Military Cooperation, Transatlantic Relations and Military Non-Alliance - a Conceptual Analysis with a Focus on the Cases of Finland and Sweden Möttölä, Kari

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Military cooperation, transatlantic relations and military non-alliance - a conceptual analysis with a focus on the cases of Finland and Sweden Möttölä, Kari

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article

Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Möttölä, K. (2001). Military cooperation, transatlantic relations and military non-alliance - a conceptual analysis with a focus on the cases of Finland and Sweden. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 30(4), 393-410. https:// nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-59816

Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung- This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu (Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see: den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.de Kari Möttölä (Helsinki) Military cooperation, transatlantic relations and military non-alliance – a conceptual analysis with a focus on the cases of Finland and Sweden

Der Artikel behandelt die Teilnahme militärisch bündnisfreier Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union – mit Finnland und Schweden als Fallbeispielen – an der im Entstehen begriffenen internationalen militärischen Kooperation in Europa. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dabei den Implikationen von Bündnisfreiheit für ihre Rolle in den transatlantischen Beziehungen geschenkt. Finnlands und Schwedens Beziehungen zur NATO im Rahmen der Partnerschaft für den Frieden (PfP) folgt der Logik institutionalistischer Trends in der Theorie und Praxis internationaler Beziehungen. Im Zuge der NATO-Erweiterung in der Region sind die beiden Staaten mit Machtpolitik konfrontiert, wobei die Option ihrer eigenen Mitgliedschaft durch politische und Identitätsfaktoren bestimmt wird. Durch ihre aktive Rolle im Rahmen der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESDP) der EU sind Finnland und Schweden Teil des Mainstreams der Union. Sie lassen sich dabei von pragmatischen Zielen der Entwicklung einer autonomen Handlungsfähigkeit der EU in Kooperation mit der NATO leiten, wobei sie die Autonomie der Entscheidungsfindung der Union als Basis weiterer Integration zu verteidigen suchen. Dadurch verfolgen die beiden Staaten dezidiert europäische politische Ziele, die in zunehmendem Maße von den Zielen der USA in Bezug auf Themen der globalen Sicherheit abweichen können. In Zukunft werden die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik sowie die ESDP die effektivsten Mittel Finnlands und Schwedens zur Beeinflussung der transatlantischen Beziehungen sein.

1. Introduction: military cooperation and conflicts and disputes have emerged as security its implications for European security risks and challenges that concern not only the direct parties but also other states concerned Military cooperation has an enlarging and about such spill-over effects as the spread of growing role in the transformation of the Euro- political instability, the danger of escalation and pean security order that has entered the second the regression of transition and integration pro- post-Cold War decade. At the same time, the cesses underway since the end of the division interaction over a wide scope of military and of Europe. Simultaneously, traditional military defence issues has become a key challenge for threats against territorial integrity have contin- the foreign and security policies of states as ac- ued to diminish for the large majority of states, tors in the unification of Europe. Defence poli- although the arrangements established for open- cies and military doctrines, adapted to the re- ness in defence policies, armaments projects and quirements and possibilities in the security and military activities and the assessment of defen- integration environment, are shaping the secu- sive-offensive capabilities remain on the security order as its essential elements.1 rity agenda for all responsible and competent The nature and substance of international actors. military cooperation has changed over the past Consequently, crisis management has decade. A complex array of internal and local emerged as the new main focus of military co-

ÖZP, 30 (2001) 4 393 operation, but it remains part of a broader prac- joint missions and to close the widening gap tice of cooperative security. The use of military between the United States and its European al- means by states and international institutions for lies and partners in the generation and such missions as peacekeeping, peace-enforce- modernisation of military resources. ment and humanitarian intervention is embed- ded within cooperative security management across the entire conflict cycle that entails also Explaining the new military cooperation early warning and conflict prevention as well as post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilita- As an element shaping the European security tion. Facing a growing set of tasks that may in- order, military cooperation is driven by a wide clude the militarily robust separation of parties range of factors that can be related to all the as well as the politically sensitive cooperation principal theories or explanatory models of In- between political and military missions on the ternational Relations.2 field, defence establishments everywhere are Primarily, military cooperation can be viewed engaged in restructuring and reconfiguration as another task for multilateral or inter-state that may turn out to be as demanding as the management, where institutions and regimes build-up effort aimed at stemming the Cold War serve as platforms for states’ cooperative efforts confrontation was in its time. based on common gains to be won in the reduc- The concept and practice of military cooperation of transaction costs and improved efficiency tion extends beyond crisis management in its of outcomes. In neoliberalism, and the institu- varying and developing forms. Defence-related tionalist approach in general, military coopera- support is provided for states that are recon- tion is envisioned and pursued along a progres- structing, reforming and restructuring their sive path towards such goals as stability and armed forces for tasks related to national or col- democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. As lective defence and international responsibili- institutions and other arrangements grow and ties by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adapt in their performance capability, security (NATO) in its Partnership for Peace (PfP) problems are mitigated, solved and overcome programmes and Membership Action Plans through cooperation based on common rules and (MAP) as well as by countries in regional con- practices. texts such as the Baltic Security Assistance At the same time, military cooperation can be (BALTSEA) coordinated by a number of Nor- explained in neorealist terms, as persuasion ar- dic and western states. Military-to-military co- ranged, led and shaped by actors pursuing their operation is aimed at contributing to the overall security interests within a recurring power struc- transition support for recipient states in the ture. Institutions and other multilateral arrange- value-based unification of the geopolitical space ments reflect or reinforce power relations, no- covered by the Organisation for Cooperation and tably the aggregation of the military capabili- Security in Europe (OSCE) and the enlargement ties of the United States and NATO, the recent of European integration. assertion of the EU onto the military-security Finally, military cooperation is not only a chal- scene and the weakened position of Russia in lenge for transition states, it has acquired a new shaping and determining European security, urgency among the established democracies and while actors in conflict regions remain objects members of NATO and the European Union of policies. (EU). Faced with the dynamics of high-tech- Finally, military cooperation may be seen as nology at the core of the Revolution of Military political and social construction reflecting the Affairs and the growing but unpredictable de- significance of values and other ideational fac- mands for their indispensable contribution to tors such as identity in international relations, military crisis management, these states are as proposed by constructivist and critical theo- struggling to develop effective armaments co- ries. Accordingly, NATO membership is not operation and new institutional solutions for viewed merely as a security-seeking strategy of

