allied withdrawal planning & operations (15-16 april) 301

Chapter Eleven

Allied Withdrawal Planning & Operations (15-16 April)

As various Greek formations tried desperately to fend off Italian pressure in Albania and to stem the tide of the German breakthrough to the north of Grevena, and while a number of W Force units jostled with German probes against the passes of the Olympus-Aliakmon Line, Wilson’s atten- tion was divided. An ever-increasing portion of his time and energy was taken by the ongoing planning for the imminent withdrawal of British and Dominion troops to the Thermopylae Line, far to the south. It would be a significant and dangerous operation, and one that at a stroke would ef- fectively end British-Greek battlefield collaboration. Not that Wilson was overly concerned about this particular issue; in fact the idea of W Force self-reliance was one aspect of the Thermopylae position that had attract- ed him to the idea in the first place. Indeed, it was indicative of Wilson’s abandonment of any further thought of cooperation with the that he instructed Blamey to ‘make every possible effort to ensure that GK [Greek] forces do not withdraw on routes available to Imperial forces, and they do not in any way whatsoever hinder the withdrawal’.1 Even so, assum- ing a clean break with the Germans along the Aliakmon-Olympus Line was possible (and that was no guarantee), to reach the Thermopylae Line W Force had to extricate itself from a front (from Kalabaka to the sea) of some 100 kilometres, then move over more than 160 kilometres of dubious roads to the south. British and Dominion units would have to link up with transport and drive right across the exposed plain of . Moreover, all routes, those on both sides of Mt Olympus, from Servia, and the lateral road from Kalabaka, converged on . If Larissa fell before forward W Force units were clear, then they would be cut off. Further south at Lamia withdrawing W Force troops would again be forced to converge, and noth- ing could be done to protect these choke points from air attack. However, with ULTRA decrypts providing a clear indication that the Germans

1 Force HQ Operation Order No. 12, 15 April 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643, 1/10. 302 chapter eleven intended to rush armour south of Olympus as soon as possible, such risks were accepted and the decision confirmed.2 At 9.50 a.m., 15 April, Wilson finally issued formal written orders for the retreat to Thermopylae—two days after the decision had effectively been made. To cover the move four rearguard groups were to be organised (and some were already moving). These rearguards were the 1st (UK) Armoured Brigade, to operate in the Grevena Sector; Brigadier Savige’s force in the Kalabaka area; the 6th NZ Brigade in the vicinity of Elasson; and a newly formed ‘Lee Force’ at (consisting primarily of the 19th Australian Brigade reinforced by the 2/6th and 2/7th Australian Battalions which had previously been en route to join Savige at Kalabaka). Together these four positions would cover the major road and rail routes to Larissa. W Force engineers were to impose maximum demolitions on Greek roads to delay the advancing Germans. Blamey was given responsibility for the actual conduct of the withdrawal which, according to Brigadier Rowell at least, was the last time Wilson’s headquarters ever came ‘into the picture’ as far as running the W Force campaign in was concerned.3 Blamey had actually issued his own written orders almost an hour before Wilson, which provided much of the technical detail and timings for the withdrawal. The move would occur in two phases. The first was to establish Wilson’s four rearguard positions and was to be complete by 8.00 a.m. the following morning. As part of these moves Blamey ordered the 16th Aus- tralian Brigade, at last arriving into position between the 4th and 5th NZ Brigades after marching south from Veria since 12 April, to march out again that night to the south side of Servia prior to embussing for Zarkos. This was to prove a continuing trial of endurance for Brigadier Allen’s men. Most had been climbing with little rest for three days since vacating the Veria Pass, with only a greatcoat and single blanket with which to sleep, often in up to 60 centimetres of snow on steep mountain ravines. This new move meant another 900 metre descent from the Servia position and a climb up the other side. ‘That march near killed us’, one veteran later wrote, as the mountain ‘seemed to have no top.’4 Once at Zarkos this brigade would form

2 Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, pp. 90-91; Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, p. 409; Long, Greece, and Syria, p. 81. 3 ‘The campaign in Greece, April 1941’, Brigadier S.F. Rowell, 6 June 1941, AWM 3DRL 6763(A) [1-4]; Anzac Corps War Diary, ANZ ADQZ 18906, WAII8/2/9; ‘6 Inf. Bde O.O. 2’, 16 April 1941, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/1658; ‘War Diary of HQ 6 NZ Inf. Bde.’, 18886, WAII1/1658; ‘History of the 2 NZ Division Engineers. Campaign in Greece, March to April 1941’, ANZ ADQZ 18886, WAII1/139. 4 Letter, Lieutenant K.L Kesteven, 2/4 Battalion, 17 May 1941, AWM 54, 234/2/17.