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Home , 1960 Winter Olympics, 1972 Winter Olympics, Anne Heggtveit, Avery Brundage, Beckie Scott, Carol Anne Letheren

‘Whistler’s Father’: The Life and Times of Andrew Sidney Dawes in Canadian Post- World War II Olympic Affairs

Richard W. Pound & Garth A. Paton*

With the 2010 Olympic Winter Games scarcely a year away, and with the Alpine events scheduled to be staged at impressive facilities on Whistler Moun- tain, the central outdoor venue on which ’s successful bid was based, it is appropriate to examine the Canadian Olympic history that had fundamen- tal substance to what will unfold in Vancouver/Whistler in February 2010. We develop that mission through an examination of the life and Canadian Olympic times of Andrew Sidney Dawes, Canadian IOC member from 1947 to 1968. Dawes was the first to identify Whistler as a prospective Olympic skiing site. This study presents a contextual biography of Dawes and analyzes his role in contentious Canadian Olympic moments, among them, the professional/ama- teur conundrum involving both and coincident with the 1948 Winter Games in St. Moritz, and, more germane to current Olympic affairs, an investigation of the long-festering rivalry between -Banff and -Whistler in their respective quests to bring Olympic Winter Games to . Within these collective scenarios, A. Sidney Dawes’ voice and action were of important and forceful significance. v Since its first appearance in the indifferently organized of 1904 (which followed poorly organized Games in Paris in 1900, an unfortunate com- bination which led to the hastily but better organized 1906 intercalated Games in ), Canada has been a regular participant, showing occasional sparkle in the Summer Games and considerable muscle in the Olympic Winter Games. Until the World War I the organization of sport in Canada evolved from its trappings inherited from the founding British military traditions. Following the War this tradition was slowly eroded, effecting a transition influenced greatly by geographical and cultural proximity to its southern neighbor—the . A central figure in this transition was Andrew Sidney Dawes, a decorated World War I officer and corporate leader from , who was first recruited into sport at the national level by the skiing federation, later by the Canadian

* Richard W. Pound is Chancellor of McGill , senior partner in the Montreal law firm Stikeman Elliot, former President of the Canadian Olympic Association, and a thirty-eight year member of the IOC. — Garth A. Paton is Professor Emeritus and former Dean of the Faculty of Kinesiology at the University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada.

Olympika XVII (2008), pp. 41-100 41 Pound & Paton

Olympic community at large, and finally by the International Olympic Commit- tee, on which he served for more than twenty years. Dawes was born in Lachine, on December 5, 1888, son of Pres- byterians James Powley Dawes and Gertrude J. Brock. The family was finan- cially well-off, thanks to his grandfather, who founded Dawes Brewery, one of the major breweries in the Montreal area.1 He would have been less than a year old when toured the Eastern United States, (Uni- versity of Toronto) Montreal (McGill University and l’Université de Montréal) and Quebec (Laval University) in the late summer and fall of 1889 in search of educational and sport models. This was an initiative that would culminate in the 1894 Congress at the Sorbonne in Paris and the establishment of the Inter- national Olympic Committee, of which Dawes would become a member in his fifty-ninth year. Little is known of Dawes’ early schooling, oth- er than that he attended St. Albans School and the High School of Montreal before enrolling at McGill University in the Faculty of Arts and Sci- ence, from which institution he was graduated in 1910 with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Engineering. It does seem clear that he got an early start with skiing, initially on the not par- ticularly challenging slopes of Mount Royal, ig- niting an interest in skiing that would stay with him for the rest of his life and eventually lead him to the pinnacle of international sports ad- ministration. Upon his graduation from McGill, A.S. Dawes in 1910 he worked initially as an apprentice for The Canadian Westinghouse Company. In 1913 he joined the Atlas Construction Company, one of the foremost construction companies in . When World War I erupted, he joined the Royal Canadian Artillery, receiv- ing a commission as Lieutenant in the 21st Battery. He was sent overseas as part of the Canadian Over-Seas Expeditionary Force (under overall British com- mand, given Canada’s constitutional status at the time). While in the trenches at Ypres, France, on 22 May 1916 he was wounded by shrapnel in the upper left arm. After hospital treatment in ,2 he was granted leave to return to Montreal to recover, following which he returned to active duty in France in October 1916. In October, too, he was awarded the Military Cross.3 On 12 April 1917, he was promoted to Temporary . He was wounded a second time, again in the left arm, on 2 November 1917. He was given a field promotion to Major on 5 March 1918 and held that rank until his demobilization, sailing from Liverpool on the S.S. Lapland on 3 April 1919 and landing at Halifax, a week later.

42 ‘Whistler’s Father’

Following his discharge from the Canadian Expeditionary Force, Dawes returned to Atlas Construction in 1919 and by 1925 had become its president, holding that office until 1956, when he became Chairman of its Board of Direc- tors, a position he occupied until his death in 1968. Past the age of useful combat service duringz World War II, he was, during that conflict, Director of Federal Aircraft and organized the Windsor Mills Ele- mentary Flying School in the Eastern Townships of Montreal. He was actively involved in civic affairs, serving on the Council of the Montreal Board of Trade, the Montreal Protestant School Commission, the Montreal Builders Exchange (now the Montreal Construction Association), a member of the Engineering Institute of Canada, and a particularly engaged Board member of the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts. Dawes was active in the social life of Montre- al which was then centered around clubs, espe- cially, although not exclusively, within the Eng- lish-speaking community. These included such A.S. Dawes in 1916 business dining clubs as the Mount Royal Club, St. James’s Club and the Forest and Stream Club. His sports-related clubs included Mount Bruno Country Club, the Royal Montreal Club, the Montreal Indoor Club, the Montreal Flying Club, and the McGill Red Birds Ski Club. The latter club, associated in particular with McGill University, led him to further involvement in Canadian skiing and to his eventual entry into the Olympic Movement, culminating in his cooptation as a member of the International Olympic Committee. Changes in Canadian Sport

The post-World War I period brought with it a dramatic growth in the develop- ment of professional sport, overlaid on the original amateur base. Initially, both amateur and professional sport proceeded in parallel tracks, with the of Canada (AAUC) managing both portfolios, which naturally increased its influence. But, interest in professional sports soon declined in that bifurcated form of governance, dominated as it was by leaders consumed with the concept of amateurism. Professional sports soon developed their own organiza- tions, better suited to the profit-making objectives of owners and players. With that migration, the AAUC’s importance was considerably diminished, leaving only the amateur and within its jurisdiction. The AAUC had its own difficulties in determining whether athletes were “amateur,” a problem that would also bedevil the IOC for decades until, in the late 1980s, a formula was found to enable each international sports federation to determine “eligibility” for the Olympic competition of its athletes.4 Ultra-conservative by inclination,

43 Pound & Paton the AAUC alienated certain of its members, some of whom withdrew in protest in 1937, including the icon Canadian sport of ice hockey, as well as and .5 Interestingly, had done so as early as 1909. Thus, the seeds were sown for the eventual decline and disappearance of the AAUC. It may well be that the impetus for significant and immediate change in the Canadian Olympic governance system arose out of Canadian per- formance at the 1936 Olympics, performance that was criticized within Canada as poor.6 The Games have been generally acknowl- edged as the first to be used for overtly political purposes and were a harbinger of the growing importance of the Games on the broader world stage. Given the all but religious Canadian fervor A.S. Dawes in 1919 for ice hockey, however, it is at least just as likely that the concerns regard- ing Canadian performance at ’s 1936 Winter and arose more from the embarrassing loss in the ice hockey tournament, where Canada (after winning in 1924, 1928 and 1932) managed only a bronze medal, than from a generally indifferent performance in the Summer Games, where no won gold medals.7 Participation in ice hockey was all very well, but dominant performance on the ice mattered far more to Canadians (indeed it was expected) than mere participation. The November 1936 Annual Meeting of the AAUC called for immediate steps to be taken to reorganize the Canadian Olympic Committee, “to the end that she [Canada] may be worthily represented at the Olympic Games in 1940.”8 Not much happened in the ensuing year and at the 1937 Annual Meeting the call was again made for the appointment of a special committee with the mandate: To consider the whole Olympic situation having regard to the con- stitution of the next Olympic Committee, and plans to organize the athletic forces and funds of Canada so that she may be worthily rep- resented at the 1940 Olympic Games.9 The ongoing criticisms led to the appointment in 1936 of former AAUC presi- dent and lawyer, James I. Morkin, to study the matter and to make recommendations regarding organization of the Olympic Committee. Morkin recommended that the COC be re-organized, but as a body independent of the AAUC, and that the COC should have the power to budget, set dates and times of Olympic trials, set standards, name officials and arrange transportation. It should also elect its own officers. The report, quite revolutionary in the circum- stances, was resolutely opposed by the long-standing president of the AAUC, P.J. Mulqueen, with the result that consideration was deferred. Thus, the matter was

44 ‘Whistler’s Father’ not settled at that time. The name of the COC was, however, changed at the 1937 meeting to the Canadian Olympic Association (COA).10 Nothing further hap- pened, leading to requests the following year from both the COA and the British Empire Games Association (also a committee of the AAUC) that the Resolu- tions Committee [of the AAUC] bring in a motion clarifying the membership and duties of both organizations.11 The adoption of the recommendations was stalled by the older AAUC guard, but was repeatedly raised each time the AAUC met. The delaying tactics result- ed in maintenance of the status quo until the outbreak of World War II, when a “war committee” was organized to deal with amateur sport until the cessation of hostilities. The period of World War II, following so closely upon the “war to end all wars,” put the affairs of many Canadian sport organizations on hold, but when that conflict was resolved in 1945, international sports relationships became increasingly managed directly between the international sports federa- tions and their respective recognized national federations, with neither the need nor desire for involvement of intermediate organizations such as the AAUC, a development which served to diminish its importance in Canada even further. This diffuse discontent also spread to the Olympic portfolio. The Canadian Olympic Association (generally described as such after 1938, but still within the AAUC) effectively withdrew from the AAUC in 1948 to become a separate (although at the time not separately incorporated) organization. This separation was achieved with no small amount of acrimony. It was in the midst of the declining status of the AAUC and the increasing desire of organizations to manage their own developmental and competitive affairs that A. Sidney Dawes emerged as a central figure on the -Ca nadian sport scene. In addition to his impeccable credentials as a businessman, cultural devoté and social leader, he was an ardent skier and a determined pro- moter of that sport. As a graduate of McGill University, he had become an early member of the McGill University Red Birds Ski Club, founded in 1928.12 He was a competitor in the first Quebec Kandahar race in 1931.13 In the early 1930s, he had been involved in unsuccessful lobbying of the Quebec government to de- velop Mont Tremblant as a ski resort. When the government initially declined any active participation in such development, Dawes worked with the legendary Hermann-Smith “Jack Rab- bit” Johannsen, Harry Pangman, and other members of the McGill Red Birds Ski Club to improve the runs at Mont Tremblant. During that period, the trails or runs known as the Kandahar, the Taschereau and Dawes Ridge were opened, greatly assisted by funds raised by Dawes himself and others. One of the major factors in the development of Mont Tremblant as a ski resort was the visit to the mountain by Joseph B. Ryan of Philadelphia, who recognized its potential and proceeded with development, the first major runs opening in 1938.14 Dawes

45 Pound & Paton was also an early supporter of the development near at Ste. Anne de Beaupré, suggesting many development scenarios at what is now one of the leading ski resorts in Eastern Canada. He provided personal assistance of $2,000 to finance the first run at Ste. Anne in 1945, and his company, Atlas Construc- tion, provided the materials for installation of the telephone communication between the base and summit of the mountain.15 Dawes had already become peripherally involved in Canadian Olympic ski- ing by the time of the 1936 Olympic Winter Games in Garmisch-Partenkirch- en.16 William Ball refers to his efforts in fund-raising: Returning to Garmisch he was greeted with the news of Gagné’s twist- ed ankle and sprained wrist and the Sidney Dawes [Mr. and Mrs.], who had done so much to make our trip possible could not join us as he was lying over in Kitzbuhel with a broken leg.17 He had devoted himself to raising money within skiing very early, as indicated above, and had also been active in relation to providing St. John Ambulance first aid service at ski hills. Ball referred to this activity as follows: To assist in carrying on the St. John Ambulance service, Sidney Dawes raised some $400 among his friends. By present standards [1981] this seems like a paltry sum but Canada’s Olympic ski team crossed the ocean and spent six weeks in Germany at a cost of $300 per man.18 As organizer, fund raiser, supporter and enthusiast, Dawes was active in Cana- dian skiing for more than thirty years. While skiing was obviously Dawes’ principal sport interest, he served as a councilor-at-large of the Canadian Lawn Tennis Association in addition to his position as president of the presently-named Canadian Ski Association from 1945-1947.19 The Montreal Daily Star reported on his election under the head- line “Skiers Plan Wider Scope” A. Sidney Dawes was a popular selection for the presidency. He fol- lows Fred Hall of Toronto, who carried on in the office so well during the war. With Jack Houghton of the Redbirds named chairman of the technical board, Montreal will be the executive center in the govern- ment of skiing in Canada.20 He represented CASA within the AAUC thereafter and from that position, became a member of the Canadian Olympic Association, undoubtedly arising from his connection with skiing. But Dawes was also one of the first wealthy and committed businessmen recruited by the sport community. This was undoubt- edly due to his connections with corporations in a position to help support the organizations whose members did not have the same level of contacts.21 The first post-War Annual Meeting of the AAUC was held in Montreal on 28-29 November 19 46. Interestingly enough, both the CAHA and the Cana- dian Amateur Ski Association were present as accredited members, despite their

46 ‘Whistler’s Father’ pre-War dissatisfaction with and withdrawal from the AAUC. Nelson Hart, on behalf of the COA, reported on the activities between 1937 and 1939, as well as during the years of the War and reported the news of the ill-health of P. J. Mulqueen, who died the following month. At the 1946 annual meeting of the AAUC, the issue of non-representation of certain of the national organizations within the COA led to a motion that called for a restructured [AAUC] executive committee that would guarantee broader representation, to be voted upon at the 1947 annual meeting. With respect to the COA, it was recognized that a new committee needed to be established with respect to the 1948 Games. Messrs. Hart and Lamb proposed a motion that the executive committee of the COA be composed of the Honorary President of the COA, the representatives of Canada on the IOC, the President, Honorary Secretary and Honorary Treasurer of the AAUC, and ten members representative of the sports governing bodies, to be ap- pointed by the president of the AAUC, having due regard to the representation of the various governing bodies of sports included on the Olympic programme. The minutes are not clear what disposition occurred, but the motion does not appear to have been adopted. Dawes was elected as the new president of the COA in 1946, succeeding Mulqueen, who was named Honorary President. The IOC, having seen its Games of 1940 and 1944 cancelled or made impos- sible by reason of the War, moved quickly after the end of the War and desig- nated London as host for the 1948 Games.22 The invitation to participate in the London Games, scheduled for 29 July -14 August, was received by the COA in early May 1947.23 In Canada, the AAUC’s Nelson Hart began work on prepa- rations for Canadian participation, requesting nominations from the national organizations for the establishment of a temporary Olympic committee. At the 1947 Annual Meeting of the AAUC, held in Lethbridge, from 20-22 November 1947, Dawes was listed as president of the Canadian Ski As- sociation and as president of the COA.24 The AAUC president’s address included the following comments regarding the COA: The Executive Committee of the Canadian Olympic Association has met frequently during the year, and has been very active under the fine leadership of A. Sidney Dawes of Montreal. He has thrown him- self into the job with all his well-known vigor and the committee has made favorable progress in the financial campaign to make the trip to Europe possible in January and next July. There was some reference to the affair earlier that year (dis- cussed below) and the COA was commended for its handling of the situation. Thanks of the COA were extended to the federal government for the promised grant of $35,000, arranged through the efforts of president Dawes. Dawes was also appointed General Manager Winter Sports in respect of the forthcoming Winter Games in St. Moritz.