394 balancing against potential threats but also as a environment. Moreover, institutions are becom- process of self-identification and an act of being hybrid in order to combine different secu- longing in the political and economic western rity functions from the management of risks and community. Likewise, the development of com- the resolution of disputes to the aggregation of mon security and defence policy within the EU power to confront threats (Wallander/Keohane can be considered a natural part of comprehen- 1999). sive and deepening integration, resulting from The order of international institutions in the the socialisation process of policy-makers and security field has gone through a structural and the Europeanisation of member-states’ foreign substantive change. While the United Nations policies. 3 (UN) and the OSCE, as universal institutions, On the actor level, participation in military were featured in the immediate post-Wall years cooperation has become indispensable for the as the mandating and lead institutions for tradi- foreign and security policies of states – what- tional peacekeeping, NATO has entered the ever their alignment or orientation in the Cold scene as the institution of choice for organising War system – in transatlantic and all-European and conducting what has emerged as more de- relations. The internationalisation of the doc- manding and complex military crisis manage- trine and practice of defence policy can be ac- ment operations forced by the conflicts in the counted for as adaptation of a state towards its Balkans. More recently, the European Union has security milieu. Moreover, states do not act only launched a process of creating a capability for on a national basis but membership of security- autonomous military crisis management opera- related international organisations affects their tions, gaining a new operative dimension for the policy preferences and outcomes. A particular Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP) challenge to the theoretical foreign policy analy- and supplanting the Western European Union sis is presented by the impact of membership of (WEU), which is being phased out as an active the EU on foreign and security policies of states organisation. as actors and societies (Manners/Whitman Among the inclusive institutions, the UN, 2000). while remaining responsible for a collective se- The following analysis deals with the partici- curity system, is promoting the overall frame- pation of the militarily non-allied member-states work of the community of member-states for of the EU in military cooperation in Europe and, crisis management while operations are increas- in particular, the implications of non-alliance for ingly sub-contracted or delegated to regional their role in transatlantic relations. Particular institutions. The OSCE is engaged primarily in attention is devoted to Finland and Sweden, conflict prevention and civilian crisis manage- which are presented as case studies. In conclu- ment while preparing a capability for military sion, references are made to the principal ex- crisis management as a regional arrangement planatory models in assessing the impact of under the UN Charter. military non-alliance in transatlantic relations. Among the exclusive institutions, NATO has transformed from a military alliance proper to a security management institution, while main- 2. Shaping European and transatlantic taining its core function of collective defence. relations The EU has enlarged its operative responsibili- ties to the area of common defence policy, leav- The response of the international community ing out common defence as represented by the to the broad scope of security challenges in the mutual security guarantee of a defence alliance, post-cold war era has brought institutionalism while maintaining and developing its capabili- to the fore as the natural point of departure for ties in political, economic and humanitarian as- theoretical and analytical explanation. Security- pects of security management. Moreover, both related international institutions are adapting to NATO and the EU connect to most if not all of perform their tasks in an increasingly complex the other OSCE states within a network of bi-

395 lateral and multilateral outreach arrangements. to traditional stationary UN peacekeeping to Russia remains a special partner of both institu- which they were major contributors. Although tions and their members. they considered themselves members of the As the engine of military cooperation in Eu- western democratic community of states by their rope, the transatlantic relationship is affected by political and economic systems, the neutrals the broader context of developments in Europe were not party to the institutionalised political and beyond. Military cooperation has become or military cooperation within NATO or the an arena where NATO is asserting its power in European Community (EC). Europe and the role of the United States is be- Although the neutrals continued to have a ing emphasized as its leading force. At the same mediating role for some time in the transition time, transatlantic relations are being adjusted from the Cold War to the New Europe, they to the introduction of European, global and re- realised that peacetime neutrality defined as gional security issues into the bilateral relation- impartiality in great-power conflicts had no role ship between the United States and the EU and any more for themselves or for European secu- to the establishment and implementation of an rity at large. They were engaged like any other EU-NATO consultation and cooperation mecha- states in maintaining, promoting and protecting nism in crisis management. the value-based accountability regime estab- The militarily non-allied members of the Eu- lished for the CSCE/OSCE area by the Paris ropean Union, which do not belong to NATO, Charter of 1990 marking the end of the division have adapted their foreign and security policies in Europe.4 to engage in European integration, to share in A new challenge was presented to the secu- the transatlantic link through the EU-US dia- rity policy adaptation of the post-neutrals by the logue and the PfP, while maintaining the mem- stepping up of NATO as a security management bership option, and to contribute to common institution opening towards enlargement and security in the OSCE space and its subregional cooperating with non-members and by the de- contexts. In all those dimensions, they have velopment of the European Union and its com- made choices regarding military cooperation mon foreign and security policy, which included that conform with their position on independent defence policy aspirations and the possibility of or separate self-defence. common defence. These developments launched the engagement of the post-neutral states, which were contemplating accession to the EU initially 3. Post-neutrals, security, and integration for compelling economic reasons but also for in Europe political and security reasons (Luif 1995), in transatlantic politics with military implications. The established neutral states (Finland, Swe- As a result, the post-neutrals remained discern- den, Switzerland, Austria and Ireland) had ible as a category of states in the post-division strengthened and consolidated their positions Europe, while Central and Eastern European towards the end of the Cold War as recognised states, which had but a long-term perspective contributors to security and stability in the East- for EU membership, turned to NATO member- West system (Hakovirta 1988). While provid- ship as their immediate recipe for security con- ing good offices in European security and co- cerns. operation, disarmament and peacekeeping, the Although there have been differences in the neutrals enhanced directly and indirectly their timing and the substantive emphasis of actions, own security. The sufficiency and credibility of all the cold war neutrals have embarked upon a their defence was measured as their capability similar double-track policy of membership of to protect territorial integrity in a side theatre of the EU and partnership with NATO – even Swit- a larger conflict – not against a separate attack zerland, which has remained outside the EU, has by a major power – and the resources and skills joined the PfP. In the context of accession to the needed for international missions were limited EU, Finland, Sweden and Austria confirmed

396 their commitment without reservations to the preparation and decision-making on combined goals of the CFSP, including the provisions of operations led by NATO in the PfP framework. the (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union And finally, Finland and Sweden have estab- (TEU) that refer to common defence policy and lished themselves as dialogue partners with common defence (Kuosmanen 2001, 232–234). NATO on implications of its enlargement for Together with this political and legal commit- European and Northern European stability and ment, the behaviour of the former neutrals as security as well as innovative contributors to new members has confirmed that military non- subregional political-military security in their alliance does not restrict or limit equal and full immediate environment shaped by the enlarge- participation in the CFSP. ment of the EU and NATO.5 The steps of engagement in deeper security Although slight differences remain in the ad- policy cooperation have been taken by the justment of their foreign and security policy former neutrals within the policy of military non- doctrines from broad peacetime neutrality to the alliance, without joining NATO and without maintenance of military non-alliance as its re- being faced with a decision on adopting com- sidual core, and in their overall strategies to- mon defence as members of the EU. When sev- wards the development of the Union, Finland eral elements in the transatlantic and Euro-At- and Sweden have pursued an identical or simi- lantic dimensions of the international security lar approach to security and military coopera- equation have been changing and evolving – tion within the transatlantic community and to NATO, the PfP, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership the protection and promotion of their national Council (EAPC), the EU, the CFSP, enlargement and regional security interests.6 of NATO and enlargement of the EU – the post- neutrals have been part of the transformation without a particular need or pressure to align 4. Coping with NATO transformation and militarily but, at the same time, without renounc- enlargement ing such an option in either case, NATO or the EU/CFSP. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the division of Europe into two op- posing military alliances, Finland and Sweden Finland and Sweden as case studies – like Austria and Switzerland – remained non- The relationship between military non-alli- allied without any compelling consideration of ance and military cooperation in the transatlan- an alternative defence solution. There was no tic and euroatlantic contexts can be approached security deficit or obvious threat that should or through the cases of Finland and Sweden. would be solved by accession to NATO nor was In a series of initiatives and representations, there a need to join NATO as a confirmation of Finland and Sweden have ascertained their democratic identity and transition, unlike the policy of active participation and engagement Central European states, which soon took up in the development and implementation of the NATO membership as a key instrument in their security and defence dimension of the CFSP of integration with the New Europe. the European Union and the operationalisation What emerged for Finland and Sweden was and application of the partnership of NATO the need to assure a proper presence in – and while reaffirming their membership option. influence on – decisions and arrangements that They confirmed their right to equal participa- closely affect their security and that are man- tion in all EU activities and missions as full aged primarily by NATO or within the PfP members, including situations in which the framework as part of their broader engagement Union takes recourse to the assets and capabili- in cooperative security in Europe. Moreover, ties of the western defence alliance (the WEU, there remained the issue of NATO membership NATO). They also asserted the need for a le- as an option to be called upon in case of change gitimate and effective role for non-members in in the security situation or as a possibility to be

