Rising Levels of Violence Against Shi'a in Pakistan

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Rising Levels of Violence Against Shi'a in Pakistan briefing ‘Everything has shattered’ – rising levels of violence against Shi’a in Pakistan By Farah Mihlar Introduction the perpetrators, in others accused of collusion. It concludes with recommendations to the international ‘We have contributed so much to Pakistan and we are community and the Pakistan government. treated like animals. At least animals are killed for In addition to a desk review of recent statistics and food, why are we killed?’ reports on the situation of religious minorities in Pakistan, Shi’a activist, Islamabad, December 2013 this briefing draws on primary field research. The author travelled to Islamabad in December 2013, where she Attacks by extremist groups against Pakistan’s Shi’a have conducted in-depth interviews with 10 Hazara and five been on the increase since the 1980s, but targeted killings Shi’a activists. At the time, due to the threat of an reached unprecedented levels in 2013, with some 700 Shi’a imminent attack against Shi’a, many other activists were murdered.1 Many of those killed were Hazara Shi’a in the not able to provide interviews. For security reasons, the province of Baluchistan.2 The death toll exceeded the names of those interviewed have been anonymized. previous high of 2012, described by Human Rights Watch as ‘the bloodiest year for Shias in living memory.’3 The recent attacks have mostly been carried out by three militant groups - Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar- Who are the Shi’a and Hazara? e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Shi’a are the second largest denomination of Muslims All three follow an extremist Sunni Islamic ideology under worldwide and comprise approximately ten to 15 percent of which the Shi’a are deemed heretics and apostates, the population in Pakistan.5 They differ from the Sunni punishable by death. These groups are also engaged in anti- majority over the leadership of the Muslim community after Shi’a propaganda and hate speech at every level of Pakistani the death of Prophet Muhammad, with Shi’a recognizing society.4 As a result, Pakistani Shi’a throughout the country the line of Ali, the fourth and last caliph and the son-in-law are living in constant fear. of Muhammad. Shi’a live throughout Pakistan and include a number of different ethnic groups. In recent decades, the “Everything has shattered, everyone is suspicious of each inclusive vision of Pakistan’s founding father, Muhammed Ali other. Those old days when there was no question of Jinnah, has given way to increased sectarianism and the who belongs to what community now don’t exist. Now growth of discrimination and hate crimes against the Shi’a. people first think – are you a Shi’a? Are you Hazara?” Shi’a activist, Islamabad, December 2013 Hazara are an ethnic group of Mongolian-Turkic origin who speak a Persian language. Most practise Shi’a Islam, This briefing paper provides an analysis of the present though a few are Sunni. Hazara are distinct from other Shi’a situation of the Shi’a and Hazara communities in Pakistan. in Pakistan due to their language and facial features.6 While It details the manner in which they are targeted and the the majority of Hazara are in Afghanistan, Pakistan also nature of these incidents. It also discusses the role of the hosts a large Hazara population – estimates range between state, in some cases failing to take sufficient action against 650,000 and 900,000 in the country as a whole – with around 500,000 based around the city of Quetta.7 History carried out most of the attacks, while LeJ was responsible for a number of other incidents.16 The roots of the militant attacks against Shi’a in Pakistan Nevertheless, the specific attacks against Shi’a and can be traced to the dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq, other minorities in Pakistan are distinct in character and who held the presidency from 1978 following a military intent to most political killings, armed conflict deaths and coup the previous year and remained in power until his indiscriminate violence against civilians. Thus the death in 1988. After the Iranian revolution in 1979, many Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies records a total of 687 majority Sunni states including Pakistan began to fear the sectarian killings during 2013 – up 22 per cent from the export of Shi’a Islam. In an attempt to counter this, Zia previous year.17 The majority of victims were Shi’a. strengthened relations with Saudi Arabia and opened However, detailed records of Shi’a attacks compiled by Pakistan’s doors to a brand of Sunni radical Islam known networks of Shi’a civil society organizations have as Wahhabism.8 Saudi Wahhabi literature and religious produced significantly higher totals. This is both because preachers were welcomed into Pakistan, establishing