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SETA DC WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVE SETA DC FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE The SETA Foundation at Washington, D. C. | www.setadc.org | November 2015 Series Editor: Kadir Ustun THE NOVEMBER 2015 ELECTIONS IN TURKEY: STABILITY AND RETURN TO THE CENTER A month ago, in an analysis of the June elections and possible drivers for the November elections, I argued that there would be several different possible influencers of voting behavior of the November 1st elections. Most of these factors seemed to have indeed played important roles in the AK Party’s victory in the elections yesterday. More than 48 million cast their votes on Sunday and the turnout rate was around 87 percent. The results of Turkish elections dem- KILIC KANAT [email protected] onstrated that the AK Party won another election victory and its 5th general election victory. The election resulted in a harsh disappointment for opposi- tion parties. The AK Party increased its votes to above 49.4 %, in line with the percentage of the vote it received in the 2011 general elections. It increased its percentage by 8.5 percent, its seats in the parliament by 59 member of the parliament and its votes by almost 4.5 million compared to June elections. This increase occurred across all electoral districts in Turkey, including the Kurdish populated southeast regions. In fact, the top four cities that AK Party increased its votes were cities of Eastern or Southeastern Turkey, Igdir (20 percent), Sanliurfa (17 percent), Bingol (17 percent) and Kilis (16 percent). The main opposition party, CHP, did not achieve a substantial increase in its votes, instead receiving voting percentages similar to previous elections, 25.4 percent of the votes. CHP also increased its votes in some of the East- ern and Southeastern cities, including Tunceli (7 percent) and Kilis (5 per- The SETA Foundation at Washington, D.C. cent). However, the party lost votes to AK Party from the Northern Turkey, 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW Suite #1106 especially along the coast of Karadeniz. In fact the four cities that CHP lost Washington, D.C. 20036 1 most votes in the election are four Karadeniz province cities, including: Phone: +1 (202) 223-9885 Fax: +1 (202) 223-6099 www.setadc.org | [email protected] SETA DC PERSPECTIVE Ordu (4 percent), Rize (4 percent), Bolu (3 percent) and Zonguldak (3 percent). This means that in the increase of the AK Party votes, there is also a relatively small shift from CHP votes. CHP got some of its votes back from HDP but lost some to AK Party in the elections. The two parties most celebrated for achieving higher than normal percentages of votes in June elections, MHP and HDP both faced serious defeats in this round of elections; MHP lost almost one fourth of its votes and declined from 16.3 to 11.9 percent in the elections. It also lost 40 seats in the parliament and declined from 80 to 40 and in terms of votes it lost 2 million of votes all over Turkey. MHP in this election lost votes in each and every city of Turkey other than Ardahan. In Ardahan, the party gained 1 percent increase. The high- est loss for the party took place in some of the Central Anatolian cities, such as Yozgat (15 percent), Aksaray, (12 percent), Kayseri (10 percent) and some Eastern cities, such as Igdir (15 percent). With these results, MHP became the fourth political party in the parliament. HDP faced almost an equal degree of defeat in the elections. It lost almost one fifth of its votes and declined from 13.1 percent to 10.6 percent in the elections. Just like MHP, HDP also lost some seats in the parliament. In the June elections, the party acquired 80 seats in the parlia- ment, whereas in this election, it lost 21 of them and in terms of votes lost one million votes in this election. Again just like the MHP, the HDP lost votes in all of the cities in Turkey, ex- cept Hatay and Kastamonu. In Hatay, the party increased its votes by 0.4 percent whereas in Kastamonu it was a 0.06 percent increase. The biggest losses of the party were in the East- ern and Southeastern cities, which are considered as the strongholds of the party, such as Bin- gol (12 percent), Bitlis (12 percent), Agri (11 percent) and Mus (10 percent). Both MHP and HDP lost out on the opportunities presented to them in the aftermath of the June elections. Thus, the failure of the opposition parties to create a bloc or serious alternative to the AK Party in the post-election period played an important role in shaping voting behaviors of Turkish citizens. The HDP and MHP, two different parties that