DOCSLIB.ORG

Settlement Monitor

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Settlement Monitor SETTLEMENT MONITOR Edited by Geoffrey Aronson This section covers items—reprinted articles, statistics, and maps—pertaining to Israeli settlement activities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. Unless otherwise stated, the items have been written by Geoffrey Aronson for this section or drawn from material written by him for Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories (hereinafter Settlement Report), a Washington-based bimonthly newsletter published by the Foundation for Middle East Peace. JPS is grateful to the foundation for permission to draw on its material. The Settlement Freeze and its Antecedents Settlement Freeze Redux (excerpts) . 174 AFocusonEastJerusalem The Very Eye of the Storm, by Akiva Eldar (excerpts) . 178 Turkish Documents Prove Arabs Own East Jerusalem Building, by Nir Hasson (excerpts)................................... 181 The Planning Crisis in East Jerusalem: Understanding the Phenomenon of “Illegal” Construction, by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (excerpts) . 181 THE SETTLEMENT FREEZE AND ITS ural growth” of settlements. Settlements ANTECEDENTS must be evacuated as part of a final status plan that establishes Palestinian sovereignty SETTLEMENT FREEZE REDUX (EXCERPTS) and enhances Israeli security, but to do so will require a degree of commitment— From Settlement Report, May–June not to a freeze in settlements but to their 2009. removal—that neither Israel nor the inter- Israel’s ever-expanding network of civil- national community has yet been able or ian settlements in the occupied territories willing to muster. is viewed by its partisans and opponents The administration of Pres. Barack alike as the most significant obstacle to the Obama is considering resurrecting the freeze creation of a viable, sovereign Palestinian idea as a key element of its policy. Israeli state. Palestinian Authority (PA) chairman prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has sig- Mahmud Abbas is conditioning a renewal naled his opposition, noting that “if Israelis of discussions with Israel on an Israeli com- cannot build houses in the West Bank, Pales- mitment to freeze all settlement, echoing a tinians do not need to build either.” demand originally made in 1992 during the U.S. officials believe that despite the pre-Oslo Washington talks.... failure of all previous attempts to freeze Yet, for more than three decades, on- settlements, the idea still has merit. But again off-again promotion of a settlement achieving the goal of peace and security freeze by the United States has failed to for both Israelis and Palestinians requires a slow settlement expansion, thereby under- strategy rooted in historical experience and mining the credibility of U.S. diplomacy. the vital requirements of both peoples. A More often than not, attempts to establish settlement freeze falls short of this standard. a freeze resulted in U.S. support for settle- Settlement evacuation, not a freeze, is a ment expansion, most notably the Clinton more credible and necessary objective, more administration’s endorsement of the “nat- closely attuned to the essential long-term Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4 (Summer 2009), pp. 174–184, ISSN 0377-919X, electronic ISSN 1533-8614. C ! 2009 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: jps.2009.XXXVIII.4.174. SETTLEMENT MONITOR 175 interests of both parties and firmly rooted tion of Menachem Begin in 1977, there was in past Israeli practice, most recently in a legitimate basis to view a cessation of set- Gaza. Placing a freeze at the center of a U.S. tlement as a confidence-building measure. diplomatic effort that calls for confidence- In a letter to Pres. Jimmy Carter delivered building measures from all parties invites after the September 1977 Camp David sum- failure and risks eroding the credibility of mit, Begin offered a three-month morato- a much-anticipated U.S. effort to end the rium on establishing new settlements rather conflict. The only context in which a freeze than the longer moratorium preferred by could be implemented is as a consequence of Washington. Restrictions on the expansion an Israeli decision to remove settlements and of existing settlements had been dropped at the Israeli army from occupied territory. The Israel’s insistence. On the face of it, Begin’s history of the last forty years suggests that agreement to halt new settlement creation if Israel makes such a momentous decision, for even three months was a bold and sur- freezing settlements becomes moot. prising concession. Yet, and not for the last time, Israel’s commitment to a moratorium Evacuation, Not a Freeze did not constrain settlement but rather es- It is important to recognize that, as Hay- tablished categories of expansion implicitly dar ‘Abd al-Shafi warned in 1992, not only endorsed by Washington. The temporary was the credibility of the Oslo process un- moratorium on new settlements notwith- dermined by the working assumption of the standing, the Begin government continued United States and Israel that peace and set- to “thicken” and “strengthen” settlements, tlement