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SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International
world nuclear forces 273 VII. Pakistani nuclear forces shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen Pakistan continues to prioritize the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems as part of its ‘full spectrum deterrence posture’ vis-à-vis India. It is estimated that Pakistan possessed 140–50 war- heads as of January 2018 (see table 6.8). Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal is likely to expand significantly over the next decade, although estimates of the increase in warhead numbers vary considerably.1 Pakistan is believed to be gradually increasing its military fissile material holdings, which include both plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) (see section X). Pakistan’s plutonium production complex is located at Khushab in the province of Punjab. It consists of four operational heavy water nuclear reactors and a heavy water production plant.2 Pakistan appears to be increasing its capacity to reprocess spent nuclear fuel—that is, to chemically separate plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel. A small reprocessing plant has been expanded at the New Laboratories facility of the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Rawal- pindi. A larger reprocessing plant has been constructed at the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex in Punjab and may already be operational.3 Uranium enrichment takes place at the gas centrifuge plant in the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) complex at Kahuta in Punjab and at a smaller plant located at Gadwal, also in Punjab. A new uranium enrichment centri- fuge plant may be under construction in the KRL complex at Kahuta.4 Pakistan’s capacity to produce HEU for nuclear weapons is constrained by its limited indigenous supply of natural uranium.5 Aircraft The Pakistan Air Force’s (PAF) Mirage III and Mirage V combat aircraft are the most likely aircraft to have been given a nuclear delivery role. -
Pakistan's Shaheen Missile Family and Its Implications for Pakistan's
ABOUT | CONTACT | SUPPORT | MY IASC SEARCH: Publications Home Research Arms Show Reports Pakistan s Shaheen Missile Family and its Articles � Implications for Pakistan s Security Book Reviews � Looking Forward by Debalina Ghoshal, Research Associate, Delhi Policy Group New Delhi Email this article Papers & Studies Published on May 8th, 2015 Print this article ARTICLES Reports Testimony Following its 1998 nuclear tests, the leadership in Pakistan has emphasized the need to develop a minimum deterrent capability to meet the requirement of its national, Transcripts � flexible (medium range missile force). [1] It is a surprising fact that despite being � Issues politically unstable, Pakistan has continued a sophisticated ballistic missile development program. Pakistan s success is due in large part to assistance from � Browse by: China and North Korea. Pakistan claims that its missile program has been mostly India centric, and it does not aim at augmentation of strategic power for a political � By Date rationale. [2] The paper will address Pakistan s nuclear strategy and then examine � � the Shaheen missile system and its place in Pakistan s nuclear strategy. By Author � Understanding Pakistan s Nuclear Strategy By Program & Issue � Strategy can be defined as a set of actions to be undertaken in order to achieve a goal. Nuclear strategy lays down a set of actions need to be undertaken for the open in browser PRO version Are you a developer? Try out the HTML to PDF API pdfcrowd.com development and the use of nuclear weapons. These plans of action aim to address the crucial issues pertaining to nuclear weapons, such as under what circumstance is it possible for the state to develop nuclear weapons; the issue of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons; and most importantly, the use of nuclear weapons - whether to use nuclear weapons against counter-value targets or against counter force targets or adopt a countervailing strategy, and the survivability options of nuclear forces. -
Pakistan Courting the Abyss by Tilak Devasher
