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German Social Policy 3 Social Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany The Constitution of the Social Bearbeitet von Prof. Dr. Dr. Hans F. Zacher 1st edition 2012 2012. Buch. xviii, 442 S. Hardcover ISBN 978 3 642 22524 6 Format (B x L): 15,5 x 23,5 cm Gewicht: 847 g Weitere Fachgebiete > Medien, Kommunikation, Politik > Politikwissenschaft Allgemein > Politische Studien zu einzelnen Ländern und Gebieten Zu Inhaltsverzeichnis schnell und portofrei erhältlich bei Die Online-Fachbuchhandlung beck-shop.de ist spezialisiert auf Fachbücher, insbesondere Recht, Steuern und Wirtschaft. Im Sortiment finden Sie alle Medien (Bücher, Zeitschriften, CDs, eBooks, etc.) aller Verlage. Ergänzt wird das Programm durch Services wie Neuerscheinungsdienst oder Zusammenstellungen von Büchern zu Sonderpreisen. Der Shop führt mehr als 8 Millionen Produkte. Social Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Constitution of the Social Hans F. Zacher The “Social” as the Guiding Concept of Politics and Law 1 The Normative Openness and the Concrete Historical Perceptibility of the “Social” 1.1 The Normative Power and Undeterminedness of the Social The social policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is based on a social norm of great authority: this society seeks to be a “social” order. It wants its polity to be social, and through its policies and laws to bring about and guarantee a state of affairs that deserves to be called “social.” This norm is so general that it cannot be adequately attested with a single piece of evidence. Rather, it is demonstrated by the totality of the political and legal development. It is grounded in a long and impressive history (Hockerts 1996, pp. 27–48; Stolleis 2013, German Social Policy, vol. 2), which after 1945 was initially picked up and vigorously carried forward by the Lander€ , and then in 1949 by the Federal Republic. By virtue of that continuity, this history constitutes an essential – and today presumably the most important – component of German identity (Ritter 1998b). At the same time, it is reinforced by the international embeddedness in a community of states whose economically developed and liberal-democratic members feel committed to the ideal of the welfare state (Ritter 1991; Schmid 1996, 1998), and who have also carried this ideal into the international community of states itself through shared institutions and norms (Kohler€ 1988; Schuler 1988). The law picks up this norm of the social above all in the social goal of the state and in the elevated ranking that it accords this goal (Zacher 1987a, pp. 1045–1111). While this social commitment of the society and polity into which this human community has constituted itself is quite firm, it is unclear what it means concretely. The term “social” is extremely indeterminate. The individual who uses it, or the H.F. Zacher, Social Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 German Social Policy 3, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-22525-3_2, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 24 Social Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Constitution of the Social group or organization that expresses itself “socially” by means of it, often has something very specific in mind. But the multitude of these specific meanings does not produce an intersubjective definitude, or a definitive clarity that holds for society as a whole. We can say only the following: “social” means social conditions.“Social” also means the individual state of being, though not in a solipsistically isolated sense, but with reference to the individual state of being of others and of society. “Social” is aimed at “correct” societal conditions (that is, those deemed correct), and thus also at “correct” individual states of being (that is, those deemed correct). “Social” refers to the criteria by means of which appropriate societal conditions and individual states of being are distinguished from inappro- priate ones. “Social” gives rise to – indeed, compels – judgments about the existing societal conditions and individual states of being and their development. But what, precisely, is meant by all of this? First this: “social” has something to do with equality and inequality.“Social” negates a certain measure of inequality –or more precisely: certain constellations of inequality (Mau 1997). The “social question” arose first in the guise of the “question of the poor”: vis-a`-vis the inequality between those who had a minimum livelihood or more, and those who lacked the bare necessities. It then manifested itself as the “workers’ question”: vis-a`-vis the inequal- ity of those who had to sell their labor like a commodity, and those who sold commodities as goods. Thus, the “social question” was ignited time and again by the constant perception of new inequalities. In that sense, “social”isamandateto distinguish unreasonable inequalities from reasonable or at least tolerable ones (or less important ones), and to eliminate, compensate