expansion were compatible, but it at times establishing new sites kilometers also suffered because Israel refused to meet away from existing colonies during the even modest U.S. benchmarks regarding three-month period. Carter administration settlement expansion and removal of new officials were frustrated by Israel’s actions, settlements, and it received no penalty for but acquiesced. its failure to do so. In contrast to Begin’s agreement to the The re-creation of a diplomatic process partial, temporary, and ineffective restric- based in part on an Israeli commitment to a tions on Israeli settlement actions in the freeze would be undermined if Israel failed West Bank and Gaza—East Jerusalem was to comply. Moreover, Israelis may well be- excluded implicitly—the peace treaty with lieve that a renewed U.S. initiative that cen- Egypt signified a strategic Israeli decision ters on a freeze can, like all previous efforts, to trade territory for new security mecha- be exploited to consolidate settlements and nisms that required Israel’s evacuation of the occupation rather than progress toward all settlements in territory returned to Egyp- an agreement requiring settlement evacua- tian sovereignty. Only in the context of an tion. Were Israel to engage Washington in Israeli decision to withdraw from Egyptian negotiations on the parameters of a freeze, territory was it possible for Israel, through it could signify a prescription for stalemate its complete evacuation of the Sinai Penin- rather than an expression of goodwill. sula, to adopt and enforce an effective halt to settlement expansion. Indeed Israeli set- The Begin-Carter Settlement Freeze tlement activity in Sinai increased in the The freeze idea was born at a time when months before evacuation until the IDF settlement expansion was in its infancy. Is- forcibly removed the Sinai settlers. Set- rael had occupied the West Bank for hardly tlement activity undertaken within the a decade, and with the exception of East strategic context of imminent evacuation Jerusalem, settlements claimed only small proved to be irrelevant. numbers of inhabitants; most had yet to shed an air of impermanence. There were less Baker-Bush I than 5,000 Israelis living in less than 30 West The emigration of Jews to Israel after Bank settlements. The settler population in the implosion of the Soviet Union, and the East Jerusalem numbered 50,000. Adminis- Madrid diplomatic process that followed tration of all settlement-related activities in the 1991 U.S. victory in the Gulf War, the West Bank and Gaza Strip was largely returned the issue of a settlement freeze controlled by the Israel Defense Forces to the U.S.-Israeli diplomatic agenda. The (IDF), and the integration of settlements and freeze idea was raised by Pres. George H. settlers into the routine bureaucratic life W. Bush without success in the context of of Israel’s civilian ministries was still some a U.S. agreement to provide loan guaran- years off. In this era, marked by the elec- tees to Israel during the 1990–92 period. 176 JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES The idea was also prominent among the Rabin Builds confidence-building measures sought by In the wake of the 1992 election of Palestinians before and after the Madrid Yitzhak Rabin, the Bush administration’s conference. In neither context was the con- demands for a settlement freeze were trans- cept incorporated into subsequent agree- formed into a two-tiered and somewhat ments, nor did its appearance as an issue contradictory policy of exacting decreasing on the negotiating and bilateral Israeli-U.S. and largely illusory financial penalties for agenda prove an effective instrument for for- settlement expansion—associated with the mally or informally constraining settlement provision of $10 billion in loan guarantees— expansion. while formally acknowledging, for the first The Bush administration called on Israel time, Israel’s right to expand settlements, to stop construction in new or existing according to the undefined requirements of settlements with increasing frequency after their “natural growth.” the beginning of Secretary of State James In the wake of his August 1992 agreement Baker’s diplomatic initiative in March 1991. with President Bush to expand settlements Presaging ideas currently being considered according to this standard, Rabin sought to by the Obama administration, Baker at one dispel the impression that the agreement point suggested that a settlement freeze with Washington meant that Israel had im- would be reciprocated by a cessation of the posed a settlement “freeze”: Arab economic boycott of Israel. During Look, I do not know what you mean when you say the October 1991 Madrid conference, Baker settlement freeze, when we are talking of the contin- broadened the proposal to include an end ued construction of 11,000 units in the territories.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Military Activism and Conservatism During the Intifadas Murat ÜLGÜL* Abstract Introduction