PAKISTAN Courting the Abyss TILAK DEVASHER To the memory of my mother Late Smt Kantaa Devasher, my father Late Air Vice Marshal C.G. Devasher PVSM, AVSM, and my brother Late Shri Vijay (‘Duke’) Devasher, IAS ‘Press on… Regardless’ Contents Preface Introduction I The Foundations 1 The Pakistan Movement 2 The Legacy II The Building Blocks 3 A Question of Identity and Ideology 4 The Provincial Dilemma III The Framework 5 The Army Has a Nation 6 Civil–Military Relations IV The Superstructure 7 Islamization and Growth of Sectarianism 8 Madrasas 9 Terrorism V The WEEP Analysis 10 Water: Running Dry 11 Education: An Emergency 12 Economy: Structural Weaknesses 13 Population: Reaping the Dividend VI Windows to the World 14 India: The Quest for Parity 15 Afghanistan: The Quest for Domination 16 China: The Quest for Succour 17 The United States: The Quest for Dependence VII Looking Inwards 18 Looking Inwards Conclusion Notes Index About the Book About the Author Copyright Preface Y fascination with Pakistan is not because I belong to a Partition family (though my wife’s family Mdoes); it is not even because of being a Punjabi. My interest in Pakistan was first aroused when, as a child, I used to hear stories from my late father, an air force officer, about two Pakistan air force officers. In undivided India they had been his flight commanders in the Royal Indian Air Force. They and my father had fought in World War II together, flying Hurricanes and Spitfires over Burma and also after the war. Both these officers later went on to head the Pakistan Air Force. -
Missile Threat Reduction and Monitoring in South Asia1
Missile Threat Reduction and Monitoring in South Asia 1 Kent L. Biringer issile -based threats are becoming an ever-increasing element of the strategic landscape in South MAsia. As India and Pakistan induct missiles into military units and push the performance envelope of missile capabilities, it is important to assess ways to limit the threats posed by these missiles. Regional stability with respect to missiles has both political and technical components. From a deterrence standpoint, striving to maintain some parity in capabilities could be a politically stabilizing factor in reducing the likelihood of conflict. Introduction of missiles might serve to correct imbalances in nuclear or conventional capabilities. On the other hand, as the inventories and types of missiles increase and as they are deployed, there could be an escalation of tension. These actions will result in more movement of systems, a rush to deploy new systems, the need for more testing, greater numbers of people with access to the systems, and the need for more distributed control. These and other factors raise concerns over system safety, security, and interpretation of intent. Together these developments serve to introduce instabilities that may outweigh the deterrence benefits. Missiles are of primary concern because of their potential use as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. The short flight-times and lack of recall ability make them more destabilizing than aircraft- delivered weapons. Many of the military advantages of missile systems, such as mobility, speed, and long range make them weapons of choice. Transparency for missile programs may offer the prospect of building confidence and reducing threats. -
Department of Justice Export Control Violation Cases
________________ JANUARY 2011 NSD WWW.JUSTICE.GOV (202) 514-2007 SUMMARY OF MAJOR U.S. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT AND EMBARGO CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS: 2007 TO THE PRESENT Below is a snapshot of some of the major export and embargo-related criminal prosecutions handled by the Justice Department since January 2007. These cases resulted from investigations by the Department of Homeland Security’s U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the Pentagon’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and other law enforcement agencies. This list of cases is not exhaustive and only represents select cases. Military Night Vision Scopes to Russia – On Jan. 14, 2011, Anna Fermanova pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of New York to one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act. In March 2010, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers searched Fermanova's checked luggage at John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York as she was preparing to board a flight to Moscow and identified three night vision items they suspected of being export controlled. ICE agents asked Fermanova about the night vision scopes, and she admitted she had obscured some of the identification numbers on the items and that she knew a license was required to export them to Russia. ICE agents detained the items and permitted Fermanova to board her flight to Moscow. ICE agents later determined that the items consisted of a Raptor night vision weapon sight and two advanced rifle sights, which are designated as defense articles. -
Panel Hospitals