397 upheld as the right of every state to choose or lines document (the Political-Military Frame- change its security policy arrangements. Such a work, PMF) on principles and modalities for the two-pillar policy towards NATO has served Fin- participation of partner countries in NATO-led land and Sweden throughout the first post-Cold PfP operations was adopted in 1999, its imple- War decade and into the continued transforma- mentation in the case of KFOR was not satis- tion of Europe in the second decade. factory and the issue of legitimate access to NATO/PfP planning structures remains on the agenda for non-allied PfP partners.9 PfP, regional security and membership Finland has asserted that attaining interoperability and cooperating in the field with Although the first bilateral contacts with NATO troops not only contribute to the devel- NATO as an institutional partner were joined opment of the national defence but also make with inflated public attention and political sym- more effective the reception and use of interna- bolism, in particular Finland’s observer status tional assistance, which Finland can call upon with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in crisis even as a UN member. One of the three (NACC) in 1992, it soon became evident that readiness brigades being developed by the Finn- the motivating factors for the non-allied post- ish Defence Forces is spearheading, as NATO neutrals in their adherence to the PfP were the interoperable, through the reinforced PfP/PARP need to continue to contribute to European mili- programme.10 Sweden has a declared goal of tary security through the emerging leading in- making its entire defence forces interoperable stitutional arrangement (NATO/PfP) and, sec- with NATO, which indirectly serves mutual co- ondly, to gain from the practical lessons learnt operation in crises affecting Sweden as well, from the bilateral cooperation on defence plan- although it has not accentuated the reception of ning with NATO (Individual Partnership assistance in defence doctrine.11 Moreover, Programme; Planning and Review Process, Sweden has a particularly active and high pro- PARP) for the modernisation and restructuring file as a participant and lead nation in PfP and of their national defence forces.7 in the spirit of the PfP exercises in the Baltic By joining the PfP and engaging in the PARP Sea region. process with an ambitious programme for pro- As for the NATO option in security doctrine, moting interoperability, Finland and Sweden are Finland and Sweden maintain a similar practi- enhancing their ability to contribute further to cal argument, which states that by contributing joint NATO-led missions with growing military to stability and security in the Baltic Sea region demands. their military non-alliance best promotes their At the same time, with their experience and national security as well under the prevailing tradition in UN peacekeeping and the broad conditions. The stabilising role of the Finnish social background and professional civilian ex- and Swedish doctrines is a reference to the most pertise of their troops recruited from the re- serious regional security concern, a potential serves, Finland (and Sweden) can provide a conflict involving Russia and the Baltic States, particularly suitable input to comprehensive in- as well as the most serious international secu- ternational and inter-institutional missions such rity concern, Russia’s potential reactions to as those in Bosnia and Kosovo, where they are NATO enlargement up to its borders. involved in the NATO-led SFOR and KFOR While Finland and Sweden demonstrate a forces.8 particular consideration of regional security is- Finland and Sweden have been active in the sues and Russia’s concerns, they do not restrict strengthening and improvement of the position their freedom of action nor do they endorse or of partners in political consultation and deci- accept the freezing or cementing of the prevail- sion-making, operational planning and coming situation in the Baltic Sea region as sepa- mand arrangements concerning their contribu- rate from the overall security order in the OSCE tion to NATO-led missions. Although a guide- area. The freedom of choice principle and the

398 need for flexibility remain key underlying factor in assessing the benefits of membership re- tors in their regional security policies. mains the deterrent effect of the security guar- Furthermore, Finland and Sweden see them- antee and the assurance of assistance, even if selves as contributors to a comprehensive pro- its credibility may be questioned against the les- cess of change that affects Northern Europe as sons learnt from history, although the influence well as Europe as a whole. Their approach was argument is gaining ground in the elite discus- promoted in 1998 in a joint initiative that con- sion. It is also notable that Finland puts special tained an offer of additional military confidence- emphasis on the influence argument in its EU and security building measures (CSBMs) with policy, whereas Sweden has had to maintain a neighbours in the region, based on the overall certain distance from the core of the Union due OSCE regime, while rebutting Russian ideas for to stronger domestic euroscepticism. a closed regional security order based on great- In the military threat perception, a geopoliti- power guarantees or a special position for Rus- cally explainable difference comes out in the sia. At the same time, the Finnish-Swedish ini- public assessment by Sweden of the absence of tiative endorsed regional multilateral coopera- a threat of invasion for at least the next ten years tion in non-military fields and the rational and provided that other factors such as the Swedish pragmatic use of European and transatlantic in- defence capability remain undisrupted. Al- stitutions, including the EAPC, for the promo- though there are similar trends in the Finnish tion of cooperative security in Europe through analysis, no specified assertions are made of the a regional focus. existence or absence of the possibility of a large- Finland states in its security and defence doc- scale attack beyond the notion that it has been trine that NATO membership remains an option further diminishing. Consequently, although although it is not on the active policy agenda. coming later, the restructuring planned and un- The doctrine indicates that membership is con- derway in the conscription- and mobilisation- ditioned by external and internal factors that will based territorial defence system is deeper in have to change for the membership issue to be Sweden than in Finland. While Finland stresses taken up for decision-making. Sweden does not the vital significance of territorial defence as a maintain an option as openly in its declared complement to the mobile readiness force gen- doctrine and it has adhered to the formulation erated for the prevention and suppression of stra- where non-participation in military alliances in tegic strikes as the new principal threat, Swe- peacetime aims at retaining the possibility of den takes up the adaptability of the defence sys- neutrality in war in the vicinity. On the other tem and the sufficient strategic warning time in hand, in the Swedish public arena there are sig- case a restructuring back to a territorial defence nificant players, such as leading news media, configuration were required. experts and political parties that support or cam- paign openly for accession to NATO. In Fin- land there is no corresponding notable domes- Facing the issue of enlargement tic political pressure for membership, although the topic comes up regularly in public discus- While NATO membership has not emerged sion. The public opinion is clearly against NATO as an issue requiring direct decisions by Fin- membership in both countries. 12 land and Sweden, they have been faced with its There is a discernible difference in the rela- implications indirectly through the process of tive emphasis given to the factors of assured NATO enlargement. The issue arose as a dis- influence and security guarantees as benefits tinct challenge to their security policy when the sought in possible membership of NATO. In the decision on the first wave of new members be- Swedish debate, a widely used and key argu- came imminent in 1996–1997. In a joint memo- ment among proponents of membership is the randum to NATO, Finland and Sweden ex- need to ensure Sweden’s presence in decisions pressed their interests and concerns and offered affecting its security. In Finland, the main fac- their cooperation based on NATO’s commitment

