The Acceptance of the Matignon Accord Ushered in a Period Of
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POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA ISS the acceptance of the Matignon Accord of an independent and socialist Kana ushered in a period ofpolitical stability kyo Furthermore, there is little evidence in a territory still numb from the vio that France is now willing to abandon lence in Ouvea. this distant relic ofempire. Rocard has The signing ofthe accord also stressed that his ultimate aim is to brought a degree ofrelief in the Pacific ensure that New Caledonia remains region and beyond as this trouble spot part ofFrance, a solution that is anath appeared to be more firmly directed ema to the FLNKS. The change in gov toward peaceful political evolution. ernment in Paris, despite all the drama The South Pacific Forum expressed its and acclaim, has effectively produced approval in September, relations be only subtle, ifelegant, change. Never tween France and Australia improved, theless, the achievement ofeven a frag and the United Nations Decolonization ile peace represents a major success Committee responded sympathetically story in this difficult period for New to the new French initiative. Even Caledonia. Vanuatu, France's most persistent JOHN CONNELL regional critic, expressed support. What this means, ofcourse, is that the PAPUA NEW GUINEA FLNKS is likely to receive less external support in the future as it continues to The opening ofthe vote ofno-confi work for independence. dence season six months after a prime The economy was also boosted by minister assumes office usually marks the signing ofthe Matignon Accord. the beginning of a difficult period in Indeed, 1988 was one ofthe best years Papua New Guinea politics. This was for the economy this decade, with high certainly the case in 1988 when the nickel prices prompting talk of a new expiration ofPrime Minister Paias nickel boom. The prospects ofin Wingti's constitutional grace period creased foreign investment were good, precipitated a frenzy ofpolitical activ not least in the tourist industry, which ity that culminated in his ouster in July. received more attention from Japanese Things calmed down considerably in tourists and investors, raising the pos the second half ofthe year as Wingti's sibility that a resort complex will even replacement, Rabbie Namaliu, a forty tually be developed at Tiare. However, one-year-old Tolai from East New Brit economic growth remained concen ain, settled into the difficult business of trated around Noumea. Even with the keeping a coalition government togeth Matignon Accord, it will be extremely er. These events raised more starkly difficult to change the regional struc than before questions about the stabil ture ofdevelopment. ity ofthe system ofparliamentary Independence for New Caledonia democracy established in Papua New appears as unlikely now as in the past. Guinea at independence in 1975. The increased subsidies provided under Prime Minister Wingti entered 1988 the terms ofthe accord will make it dif with coalition management problems ficult for the FLNKS to revitalize the that centered on former defense com agricultural sector and sustain visions mander Ted Diro and his supporters in THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING/FALL 1989 the Papua-based People's Action Party, March 1988, 3). In April, some two the second largest ofthe five coalition million kina were diverted from the partners. Diro's aspirations to be dep Civic Action Programme to supple uty prime minister had been put on ment existing "slush funds" available to hold after the 1987 elections, pending individual MPS for use in their constitu the outcome of an official inquiry into encies (TPNG, 14-20 April 1988 , 3). the forest industry-including allega Then on II April, less than three hours tions of his gross financial misconduct into its first 1988 session, and after the when he was minister for forests in the motion ofno-confidence had been first Wingti government. Pressure to introduced, Parliament was abruptly restore Diro to cabinet rank increased adjourned by the government. On the in late January 1988 after the District same day Wingti reluctantly appointed Court acquitted him of five perjury Diro to the cabinet as part of a last charges arising from his testimony ditch attempt to retain the support of before the commission, and some Port the People's Action Party and save his Moresby rascal gangs tried to force the crumbling government (PR, 14 April issue with threats ofviolence (TPNG, 1988, I). 