Glop Theory: a New Trope Ontology a Dissertation
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GLOP THEORY: A NEW TROPE ONTOLOGY A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Daniel G. Giberman May 2010 © 2010 by Daniel Gary Giberman. All Rights Reserved. Re-distributed by Stanford University under license with the author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/ This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/mg102tn9485 ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. John Perry, Primary Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Mark Crimmins, Co-Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Thomas Ryckman Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost Graduate Education This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives. iii Abstract The dissertation addresses three issues at the center of contemporary naturalistic metaphysics, where ‘naturalistic’ is intended in David Armstrong’s ontological sense, according to which nothing exists outside of spacetime. The first issue concerns the underlying ontology of property exemplification. I argue that properties are resemblance classes of particular features—tropes—and that material objects are trope bundles. The second concerns the nature of ontological fundamentality. I defend a new version of the familiar view that the fundamental properties are those from whose local exemplifications the rest of the world is “built,” much as a language is “built” from primitive terms. The third issue concerns persistence through time. I develop and defend a novel approach from within the framework of four-dimensionalism, the view that material objects have proper temporal parts much as they have proper spatial parts. In my positive treatment of each issue, I invoke a new underlying metaphysic that I call ‘Glop Theory’. ‘Glop’ functions as an acronym for Grounding Local Ontological Primitive. This grounding primitive is a special property, markedness. Tropes of this property, mark tropes, are not like familiar qualitative tropes. They do not confer color or texture or charge. Rather, mark tropes are mere fillers of spacetime. They serve the role of marking certain locations from others, thus furnishing a sort of binary code for fundamental ontology. The key hypothesis of glop theory is that at any given world there are (law-like) regularities between the spatiotemporal arrangements iv of mark tropes, on the one hand, and the distribution of all qualitative tropes like color or charge, on the other. Part 1 The three chapters in this part of the dissertation motivate glop theory by arguing against its naturalistic competitors for various philosophical jobs: bare particulars and immanent universals in the case of property exemplification, zero- dimensional material objects and extended simples in the case of fundamentality, and three-dimensionalism in the case of persistence. In Chapter 1, Against Zero-Dimensional Material Objects, I reject bare particulars because they seem to have the problematic feature of being such that they might have existed without exemplifying any natural properties. I argue that zero- dimensional material objects cannot be treated convincingly by the only competitive theory of material property exemplification that is not committed to bare particulars, namely, bundle theory. I conclude that there are no zero-dimensional material objects. In Chapter 2, T-Gunk and Exact Occupation, I address the worry that since most physicists presuppose that spacetime decomposes into points, we should be suspicious of any metaphysics that banishes zero-dimensional material objects. One way to address this worry is to develop a theory of non-pointy spacetime that is equipped for doing physics. Such theories, however, are highly controversial. As an alternative response to the worry, I argue that we can allow for zero-dimensional spacetime points without being committed to zero-dimensional material objects. Specifically, I defend the thesis that all material objects are extended in each v dimension (T-theory) against thought experiments set to show that, in pointy space, certain points are exactly occupied by zero-dimensional material objects. The final chapter in this section, Problems from Whole Self-Distance, presents an argument against extended simples, immanent universals, and three-dimensionally- persisting objects. The key premise is that endorsing any of these items commits one to the implausible claim that something might exist at a non-zero distance (whether spatial or temporal) from its whole self. Attempts to defend these items without being so committed are considered and shown to be independently implausible. Part 2 The three chapters in this part of the dissertation use glop theory to develop positive accounts of exemplification, fundamentality, and persistence. In Chapter 4, Gloppy Trope Bundles, I develop a trope bundle theory of property exemplification that uses mark tropes as the means of bundling other tropes into material objects. The upshot is a theory of objects and properties that remains faithful to the austere ontology of traditional trope theory without being committed to spacetime substantivalism, a primitive ‘compresence’ relation, or essential connections among distinct, qualitative properties—commitments which plague competing trope bundle theories. The chapter contains a discussion of why these commitments are best avoided. In Chapter 5, Reconciling Sparse Fundamentality with Infinite Complexity and Emergence, I defend the “builder” approach to ontological fundamentality against the objection that it fails to account for worlds that contain atomless gunk, infinite vi qualitative complexity, or emergent properties. The key to the defense in the first two cases is the idea that mark tropes can serve as ultimate supervenience bases even if they are not the smallest or mereologically simplest items at a given world. Those who have argued against the “builder” approach from the possibilities of gunk and infinite complexity have not adequately considered this idea. The defense in the emergence case consists of (i) an argument against the clarity of putative examples of emergent mentality and (ii) a sketch of how glop theory furnishes a “builder”-friendly interpretation of a putative example of emergence from physics: quantum entanglement. Finally, in Chapter 6, Gloppy Four-Dimensionalism, I use glop theory to develop a version of four-dimensionalism that can treat the puzzles of fission and fusion without being committed to either (i) instances of simultaneous co-location of a spatial region by more than one material object or (ii) instantaneous objects. The former commitment, as stage theorists have emphasized, is counterintuitive. Yet the latter commitment is problematic as well since there might be temporally atomless gunk. Historically, those versions of four-dimensionalism that avoid the former commitment bear the latter, and vice versa. The chapter constitutes a step forward for four-dimensionalism by furnishing a theory that avoids both commitments. vii “I should have liked to be a piecemeal, unsystematic philosopher, offering independent proposals on a variety of topics. It was not to be." - David Lewis viii Acknowledgements Without comparison my deepest debts are to my parents, my brother, and my amazing wife. I could never ask for more support than these loved ones have provided. I would like to thank my advisor John Perry and my other committee members, Mark Crimmins and Tom Ryckman, for helping my professional development in a great many ways, not least of which has been the contribution of substantial improvement to the present project. I owe special thanks to Jonathan Schaffer for extraordinarily generous involvement with the project (and for inviting me to visit Australia!). Thank you to Thomas Hofweber, Ted Sider, and Jessica Wilson for engaging in very helpful email exchanges with me at one stage or another. Thank you to Stephen Schiffer and Peter Unger for helping me so much as an undergraduate and for encouraging my pursuit of graduate study in philosophy. Thank you to Russ Heller, Scott Arnold, and Chris Niebrand for helping me so much as a wee high school student and for first turning me on to the discipline of philosophy. Thank you to all of the past Stanford philosophy PhDs, whose names grace the cardinal spines of the dissertations in Tanner Library, for showing me what to work toward. The word tokens comprising this sentence, and all that follow, are delighted to be among such company in their final resting place. I have benefited a great deal from audiences and friends at Stanford, Oxford, Boulder, UMass Amherst, and the 2009 and 2010 APA Pacific division meetings. Particular thanks are extended to Lanier Anderson, Alexei Angelides, Ralf Bader, Jim Binkoski, Einar Bohn, Alexis