47 Pound & Paton

On that same occasion, the Hart/Dawes motion re-emerged, with signifi- cant changes, principally that ten delegates be appointed by the Olympic Com- mittee itself, rather than by the AAUC president, which led to tabling the mo- tion until the 1948 annual meeting scheduled for London, on 18-20 November. Dawes believed that the Canadian Olympic Association was be- ing stifled within the AAUC and was recognized as among those leading the charge to establish an independent Olympic organization.25 On the one side of the conflict was the AAUC president, Col. George C. Machum, attempt- ing to preserve its traditional powers and, on the other, Sidney Dawes, with considerable support from the sport governing bodies. Organizationally, af- ter 1933, the Olympic Committee had been under the effective control of the AAUC president, through the Executive Committee, which consisted of the president, secretary and treasurer of the AAUC plus five members appointed by the president. The Executive Committee, thus selected, was given authority over the Olympic Games, including team trials, team selection, transportation and fund raising. There was much politicking around the issue. Dawes, as president of the COA (in addition to and, no doubt because of, his presidency of the Canadian Ski Association), solicited support for an independent Olym- pic Committee from IOC president Edström as well as the very influential , destined to succeed Edstrom as IOC president in 1952.26 Dawes suggested that Brundage be invited as the guest speaker at the 1948 annual meeting of the AAUC held in London, Ontario. Machum, elected president of the AAUC in 1946, following the death of Mulqueen earlier that year,27 strongly opposed the emergence of an independent Olympic committee and, knowing what Avery Brundage would almost be certain to say, strongly opposed extending Brundage an invitation to speak.28 He ac- cused Dawes of being “arrogant, autocratic, lacking in consideration of oth- ers, poor in handling meetings, and unwilling to listen to opinions which do not agree with his own.”29 Ultimately, however, Brundage appeared, despite Machum’s opposition. Machum, the nominating committee’s recommendation for AAUC presi- dent, was easily defeated by Hart, nominated from the floor at the same 1948 meeting.30 Hart favoured an independent Olympic committee. The end of the saga was then in sight: new rules for the new Canadian Olympic Association were devised and approved by the AAUC. At the 1949 Annual Meeting of the AAUC in Toronto on 24-26 November 1949, the foundation was laid for the independence of the COA, although it continued for the time being as a com- mittee of the AAUC. The separation was finally achieved and, as of 5 January 1950, Dawes was in place as the president of the officially independent COA. He remained its president until 1953.31 It would be easy, and largely correct, to regard Dawes as the founder of the current COC and he was certainly at

48 ‘Whistler’s Father’ the forefront of arranging for its separate existence and later incorporation, but it would be wrong to discount or ignore the important role of Nelson Hart in paving the way.32

Dawes and the Barbara Ann Scott Affair

One of the highest profile cases in Canada involving the principles of amateur- ism arose from the 1947 affair involving a young Canadian figure skater and a yellow convertible. Barbara Ann Scott was Canada’s sweetheart following World War II. The petite figure skater had emerged as a junior in the late 1930s, when she became Canadian Junior Ladies Champion in 1939. She would un- doubtedly have been even better known (and sooner) had it not been for the outbreak of the War, but she was dominant thereafter, winning the Canadian Senior Ladies Championship in 1944, 1945, 1946 and 1948, the North Ameri- can Ladies Championship in 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948, plus the European and World Championships in 1947 and 1948. Following the War, Canada developed an extremely high sense of patriotism and national pride, emerging from the country’s extraordinary record during the War and its remarkable contribution, despite its small population, to the success of the Allies in the conflict. Barbara Ann Scott, in addition to her extraordinary athletic ability and achievements, proved to be a unifying symbol for the entire nation.33 In a burst of collective pride and excitement following her triumphs in the 1946-1947 season, the people of Ottawa, with great fanfare and publicity, pre- sented Scott with a yellow convertible. It was a spontaneous gift in recognition of her tremendous achievements, not something she had ever requested or even imagined. The problem, however, was that the 1948 Olympic Winter Games were less than a year away and the brooding guardians of amateurism, the IOC on the international scene, and the COA domestically, were concerned that by accepting the gift she might compromise her amateur status and, therefore, her eligibility to compete in the 1948 Games. Such were the rules of the day that am- ateur status could be affected by accepting gifts or money and even (believe it or not!) by merely expressing the thought that, one day, the athlete might consider becoming a professional.34 Given the prevailing catechism and the widespread publicity attached to the gift of the yellow convertible, it was inevitable that the issue of her amateur status would arise. Dawes, at the time the matter became a public concern, was president of the COA and had been invited to attend the Session of the IOC the following month, in June 1947, and to become a member of the IOC. He was in close and regular communication with Avery Brundage, then vice president of the IOC, as well as with Edström.35 Brundage, not surprisingly, given his obses- sion with amateurism and his general dislike of the Winter Games, immedi- ately raised the question of Scott’s amateur status were she to accept the gift.36

49 Pound & Paton

There is no evidence of Brundage attempting to have Scott declared ineligible for the Games, but rather more of a prophylactic concern that she not do anything which might imperil her amateur status. This was a view very much shared by Dawes, who, as the president of the COA, had to deal with this matter arising in his own country. The public, not uniformly steeped in the mysteries of ama- teurism, interpretable only by the high priests of sport, was very much opposed to this doctrinaire approach of the Olympic authorities and chose to focus at least as much antagonism on Brundage as upon Dawes. Canadian newspapers were awash in articles. Public figures, from city councilors to the Prime Minister, spoke publicly in support of Scott. The general public view expressed was one of disgust against the “meddling American.” While there would continue to be recriminations, the matter seems to have come to a head on 6 May 1947, when the COA met behind closed doors at the exclusive Mount Royal Club in Montreal (one of Dawes’ clubs). The media were frustrated by Dawes’ refusal to meet with them or to give any indication as to the direction of the deliberations. The past president of the Canadian Figure Skating Association, Mel Rogers, indicated that Brundage had filed an objection with Edstrom and that in Rogers’ view the COA should “take a strong stand against the attitude of Mr. Brundage.” The necessary steps were put in motion on 7 May 1947 when Barbara Ann Scott declared her intention to skate for Canada in the Olympics. Obviously, Brundage had been further briefed on the situation and was quoted as saying: … there might be “extenuating circumstances” which would clear Bar- bara Ann Scott of violating amateur rules in accepting an automo- bile from her native city of Ottawa … My personal opinion would be that if the girl had accepted the car after being told that it would be all right—and I have heard that she was given this advice by a competent authority—such an extenuating circumstance might clear up the matter. This opinion was expressed after being told that Scott’s mother had announced that the car would be returned to the city of Ottawa.37 The COA merely in- dicated that a complete report had been made to Edström. George Machum, president of the AAUC, said they had all agreed that no statement would be made, but urged the public to understand that what had been done at the meet- ing was strictly in the interest of the skater and to protect her Olympic status.38 There can be little doubt that against the prevailing ethos of the time, the correct decision was to return the automobile as the price of preserving Scott’s amateur status and Dawes would have been quite correct in leading the COA to that outcome.39 The IOC would have had little, if any, choice but to act preemptively to declare her ineligible, or to do so in response to predictable complaints from other NOCs. Most of the commentators seemed to have been under a misappre-

50 ‘Whistler’s Father’ hension that Canada’s decision on the question of amateur status might trump that of the IOC. Once the risk of ineligibility had passed, although the formal decision had yet to be made by the IOC,40 there was opportunity for additional polemic in the media. Dawes made a statement on 8 May 1947 to the effect that he was not wor- ried about her status and pointed out that the problem had not resulted from any action of the COA: “The young athlete is not really to blame … I would place the responsibility on bad advice … Donald Cruickshank is as much to blame as anyone; he was one of her advisers following the European triumph.” Dawes was also of the view that Allan M. Hearn, president of the Eastern Ontario Branch of the AAUC had no authority to authorize the acceptance of the car by Scott. Hearn responded by stating that when the COA had been asked if the presentation of the car was all right, the so-called ‘big shots’ in Montreal turned right around and dumped the problem on their doorstep. Now that the question had been revived, he complained that they had not even been con- sulted. He continued by saying that Dawes had stated that the COA was not concerned about the matter and would accept the ruling of the AAUC. If the matter had not been under the jurisdiction of the AAUC, the COA should have over-ruled the decision at the time—not two months later. His parting shot was that the COA was canvassing for funds for the Olympics and that “when the committee comes to us for financial aid, they’re going to be surprised at our reaction.”41 Lord Burghley, later the Marquess of Exeter and a potential rival to Brundage for the IOC presidency, arrived on business in Montreal, but wisely declined to be drawn into the matter. Dawes had little more to say to the media, other than to criticize the coverage: “It is perfectly ludicrous the way you have been publicizing the affair.”42 The secretary of the International Skating Union, H. J. Clarke, remarked that the whole Scott affair was “a storm in a tea cup.” Dawes was asked to comment on the statement, but declined, suggesting that the press should let the “whole matter drop” and that there had been altogether too much publicity.43 Ottawa mayor Stanley Lewis was not, however, finished with the affair. On 16 May 1947, he called for a government investigation of “the Olympic games set-up in Canada” and in making public the letter calling for the action, took sweeping, polemic, shots at the COA and the IOC, all arising from the embar- rassment created by the Scott affair. Some of the quotes included: The Canadian people contribute directly through the government to- ward these games and indirectly even more. I believe I am speaking for many citizens when I suggest the whole set-up be investigated and a report be given to the public. If the Olympics are to mean something to the people of Canada they will have to become more closely related to them and to the best in Canadian sports.

51 Pound & Paton

As I see it, unless the Canadian Olympic Committee [sic] clear them- selves of the general impression that they are more concerned with their own particular affairs than with the securing of Olympic hon- ours for Canada, such as Miss Scott can bring, they will find it ex- ceedingly difficult to get monetary support from the Canadian public which they, evidently, anticipate.44 The letter reached the House of Commons, where John G. Diefenbaker (future , but at the time Opposition Member of Parliament from Lake Centre, New Brunswick) questioned the Prime Minister about it, who said he would answer later.45 In the meantime, the government approved a grant of $17,500 to the COA. Dawes, with his high business, social, and sport profiles, was in charge of the fund raising campaign that would seek a further $100,000 for the 1948 Canadian Olympic teams. He was to be the general man- ager of both the Winter and Summer teams. Edström put an effective end to the question, writing to Patteson,46 with a copy to Dawes, stating clearly the procedure to declare athletes eligible. As to Scott, he noted, “I am glad to see from the newspaper cutting you sent me that Miss Scott has returned the car, which action makes her a true amateur.”47 Dawes wrote to Brundage thanking him for having drawn Scott’s case to the COA’s attention in time for it to be corrected. Reports of this correspondence and Dawes’ statements appeared in the media.48 Dawes was laudatory of Brund- age, saying that the COA was indebted to him, that his action, coming when it did, meant steps could be taken to correct the situation. Had Mr. Brundage really wanted to debar Miss Scott from Olympic competition he had only to hold his silence and wait until it was too late to correct this mistake. Instead of this, he immediately pointed out the error—the presentation of the car to Miss Scott—which permitted it to be corrected. This now appears to have been a fortunate and most timely act. Dawes sent Brundage a copy of the newspaper coverage on 29 May 1947, saying that he believed Brundage would be happy to read it and Brundage replied 31 May 1947 to say that he appreciated Dawes having come to his ‘rescue.’ None of the media attention surrounding the Scott affair had any negative influence on the Canadian Amateur Ski Association, which in the midst of the heated coverage, re-elected Dawes as its president, nor indeed with the COA, which continued to elect him as its president.49

Dawes and the International Olympic Committee

Almost unnoticed against the domestic background noise of Canadian interne- cine sport machinations was the 1947 cooption of Dawes as a member of the IOC, then under the presidency of Sigfrid Edström.50 For a number of years,

52 ‘Whistler’s Father’ there had been two Canadian IOC members. Dawes replaced James Merrick51 and served alongside J. C. Patteson until the latter’s death in 1954. After that, de- spite Dawes’ constant urging that a second Canadian member be appointed, on the basis of a developing internal IOC protocol that (aside from some exceptions for large countries, such as the USSR, India and Brazil)52 there could be only one IOC member in any country, unless that country had hosted the Olympic Games, in which case a second member might be possible, he remained the sole Canadian member.53

The Post-War International Olympic Committee The International Olympic Committee into which Dawes was inducted in 1947 was a vastly different body than the present organization. Twenty-first century readers need, in the first instance, to be careful to understand the huge dif- ferences between the economic situation of the world immediately following World War II, the state of international sport development, the nature and role of an organization like the IOC, the obsession with the socially-driven concept of amateurism in sport, the emergence of systems of government that were un- known to the world prior to that time, and the international landscape which now exists. Comparing the IOC of 1947 with the IOC of 2008 is all but impos- sible. Comparing the Olympic Movement of 1947, which hoped to be able to celebrate the modest post-War 1948 Games, with that which gathered in in 2008 is mind-boggling. The IOC of 1947 was, admittedly, the club of rich males that is often stereo- typed and sneered at by undisciplined commentators lacking a sense of the context of the times. The inescapable fact of the matter, however, was that it required a certain amount of wealth or third-party support to be a member of the IOC at that time. Members were required to pay their own expenses to at- tend IOC Sessions and the Olympic Games. Then, too, annual financial assess- ments were levied against the members to support the modest secretariat.54 The IOC had no independent resources and no sources of any significant income. Women were only marginally involved, if at all, in the organization of interna- tional sport. The world was in a shambles following six years of war. Europe in particular was in a dreadful state. International air travel was in its infancy. No one was quite sure what to do with the “losers” of the war. The , in the eyes of the West, was a huge and menacing power about which little was known. It was in this context that Dawes was invited to become an IOC mem- ber. He fit perfectly well into the Club. Tall, handsome, self-assured, wealthy, at ease with nobility, wrapped in the religion of amateurism, a dilettante in the world of sport, he was admirably fitted for IOC membership. While the official records of the IOC meetings and Sessions do not indicate that Dawes was particularly vocal or overtly influential in his capacity as a mem- ber of the IOC, some allowance must be given to the role of official records. Such

53 Pound & Paton records do not necessarily provide reliable indications of what may have led to consensus decisions, nor to what influence an individual whose words were not recorded during a meeting may have had on the formation of that decision. It is a well known organizational phenomenon that it is not always the people who speak the most at meetings who are the most influential when decisions are taken, and that, on many issues, the formal meetings have a tendency to be merely the tips of the icebergs, leaving undisclosed many of the other factors leading to the decisions. Dawes was a regular attendee of IOC Sessions, almost all of which were expensive to attend. He missed very few meetings during the time of his membership, but he is not one who appears to have spoken a great deal for the record.55 This, too, is not unusual for many influential members, whose contributions occur during meetings of regular or specially constituted committees or working groups or informal gatherings.

The 1948 Olympic Ice Hockey Crisis

The formal involvement of Dawes in IOC Sessions often, although not exclusive- ly, occurred in relation to winter sport issues. Canada, for all its interest in sum- mer sports, is generally regarded as a winter sports country. Though Dawes, of course, was fundamentally associated with skiing, one of his first IOC involve- ments related to ice hockey. Shortly after he became an IOC member, Dawes was thrown into what would remain a thorny problem for the Winter Games for many years—the matter of eligibility of ice hockey players. This concerned the controversy as to which of two U.S. organizations had the right to determine which ice hockey team was entitled to represent the United States at the 1948 .56 At his first IOC Session in June 1947, discussion took place, led by Brund- age regarding the amateur status of the American team. The minutes of the Stockholm Session record the observation of Dawes that the new eligibility rules would completely resolve the situation.57 The rules were to be forwarded to the members and discussed again at the forthcoming Session in St. Moritz. During this Session, it became evident that the rules were not entirely clear and the sub- ject occupied much of the discussions as the first item of business for the meet- ing. Initial hair-splitting centered on whether a Jury d’Honneur was legal prior to the beginning of the Games, where the Executive Committee and the Jury were composed of the same members. Dawes’ only recorded comment in the minutes relating to this discussion was the observation that it was possible that the IOC rules were not perfect. The immediate ice hockey problem at the Games was that the United States had sent two teams to compete: one team sanctioned by the United States Olympic Committee and the other sanctioned by the Amateur Hockey Association of the United States. It was the latter team that had, in turn, been sanctioned by the Ligue International de Hockey Sur Glace (LIHG), the

54 ‘Whistler’s Father’ governing international federation. Dawes’ contribution to the debate was to ex- plain the ice hockey situation as it existed in Canada. After much discussion, the IOC decided to establish a committee, struck by the President (Edström), con- sisting of Lord Burghley (Great Britain), Dawes, and Bo Ekelund (). The committee was directed to meet with Dr. Krantz, president of the LIHG, to see if a solution to the problem might be found, of which there was little early en- couragement indicating such a possibility. Krantz’s initial reaction was a threat to move all teams to Zurich, thus boycotting the Games, and to hold, instead, a LIHG world championship. While there was further discussion of the issue dur- ing subsequent days of the Session, Dawes is not reported as participating.58 Dawes’ summary of the situation regarding ice hockey (which he sent to Brundage for comment) was: As one of Canada’s representatives on the International Olympic Com- mittee, I listened for hours to the President and the Past-President of Ligue Internationale de Hockey sur Glace present the case for the United States A.H.A. Team and then to the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States present the case for the Hockey Team that they approved. Eventually, the I.O.C. made the only decision that they could have made and refused to recognize either team but as the draw had already been made with one of the United States Team[s] included and as the tickets had already been sold, we recommended that the games proceed with the A.H.A. Team playing but their points not counting in the score. This reasonable decision, the Ligue Internationale de Hockey sur Gla- ce refused to accept and challenged the authority of the I.O.C. to run the games.59 It was then unanimously decided by the Representatives of the fifty-nine countries who make up the I.O.C., that Ice Hockey would not again be a Winter Olympic Game under the Ligue Inter- nationale de Hockey sur Glace. Next day, the Ligue Internationale de Hockey sur Glace changed their decision and the ice hockey matches proceeded as had been suggested. However, the exclusion of ice hockey from future Winter Olympic Games still stands unless the Ligue In- ternationale de Hockey sur Glace can reconcile their differences with the I.O.C.60 That matters were headed towards a position of ultimatum can be seen from exchanges between IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer and Dawes in 1947, even be- fore the 1948 meetings. A Bulletin published by the COA was drawn to Dawes’ attention by Mayer, particularly a portion that reported on the IOC Session in Stockholm. Mayer wrote to Dawes in early October 1947 drawing his attention to the statement: It was stated by the President of the I.O.C. that if the present profes- sional difficulties with ski instructors, ice hockey players and figure

55 Pound & Paton

skaters continued, it will be necessary to drop Winter Games from future Olympic events.61 Mayer advised Dawes that “never Mr. Edström mentioned officially” what was reported and that if Dawes referred to the minutes of the meeting he “would not find any notice about it.” Mayer was concerned that the situation might be badly interpreted by those who read it, especially the “Norwegian people of to whom the 1952 Winter Games have been attributed.” Concluded Mayer, “I thought [it] well to give you this information.” Scarcely a week later, Dawes responded: The unofficial remark of Mr. Edstrom had a very salutary effect on some of our so-called amateurs who are too prone to want to break amateur regulations. My announcement of this unofficial remark of Mr. Edstrom’s was well timed and helped to straighten out our Winter Sports Associa- tions generally. However, I will certainly not repeat it, and see that anyone criticizing it knows that it was unofficial and merely expressed a personal opinion.62 Mayer replied to say that if the remark served to “straighten out your Winter Sports Associations it is all the best.” He had just been worried that there might have been a different judgment in Norway and considered the matter settled.63 Over the years, the question of the eligibility of Canadian ice hockey teams occup ied an inordinate amount of the correspondence between Dawes and Brundage. They seemed to be of a similar mind and Dawes was always at pains to assure Brundage that Canada’s teams would be amateur, although there were many doubts about the interpretations that applied. All around them, of course, the European teams were becoming more professional and, with the two ex- ceptions of Squaw Valley and Lake Placid in 1960 and 1980, both won by the Americans on home ice, no North American team won the Olympic ice hock- ey tournament between 1952 and 2002. The increasing discrimination against North American teams at the hands of Europe and the European-dominated IIHF led to Canada boycotting the Olympic ice hockey tournaments in 1972 and 1976. Relations between the IOC and the IIHF (and its predecessor LIHG) were always strained. In late July 1948, at the London Session, Dawes was appointed to two sepa- rate committees, one, with Brundage and Lord Porritt (New Zealand), to study the question of whether Eire should be permitted to participate and to meet for that purpose with its representatives, and the other, with Brundage and Moenck (Cuba) to study and report on the delicate (for the IOC members) question of members’ age limits. There were, in fact, two of the latter committees, the other consisting of Lord Porritt, Bo Ekelund, and Prince Axel (Denmark). Eventually, discussion on participation by Eire led to Edström proposing that the Amateur Athletic Union of Eire be recognized and authorized to take part in the Games.

