Clandestine cell system

“Sleeper cell” redirects here. For other uses, see Sleeper passage of time and changes in contemporary thinking cell (disambiguation). and technology.[1] Officially, the PIRA is hierarchical, but, especially as A clandestine cell structure is a method for organizing a British security forces became more effective, changed group of people in such a way that it can more effectively to a semiautonomous model for its operational and cer- resist penetration by an opposing organization. Depend- tain of its support cells (e.g., transportation, intelligence, ing on the group’s philosophy, its operational area, the cover and security).[2] Its leadership sees itself as guid- communications technologies available, and the nature of ing and consensus-building. The lowest-level cells, typ- the mission, it can range from a strict hierarchy to an ex- ically of 2-5 people, tend to be built by people with an tremely distributed organization. It is also a method used existing personal relationship. British counterinsurgents by criminal organizations, undercover operatives, and un- could fairly easily understand the command structure, but conventional warfare (UW) led by special forces. Histor- not the workings of the operational cells. ically, clandestine organizations have avoided electronic The IRA has an extensive network of inactive or sleeper communications, because signals intelligence is a strength cells, so new ad hoc organizations may appear for any of conventional militaries and counterintelligence organi- specific operation. zations. In the context of tradecraft, covert and clandestine are not synonymous. As noted in the definition (which has 1.2 World War II French Resistance been used by the United States and NATO since World War II) in a covert operation the identity of the sponsor is In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted concealed, while in a clandestine operation the operation into occupied France to lead unconventional warfare itself is concealed. Put differently, clandestine means units.[3][4] They would be composed of two officers, one “hidden”, while covert means “deniable”. The adversary American or British, and the other French, the latter is aware that a covert activity is happening, but does not preferably from the area into which they landed. The know who is doing it, and certainly not their sponsor- third member of the team was a radio operator. ship. Clandestine activities, however, if successful, are Especially through the French member, they would con- completely unknown to the adversary, and their function, tact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask such as espionage, would be neutralized if there was any them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (i.e., a sub- awareness of the activity. Saying a "covert cell structure” cell). If the team mission were sabotage, reconnaissance, is tantamount to tautology, because the point of the cell or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units. structure is that its details are completely hidden from the If the team was to carry out direct action, often an un- opposition. wise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals A sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of had military experience, it would be necessary to assem- sleeper agents that lies dormant until it receives orders ble into units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the or decides to act. leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The le- gitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known af- filiation with Allied powers, and it was a structure more 1 History appropriate for UW than for truly clandestine operations.

1.1 Provisional Irish Republican Army 1.3 National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam As opposed to the French Resistance, the modern Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has a history Also known as the Viet Cong, this organization grew from going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th earlier anticolonial groups fighting the French, as well as century, but has little external control. Its doctrine and or- anti-Japanese guerillas during World War II.[5] Its com- ganization have changed over time, given factors such as mand, control, and communication techniques derived the independence of 26 of Ireland’s 32 counties, the con- from the experiences of these earlier insurgent groups. tinued British control of Northern Ireland and the simple The group had extensive support from North Vietnam,