    Soldiers and The Use of Force: Military Activism and Conservatism During The Intifadas Murat ÜLGÜL* Abstract Introduction Are soldiers more prone and likely to use force Are soldiers more prone to use force and initiate conflicts than civilians? To bring a and initiate conflicts than civilians? new insight to this question, this article compares The traditional view in the civil- the main arguments of military activism and military relations literature stresses that military conservatism theories on Israeli policies during the First and Second Intifadas. Military professional soldiers are conservative activism argues that soldiers are prone to end in the use of force because soldiers political problems with the use of force mainly are the ones who mainly suffer in war. because of personal and organizational interests Instead, this view says, it is the civilians as well as the effects of a military-mindset. The proponents of military conservatism, on the who initiate wars and conflicts because, other hand, claim that soldiers are conservative without military knowledge, they on the use of force and it is the civilians most underestimate the costs of war while likely offering military measures. Through an overvaluing the benefits of military analysis of qualitative nature, the article finds 1 action. In recent decades, military that soldiers were more conservative in the use of force during the First Intifadas and Oslo conservatism has been challenged by Peace Process while they were more hawkish in a group of scholars who argue that the the Second Intifada. This difference is explained traditional view is based on a limited by enemy conceptions and by the politicization number of cases, mainly civil-military of Israeli officers.
    [Show full text]
  • Ground to a Halt, Denial of Palestinians' Freedom Of
    Since the beginning of the second intifada, in September 2000, Israel has imposed restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank that are unprecedented in scope and duration. As a result, Palestinian freedom of movement, which was limited in any event, has turned from a fundamental human right to a privilege that Israel grants or withholds as it deems fit. The restrictions have made traveling from one section to another an exceptional occurrence, subject to various conditions and a showing of justification for the journey. Almost every trip in the West Bank entails a great loss of time, much uncertainty, friction with soldiers, and often substantial additional expense. The restrictions on movement that Israel has imposed on Palestinians in the West Bank have split the West Bank into six major geographical units: North, Central, South, the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea, the enclaves resulting from the Separation Barrier, and East Jerusalem. In addition to the restrictions on movement from area to area, Israel also severely restricts movement within each area by splitting them up into subsections, and by controlling and limiting movement between them. This geographic division of the West Bank greatly affects every aspect of Palestinian life. B’TSELEM - The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories Ground to a Halt 8 Hata’asiya St., Talpiot P.O. Box 53132 Jerusalem 91531 Denial of Palestinians’ Freedom Tel. (972) 2-6735599 Fax. (972) 2-6749111 of Movement in the West Bank www.btselem.org • [email protected] August 2007 Ground to a Halt Denial of Palestinians’ Freedom of Movement in the West Bank August 2007 Stolen land is concrete, so here and there calls are heard to stop the building in settlements and not to expropriate land.
    [Show full text]
  • The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options
    ISSUE BRIEF 08.25.20 The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes, and Options Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Ph.D, Fellow for the Middle East conflict, the Gulf states complied with and INTRODUCTION enforced the Arab League boycott of Israel This issue brief examines where the six until at least 1994 and participated in the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council— oil embargo of countries that supported 1 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Israel in the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates 1973, for example, the president of the (UAE)—currently stand in their outlook and UAE, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, approaches toward the Israeli-Palestinian claimed that “No Arab country is safe from issue. The first section of this brief begins by the perils of the battle with Zionism unless outlining how positions among the six Gulf it plays its role and bears its responsibilities, 2 states have evolved over the three decades in confronting the Israeli enemy.” In since the Madrid Conference of 1991. Section Kuwait, Sheikh Fahd al-Ahmad Al Sabah, a two analyzes the degree to which the six brother of two future Emirs, was wounded Gulf states’ relations with Israel are based while fighting with Fatah in Jordan in 3 on interests, values, or a combination of 1968, while in 1981 the Saudi government both, and how these differ from state to offered to finance the reconstruction of state. Section three details the Gulf states’ Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor after it was 4 responses to the peace plan unveiled by destroyed by an Israeli airstrike.