56 ‘Whistler’s Father’

That motion was adopted unanimously. The age question was deferred until 13 August, where the matter was thoroughly discussed. A vote taken was lost and a new committee struck (Lord Porritt, Scharoo (Netherlands), and Seeldrayers (Belgium) with instructions to report at the next meeting. Nothing is recorded regarding participation by Dawes in these discussions.64 At the 1949 Session in , there was a lengthy report of the committee chaired by Brundage which had met for three days in focusing on a broad range of items designed to improve the IOC. The committee had not restricted itself merely to the matter of age limits and had come up with some thirty recommendations, most of which were adopted by the Session.65 Dawes participated actively in the discussions concerning the program of the Winter Games and proposed that be added to the program.66 In the next year, the question of the readmission of Germany was discussed. A committee was established to review the matter. Although Dawes participated in the discussions, he was not named to the committee.67 The ongoing ice hock- ey situation again formed part of the discussions. Dawes spoke to report that the Canadian federation guaranteed that only amateurs would be eligible, to be certified by Mr. [George] Dudley, president of the Canadian federation.68 In 1950 Dawes raised the issue of English versions of the Session minutes and of other meetings, to be advised by Otto Mayer that they had always been given out only in French.69 He participated in the discussion regarding the re- admission of Germany to the Olympic Movement. Hockey continued as a hot topic and Dawes, once again, stated that the Canadian federation guaranteed that amateurs only would be eligible and that this status would be certified by Mr. [George] Dudley, president of the Canadian federation. Amateurism also raised its head regarding skiing, in particular, the eligibility of ski instructors. Dawes pointed out that the U.S. and Canadian federations were stricter than the Europeans on this question. The committee consisting of Mayer, Dawes, Pat- teson and Ditlev-Simonsen (NOR) reported that the LIHG might be re-admit- ted, since it had changed its rules to conform more closely with those of the IOC. Later the same year, in mid-November, Dawes enquired of Mayer regarding fe- male competitors in the equestrian events: Canada is definitely interested in sending an equestrian team to the next Olympic Games and is quite active now in international compe- tition on this side of the water, but there is some doubt as to whether women may form part of an equestrian team. On page 19, Section 41 of the Olympic Rules it would appear that “Women are allowed to compete in athletics, fencing, gymnastics, swimming, , figure skating, skiing, yachting and art exhibi- tions”. Therefore, I presume that they are not allowed to compete in equestrian events. Would you please let me know the answer to this question as soon as possible.70

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Mayer replied on 28 November 1950: In reply to your est. letter dated Nov. 14th I inform you that the Ex- ecutiv [sic] Committee, assembled at in August last has decided—on the request of the “Fédération Equestre Internationale” to recommand [sic] at the Session that: ‘every country is al- lowed to enter, if they wish, one woman amongst the three competitors of the individual events and to allow them to take part in the Olympic Games in the Dressage tests only.’ Such a decision of course can only be taken at the Session of Vienna, but I suppose it will be admitted.71 At the 1952 Session in , Dawes was active relative to elections, calling for the vote to be held on the presidency. He proposed Lord Burghley (GBR) for vice-president, who lost to Massard (FRA). On the matter of new members, he thought was too small to warrant having an IOC member. While he at- tended the 1953 Session in City, there is no record of his participation in the debates. But the following year, Dawes was recorded as having contributed to the discussion on the composition of the IOC, the specifics of which were ac- cepted, and this must have been a matter of satisfaction to Dawes, who had long argued for the principle that “a member of the IOC must live in the country he represents.”72 Earlier in the year, following the Oslo Winter Games, the Czechoslovakian Olympic Committee filed a protest with the IOC arising out of the ice hockey tournament at the Games, complaining about the style of play of the Canadi- ans (and Americans) and the violation of the hockey regulations as well as the principles of amateur sport. They complained about unqualified officials and that a professional referee had been allowed to participate. Finally, they claimed that the final game between Canada and the U.S. had been rigged to displace Czechoslovakia from a second-place finish. Dawes responded to the Czech NOC in early May 1952: I have a copy of your letter of April 2, 1952, addressed to the Interna- tional Olympic Committee, Lausanne, which was forwarded to me by Mr. Otto Mayer, the Chancellor, and which I had filed away in the hope that it would not be necessary to reply to it. We have already had too much adverse Ice Hockey criticism. 1. The Ice Hockey Team that represented Canada in 1952 was, I be- lieve, the best one that we have ever sent. It not only played good, fast, competitive hockey, but there was not one disagreeable episode in any of the Canadian Olympic Hockey Games. 2. The three hockey matches played with the good Czechoslovakian, Swedish and U.S.A. Teams were excellent examples of the sport. None of them were rough and the Swedish and U.S.A. games were particu- larly close.

58 ‘Whistler’s Father’

3. Your claim that the loss of the drawn match with the U.S.A. was intentionally arranged was most unfair. The U.S.A. Team never played a better game than the one they played against Canada and, when they later played the same Canadian Team in Stockholm, they could not do anything right and never did they appear to be the same team at all. All of the matches I have spoken about, I actually saw. Including the U.S.A.—Canada game in Stockholm, and I want to go on record as saying that I do not agree with your criticism of the recent Olympic Ice Hockey Games or of our Team, which criticism I consider most unfair as the criticism of the European Press was at the time. We had no complaint to make about the refereeing.73 At the Paris Session in 1955, Dawes is noted only for having proposed a vote of thanks to the President (Brundage) for “the very efficient man- ner in which he has conducted these debates.” The next year in Cortina D’Ampezzo, Dawes’ principal contribution was made to allay concerns re- garding a lack of progress on the development of the 1960 Squaw Valley site, saying, “Trust the American contractors, they will get it done.” He also made a comment on the parade of athletes at the opening ceremonies of the Games, but the details are not available. In in November the same year, he participated in the discussion on Rule 34 (the Amateur Rule) but no details are contained in the minutes. Interestingly, he disagreed with his friend the Marquess of Exeter regarding the latter’s proposal that the national sport federations and NOCs be permitted to decide on the matter of amateur standing. With Dawes’ known impatience and dislike of wasting time, the letter he sent to Brundage following the Winter Games in Cortina D’Ampezzo on 5 March 1956 was both typical of Dawes and indicative of some of the pressures faced by IOC members in certain countries. On the subject of Mainland as part of the Modern Olympic Movement, Dawes wrote: For some time our representative in mainland China, Professor Shou- Yi-Tung who joined the I.O.C. in 1947 at the same time that I did, has been guilty of practicing politics by insisting upon speaking in Chinese, which none of the Members of the I.O.C. understand, and in using an interpreter, which delays our meetings needlessly. Mr. Tung has been a Y.M.C.A. official in China for many years and he was a good friend of our Mr. J.H. Crocker of Brantford, Ontario, who has also been very interested in the Canadian Y.M.C.A. Mr. Tung and Mr. Crocker through me have exchanged salutations each time we met. Mr. Crocker has always been spoken to by Mr. Tung in English and so have I. When Mr. Tung and I were appointed to the I.O.C. at Stockholm in 1947 we conversed in English while in the little ante-room before we were invited in to be notified of our election, as also did I and Baron von Markoff.

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To further verify that Mr. Tung understands and speaks English with great facility, I had him to meet some of our Canadian members during the U.S.A. cocktail party at the Miramonti Hotel and not only did he converse with our Canadian members and with our Ambassador to , Mr. Dupuy, but I care- fully listened to his conversation with these Canadians which was all carried on in English with which language he is completely at home. I object to any member of the I.O.C. playing politics and I would like you please to bring my letter to the attention of the Executive Committee as I think they should not allow Mr. Tung to speak in Chinese which delays our meetings. As you know, on account of the fact that neither of the Russian members on the I.O.C. can speak either English or French, they have been given the privilege of having an interpreter which is thoroughly justified on account of the large and very successful teams that they have been sending to the Summer and Win- ter Olympic Games. This, however, is not justified in the case of mainland China, first, be- cause Mr. Tung thoroughly understands and speaks English very well and, secondly, because their teams are of negligible importance. There is no justification in making an exception to our Rule as far as Mr. Tung is concerned and I would like the Executive Committee to pro- hibit allowing Mr. Tung to speak Chinese and to have his interpreter there in future.74 Brundage replied on 14 March: Your letter about our Chinese colleague was forwarded to me out here in and I am glad to have this information which re-enforces the position I have already taken. I told the professor in Cortina that it would be the last time he would be permitted an interpreter.75 Brundage went on to comment about the winter sport program. As a matter of fact, our winter sport program is not too healthy. I have received protests asking for the elimination of bob-sledding for the reason that there are only a few bob-runs in the world and probably not more than four or five [countries which are] participants. Three- fourths of the figure skaters apparently hope to become stars of the Icecapades and you know better than I do how many truly amateur ice hockey players there are.76 There is an amusing exchange in the IOC records relating to Dawes, arising out of some peremptory correspondence with the chancellor of the IOC, Otto May- er, to who m Dawes had written on mid-April 1956: I duly received a copy of your letter addressed to Dr. A. Paplauskas- Ramunas dated April 12th and I would ask you please not to give my name to other people wishing to write books as I have not the time to dig up the information that they always ask us to give them.

60 ‘Whistler’s Father’

I am quite a busy man and do not intend to have my connection with the I.O.C become so onerous that I have to give it up.77 The words “so onerous” were heavily underlined by Mayer and a handwritten note added to the original letter: “What has he done so onerous for the I.O.C.?” The IOC Member files regarding Dawes are routine and not extensive. The bulk of his correspondence was with Brundage at his address in the United States and copies do not appear in the IOC files. At the 1957 Session, Dawes proposed Karl Ritter von Halt (Germany) for election to the Executive Board, who lost to Bo Ekelund (Sweden) by a vote of 17-15. The matter of the protection of the was on the agenda and Dawes spoke on the subject, although no particulars are given. He contrib- uted, again with no details provided, on the new Rules and spoke in support of shooting events being added to the Olympic programme, noting that these “are not war weapons.” He missed the 1958 Session in , but earlier that year, corresponded with the Marquess of Exeter regarding a proposal to add a sur- charge to Olympic tickets for the benefit of the IOC. In a letter dated 14 March 1958, Dawes suggested, instead, that the IOC should ask the Summer host cities for $125,000 instead of $30,000 and the Winter cities $25,000 instead of $10,000, which he thought would be “a drop in the bucket compared to the cost of staging the Games” and would be much less controversial.78 There was a bit of interesting contained in a letter from Dawes to Brundage dated 13 February 1958 regarding canoeing: I have today received a file for my information from our Canadian Canoe Association. This includes Dr. Karel Popel’s [Popel was presi- dent of the ICU] argument in favour of 17 competitors for the 7 Canoe Events approved, which includes a K-4 or 4-men Kayak canoe. The kayak is a development of the Eskimo’s hunting canoe which ac- commodated only one man and the cover over the opening fitted him closely so that the canoe could not be swamped. The boat used by the Eskimos for the transportation of their families was called the “umiak”, which was usually worked by women. Both the kayak and the umiak were made of skin stretched over a frame carved from driftwood, bone or ivory. The Canadian canoe is a development of the Indians’ birch bark ca- noe which was an open canoe that was made very small when it was used by an individual trapper, larger for two men and, still larger, for transportation of a family. If you do have an event for 4 men in a canoe, I think it should be for an open type of canoe. In my opinion, a K-4 Event is fantastic and not a proper development and should be dropped. This will allow Popel to reduce his number of competitors to the lim- its that you request.79

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At the 1959 Session, Dawes seemed surprised to learn that the Canadian Bobsled Federation had entered a team in the forthcoming Winter Games, because the sport was not particularly popular in Canada, and he contributed to a discussion on the funding of the international federations. In San Francisco, just prior to the Squaw Valley Games in 1960, only twenty-five IOC members attended the IOC Session and Dawes played a particularly active role, proposing that the Gi- braltar question80 be deferred to the Rome meeting later that year, that the term of the president be four, rather than eight years, that there be a rotation in the terms of the vice-presidents, so that one would retire every two years, and that a member of an Olympic Organizing Committee could become an honorary member of the IOC. He opposed a motion to cancel the Winter Games, which had been a consequence of professional ice hockey, and was part of a working group to draft a statement for the press regarding the Chinese “problem.”81 The Gibraltar issue was again deferred in Rome and was not dealt with the following year in Athens. Due to the extended period of recovery from his heart attack in 1962, Dawes did not attend the 1962 Session in Moscow and, while he attended Baden-Baden in 1963, there is no record of his participation in the minutes of the Session. At in 1964, Dawes was involved in discussion of the wording differences between the French and English versions of the rules relating to election of the president and vice-presidents, in which he supported Brundage, who, under the French version, could serve only one additional term of four years as president of the IOC, and under the English had no such limitation. In a later discussion, only informal, due to a lack of quorum, Dawes, yet again, assured the meeting that the Canadian hockey players were amateurs. In Tokyo, prior to the 1964 Games, he was present, but no contribution is noted in the minutes. He missed Madrid in 1965, but attended the 1966 Rome Session and was part of the delega- tions submitting both the Montreal and Calgary bids for the 1972 Games. The minutes record that Dawes defended the Calgary-Banff bid and that he attempt- ed to dismiss the criticisms leveled by the conservationists opposed to hosting the Games in a national park. He argued that there was no basis to their claims of alleged damage. It seems clear that Brundage was not of the same view. In the same Session, Dawes spoke of his intention to resign as a member owing to his age, and raised the matter of his replacement, but the matter was postponed until Teheran the following year, a Session which Dawes did not attend. In days when international travel was difficult and expensive, the costs of which were borne by the IOC members themselves, Dawes must be considered as an active and engaged member. On the written record of the Sessions he at- tended, while he clearly participated, he did not appear to have been particularly influential. As indicated elsewhere, however, formal minutes of international organizations are not always reliable indicators of influence, particularly when members are confident enough in their positions that they do not have to feel

62 ‘Whistler’s Father’ they must reiterate what may already have been said or publicly contradict a position which has no merit, or which has been advanced principally “for the record” and to appeal to audiences (mainly political) outside the IOC. Given his ongoing close relationship with the Canadian sports scene and his regular pres- ence at IOC Sessions, there is every reason to conclude that Canada was well represented within the IOC and/or that the IOC was well represented in Canada throughout the entire period of Dawes’ membership in the IOC. Dawes’ term as an IOC member included the first organized efforts by the IOC to attempt to obtain legal protection for the five-ring Olympic Symbol. The Executive Board discussed the matter at a meeting in Evian, France on 4 June 1957, following upon the disinclination of the Swiss government to act in the mat- ter after consultation with many governments.82 A form letter to all IOC mem- bers, dated 10 July 1957, was prepared by Swiss counsel for Brundage’s signature, asking for (in Dawes’ case) Canadian support for international treaty to protect the five rings and to give it his highest priority over all his current Olympic preoc- cupations, making it his chief concern, using all his influence within Canada in order to bring about the successful issue of the scheme.83 The eventual outcome, almost a quarter-century later, was the Treaty, which was signed by 22 countries and came into effect in 1981.84 Canada, like many of the developed and industrial countries, was not one of the signatories, having other intellectual property considerations which might, arguably, have been compromised had it become a party. Efforts, encouraged by the IOC, to increase the protection of the Olympic symbol continue to this day, but the most effective outcomes have tend- ed to be achieved by the NOCs of developed countries, applicable to their own territories. Recent registrations under harmonized European law have been filed by the IOC, but no alleged infractions have yet been tested before the courts. Concern regarding the amateur status of ice hockey players arose once again in relation to the 1960 Winter Games in Squaw Valley. Brundage wrote to Dawes in late January 1960 raising the issue of the Canadian team, having seen newspaper articles from the Toronto media which suggested there might be doubts.85 Dawes replied immediately to assure him that all Canadian ath- letes, including the hockey players, knew the Olympic amateur definition and the oath they would have to take before being allowed to compete in the Olym- pic Games.86 The central core of the Canadian team was to be the Kitchener- Waterloo Dutchmen, the same team that played and lost in 1956. Dawes told Brundage that neither he, nor Farmer (COA president) nor (then secretary-manager CAHA) wanted to get drawn into an altercation with the Toronto media. The next day, Dawes wrote again, noting that the amateur definition used by the IIHF was “considerably at variance with” the IOC defini- tion, including the fact that the IIHF permitted the use of reinstated profession- als. He reiterated that it would be the Kitchener-Waterloo team at the Olympics and that the team had been playing in the OHA Senior League and that all of the

