THE CONGRESS llll1llllllllllllllllllIIIIIIIIIAllllllllllllllll LM095814 Navy Logistic Support (If The 7th Fleet I n Southeast Asia: Continuing Logistics Issues And Constraints B-746964 Department of The Navy BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548 B-146964 To the President of the Senate and '1 the Speaker of the House of Representatives This is our report on Navy logistic support of the 7th Fleet in Southeast Asia: continuing logistics issues and constraints. We made our examination pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67). Copies of this report are being sent to the Director, _.-I '-k Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; -'- -*f and the Secretary of the Navy, i Comptroller General of the United States --------Contents Page DIGEST 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 5 Navy organization 5 Fleet operational and administrative organization in the Pacific area 5 Fleet operational and administrative organizations in the Atlantic area 6 Navy logistic support organization 6 2 RESPONSIVENESS: KEEPING SHIPS AT THEIR BATTLE STATIONS 9 Land-based supply and maintenance organizations in Western Pacific area 9 Personnel actions 12 Other management actions 13 3 SUPPLY SUPPORT PERFORMANCE 15 Materiel selection task difficult 15 Problems experienced in supporting authorized stock levels 19 4 BUDGETING AND FUNDING 27 Overall budget 27 Operations and maintenance 28 5 MANPOWER 35 Retention 35 Impact on fleet operations 38 Navy's retention improvement program 39 Technical services support 39 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSOR SUGGESTIONS 4.2 Conclusions 42 Recommendations or suggestions 44 Matters for consideration by the Congress 46 7 SCOPE OF REVIEW 47 . APPENDIX Page I Cruiser type ship U.S.S. Oklahoma City (CLG-5) COMSEVENTHFLTflag ship 49 II Destroyer type ships U.S.S. Sterett (DLG-31) and U.S.S. Sherman (DD-931) 50 III An aircraft carrier being refueled by an oiler 51 IV Logistic support distance relationships between Pacific and Atlantic Fleets 52 v Age of active fleet as of end of fiscal year 1973 53 VI Changes in active fleet and average- age of ships, fiscal years 1969-73 54 VII Examples of other-than-inflationary cost increases 55 VIII FPSM line items with zero demands for 12- month period ended April 9, 1973 57 IX Examples of habitability improvements 58 X Letter dated February 19, 1974, from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management) 63 XI Principal officials responsible for activities discussed in this report ' 72 ABBREVIATIONS CINCPACFLT Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet FPSM Fleet Program Support Materiel GAO General Accounting Office NSD Naval Supply Depot OW Operations and Maintenance OMB Office of Management and Budget OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense SRF Ship Repair Facility COMPTROLLERGENERAL'S NAVYLOGISTIC SUPPORT OF THE REPORTTO THE CONGRESS 7th FLEET IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CONTINUINGLOGISTIC ISSUES AND CONSTRAINTS Department of the Navy B-146964 _---DIGEST -- WHYTHE REVIEW WAS MADE --Reduced the amount of resources available to other fleets and The 7th Fleet, engaged in wartime therefore reduced their operations in Southeast Asia for operational capabilities. (See several years, was considered the P* 9.) Navy's most significant operational I force. Navy logistic support for --Deferred maintenance, so the 7th Fleet was enormous. additional funds may be needed to return ships to a desired state of GAO reviewed the Navy's logistic readiness. (See pp. 10 and 13.) support to determine --its rw-onsj.veness to the --Compounded the problem of operational needs of the 7th Fleet retaining qualified, experienced during a _.wartime situation; personnel because of extended deployments, frequent --the general impact that this redeployments, extended periods on logistic support had on other station, and uncertain operating fleets; and schedules. (See pp. 13 and 38.) --the impact that key logistic The Navy promptly serviced 7th Fleet issues, such as funding and ships and aircraft needing repairs personnel, have on the logistic and resupply; returned them to their support for all fleets. battle stations; and retained them there, in spite of Navy-wide FINDINGSAND CONCLUSIONS logistic support problems which continue to reduce supply support Through a massive and concerted effectiveness and, in turn, the effort, the Navy was responsive in fleets' operational capabilities. keeping the ships--carriers and other combatants--at their battle stations in Southeast Asia. A shortage of repair parts and components reduces ships' and The ships were kept on station by aircraft's capabilities to perform giving them and supporting shore their designed missions. According