1 2 4 MODELS OF INSURGENCY AND ASSOCIATED CELL CHARACTERISTICS

and, indirectly, from the Soviet Union. It had parallel External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups political and military structures, often overlapping. See in Iraq, for example, do receive assistance from Iran, but Viet Cong and PAVN strategy and tactics. this is not a public position of the government of Iran, and may even be limited to factions of that government. Early US support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban used clandestine operators from both the CIA and United States Army Special Forces. As the latter conflict escalated, the US participation became overt. Note that both unconventional warfare (UW) (guerrilla operations) and foreign internal defense (FID) (coun- terinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organiza- tion. In a covert FID mission, only selected host nation (HN) leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Un- der Operation White Star, US personnel gave covert FID assistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959, be- came overt in 1961, and ceased operations in 1962. A dual, but sometimes overlapping, Party and Military structure was top-down 4 Models of insurgency and associ- The lowest level consisted of three-person cells who op- ated cell characteristics erated quite closely, and engaging in the sort of self- criticism common, as a bonding method, to Communist organizations. While different kinds of insurgency differ in where they place clandestine or covert cells, when certain types of in- surgency grow in power, the cell system is deemphasized. Cells still may be used for leadership security, but, if overt 2 Parallel organizations violence by organized units becomes significant, cells are less important. In Mao’s three-stage doctrine,[7] cells are The NLF and PIRA, as well as other movements, have still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas, chosen to have parallel political and military organiza- but, as the insurgency creates full-time military units in tions. In the case of the NLF, other than some individuals Phase III, the main units are the focus, not the cells. The with sanctuary in North Vietnam, the political organiza- Eighth Route Army did not run on a cell model. tion could not be overt during the Vietnam War. After When considering where cells exist with respect to the the war ended, surviving NLF officials held high office. existing government, the type of insurgency needs to be In the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Féin, be- considered. One US Army reference was Field Manual came increasingly overt, and then a full participant in pol- 100-20, which has been superseded by FM3-07.[8] Draw- itics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt ing on this work, Nyberg (a United States Marine Corps political/social service and covert military wings. officer) extended the ideas to describe four types of cell system, although his descriptions also encompass types of The overt political-covert military split avoided the inflex- insurgencies that the cell system supports.[9] At present, ibility of a completely secret organization. Once an active there is a new type associated with transnational terrorist insurgency began, the secrecy could limited freedom of insurgencies. action, distort information about goals and ideals, and re- strict communication within the insurgency.[6] In a split organization the public issues can be addressed overtly, 1. Traditional: the slowest to form, this reflects a prin- while military actions were kept covert and intelligence cipally indigenous insurgency, initially with limited functions stay clandestine. goals. It is more secure than others, as it tends to grow from people with social, cultural or family ties. The insurgents resent a government that has failed to recognize tribal, racial, religious or linguistic groups 3 External support “who perceive that the government has denied their rights and interests and work to establish or restore Many cell systems still receive, with due attention to se- them. They seldom seek to overthrow the govern- curity, support from the outside. This can range from ment or control the whole society; however, they fre- leaders, trainers and supplies (such as the Jedburgh assis- quently attempt to withdraw from government con- tance to the French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt trol through autonomy or semiautonomy.” The Mu- activities (such as the NLF spokesmen in Hanoi). jahideen in Afghanistan and the Kurdish revolt in 3

