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Riding the Electoral Roller Coaster in Turkey: How to Read the Results of the June and November 2015 Elections? Ali Çarkoğlu*

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Riding the Electoral Roller Coaster in Turkey: How to Read the Results of the June and November 2015 Elections? Ali Çarkoğlu* Riding the Electoral Roller Coaster in Turkey: How to Read the Results of the June and November 2015 Elections? Ali Çarkoğlu* he Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve declined in November. As a result, the AK Party’s support Kalkınma Partisi, AK Party) won three consecutive peaked with a new record. Telections in 2002, 2007 and 2011 by continuously increasing its vote share from about 34 percent to nearly To see the significance of the November 2015 results, 50 percent. As such the AK Party forms an exceptional il- we need to contextualise these results in comparison to lustration of a predominant party in competitive demo- earlier AK Party election performances. In the 2002 general cracies.1 In March and August 2014, first local elections elections the AK Party got a respectable 34 percent of and then presidential elections were held. Next came the the vote, which grew in 2004 to reach nearly 42 percent parliamentary elections in June 2015 in which the AK Par- in the local elections. In 2007, the political crisis around ty incurred a significant electoral loss, leading to a parlia- the presidential election led to remarkable electoral gain mentary outlook that did not allow the formation of any for the AK Party, which won 47 percent. With the global government. Eventually President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan economic crisis reaching Turkey by the time of the 2009 decided to hold early or “repeat” elections on November local elections, the AK Party lost about eight percentage 1, 2015. The campaign period for the November election points of electoral support but managed to recover by saw rising militarised conflict in east and southeastern continuously improving economic conditions for the Anatolia with the Kurdish PKK as well as ISIS-linked terror mass electorate. By the 2011 parliamentary elections attacks. the recovery was more than complete, and the AK Party won record-breaking support with almost 50 percent of The “repeat” elections in November 2015 turned out to be valid votes (which totaled about 21.4 million votes). As a a true victory for the AK Party, which was able to raise its general rule support for the AK Party rose when the mass share amongst the valid votes to 49,5 percent – an all- public was content with the economy’s performance.2 time high of almost 23,7 million total votes. Turnout in Likewise, deteriorating economic performance before November rose to 85,2 percent from 83,9 percent in June. the 2014 local elections caused the level of support to The number of invalid votes, which had risen in June drop to about 43 percent. Nevertheless, even at times of primarily to a ballot design issue in Istanbul constituencies, economic crisis the AK Party’s support still remained higher than its original 34 percent by about nine percentage 1 On the predominant party system in Turkey see Ali Çarkoğlu, “Turkey’s 2011 General Elections: Towards a Dominant Party points. Even in one of the worst electoral contexts the System?”, in Insight Turkey, Vol. 13, No. 3 (July-September 2011), p. 43-62, http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/20120903122353_ 2 On the influence of the economic evaluations upon voter insight-turkey_volume_11_number_3_-ali_carkoglu_towards-a- decisions during the 2002-2011 period, see Ali Çarkoğlu, dominant.pdf; Şebnem Gümüşcü, “The Emerging Predominant “Economic Evaluations vs. Ideology: Diagnosing the Sources of Party System in Turkey”, in Government and Opposition, Vol. 48, No. Electoral Change in Turkey, 2002-2011”, in Electoral Studies, Vol. 31, 2 (April 2013), p. 223-244. No. 3 (September 2012), p. 513-521. * Ali Çarkoğlu is Professor of International Relations at Koç University, Istanbul. A complementary analysis is due to appear as “Election Storm in Turkey: What do the Results of June and November 2015 Elections Tell Us?”, forthcoming in Insight Turkey, co-authored with Kerem Yıldırm. December 2015 COMMENTARY 28 1 AK Party’s votes in provincial council elections was about 17,8 million, up by more than 4,4 million votes compared to the 2004 local elections. Background to the November Election In the first-ever popular elections for the presidency, the AK Party candidate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan outperformed the joint opposition candidate, a devout Muslim intellectual of high caliber, Ekmelettin İhsanoğlu. Erdoğan received 21 million votes or 51,8 percent of the valid votes, securing An election official holds a ballot during a count at a the presidency in the first round of elections. The pro- polling station in Diyarbakir, 1 November 2015. Kurdish, democratic socialist People’s Democratic Party (Photo Reuters/Sertac Kayar) (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP) candidate Selahattin Demirtaş received 9,8 percent of the valid votes in the parliament. The CHP remained more or less at the same August 2014 presidential election. This