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players would be required to take the (Olympic) oath. He again said there was no point in getting into a media debate. Following the Games, Brundage wrote to Dawes on 13 April 1960, exposing the obvious problem. As I suspected, the correspondence about Canadian “amateur” ice hockey I have had from Canada, to which I referred in our various conversations at Squaw Valley, has not ceased. When I got back from California I found some more clippings: 1. A long and amusing column written by Milt Dunnell, Sports Edi- tor of the Toronto Star, at Squaw Valley, February 26, includes the following paragraph; “How can a team of pick-ups, such as the one the Yanks threaten to place on the top podium here Sunday when the Olympic fanfare is sounded, beat a club composed of men who make hockey a part-time career? No person ever denies the Dutchies get paid for playing hockey. So do the , who sent four top stars on loan for Olym- pic service. Yet, it’s the career chaps who get licked.” 2. A copy of another clipping from the Toronto Telegram, referring to the “regular salaries” received and the extra pay demanded before they would play at Squaw Valley is attached. This is, to say the least, astonishing in the light of our conversations and the statement [regarding amateur status] signed by Mr. Shaugh- nessy [chef de mission] at Squaw Valley. What answer can I make to the correspondents who are writing to me from Canada and send these newspaper clippings?87 Later the same year, Dawes wrote to Brundage in early November reporting his concern regarding the Canadian performance at the Rome Olympic Games (which he described as the worst showing at any Games since the War) and the COA efforts to see what could be done to improve future competitors.88 He men- tioned that the only thing he had been able to think of was to ask the Canadian ambassador in Moscow, David Johnston, who had won a bronze medal in the in Paris in 1924, to collect data on what “Russia” does to encourage her athletes to take up sports and to work hard at them. He also asked Brund- age if the IOC President would write with suggestions especially with regard to summer competitors where Canada was so weak. After hearing from Brundage and the Canadian ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Dawes suggested to Brundage that he and Farmer go to to have a talk with him. There is no record that such a meeting occurred. Dawes and Farmer both realized early on that, somehow or other, the government would have to become involved in sport. The post-War period had made it clear that this was happening in many other countries and it would be important for Canada to do the same thing. As noted earlier, Dawes asked the Canadian ambassador in Moscow to make enquiries in the U.S.S.R.

64 ‘Whistler’s Father’ to see what they were doing, since their sport progress had proved to be re- markable. The COA produced a report on sport in the U.S.S.R. which- at tracted media attention in 1955: The report, contained in the regular bulletin issued by the COA, told of Avery Brundage’s findings on a recent trip to Russia. Brundage, president of the International Olympic body, went on invitation of the Russians and attended their annual sports parade in Moscow. In his remarks on the trip, Brundage said: `In 1934 Russia adopted a plan to train every man, woman and child in physical education and competitive sports. They proposed to build playing fields, stadia, swimming pools in every city, town and village.’ ‘The Russians are now reaping the rewards of their intensive pro- gram,’ added Brundage ‘and I believe the Soviet athletes will provide intensive aggressive competition in the future.’ Mr. Dawes, who is also immediate past president of the COA, thinks the Brundage story should tell volumes to the Canadian government and people. ‘I would like to see better facilities made available to all in Canada,’ he said. ‘If we are going to compete on the international level we must do something in step with countries like Russia.’ However, Mr. Dawes said that to obtain the facilities needed, it would be a job for the various governments in the country to under- take. ‘And, if these facilities are made available, we should see that there is a program designed so that every man, woman and child will get the opportunity to take part in some form of activity.’ Only through such a program, said Mr. Dawes, can Canada hope to turn out the type of athlete that will be needed to compete in such events as the Olympics. ‘It is very obvious that Russia’s program of athletics has paid off for them in world competition,’ continued Mr. Dawes. ‘And, it is also rea- sonable to assume that as their program continues, the class of athlete will improve.’89 Dawes and Farmer made repeated visits to Ottawa, which aided in the culmina- tion of the nation’s first health and fitness legislation, the Fitness and Amateur Sport Act in 1961 and its initial seed funding of five million dollars. Farmer be- came the first president of the National Advisory Council on Fitness and Ama- teur Sport established by the legislation.90 Brundage was supportive of the draft legislation, noting in a late October 1961 letter to Dawes: I note also the correct objectives of the bill in the clip- pings from the Montreal Star. With a sound foundation of physical training and competitive sport in the educational system, beginning with the elementary schools, there will be no need to worry about Olympic honors, which will take care of themselves.91

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Farmer proved to be an able and effective chairman of the Advisory Council and, by mid-February 1962, Dawes was able to send Brundage a summary of what had been accomplished to date, saying that with Farmer in charge of the project, the money would be well and properly spent. Dawes hoped (on a top-down model) it would do some good to the athletes, which in turn might stimulate interest in sports.92 Brundage came to Montreal to speak at the annual Montreal Sportsmen’s Banquet in February 1961, staying at the Dawes residence. Always a forceful speaker, Brundage made an excellent impression on those present, as well as the media. The following year, the amateurism question once again focused on skiing. As the Christmas season opened in Montreal in December 1961, Dawes wrote to Brundage in response to a Brundage inquiry regarding women’s skiing: You asked me how some of our lady skiers have become fairly profi- cient in their downhill and . The enclosed clipping from the Montreal Star explains the sort of planned training tour that the Canadian Amateur Ski Association has organized each winter. I do not know why our men skiers do not show up as well as the ladies. Perhaps it is that a great many of the best European skiers are more constantly on their skis than our men are.93 Less than two weeks later, Brundage replied to Dawes, thanking Dawes for the clipping, noting that it was a young group, but that that was the time to learn. He was curious as to who paid the expenses and wondered if it was part of the new government program. On a different note, he said he had called for a meeting of the IOC Executive Board with the international federations to discuss the question of political interference, which was be- coming more and more serious.94 Dawes’ reply of 18 December 1962 was not fully responsive: In reply to yours of the 14th, I have never made the Collection so am not conversant with who pays for our ski group’s visit to Europe but I do know that whenever I have been asked I have contributed any- where from $50 to $100. There is an annual Alpine Ball held each fall at the Royal St. Lawrence Yacht Club which is given on their behalf, part of the proceeds of which go to help defray the expenses of the young Ski Team. As well as this, local people support their own skier if one is selected. Now that the National Advisory Council on Fitness and Amateur Sport has been established, they might contribute something toward this worthy cause.95 The response satisfied Brundage and by the following March, the amateurism focus had, once again, shifted to hockey and the upcoming Winter Games in 1964. Dawes wrote Brundage a letter in mid-March 1963, enclosing a news- paper clipping from the previous day’s Montreal Star regarding the disparities

66 ‘Whistler’s Father’ between the Canadian and European players, with the latter being offered non- working jobs so they could play hockey.96 The Canadians selected the Reverend David Bauer as the 1964 Olympic coach. The team was composed mainly of and post-graduate students and some senior amateurs. Dawes hoped Father Bauer would have better success than his brother, Bobby Bauer, a former Boston Bruins star in the who had coached Canadian teams in the past.97 Father David Bauer and his amateur teams captured the imagination of Canadians for several years, notwithstanding the difficulties of getting students into central locations and the problems the student athletes faced regarding extended tournaments which kept them from their studies, as well as having to compete against the professional players they encountered on the European teams.98 Brundage seemed to have been struck with the success of Canadian Skier at the Squaw Valley Games in 1960 and had spoken about her with Dawes on a number of occasions. Dawes remembered this and an article appearing as an advertisement in The Reader’s Digest in early 1963 for Instant Postum (a caffeine-free drink) which highlighted her skill, fit- ness and calm determination prompted him to send a copy of the article to Brundage.99 Dawes noted that her success had been a combination of things, firstly that she had skied with her Scandinavian family in the Gatineau Hills from her earliest days when her father (who was employed in the Canadian civil service) used to carry her in a rucksack so that her mother could come with them, as well as what had been said in the advertisement. In his reply to Dawes, though thanking him for his note about Heggtveit, who was a sensa- tion in Squaw Valley, Brundage pontificated: “I am sorry she had to dull her renown by using it for advertising purposes.”100 Dawes would have none of that and replied immediately: Thank you for your letter of May 14th re Anne Heggtveit. Anne was, and still is, a heroine in this country and I personally am glad to see our people so enthusiastic about a competitor who is outstanding and truly amateur. I think we must get used to the fact that the temptation to capital- ize on one’s accomplishments is perfectly normal and legitimate when they retire and give up competition, provided they need the money, which Anne did. I myself have every sympathy for Anne who mar- ried a very nice young man, Ross Hamilton, and I do not think it has reduced her stature in this country.101 This was undoubtedly a correct appreciation of the Canadian attitude on the matter (assuming anyone other than the defenders of amateurism paid the slightest attention to the possible commercial impact of The Reader’s Digest ad- vertising) and Brundage dropped the matter.

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‘Whistler’s Father’: A. Sydney Dawes and the Banff-Garibaldi (Whistler) Conundrum

Dawes attended the 1960 Winter Games in Squaw Valley. Following the Games, he was invited by the Premier of British Columbia, W. A. C. Bennett, to help search for a suitable site in British Columbia to support a Canadian bid to host the 1968 Olympic Winter Games. Dawes rejected the original B.C. choice of Di- amond Head, but went on to inspect what was then named London Mountain, later re-named Whistler Mountain, located in the provincial Garibaldi Park. He advised Premier Bennett that the site was one of the best in North America.102 This conclusion proved to be perhaps the most significant vision for alpine ski- ing in the history of British Columbia. There is some irony in the fact that it required a Montrealer to make the definitive assessment and to have the con- viction to insist that Whistler was the only acceptable location for an Olympic- calibre ski development. Thirty years later, on 23 July 1990, a ceremony was held at Whistler to commemorate the two men who had been instrumental in building the mountain and to mark the occasion with a plaque in their honour. The plaque reads: In February of 1960 Mr. A. Sidney Dawes, Canada’s representative to the International Olympic Committee was invited by Premier W. A. C. Bennett to come to Vancouver following completion of the Winter Olympic Games in Squaw valley. He was to inspect Garibaldi Park’s Diamond Head ski area near Squamish as a site for the Canadian bid for the 1968 Winter Olympic Games. On March 3, 1960 Mr. Dawes flew to Diamond Head by helicopter and decided that it would not meet Olympic standards. Otar Brandvold of Diamond Head sug- gested looking at London Mountain, some 20 miles farther north. Mr. Dawes flew to London Mountain, surveyed it and landed on the peak. Obtaining topographical maps in Victoria, and later reviewing them in his Montreal office, he advised the British Columbia government the mountain was one of the best sites in North America and should meet all criteria for an Olympic bid. His positive assessment and en- thusiasm for the project convinced Premier Bennett and his govern- ment to support the Olympic bid proposal. Development proceeded and by Christmas 1965, the road, lift system, hotels and condominiums were ready and operating for the 1965/66 ski season. London Mountain was known as Whistler Mountain by the local residents. The name was officially changed to “Whistler Mountain” on August 27, 1965. One of the world’s great ski resorts, Whistler Moun- tain might never have been were it not for the vision of Premier W. A. C. Bennett and Mr. A. Sidney Dawes. This memorial honours their vision. William Andrew Cecil Bennett Andrew Sidney Dawes Premier 1952-1972 1900-1979 1888-1968

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The ceremony (organized by Dave Matthews, who was on the first helicopter flight to Whistler with Dawes) was attended by Bennett’s son, R. J. Bennett, members of the Dawes family, including his daughter, Joan Bourne, children and grandchildren, famed Canadian skier Nancy Greene and her husband, Al Raines, representatives of the British Columbia government and Whistler, Kaare Olsen, then president of Atlas Construction, and many others. Dawes’ nephew, Alex Paterson, wrote to the organizers on 9 July 1990: Unfortunately I will not be able to join the dedication of a memorial to the late Premier Bennett and my late uncle, Sidney Dawes. If you knew Sidney Dawes you would no doubt agree that he was most definite in his opinions. Not only was he emphatic about the merits of Whistler, but he had equally strong opinions about the un- suitability of certain sites in Alberta, and got a very poor press from that part of the world. He would have been delighted to know how Whistler Mountain has blossomed in the last two decades and I am personally pleased to see this recognition.103 In a column written in late January 1967 in the Province, Eric Whitehead, speak- ing of Whistler, said: Gazing across the roofs of this snug commu- nity of A-framed dwellings and alpine lodg- es to the spacious ski grounds beyond, they [visitors and competitors] are amazed to learn that Whistler was “discovered” barely more than six years ago—and by a Montreal city-dweller, at that. Before the in Cali- fornia’s Squaw Valley, this area was known only to the occasional hardy adventurer. Then, in California, a bunch of the boys got to wondering why, with all our gorgeous countryside, we in B.C. couldn’t produce something as grand as Squaw Valley. Travelling by helicopter Right after that meet, Vancouver’s Dave Matthews and Canadian Olympic chief Sid- ney Dawes helicoptered into Garibaldi for a look. Both sides of the bordering Diamond Head were examined and vetoed. Still intrigued, Dawes went back to Montreal. There he hauled out an old B.C. topographical map, traced the Garibaldi area beyond Diamond Head—and discovered Whistler. “Boys;” he said, “I think I’ve got something there.” They had. This will, without a doubt, one day be one of the world’s great playgrounds. One day also it may be the site of the Winter Olym- pics, for which this du Maurier meet is a critical test-run. If the mist will lift just a little it should be a smash success.104

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There was undoubtedly some element of inter-provincial rivalry involved in British Columbia’s desire to host the Olympic Winter Games. Calgary had a sig- nificant head-start. COA secretary Howard Radford advised the annual meeting of members held in Montreal on 12 April 1958 that he had received correspon- dence from Calgary indicating serious interest by the city in holding the Olym- pic Winter Games in 1964.105 At the COA directors’ meeting on 1 November 1958, it was reported that Calgary had filed its application to host the Games and that its presentation was to be made in in May 1959. It was unsuccessful on that occasion but Calgary was invited to apply for the 1968 Games.106 Following Dawes’ British Columbia inspection, the COA board of directors struck a standing committee of Farmer, Shaughnessy and Clark on 23 July 1960 to enquire into and report on the various venues in Canada capable of staging the 1968 Winter Olympic Games. At a meeting of the COA board of directors in Toronto on 22 April 1961 it was reported that Foundation Engineering Com- pany of Canada had been engaged to study possible Canadian sites for the Win- ter Games and to prepare a recommendation as to the most suitable site.107 The standing committee endorsed the Foundation Engineering report and recom- mended that Banff be selected as the Canadian site for the 1968 Winter Games, a recommendation adopted unanimously by the COA board. At the following COA annual meeting on 14 April 1962, president James Worrall reported on the Calgary bid to be considered at the IOC Session in Innsbruck in January 1964. Worrall expressing reserved optimism. Worrall’s “reserve” proved clairvoyant. The Games were awarded to in a closely-fought competition.108 Undaunted by this rebuff, however, and perhaps encouraged by the narrow margin of loss, the COA directors recommended endorsement of yet another bid by Calgary/Banff for the 1972 Winter Games.109 This was before hearing anything on the merits of a bid from Vancouver and might well have repre- sented more a statement of national enthusiasm than a considered decision after hearing all interested parties. There was, indeed, interest expressed on the part of Vancouver. The COA board of directors duly heard both cities at a meeting in Montreal on 12 September 1964, during which it chose Calgary as the Canadian candidate over the Vancouver/Garibaldi bid.110 Notwithstanding the opportunity thus created for both cities to make their presentations, the auguries for the Vancouver bid were most unpromising. Ear- lier in the year, the COA board of directors met on 4 April 1964. The minutes of that meeting record, in part: The Directors at this point considered requests from the Calgary Olym- pic Development Association and the Garibaldi Olympic Develop- ment Association for permission to apply to the International Olym- pic Committee for the privilege of holding the 1972 Winter Olympic Games. The President advised the meeting that he had reviewed the two applications with the Minister of Northern Affairs in the Govern-

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ment of Canada, the Cabinet Minister responsible for obtaining the ’s approval of such an application, - a neces- sary prerequisite to the filing of the application with the International Olympic Committee. This review has confirmed that the Government of Canada will approve of the application which is endorsed by the Canadian Olympic Association. During the deliberations that followed the Board referred to a report tabled with it on April 22, 1961 by a standing committee of Messrs. Farmer, Shaughnessy and Clark, upon which Calgary’s application for the 1964 Winter Olympic Games was endorsed and Mt. Garibaldi’s 1964 application was rejected. After prolonged and painstaking con- sideration, which included a full examination of the aforementioned report (prepared for the standing committee by Foundation Engineer- ing Company of Canada) and the excellence with which C.O.D.A. had prepared and presented its 1964 application to the I.O.C. as well as the fine effect this application has had upon the I.O.C. and the international winter sports federations, it was resolved, upon motion by McGavin and Hauch, to (a) table both requests until the next meeting of the Board of Directors, tentatively scheduled for September 12, 1964, with the explicit inten- tion of approving Calgary’s application, and (b) advise the Garibaldi Olympic Development of such intention, requesting it to submit reasons, in writing, to the President and Sec- retary of this Association before September 1, 1964, why approval of Calgary’s application should not be given, and (c) not to consider other applications to hold the 1972 Winter Olympic Games which may be received from other Canadian cities or localities. The President agreed to advise the Calgary Olympic development Association and the Garibaldi Olympic Development Association of the above resolution.111 There was considerable jockeying for national position leading up to the Sep- tember COA meeting. In British Columbia, there was evident concern about the Garibaldi site being already counted out, which was not an unreasonable conclusion under the circumstances. British Columbia needed an edge which would put them on even terms with the Calgary/Banff bid, which had already lost bids for the 1964 and 1968 Games.112 The only encouragement they could garner was Dawes’ statement that the choice for national bidders should be made as late as possible and that the decision should not be made at the September 1964 COA board of directors meeting. Dawes quoted Brundage as saying that “I like to give people all the time there is before the bidding period so they can get their places ready.” The Vancouver bidding group, as reported in the Vancouver Sun, seized on this: In Vancouver, Jack Bain, president of the Garibaldi group, said: “We are encouraged by the support of Mr. Brundage and Mr. Dawes.