Iraq illustrate the traditional pattern of insurgency. cell systems work from within the government, the al-Qaeda generally operates in this mode, but if they mass-oriented builds a government completely out- become strong enough in a given area, they may side the existing one, with the intention of replac- change to the mass-oriented form. ing it. Such “insurgents patiently construct a base of passive and active political supporters, while simul- 2. Subversive: Usually driven by an organization that taneously building a large armed element of guer- contains at least some of the governing elite, some rilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted cam- being sympathizers already in place, and others who paign of increasing violence to destroy the govern- penetrate the government. When they use violence, ment and its institutions from the outside. They have it has a specific purpose, such as coercing voters, a well-developed ideology and carefully determine intimidating officials, and disrupting and discredit- their objectives. They are highly organized and ef- ing the government. Typically, there is a political fectively use propaganda and guerrilla action to mo- arm (such as Sinn Féin or the National Liberation bilize forces for a direct political and military chal- Front) that directs the military in planning carefully lenge to the government.” The revolution that pro- coordinated violence. “Employment of violence is duced the Peoples’ Republic of China, the American designed to show the system to be incompetent and Revolution, and the Shining Path insurgency in Peru to provoke the government to an excessively violent are examples of the mass-oriented model. Once es- response which further undermines its legitimacy.” tablished, this type of insurgency is extremely diffi- The Nazi rise to power, in the 1930s, is another ex- cult to defeat because of its great depth of organiza- ample of subversion. Nazi members of parliament tion. and street fighters were hardly clandestine, but the overall plan of the Nazi leadership to gain control of the nation was hidden. “A subversive insurgency is suited to a more permissive political environment 5 Classic models for cell system op- which allows the insurgents to use both legal and il- erations legal methods to accomplish their goals. Effective government resistance may convert this to a critical- cell model. Different kinds of cell organizations have been used for different purposes. This section focuses on clandestine 3. Critical-cell: Critical cell is useful when the po- cells, as would be used for espionage, sabotage, or the litical climate becomes less permissive than one organization for unconventional warfare. When uncon- that allowed shadow cells. While other cell types ventional warfare starts using overt units, the cell sys- try to form intelligence cells within the govern- tem tends to be used only for sensitive leadership and ment, this type sets up "shadow government" cells intelligence roles.[7] The examples here will use CIA that can seize power once the system is destroyed cryptonyms as a naming convention used to identify both by external means and the internal subversion. members of the cell system. Cryptonyms begin with a This model fits the classic coup d'etat,[10] and of- two-letter country or subject name (e.g., AL), followed ten tries to minimize violence. Variants include with an arbitrary word. It is considered elegant to have the the Sandinista takeover of an existing government code merge with the other letters to form a pronounceable weakened by external popular revolution. “Insur- word. gents also seek to infiltrate the government’s institu- tions, but their object is to destroy the system from within.” Clandestine cells form inside the govern- 5.1 Operations under official cover ment. “The use of violence remains covert until the government is so weakened that the insurgency’s Station BERRY operates, for country B, in target coun- superior organization seizes power, supported by try BE. It has three case officers and several support of- the armed force. One variation of this pattern is ficers. Espionage operation run by case officers under when the insurgent leadership permits the popu- diplomatic cover, they would have to with the basic re- lar revolution to destroy the existing government, cruiting methods described in this article. Case officer then emerges to direct the formation of a new gov- BETTY runs the local agents BEN and BEATLE. Case ernment. Another variation is seen in the Cuban officer BESSIE runs BENSON and BEAGLE. revolution[11] and is referred to as the foco (or Cuban Some recruits, due to the sensitivity of their position or model) insurgency. This model involves a single, their personalities not being appropriate for cell leader- armed cell which emerges in the midst of degenerat- ship, might not enter cells but be run as singletons, per- ing government legitimacy and becomes the nucleus haps by other than the recruiting case officer. Asset around which mass popular support rallies. The in- BARD is a different sort of highly sensitive singleton, surgents use this support to establish control and who is a joint asset of the country B, and the country iden- erect new institutions.” tified by prefix AR. ARNOLD is a case officer from the 4. Mass-oriented: where the subversive and covert- country AR embassy, who knows only the case officer 4 5 CLASSIC MODELS FOR CELL SYSTEM OPERATIONS

Representative diplomatic-cover station and networks Initial team presence by 2 separate clandestine teams with no of- ficial cover BERTRAM and the security officer BEST. ARNOLD does not know the station chief of BERRY or any of its other personnel. Other than BELL and BEST, the Station be shared. ALPINE and ALTITUDE, however, do not personnel only know BERTRAM as someone authorized know one another. They do not know any of the mem- to be in the Station, and who is known for his piano play- bers of team ALICE. ing at embassy parties. He is covered as Cultural Attache, in a country that has very few pianos. Only the personnel The legitimacy of the subcell structure came from the re- involved with BARD know that ARNOLD is other than cruitment process, originally by the case officer and then another friendly diplomat. by the cell leaders. Sometimes, the cell leader would pro- pose subcell member names to the case officer, so the In contrast, BESSIE and BETTY know one another, and case officer could have a headquarters name check run procedures exist for their taking over each other’s assets before bringing the individual into the subcell. In princi- in the event one of the two is disabled. ple, however, the subcell members would know ALPINE, Some recruits, however, would be qualified to recruit and sometimes the other members of the ALPINE cell their own subcell, as BEATLE has done. BESSIE knows if they needed to work together; if ALPINE-1 and the identity of BEATLE-1 and BEATLE-2, since he had ALPINE-2 had independent assignments, they might not them checked by headquarters counterintelligence before know each other. ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2 certainly they were recruited. Note that a cryptonym does not im- would not know ALISTAIR or anyone in the ALTITUDE ply anything about its designee, such as gender. or ALLOVER cells.

