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Clandestine Cell System Clandestine cell system “Sleeper cell” redirects here. For other uses, see Sleeper passage of time and changes in contemporary thinking cell (disambiguation). and technology.[1] Officially, the PIRA is hierarchical, but, especially as A clandestine cell structure is a method for organizing a British security forces became more effective, changed group of people in such a way that it can more effectively to a semiautonomous model for its operational and cer- resist penetration by an opposing organization. Depend- tain of its support cells (e.g., transportation, intelligence, ing on the group’s philosophy, its operational area, the cover and security).[2] Its leadership sees itself as guid- communications technologies available, and the nature of ing and consensus-building. The lowest-level cells, typ- the mission, it can range from a strict hierarchy to an ex- ically of 2-5 people, tend to be built by people with an tremely distributed organization. It is also a method used existing personal relationship. British counterinsurgents by criminal organizations, undercover operatives, and un- could fairly easily understand the command structure, but conventional warfare (UW) led by special forces. Histor- not the workings of the operational cells. ically, clandestine organizations have avoided electronic The IRA has an extensive network of inactive or sleeper communications, because signals intelligence is a strength cells, so new ad hoc organizations may appear for any of conventional militaries and counterintelligence organi- specific operation. zations. In the context of tradecraft, covert and clandestine are not synonymous. As noted in the definition (which has 1.2 World War II French Resistance been used by the United States and NATO since World War II) in a covert operation the identity of the sponsor is In World War II, Operation Jedburgh teams parachuted concealed, while in a clandestine operation the operation into occupied France to lead unconventional warfare itself is concealed. Put differently, clandestine means units.[3][4] They would be composed of two officers, one “hidden”, while covert means “deniable”. The adversary American or British, and the other French, the latter is aware that a covert activity is happening, but does not preferably from the area into which they landed. The know who is doing it, and certainly not their sponsor- third member of the team was a radio operator. ship. Clandestine activities, however, if successful, are Especially through the French member, they would con- completely unknown to the adversary, and their function, tact trusted individuals in the area of operation, and ask such as espionage, would be neutralized if there was any them to recruit a team of trusted subordinates (i.e., a sub- awareness of the activity. Saying a "covert cell structure” cell). If the team mission were sabotage, reconnaissance, is tantamount to tautology, because the point of the cell or espionage, there was no need to meet in large units. structure is that its details are completely hidden from the If the team was to carry out direct action, often an un- opposition. wise mission unless an appreciable number of the locals A sleeper cell refers to a cell, or isolated grouping of had military experience, it would be necessary to assem- sleeper agents that lies dormant until it receives orders ble into units for combat. Even then, the hideouts of the or decides to act. leadership were known only to subcell leaders. The le- gitimacy of the Jedburgh team came from its known af- filiation with Allied powers, and it was a structure more 1 History appropriate for UW than for truly clandestine operations. 1.1 Provisional Irish Republican Army 1.3 National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam As opposed to the French Resistance, the modern Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) has a history Also known as the Viet Cong, this organization grew from going back to Irish revolutionary forces in the early 20th earlier anticolonial groups fighting the French, as well as century, but has little external control. Its doctrine and or- anti-Japanese guerillas during World War II.[5] Its com- ganization have changed over time, given factors such as mand, control, and communication techniques derived the independence of 26 of Ireland’s 32 counties, the con- from the experiences of these earlier insurgent groups. tinued British control of Northern Ireland and the simple The group had extensive support from North Vietnam, 1 2 4 MODELS OF INSURGENCY AND ASSOCIATED CELL CHARACTERISTICS and, indirectly, from the Soviet Union. It had parallel External support need not be overt. Certain Shi'a groups political and military structures, often overlapping. See in Iraq, for example, do receive assistance from Iran, but Viet Cong and PAVN strategy and tactics. this is not a public position of the government of Iran, and may even be limited to factions of that government. Early US support to the Afghan Northern Alliance against the Taliban used