    [Show full text]
  • A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution WATCH
    HUMAN RIGHTS A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution WATCH A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution Copyright © 2021 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-62313-900-1 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org APRIL 2021 ISBN: 978-1-62313-900-1 A Threshold Crossed Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution Map .................................................................................................................................. i Summary ......................................................................................................................... 2 Definitions of Apartheid and Persecution .................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • B'tselem Report: Dispossession & Exploitation: Israel's Policy in the Jordan Valley & Northern Dead Sea, May
    Dispossession & Exploitation Israel's policy in the Jordan Valley & northern Dead Sea May 2011 Researched and written by Eyal Hareuveni Edited by Yael Stein Data coordination by Atef Abu a-Rub, Wassim Ghantous, Tamar Gonen, Iyad Hadad, Kareem Jubran, Noam Raz Geographic data processing by Shai Efrati B'Tselem thanks Salwa Alinat, Kav LaOved’s former coordinator of Palestinian fieldworkers in the settlements, Daphna Banai, of Machsom Watch, Hagit Ofran, Peace Now’s Settlements Watch coordinator, Dror Etkes, and Alon Cohen-Lifshitz and Nir Shalev, of Bimkom. 2 Table of contents Introduction......................................................................................................................... 5 Chapter One: Statistics........................................................................................................ 8 Land area and borders of the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea area....................... 8 Palestinian population in the Jordan Valley .................................................................... 9 Settlements and the settler population........................................................................... 10 Land area of the settlements .......................................................................................... 13 Chapter Two: Taking control of land................................................................................ 15 Theft of private Palestinian land and transfer to settlements......................................... 15 Seizure of land for “military needs”.............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Creating the Jewish State: Projects of (In)Security and the Disjuncture to Price-Tag Violence
    (Re)Creating the Jewish State: Projects of (In)Security and the Disjuncture to Price-Tag Violence Nicola S. Mathie Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion Lancaster University This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations November 2018 Declaration This thesis is the result of my own work and includes nothing, which is the outcome of the work done in collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text. It has not been previously submitted, in part or whole, to any university or institution for any degree, diploma, or other qualification. Signed: Nicola S. Mathie Research Award This thesis is the outcome of Research Award Grant Number 1225917 from The Economic and Social Research Council. My appreciation will always be with The Economic and Social Research Council for funding this PhD. Abstract Jewish-Israeli settlements built over the State of Israel’s internationally-recognised territorial borders are sites of contestation. The focus of this thesis is upon conflicts and contestations which have developed between the State of Israel and some of its own subjects, Jewish settlers, over the evacuation of settlement-communities and structures, and other perceived threats to settlement. From 2008, a new form of violence has been enacted by individuals in the settler community. Self-declared as Price-Tag violence, the attacks take different forms. These include vandalising Palestinian properties and spraying provocative graffiti, and throwing Molotov cocktails at properties. Whilst the attacks are predominantly perpetrated upon Palestinian targets, the attacks are directed at the State of Israel. Price-Tag attacks have also occurred directly on Israeli targets, such as Israeli military vehicles.