activities priority of to the Navy: resources--financial, materiel, and personnel--before and during the 7th --Of its total operating aircraft, Fleet deployments. Ship and shore an estimated 21 percent personnel worked around the clock. (approximately 1,200 aircraft) (See pp. 9 and 12.) were not fully mission ready in fiscal year 1973 due to materiel The extensive operations of the 7th shortages and 800 of these were Fleet: not operationally ready. Tear Sheet. Upon removal, the report 1 cover date should be noted hereon. --As of January 1973, 1,860 --Decentralized management of Navy essential pieces of equipment on contractor and civilian board Navy ships were reported as technicians made it difficult to inoperative because of materiel analyze the continuing need for shortages. This equipment needed their services. (See p. 40.) 5,924 repair part line items to repair the casualties. (See RECOMMENDATIONSOR SUGGESTIONS p. 15.) GAO recommends that the Secretary of Some of the reasons for the less ' Defense insure that the Navy is able than desirable supply support are F to fully inform the Congress of the beyond the complete control of the trade-offs and impacts for each Navy, while others are within the alternative presented in the section Navy's control. on matters for consideration by the Congress. Issues beyond the Navy ‘s compZete con.troZ GAO also recommends that the Secretary of the Navy consider: --Limitations on the financial resources to operate and maintain --Stocking low- or no-demand items the fleets. (See p. 27.) in the United States and using rapid air transportation when --A wide range of nonstandard items are needed in the Pacific or equipment items on board ships, Atlantic Fleets. Centralized coupled with the old age of many: stockage should make such items ships. (See p. 16.) more accessible to all fleets and - should reduce costs by reducing Issues within the Navy's con-hot the number of'items stocked. --Logistic support programs --Testing the feasibility of emphasize depth of support at directly replenishing authorized various stockage points. This stock levels on combatant ships means that some inventories are and at advanced bases by air procured which may never be used transport in lieu of the normal and could, eventually, be declared depot support system. This should excess. (See p. 20.) reduce amounts of stocks required aboard ships and at advanced --Programs for repairing aircraft bases. components need major management improvements. (See p. 24.) --Giving top management attention to the program for reworking aircraft --Weapons systems should be tested components, to correct the continually. (See p. 25.) management problems the Department of Defense, the Navy, and GAO dis- --Because of the rapid turnover of closed during recent reviews. first-term enlistees and an inability to retain skilled --Testing weapon systems intensively personnel, more personnel with for all designed missions, to technical expertise and experience obtain data on the personnel are needed. (See p. 35.) training,- maintainability, 2 dependability, and logistic Navy response is appendix X. support needs for each mission role. MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS --Improving personnel retention programs by emphasizing the three most common reasons for not making During future hearings on the Navy's a career of the Navy--family budget, the Congress may wish to separation, lack of personal consider the following alternatives: freedom, and less than desirable living conditions on board ships. --Shifting the priority of resource allocation toward the current --Centralizing the management of operational and maintenance needs Navy civilian and contractor of the ships, aircraft, and shore personnel, so that management activities. could determine whether Navy personnel training should be --Allocating additional operational revised and whether the number of and maintenance resources to up- civilian and contractor personnel grade the status of the fleets should be increased or decreased. and shore activities. --Requiring that the size of the AGENCYACTIONS AND UNRESOLVEDISSUES fleets and the number of supporting shore activities be The Navy said it found no reduced to levels which could be inaccuracies or substantive errors supported with available in GAO's report. resources. The Navy concurred with GAO's The Congress also may wish to weigh recommendations and has planned or the trade-offs and impacts that each initiated management actions to alternative will have on the size improve and economize the logistic and combat readiness of the fleets support to the fleets. in meeting current and potential threats in certain areas of the Navy comments on each recommendation world as well as on overall U.S. are summarized