LAHORE HOSPITALS SERIAL NAME OF HOSPITAL ADDRESS TELEPHONE # NO. 1 Akram Eye Hospital Main Boulevard Defence Road Lahore. 042-36652395-96 2 CMH Hospital CMH Lahore Cantt., Lahore 042-6699111-5 3 Cavalry Hospital 44-45, Cavalry Ground Lahore Cantt. 042-36652116-8 4 Family Hospital 4-Mozang Road Lahore 042-37233915-8 5 Farooq Hospital 2 Asif Block, Main Boulevard Iqbal Town, Lahore 042-37813471-5 6 Fauji Foundation Bedian Road Lahore Cantt. 042-99220293 7 Gulab Devi Hospital Ferozepur Road Lahore 042-99230247-50 8 Ittefaq Hospital Near H. Block Model Town, Lahore 042-35881981-8 9 Masood Hospital 99, Garden Block, Garden Town, Lahore 042-35881961-3 10 Prime Care Hospital Main Boulevard Defence Lahore 042-36675123-4 11 Punjab Institute of Cardiology Jail Road Lahore. 042-99203051-8 12 Punjab Medical Centre 5, Main boulevard, Jail Road, Lahore 042-35753108-9 13 Laser Vision Eye Hospital 95-K, Model Town, Lahore 042-35868844-35869944 14 Sarwat Anwar Hospital 2, Tariq block Garden Town, Lahore 042-35869265-6 15 Shalimar Hospital Shalimar Link Road, Mughalpura Lahore 042-36817857-60, 111205205 16 Rasheed Hospital Branch 1, Main Boulevard Defence Lahore 042-336673192-33588898 Branch 2, Garden Town Lahore. 17 Orthopedic Medical Complex & Hospital Opposite Kinnarid College Jail Road, Lahore 042-37551335-7579987 18 National Hospital & Medical Centre 132/3, L-Block, LCCHS Lahore Cantt. 042-35728759-60 F: 042-35728761 19 Army Cardiac Centre Lahore Cantt. 20 Dental Aesthetics Clinic 187-Y, Block D.H.A., Lahore – Pakistan 042-35749000 21 Sana Dental Aesthetics 153-DD, CCA Phase-IV, DHA Lahore 042-37185861-2 CONSULTANTS 1 Cavalry Dental Clinic 26, Commercial Area, Cavalry Ground Lahore 042-36610321 2 Dr. -
VII. Pakistani Nuclear Forces Shannon N
world nuclear forces 443 VII. Pakistani nuclear forces shannon n. kile and hans m. kristensen Pakistan continues to prioritize the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and delivery systems as part of its ‘full spectrum deterrence posture’ in relation to India. It is estimated that Pakistan possessed up to 140 warheads as of January 2017 (see table 11.8). Pakistan’s nuclear weapon arsenal is likely to expand significantly over the next decade, although esti- mates of the increase in warhead numbers vary considerably.1 Pakistan is believed to be gradually increasing its military fissile material holdings, which include both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and pluto- nium. Uranium enrichment takes place at the gas centrifuge plant at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) complex at Kahuta, Punjab Province, and at a smaller plant located at Gadwal, also in Punjab. According to reports in 2016, a new uranium enrichment centrifuge plant may be under con- struction at the KRL complex.2 Pakistan’s plutonium production complex is located at Khushab, Punjab Province. It consists of four heavy-water nuclear reactors, two of which have become operational since 2013, and a heavy-water production plant. Pakistan appears to be increasing its capacity to reprocess spent nuclear fuel, and a small reprocessing plant in the New Laboratories facility at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH), near Rawal- pindi, has been expanded. A larger reprocessing plant has been constructed at the Chashma Nuclear Power Complex in Punjab and may be operational.3 Aircraft The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) Mirage III/V combat aircraft are the aircraft most likely to have a nuclear-delivery role. -
Nuclear Learning in South Asia with Special Reference to India-Pakistan Crises Behavior
NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISES BEHAVIOR A thesis submitted to the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES by SANNIA ABDULLAH DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES QUAID-I-AZAM UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD-PAKISTAN JULY 2015 i ii DECLARATION The PhD thesis “NUCLEAR LEARNING IN SOUTH ASIA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA-PAKISTAN CRISES BEHAVIOR”is based on the original research. No part of the thesis is copied or plagiarized; all sources are properly documented as per the guidance provided by the QAU/HEC. Sannia Abdullah Islamabad July 27, 2015 iii Dedicated to a mentor and friend, Dr. Nazir Hussain with special thanks for his support and guidance iv CONTENTS ABSTRACT viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix ABBREVIATIONS x LIST OF TABLES/FIGURES xiv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 22 1.1. Nuclear Weapons and International Debate 1.2. International Relations Theory: Learning and Military Crises 1.3. Conceptualizing Nuclear Learning 1.3.1. Operationalizing the term ‘Learning’ in International Relations 1.3.2. Defining the Concept of Nuclear Learning 1.3.3. Who Learns?: Levels of Analyses Approach 1.3.4. Nuclear Learning and State Behavior 1.4. Nuclear Learning and Strategic Culture 1.5. Cognitive Dissonance and the Concept of Nuclear Learning 1.6. “Simple vs. Complex Learning” and Crisis Instability 1.7. Relationship between Nuclear Learning and Stable Nuclear Deterrence CHAPTER 2: NUCLEAR DECISION MAKING AS A DRIVER OF NUCLEAR LEARNING 44 2.1. -
13. Calculus on Missile Defence and Hypersonic Glide
13. Calculus on Missile Defence and Hypersonic Glide This chapter uses technological advances in the fields of missile defence and hypersonic glide to explore the implications of such platforms for Chinese and Russian nuclear deterrence. Zhao Tong discusses common Chinese and Russian concerns over US missile defence, which is viewed as threatening their respective nuclear deterrents, and the measures both are taking in response. Lora Saalman provides the context for how similar threat perceptions are manifested in China’s development of hypersonic glide capabilities. She argues that increased identifi- cation with Russia has filtered into Chinese research on hypersonic glide vehicles, such that China may similarly pursue missile defence as the target and nuclear warheads as the payload for its platforms. 13.1. Zhao Tong1 Introduction Russia and China have similar threat perceptions when it comes to the potential impact of US missile defence on their respective nuclear deterrents. While some foreign analysts doubt that the two countries’ concerns are genuine, an in-depth examination of the Chinese understanding of US missile defence reveals that a number of factors—including some serious misperceptions—make China deeply wary of these systems. If the similarities between the Chinese and Russian polit- ical systems and their decision-making dynamics are taken into account, as well as their deep mistrust of the United States, it is likely that Russian concerns about US missile defence will similar to those of China; and these must be adequately addressed. Common concerns over missile defence From a technical perspective, Russia and China evaluate the US missile defence threat based on a variety of basic assumptions. -
Summary of Major Us Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage
______________________________________________________________________________ MARCH 2014 NSD WWW.JUSTICE.GOV (202) 514-2007 SUMMARY OF MAJOR U.S. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, TRADE SECRET AND EMBARGO-RELATED CRIMINAL CASES (January 2008 to the present: updated March 26, 2014) Below is a snapshot of some of the major export enforcement, economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, and embargo-related criminal prosecutions handled by the Justice Department since January 2008. These cases resulted from investigations by the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) [formerly Immigration and Customs Enforcement , (ICE)], the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the Pentagon's Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and other law enforcement agencies. This list of cases is not exhaustive and only represents select cases. DuPont Trade Secrets to China - On March 5, 2014, a federal jury in the Northern District of California found two individuals and one company guilty of economic espionage, theft of trade secrets, bankruptcy fraud, tax evasion, and obstruction of justice for their roles in a long-running effort to obtain U.S. trade secrets for the benefit of companies controlled by the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The