5.2 Clandestine presence

The diagram of “initial team presence” shows that two teams, ALAN and ALICE, have successfully entered an area of operation, the country coded AL, but are only aware of a pool of potential recruits, and have not yet ac- tually recruited anyone. They communicate with one an- other only through headquarters, so compromise of one team will not affect the other. Assume that in team ALAN, ALISTAIR is one of the of- ficers with local contacts, might recruit two cell leaders, ALPINE and ALTITUDE. The other local officer in the team, ALBERT, recruits ALLOVER. When ALPINE recruited two subcell members, they would be referred to as ALPINE-1 and ALPINE-2. Clandestine teams have built initial subcells ALPINE and ALTITUDE only know how to reach AL- ISTAIR, but they are aware of at least some of other team members’ identity should ALISTAIR be unavailable, and As the networks grow, a subcell leader might create his they would accept a message from ALBERT. Most often, own cell, so ALPINE-2 might become the leader of the the identity (and location) of the radio operator may not ALIMONY cell. 5

5.3 Fault-tolerant cellular structures leadership core. Superficially, this might be likened to a Western cell structure that emanates from a headquarters, Modern communications theory has introduced methods but the Western centrality is bureaucratic, while struc- to increase fault tolerance in cell organizations. In the tures in other non-western cultures builds on close per- past, if cell members only knew the cell leader, and the sonal relationships, often built over years, perhaps involv- leader was neutralized, the cell was cut off from the rest ing family or other in-group linkages. Such in-groups are of the organization. Game theory and graph theory have thus extremely hard to infiltrate; infiltration has a serious been applied to the study of optimal covert network de- chance only outside the in-group. Still, it may be possible sign (see Lindelauf, R.H.A. et al. 2009. The influence for an in-group to be compromised through COMINT or, of secrecy on the communication structure of covert net- in rare cases, by compromising a member. works. Social Networks 31: 126-137). The core group is logically a ring, but is superimposed If a traditional cell had independent communications with on an inner hub-and-spoke structure of ideological au- the foreign support organization, headquarters might be thority. Each member of the core forms another hub and able to arrange its reconnection. Another method is to spoke system (see infrastructure cells), the spokes leading have impersonal communications “side links” between to infrastructure cells under the supervision of the core cells, such as a pair of dead drops, one for Team ALAN group member, and possibly to operational groups which to leave “lost contact” messages to be retrieved by Team the headquarters support. Note that in this organization, ALICE, and another dead drop for Team ALICE to leave there is a point at which the operational cell becomes au- messages for Team ALAN. tonomous of the core. Members surviving the operation may rejoin at various points. These links, to be used only on losing contact, do not guarantee a contact. When a team finds a message in its emergency drop, it might do no more than send an alert message to headquarters. Headquarters might deter- mine, through SIGINT or other sources, that the enemy had captured the leadership and the entire team, and or- der the other team not to attempt contact. If headquarters can have reasonable confidence that there is a communi- cations failure or partial compromise, it might send a new contact to the survivors. When the cut-off team has electronic communications, such as the Internet, it has a much better chance of eluding surveillance and getting emergency instructions than by using a dead drop that can be under physical surveillance. Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy

Osama, in this model, has the main responsibility of com- 6 Non-traditional models, exempli- manding the organization and being the spokesman on fied by al-Qaeda propaganda video and audio messages distributed by the propaganda cell. The other members of the core each Due to cultural differences, assuming the al-Qaeda command one or more infrastructure cells. Training Manual[12] is authentic, eastern cell structures While the tight coupling enhances security, it can limit may differ from the Western mode. “Al-Qaida’s minimal flexibility and the ability to scale the organization. This core group, only accounting for the leadership, can also in-group, while sharing tight cultural and ideological val- be viewed topologically as a ring or chain network, with ues, is not committed to a bureaucratic process. each leader/node heading their own particular hierarchy. “Members of the core group are under what could be “Such networks function by having their sub-networks termed 'positive control'—long relationships and similar provide information and other forms of support (the mindsets make 'control' not so much of an issue, but there ‘many-to-one’ model), while the core group sup- are distinct roles, and position (structural, financial, spir- plies ‘truth’ and decisions/directions (the ‘one-to-many’ itual) determines authority, thus making the core group a model). Trust and personal relationships are an essen- hierarchy topologically.[13] tial part of the Al-Qaida network (a limiting factor, even In the first example of the core, each member knows how while it provides enhanced security). Even while cell to reach two other members, and also knows the mem- members are trained as ‘replaceable’ units, ‘vetting’ of ber(s) he considers his ideological superior. Solid lines members occurs during the invited training period under [13] show basic communication, dotted red arrows show the the observation of the core group. first level of ideological respect, and dotted blue arrows Cells of this structure are built outwards, from an internal show a second level of ideological respect. 6 6 NON-TRADITIONAL MODELS, EXEMPLIFIED BY AL-QAEDA

If Osama, the most respected, died, the core would re- constitute itself. While different members have an indi- vidual ideological guide, and these are not the same for all members, the core would reconstitute itself with Richard as most respected. Assume there are no losses, and Osama can be reached directly only by members of the core group. Members of outer cells and support systems might know him only as “the Commander”, or, as in the actual case of al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden’s face is recognizable worldwide, but only a very few people know where he is or even how to contact it.