clandestine operators from both the CIA and United States Army Special Forces. As the latter conflict escalated, the US participation became overt. Note that both unconventional warfare (UW) (guerrilla operations) and foreign internal defense (FID) (coun- terinsurgency) may be covert and use cellular organiza- tion. In a covert FID mission, only selected host nation (HN) leaders are aware of the foreign support organization. Un- der Operation White Star, US personnel gave covert FID assistance to the Royal Lao Army starting in 1959, be- came overt in 1961, and ceased operations in 1962. A dual, but sometimes overlapping, Party and Military structure was top-down 4 Models of insurgency and associ- The lowest level consisted of three-person cells who op- ated cell characteristics erated quite closely, and engaging in the sort of self- criticism common, as a bonding method, to Communist organizations. While different kinds of insurgency differ in where they place clandestine or covert cells, when certain types of in- surgency grow in power, the cell system is deemphasized. Cells still may be used for leadership security, but, if overt 2 Parallel organizations violence by organized units becomes significant, cells are less important. In Mao’s three-stage doctrine,[7] cells are The NLF and PIRA, as well as other movements, have still useful in Phase II to give cover to part-time guerillas, chosen to have parallel political and military organiza- but, as the insurgency creates full-time military units in tions. In the case of the NLF, other than some individuals Phase III, the main units are the focus, not the cells. The with sanctuary in North Vietnam, the political organiza- Eighth Route Army did not run on a cell model. tion could not be overt during the Vietnam War. After When considering where cells exist with respect to the the war ended, surviving NLF officials held high office. existing government, the type of insurgency needs to be In the case of the PIRA, its political wing, Sinn Féin, be- considered. One US Army reference was Field Manual came increasingly overt, and then a full participant in pol- 100-20, which has been superseded by FM3-07.[8] Draw- itics. Hamas and Hezbollah also have variants of overt ing on this work, Nyberg (a United States Marine Corps political/social service and covert military wings. officer) extended the ideas to describe four types of cell system, although his descriptions also encompass types of The overt political-covert military split avoided the inflex- insurgencies that the cell system supports.[9] At present, ibility of a completely secret organization. Once an active there is a new type associated with transnational terrorist insurgency began, the secrecy could limited freedom of insurgencies. action, distort information about goals and ideals, and re- strict communication within the insurgency.[6] In a split organization the public issues can be addressed overtly, 1. Traditional: the slowest to form, this reflects a prin- while military actions were kept covert and intelligence cipally indigenous insurgency, initially with limited functions stay clandestine. goals. It is more secure than others, as it tends to grow from people with social, cultural or family ties. The insurgents resent a government that has failed to recognize tribal, racial, religious or linguistic groups 3 External support “who perceive that the government has denied their rights and interests and work to establish or restore Many cell systems still receive, with due attention to se- them. They seldom seek to overthrow the govern- curity, support from the outside. This can range from ment or control the whole society; however, they fre- leaders, trainers and supplies (such as the Jedburgh assis- quently attempt to withdraw from government con- tance to the French Resistance), or a safe haven for overt trol through autonomy or semiautonomy.” The Mu- activities (such as the NLF spokesmen in Hanoi). jahideen in Afghanistan and the Kurdish revolt in 3 Iraq illustrate the traditional pattern of insurgency. cell systems work from within the government, the al-Qaeda generally operates in this mode, but if they mass-oriented builds a government completely out- become strong enough in a given area, they may side the existing one, with the intention of replac- change to the mass-oriented form. ing it. Such “insurgents patiently construct a base of passive and active political supporters, while simul- 2. Subversive: Usually driven by an organization that taneously building a large armed element of guer- contains at least some of the governing elite, some rilla and regular forces. They plan a protracted cam- being sympathizers already in place, and others who paign of increasing violence to destroy the govern- penetrate the government. When they use violence, ment and its institutions from the outside. They have it has a specific purpose, such as coercing voters, a well-developed ideology and carefully determine intimidating officials, and disrupting and discredit- their objectives.
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