    [Show full text]
  • Advanced Unedited Version
    Advanced Unedited Version Human Rights Council Twenty-second session Agenda item 7 Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories Report of the independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem Summary The present report is submitted pursuant to resolution 19/17 in which the Human Rights Council decided to establish an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate the implications of the Israeli settlements on the human rights of the Palestinian people throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. GE. Contents Paragraphs Page I. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1–9 A. Establishment and Mandate for the Mission ................................................... 1–2 B. Terms of Reference and Methods of Work ..................................................... 3–9 II. Applicable Law ....................................................................................................... 10–17 III. Context ................................................................................................................ 18–30 IV. Implications of Israeli Settlements on Rights of Palestinians ................................. 31–99 A. Right to Self-Determination ...........................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
    The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Founded by the Charles H. Revson Foundation Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Editor: Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov 2010 Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies – Study no. 406 Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Editor: Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov The statements made and the views expressed are solely the responsibility of the authors. © Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Israel 6 Lloyd George St. Jerusalem 91082 http://www.kas.de/israel E-mail: [email protected] © 2010, The Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies The Hay Elyachar House 20 Radak St., 92186 Jerusalem http://www.jiis.org E-mail: [email protected] This publication was made possible by funds granted by the Charles H. Revson Foundation. In memory of Professor Alexander L. George, scholar, mentor, friend, and gentleman The Authors Yehudith Auerbach is Head of the Division of Journalism and Communication Studies and teaches at the Department of Political Studies of Bar-Ilan University. Dr. Auerbach studies processes of reconciliation and forgiveness . in national conflicts generally and in the Israeli-Palestinian context specifically and has published many articles on this issue. Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov is a Professor of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and holds the Chair for the Study of Peace and Regional Cooperation. Since 2003 he is the Head of the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. He specializes in the fields of conflict management and resolution, peace processes and negotiations, stable peace, reconciliation, and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. He is the author and editor of 15 books and many articles in these fields.
    [Show full text]
  • Israel: Background and U.S
    Israel: Background and U.S. Relations Jim Zanotti Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs November 1, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL33476 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Israel: Background and U.S. Relations Summary Since Israel’s founding in 1948, successive U.S. Presidents and many Members of Congress have demonstrated a commitment to Israel’s security and to maintaining close U.S.-Israel defense, diplomatic, and economic cooperation. U.S. and Israeli leaders have developed close relations based on common perceptions of shared democratic values and religious affinities. U.S. policymakers often seek to determine how regional events and U.S. policy choices may affect Israel’s security, and Congress provides active oversight of executive branch dealings with Israel and the broader Middle East. Some Members of Congress and some analysts criticize what they perceive as U.S. support for Israel without sufficient scrutiny of its actions. Israel is a leading recipient of U.S. foreign aid and is a frequent purchaser of major U.S. weapons systems. The United States and Israel maintain close security cooperation—predicated on a U.S. commitment to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over other countries in its region. The two countries signed a free trade agreement in 1985, and the United States is Israel’s largest trading partner. For more information, see CRS Report RL33222, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, by Jeremy M. Sharp. Israel has many regional security concerns. Israeli leaders calling for urgent international action against Iran’s nuclear program hint at the possibility of a unilateral military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
    [Show full text]
  • Lost Opportunities for Peace in the Arab- Israeli Conºict
    Lost Opportunities for Jerome Slater Peace in the Arab- Israeli Conºict Israel and Syria, 1948–2001 Until the year 2000, during which both the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian negotiating pro- cesses collapsed, it appeared that the overall Arab-Israeli conºict was ªnally going to be settled, thus bringing to a peaceful resolution one of the most en- during and dangerous regional conºicts in recent history.The Israeli-Egyptian conºict had concluded with the signing of the 1979 Camp David peace treaty, the Israeli-Jordanian conºict had formally ended in 1994 (though there had been a de facto peace between those two countries since the end of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war), and both the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Syrian conºicts seemedLost Opportunities for Peace on the verge of settlement. Yet by the end of 2000, both sets of negotiations had collapsed, leading to the second Palestinian intifada (uprising), the election of Ariel Sharon as Israel’s prime minister in February 2001, and mounting Israeli-Palestinian violence in 2001 and 2002.What went wrong? Much attention has been focused on the lost 1 opportunity for an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, but surprisingly little atten- tion has been paid to the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian peace process.In fact, the Israeli-Syrian negotiations came much closer to producing a comprehen- Jerome Slater is University Research Scholar at the State University of New York at Buffalo.Since serving as a Fulbright scholar in Israel in 1989, he has written widely on the Arab-Israeli conºict for professional journals such as the Jerusalem Journal of International Relations and Political Science Quarterly.