pulled AK Party votes from two dif- ferent sides, lost their votes and the voters of these parties went back to the political center. The loss of the Saadet and Buyuk Birlik Partisi in this election also gave the same message of return to political center. Political center meant different things for the voters, including economic stability, resolution process and political stability without a coalition government. First set of influencers of this election included the changes to the AK Party’s election strategy. For example, the AK Party reconsidered its three-term limit for the MPs, which played against them in the previous election. In this round of elections, it amended its bylaws to allow the re- 2 SETA DC PERSPECTIVE election of the some of the three-term MPs, thereby allowing 24 previously term limited MPs, including very prominent MPs such as Ali Babacan, Besir Atalay (Van), Faruk Celik (Sanliurfa), and Cemil Cicek to return to office. As an example of the factor this played, in Van, there was ten percent increase in AK Party votes, and in Sanliurfa the party enjoyed a 17 percent higher return. Therefore, the return of these term limited MPs, who had not appeared on the June ballots, was considered a serious factor in the upswing of AK Party votes. Both the experience and incumbency effect of these ministers played an important role in their electoral districts. Other changes to the candidates list also played in favor of the AK Party. The low numbers of the AK Party in June elections in part was linked to the candidates put forward in particularly some eastern and southeastern cities in Turkey. The AK Party administration took this seri- ously and changed a significant number of candidates in eastern and southeastern cities before the November elections. For instance, all of the MP candidates in Agri (4), Diyarbakir (11), and Igdir (2) and all but one MP candidates in Kars (3), Mus (2), Siirt (3), Tunceli (2), Van (8), Kilis (2) and Sirnak (4) were changed. Again, in most of the cities, the AK Party increased its number of deputies, such as in Agri (+1), Diyarbakir (+1), Igdir (+1), Kars (+1), Van (+1). The dramatic changes in voting behavior in the elections took place primarily as a result of a swing back of votes that shifted to other parties from the AK Party during the June elections. As was expected before the elections, developments in the Kurdish issue, including the increased attacks by the PKK, the fate of the resolution process, and the fight against terrorism played a strong role in influencing voter behavior. Most of the votes that shifted from the HDP to AK Party took place as a result of concerns of Kurdish citizens about the safety and security in their regions and their desire for a relaunch of the resolution process. Analysts were cor- rect in predicting that some votes from the MHP would swing to the AK Party, owing to the MHP’s policies, positions, and election strategy; however, not many had estimated the swing of votes from the HDP to AK Party. For many the Kurdish votes for the AK Party was a per- manent loss and would never come back in the short term. However, this proved to be wrong. Kurdish and Turkish voters who voted for the HDP in the June elections were disappointed with the performance of the HDP and its policies in regards to emerging crisis in Turkey as a result of the PKK attacks. The sharp decline in HDP votes is the result of two different factors. Firstly, voters stand against the street politics and identity politics in Turkey. A year ago, October events in 2014 generated a negative reaction from people in the region. Uncontrolled street politics and the mobilization of radical groups in the region resulted in the death of more than 50 civilians. In 3 SETA DC PERSPECTIVE the aftermath of these incidents, people in the region reacted harshly against the perpetrators of this violence. For most of them, the three days of riots and looting in different city centers were too reminiscent of the atmosphere of the 1990s. It was clear that people in the region had become accustomed to enjoying peace and stability in the region that emerged during the resolution pro- cess, and they were vocal in expressing their desire for the region not to return to violence. Howev- er, this impact was minimized in the ten months between October events and the June elections. In part, what made the HDP so successful in June elections was the expectation that it would continue to pursue the resolution process in the parliament. However, the HDP failed to deliver on this expectation. The party failed to present itself as a contributing part of the resolution process in the aftermath of the elections.