear of allegations of staff impropriety or corruption. Where isolated incidents have occurred, and officers have been found guilty of serious matters, they have been dismissed as a consequence of their unlawful activities. 53

The discussion paper refers to the “inherent requirements of a job” and raises the question whether these requirements should be tightly linked to the assessment of any criminal history outcomes. It is the view of CV that the nature of the corrections environment is such that only persons who demonstrate a high level of integrity should be employed, irrespective of the nature of the work. But having said that, there may be scope for persons who are being recruited for administrative support roles and who have recorded a finding of guilt offence at the lower end of the scale some time ago, to be considered for employment if they are able to demonstrate a high level of integrity in a different way.

Review of decision not to employ/dismiss CV does not have a formal system for the review of decisions not to employ, or to dismiss a person on the basis of their criminal history. However, where an applicant is aggrieved, they are advised that they may write to the Commissioner, Corrections Victoria. The Commissioner will consider the full circumstances of the case, seek advice where necessary, and determine whether any discretion is warranted. Unless the applicant pursues action through the courts, there is no redress. Other reports

Conflict of interest in local government Investigation into the handling, storage March 2008 and transfer of prisoner property in Victorian prisons Conflict of interest in the public sector December 2005 March 2008 Whistleblowers Protection Act: Investigation into VicRoads driver Ombudsman’s Guidelines licensing arrangements October 2005 December 2007 Own motion investigation into VicRoads Investigation into the disclosure of registration practices electronic communications addressed to June 2005 the Member for Evelyn and related matters November 2007 Review of the Freedom of Information Act: discussion paper Investigation into the use of excessive force May 2005 at the Melbourne Custody Centre November 2007 Review of complaint handling in Victorian universities Investigation into the Office of Housing’s May 2005 tender process for the Cleaning and Gardening Maintenance Contract - Investigation into the conduct of council CNG 2007 officers in the administration of the Shire October 2007 of Melton March 2005 Investigation into a disclosure about WorkSafe and Victoria Police handling of a Discussion paper on improving responses bullying and harassment complaint to sexual abuse allegations April 2007 February 2005 Own motion investigation into the policies Essendon Rental Housing Co-operative and procedures of the planning department (ERHC) at the City of Greater Geelong December 2004 February 2007 Complaint about the Medical Practitioners Conditions for persons in custody Board of Victoria July 2006 December 2004 Review of the Freedom of Information Act Ceja task force drug related corruption: June 2006 second interim report June 2004 Investigation into parking infringement notices issued by Melbourne City Council April 2006 Improving responses to allegations involving sexual assault March 2006 Ombudsman Victoria Level 9, North Tower 459 Collins Street Melbourne VIC 3000

Phone 03 9613 6222 Fax 03 9614 0246 Toll free 1800 806 314 Email [email protected] www.ombudsman.vic.gov.au