399 to an enlargement process that would enhance enlargement is approaching in 2002, with a European security at large. By engaging NATO growing possibility of a Baltic dimension,16 Fin- in a dialogue on the implications of enlargement, land and Sweden continue to be involved in the Finland and Sweden established themselves as process as contributors and demanders. Russia recognized partners with legitimate concerns clearly expects them to adhere to the policy of and security producers. 13 non-alliance, while the United States, as the As NATO was preparing a special charter ar- main protagonist and leader of the policy of rangement with Russia as an effort to acknowl- enlargement, expects Finland and Sweden to edge Russia’s great-power position without giv- play a continued stabilising and mitigating role ing it a veto on enlargement, a natural concern whichever way the decision might go – as con- of Finland and Sweden was to make sure that tributors to the continued stability and transi- no decisions concerning their security or their tion of the Baltic States, in case of no NATO region would be made above their heads in such enlargement in the region, or possibly by join- a great-power arrangement. Moreover, the ini- ing NATO as well or otherwise softening the tiative towards NATO signalled a permanent effect of a Baltic accession in Russia’s eyes. interest by Finland and Sweden in safeguard- While the Nordic members of NATO, Denmark, ing their region from any undue or unreason- Norway and Iceland, are active proponents of able side-effects from a conflict over enlarge- Baltic membership, Finland and Sweden are ment. At the same time, they were expressing hard pressed to indicate their position beyond confidence in NATO’s intentions towards over- merely referring to the freedom of choice prin- all European security and stressing the Baltic ciple. States’ right to choose their own security policy As Sweden emphatically, and also Finland, line. Moreover, Sweden and Finland jointly con- shy away from being given any kind of a guar- ducted a parallel discussion with Russia during antor status vis-à-vis the security of the Baltic the formative period connected with the first States, they cannot be involved in the decision wave of enlargement and Russia’s responses that that is to be made by the NATO members. Con- included its proposal for a closed regional se- sequently, Sweden and Finland do not give di- curity system.14 rect advice on, or pretend to be able to promote Finland and Sweden were drawn into the poli- NATO membership for the Baltic States. Swe- tics of NATO enlargement in the North also by den seems to promote the inevitability of Baltic the active policy of the United States towards membership as part of European transition. the Baltic States and Northeastern Europe at While Finland has come to acknowledge the large. Early on in the debate, Finland and Swe- increased likelihood of Baltic memberships, it den were presented by US analysts as key re- stresses its role in promoting EU enlargement gional players capable of promoting objectives as the effective contribution to regional stabil- common with those of the United States and ity. While emphasizing that Baltic memberships NATO.15 Finland and Sweden supported the are not against its security interests, Finland re- transition and consolidation of the Baltic States frains from making concrete predictions on their by political, economic as well as defence assis- consequences to regional security.17 tance for the construction of their national de- While the second round of NATO enlargement fence forces. Finland and Sweden would also seems to intensify the political linkage of the have a key role in speeding up the admittance process with the position of Finland and Swe- of the Baltic States to membership of the EU as den as non-allied regional players, it will also an alternative or complementary measure to their reconfirm the difference between their policy potential NATO membership. on NATO membership and that of the Baltic Consequently, the non-alliance of Finland and States. At the same time, Finland and Sweden Sweden has been a position widely supported continue to remain effective interlocutors of the and accepted by the leading NATO powers as United States because of their strategic position well as Russia. As the second wave of NATO and policy of military non-alliance.

400 Summing up As for the option of NATO membership, Fin- land and Sweden have retained their freedom The agenda of military cooperation between of choice, while any decisions changing their Finland and Sweden, as militarily non-allied non-alliance status are influenced and shaped states, and NATO consists of three issue-areas: by a broad spectrum of domestic, social and practical cooperation in crisis management political factors that make membership a broad within the PfP framework, dialogue on NATO issue of identity construction as well. Due to enlargement and its regional implications, and their geopolitical situation, as applicants and respect for the right of choice related to the op- invitees Finland and Sweden would be faced tion of membership. Viewed from the Finnish with the realities of strategic power calculations and Swedish perspectives, the relations with by the US and NATO at large. Institutional and NATO in each of these issue-areas are guided managerial arrangements would not present a and affected differently by the explanatory fac- major obstacle because of their established tors of management, power and identity (see democratic systems and the progress in military Figure 1). interoperability produced by the intensive work within PfP cooperation and based on existing credible national defence systems. Figure 1. Explaining the agenda of military cooperation PARTNER- ENLARGE- MEMBERSHIP 5. Enhancing the role of the EU in the field SHIP MENT OPTION of security and defence MANAGEMENT 1 2 3 POWER 3 1 2 Membership of the European Union is the IDENTITY 2 3 1 main platform for the militarily non-allied coun- Note: Rank order of factors guiding and affecting the relations tries in their engagement in shaping political and of Finland and Sweden as non-allied states with NATO over military security in Europe and is also their most the main three issue-areas. effective channel in influencing transatlantic relations. Although the EU has long remained – and still primarily is – a political, economic Contributing to NATO-led military crisis man- and humanitarian actor, it is in the development agement is, above all, a task of institutional of the integration and common policies of the management for Finland and Sweden, which are Union where Finland and Sweden, as well as both contributors to and consumers of the com- Austria and Ireland (Keohane 2001), have been mon gains in international military cooperation. realigning their neutrality conceptions and Secondly, they have an interest in identifying adapting their foreign and security and, more themselves with the inclusive process of PfP recently, also their defence doctrines. cooperation that benefits the overall OSCE se- In a broader context, changes in the security curity space, while power affects mainly the is- and defence policies have been part of the over- sue of non-member participation in planning and all adaptation process brought about by mem- preparation of NATO-led missions. bership of the EU. In the Europeanisation of In enlargement, Finland and Sweden are faced foreign and security policy, a growing array of with an outcome of the power structure, which assessments, decisions and actions take place they can influence only marginally. At the same within the Union and through the CFSP mecha- time, they can contribute to the broader man- nism. For the former neutrals, past beliefs and agement of regional security and stability by conceptions of neutrality form a particular area assistance and support for the Baltic States and of adaptation. Although national defence proper by promoting PfP-related activity in the region. – whether separate (independent) or common Finally, Finland and Sweden do not see them- defence – remains domain privé as long as an selves in the same group as transition countries article V commitment is not adopted as part of seeking NATO membership. the TEU, the security and defence policy of

401 members remains under the influence of sev- The European Security and Defence Policy eral other factors. (ESDP) has not included or activated the dis- Finland and Sweden stress the role of the EU cussion on a common defence commitment but as an amplifier of their influence in international has retained the concept of the Petersberg tasks affairs and, more indirectly, as a contributor to as the operative focus. As for the transfer of their security. Consequently, they are willing and certain functions and bodies from the WEU to prepared to contribute to strengthening the effi- the EU, the Finnish-Swedish approach even ciency of the CFSP both institutionally and in prior to Amsterdam was to stress the role of the joint outcomes. Union as the institution making the decisions The Finnish-Swedish initiative of 1996 on and taking the political responsibility in the con- introducing the security and defence dimension duct of European operations. The EU-WEU as a practical and concrete common policy into model was never tested and remained too com- what became the Amsterdam Treaty was aimed plicated to work. The decision to make the EU at strengthening the capability of the Union in the institution that would not only plan and de- international security beyond its previous role cide upon but also conduct European military in political and economic matters. The initia- crisis management operations conformed with tive had three main objectives, namely, intro- the CFSP philosophy of Finland and Sweden. ducing the Petersberg tasks as membership ob- Moreover, the ESDP strengthened their equal ligations, strengthening the operative link be- position as full members of the Union through- tween the EU and the WEU in conducting such out the process of crisis management, as the operations, and securing for the militarily non- complicated arrangements within the WEU allied members a position on equal footing in framework were replaced. planning and decision-making related to such Consequently, Finland played a major role EU-led operations.18 during its Presidency in the negotiations on the At the same time, the Finnish-Swedish initia- headline goal and the principles, institutions and tive guided the work towards military crisis mechanisms of the ESDP that were adopted at management – and armaments cooperation – as the Helsinki Summit of 1999. During its Presi- the operative substance of common defence dency in the first half of 2001, Sweden pursued policy and kept out the issue of common de- an active role in the implementation of the defence, which was promoted in the competing cisions adopted at the Nice European Council proposal by Germany and France on the step- towards making the ESDP operational by the by-step integration of the WEU into the EU. end of 2001 and finalising the institutional ar- There was no consensus for the introduction of rangements with NATO and third countries. The common defence and the Finnish-Swedish ini- Chief of Finnish Defence, General Gustav tiative was effectively adopted at Amsterdam, Hägglund, was selected by his peers as the first while common defence was reaffirmed as a pos- Chairman of the EU Military Committee. Ear- sible finalité goal requiring a unanimous deci- lier in 1998, Austria had been active in prepar- sion. The outcome confirmed the assessment ing the operationalisation of the defence dimen- made by the new members that their specific sion by inviting the defence ministers to a first position in the defence area would not limit their unofficial meeting, thus initiating the practice participation or influence in the CFSP. of having defence ministers join foreign minis- As the next step was taken by the EU after ters at the Council or meet separately when is- the 1998 St. Malo initiative of France and the sues to be discussed call for their expertise. UK, followed by consecutive decisions in the A further joint initiative by Finland and Swe- Cologne and Helsinki summits of 1999, there den, in 2000, pushed forward the strengthening was no difficulty for Finland and Sweden to of the capability of the EU in civilian crisis support, and actively shape, the further devel- management as an integral and complementary opment of the common security and defence part of the reform of the CFSP that was launched policy. by the new phase in the development of the com-