Core group and infrastructure cells; military cells in training 6.1 Infrastructure cells

Any clandestine or covert service, especially a non- “These cells are socially embedded (less so than the national one, needs a variety of technical and adminis- core group, however), structurally embedded, function- trative functions. Some of these services include:[13] ally embedded (they are specialized into a domain), and knowledge base-specific (there does not seem to be a great deal of cross-training, or lateral mobility in the orga- 1. Forged documents and counterfeit currency nization). Such cells are probably subjected to a mixture 2. Apartments and hiding places of positive and negative control (“do this, do these sorts of things, don’t do that”).”[13] 3. Communication means The leaders of military cells are responsible for training them, and, when an operation is scheduled, selecting the 4. Transportation means operational commander, giving him the basic objective and arranging whatever support is needed, and then re- 5. Information lease him from tight control to execute the meeting. De- pending on the specific case, the military leaders might 6. Arms and ammunition have direct, possibly one-way, communications with their 7. Transport cells, or they might have to give Kim the messages to be transmitted, by means that Anton and Hassan have no need to know. Other functions include psychological operations, train- ing, and finance. Note that Anton does not have a direct connection to Kim. Under normal circumstances, he sacrifices effi- A national intelligence service[14] has a support organi- ciency for security, by passing communications requests zation to deal with services such as finance, logistics, fa- through Hassan. The security structure also means that cilities (e.g., safehouses), information technology, com- Hassan does not know the members of Anton’s cells, and munications, training, weapons and explosives, medical Kim may know only ways to communicate with them but services, etc. Transportation alone is a huge function, in- not their identity. cluding the need to buy tickets without drawing suspicion, Kim operates two systems of cells, one for secure com- and, where appropriate, using private vehicles. Finance includes the need to transfer money without coming un- munications and one for propaganda. To send out a pro- der the suspicion of financial security organizations. paganda message, Osama must pass it to Kim. If Kim were compromised, the core group might have significant Some of these functions, such as finance, are far harder to problems with any sort of outside communications. operate in remote areas, such as the FATA of Pakistan, than in cities with large numbers of official and unofficial Terrorist networks do not match cleanly to other cell sys- financial institutions, and the communications to support tems that regularly report to a headquarters. The apparent them. If the financial office is distant from the remote al-Qaeda methodology of letting operational cells decide headquarters, there is a need for couriers, who must be on their final dates and means of attack exhibit an oper- trusted to some extent, but they may not know the con- ational pattern, but not a periodicity that could easily be tents of their messages or the actual identity of sender used for an indications checklist appropriate for a warn- ing center. Such lists depend on seeing a local pattern to and/or receiver. The couriers, depending on the balance [15] among type and size of message, security, and technology give a specific warning. available, may memorize messages, carry audio or video Note that Hassan has two subordinates that have not yet recordings, or hand-carry computer media. established operational cells. These subordinates can be 6.3 Indirect support networks 7 considered sleepers, but not necessarily with a sleeper cell.