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We can be in a better position to make a presentation when ski runs and a chairlift are in next year and when we can give a better all- round picture of what can be developed at Garibaldi. We would like to see the decision deferred until the autumn of 1965.”113 Calgary, of course, wanted the decision to be made as soon as possible, arguing that the sooner a particular site was chosen, the better Canada’s chances would be when the IOC made its decision in 1967. Dawes’ position was reported as follows: Dawes said the bidding by national contenders now is carried out five years before the year of the games. He said a motion due for consideration by the international committee would lengthen the time to six years. ‘Anyway, right now we have until 1967 before somebody has to bid in Canada’s name,’ Dawes said. He said Garibaldi Park is ‘a fantastic place and I would think it would certainly be as good as the Banff- Lake Louise location.’ A ‘hasty choice’ of a bidder would ‘be unwise from the point of view of developing new places for skiing.’ He added: ‘It would certainly be a shame to discount Garibaldi and so hamper its development. If we did anything to discourage the development of Garibaldi and Whistler Mountain which it includes, it would be an awful shame.’114 There is no doubt regarding the enthusiasm with which Dawes promoted the devel- opment of Whistler, nor that he understood the importance of having something tangible in place before an Olympic bid would have a reasonable chance for success. Delay favoured Whistler; an early decision favoured the Calgary/Banff bid.115 The COA nevertheless chose Calgary/Banff at the September 1964 meeting. In addition to the decision to approve Calgary/Banff, the COA also pro- posed Montreal as a candidate for the 1972 Summer Olympic Games and both bids were presented at the IOC Session in Rome in . Neither was suc- cessful. Banff lost to on the first ballot and Montreal was beaten by Ma- drid and Munich, the eventual winner, on the second. Worrall reported on the outcomes to the COA board of directors on 2-3 December 1966.116 His report contained some interesting portents of things to come in the IOC’s future: 1. A very considerable amount of contact and “IOC relations” work was done by both the Banff and Montreal delegations during the months preceding the IOC Meeting and, in particular, while in Rome on the days immediately preceding the meeting. There is no certainty about the effectiveness of this procedure. 2. Some regulations of the IOC were not lived with by cities opposing the two Canadian cities. While these irregularities are officially un- welcome, some IOC Members may be “privately” condoning tangible representations made to them.117 … 5. Many various reasons have been speculated for Banff’s defeat but there is no way of determining the correct answer. However, there is

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no doubt that the “lobby” of IOC Members by Canadian wildlife in- terest did adversely affect the IOC opinion of Banff’s application.118 6. The Montreal application appears to have been beaten by a de- termined IOC opinion that the Summer Games should return “home” to Europe in 1972. 7. It is impossible to determine whether or not applications from two Canadian cities (1 for permission to hold the Winter Games and the other for the Summer Games) being voted upon at the same IOC meeting had an adverse effect on either or both applications.119 Consideration of any candidates for the 1976 Games was to be put off until 1967.120 No decisions on Canadian candidates for the 1976 Games were made during Dawes’ lifetime. His native city of Montreal and the two Canadian winter sites he supported would eventually be chosen to host the Games, but he did not live to see or know of any of this. Dawes was the subject of some controversy in Canada when it was sus- pected or rumoured in some quarters that he had not supported the Calgary bid. He had participated in most of the COA meetings that led to the choice of Canadian candidate cities, up to and including the 1972 selections of Montreal and Calgary. His enthusiasm for the Whistler site and its potential were well known and, when Calgary was unsuccessful, some in Canada (mainly, but not exclusively, in Alberta) turned on him and suggested that he had not supported the Canadian bids. That it was highly unlikely to have been true did not lessen the reckless enthusiasm with which Dawes was attacked, including from within the COA. Given Dawes’ penchant for stating his opinion, it is inconceivable that if he had a do-or-die preference for Garibaldi over Banff he would have failed to make this perfectly clear within the COA. It would also have been extraordinary in the extreme for a Canadian member of the IOC to vote against a candidate city from his own country, even if he might have had a personal preference for a different city. There can, however, be no doubt regarding his interest in developing the British Columbia area. As early as April 1961, after the first unsuccessful Calgary bid and before its second attempt, Dawes had written to Brundage: I received a copy of your letter to the Honorable Ward Bowen, Secre- tary of the Senate, Olympia, Washington, and am very pleased at their interest in Garibaldi Park, which is just 50 miles North by Helicopter from the airport in Vancouver and 75 miles by railway or road. In Quebec our McGill and other skiers have always gone down to the New States each winter to ski and compete with your people and they have reciprocated by coming up to ski at Mont Tremblant and our other resorts and take part in our competitions. This fraterni- zation is very commendable and I feel sure that, if we can get Whistler Mountain developed, the same thing will happen in B.C., and this let- ter of yours is just evidence that it is their thinking also. …

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If there is anything you can do to encourage the ski resort of Whistler Mountain, I would appreciate it.121 This was only four days prior to the COA board of directors meeting at which the board decided to engage Foundation Engineering Company of Canada to investigate Canadian sites. The Banff committee had been quick to send materi- als to Brundage, who advised Dawes that he had received “a batch of literature” from the committee.122 Banff, as noted above, was not successful, losing out to Grenoble. The Calgary/Banff candidacy was, as described above, re-launched for the 1972 Winter Games, but it was bedeviled with objections to staging the Games in a national park. A concerned Brundage wrote to Dawes (with a copy to the bid leader, Edgar H. Davis, a consulting engineer in Calgary) in December 1965: On my desk when I returned a few days ago from an extended trip through the Orient, I found strong letters of opposition to staging the Winter Games in , from the National and Provin- cial Parks Association of Canada and the Canadian Audubon Society, the letter enclosing a copy of the letter to the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson. There were also letters from individuals holding the same view.123 While there may have been discussions on the matter in the interim, Dawes remained resolute, writing to Brundage two months later to say: I do think you should disregard letters from Wild Life and other per- sons about imaginery [sic] interference with the animals and be guid- ed by our Prime Minister, Mr. Pearson’s letter of March 25, 1965 to the Canadian Audubon Society, copy of which was sent to you and duplicate copy of which I am enclosing herewith. I am sorry that these Wild Life people are such obstructionists but do hope that our Rocky Mountains as a ski venue for the Winter Olympic Games will not suffer from their prejudiced criticism.124 Copies were sent to COA officials Shaughnessy, Worrall and McGavin, as well as to the Calgary-Banff bid leader, Edgar H. Davis. Prime Minister Pearson’s response was addressed to W. E. Swinton, Chair- man of the Canadian Audubon Society: I thank you for your letter of February 25th, re-affirming your Soci- ety’s support of the National Parks Policy Statement announced by my Cabinet colleague, the Honourable Arthur Laing. I can appreciate the stand the Society has taken in opposing the stag- ing of the in Banff National Park for I have always had a great deal of admiration for your organization. However, I am sure you realize that our National Parks are for the benefit, edu- cation and enjoyment of all Canadians be they naturalists, conserva- tionists, tourists or recreationists.

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The National Parks Policy Statement gives support to the staging of international events such as the Winter Olympics, and I quote: ‘If it becomes established that a particular area of a park is best suited for such an event, and it is in the national interest such an event be held in Canada, then the National Parks should permit the intrusion.’ The choice of Banff National Park as Canada’s Olympic site was made only after the potential of five other areas had been studied in detail. It was then that the conclusion was reached that Banff Nation- al Park was in fact the best suited location for the Winter Olympics in Canada. In these circumstances, the Federal Government has given and will continue to give full support to the application by the City of Calgary to obtain the 1972 Winter Olympics. Our support, however, is contingent on several conditions which we think will ensure that the impairment to the Park and its values will be of a minimum nature. Technical stud- ies of the facilities required to successfully stage the Games have been continually reviewed and up-dated by the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources to ensure that the Department will not find itself carrying a massive winter sports plant that is uneconomic to operate and unsuited to the purposes of a National Park. As you sent a copy of your letter to Mr. Laing, I thought it best to dis- cuss the entire situation with him. Mr. Laing was in Calgary this past week-end and, from the reports that I have read of the meetings he had with various groups, your apprehensions about the permanently destructive nature of the Winter Olympics are, I believe, unfounded. When Mr. Laing was in Calgary he emphasized that the Winter Olympics would be welcomed and their award to this Country would be a great honour. However, he said that every effort would be made to ensure that any permanent facilities developed for the Games would have potential for long-term use by the public. Any facilities that did not fall into this category would be either of temporary construction so they could be removed from the Park following the Games or lo- cated outside the Park boundaries. I think that this is a reasonable approach and I am certain in my own mind that it will ensure that Banff National Park will remain the museum of nature that is so well known to Canadians, as well as other people from all over the world.125 This had not, of course, assuaged the conservationists, who kept up the barrage of protests directed at the IOC and aimed at preventing use of the Banff National Park in connection with the Games. There were other comments in the media suggesting that some of the alpine aspects were technically defective, but these were cleared up by Shaughnessy in a letter to Dawes which, in addition to the technical clarifications, contained the following comments:

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With such people, as bird watchers and bear lovers, making ridicu- lous statements about imaginary damage that the Olympics at Banff might do their animal friends (not supported by [Minister] Arthur Laing or Mr. Lester Pearson) and newspaper writers incorrectly re- porting International ski experts, it appears to me that former winter sports officials like you and I [sic] should do all we can to ensure that the people that count are acquainted with the truth. Mr. Dawes, you have given great service to Amateur Sport in Cana- da, to the Olympic movement all over the world, and in particular to Winter . I can think of no more crowning achieve- ment to your wonderful career in amateur sport than for you to re- turn from Rome in late April having convinced your IOC Associates that your country, Canada, in 1972 will stage the best Winter Games ever held. We all know that Banff is the only area in Canada that can attract the Olympic Winter Games at this time. We have heard outstanding International Sports authorities speak enthusiastically of Banff as a great place to stage the Winter Games. Now, if the true facts can reach your Confreres in the IOC and if they support Banff’s application in April all Winter Sport lovers in Canada will be eternally grateful to you. I am looking forward, as I am sure you are, to the great day when Banff will host the 1972 Olympic Winter Games. I hope you are enjoying the best of health.126 This was a rather strange plea to come from the lead COA director in winter sport matters. It may, perhaps, indicate that either the Calgary/Banff bidding committee, or perhaps even the COA, were not altogether certain where Dawes stood with respect to the Winter Games bid. Following the decision of the IOC to award the 1972 Winter Games to Sap- poro, Dawes wrote Brundage: As you probably know, of all the Commonwealth Members present at the Rome Meeting, it would appear that I was the only one to vote in favour of Canada’s bids for the Winter and Summer Olympic Games. I can think of two reasons which may have influenced the other Commonwealth Members: 1. The opposition of Peter Scott, the President of the Wildlife Fund, as well as the President of the International Yacht racing Union. 2. Canada’s rapprochement with the U.S.A. (which will inevita- bly become even closer as time goes by) which may be unpopular in certain quarters of the Commonwealth. (See enclosed page 9 of the Montreal Star, May 16, 1966, “Canada Considers Closer U.S. Ties” by Roy A. Matthews, Director of Research (Montreal) of the Canadian- American Committee, who wrote the article for the current issue of the Harvard Business Review, which holds the copyright.)

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Also enclosed is a copy of the kind letter that I received from Ray Smith of Calgary which is probably similar to the one he wrote to you.127 In the COA publication, The Record, the assessment was that the Montreal loss was more egregious than Calgary’s and there was much complaint about Eu- ropean arrogance and paternalism expressed in the view that the Games, after being in Tokyo (1964) and Mexico (1968), simply must come “home” to Europe. This view extended to another apparently prevailing sentiment in Europe that, if ever Moscow wanted the Games, it had but to ask, an interesting forerunner to the upcoming bids for 1976—and their outcome.128 The Banff application and its rejection must be seen in a different context [from Montreal’s defeat]. Banff lost to excellent competition which had no other claim than readiness, competence and good fa- cilities. Banff had the same claim, plus the confidence that its narrow defeat by Grenoble for 1968 would bring victory this time. Sapporo, won on merit but would have been a future winner, if the Banff application had not been faulted by controversy, prejudice and confusion. We could not really expect that the sordid controversy about Banff’s location in a national park would be ignored by the IOC, when it was unresolved among Canadians themselves. The lobby of Canadians and international wildlife, naturalist and conservation groups managed to prejudice the case of Banff in the IOC. It can be questioned if the Banff delegation received a fair and ad- equate hearing, if Avery Brundage was as helpful as he could have been and if the Canadian IOC member was as strong an advocate as his German and Japanese colleagues were. However, Banff’s defeat was prompted by Canadians who in their zeal chose to ignore Canada’s interest, such as it was not only promot- ed by a group of highly dedicated volunteers in Olympic 72, but also endorsed by the Canadian Olympic Association and the Canadian and Alberta governments. As might be expected, Brundage was besieged with angry letters from yet anoth- er cross-section of Canadians, this time not from the conservationists, but those who were furious that the Calgary/Banff bid had been unsuccessful. He took the time to answer many of them and his letter of 26 July 1966 in response to a letter earlier that month from an E.J. McCullough of Toronto gives some idea of the flavour of both the criticisms and his manner of dealing with them. Brund- age was not someone who took criticism, especially unfair criticism, directed at himself or the Olympic Movement, lying down. He was typically combative in responding: After reading your long letter of July 8, I am not quite sure I under- stand all of your complaints so it is difficult for me to answer them. You speak of “some of the most shocking behavior that I have ever seen,” which you experienced in the 1948 Olympic Games. I must con- fess that I saw some shocking behavior in 1912, when I participated,

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not in connection with the Games but by individuals who were pres- ent. We live in an imperfect world and this did not alter my enthusi- asm for the Olympic idea. You speak of omissions, deficiencies and errors by the Canadian Olympic Association and Canadian members of the IOC, but these again, if they do exist, are personal mistakes and do not alter the lofty ideals and high standards of the Olympic Movement. Your main and only specific complaint seems to be the award of the Olympic Games to Sapporo instead [of] to Banff, and here I say that there is no justification for it. When the huge deluge of protests FROM CANADIAN CITIZENS and CANADIAN ORGANIZATIONS began to arrive at our office, the Banff Committee was promptly notified and warned. We have always had a great respect for Mr. Davis and the other members of the Banff Organizing Committee and still do, but these protests were not from “ill informed and malicious letter writ- ers.” They were from responsible individuals and from organizations of high public standing with thousands of members. They objected as a matter of principle and their arguments were valid and logical, so much so that they began to enlist support from WILDLIFE and conservation organizations in other countries, who feared that such an example in Canada would injure their local programs. This inter- national campaign could not be ignored by the International Olympic Committee, despite the fact that the Prime Minister of Canada sup- ported the Banff invitation. There was no reason for the IOC to throw itself into the middle of such a violent controversy when it had other uncontroversial invi- tations. It must be remembered that while Banff had been after the Games for a dozen years, Sapporo had been after them for more than thirty years. In view of the enthusiasm for the Olympic Movement in Canada, I regret that neither the Banff nor the Montreal invitations were ac- cepted. I am sure, and I said so publicly, that both Banff and Mon- treal would have staged the GAMES with credit to themselves and the Olympic Movement had they received them.129 It would not be until 1981, fifteen years later, that Calgary would finally succeed, winning the right to stage the 1988 Olympic Winter Games.