402 mon security and defence policy.19 Broad con- ence their views of the objectives of the ESDP sensus has emerged in support of steps towards and the mandate issue of humanitarian interven- operationalising the EU capability in the field, tions and EU-led operations. starting with policing, as it had become clear The implications of the European Security and that the civilian component was not aimed at Defence Policy for security relations between interfering with the development of the head- the EU and the United States can be viewed from line goal but at complementing the overall ca- the perspective of the change launched in the pability of the Union in crisis management. Union by the ESDP, and the consequent re- The impact of membership of the EU in the sponse by the US, and the adaptation of NATO adaptation of the foreign and security policies to the emergence of a new institutional player of such non-allied members as Finland and in military security management and defence Sweden is of particular complexity in the area policy developments in Europe. of security and defence. On one hand, national On the basis of this approach, an analysis20 defence is kept outside the Union acquis and can be conducted around three concepts deter- special attention is required in the development mining the impact of the ESDP on the role of of the EU-NATO relationship. On the other the EU in international security management: hand, both countries are engaged fully in the ● competence: determining such items as pur- CFSP and the ESDP to augment the impact of pose, power as decision-making, and au- their national policies and to promote common tonomy; values and objectives. Participating in common ● capability: performance, institutions, input policies of a global player, they are exposed to and output contributions; the socialisation and Europeanisation process, ● authority: power as prestige and leadership which is enlarging the scope and weight of is- in governance; and order, influence and iden- sues being worked through the CFSP mecha- tity. nism. The CFSP is not only a complement to national policy; it is also a factor that develops In these three dimensions, developments mea- national foreign and security policy. sure the autonomy of the EU in military crisis management and its linkage with the US/NATO as factors that constrain, guide and adapt the Implications of the ESDP for transatlantic development and implementation of the ESDP. relations The degree of autonomy-linkage can be analysed against the preconditions set by the US Coming from the tradition and practice of for the effects of the ESDP on NATO and the neutrality, and the northern European strategic transatlantic security link: decoupling-indivis- environment with its sensitivities to great-power ibility; duplication-improvement; discrimina- politics, Finland and Sweden are not natural tion-inclusiveness.21 adherents of either Europeanist or Atlanticist The ESDP is not so much about the relation- schools as developed in the European Commu- ship between the EU and NATO as it is about nity/Union over decades. For Finland and Swe- the relationship between the EU and the US. The den, the EU can be an avenue that combines political, institutional and practical as well as and satisfies both orientations in a balanced military factors behind the EU’s drive in fram- manner. For geopolitical reasons they consider ing the defence aspects of the CFSP will shape the US presence in Europe important while the EU-US relationship. viewing the EU as their main instrument in pro- The political factor is derived from the inter- moting values and policy preferences based on nal political dynamics of the Union, which are common European history and identity. More- affected by ideational and power relations over, Sweden and Finland are active and suc- among members plus their perceptions of the cessful proponents of multilateral cooperation objectives and direction that the common poli- within the UN and the OSCE, which may influ- cies of the Union should pursue. The relation-

403 ship between the Europeanist and Atlanticist degree of accommodation and competition in schools of transatlantic relations is a case in defining NATO as the institution of first choice point. in military crisis management. As states ben- The institutional factor is linked with the in- efiting particularly from membership, Finland ternal dynamics of the integration process. It is and Sweden are strong proponents of its deci- theoretical or ideological by nature in stressing sion-making autonomy and the cohesion and the inevitability of the development of the Union integrity of the unified institutional structure. towards a finalité goal that includes common The competence, as tasks assigned by the EU defence. The theoretical-ideological approach for the ESDP, can be read in treaty-making, ca- stresses the integrity of the institutional struc- pabilities devoted to and strategies defined or ture of the Union and its internal rules of the scenarios assumed for EU-led missions. Al- game. though competence defined as tasks is an open- The practical factor is based on a pragmatic ended category, the formal and institutional limi- approach to the external challenges facing the tations, reinforced by real and pragmatic poli- Union. The response should be designed and tics, profile the Union as a junior partner to measured according to the tasks at hand and the NATO in military crisis management. With ac- Union should be open to cooperation and part- tive participation in the PfP, Finland and Swe- nership with other institutional players. There den have no interest in duplicating efforts in is less concern about the self-value of the Union, resource generation and maintain a pragmatic its institutions and separate objectives. approach to NATO’s leading role. The military factor would be related to the The generation of an EU capability for au- protection of the territorial integrity of the Union tonomous action in military crisis management, and its members. It would become a motivating as envisaged in the decisions of the Union on factor in case the members were to perceive an resources assigned for the rapid reaction force external threat and a security deficit. Such a situ- and the institutional reform carried out in the ation would arise, for example, if NATO were Council structure for the political control and to be dissolved or otherwise lose its credibility strategic direction of EU-led operations, will as a collective defence arrangement for mem- measure the political-military credibility of the bers and non-allied members would lose confi- ESDP and its significance for European secu- dence in their separate national defence. rity. In this context, the US is driving the dis- In the broader context, the prospect of diver- cussion on the need for high-technology based gence vs. convergence between the EU and the defence reforms and armaments cooperation and US in their grand strategies of geopolitics, doc- integration. trine and military technology is emerging as a The added value brought by the ESDP to the factor framing the evolution of the ESDP in US- aggregate capabilities, primarily existing EU relations. It is shaped by such issues as mis- through NATO and its Partnership for Peace, sile defence and international terrorism. The for military crisis management in Europe will question asked is whether the security policy arise from the forces and collective capabilities relationship between the European Union and developed, the enhanced institutional capabil- the United States is being based on a division ity and new strategic culture created for dealing of labour or partnership or possibly in their com- with political-military issues, the public and bination.22 parliamentary support that is envisaged and also The competence of the EU in military crisis the intensified work on the capability for civil- management remains based on the fundamen- ian crisis management, which further strength- tal principle of autonomy in decision-making, ens the EU’s position as a comprehensive player emphasizing the theoretical or ideological mo- in stability and security promotion. As a dis- tivation and the perception of the ESDP/CFSP tinct security entity, the EU is seen as perform- as a step in the historical development of EU ing military missions of less than maximum ur- integration. The political motivation shapes the gency.