28 Jan-3 Feb 1988, I; 18-24 Feb 1988, Opposition cries offoul play were 7). However, the court's decision, silenced by the announcement on 20 upheld by the Supreme Court in early April of a Grand Coalition ofNational August, was a technical one based on Stability, based on Wingti's People's the surprising absence of a perjury Democratic Movement and opposition clause in the Commission ofInquiry leader Michael Somare's Pangu Patio Act, and by no means cleared Diro's The move was initiated by Wingti in an name. The allegation that Diro had apparent bid to rid himself of Diro and received a 1987 election campaign con the People's Action Party, but immedi tribution of US$139,000 from the then ately fell into disarray as both sides head ofthe Indonesian security forces, scrambled for ministries and attempted General Murdani, was confirmed by to include their allies in the deal (PR, Wingti after meeting with Murdani in 28 April 1988, 4). The crisis deepened Indonesia in January 1988 (TPNG, 28 in late May when another attempt at a Jan-3 Feb 1988, 2). grand coalition ofthe two parties It was clear early in 1988 that the failed. This time Rabbie Namaliu, who crucial Papuan bloc in the government had replaced Somare as Pangu leader was split between support for Diro and the previous week, signed the memo loyalty to the prime minister. But randum ofunderstanding on behalf of Wingti employed some innovative tac the opposition on 26 May (PR, 26 May tics in his fight to survive the vote of 1988,3). The "irrevocable commit no-confidence expected in April. Early ment" to stay together until the 1992 in March,with no more government elections lasted less than a week. ministries available to attract or retain Declaring the agreement void, ostensi supporters, he unveiled plans to put bly because Somare had turned down backbench MPS in charge oftwenty the foreign affairs portfolio, Wingti seven statutory bodies (TPNG, 10-16 announced a "revitalized" coalition POLITICAL REVIEW. MELANESIA 157 government that excluded both Pangu 1988, 3-4). The distribution of portfo and Ted Diro. This was made possible lios reflected Namaliu's attempt to bal by bringing Michael Mel and his ance regional interests, with each ofthe Highlands-based National Party into nineteen provinces getting a ministry, the government, while retaining the while simultaneously rewarding those support ofmost ofDiro's colleagues in who had defected from Wingti's coali the People's Action Party (PR, 9 June tion. Wingti's foreign minister, Akoka 1988 ,1). Doi, became deputy prime minister, Wingti's claimed support ofmore while Paul Pora was rewarded with the than seventy MPS was eroding quickly key finance and planning ministry. as Parliament reconvened on 27 June. Michael Somare reversed his grand At first, the unrest was most apparent coalition decision oflate June and among Papuan ministers such as Allan accepted the position ofminister for Ebu, Galeva Kwarara, and Akoka Doi, foreign affairs. who had been pushed aside to accom The prime minister's statement of modate the Highlands members of the early August indicated some new new coalition. But the defection ofPaul emphases in government policy, but Pora and four of his fellow Highland foreshadowed no radical change of ers in the newly recruited National direction for Papua New Guinea. Some Party proved to be the crucial factor in ofthe new priorities were reflected in Wingti's defeat. On 4 July the eleventh the November budget, with more vote ofno-confidence since 1978 was resources allocated for education and carried in Parliament 58 to 50, and to combat the serious "law and order" Papua New Guinea's fourth prime min problem. However, Namaliu had ister, Rabbie Namaliu, set about form inherited his own law and order prob ing a government of "reconciliation, lem in the form of an unrepentant Ted reconstruction and unity" (PIM, Aug Diro, who expects to become deputy 1988,10). prime minister if and when he is Namaliu, who holds a master's cleared ofthe criminal charges pending degree from a Canadian university, against him. The stabbing attack by was first elected to Parliament in 1982, Port Moresby rascals onJudge Tos and served as foreign minister in the Barnett, who headed the commission 1982-1985 Somare government. In July of inquiry that uncovered that evidence· 1988 he announced a six-party coali against Diro, added an ominous new tion government consisting ofPangu dimension to the whole affair in early (13 ministries), People's Action Party September (PIM, Oct 1988, 10). (4 ministries), Papua Party (1 ministry), As expected, Namaliu moved fast to Melanesian Alliance (4 ministries), increase to thirty months the period of National Party (3 ministries), and immunity from no-confidence votes League for National Advancement afforded to incoming prime ministers. (1 ministry). Two independents also The proposed constit~tionalamend received cabinet positions, making a ment was approved by cabinet early total of28, the maximum allowed in October, but had yet to begin its under the constitution (PR, 21 July lengthy journey through Parliament THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC. SPRING/FALL 1989 at year's end (PR, 13 Oct 1988, I). On the economic front, the rates of Whether this proposal, or some varia investment and growth remained slug tion ofit, eventually achieves the neces gish in all sectors except mining during sary two-thirds-majority support in 1988.