Looking Back

The ‘bottom line’ (to use an accounting expression employed by Kenneth P. Farmer) on Dawes, certainly as seen by those involved in the Olympic Movement in Canada, was that he was a public-spirited, albeit impatient and opinionated, man who was trying to do a good job.130 He had been among the many who correctly viewed the AAUC as moribund follow- ing World War II. Dawes described the situation as “untidy.” This activist group believed that there should be an independent organization, with

78 ‘Whistler’s Father’ one member of the committee responsible for each of the Olympic sports and some members selected at large. Eventually, they made the sought-for change happen. Dawes had his contradictions. Because of his wealth and status, he could approach the business community to ask for money in support of the Canadian teams and for other sport-related initiatives, where he would clearly obtain a better reception than other less highly-placed sports volunteers. He was very opinionated, but could also be brought around to other views if one was patient with him, took the time to “educate” him, and once he took the time to think about the other views. As an example, when sailing was admitted as a sport on the Olympic pro- gramme, people like Reginald C. Stevenson, a COA director and prominent Montreal Chartered Accountant, worked to encourage young Canadians to learn to sail competitively. He bought boats and taught sailing at the Royal St. Lawrence Yacht Club in Dorval. Stevenson approached Dawes about Cana- dian sailing, who was quite rude about the whole matter. He did not like sail- ing, said there was no exercise involved and that it was an activity for girls.131 Stevenson called Farmer to see if there was any chance he could come to the next meeting of the COA. Farmer said that, as secretary, he could arrange for the invitation. The question was, ‘What about Dawes?’ Farmer said he would likely rant and rave. He was right. Stevenson came to the meeting and made his case on behalf of sailing as an Olympic sport. Dawes, chairing the meet- ing, was rude, repeated the same comments he had made earlier and told Stevenson he was wasting the time of the meeting. A vote was nevertheless held, in which sailing prevailed, which made Dawes furious, but he could do nothing about it. Stevenson said not to worry about Dawes—he had known him all his life. After the next meeting of the COA, when sailing had, once again, been discussed, Stevenson asked Dawes to come out to the yacht club to see the training program for young sailors in action. Dawes agreed, went out, also sailed personally as part of his observation, and soon became a great supporter of the program. Dennis White, a long-time COA representative for amateur boxing, was heard to remark, “Don’t worry about Sidney Dawes—in the end, he always does the right thing, and we need him to raise money.”132 Within the IOC, Dawes appears to have mingled well and got along with many of the IOC members, including Brundage, Burghley, Lord Luke, Sir Arthur Porritt and many others, including members in Europe and the Americas. He would have had a natural affinity with Jean de Luxembourg, who had been sent to Canada during the war and who studied in Montreal and in Quebec City at Laval University and who was co-opted by the IOC immediately after the War at the age of twenty-five.133 The IOC of the day

79 Pound & Paton was a very social group, run largely by consensus, where votes were taken mainly for purposes of elections or where a consensus had already been reached and was merely being recorded. Dawes had a particularly active correspondence and personal relationship with Brundage and their two families were quite friendly, with frequent visits between them. The two had additional affinities, both being involved in the construction business, interested in art and staunch believers in the principles of amateurism.134 Dawes was also generous with respect to the Czech member of the IOC, Josef Gruss, whose support was cut off by the Soviets after the War, even though the Soviet Union itself was not involved in the Olympic Move- ment.135 Dawes helped him to meet his IOC expenses and was equally gen- erous in taking athletes in need into his home. Farmer describes Dawes’ wife, Elspeth, as a “saint on earth.”136 Dawes had no problem giving up the presidency of the COA once it was clear that Farmer was willing to take it on.137 His only concern, as he expressed it to Brundage, seemed to be whether Farmer would be willing to do all the work necessary to collect the funds required for the teams. That was one of the rea- sons Dawes tried to get Farmer appointed to the IOC, thinking (not surprisingly, but incorrectly) that what appealed to him would naturally appeal to Farmer, a much younger man, working hard to support his growing family. Dawes contin- ued, however, to be very active in support of the COA in the fundraising neces- sary to send Canadian teams to the Games and in lobbying the government for support of amateur sport long after he relinquished the COA presidency. His relations with James Worrall, who was to succeed him as IOC mem- ber, were more problematic. Worrall, the Canadian flag bearer on the 1936 Olympic team in Berlin, was a tall (considerably taller than Dawes), hand- some product of a working class family, born in Bury, Lancashire, on the 20th anniversary of the creation of the IOC, but who grew up in Pointe St. Charles in Montreal. Like Dawes, he was a graduate of McGill University, a quarter century later. He had been manager of the team at the 1948 Games in London and was Assistant Chef de Mission at the Helsinki Games in 1952 and chef de mission of the 1956 and 1960 teams, succeeding Farmer as COA president in 1961.138 He was unprepared to take too much bullying from Dawes, while nevertheless recognizing his status and importance to the organization, with the result that Dawes, despite acknowledging Worrall’s in- creasing importance within the COA, did not much care for him, as his cor- respondence with Brundage indicated.139 Nor was Worrall fully enamoured of Dawes.140 However, once Worrall was an IOC member, Dawes was quite gracious about his replacement. He said that “my age won’t allow any more long trips. I’m 78 now and that’s too long a journey for a man my age. Worrall is a good man with lots of experience and I think his appointment to the IOC is just splendid.”141

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The End of the Road

Dawes died at his home in Westmount on 3 March 1968. Elspeth cabled Brund- age later that day, to say “Sidney died early this morning. Not well since Sep- tember.” The Montreal media covered his career with sympathy and respect. Frank Shaughnessy recounted that he had visited Dawes the Thursday before his death and had presented him with a bouquet of roses from Nancy Greene, the new darling of Canadian sport after her gold medal performance in skiing at Grenoble earlier in February, and the first to capture the imagination of the public to the same degree as Barbara Ann Scott a generation earlier. Shaugh- nessy recounted that the roses had been presented to Greene by admiring fans. When she heard that Dawes was ill, she said she felt he should have them. It may have been of some comfort to Dawes to have lived to see Greene’s triumph at the Grenoble Olympics, in the sport that had led him to the CASA, the COA and to the IOC, even though he was never successful in attracting the Winter Games to Canada. Only later would they come to Canada, first to Calgary in 1988 (hav- ing relocated the alpine events from Banff to Kananaskis) and to his beloved Whistler for 2010. Tributes to Dawes came from Farmer, Shaughnessy and Radford, all COA spokesmen. Farmer stated, “While there is no doubt the man is a controver- sial figure, he set his own goals for fund-raising and always got the athletes to the Games.” Shaughnessy and Radford called him a “much maligned man” for his somewhat controversial rulings during his twenty-year tenure on the IOC. Shaughnessy said, “In the early years I’ve seen him personally pay the way of some of our athletes to the Games,” and “at times he billeted them in his home when funds were short.” The Montreal Star, discussing the Calgary situation in 1966, noted: Mr. Dawes raised a storm in Canadian Olympic circles when reports reached this country from the IOC Rome meetings that he had backed the bid of Sapporo, Japan, for the 1972 Winter Games rather than Banff, Alta. Sapporo’s bid was accepted for the Games, while Munich, Germany, won out over Montreal for the Summer Olympics in 1972. However, in typical fashion, Mr. Dawes lashed back at criticism in Canadian newspapers with ‘I don’t think how I voted is of interest to Canadian newspapers.’ He was later reported to have withheld approval of Banff because he felt the winter site in Canada should be Garibaldi, B.C. Situations like this caused him to be known as an autocrat in cer- tain circles. However, the same people were the first to praise his con- tributions to the Olympic movement.142 Other comments in the Montreal Star editorial on 5 March 1968 included: “… in an age when consensus is a by-word, Dawes was never much for going along with the crowd … His independence earned him his share of criticism … There is some-

81 Pound & Paton thing to be said for doing what you believe … Autocrat and all, he made a signifi- cant contribution to Canadian sport … His contributions were noteworthy and he did it without seeking public acclaim.” The Postscript Edition of the Montreal Star on 4 March 1968 had a more personal “take” on Dawes, noting “Although some- times chided for his firm opinions and determination to do what he thought had to be done, Mr. Dawes had a warm heart. He had a keen sense of humour too, one which usually manifested itself when he was among the young athletes.” Dawes was a man of his time and station, both of which shaped him, but he owned a strong sense of public duty that led him to volunteer during World War I, to be a war hero, to lead a successful company in a highly competitive in- dustry, to ongoing further service in the community and to achieve what many others might not have been able to deliver. There can be little doubt that Canada and Canadian sport were the better for his active contributions. British Colum- bia, the Canadian Ski Association and the Canadian Olympic Committee have all recognized the remarkable contributions of Dawes. It took decades in many cases for this recognition to manifest itself, perhaps because while accomplish- ing everything he did, he undoubtedly stepped on some toes and bruised the occasional ego. The passage of time affords a welcome opportunity to reach a more balanced assessment and appreciation of his evident accomplishments.

Endnotes

1 It appears that virtually everyone in the Dawes family, except for Sidney, maintained an active role in the family brewery business. Since he was very wealthy, more than could reasonably be accounted for solely by his own later activities, successful as they were, in the construction business, it is likely that Sidney inherited shares in the company, which was later acquired by National Breweries. The brand name used by the company was Black Horse Ale. An amusing coincidence occurred many years later, as noted in a letter to Dawes from Avery Brundage dated 29 June 1949, in which Brund- age notes: “Sigfrid Edström has been here the last week or so and we have enjoyed many a glass of Black Horse ale together. While we have served it for some time at the hotel [the Lasalle Hotel in Chicago, Brundage’s office headquarters], I did not know it was your family product until Sigfrid in- formed me. Incidently [sic], it is very good.” 2 While the wound itself was not life-threatening, after initial dressing at a nearby Field Dressing Station to which he was able to walk after being wounded, gas gangrene set in and the wound became acutely septic by the time he was transported to the I.O.D.E. Duchess of Westminster Hospital, where he was operated upon to remove a piece of shell and pieces of cloth.

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After proper cleaning, however, the wounds healed quickly and although the arm was stiff, there was no paralysis. 3 The decoration was awarded “for conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty as F.O.O. [Forward Observation Officer] during an attack. When the attack went forward he found it impossible to observe or to keep his line work- ing. He therefore went forward with the infantry attack and was able to send back valuable information throughout the day across a continuously shelled area. He displayed great coolness, courage, and initiative, and his work was of the utmost value.” See: London Gazette, No. 30561, 4th Supple- ment, d/7-3-18. Published in Pt II Orders, No. 212 of 5th Bde., C.F.A. 1917. 4 Indeed, the word “amateur,” once the bedrock of the Olympic philosophy, disappeared from the by 1974. In its place was the much more flexible concept of “eligibility.” The current state of play is that Olym- pic eligibility is effectively determined by the international sports federa- tions and the IOC will generally accept as eligible for Olympic competition any athlete eligible for the world championships organized by the particular international sports federation. 5 There were a number of issues, relating mostly to the strictness of the ama- teur rules, including payments for “broken time” and disputes as to whether an athlete declared professional in one sport automatically became profes- sional in all other sports. A proposal in favour of broken time payments was strongly rejected (118-40) at the 1936 Annual Meeting of the AAUC on 19 November 1936, while the “blanket” rule (if an athlete was professional in one sport, he was a professional in all sports) carried (90–72), but the president ruled against it on the basis that the change would have required a two-thirds majority. Hockey was also concerned with the blanket rule. At the AUCC meeting in 1937, the Amateur Athletic Union of the United States (AAU) sent a telegram stating that the AAU had been confirmed by the Ligue Internationale de Hockey sur Glace (LIHG), predecessor to the current International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF), as the governing body for hockey in the U.S. This had the effect that U.S. players could not play against players registered with the CAHA. 6 See Stephen R. Wenn, “A Call to Arms: A. Sidney Dawes’ Campaign for C.O.A. Independence,” Canadian Journal of History of Sport, Vol. XXI, Dec. 1990, 33-35. The same position was also adopted in relation to performance at the 1948 Olympic Games (see 40-41). 7 Canada’s ice hockey performance recovered after World War II, with gold medals in 1948 and 1952, but, thereafter there was a long drought, ending only in 2002. Cynical as it may be, we suspect that, at the Olympic Winter Games in 2002, even if Canada had not won a single medal, other than the two gold medals in men’s and women’s ice hockey, the Games would have been perceived by the Canadian public as a great success. 8 Annual Meeting of the AAUC, 1936, 53, National Archives of Canada (hereafter, NA), Ottawa.

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9 Annual Meeting of the AAUC, 1937, 12, NA, Ottawa. 10 Annual Meeting of the AAUC, 1937, 40, NA, Ottawa. 11 Annual Meeting of the AAUC, 1938, 66, NA, Ottawa. 12 The name of the club was derived from the red Martlet bird that forms part of the McGill University crest. 13 This has evolved into an adventuresome combination cross-country and downhill race between Mont Tremblant and the Seignory Club (now Cha- teau Montebello) in Montebello, Quebec that involved sleeping overnight as part of completing the full course. The Kandahar Ski Club, so named in honour of Lord Roberts of Kandahar who had led an expedition to relieve a siege at Kandahar, Afghanistan in 1879, was formed in Europe in 1924. The Club donated a trophy to the Canadian Amateur Ski Association in 1931. The authority to run the competition was assigned to the Red Birds Ski Club. See: W.L. Ball, I Skied the Thirties (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers & Company Limited, Ottawa, 1981), 46-ff. 14 One of the current trails is named “Ryan’s Run,” in honour of Peter Ryan, a son of Joseph Ryan, a fine skier, but not eligible to compete for Canada at the Olympic Games since he was not a Canadian citizen. He was killed in a racing car accident in Paris on 2 July 1962. 15 François Pichard, “Qui était Sidney Dawes?,” unpublished, undated article, McGill University Archive, Sidney Dawes, item no. 7. See also : Ball, I Skied the Thirties. Bill Ball was an ardent skier and a member of Canada’s 1936 Olympic ski team, coached by Harry Pangman, who in turn was a member of the 1932 Olympic team. 16 Kenneth Pentin Farmer, who eventually succeeded Dawes as president of the COA in 1953, said, in an interview with the authors on 12 March 2003, he believed that it may have been Dr. Arthur S. Lamb of McGill Univer- sity who recommended that Dawes be approached by the skiing association (hereafter: Interview KPF, 12 March 2003). Lamb himself was involved as team manager at the 1928 Olympic Games in and had encoun- tered some difficulty with Canadian sports authorities when he refused to protest against an error made by race officials. It does not seem to have been terminal trouble, however, since he became president of the AAUC and later Honorary President of the COA. 17 Ball, I Skied the Thirties, 60. This injury may suggest, in Dawes’ case, at the age of forty-seven, a triumph of enthusiasm over expertise in his skiing. An interesting historical aside is that Dawes’ younger brother played a direct role in raising the money necessary for getting Kenneth P. Farmer to the same Olympic Games. The Canadian ice hockey team was made up of about half of the Port Arthur Bearcats, which has been runner-up in the 1935 Al- len Cup finals losing to the Halifax Wolverines, which became ineligible for Olympic competition when its players demanded broken time payments. Farmer played for the Montreal Victorias that year, refusing to play for the Royals. The Montreal hockey group was miffed with Farmer. James de la

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Lande, president of the Quebec Hockey Association and the , a friend of the Port Arthur club (and everyone else, said Farmer), asked that there be a few more added to the Port Arthur team, so that the Olym- pic team would, in effect, be a Canadian all-star team. In a game against Port Arthur, Farmer scored two goals and an assist. Farmer was noted as a tough, wiry, and determined competitor. The manager of the Port Ar- thur team asked why the QHA did not recommend Farmer? The politics of Montreal’s discontent was such that they were not positively inclined. But, Port Arthur insisted. The Montrealers then said they had no money to send Farmer. Richard “Dickie” Dawes, involved with the Victoria club, asked how much they needed. They said they needed $500, whereupon Dickie walked around the rink where the game was played and returned with the $500 the same night. Farmer was on the boat to Europe the following Wednesday. Interview KPF 12 March 2003. 18 Ball, I Skied the Thirties, 103. 19 The Canadian Ski Hall of Fame summary on Dawes lists him as president of the Canadian Amateur Ski Association in 1944, but this appears to be incorrect. 20 12 November 1945, 19. Harry Pangman became the eastern vice-president of the technical board. Re-elections were reported in the Montreal Daily Star of 20 May 1946. 21 Interview KPF, 12 March 2003. 22 Sigfrid Edström, the Swedish vice president of the IOC, who assumed man- agement of the IOC following the death of the Belgian IOC president Count Henri Baillet-Latour in 1942 (and who may well have saved the IOC dur- ing the years of the War) moved quickly after the end of hostilities in Eu- rope—even before hostilities were completed in the Pacific theatre—saying as early as June 1945 that the 1948 Games would be celebrated. See: Wolf Lyberg, Fabulous 100 Years of the IOC Facts – Figures – and Much, Much More (Lausanne, International Olympic Committee, 1996), 65. A meeting of the IOC Executive Board was scheduled in London for 21-24 August 1945, attended by Edström, Avery Brundage and Lord Aberdare, who rec- ommended London and St. Moritz for the two 1948 Games, to be ratified by a postal vote of the IOC members, a process required because awarding the Games is the prerogative of the IOC Session. A proposed ratification date of December 1945 was delayed until 14 February as a result of postal problems. A Session was set for September 1946 in Lausanne. There were other possible candidates, but the policy within the inner IOC circles was obviously to ensure that the Games were celebrated in Europe, where the War had been fought. London had also been previously elected as the host of the 1944 Olympic Games and had indicated, at that time, that it did not wish to host the Winter Games. The IOC Executive Board decided that if London were to be awarded the 1948 Games, St. Moritz would automati- cally be awarded the Winter Games. Lake Placid had expressed interest in