404 The willingness to assign credible resources a pragmatic interest in building upon their work for EU-led missions is driven largely by prag- within the PfP/PARP as they prepare further matic motivations, as there are no immediate or their forces earmarked for EU-led operations direct needs for military security of the EU or under the headline goal. its members beyond the existing defence ar- As the EU is becoming operational in crisis rangements within NATO or separately outside management, initially during 2001, and finally the EU framework. Finland and Sweden are in 2003, the ESDP will expand the authority of leading proponents of the pragmatic approach, the Union in military security, reinforcing its which measures the need for an EU crisis man- established position in comprehensive security. agement capability, augmented by an access to At the same time, it is evident that NATO will NATO resources, as a response to challenges in remain the institution of choice for the most the European security environment. demanding cooperative military crisis manage- The question of improvement in the genera- ment operations in Europe and the role of NATO tion of capabilities by the ESDP is centred on will be emphasized increasingly as the primary military planning. The implications of the ESDP platform and instrument of US security policy for the regime of military crisis management are in Europe. determined and controlled by the institutional The development of the ESDP will enhance relationships being established between the EU the hybridisation of the Union toward an inter- and NATO in strategic planning, force planning national institution that covers all the sectors of and operational planning. security, excluding common defence proper but The autonomy and identity of the EU are most involving international military cooperation. effectively challenged by the US/NATO prepon- The common security and defence policy of the derance in planning. For the EU to maintain its EU remains initially European in its scope, decision-making autonomy over the whole pro- complementing the global dimension of its po- cess of an operation, a degree of autonomous litical and economic role. As the US’s military planning is required. The relationship between security interests and capabilities are inherently EU planning and NATO defence planning re- global, complementing its global political and mained open after the Nice/Brussels meetings economic role, the relationship between the EU in December 2000 and lingered on beyond the and the US will become increasingly complex 2001 Gothenburg summit. in scope and substance. In strategic planning, NATO will perform an For associated candidate states the ESDP has advisory and supporting role; in operational become an additional membership requirement. planning NATO’s integrated structure SHAPE In EU-Russian relations, the ESDP has opened will have the primary role as requested by the a new issue-area with a potential significance EU in each case. It is in force planning where for the formation of the security order. The EU, most of the ambiguity exists and where the ca- governed by its common strategy and Northern pacity of NATO is most critically guiding, aug- Dimension, will assume increased significance menting and controlling the EU planning pro- as the overall partner of Russia in shaping Eu- cess. ropean stability, security and unification and Although pragmatic motivations prevail in the determining the lines of division in the Euro- issue of planning as part of capabilities genera- pean order. Finland and Sweden are closely in- tion, ideological values of integration are volved in the EU-Russian cooperation. touched upon as well, due to the need to assure Political motivations enhanced by ideologi- the decision-making autonomy and identity of cal factors come to the fore in the issue of au- the Union. Moreover, the need to distinguish thority between the EU and the United States in the alternative option of an autonomous EU-led international relations. Ultimately, this empha- operation without recourse to NATO assets, in sis is true for Sweden and Finland as well, as particular by France, is based on political moti- European and American objectives and grand vations. The militarily non-allied members have strategies continue to diverge under the global

405 security change. In determining its cooperative link to maximum effect in supporting the de- relations in military crisis management with velopment of the military resources of the Union third countries in Europe, the EU is asserting and underpinning its missions. Here also, they its comprehensive strategy for engagement and would be keen on protecting the autonomy of unification, addressing also the specific cases the Union in the issue concerning the review of of Turkey and Russia. For the non-allied mem- force planning, although they do not feel a need bers, it is vital to benefit fully from their status for NATO or the United States to be challenged as members of the Union, while they continue politically as the leading players in military se- to adapt to the position of non-members of curity. NATO in the PfP. In global security issues out- Faced with the broader issue of authority in side Europe, differences of approach between international relations, Finland and Sweden take the EU and the United States reinforce the com- a political approach connected with European mon profile of the EU. ideas, values and traditions. Their past experience as small states or their non-aligned status does not bring them closer than other EU mem- Summing up bers to the US policies in global or regional security issues. On the other hand, Finland and The profile of non-allied members of the EU, Sweden would not perceive the Union neces- such as Finland and Sweden, in their policies sarily as a global power in the same category as towards transatlantic relations in the ESDP con- the United States but take a pragmatic and co- text is shaped by a combination of institutional, operative line when one is called for; and they pragmatic and political motivations and incen- value the stabilising role of the US in the north- tives (see Figure 2). ern European region. The military factor is not an active consider- Figure 2. The profile of Finland and Sweden in ation for Finland and Sweden as long as com- transatlantic military issues mon defence is effectively off the agenda of the COMPETENCE CAPABILITY AUTHORITY ESDP.23 INSTITUTIONAL 1 2 3 In this tentative analysis, the profile of Fin- PRACTICAL 3 1 2 land and Sweden in the ESDP is placed in the POLITICAL 2 3 1 mainstream of the European Union. Being par- MILITARY 4 4 4 ticular about the autonomy of the Union, prag- Note: Rank order of motivations driving their policies and po- matic in EU-NATO cooperation on generating sitions on the competence, capability and authority of the EU in the development of the ESDP and in the relationship with military resources, and political towards global the US/NATO. security issues in the EU-US dialogue, Finland and Sweden contribute to the shaping of trans- In protecting and strengthening the compe- atlantic relations in the field of military coop- tence of the Union, its decision-making au- eration as effective players among the EU mem- tonomy and unified institutional structure, Fin- bers. As long as common defence remains out- land and Sweden are driven, first of all, by the side the effective development of the ESDP, the theoretical or ideological factor. They do not shy policy of military non-alliance is but one and away from the long-term goals or ideals of the not necessarily a decisive factor in shaping their Union, although they do not encourage efforts role in political-military transatlantic relations. to define them in any binding manner. Political and pragmatic factors would follow in that order. 6. Conclusions In addressing the issue of the capability of the Union in military crisis management, Finland Despite the dominant position of NATO in the and Sweden primarily take a pragmatic ap- military politics of European security, militar- proach. They are willing to use the EU-NATO ily non-allied members of the European Union

406 are competent and effective players in military the OSCE Code of Conduct on politico-military as- aspects of transatlantic relations and European pects of security, held in 1997 and 1999. While the previous forum brings together all the states of the security at large. OSCE region to discuss developments in the secu- The role of non-allied states is evolving in the rity environment, military doctrines and defence re- context of change in both of the principal secu- forms, as well as military cooperation, the latter fo- rity institutions, NATO and the European Union, rum deals with rights and principles of states in the choice of their security and defence policies and in and in the transformation in the subject matter the use of armed forces for internal and external tasks. and practice of military cooperation. The en- 2 The great debate on the main schools of thought is gagement and impact of Finland and Sweden assessed in Katzenstein et al. (1998). reflect the explanatory power of the institution- 3 On the effectiveness of the three main theories of international relations in explaining transatlantic realist model in an international order where play- lations, see Duffield (2001). Likewise, foreign policy ers are searching for new and pragmatic solu- outcomes can be explained by three foreign policy tions to common problems and challenges. theories built on the main theoretical schools; see The contribution of Finland and Sweden to Rittberger (2001) for case studies in German post- cold war foreign policy. A similar approach assess- shaping the common security and defence policy ing the roles of power, governance and identity is of the EU demonstrates the dynamics and lim- applied on Finland’s policies towards the EU and its of adaptation as a source and cause of for- NATO in Möttölä (2001c). eign policy change. Finland and Sweden have 4 See Möttölä (1998) on the formative period of the security order after the end of the Cold War. developed their participation in military and 5 Torstila (1998). For the series of joint articles by the defence cooperation but kept the change within foreign and defence ministers of Finland and Swe- the limits of military non-alliance in accordance den, see: first, by foreign ministers Tarja Halonen/ with their national objectives. Lena Hjelm-Wallén, “Cooperation between the EU and the WEU should be strengthened” (in Finnish/ In the future, the ESDP will become more Swedish), Helsingin Sanomat/Dagens Nyheter, 21 effective as a tool with which Finland and Swe- April 1996; “Finland and Sweden on the Approach- den will be able to influence transatlantic rela- ing of Enlargement of NATO”, International Herald tions and even contribute to change in power Tribune, 15 March 1997; second, by defence ministers Björn von Sydow/Anneli Taina, “Finnish-Swed- relations. Moreover, the constructivist model ish defence cooperation deepening in five areas” (in guides their orientation towards a more Finnish/Swedish), Helsingin Sanomat/Dagens Europeanised or EU-channelled security and Nyheter, 13 June 1998; by Halonen/Lindh, “The EU defence policy. At the same time, the realist is developing its crisis management capability” (in forces place the non-allied states in a position Finnish-Swedish), Helsingin Sanomat/Dagens Nyheter, 5 December 1998; and third, by foreign of choice on the diverging paths between the ministers Erkki Tuomioja/Anna Lindh, “The EU must EU and the United States and continue to affect urgently enhance its capability for civilian crisis their immediate security environment in a criti- management” (in Finnish/Swedish), Helsingin cal manner. Sanomat/Dagens Nyheter, 30 April 2000. The joint initiatives are presented in two joint memoranda: “The IGC and the security and defence dimension – towards an enhanced EU role in crisis management”, memorandum by Finland and Sweden, 25 April 1996; “Cooperative security for the Baltic Sea region”, the NOTES Finnish-Swedish non-paper, 17 April 1998 (presented to the OSCE, registered as FSC.DEL/104/98/22 April Note: Statements of fact and opinion are those of the 1998). author and do not imply endorsement by the Finnish 6 For a recent account of the Finnish and Swedish poli- Government. cies, including detailed information on domestic background factors, see Vaahtoranta/Forsberg (2000) 1 The changing military scene is reflected in a repre- and Möttölä (2001c). sentative way in the OSCE seminar on defence poli- 7 On Finland’s participation in the PfP, see Heikkilä cies and military doctrines held in 1990, 1991, and (2000). 1998 and in June 2001 (Seminar on military doc- 8 On the advantage of conscription-trained reservists trines and defence policies in the OSCE area, Vienna, as peacekeeping troops, see Tuomioja (2001). 11 to 13 June 2001, FSC.GAL/78/01/6 July 2001). 9 Political-Military Framework for NATO-led PfP Op- Similarly indicative is the follow-up conference on erations, adopted at the Meeting of the Euro-Atlan-