strong showing level of support compared to the June elections and signaled that the military-imposed 10 percent threshold continued to be the main opposition party. may be surpassed by the HDP in the next election. In fact, the HDP obtained about 13 percent of the vote in June The nearly five months between the June and November 2015. elections witnessed paralysed coalition negotiations and a virtual end to the Kurdish peace process. Then came The campaign period before the June elections was hit intensified military action against the PKK and many by terror attacks and mass violence. Two days before the losses of life, with terror attacks in Şanlıurfa Suruç in the elections, two bombs attributed to ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq southeast and in the capitol city Ankara killing tens of and al-Sham) exploded at the HDP’s rally at its Diyarbakır civilians. Among those killed were some HDP politicians meeting, killing four civilians. There were also numerous and youth branch members of the CHP. The CHP and small-scale attacks against all parties. According to the the HDP announced afterwards that they would not Human Rights Association of Turkey (İHD), there were hold rallies or large campaign meetings because of the 187 attacks against parties. 168 of them were against threats. An intriguing development following the Ankara the HDP, 12 against the AKP, 5 against the Republican bombing was that the responsibility for the event was not People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) and 2 against clearly attributed either to the interim government or to the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, the AK Party that the majority of the ministers were from. MHP). According to the same statement, 97 party activists The Prime Minister and leader of the AK Party, Ahmet were wounded, 10 attackers were detained and only one Davutoğlu, successfully shifted the blame to the electoral attacker was imprisoned because of these 187 attacks.3 context that did not allow a single party government. Between the attacks on October 10 and the elections on The June 7, 2015 elections led to a nearly nine- November 1, there were no serious clashes between the percentage-point loss for the ruling AK Party compared armed forces and the PKK or any other terror plot against to the 2011 general elections. As such, no party had the civilians that captured mass attention. necessary majority in the Parliament to single-handedly form the government – a first since 1999. The AK Party The terror attacks and military action against the PKK nevertheless remained the largest group with nearly 41 created a new political agenda in the country that percent, followed by the main opposition CHP with about benefitted the AK Party considerably. During the months 25 percent (down by about 1 percentage point from preceding the June election more than half of the voting 2011) of the valid votes. The opposing Turkish and Kurdish age respondents saw economic problems as the most ethnic nationalist parties, the MHP and the HDP, scored important.4 Terror and national security was the primary 3,3 and 6,6 percentage points increases respectively. concern of slightly less than one in ten respondents, The ideological incongruence and polarisation in the and only about one in twenty saw the Kurdish question party system did not allow for constructive coalition or peace process as the primary issue on the agenda. negotiations. As a result, President Erdoğan called for a However, as of mid-September the political agenda “repeat” election in November 1, 2015 which led to AK has completely shifted, with more emphasis put upon Party recovery at the polls. Although the HDP and MHP security issues. Terror more than tripled its presence on had significant losses they both managed to remain above the agenda. Together with the Kurdish question or peace the 10 percent threshold, securing representation in the 4 See the presentation of pre-election survey results by Ali Çarkoğlu and Erdem Aytaç: Public Opinion Dynamics ahead of the 3 “Emek ve Demokrasi Platformu üyeleri, Diyarbakir’da yaşanan June 2015 Elections in Turkey, 5 May 2015, https://csr.ku.edu.tr/ patlamayi kinadi”, in Milliyet, 6 June 2015, http://www.milliyet.com. public-opinion. tr/d/t1.aspx?ID=826431. December 2015 COMMENTARY 28 2 process, terror was the answer of nearly one in every three allegations in June elections. While the opposition party people to the question of the most important problem. supporters overwhelmingly expected some fraud and While ISIS, foreign policy issues and the Syrian conflict did claimed overall that the election would not be fair, the not gain ground, we observe that political instability was supporters of the AK Party remained confident about the answer of nearly one in ten people. the free and fair nature of the elections.5 However, a civil initiative called Oy ve Ötesi monitored various provinces The big drop among the other issues came in the during both elections and according to their reports, importance of economic issues, together with a decline there were no serious electoral frauds or irregularities in in the emphasis on social problems such as education the ballot boxes.6 and health issues.
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