they record individual incidents not picked up by general madrasas and other learning centres where this ideology media reviews, and also because the final body count in was widely disseminated. The main targets of these mass attacks is often larger than that given in initial religious leaders were Shi’a Muslims and Sufis, who are reports. The International Imam Hussain Council thus followers of Islamic mysticism.9 records a total of 675 Shi’a killed in targeted attacks and In 1985, Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP) was formed with the bombings in 2013, and 1,061 injured.18 Another main objective of aggressively promoting Sunni Islam. A compilation of incidents recorded by Shi’a activists gives decade or so later a breakaway faction of the group went 732 ‘directly killed’ in 2013 and 1,169 injured.19 The on to form the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), with the aim of actual number is almost certainly higher, however, as transforming Pakistan into a Sunni state through violent these figures only cover targeted attacks and do not means. The LeJ’s founder and leader until 2002, Riaz include those Shi’a killed in the course of indiscriminate Basra, was known in the 1990s for orchestrating an attack attacks on civilians. on Iranian diplomat Sadiq Ganji and killing Iranian Air The largest death tolls have occurred as a result of Force cadets on an official visit to Pakistan.10 The group suicide bombs and grenade attacks in crowded Shi’a areas. was banned in Pakistan in 2001 for provoking sectarian Some of the most deadly incidents in 2013 include: violence and subsequently listed as a terrorist organization by the United States government in 2003.11 The LeJ was • Quetta, Baluchistan, 10 January 2013: An initial suicide also implicated in the assassination of former Pakistani bombing in the predominantly Shi’a area of Alamdar Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 200712 and is suspected Road, followed by a car bomb in the same location to have played a role in the 2009 grenade attack on the moments later, killed 91 people and injured at least 190 visiting Sri Lankan cricket team.13 others.20 From their inception, both organizations have publicly • Quetta, Baluchistan, 16 February 2013: 110 people were called for the killing of Shi’as in Pakistan and conducted a killed and 200 others injured in a remote-controlled number of violent attacks against them. The SSP, having bomb attack targeting a bazaar near Hazara Town.21 been banned in 2002 by the Musharraf government, was • Karachi, Sindh Province, 3 March 2013: 50 people were subsequently re-established under the new title of Ahl-e killed and many others injured in two explosions that Sunnat Wal Jama’at (ASWJ) before being banned again in ripped through a Shi’a neighbourhood outside a 2012.14 More recently, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan mosque.22 (TTP), or the Pakistani Taliban, became associated with • Quetta, Baluchistan, 30 June 2013: 30 people were targeted killings against Shi’a. They claimed responsibility killed and dozens injured when a suicide attack for a pair of bombings in Karachi in late 2013 and vowed occurred near a Shi’a mosque in Hazara Town.23 to conduct more attacks.15 Militant groups have openly stated that their targeting Escalation of violence of Shi’a is on religious grounds and this has been explicitly showcased in recent attacks. For example, one open letter The escalation of violent attacks against Shi’a in the last issued by the LeJ militant group reads: decade has occurred alongside a general deterioration in the country’s security context. According to the Pakistan ‘Like in the past, our successful jihad against the Institute for Peace Studies, the number of people killed in Hazaras in Pakistan and, in particular, in Quetta, is terrorist attacks during 2013 rose by 19 per cent from the ongoing and will continue in the future. We will make previous year. In 2013, militants carried out 1,717 attacks, Pakistan the graveyard of the Shi’ite Hazaras and their killing 2,451 people and injuring 5,438 people. The houses will be destroyed by bombs and suicide bombers. Institute further states that 46 suicide attacks took place in We will only rest when we will be able to fly the flag of 2013 – a 39 per cent rise from the previous year. TTP 2 ‘EVERYTHING HAS SHATTERED’ – RISING LEVELS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST SHI’A IN PAKISTAN true Islam on this land of the pure. Jihad against the have waged a successful jihad against the Shi’ite Shi’ite Hazaras has now become our duty.’ 24 Hazaras in Afghanistan, our mission in Pakistan is the abolition of this impure sect and its followers from There have been a number of attacks on Shi’a pilgrims every city, every village and every nook and corner of travelling to and from Iran to attend holy sites and Pakistan.’ 35 festivals.
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