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the Winter Games. This may have been the cause of some of the objections to the sites which appeared in certain of the U.S. and Canadian media. 23 “Canada Gets Olympic Bid,” Montreal Daily Star, 2 May 1947. 24 The problem of payments made for broken time was still an issue in Canada and elsewhere. In advance of the meeting, Dawes had written to Brundage, with a follow-up reminder, seeking clarification. See Dawes to Brundage, 18 September 1947 and Dawes to Brundage, 6 October 1947, Box 53, Reel 32, Avery Brundage Collection (hereafter ABC), International Centre for Olympic Studies Archives (herafter ICOSA), University of Western Ontario. The new definition of “amateur” seemed to be silent on the question so long as there was no “material gain of any kind direct or indirect,” whereas under the necessary conditions for representing a country, the rule said “must not have received reimbursement or compensation for loss of salary.” Brundage confirmed that the prohibition against receiving payment for broken time was still in force. See Brundage to Dawes, 9 October 1947, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 25 See, generally, Wenn, “A Call to Arms,” 30-46. We have relied on this article for the brief description that follows. 26 Dawes wrote to Edström in mid July 1948, outlining his plan to have the COA obtain letters patent and adopt its own by-laws, rules and regulations, so that it would be composed of one or more representatives appointed by each of the sports governing bodies interested in Olympic events, includ- ing the AAUC, which would also nominate representatives for the sports it administered, which were boxing, , track and field, weightlift- ing and gymnastics. Dawes forwarded a copy of the letter to Brundage the same day, asking for a letter recommending Dawes’ proposed structure and hoped “your recommendation could be as strong as possible.” See Dawes to Edström, 21 July 1948, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 27 Mulqueen and Hart kept the COA together during the War. Hart originally said that he wanted to retire as secretary and that Kenneth P. Farmer should replace him. As tensions grew regarding an independent Olympic commit- tee, Hart stayed on and played out the game with Machum in the battle within the AAUC, culminating in 1948 when he defeated Machum for its presidency. 28 Machum, on learning that Dawes had invited Avery Brundage, wrote a brusque letter to Brundage at the end of August 1948, effectively disinviting him, on the basis that Dawes had invited him to speak on the broken time issue and that Machum had already made complete plans for the meeting without any outside visitors on the program and that he did not intend to discuss the broken time question. The agenda, he said, was full and while he was appreciative of Brundage’s great contribution to amateur sport and had been looking forward to meeting him, he felt that it would be impos- sible for them to entertain Brundage at the annual meeting in the manner he deserved. He was quite confident that Brundage would understand his

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position. See Machum to Brundage, 30 August 1948, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. Brundage wrote Dawes on 18 September 1948, quoting the Machum letter, followed by the comment, “Well! Well!” See Brundage to Dawes, 18 September 1948, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. Dawes replied to Brundage a few days later to make it clear that the dinner to which Brundage had been invited was one given by the city of London, not the AAUC. He noted that Machum was mostly worried about Brundage saying something in favor of the reorganization of the COA on a national basis, which Machum saw as a further diminution of the authority of the AAUC. See Dawes to Brundage, 23 September 1948, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. Brundage, although not without some effort to get out of the situation, did eventually appear at the London dinner, and indeed, did speak. 29 This would not be the only occasion on which charges of arrogance and willfulness would be directed at Dawes. Kenneth P. Farmer, treasurer for both the 1948 Winter and Summer Canadian Olympic teams, described Dawes as extremely autocratic, a man who treated Farmer as if he were an office boy. Dawes was quite content to engulf Farmer with work on Cana- dian Olympic matters, something which did not particularly bother Farmer nor interfere inordinately with his professional work. In fact, Farmer’s firm, McDonald Currie & Company, helped with some of Farmer’s travel expens- es when necessary. Interview KPF, 12 March 2003. See also, comments by James Worrall, in My Olympic Journey: Sixty Years with Canadian Sport and the Olympic Games (Canadian Olympic Association, 2002), 34, 56, 74, and 85. 30 There was obviously a good deal of hard feeling involved and it is reason- able to conclude that it may have centered on the future of the COA. The minutes of the meeting record that “Mr. Dawes took the floor and stated that he felt that Col. Machum had made a very serious attack on the COA and that it will take a long time for this to be forgotten.” This was in re- sponse to the “Machum Plan” for Canadian amateur sport (116 of the meet- ing minutes). Further evidence of the tensions can be seen in Dawes’ letter of 23 September 1948 to Brundage, in which Dawes made two observations, one that according to precedent, Machum was to retire as AAUC president, having been in office for two years. Machum nevertheless was the choice of the nominating committee. The second was that Dawes had been asked by Machum to resign from the presidency of the COA on account of his so- called attacks on the AAUC. Dawes to Brundage, 23 September 1948, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA, op cit. 31 At the 1950 AAUC meeting held at the Mount Royal Hotel in Montreal, its new president, Robert F. Osborne, reported, “Your president was able to attend the organizational meeting of the C.O.A. held in Montreal in the spring [22 April 1950]. He is pleased to report that great consideration [is due] to the A.A.U.C. as the progenitor of this new, autonomous organiza- tion.” See Annual Meeting of the AAUC, 1950, President’s Address, 8, Na- tional Archives, Ottawa. Prior to its independent status, the COA letterhead

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included the description: “A Committee of the Amateur Athletic Union of Canada Appointed to Organize and Direct Canada’s Participation in Olym- pic Competitions.” The new letterhead contained no such notation. Further, the COA obtained “Grand Patronage” from the Governor General of Can- ada. For many years, the mailing address of the COA was Dawes’ private residence at 679 Belmont Avenue, Westmount, but he moved it to the office of Atlas Construction at 4781 St. Catherine Street West in Montreal in 1949. See Dawes to IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer, 24 March 1949, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 32 The COA was incorporated as a company without share capital pursu- ant to letters patent issued under Part III of the Canada Corporations Act dated 3 January 1952. This was a major milestone in the history of the COA and (since contributions can be lost or forgotten over the years) it is worth noting the original incorporators of the COA, as listed in the let- ters patent: Andrew Sidney Dawes, Paul Desilets, John William Davies, Hy- man Ernest Herschorn, Roy Ashworth, Elsden Howard Radford, Reginald Crawford Stevenson, Kenneth Percival (sic.) Farmer, William Alder Irwin, Charles Edward Walker, William Edward Roughton, Irene Wall, Franklin Henry Dillingham, Fred Sloan Urquhart, Nelson Collins Hart, James Wor- rall, Fredericton Henry Carter, George Samuel Dudley, Margaret Lord and Robert Freer Osborne. [In 2002, the COA changed its name to “Canadian Olympic Committee—Comité Olympique Canadien” (COC) to fit better within the international descriptions used throughout the Olympic Move- ment (i.e., national Olympic “committees”) and to have working initials which were the same in both Canadian official languages. The change was approved on 25 April 2002 at the Annual General Meeting of Members and supplementary letters patent confirming the change were issued on 9 May 2002. Because the events recounted in this essay all occurred prior to such change, we have used COA throughout. 33 See S. F. Wise and Douglas Fisher, Canada’s Sporting Heroes (Don Mills, Ontario: General Publishing Company, 1974), 215-216; See also, Don Morrow, “Sweetheart Sport: Barbara Anne Scott and the Post-World War II Image of the Female Athlete in Canada,” Canadian Journal of History of Sport, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, May 1987, 36-54. Morrow observes, “For a vari- ety of reasons and carefully contrived factors, Scott was figuratively and literally embraced as Canada’s darling of sport; the sweetheart image was paramount.” 34 This was confirmed by Kenneth P. Farmer. Interview KPF, 12 March 2003. It was also well known to athletes competing in the late 1950s and early . The situation was so ridiculous that the IOC (a position very closely iden- tified with Avery Brundage, by then the IOC president) intimated that a competitive swimmer could not take a job as a lifeguard, apparently on the IOC’s view that sitting in a poolside chair for several hours a day in the hot sun would, somehow, provide an unfair advantage in subsequent competi- tion. Kenneth G. Murray, a COA director for many years, once told Richard

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Pound that during the 1930s and 1940s when amateur ice hockey players played with professional or semi-professional hockey teams, the amateurs were, very scrupulously, never paid for playing the games, but that in the locker room after the game, the team manager would lay a hockey stick flat on the floor and bet the amateur player $25 (or whatever was the going rate) that the athlete could not jump over the stick. 35 Letters from Dawes to Brundage, and Dawes to Edström, during this epi- sode included clippings from newspapers regarding the Scott case. 36 Brundage never championed the Winter Games, principally due to ques- tions about the amateur status of many of the winter athletes. This went back to the matter of ski instructors for the 1940 Winter Games, originally scheduled for St. Moritz, but moved to Garmisch-Partenkirchen by the IOC in 1939 when no resolution of the question of their amateur status could be achieved. There was an ice hockey controversy in the wings for the 1948 Games as well and eligibility rules for that sport would continue to trouble the Games for decades. Brundage continued his opposition to what he con- sidered to be professional skiers, continuing throughout the final year of his presidency, leading to the disqualification of Austrian Karl Schrantz at the 1972 Games in Sapporo, Japan. 37 Montreal Daily Star, 7 May 1947. 38 Montreal Daily Star, 7 May 1947. In the same issue, Myrtle Cook (a gold medal winner in athletics at Amsterdam in 1928, who became a well- known sports journalist in Montreal) wrote a column identifying a number of amateur athletes who had received significant gifts in the past, without having attracted the attention afforded to the gift to Scott. Athletes named included Fanny Rosenfeld, Ethel Calderwood, Percy Williams, Sonja Henie, Stella Walsh, Walter Tilden and others. 39 There was, naturally, a ceremony connected with the return of the car. The headlines and photos for the occasion included “Car Ceremony Brings Tears” and a photograph, showing Scott kissing the convertible, bearing the caption, “Good-bye Old Pal.” 40 Dawes would certainly have checked with Edström and Brundage to be sure that the proposed solution would be acceptable to the IOC before making any statement and with those two on-side, there would likely be no prob- lem. Prime Minister Mackenzie King cabled the Canadian IOC member, J. C. Patteson, in London to say that the Canadian government would appre- ciate anything he could do to straighten out the case. See “Prime Minister to the Rescue,” Montreal Daily Star, 8 May 1947. Some additional, but not determinative, support came from the Peruvian member of the IOC, Dr. Alfredo Benavides, then Ambassador of Peru to Canada, who wrote to Ed- ström, saying that with the return of the car, the matter should be dropped. See Montreal Daily Star, 9 May 1947. 41 It was the practice of the day, driven by financial necessity, for the COA to assess the national federations in respect of the participation of their ath-

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letes in the Games, a practice which continued for at least another two de- cades until the COA assumed the full costs, initially possible as a result of increased grants from the federal government. 42 Montreal Daily Star, 10 May 1947. 43 Montreal Daily Star, 14 May 1947. 44 Montreal Daily Star, 16 May 1947. 45 Montreal Daily Star, 16 May 1947. As political veterans are prone to note, Question Period in the House of Commons is aptly named: “a time for questions from the Opposition, not answers from the Government.” 46 Although Dawes would soon become a member of the IOC, J. C. Patteson was the only Canadian IOC member at this time. 47 Montreal Daily Star, 17 May 1947. 48 Montreal Daily Star, 27 May 1947 (mentioned above under headline of “Thanks Avery.”) 49 Montreal Daily Star, 19 May 1947. 50 His potential nomination was known to the AAUC, when Nelson Hart re- ported on behalf of the COC at the Annual Meeting in Montreal on 28-29 November 1946 that the IOC had appointed John C. Patteson as one of Can- ada’s representatives on the IOC and had suggested Mr. A. Sidney Dawes of Montreal as the other. The possible appointment of Dawes did not appear to attract any adverse comment within Canada and Dawes was unanimously co-opted and inducted at the 40th Session of the IOC in Stockholm, 18-21 June 1947. 51 James Merrick became a member of the IOC in 1921, replacing John Hanbury-Williams. Sir George McLaren Brown was co-opted in 1928 and served until his death in 1939. No action was taken during the War and Merrick died in April 1946. The effort to replace McLaren Brown eventually led to Patteson’s co-option in 1946. 52 Later exceptions included Spain and Ireland. In the case of Ireland, Lord Killanin was the president of the IOC and took the position that his larger responsibilities prevented him from properly representing the IOC in his own country. In the case of Spain, Brundage apparently decided that he liked and simply created the exception arbitrarily. 53 This single-member status for Canada persisted until 1978, following the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, when Richard Pound, then president of the COA, was co-opted as a second member in Canada. Since then, as a result of the IOC reforms arising out of the 1998-1999 Salt Lake City bid- ding scandal (relating to the award of the 2002 Olympic Winter Games), the IOC has reverted to the principle of having no new second members in any country, other than those who may be elected from the representative constituencies of international federations, National Olympic Committees, or athletes. There was a brief period during which Canada had five- vot ing members of the IOC, when Pound, Carol Anne Letheren, sailing’s Paul

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Henderson (qua president of the ISAF), Robert Steadward, (qua president of the International Paralympic Committee) and Charmaine Crooks, (qua elected athlete member), were all full members of the IOC. At the time of this writing, Olympic cross-country skiing champion Beckie Scott (qua elected athlete member, elected during the 2006 Torino Olympic Winter Games) and Pound are the only Canadian voting IOC members. 54 An IOC member’s personal financial responsibility for one’s travel expenses (although not the assessments to support the secretariat) continued until 1981, when the IOC began to gather sufficient resources to defray the travel expenses of members to participate in IOC Sessions, Olympic Congresses, and attendance at the Olympic Games. 55 He attended the 40th Session in Stockholm, where he was inducted as an IOC member. He also attended the 41st Session in St. Moritz in 1948, the 42nd Session in London in 1948, the 43rd Session in Rome in 1949, the 44th Session in Copenhagen in 1950, the 46th Session in Oslo in 1952, the 47th Session in Helsinki in 1952, the 48th Session in in 1953, the 49th Session in Athens in 1954, the 50th Session in Paris in 1955, the 51st Session in Cortina D’Ampezzo in 1956, the 52nd Session in Melbourne in 1956, the 53rd Session in Sofia in 1957, the 55th Session in Munich in 1959, the 56th Session in San Francisco in 1960, the 57th Session in Rome in 1960, the 58th Session in Athens in 1961, the 60th Session in Baden Baden in 1963, the 61st Session in Innsbruck in 1964, the 62nd Session in Tokyo in 1964 and the 64th Session in Rome in 1966. This was his last Ses- sion, as he died early the following year. He missed only the 45th Session in Vienna in 1951, the 54th Session in Tokyo in 1958, the 59th Session in Moscow in 1962 (he suffered a heart attack on 29 January 1962 and, al- though he advised Avery Brundage that he hoped to attend the Moscow Session, his recovery took longer than he expected), and the 63rd Session in Madrid in 1965. 56 See Gordon H. MacDonald, “American Organizational Struggles Surround- ing Ice Hockey at the 1948 Olympic Games,” in Robert K. Barney, Kevin B. Wamsley, Scott G. Martyn, and Gordon H. MacDonald, eds., Global and Cultural Critique: Problematizing the Olympic Games . Fourth International Symposium for Olympic Research (London, Ontario: International Centre for Olympic Studies, 1998), 99-106. This article describes the lead-up to the 1948 Winter Games as well as the assorted meetings, committees and nego- tiations, including those in St. Moritz immediately prior to the Games. 57 Procès-verbal de la 40ième Session du Comité International Olympique, Stockholm, 18-21 juin 1947, 5-6. (Hereafter references, in respect of the period during which the IOC Minutes were published in French only, will be PV 40 Session IOC, etc.) 58 PV 41 Session IOC, St. Moritz, 29-31 janvier 1948 and 2-8 février 1948. Dawes and Patteson were both present at this Session.