407 tic Partnership Council at Summit Level, Washing- and think-tank analysts in Washington, D.C., in early ton D.C., 25 April 1999. Finland and Sweden had 2001, after the coming into power of the new US similar unsatisfactory experience in their position as administration. In view of the forthcoming summit full EU members but mere observers in the WEU, in Prague in late 2002, preparations and assessments which was developed as the defence arm of the Union leading to the US stand and consultations with the until the decisions on developing the ESDP by the allies were being initiated at the same time. For a EU. background study on the political and military feasi- 10 On the Finnish doctrine of security and defence bility of the official candidates (MAP countries) and policy, see the government’s white books, “The Eu- the militarily non-allied EU members, see Szayna ropean Security Development and Finnish Defence (2001), which also evaluates the strategic attractive- 1997”, and “The Finnish Security and Defence Policy ness of the Baltic States as well as Finland and Swe- 2001”; for the broad concept of security, see “Secu- den for NATO from the purely military point of view. rity in a Changing World” (1995). On the scope of For an American analysis of strategic developments interoperability in the Finnish Defence Forces, see in the Baltic Sea region, see Perry/Sweeney/Winner Heikkilä (2000, 151) and President Tarja Halonen’s (2000). address to the National Defence Course Association, 17 Increased interest and focus on Finland’s and 21 May, 2001. Sweden’s stands was reflected in the international 11 On the Swedish doctrine of security and defence media from early 2001 on. See, for example, the in- policy, see the government’s white book, “Det nya terview of President Tarja Halonen in Der Spiegel, 9 försvaret (1999/2000)”; for the assessment on the April 2001. For the Swedish view stressing that it is absence of an invasion threat for at least ten years, the Swedish interest that the new democracies reach see p. 12 and the recent analysis of the parliamentary their security policy goals, see a statement by for- defence committee, “Gränsöverskridande sårbarhet eign minister Anna Lindh, 24 January 2001, and as- (2001)”; for a review of the Swedish doctrine, see serting that the end of the Cold War division is not pp. 214 ff. On the need to reassess the neutrality for- complete in the region until Estonia, Latvia and mulation, while maintaining military non-alliance, Lithuania have reached their security policy goals, see foreign minister Anna Lindh’s statement in see Gränsöverskridande sårbarhet, p. 210. Shortly Riksdagen, 7 February 2001. For a comparative look after assuming his post on 4 June 2001, the new Chief at Finland and Sweden across the foreign and secu- of Finnish Defence, Admiral Juhani Kaskeala offered rity policy issue-area, see Huldt et al. (2001). the assessment that the Baltic States’ membership of 12 According to a survey published by the MOD Com- NATO would promote stability in the Baltic Sea re- mission on Defence Information, 5 July 2001, 68 per gion by removing uncertainty around the security im- cent of the Finns are in favour of maintaining mili- plications of the minorities issue, whereas on 17 June tary non-alliance, while 21 per cent are for military 2001 Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen stressed the alignment. When presented with alternatives of mili- importance of the consolidation of the position of tary alliance, 43 per cent pick NATO, 22 per cent are the Baltic States: there should be no grey zones in for the EU and 18 per cent for an alliance with Swe- Finland’s vicinity. President Tarja Halonen, on 3 Sep- den. On the other hand, 53 per cent think that Fin- tember 2001, in connection with President Putin’s land is on its way to committing to NATO member- visit to Finland, noted that the invitation to the Baltic ship as a result of the multi-faceted cooperation un- States from NATO seemed to be a question of time. derway. Recent figures in Sweden are 62 per cent 18 A thorough analysis of the adaptation of Finland’s against and 24 for joining military alliance. and Sweden’s foreign and security policy lines to EU 13 Speaking notes by Finland and Sweden for a dia- membership and the development of the common logue with NATO, 2 April 1997; Finland’s statement security and defence policy is Ojanen et al. (2000), in connection with the Intensified Dialogue with see also Herolf (1999) and Miles (2000). On the point NATO on the basis of the Study on Enlargement, 29 that the firewall established by the assessment and May 1996. calculation that the EU would not proceed to adopt 14 As noted by Torstila (1998), it was the first joint Finn- common defence has been standing erect, providing ish-Swedish mission to Moscow since 1939, when Finland and Sweden with flexibility in their activity they addressed the security of the Åland Islands with on the issue-area, see Möttölä (2001a). the Soviet Union as one of the parties to the interna- 19 The Finnish-Swedish initiative was taken after the tional treaty governing the demilitarised status of the Helsinki Summit. Sweden had been a vocal propo- Åland Islands. The Russian initiatives on Baltic Sea nent of civilian crisis management from the begin- security are analysed in a broad regional framework ning. Moreover, at Sweden’s initiative, an EU in Möttölä (1999/2000). Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts 15 Since the first RAND article on the issue of NATO was adopted by the Gothenburg Summit, stressing enlargement (see Asmus et al. 1996), the question the importance of conflict prevention in the EU’s role. has been approached by the US in a broader frame- 20 This analysis is based on the ISA paper by Möttölä work. (2001b); for prospects of EU-NATO relations in cri- 16 The discussion on the Baltic dimension of NATO sis management, see Gärtner (2001). For recent re- enlargement took an active turn among politicians ports and studies on the ESDP and the EU-US rela-