6.2 Operational cells

For each mission are created one or more operational cells. If the al-Qaeda signature of multiple concurrent attacks is used, there may be an operational cell for each target location. It will depend on the operation if they will need any support cells in the operational area. For example, it may be more secure to have a local cell build bombs, which will be delivered by cells coming from out- side the area. Core group, with contact ring and ideological hierarchy “Operational cells are not created, but instead 'seeded' utilizing individuals spotted or that request assistance • Cells are coordinated, not under “com- (both groups are 'vetted' by being trained under the ob- mand & control”—this autonomy and lo- servation of the core group, which dramatically restricts cal control makes them flexible, and en- the opportunity for passing off walk-ins under false flag). hances security Categorization of operational cells appears to be by capa- • Trust and comcon internally to the cell bilities, region, and then task/operation. Operational cells provide redundancy of potential com- are composed of members whose worldview has been mand (a failure of Palestinian operations firmly tested—necessary to front-load, because such cells in the past), and well as a shared knowl- are dispersed back to their own local control (or nega- edgebase (which may mean, over time, tive control—proscribed behavior—with positive control that ‘cross training’ emerges inside a cell, only coming in the form of contact for synchronization or [13] providing redundancy of most critical support).” skills and knowledge).[13] If operational cells routinely are “released” curved dotted lines on link to military cells to select their final operational parameters, they use a different paradigm than govern- 6.3 Indirect support networks mental clandestine or covert operations. On a number of cases, US special operations forces had to wait for Presi- In the above graphic, note the indirect support network dential authorization to make an attack, or even move to controlled by Richard’s subcell. staging areas. Admittedly, a country would have to face “While Al-Qaida has elements of the organization de- the consequences of an inappropriate attack, so it may signed to support the structure, but such elements are in- tend to be overcautious, where a terror network would sufficient in meeting the needs of such an organization, merely shrug at the world being upset. Assuming that the and for security reasons there would be redundant and al-Qaeda operational technique is not to use positive con- secondary-/tertiary-networks that are unaware of their trol, their operations may be more random, but also more connection to Al-Qaida. These networks, primarily re- unpredictable for counterterror forces. If their cells truly lated to fundraising and financial activities, as well as need constant control, there are communications links technology providers, are in a ‘use’ relationship with Al- that might be detected by SIGINT, and if their command Qaida—managed through cut-outs or individuals that do can be disrupted, the field units could not function. Since not inform them of the nature of activities, and that may there is fairly little downside for terrorists to attack out have a cover pretext sufficient to deflect questions or of synchronization with other activities, the lack of pos- inquiry.”[13] itive control becomes a strength of their approach to cell organization. The operational cells need to have continuous internal 6.4 A possible countermeasure communication; there is a commander, who may be in In 2002, U.S. News & World Report said that American touch with infrastructure cells or, less likely from a secu- intelligence is beginning to acquire a sufficiently criti- rity standpoint with the core group. cal mass of intelligence on al-Qaida indicating, “Once Al-Qaeda’s approach, which even differs from that of ear- thought nearly impossible to penetrate, al Qaeda is prov- lier terrorist organizations, may be very viable for their ing no tougher a target than the KGB or the Mafia--closed goals: societies that took the U.S. government years to get in- side. “We're getting names, the different camps they • Cells are redundant and distributed, mak- trained at, the hierarchy, the infighting,” says an intelli- ing them difficult to ‘roll up’ gence official. “It’s very promising.”[16] The report also 8 9 EXTERNAL LINKS said that the collected data has allowed the recruiting of [9] Nyberg, Eric N. (1991). “Insurgency: The Unsolved Mys- informants. tery”. US Marine Corps University Command and Staff College. Writing in the U.S. Army journal Military Review, David W. Pendall suggested that a “catch-and-release program [10] Luttwak, Edward (1968). Coup d'etat: A Practical Hand- for suspected operatives might create reluctance or dis- book. Harvard University Press. trust in such suspects and prevent them from further acts [11] Guevara, Ernesto “Che” (1961). On Guerilla Warfare. or, perhaps more important, create distrust in the cell Praeger. leaders of these individuals in the future.” The author noted the press release describing Ramzi Binalshib’s co- [12] “al-Qaeda training manual” (PDF). US Southern District operation with the United States “are sure to prevent reen- Court, US New York City Attorney’s Office, entered as try into a terrorist cell as a trusted member and most likely evidence in Africa embassy bombings. limits the further trust and assignments of close cell asso- [13] Decision Support Systems, Inc. (2001-12-31). “Hunting ciates still at large. The captor would determine when to the Sleepers: Tracking al-Qaida’s Covert Operatives” [17] name names and when to remain silent.” Indeed, once (PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-17. intelligence learns the name and characteristics of an at- large adversary, as well as some sensitive information that [14] US Central Intelligence Agency. “Support to Mission: would plausibly be known to him, a news release could be Who We Are”. Retrieved 2007-11-19. issued to talk about his cooperation. Such a method could [15] Fellman, Philip Vos; Wright, Roxana. “Modeling Ter- not be used too often, but, used carefully, could disturb rorist Networks - Complex Systems at the Mid-Range” the critical trust networks. The greatest uncertainty might (PDF). Retrieved 2007-11-02. be associated with throwing doubt onto a key member of an operational cell that has gone autonomous. [16] Kaplan, David E. (22 September 2002). “Run and Gun: Al Qaeda arrests and intelligence hauls bring new energy to the war on terrorism”. U.S. News & World Report. 7 See also [17] Pendall, David W. (January–February 2004). “Effects- Based Operations and the Exercise of National Power”. • Military Review (United States Army Combined Arms Leaderless resistance Center). Find the article by going through the Military • Lone wolf (terrorism) Review directories