    [Show full text]
  • Palestinian Economy and the Prospects for Its Recovery
    40462 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized .UMBER $ECEMBER %CONOMIC-ONITORING2EPORTTOTHE!D(OC,IAISON#OMMITTEE ANDTHE0ROSPECTSFORITS2ECOVERY 4HE0ALESTINIAN%CONOMY 7EST"ANKAND'AZA 4HE7ORLD"ANK Contents FOREWORD – THE CONTEXT FOR THIS REPORT…………………………….……….i 1 – SUMMARY ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS………………………………1 I – THE NEED FOR RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH…………………………………….1 II – GROWTH IN 2005 – ENCOURAGING BUT INCONCLUSIVE………………………..1 III – CREATING THE PRECONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY: A PROGRESS REPORT………………………………………………..………….………….....2 IV – NEXT STEPS……………………………………………………………………5 2 – THE STATE OF THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY: JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 2005……………………………………………6 I – OVERVIEW............................................................................................................................6 II – ECONOMIC OUTPUT…………………………………………………………….6 III – FISCAL AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS………………………………………7 IV – LABOR MARKET TRENDS……………………………………………………….9 3 – ECONOMIC RECOVERY: PRECONDITIONS AND PROSPECTS……………………10 I – MOVEMENT AND ACCESS………………………………………………………10 II – PALESTINIAN GOVERNANCE…………………………………………………..16 III – GROWTH PROSPECTS AND THE ROLE OF THE DONORS……………………….22 MAPS – GAZA, WEST BANK…………………………………………………………..24 ANNEX 1 – ECONOMIC SCENARIOS………………………………………………….26 ANNEX 2 – INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC REVIVAL…………………………………..29 ANNEX 3 – “TURNING THE CORNER” .……………………………………………..35 ANNEX 4 – AGREEMENT ON MOVEMENT AND ACCESS…………………………….39 ENDNOTES………………...………………………………………………………...44
    [Show full text]
  • Muting the Alarm Over the Israeli-Palestinian Conºict Muting the Alarm Over Jerome Slater the Israeli-Palestinian Conºict the New York Times Versus Haaretz, 2000–06
    Muting the Alarm over the Israeli-Palestinian Conºict Muting the Alarm over Jerome Slater the Israeli-Palestinian Conºict The New York Times versus Haaretz, 2000–06 In 2000 the Israeli- Palestinian negotiations for a two-state settlement ended in failure, and the Palestinian uprising (or intifada) broke out. Then, in early 2001 Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister of Israel. In 2006 three events dealt further setbacks to the “peace process”: the Israeli election of Ehud Olmert, the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian parliamentary elections, and the Lebanon war. Then, the 2007 civil conºict in Gaza between Hamas and Fatah ended with a Hamas victory. As a consequence of these events, the prospect for a two-state solution, necessitating negotiations to create a genuinely viable Palestinian state in Gaza and nearly all of the West Bank, is more elusive than ever. The underlying assumption of this article is that the present situation is di- sastrous not only for Israel and the Palestinians but also for U.S. national inter- ests. There is a wealth of information and critical commentary, much of it by Israelis, on the terrible consequences of Israel’s policies and behavior toward the Palestinians—and not just for the Palestinians but also for Israeli security, society, civil culture, and even the future of Israeli democracy. What is less understood—or even denied—is that U.S. support of Israeli pol- icies is gravely endangering critical U.S. national interests: it exacerbates the expanding threat of Islamic fanaticism; it undermines what remains of Middle Eastern stability and, in particular, threatens the conservative Arab regimes (especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) with which the United States has de facto alliances; and should radicalism spread, it could threaten U.S.
    [Show full text]