408 tions, see Andréani et al. (2001), Heisbourg (2000), Howorth, Jolyon (2000). European integration and de- Howorth (2000). Key documents related to the ESDP fence: the ultimate challenge? Chaillot Paper 43, are: Joint declaration on European defence, Franco- Paris. British Summit, St. Malo, 4 December 1998; Euro- Huldt, Bo/Teija Tiilikainen/Tapani Vaahtoranta/Anna pean Council Declaration on strengthening the com- Helkama-Rågård (Eds.) (2001). Finnish and Swed- mon European policy on security and defence, Presi- ish Security: Comparing National Policies, Helsinki. dency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 Katzenstein, Peter J./Robert O. Keohane/Stephen D. and 4 June 1999; Presidency progress report to the Krasner (1998). International Organization and the Helsinki European Council on strengthening the com- Study of World Politics, in: International Organiza- mon European policy on security and defence, Presi- tion, 52(4), 645 ff. dency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 Keohane, Daniel (2001). Realigning neutrality? Irish and 11 December 1999; Presidency report on the Eu- defence policy and the EU, Occasional papers 42, ropean security and defence policy, Presidency Con- Paris. clusions, Nice European Council, 7 and 8 December Kuosmanen, Antti (2001). Finland’s Journey to the Eu- 2000; Presidency Conclusions, Gothenburg European ropean Union, Maastricht. Council, 15-16 June 2001. Luif, Paul (1995). On the Road to Brussels: The Politi- 21 The three D’s were modified by NATO Secretary cal Dimension of Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s General into three I’s with a positive connotation; Accession to the European Union, Vienna. see Sloan (2000). Manners, Ian/Richard Whitman (2000). Conclusion, in: 22 Implications of the widening military gap between Ian Manners/Richard G. Whitman (Eds.): The for- the US and Europe are assessed in Gompert et al. eign policies of European Union Member States, (1999). Manchester/New York, 243 ff. 23 While in Austria a mutual EU security guarantee is Miles, Lee (2000). Sweden and Finland, in: Ian Man- debated as an alternative in future security solutions. ners/Richard G. Whitman (Eds.): The foreign policies of European Union Member States, Manchester and New York, 181 ff. Möttölä, Kari (1998). Collective and Co-Operative Se- LIST OF REFERENCES curity Arrangements in Europe, in: Martti Koskenniemi (Ed.): International Law Aspects of the Andréani, Gilles/Christoph Bertram/Charles Grant European Union, The Hague/London/Boston, 87 ff. (2001). Europe’s military revolution, London. Möttölä, Kari (1999/2000). How Regionalism and Asmus, Ronald D./Robert C. Nurick (1996). NATO En- Subregionalism Fit in the OSCE Security Model, in: largement and the Baltic States, in: Survival 38(2), Dieter S. Lutz/Kurt P. Tudyka (Eds.): Perspektiven 121 ff. und Defizite der OSZE, Baden-Baden, 191 ff. Det nya försvaret. Regeringens proposition 1999/2000: Möttölä, Kari (2001a). Finland, Sweden, and the CFSP, 30, Stockholm. in: Northern Dimensions, Yearbook 2001, Helsinki, Duffield, John S. (2001). Transatlantic Relations after 85 ff. the Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future, in: Möttölä, Kari (2001b). The EU, the US and the Com- International Studies Perspectives, 2(1), 93 ff. mon European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Gompert, David C./ Richard L. Kugler/Martin C. Libicki – towards equal competence, capability and author- (1999). Mind the Gap. Promoting A Transatlantic ity in crisis management? Paper presented at ISA Revolution in Military Affairs, Washington, D.C. Annual Convention, Chicago, 20–24 February 2001. Gränsöverskridande sårbarhet – gemensam säkerhet Möttölä, Kari (2001c). Finland, the European Union and (2001). Säkerhetspolitisk rapport från NATO – Implications for Security and Defence, in: Försvarsberedningen, Stockholm. Erich Reiter/Heinz Gärtner (Eds.): Small States and Gärtner, Heinz (2001). European Security, the Transat- Alliances, Heidelberg, 113 ff. lantic Link, and Crisis Management, in: Heinz Ojanen, Hanna/Gunilla Herolf/Rutger Lindahl (2000). Gärtner/Adrian Hyde-Price/Erich Reiter (Eds.): Non-Alignment and European Security Policy. Am- Europe’s New Security Challenges, Boulder. biguity at Work, Helsinki. Hakovirta, Harto (1988). East-West Conflict and Euro- Perry, Charles M./Michael Sweeney/Andrew C. Winner pean Neutrality, Oxford. (2000). Strategic Dynamics in the Nordic-Baltic Re- Heisbourg, François (2000). European defence: making gion, Everett. it work, Chaillot Paper 42, Paris. Rittberger, Volker (2001) (Ed.). German foreign policy Heikkilä, Kaisa (2000). Suomi ja NATOn since unification, Manchester/New York. rauhankumppanuusohjelma, 2. uudistettu painos, Security in a Changing World. Guidelines for Finland’s Helsinki. Security Policy (1995), Helsinki. Herolf, Gunilla (1999). The Role of Non-Aligned States Sloan, Stanley (2000). The United States and European in European Defence Organizations: Finland and defence, Chaillot Paper 39, Paris. Sweden, in: Mathias Jopp/Hanna Ojanen (Eds.): Szayna, Thomas S. (2001). NATO Enlargement, 2000– European Security Integration. Implications for Non- 2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Alignment and Alliances, Helsinki, 137 ff. Planning and Shaping, Santa Monica.

409 The European Security Development and Finnish De- atlantic relations, and the European security order. Re- fence (1997), Helsinki. cent publications: “Between Order, Uncertainty and Pos- The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001 (2001), sible – outlining the Finnish Security Policy as a Mem- Helsinki. ber of the European Union” (in Finnish), in Olavi Borg Torstila, Pertti (1998). Suomen ja Ruotsin yhteistyön et al. (eds.) (1998) Tieto, valta ja maailmanpolitiikka. ulottuvuudet, in: Ulkopolitiikka, 2, 41 ff. Knowledge, Power and World Politics, University of Tuomioja, Erkki (2001). Sécurité et défense, le point de Tampere; “Finnland und die OSZE”/”Finland and the vue finlandaise sur la PECSD, in: Revue Défense OSCE”, in OSZE-Jahrbuch 1998. Jahrbuch zur Nationale, Mars. Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Vaahtoranta, Tapani/Tuomas Forsberg (2000). Post- Europe (OSZE)/OSCE Yearbook 1998. Yearbook on the Neutral or Pre-Allied? Finnish and Swedish Policies Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on the EU and NATO as Security Organisations. UPI (OSCE) (in German, 1998, in English, 1999), Nomos Working Papers 29. Verlagsgesellschaft; “How Regionalism and Wallander, Celeste A./Robert O. Keohane (1999). Risk, Subregionalism Fit in the OSCE Security Model”, in threat, and security institutions, in: Helga Haftendorn/ Dieter S. Lutz/Kurt P. Tudyka (Eds.) (1999/2000) Robert O. Keohane/Celeste A. Wallander (Eds.) Im- Perspektiven und Defizite der OSZE, Nomos perfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Verlagsgesellschaft; “The Challenge of Collective Ac- Space, Oxford, 21 ff. tion: Security Management in European and Regional Contexts”, in: Heinz Gärtner et al. (Eds.) (2000) Europe’s New Security Challenges, Lynne Rienner; “Finland, the AUTHOR European Union and NATO – Implications for Security and Defence”, in: Erich Reiter/Heinz Gärtner (Eds.) Kari MÖTTÖLÄ, born 1945. Special Adviser in the (2000). Small States and Alliances, Physica-Verlag. Unit for Research and Planning, Political Department, of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Main re- Adress: Kari Möttölä, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, search interests are the doctrine of national security POL-07, POB 176, FIN-00161, Helsinki, Finnland. policy, the CFSP/ESDP of the European Union and trans- Email: [email protected]

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