8 References 9 External links • An Introduction To Terrorist Organisational Struc- [1] Leahy, Kevin C. (2005). “The Impact of Technology on the Command, Control, and Organizational Structure of tures Insurgent Groups” (PDF). Retrieved 2007-12-04.

[2] Irish Republican Army. “The Green Book”. Archived from the original on 2007-06-16. Retrieved 2007-12-04.

[3] Hall, Roger (1964). You're Stepping on my Cloak and Dag- ger. Bantam Books.

[4] Hogan, David W. (1992). “Chapter 3: Special Operations in the European Theater”. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 70-42.

[5] Pike, Douglas (1970). Viet Cong: Organization and Tech- nique of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. MIT Press.

[6] US Department of the Army (December 2006). “FM 3- 24: Counterinsurgency” (PDF).

[7] Mao, Zedong (1967). On Protracted War. Foreign Lan- guage Press, Beijing.

[8] US Department of the Army (20 February 2003). “FM 3- 07 (formerly FM 100-20): Stability Operations and Sup- port Operations”. 9

10 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

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• Clandestine cell system Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clandestine%20cell%20system?oldid=625853879 Contributors: Edward, Tom harrison, Sherurcij, Hu, Tournesol, GraemeLeggett, Rjwilmsi, VolatileChemical, Kajerm, Allens, SmackBot, Premjs, Chris the speller, Sadads, Colonies Chris, Rogermw, Bigmantonyd, Makyen, CmdrObot, Cydebot, Dougweller, Hcberkowitz, Nick Number, John3103, Erxn- media, VoABot II, Kyle the bot, RaseaC, Justmeherenow, Laval, StAnselm, Colfer2, ClueBot, Cmmmm, NuclearWarfare, Wprlh, L33t- krew, ApocalypseNow115, Boleyn, Dthomsen8, JimmyPowell323, Addbot, Rejectwater, Profitoftruth85, OlEnglish, Zorrobot, Yobot, Ptbotgourou, AnomieBOT, Galoubet, Xqbot, Noamz, Gighli, FrescoBot, Citation bot 1, Jonathandeamer, RedBot, Captain Screebo, Rock- etrod1960, ClueBot NG, Helpful Pixie Bot, Andrew Gwilliam, PhnomPencil, LNCP, Mogism, KindaSortaInTheArmyOnce, Monkbot, Jetpax and Anonymous: 32

10.2 Images

• File:Ambox_content.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f4/Ambox_content.png License: ? Contributors: Derived from Image:Information icon.svg Original artist: El T (original icon); David Levy (modified design); Penubag (modified color) • File:Edit-clear.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The Tango! Desktop Project. Original artist: The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the file, specifically: “Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (although minimally).” • File:T-Cell-0.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/97/T-Cell-0.png License: CC-BY-3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz • File:T-Cell-1.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/T-Cell-1.png License: CC-BY-3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz • File:T-Cell-2.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/T-Cell-2.png License: CC-BY-3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz • File:Unbalanced_scales.svg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Unbalanced_scales.svg License: Public do- main Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Vcnvastructure4rev.jpg Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/9b/Vcnvastructure4rev.jpg License: ? Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:Wdip-Cell-0.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/Wdip-Cell-0.png License: CC-BY-3.0 Contribu- tors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz • File:Wnoc-Cell-0.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bc/Wnoc-Cell-0.png License: CC-BY-3.0 Contribu- tors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz • File:Wnoc-Cell-1.png Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fb/Wnoc-Cell-1.png License: CC-BY-3.0 Contribu- tors: Own work Original artist: Hcberkowitz

10.3 Content license

• Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0