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59 Here, Brundage suggested that Dawes delete his original phrase: “in what they stated to be an autocratic way.” See Brundage to Dawes, 17 March 1949, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 60 Draft foreword article for COA Olympic Report. Dawes to Brundage, 12 March 1949, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 61 See Mayer to Dawes, 6 October 1947, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 62 See Dawes to Mayer, 15 October 1947, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA; em- phasis in original. 63 See Mayer to Dawes, 20 October 1947, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 64 PV 42 Session IOC, London, 27-29 juillet, 13 aout 1948. 65 PV 43 Session IOC, Rome, 21-27 avril 1949. The Brundage committee re- port was Annex 2. 66 Ibid. 6. He also asked Edström about the inclusion of orienteering. Edström wrote to Dawes on 6 May to say, “Having returned home I have looked into the question of orientation and found that there is no federation for ori- entation in Sweden nor is there any international federation for said sport. Under the circumstances I think it best that we take out the orientation from the winter sports in the new rules and only add curling and ‘com- bined skiing and shooting’ [now ] Let us hope that the orientation in the future will develop so that an international federation can be formed.” See Edström to Dawes, 6 May 1949, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA, Dawes also discussed “combined skiing and shooting” with Brundage, who recom- mended an individual who might be helpful in the Canadian sport reorga- nization. See Brundage to Dawes, 5 February 1949, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 67 PV 44 Session IOC, Copenhagen, 15-17 mai 1950. 68 Ibid., 12. 69 Letters from Dawes to Mayer 30 June 1950 (Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA) and Mayer to Dawes 12 July 1950 (Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA). Resolu- tion of this issue occurred at the Oslo Session in 1952 (beginning with the minutes of the Session held later that year in Helsinki) and seems to have been argued for and proposed by Patteson, but at the cost of an increase in the annual assessment of members from 100 Swiss Francs to 150. On the same issue, see, Robert K. Barney, Malcolm Scott, and Rachel Moore, “Old Boys at Work and Play: the International Olympic Committee and Canadi- an Co-option, 1928-1946,” Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies, Vol. VIII, 1999, 95-96. 70 See Dawes to Mayer, 14 November 1950, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 71 See Mayer to Dawes, 28 November, 1950, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA; emphases in original. 72 This is an interesting “slip in IOC language,” and does not conform at all to the IOC theory of membership, in which the members are, specifically,

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not considered as “representatives” of their countries. It occurs regularly in Canadian and COA correspondence, possibly because the COA tended to regard Canadian IOC members in such light. It probably did not matter much to Dawes, who was quite prepared to decide what he considered to be correct. If that pleased the COA, so much the better; if not, that was the COA’s problem. 73 Dawes to Czech NOC, 9 May 1952, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 74 See Dawes to Brundage, 5 March 1956, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICO- SA. The matter of the People’s Republic of China within the Olympic Movement is worthy of separate and extensive treatment. Presumably, the IOC, while knowing of the unsettled conditions in China in 1947, thought it was co-opting a member satisfactory to the Chiang Kai-shek government, only to find that when Chiang withdrew to in 1949, the IOC member stayed in the newly-proclaimed People’s Republic of China under Mao Tse Tung. Professor Tung’s membership terminated in 1958, shortly after this episode and the withdrawal of the PRC from the Melbourne Games. An IOC member (Henry Hsu) was appointed in Taiwan in 1970 and it was not until 1981 that another Chinese member (He Zhenliang) was appointed, this time in the PRC. Canada got caught in some of the Two Chinas crossfire in relation to the 1976 Games in Montreal when the delegation from what is now referred to as Chinese Taipei was refused permission to enter Canada by the Government of Canada under its then Olympic name of “Republic of China Olympic Committee.” 75 See Brundage to Dawes, 14 March 1956, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 76 Ibid. 77 Dawes to Mayer, 17 April 1956, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 78 Dawes to the Marquess of Exeter, 14 March 1958, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 79 Dawes to Brundage, 13 February 1958, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 80 The question of whether Gibraltar should have a separate National Olym- pic Committee is complicated and is still under litigation in the Swiss courts. There seems to be little argument that there is a British colony involved and that, should the colonial status be surrendered, the terri- tory comprising the original colony would be returned to Spain. In the intervening years, it appears that additional territory has been effectively occupied as if it were part of the territory covered by the original colony, which now includes the airport, sports and other facilities. This has led to many practical and possibly legal difficulties, still unresolved. In the in- terim, Spain has opposed the recognition of a NOC in Gibraltar and the IOC has declined to grant the status sought by Gibraltar. On 7 February 2008, le Tribunal d’Arrondissement de Lausanne upheld the decision of the IOC not to grant such recognition, although the reasons for the judg- ment have not yet been issued. [Gibraltar Olympic Committee c. Comité

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International Olympique, court file reference PP03.003419] The Olympic situation is further confused by the fact that certain international federa- tions (e.g., the IAAF) have recognized national federations in Gibraltar and EUFA has lost cases before CAS (Court of Arbitration for Sport), effectively forcing it to include Gibraltar. 81 This was the result of action by the People’s Republic of China, which ob- jected to the description used by the authorities based in Taiwan, namely “Republic of China.” At the Summer Games in Rome, the team from the Re- public of China was required to march in the Opening Ceremony under the name of Formosa. The bearer of the sign that read “Formosa” was followed by another bearer carrying a sign that read “Under Protest.” The People’s Republic of China did not participate. 82 See Avery Brundage File, IOC Archives, Lausanne. There was earlier corre- spondence between Brundage and Dawes in 1955, when Dawes had report- ed in a mid-November letter that the Olympic symbol was not “patentable” and that exclusive use of the words “Olympic” and “Olympiad” could not be obtained, although there was some protection given, but that nothing further could be gained. If a case was to occur, and the COA had the money, the only thing it could do would be to prosecute and endeavour to get a judgment. See Dawes to Brundage, 17 November 1955, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. Brundage’s reply a week later said that the IOC had persuad- ed the Swiss government to arrange for international protection and urged Dawes to get the Canadian government to send its agreement to participate in the Convention. Brundage to Dawes, 25 November 1955, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 83 Dawes was never as enthusiastic as Brundage on the matter of international protection of the Olympic marks and symbol. He had taken it up at Brund- age’s urging in 1955 and was satisfied that sufficient protection was available for the COA under the existing Canadian trade marks legislation. Since then, he observed that “we have not been unduly troubled by misuse of our Olympic words and symbols and until we are, I cannot get very excited about this matter.” He quite understood Brundage’s concern over those countries which did not have protection, but considered that Brundage should get after them and not bother Canada, which already had the necessary protec- tion. Dawes said he would try to get someone from the Canadian embassy to attend the proposed meeting regarding a possible convention in Athens on 7 October, but was not in favour of asking the Canadian government to change its own legislation until it had proven to be inadequate. 84 For a discussion of the Nairobi Treaty, see, Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn and Scott G. Marytn, Selling the Five Rings: The International Olympic Committee and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism (Salt Lake City: Uni- versity of Utah Press, 2002), 159, 161, 163. See also, Robert K. Barney, “An Olympian Dilemma: Protection of Olympic Symbols,” Journal of Olympic History 10, no. 3, 7-29. The need to protect Olympic trade marks and sym- bols only became important to the Canadian government once Montreal

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was awarded the 1976 Olympic Games and the Montreal Organizing Com- mittee adopted additional emblems of its own which were used for com- mercial purposes and which risked being subject to unauthorized usage. This concern led to enactment of the Olympic (1976) Act, S.C. 1973-74, c. 31, assented to 27 July 1973, later amended by the Act to amend the Olympic (1976) Act, S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 68, assented to 30 July 1975. In respect of the 2010 Olympic Winter Games and , and for the same rea- sons, the federal government enacted the Olympic and Paralympic Marks Act, S.C. 2007, c. 25, assented to 22 June 2007. The Organizing Committee for the 1988 Olympic Winter Games in Calgary did not think it necessary to have special legislation adopted and was content to rely on the protections granted by the existing general legislation. For “routine” protection of the COA marks, there has been general acceptance by the federal government, confirmed by judgments of, inter alia, the Federal Court of Canada, based on acceptance of the principle that the COA is a “public authority” for pur- poses of the Trade Marks Act, which allows easier registration of the COA marks than would otherwise be the case for normal commercial marks. 85 Brundage to Dawes, 29 January 1960, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 86 Dawes to Brundage, 1 , Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 87 Copies were sent to Farmer, Shaughnessy and Otto Mayer. The authors have not found any written responses, the absence of which, in the circumstanc- es, may not be altogether surprising; Brundage’s emphasis 88 See Dawes to Brundage, 4 November,1960, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. The entire 1960 Canadian team won only one medal, a silver in the eights, in which the University of British Columbia (UBC) crew finished second. 89 Montreal Star, 5 March 1955. 90 Bill C-131, An Act to Encourage Fitness and Amateur Sport, was passed by the House of Commons on 25 September 1961. 91 Brundage to Dawes, 30 October 1961, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 92 Dawes to Brundage, 16 February 1962, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 93 Dawes to Brundage, 4 December 1962, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. The article described a land training program plus a three-month training tour of Europe. The reference to European men was obviously to suggest the professional skiers who were part of the European teams. 94 Brundage to Dawes, 14 December 1962, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 95 Dawes to Brundage, 18 December 1962, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. Brundage replied to Dawes on 24 January 1963, thanking him for a news clipping relating to government grants, noting that they were made to or- ganizations, and not to individuals, which he described as an improvement over the U.S. idea of scholarships for college athletes, now “outlawed” by IOC regulations. See Brundage to Dawes, 24 January 1963, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA.

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96 Dawes to Brundage, 21 March 1963, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 97 The idea was to have a team-in-residence concept at UBC (where Father Bauer coached the university team) and to develop a national team that lived and played together for several months. It was a concept that Brund- age approved. See Brundage to Dawes, 25 November 1963, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. The CAHA made sure Dawes was aware of the make-up of the team and its amateur nature. See CAHA to Dawes, 27 November 1963, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. The CAHA also provided Dawes with a de- scription of the team members, along with a press book, in case he wished to provide Brundage with a copy (which he did). See Dawes to Brundage, 29 November 1963, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. The team finished fourth at Innsbruck, on the basis of a somewhat problematic scoring system that caused Canada to drop from third to fourth. 98 See Dawes to Brundage, 6 November 1964, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA, enclosing a summary from Father Bauer and a clipping of coverage of a speech made by Bauer to the Montreal Advertising and Sales Club. Stated Dawes, “If we make it known that our primary concern in amateur sport is the development of character and personality, the rest will take care of it- self.” In his reply, Brundage observed that Bauer “has expressed the essence of Olympic philosophy and if everyone followed this line we would have fewer troubles.” See Brundage to Dawes, 12 November 1964, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 99 See Dawes to Brundage, 6 May 1963, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 100 Brundage to Dawes, 14 May 1963, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 101 Dawes to Brundage, 17 May 1963, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC. ICOSA. 102 Canadian Ski Hall of Fame. Dawes was inducted, posthumously, in 1982 as a Builder, in recognition his many contributions concerning that sport between 1928 and 1968. 103 See Hall of Fame Collection File, COA Archives, in Montreal Amateur Ath- letic Association Building, Montreal, Quebec. 104 See Province [Vancouver], 27 January 1967. Whitehead also provided an amusing description of the Hoary Marmot, “a busy, rodent-like creature who dwells in large numbers in the rock stretches above the timberline. He is about the size of a small dog or a large raccoon, with a curious, child-like cry like a thin, piercing whistle. He is seen mostly on the high ridge that leads to Singing Pass, where he lurks on the rocks to shrill angrily at hikers and other vulgar intruders. Hence, Whistler Mountain.” 105 COA Minutes of Annual Meeting-1958, 108. Occasionally forgotten is the fact that Montreal had previously bid twice for the Winter Games, first for the 1944 Games, finishing second to Cortina D’Ampezzo [The second- round votes were: Cortina D’Ampezzo – 16; Montreal – 12; Oslo – 2], and for the 1956 Games, finishing a distant second to Cortina D’Ampezzo [Cor- tina d’Ampezzo – 31; Montreal – 7; Colorado – 2; Lake Placid – 1].

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106 Innsbruck obtained 49 votes to 9 for Calgary. 107 COA Minutes 22 April 1961, 194-195. Interestingly, the Canadian govern- ment had made a special grant to the COA to be used to pay the fees of the Foundation Engineering Company of Canada for their professional servic- es in compiling the report. 108 COA Minutes, pp.ages 241-242. The IOC decision was made on 26 April 1966, Grenoble winning 27 to 24 in the third round of voting. Calgary/Banff was actually ahead of Grenoble after the second round, but 9 of the 14 votes for /Are (eliminated after the second round) went to Grenoble in the final round. 109 COA Minutes, Board of Directors meeting, 20 November 1965, Toronto, Ontario. See also, Worrall, My Olympic Journey, 88–92, “We chose Calgary- Banff to be Canada’s candidate to host the Winter Games, this time the 1972 edition. Vancouver had applied as well but we felt Calgary had the advantage by already being familiar to both IOC members and to the winter sports federations.” 110 COA Minutes-1964, 300. 111 COA Minutes, 287-288. Note that the proposer of the motion, Allan Mc- Gavin, was from Vancouver. Dr. Paul Hauch, the seconder, was from Lon- don, Ontario. 112 Vancouver Sun, 20 August 1964. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 The Calgary/Banff bid over than of Whister’s was given a stimulus due to the fact that IOC brought its decision forward by a year, with respect to awarding 1972 Games locations. See IOC 65th Session Minutes, Rome, 26 April 1966. 116 COA Minutes, December 1966, 64. 117 This issue would eventually explode in late November 1998 when the Salt Lake City scandal on payments to or for the benefit of IOC members in rela- tion to bidding for the Olympic Winter Games of 2002 was revealed. 118 This same issue was a factor in ’s decision to withdraw from hosting the 1976 Winter Games, after winning the bid to do so. 119 Canada repeated its double candidature in relation to the 1976 Games, en- joying mixed success when Montreal won the Summer Games and Van- couver lost to Denver. France followed the same path in relation to the 1992 Games, losing with Paris, but winning with . 120 The COA decisions on 1976 candidates were made in 1968. 121 See Dawes to Brundage, 18 April 1961, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 122 Brundage to Dawes, 26 April 1961, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 123 Brundage to Dawes, 6 December 1965, Box 119, Reel 65, ABC, ICOSA.

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124 Dawes to Brundage, 23 February 1966, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 125 Lester B. Pearson to W. E. Swinton, 25 March 1965, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 126 Shaughnessy to Dawes, 22 February 1966, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 127 Smith’s handwritten letter was dated “May 1966.” See Dawes to Brundage, 19 May 1966, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. Smith, of course, did not know for which candidate Dawes may have voted, but said Dawes was perfectly free to make his own analysis of the Calgary bid and that if he felt that the bid was not in keeping with the Olympic ideals, then how he voted was his own business. Smith had been involved as an original found- ing member of CODA and he and others had been “eased out” by a new group that took over all aspects of the bid, which he felt would have bene- fited from suggestions from the well travelled members of the earlier group. Ever since Japan was awarded the Games, the Calgary delegation had been blaming Dawes, Brundage, wildlife groups, politics, in fact everything but themselves. Smith suggested that if Canada were to make another bid, it should come from another group far removed from the same people who had failed more miserably in 1966 than they had at Innsbruck. To put it plainly, he said, “they didn’t do their homework properly.” 128 The article inThe Record, published in June 1966, was almost certainly writ- ten by the COA’s first full-time Executive Director, Henk W. Hoppener. The issue contained a number of other complaints directed at the IOC and Hop- pener made sure it was brought to the attention of the IOC. COA president James Worrall (whose candidacy as a possible IOC member was to come forward at the next IOC Session) wrote to Brundage in mid-August 1966 with a placating response about freedom of expression and debate, etc., plus the assurance that the COA and he personally believed in and supported the Olympic movement very sincerely and wanted in every way to assist its continued development (see Worrall to Brundage, 16 August 1966, Box 119, Reel 65, ABC, ICOSA. For 1976, the IOC had a perfect opportunity not to favour either of the existing super powers. Thus, Montreal emerged as a compromise between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., with each of them getting one of the following two Games. Both Games were burdened with the all- too-predictable political baggage attaching to a polarized world situation in which each of the hosts was an opposing super-power. 129 Brundage to E. J. McCullough, 26 July 1966, Box 119, Reel 65, ABC, ICOSA; emphasis in original. 130 The observations in this and the following paragraph come from Interview KPF, 12 March 2003. 131 Worrall, in, My Olympic Journey, noted the same approach by Dawes to men’s field hockey. Dawes thought it was a girl’s game and not suitable for men, even after it had been added to the Olympic programme. 132 Interview KPF, 12 March 2003.

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133 The Grand Duke of Luxembourg remained an active member of the IOC until 1998, and finished as the much respected Doyen of the IOC before retiring voluntarily, to become an Honorary member. 134 In early February 1953, Dawes sent Brundage a lengthy article published in the November 1952 issue of The Engineering Journal, in which one of the Atlas Construction jobs on the Sir Adam Beck Niagara tunnels project for the Ontario Hydro-Electric Power Commission was described in some de- tail. See Dawes to Brundage, 6 February 1953, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICO- SA. In replying, Brundage observed that it was a very interesting operation and that he thought it would keep Dawes very busy. See Brundage to Dawes, 12 February 1953, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 135 The first member appointed for the former Soviet Union was Konstantin Adrianov in 1951, followed by Alexei Romanov in 1952. The Soviet Union considered the Olympic Games too bourgeois for its taste following the Rev- olution in 1917 and (beginning with the former Russia and including the subsequent acquisitions that made up the Soviet Union) would not partici- pate again until the Winter Games in Oslo in 1952, missing only thereafter in 1984, as retaliation for the U.S.-led boycott in 1980. The U.S.S.R. had, however, begun to manoeuvre its way into the international federations, such as the FIS, even before it had begun to enter any competitions. 136 She was Grace Elspeth Paterson. 137 Writing to Brundage in early April 1953, following the Annual Meeting of the COA held on 28 March 1953, Dawes informed him that he had been re- placed by Farmer, “an ex-Olympic hockey player, a chartered accountant and a very good and popular executive, who has until now been Secretary of the C.O.A.” He also passed on suggestions from the COA regarding transfer of certain sports (particularly basketball and fencing) from the Summer to the Winter Games, the reduction of the number of entrants in individual events from three to two for the Summer and of four to three for the Winter Games and that standards be imposed for all measurable sports by the NOCs which must be met by all entrants, but standards not so severe as to eliminate most countries (as this would be contrary to the spirit of the Games). See Dawes to Brundage, 9 April 1953, Box 53, Reel 32, ABC, ICOSA. 138 Farmer said he always thought the COA president should be a ‘young’ man and therefore gave up the presidency at the age of 48. 139 One illustrative occasion of conflict between them (of which Richard Pound was one among many grateful beneficiaries) occurred at the 1960 Games in Rome. The weather on the day of the Opening Ceremony was extremely hot. The COA team organizers had managed to secure parade uniforms as a donation in support of the team from one of the large Montreal depart- ment stores. Unfortunately, the blazers were thick wool and the matching grey flannels were equally heavy. Worrall, as chef de mission, decided that the team would be better off marching in the Opening Ceremony in shirt- sleeves, which made the Canadian team the envy of all others, sweltering

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in their own dress uniforms. Dawes was furious and upbraided Worrall as having shown disrespect to the hosts and embarrassing Dawes personally. Worrall was unrepentant and the team would have supported him unani- mously had it been called upon to express an opinion. It was 1960, however, and no such team opinion was requested. For Worrall’s recounting of the matter, see Worrall, My Olympic Journey, 74. 140 Worrall, My Olympic Journey, 56. 141 Montreal Star, 4 March 1968. 142 Montreal Star, 4 March 1968.

Illustration Credits

42 Dawes family collection.

43 Dawes family collection.

44 Dawes family collection.

69 Dawes family collection.

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