for, or at least diminish the unreason- able ones. In this regard, “social” aims at more equality. Not equality as such. This is the difference between “social” and “socialist.” And at no time has there been a general consensus about the “socialist” approach. The basic norm that is generally endorsed aims at something more open. This version of the “social” means a selective, responsible approximation to equality. Thus, the expansion of the social across the nineteenth and twentieth century took place as a process of negating an ever growing number of inequalities and discovering more and more new equalities: and the latter were used to define the inequalities and to guide the efforts that would prevent, eliminate, compensate, or at least moderate them.1 Thus, “more equality” can also be understood as “more equalities”: not “equality” as such, but “many equalities.” Here we must insert a constriction, though. At its core, “social” is aimed at something economic (Zacher 1987a, p. 1087). “Social” refers to economically conditioned or economically relevant inequalities and equalities. But that, too, is a result of the history of the “social question.” And it results from a basic liberal attitude. The goal is not to change the human being: a person should have autonomy over his or her own self. The goal is to change the conditions that surround people. What is given from the outside is to be altered. And those things are first and foremost the economic givens and the economic effects of non-economic givens. 1 For a diagnosis of the reality of social inequality in Germany at the end of the twentieth century see Braun and Mohler (1998); Hradil and Schiener (1999), which also has a further discussion, including older material. 1 The Normative Openness and the Concrete Historical Perceptibility of the “Social” 25 But what degree of proximity to the economic core is demanded? What must the relationship between economic and non-economic conditions be for social conditions and individual states of being to be measured by the yardstick of the “social”? There are no definitive answers to any of these questions. The latitude is wide and variable over the course of social and political developments. Exceptions, too, are conceiv- able.2 The concept of the “social” is an open one. This openness is by no means merely a default position. On the contrary: it alone can reconcile the lofty claim of the norm to validity and the multiplicity of conditions and the diversity of societal and political constellations that form the basis from which humans respond to the challenges of the social. Most of all, however, it manifests another basic norm of this society: the willingness to accept inequality. Inequality between people is not only perceived as the result of fate. It is also understood and accepted as something truly human, as a conditio humana. But it is also seen as an opportunity, as a sphere of freedom. And that applies especially in relationship to the economically conditioned or economically relevant circumstances – in other words: in relationship to the “social.” Neither individuals nor the groups with which individuals associate themselves want to be equal above all else. Rather, the entire development is shaped by an ideal of social happiness, which fundamentally rejects disadvantages vis-a`-vis respective others, accepts the disadvantages of the respective others, but also limits them, and, finally, regards advantages vis-a`-vis respective others as legitimate, in fact, regards the possibility of advantages vis-a`-vis respective others as essential. The relativity of the maxims of equality, which characterizes the meaning of the “social,” has two roots, there- fore: on the one hand, the multiplicity of what equality can mean, and on the other hand, the proviso of inequality, which has always been essential for the relationship of this society to the social. 1.2 The Concrete Historical Perception of the Social 1.2.1 Approaches The historical experiences connected to the concept of the social can be perceived and depicted through two approaches. Both approaches can be derived from the self-evident societal and political nature of historically evolved socio-political institutions. They convey the concrete substance of what is meant by the word “social.” They furnish images that form the basis for all further thinking and talking about the social. One approach leads to the basic formula that every adult who is not old and bound by family work should have the opportunity, but also the responsibility, to earn a 2 For example, a common phenomenon is the application of the principle of the social state to the protection of the individual in criminal law and in the penal system: BVerfGE 35, 202 (235f.); 41, 329 (331); 45, 187 (223, 228f., 238f.); Stern (1984, p. 901f.). 26 Social Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Constitution of the Social living through work and thus provide for his needs and the needs of those who live with him in a community of maintenance and depend on his support.