jury found that Walter Lian-Heen Liew (aka Liu Yuanxuan), his company, USA Performance Technology, Inc. (USAPTI), and Robert Maegerle conspired to steal trade secrets from E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company (DuPont) regarding their chloride-route titanium dioxide production technology and sold those secrets for large sums of money to state-owned companies of the PRC. The purpose of their conspiracy was to help those companies develop large-scale chloride-route titanium dioxide production capability in the PRC, including a planned 100,000-ton titanium dioxide factory in Chongqing. -
An Assessment of Ballistic Missile Production Capacity in Pakistan
September 2007 R2 - 07 NIAS Study - 2007 An Assessment of Ballistic Missile Production Capacity in Pakistan Rajaram Nagappa International Strategic and Security Studies Programme NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES Bangalore, India An Assessment of Ballistic Missile Production Capacity in Pakistan NIAS Study - 2007 Rajaram Nagappa International Strategic and Security Studies Programme NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES Bangalore, India © National Institute of Advanced Studies 2007 Published by National Institute of Advanced Studies Indian Institute of Science Campus Bangalore - 560 012 ISBN 81-87663-73-1 Price: Rs. 300/- Typeset & Printed by Aditi Enterprises #17/6, 22nd Cross, Bhuvaneshwari Nagar Magadi Road, Bangalore - 560 023 Mob: 92434 05168 Acknowledgement The author would like to thank Dr. K. Kasturirangan, Director, NIAS for his support and encouragement for taking up this study. The author is indebted to Prof. S. Chandrashekar, JRD Tata Visiting Professor, NIAS, Shri Arvind Kumar, Associate Fellow, NIAS, Prof. M.C. Uttam, University of Pune and Dr. Subhananda Rao, Director, HEMRL, Pune for reviewing the report and offering useful suggestions and comments. Rajaram Nagappa List of Abbreviations AP Ammonium Perchlorate Al Aluminum ASFC Army Strategic Forces Command CEP Circular Error Probable CP Carbon Phenolic EPDM Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer FLSC Flexible Linear Shaped Cord FRP Fibre Reinforced Plastic HTPB Hydroxyl Terminated Poly-Butadiene IGMDP Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme INCOSPAR Indian National Committee for Space Research IRNA Islamic Republic News Agency MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime NDC National Defence Complex NDE Non Destructive Evaluation NTI Nuclear Threat Initiative PVC Poly Vinyl Chloride R&D Research and Development SP Silica Phenolic SUPARCO Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission Assessment of Ballistic Missile Production Capacity in Pakistan Assessment of Ballistic Missile Production Capacity in Pakistan Summary Complex plant located at Fatehjang. -
USAF Counterproliferation Center CPC Outreach Journal
Issue No. 1036, 07 December 2012 Articles & Other Documents: Featured Article: Obama Seeks Renewal of Nuclear Arms Control Deal with Russia 1. U.S. Open to Bilateral Talks with Iran: Clinton 2. Iran Says Nuclear Fuel Removed Because of Debris 3. U.S. Steps up Spying on Iran’s Nuclear Reactor: Report 4. U.S. Warns Syria on Chemical Weapons 5. Senior MP Sees No Room for N. Weapons in Iran's Defense Strategy 6. ‘Iranian Nuclear Bomb would Trigger Arms Race’ 7. Syria Loads Chemical Weapons into Bombs; Military Awaits Assad's Order 8. U.N. Nuclear Chief: Alleged Weapons Testing Site Was Probably Sanitized by Iran 9. N. Korea Notifies Countries under Missile Path of Launch Plan: Seoul Official 10. US Warns Against N Korean Missile Launch 11. NK Urged to Drop Launch 12. N. Korea Completes Installation of Long-Range Rocket on Launch Pad 13. Xi Jinping Calls for Powerful Missile Force 14. Japan Deploys Patriot Missiles to Combat North Korean Rocket Threat 15. US: NKorea Launch Intended to Show Missile Tech 16. N. Korea Preparing Fuel for Rocket: Source 17. Japan to Shoot Down North Korean Rockets 18. Pakistani Ballistic Missile Test Failed 19. India's First Nuke Submarine to be Ready by 2013-End 20. Pakistan 'Expanding Nuclear Arsenal to Deter US Attack' 21. Post-Soviet Military Alliance Reaffirms Missile Defense Plans 22. Developing a Non-Nuclear Alternative for Winning Wars 23. France Denies Claims it will Ditch Year-Round Seaborne Nuclear Deterrent 24. Obama Seeks Renewal of Nuclear Arms Control Deal with Russia 25.